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Punishment of international crimes at international and hybrid crimi-
nal courts have been traditionally and mainly guided by retributive 
justice and adversarial proceedings rather than by restorative justice 
and an inquisitorial model. Thus, victims’ status at international and 
hybrid criminal courts was limited to be witnesses at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL). However, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has meant an important shift in how victims are regarded in 
international criminal justice forums, i.e., from a paternalistic view 
considering them only as witnesses to a setting where they can also 
voice their views and concerns (participants) and claim reparations. 
This trend has continued at the international criminal justice level as 
manifested in hybrid criminal courts created afterwards the ICC such 
as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) at 
which victims can be civil parties and the Special Tribunal for Leba-
non (STL) at which victims can be victim participants.
The present study seeks to address two main research questions. 
The first one is: What is the victims’ status at international and hybrid 
criminal courts? and the second one is: How does victims’ status as 
witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and reparations claimants 
work at international and hybrid criminal courts? Besides the legal 
framework and practice of the courts considered, other areas of law 
such as international human rights law and comparative criminal law 
have been examined in this study. Moreover, the analysis of victims’ 
status considered in a triple dimension as witnesses, victim partici-
pants/civil parties and reparations claimants has been conducted 
paying attention to not only the victims’ status as such but also other 
interests existing at the courts. Therefore, this study seeks to present 
a comprehensive and integrated critical view of the victims’ status 
across six international and hybrid criminal courts.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
 
1. Setting the Scene 
Punishment of crimes, in general, and international crimes, in particular, 
remains primarily guided by Western-driven retributive modalities rather than 
by restorative initiatives.1 Victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal 
courts is broadly guided by the uneasy, but not necessarily opposed, relationship 
between the predominant retributive justice approach and increasing 
restorative-oriented justice approach manifestations.2 Moreover, victims’ status 
in criminal proceedings, both national and international, can be strengthened or 
weakened depending on whether the criminal system or court in question 
presents a higher or lower presence of features of the inquisitorial or adversarial 
systems. On the one hand, at an adversarial system, i.e., a system based on 
opposing parties and in a neutral judicial setting, victims have no much room for 
action and, therefore, their status is basically limited to that of witnesses.3 On the 
other hand, at an inquisitorial system where, inter alia, judges normally assume a 
more active role, victims in principle hold a more active status not limited to 
being witnesses.4             
Traditionally, international and hybrid criminal courts, based on the 
Anglo-American systems, have followed a predominantly adversarial system.5 As 
a consequence, victims’ status was limited to that of witnesses. This was the case 
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) and, more recently, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). In this context, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has meant a pivotal change in how victims are considered 
 
1 Mark Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity’ 99 Northwestern University Law Review (2005) 539, 600.  
2 On definitions of retributive and restorative justice see, e.g., Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A 
New Focus for Crime and Justice (1st edn., Herald Press 1990) 181.  
3 See, e.g., Mirjan Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (Yale University Press 1986); 
Alphons Orie, ‘Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings Prior 
to the Establishment of the ICC and in the Proceedings Before the ICC’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta and John R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, Vol. II (Oxford University Press 2002) 1439, 1439-1456. 
4 See Orie (2002) 1443-1446.  
5 See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press 2008) 366-
377. 
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in international criminal justice forums, i.e., from a paternalistic view regarding 
them only as witnesses to a judicial scenario at which they can also voice their 
views and concerns (victim participants) and additionally claim reparations. The 
historical background to this new scene for victims at the ICC is powerfully and 
succinctly called upon in the ICC Statute Preamble ‘The States Parties to this 
Statute […] Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and 
men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity’. Victims’ status that goes beyond being witnesses has 
actually been qualified as one of the great innovations of the ICC Statute.6       
This trend has continued at the international criminal justice level as 
evidenced in hybrid criminal courts created after the ICC such as the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and which are considered in this thesis. This is also 
true for other hybrid criminal courts such as the UNTAET Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes in East Timor, the UNMIK/EULEX War Crimes Panels in 
Kosovo, and the War Crimes Chamber for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are not 
included in this thesis.7 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), considered in 
this thesis, however, followed the ICTY and the ICTR models.      
It is necessary to notice that in selecting what courts should be 
considered as ‘scenarios’, in this thesis, where victims’ status takes place two 
main factors are taken into account. First, all the contemporary international 
criminal courts have been considered in this thesis, i.e., the ICC, the ICTY and 
the ICTR. The IMT and the IMTFE have not been included as they belong to a 
(much) earlier generation of international criminal justice institutions. Second, 
with regard to what hybrid criminal courts should be taken into account, only 
the SCSL, the ECCC and the STL are considered in this thesis due to, inter alia, 
similarities in their institutional and procedural frameworks with the 
international criminal courts, which allow among other things to conduct a 
more pertinent comparative analysis among international and hybrid criminal 
courts. The few references to the IMT and the IMTFE in the third chapter of this 
 
6 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn., Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 347; Jérome de Hemptinne, ‘Victims’ Participation in International 
Proceedings’ in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
(Oxford University Press 2009); Otto Triffterer, ‘Preamble’ in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article (2nd 
edn., C. H. Beck/Nomos/Hart 2008) 1, 7.  
7  For very general considerations on the victims’ status at some of these courts see, e.g., Brianne 
McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings 
(Intersentia 2011) 151-159.  
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thesis (‘Victims as Witnesses’) as well as the few references to the 
UNMIK/EULEX War Crimes Panels in Kosovo and the War Crimes Chamber 
for Bosnia Herzegovina in the fifth chapter of this thesis (‘Victims as Reparations 
Claimants’) are only for illustrative purposes and do not change the material 
scope of this thesis.  
Accordingly, when the expressions ‘international and hybrid criminal 
courts’ or ‘all the international and hybrid criminal courts’ are employed in this 
thesis, they only refer to the international and hybrid criminal courts that are 
examined in this thesis. Thus, the expression ‘international and hybrid criminal 
courts’ in this thesis only includes six courts: the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, the 
ICC, the ECCC and the STL. 
In connection with the ICTY and the ICTR, it must be added that, in this 
thesis, the UN International Residual Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals is not considered. This mechanism was created via Security Council 
Resolution 1966 (2010) to progressively undertake and complete the mandate of 
the ICTY, and the ICTR in years to come.8 Its Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
were adopted on 8 June 2012. The reasons for not considering this mechanism 
are: i) the contents of their legal framework (its Statute and rules) concerning 
victims’ status are basically the same than those of the ICTY and the ICTR legal 
frameworks; ii) this mechanism is in essence a temporal extension of the ICTY 
and the ICTR to complete their mandates; and iii) on parallel basis to the on-
going work of the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICTR branch of this mechanism 
commenced functioning on 1 July 2012 and the ICTY branch only did so on 1 
July 2013.9 Be that as it may, since the contents of this mechanism’s legal 
framework, concerning victims’ status, are the same than those of the ICTY and 
the ICTR legal instruments (and consequently the mechanism’s emerging 
practice), the analysis and conclusions reached in this thesis are mutatis mutandi 
also applicable to the victims’ status at it. Similar considerations are applicable to 
the Residual SCSL,10 which is not considered in this thesis due to reasons 
equivalent to those for the other tribunals’ residual mechanism. The Residual 
SCSL replaces the SCSL as the latter has quite recently completed its mandate by 
rendering its appeals judgment in Taylor. In any case, in this thesis, references to 
the now extinct SCSL are mainly in the present tense due to inter alia the fact 
 
8 See UN Doc. S/RES/1966 (2010).  
9 For further information, see the web-site of the United Nations Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals. Available at: http://unmict.org/ (last visit on 1 August 2013).  
10 See Residual SCSL Agreement (Ratification) Act, 9 February 2012. 
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that the Residual SCSL’s legal framework is basically the same than that of the 
SCSL.      
Two extra notions should be preliminary addressed here, namely, 
victims and status. One of the meanings of the word victim, in common 
language, is ‘a person harmed, injured, or killed as a result of a crime, accident, 
etc’.11 This definition is quite similar to a general legal definition of the word 
‘victim’, which is ‘a person harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong’.12 Although 
specific legal definitions of victims relevant to and/or applicable at international 
and hybrid criminal courts are examined later, it is pertinent to reproduce here 
the definition of victims contained under rule 85 (a) of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (RPE) of the ICC as follows previous victims’ definitions and is 
consistent with subsequent definitions of victims in international law, and can 
generally speaking be considered as an operational definition of victims at the 
level of international and hybrid criminal courts. This definition of victims reads 
as follows ‘“Victims” means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result 
of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’.   
It must be emphasized that although certain legal entities/persons may 
qualify as victims at the ICC and the ECCC,13 this thesis exclusively examines 
victims’ status in relation to natural persons as victims. It should be noticed that 
the use of the plural ‘victims’ instead of the singular ‘victim’ corresponds to the 
fact that, at the international and hybrid criminal courts, any case normally 
involves a large number of victims. Accordingly, the use of the plural is arguably 
a good manner to keep in mind victimization in contexts of criminal violence at 
a large or massive scale that international and hybrid criminal courts have to 
deal with. Indeed, the international and hybrid criminal courts instruments 
normally use the plural to refer to victims.14   
With regard to ‘status’, a general legal definition thereof is ‘A person’s 
legal condition, whether personal or proprietary; the sum total of a person’s legal 
rights, duties, liabilities, and other legal relations, or any particular group of 
them separately considered’.15 This definition, as adapted to the present thesis, 
involves the existence of (procedural) rights held by the victims, 
procedural/evidence requirements to be met by the victims, and legal relations 
involving victims in the context of international and hybrid criminal courts. 
 
11 Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th edn. Oxford University Press 2004) 1610.  
12 Bryan Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn., Thomson West 2004) 1598.  
13 ICC RPE, rule 85 (b); ECCC Internal Rules, glossary.  
14 See, e.g., ICC RPE, rule 85 (a); STL Statute, article 17. 
15 Garner (2004) 1447.  
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2. Research Questions 
The present thesis aims to address two main research questions. 
The first research question is: What is the victims’ status at international 
and hybrid criminal courts?  
It is argued herein that the victims’ status at international and hybrid 
criminal courts may mainly consist of up to three dimensions, i.e., victims as 
witnesses, victims as victim participants/civil parties, and victims as reparations 
claimants.  
Victims as witnesses testify about facts witnessed by them. Victims’ 
status as witnesses is present at all international and hybrid criminal courts. 
Indeed, this dimension of the victims’ status is the only existent at the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the SCSL. Victims as participants/civil parties participate in the 
proceedings to voice their own interests and concerns (victim participants) or to 
support the prosecution and to seek reparations (civil parties). Victims’ status as 
victim participants/civil parties is only present at the ICC and the STL (victim 
participants) as well as at the ECCC (civil parties). At the ICTY, the ICTR and 
the SCSL, there are only some limited instances of ‘participation’. Victims as 
reparations claimants can claim and benefit from reparations for harm caused by 
crimes. Victims’ status as reparations claimants only exists at the ICC and the 
ECCC. It should be noticed that, depending on the court, these victims’ status 
dimensions can be cumulative.                   
The second research question is: How does victims’ status as witnesses, 
victim participants/civil parties and reparations claimants work at international 
and hybrid criminal courts?  
 With regard to victims as witnesses, victims are subject to a restricted 
regime whereby they cannot express as such their own views and concerns since 
they are called as an evidentiary source. However, specific protective and special 
measures (especially for vulnerable witnesses), which may exceptionally include 
anonymity (normally before trial) are provided to victims for security reasons 
and in order to avoid secondary victimization.  
With regard to victims as victim participants/civil parties, to hold the 
official victim participant status (ICC, STL) or the civil party status (ECCC), 
victims first need to apply for and be granted it. Once this is done, and according 
to the respective courts’ instruments and case law, victims can participate as 
victim participants (ICC, STL) or as civil parties (ECCC) through a variety of 
modalities of participation/procedural rights to move forward their own 
interests. Participation as victim participants/civil parties is feasible under the 
respective courts’ instruments during investigation/pre-trial, trial, sentencing 



and/or appeals. At the ICC, victims without holding the ‘official’ victim 
participant status (granted upon application) can still participate in specific 
proceedings during investigation/pre-trial.16   
With regard to victims as reparations claimants, procedural steps are 
necessary to be taken by victims who want to claim reparations for the harm 
inflicted to them and linked to crimes in the ICC and the ECCC cases, including 
specific reparations proceedings at these courts. Victims can claim and receive 
individual/collective reparations (ICC) or collective and moral reparations 
(ECCC), whose implementation may involve mechanisms such as the ICC Trust 
Fund for Victims (TFV).                     
Under the second research question, it is also argued that when 
examining how these dimensions of the victims’ status work at international and 
hybrid criminal courts, attention needs to be given not only to victims’ interests 
but also to other parallel and/or competing interests such as the accused’s 
rights,17 efficient conduct of the proceedings, search for judicial truth, and/or 
implementation challenges. All of this taking place in the context of large 
numbers of victims and courts with limited resources.   
       
3. Sources 
At a general level, legal sources considered in this thesis correspond to the 
sources enumerated under article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Statute which, according to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, ‘is generally regarded as 
a complete statement of the sources of international law’.18 This article reads as 
follows:  
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
 
16 See infra Chapter IV.   
17 Article 67 (Rights of the accused) of the ICC Statute provides for a complete illustrative list of the 
rights of the accused, as considered in this thesis. This article resembles article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), articles of other human rights 
instruments as well as provisions of instruments of other international and hybrid criminal courts. 
As for other international and hybrid criminal courts instruments see: ICTY Statute, article 21; 
ICTR Statute, article 20; SCSL Statute, article 17; ECCC Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers, article 35 new; STL Statute, article 16.  
18 Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 24 March 2000, footnote 364; 
Kupreškić (IT-95-16-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000.     
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d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.  
 
At a more specific level, article 21 of the ICC Statute provides a complete 
list of sources of law applicable by it. This list is mutatis mutandi also relevant for 
the other international and hybrid criminal courts. Article 21 reads as follows:        
 
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles 
and rules of international law, including the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict;  
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national 
laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of 
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that 
those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international 
law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions.  
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any 
adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, 
paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.19  
 
Taking into account, inter alia, the previous provisions and considering 
the nature and contents of this thesis, the following legal sources have mainly 
been used.    
First, instruments constitutive of international and/or hybrid criminal 
courts, either international treaties (ICC Statute), statutes included as annexes to 
 
19 For a detailed analysis of the sources of law applicable by international and hybrid criminal 
courts see William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals. The Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press 2006) 74-120; William Schabas, The 
International Criminal Court. A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 2010) 
381-400; William Schabas, ‘International Tribunals’ in Catarina Krause and Martin Scheinin (eds.), 
International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2nd ed., Åbo Akademi University 
Institute for Human Rights 2012a) 695, 716-717; and Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Sources of 
International Criminal Procedure’ in Göran Sluiter et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: 
Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 68.             
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UN Security Council Resolutions adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(ICTY and ICTR Statutes), and bilateral treaties between the UN and a particular 
State (SCSL, ECCC and STL). These instruments contain the general framework 
within which victims’ status falls.  
Second, rules of procedure and evidence adopted either by judges of the 
court in question (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ECCC), or by an assembly of States 
Parties (ICC) as complemented by the respective regulations and/or directives of 
the respective court. These sets of rules flesh out considerably the provisions 
contained in the constitutive instruments of international and hybrid criminal 
courts, which are by nature of a more general scope. Therefore, they provide the 
necessary detail to examine the three dimensions of the victims’ status and how 
these work.20 It should be noticed that the latest versions of these rules are used, 
unless otherwise indicated.   
Third, case law of international and hybrid criminal courts, which 
constitutes a fundamental authoritative interpretation of the above-referred 
provisions. Moreover, since the topic of victims’ status as witnesses, victim 
participants/civil parties and reparations claimants is intrinsically quite dynamic, 
the consolidated and emerging jurisprudence of international and hybrid 
criminal courts constitutes a necessary source to better understand how all the 
sets of provisions are put into practice. Accordingly, case law of international 
and hybrid criminal courts is used in this thesis extensively. Complementary to 
it, submissions by, inter alia, the Prosecutor, legal representatives of victim 
participants and civil parties are in some instances also considered. Furthermore, 
where relevant, transcripts of hearings have also been examined.  
In addition to the three above-mentioned sources, the following legal 
sources are used.  
First, instruments applicable by and, especially, case law of international 
human rights bodies, in particular the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
applying/interpreting the pertinent articles of their constitutive instruments, i.e., 
the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR).  
Second, set of UN General Assembly Resolutions containing principles 
and guidelines on victims of international crimes and their rights to, inter alia, 
 
20 As mentioned in the explanatory note to the ICC RPE ‘The Rules of Procedure and Evidence are 
an instrument for the application of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to 
which they are subordinate in all cases’.  
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participate in criminal proceedings and to receive reparations for the wrongful 
acts inflicted on them, in particular the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims and Abuse of Power and the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.  
Third, official non-judicial documents such as reports and press 
statements issued by international and hybrid criminal courts. 
Fourth, where pertinent, relevant rules of customary international law, 
general principles of public international law and/or principles common to the 
major criminal law traditions. 
Fifth, legal literature consisting in theses, books, articles and on-line 
resources and which systematizes and/or analyzes both the law applicable by 
international and hybrid criminal courts and the case law of these courts. 
Sixth, interdisciplinary literature such as criminology/transitional justice 
academic materials and/or reports, especially used in the second chapter 
(‘Shaping the Victims’ Status and International Criminal Proceedings’).  
Seventh, in some specific instances, victims’ opinions/considerations as 
found in the reviewed literature.  
Eighth, indirectly some Cambodian procedural criminal law via ECCC’s 
case law references is considered.   
Ninth, taking into account that three influential national systems: the 
English, the American and the French ones, are in a general manner presented in 
this thesis for illustrative and to some extent comparative purposes, the 
following sources are examined: i) national legislation, e.g., codes/acts, directives 
as well as Council of Europe/European Union instruments; ii) national case law 
and ECtHR’s case law; and iii) related legal literature which has been extremely 
useful, especially concerning systematization and analysis of case law. Quotes of 
English-translated French legal materials have been obtained from the database 
‘Legislation on Line’,21 unless otherwise made and indicated by the author.     
Tenth, some other instruments and/or practice of other national systems 
and of international/hybrid institutions from the Balkan region, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone have been considered in the last chapter (‘Victims as Reparations 
Claimants’).  
 
 
 
21 Available at: http://legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes (last visit on 3 
December 2012).   
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4. Sources Limitations 
Concerning sources used in this thesis, it must be mentioned two limitations 
related to the thesis timeframe and access to materials. 
 
Timeframe 
The sources used and analyzed in this thesis are limited to those existent as of 2 
January 2014. Thus, for example, the analysis corresponding to victims’ status at 
the ICC puts special emphasis on Lubanga since it was the first ICC case in 
which the trial was completed and also due to the seminal decisions on victims’ 
status rendered in/connected to that case.  
 
Access to materials 
With regard to case law sources, the materials considered in this thesis are those 
which were publicly available as of 2 January 2014 in, for example, the respective 
web-sites of the international and hybrid criminal courts.  
 
5. Methodological Approach 
In order to discuss the research questions and when examining the above-listed 
sources, it has been followed a legal research methodology implemented as 
follows.    
First, a thorough analysis of the international instruments that constitute 
the law applicable by international and hybrid criminal courts at which victims 
may exercise one or more dimensions of their status. Under the interpretation 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which have been 
applied by international and hybrid criminal courts,22 the legal analysis of the 
provisions in this thesis pays attention to: i) the provision wording; ii) the object 
and purpose of the instrument in question; iii) a systematic and contextual 
reading of the provision; and/or iv) a survey of the legislative history (travaux 
préparatoires) that led to the adoption of the provision in question.23   
 
22 See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC-01/04-168), Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Appeals Chamber, 13 July 2006, para. 33. 
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31 (1) (‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’), (2) (3) and article 32 (2) (referring to the 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of a treaty). For rules and 
principles of treaty interpretation specifically relevant to international and hybrid criminal courts 
see Schabas (2006) 80-84; Schabas (2010) 387-388; Elizabeth Salmón Gárate, Introducción al 
Derecho Internacional Humantario (IDEHPUCP/CICR 2004) 42-47.        
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Second, the examination of the applicable law takes into account 
painstakingly and critically how it has been interpreted and applied by the 
competent international or hybrid criminal court. Emphasis is given to how and 
to what extent the judicial reasoning has shaped the victims’ status. Moreover, it 
is closely analyzed how victims’ status has been enhanced or weakened by the 
jurisprudence of international and hybrid criminal courts and also, where 
relevant, how these jurisprudential outcomes have impacted on the efficiency of 
the proceedings and the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial/proceedings. 
Furthermore, where relevant, it is also considered whether the Judges/Chambers 
of the international and hybrid criminal courts issued their decisions or 
judgments within the limits of applicable law or whether they implemented an 
excessively ‘creative’ or restrictive interpretation. Submissions by victims’ legal 
representatives are in some specific instances also examined to see their impact 
on the respective jurisprudential outcomes.    
Third, the analysis of both the law applicable by international and hybrid 
criminal courts and their case law is substantially complemented by using and 
discussing relevant academic literature commenting on both sources. This 
academic literature is used either to back up the thesis argumentation or, where 
pertinent, this literature is also criticized. In addition, some of the academic 
literature has been employed as a very important source of systematized case law 
from international and hybrid criminal courts.24 
Fourth, jurisprudential contributions from international human rights 
monitoring bodies, in particular the IACtHR and the ECtHR, are examined 
especially when they have been cited/referred to by international and hybrid 
criminal courts to give content to some aspects of the dimensions of the victims’ 
status and how these work.  
Fifth, analysis of some empirical evidence, in particular, 
comments/opinions from victims, found in academic literature, are integrated as 
part of the argumentation to especially analyze jurisprudential outcomes. 
Sixth, the above-detailed methodological guidelines are employed to 
examine specific aspects of the victims’ status as witnesses, victim 
participants/civil parties and reparations claimants in a particular international 
or hybrid criminal court or a subgroup of them, put together when they are quite 
similar in a particular dimension of the victims’ status. In particular, the ICTY, 
the ICTR and the SCSL are always grouped together due to the identical 
 
24 In this regard, inter alia, the following material has been particularly useful: McGonigle Leyh 
(2011); Anne-Marie de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC 
and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR (Intersentia 2005) 227-313, 383-424.  
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situation of the victims’ status in their dimensions at these courts. After having 
examined the victims’ status in a specific international or hybrid criminal court 
or a subgroup of them, some comparisons with the other international and 
hybrid criminal courts are made to have a better approach to the similarities and 
differences among these institutions as well as to identify some trends 
concerning victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal courts.  
Seventh, although the thesis research questions concern the victims’ 
status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and reparations claimants at 
international and hybrid criminal courts, as previously said, three national 
systems have been considered for illustrative and, to some extent and where 
relevant, comparative purposes. Those national systems, as mentioned, are the 
English and the American systems (adversarial systems) and the French system 
(inquisitorial system). The general presentation of national systems is based on 
the fact that, like international and hybrid criminal courts, at these systems, 
victims also have a status in criminal proceedings. The selection of those three 
systems correspond to their high influence not only on the procedural/evidence 
law of the international and hybrid criminal courts and, in particular, victims’ 
status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and reparations claimants, 
but also on criminal proceedings and victims’ status in other national systems 
worldwide.         
    
6. Structure   
In addition to this introduction (first chapter), the present thesis consists of five 
chapters. While the second chapter is of a general/introductory character, the 
three subsequent chapters develop respectively each of the three dimensions of 
victims’ status as considered in this thesis. The thesis general conclusions are 
contained in the last (sixth) chapter.      
Under the second chapter titled ‘Shaping the Victims’ Status and 
International Criminal Proceedings’, it is brought an introductory framework to 
victims’ status in criminal proceedings and relevant procedural features of the 
international and hybrid criminal courts. The chapter consists of four 
subchapters: introduction, followed by three subchapters. The second 
subchapter explores victims’ status under restorative, retributive/utilitarian 
justice paradigms and under inquisitorial/adversarial systems, some 
international law landmarks on victims, national models of victims’ roles and 
victims’ status in transitional justice scenarios. The second subchapter examines 
the main adversarial and inquisitorial features of international and hybrid 
criminal courts. The last subchapter is chapter conclusions. 
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Under the third chapter titled ‘Victims’ Status as Witnesses’, it is 
discussed the first of the three dimensions of the victims’ status as considered in 
this thesis. Since victims’ status as witnesses is present across all international 
and hybrid criminal courts, the analysis focus tries to be evenly distributed 
across the courts. This chapter consists of four subchapters, being the chapter 
introduction the first one. In the second subchapter, it is discussed the general 
legal regime applicable to victims as witnesses at international and hybrid 
criminal courts, including the dual status victim participant-victim witness. 
Under the third subchapter, protective measures and special measures adopted 
in favor of victims are examined. The fourth subchapter examines the 
controversial issue of anonymity, especially during trial. Each of those three 
subchapters begins with a general presentation of the three considered national 
systems. Then, the analysis focuses on victims’ status at the ICTY/ICTR/SCSL, 
the ICC, and the ECCC/STL. Comparative conclusions are provided within each 
subchapter. Chapter conclusions constitute the last subchapter. 
Under the fourth chapter titled ‘Victims’ Status as Victim 
Participants/Civil Parties’, it is discussed the second dimension of the victims’ 
status as considered in this thesis. Since the participatory dimension of the 
victim status formally only exists at the ICC, the STL (victim participant) and the 
ECCC (civil party), the analysis is mainly focused on these courts, but also 
examining some specific indirect ‘participation’ instances at the other courts. 
The chapter introduction (first subchapter) and other five subchapters constitute 
this chapter. Under the second subchapter, legal definitions of victims and the 
requirements to participate as victim participants (ICC, STL) or civil parties 
(ECCC) are discussed. In the subsequent subchapters, it is examined victims’ 
modalities of participation/procedural rights following the sequential flow of the 
procedural stages, i.e., investigation/pre-trial, trial, sentencing and appeals, 
which respectively constitute the third, the fourth, the fifth and the sixth 
subchapters. Each subchapter starts with a general presentation of the three 
considered national systems. Then, it is examined the victims’ status at the 
ICTY/ICTR/SCSL, the ICC, and the ECCC/STL. Within each subchapter, 
comparative conclusions are provided. Chapter conclusions constitute the last 
subchapter.                           
Under the fifth chapter titled ‘Victims’ Status as Reparations Claimants’, 
it is discussed the third dimension of the victims’ status as considered in this 
thesis. Due to the fact that the victims’ status as reparations claimants only exists 
at the ICC and the ECCC, emphasis is put on these two courts. However, the 
situation at the other international and hybrid criminal courts as for some 
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references to reparations under their instruments is also evaluated. This chapter 
consists in five subchapters, including the introduction (first subchapter). Under 
the second subchapter, the general framework of victims as reparations 
claimants is provided, which includes categories of reparations claimants and 
beneficiaries and resources for implementing reparations. Under the third 
subchapter, the reparations proceedings, including bringing reparations requests 
and specific reparations proceedings are evaluated in detail. Under the fourth 
subchapter, categories such as individual/collective reparations, modalities of 
reparations and reparations implementation are examined. Each subchapter 
begins with a general evaluation of the three considered national systems. Then, 
the analysis addresses the victims’ status at the ICTY/ICTR/SCSL/STL, the ICC 
(and its TFV), and the ECCC. Within each subchapter comparative conclusions 
are provided. Chapter conclusions constitute the last subchapter.   
Under the sixth and last chapter titled ‘General Conclusions’, it is 
provided some general conclusions applicable to both each of the three 
dimensions of the victims’ status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties 
and reparations claimants as well as concerning the overall victims’ status in the 
examined international and hybrid criminal courts. 
Two extra observations should be added concerning the thesis structure. 
First, within the third, fourth and fifth chapters, the ‘Comparative Conclusions’ 
subsections refer to: i) a summary of the argumentation discussed in the 
respective subchapter and some general conclusions; ii) a comparison of victims’ 
status across and among international and hybrid criminal courts; and iii) some 
general references, where relevant, to the three considered national systems. 
‘Comparative Conclusions’ thus provide both an analytical summary and 
conclusions, and the comparison is made across and among international and 
hybrid criminal courts, complemented, where relevant, by referring to the three 
considered national systems. Second, international and hybrid criminal courts 
have been grouped to facilitate the analysis taking into account their quite 
similar procedural law. Thus, this is the case of the ICTY/ICTR/SCSL in the 
chapters on victims’ status as witnesses (chapter III) and victims’ status as victim 
participants/civil parties (chapter IV); and, in the case of the chapter on victims’ 
status as reparations claimants (chapter V), the sub-grouping corresponds to the 
ICTY/ICTR/SCSL/STL. Although the ECCC and the STL, due to their nature as 
hybrid criminal courts, appear under the same subsections on the chapters on 
victims’ status as witnesses (chapter III) and victims’ status as civil parties/victim 
participants (chapter IV), independent analysis of victims’ status at each court is 
conducted. Lastly, but equally important, the ICC is always analyzed 
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autonomously due to, inter alia, its importance as the first permanent 
international criminal court and its scope. In any case, in the chapter on victims’ 
status as reparations claimants (chapter V), the ECCC is also examined 
autonomously.                                                       
 
7. Originality of the Present Study and Aimed Contributions 
The present study aims to contribute to the field of victims’ status at 
international and hybrid criminal courts basically in three manners, each of 
them of academic and practical nature as well as effects.     
First, the originality of this thesis mainly lies on that it is arguably the 
first study which seeks to comprehensively and truly draw the ‘full picture’ of 
victims’ status at the six considered international and hybrid criminal courts. 
Although a seminal study by Mikaela Heikkilä first examined the three 
dimensions of the victims’ status as presented in this thesis, it is limited to the 
ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC and under the legal sources existent in the early 
2000s.25 Similar remarks can be said as for an important study by Anne-Marie de 
Brouwer.26 In turn, a recent and comprehensive book chapter by Anne-Marie de 
Brouwer and Mikaela Heikkilä, which covers the six international and hybrid 
criminal courts considered in this thesis (plus the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes in East Timor), focuses mainly on victim participation and, more 
concisely, on reparations for victims but only tangentially deals with protection 
of victims.27 Concerning victims’ status as witnesses, that study is complemented 
to an important extent by a comprehensive book chapter section by Guido 
Acquaviva and Mikaela Heikkilä in the same recent and outstanding collective 
work.28    
Accordingly, taking into the account the existent literature, which has 
been inspirational, this thesis contribution is expected to be achieved by 
examining the victims’ status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and 
reparations claimants at international and hybrid criminal courts in order to 
reach, as much as possible, accurate and complete answers to the research 
questions formulated. Moreover, the holistic and integrated study of victims’ 
status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and reparations claimants in 
 
25 Mikaela Heikkilä, International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime (Åbo Akademi 
University Press 2004).  
26 Brouwer (2005).  
27 Anne-Marie de Brouwer and Mikaela Heikkilä, ‘Victim Issues: Participation, Protection, 
Reparation, and Assistance’ in Sluiter et al. (2013) 1299.  
28 Guido Acquaviva and Mikaela Heikkilä, ‘Protective and Special Measures for Witnesses’ in 
Goran Sluiter et al. (2013) 818. 



six international and hybrid criminal courts distinguishes this study from 
previous theses/studies, which have mainly focused on one specific dimension of 
the victims’ status, for example, an important study by Brianne McGonigle 
Leyh,29 and/or which have only examined one court in particular, for example, 
an important study by Eva Dwertmann.30 Thus, unlike the vast majority of 
publications in the field which explore one or other dimension of the victims’ 
status at international and hybrid criminal courts and/or topics related to those 
dimensions,31 this thesis presents an original (and arguably necessary) integrated 
study of those dimensions. At the same time, this thesis seeks to update and 
largely expand previous works that, to a large or short extent, considered victims’ 
status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and/or reparations 
claimants.32 With regard to this second group of studies, the originality of the 
present study consists in: i) the analysis of the three dimensions constitutive of 
the victims’ status in an integrated and exhaustive manner, across six 
international and hybrid criminal courts and under the most up-to-date legal 
sources; and/or ii) the continuous and analytical use of legal sources from legal 
areas other than international criminal law, mainly, comparative criminal 
procedural law and international human rights law.      
Second, it is aimed that the analysis made and the conclusions arrived in 
this thesis be taken into consideration by other researchers, practitioners and 
policy makers who are in one or another manner involved in victim-related 
issues at international and hybrid criminal courts. Moreover, due to some 
general presentation of three national systems in this thesis, some of the analysis 
made can also be of relevance for individuals and organizations working and/or 
researching on victim-related issues in criminal proceedings at the national level. 
This feature also distinguishes the present thesis from other theses/studies that 
examined issues on victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal courts 
like in a ‘bubble’ without paying (further) attention to national criminal systems. 
Furthermore, this thesis can arguably be considered as the first study which, to 
 
29 McGonigle Leyh (2011) (focusing mainly on victims’ status as victim participants/civil parties at 
the ICC and the ECCC although with some general references to victims’ status as witnesses and 
reparations claimants). As for aspects relevant to the victims’ status as reparations claimants, see, 
e.g., Eva Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the International Criminal Court. Its 
Implementation, Possibilities and Limitations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010).     
30 Dwertmann (2010) (examining the ICC as for reparations). In turn, the study by McGonigle 
Leyh is focused on the ECCC and the ICC although with some general presentation of victims’ 
status at other international and hybrid criminal courts. See McGonigle Leyh (2011).    
31 For detailed references to legal literature, see both the thesis bibliography and the footnotes. 
32 See, e.g., Heikkilä (2004); Brouwer (2005) 227-313, 383-424; Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013).           
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some level of detail, tries to set up a bridge and open a dialogue between the 
victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal courts and victims’ status at 
national criminal courts.33 This has been to a large extent ignored in previous 
theses and studies examining the victims’ status at international and hybrid 
criminal courts. This effort aims at hopefully encouraging future academic 
production to deepen such dialogue much further.  
Third, this thesis constitutes to date, arguably, the most complete and 
exhaustive study on victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal courts. It 
is expected that this feature can be measured not only quantitatively through the 
length of the thesis but also, and more importantly, qualitatively via the depth of 
the analysis and argumentation aimed to be presented in each and every of the 
chapters and sections of this thesis.  
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 Chapter II. Shaping the Victims’ Status and 
International Criminal Proceedings 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to examine some underlying and foundational questions in 
order to better understand the status of victims as witnesses, victim 
participants/civil parties and reparations claimants in the following chapters. 
The analysis and conclusions in this chapter address some of the main general 
issues in the always difficult process of shaping, giving content to and enhancing 
victims’ status as well as building up platforms, i.e., international and hybrid 
criminal courts, at which the status of victims of the most serious international 
crimes can be exercised. Bearing in mind that two broad legal categories, i.e., 
victims’ status and international criminal proceedings, are present across the 
whole thesis, this chapter is accordingly structured in two main parts: the first 
one on victims’ status and the second one on international criminal proceedings.   
After this introduction, the following subchapter (‘Shaping the Victims’ 
Status’) concerns the analysis and discussion of theoretical approaches as well as 
of national and some international law developments, especially in contexts of 
serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations, in the long 
and not easy path to recognize victims as important agents in criminal 
proceedings. This first sub-chapter, in turn, consists of four sections. In the first 
section, both traditional and more recent criminal justice paradigms which have 
led or influenced criminal justice systems are examined with regard to the 
victims’ status allocated in each of them. This first section is concluded by 
mapping some of the most important international law developments in the 
building up process of victims’ status in criminal proceedings. The second 
section deals with some general notions and main characteristics of adversarial 
and inquisitorial systems followed by a very brief presentation of the victims’ 
status in each system. The third section concerns six models of victims’ status in 
criminal proceedings as existent and implemented in national criminal justice 
systems. The fourth and last section critically draws the broad picture 
constituted by transitional justice scenarios and mechanisms where victims’ 
status and international, hybrid criminal courts are brought to existence and 
operate.   
 The next subchapter (‘Shaping International Criminal Proceedings’) 
consists of two sections. In the first one, a very general presentation of the 
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international and hybrid criminal courts considered in this thesis is provided, 
paying attention to the impact of them on the respective victimized populations. 
Under the second section, criminal procedural elements identified as belonging 
to the adversarial/common law system or inquisitorial/civil law system are 
applied to the international and hybrid criminal courts that are examined in this 
thesis. The idea of this exercise is not only to demonstrate that international 
criminal justice proceedings are arguably unique or mixed but also to set the 
general procedural and evidentiary law where the three dimensions of victims’ 
status, as presented in this thesis, take place.  
 This chapter ends with chapter conclusions.   
 
2. Shaping the Victims’ Status  
2.1. Victims’ Status under Retributive, Utilitarian and Restorative Paradigms 
and Enhancement of Victims’ Status at the International Level  
Victims’ status in criminal proceedings has been traditionally driven by 
retributive justice paradigms. This situation has, however, progressively changed 
due to the increasing presence of a restorative justice paradigm in criminal 
proceedings. Retributive and restorative justice paradigms and what role victims 
are allocated under either paradigm will be briefly considered herein followed by 
references to some landmark moments in the evolution of victims’ status at the 
international level.   
 
2.1.1. Victims’ Status in the Retributive Justice Paradigm  
Retributive or desert justice theories are grounded on the relationship between 
punishment and culpability insofar as punishment is justified ‘because and only 
because offenders deserve it’.34 The retributive criminal justice paradigm 
endeavors to achieve proportional punishment, i.e., punishment has to be 
proportional to the gravity of the crime, and criminal justice systems should be 
consistent with treatment of offenders.35 The idea that the severity of a sentence 
should be proportional to the seriousness of the criminal conduct is intrinsic to 
retributive justice.36 Such notion has led to criticism against retributive justice 
 
34 Michael Moore, ‘The Moral Worth of Retribution´ in Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew 
Ashworth (eds.), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (2nd edn., Oxford 
University Press 1998) 179, 190.   
35 James Dignan and Michael Cavadino, ‘Towards a Framework for Conceptualising and 
Evaluating Models of Criminal Justice System from a Victims’ Perspective’ (1996) 4 International 
Review of Victimology 153, 155; Loretta Stalans and Julian Roberts, ‘Retribution’, Richard Wright 
and J. Mitchell Miller (eds.), Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol 3. (Routledge, 2005) 1430. 1431.   
36 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Desert´ in Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth (1998b) 141, 141. 
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based on, inter alia, the assumption of a widespread moral agreement about 
wrong and right,37 difficulties to find a proportional punishment and why two 
harms (crime and punishment) are always better than just one (crime).38 The 
degree of guilt and also punishment cannot hence vary with identity of the 
victim.39 Accordingly, victims do not play a role in the determination of guilt or 
punishment under the retributive justice paradigm. Indeed, retributive scholars 
barely discuss about victims’ status in criminal justice.40  
Although victims may obtain satisfaction out of perpetrators’ 
punishment, moral culpability of the latter and not the degree of harm inflicted 
on the victims determines the seriousness of the offences.41 In this manner, the 
defendant’s deed and not the suffering of the victim is what is examined on trial. 
There is, however, arguably certain recognition of the victims’ plight as 
Ashworth, a prominent representative of the retributive justice paradigm, 
acknowledges ‘the justice of punishment for culpable and criminalized 
wrongdoing may be said to stem from the wrongdoer’s denial of respect for the 
victims’ integrity’.42 This has been read by some as a victim-friendly approach 
since punishment expresses society’s ‘solidarity with the victim’.43 Nevertheless, 
due to the fact that retributive justice is a response to the crime inflicted on the 
victim rather than a reaction to the harm experienced by him/her, there is 
consensus to consider retributive justice as a non-victim-friendly paradigm.44 
Therefore, consideration of victims’ sorrow under retributive justice does not 
make it a victim-centered or even a victim friendly approach as criminal 
proceedings are focused first and foremost on the offence committed and not on 
the victimized individual. 
Even though victims are considered important as information providers 
(witnesses), this substantive role assigned to victims does not grant them any 
 
37 Heikkilä (2004) 26.  
38 As for the critique, see, e.g., Aleksandar Fatić, Punishment and Restorative Crime-Handling: A 
Social Theory of Trust (Avebury Publishers 1995) 188; Wesley Cragg, The Practice of Punishment: 
Towards a Theory of Restorative Justice (Routledge Publishers 1992) 20-23. Referred to in Heikkilä 
(2004) 26, footnote 84.    
39 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Some Doubts about Restorative Justice’ (1993) 4 Criminal Law Forum 277, 
298.  
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Heikkilä (2004) 27. 
41 Miriam Aukerman, ‘Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding 
Transitional Justice’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 39, 54. 
42 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th edn., Oxford University Press 2006) 16.    
43 Randy Barnett, ‘Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice’ (1977) 87 Ethics 279, 284. 
44 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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procedural role in the criminal trial process.45 This arguably depersonalizes the 
process, which means that ‘the victim loses his central role in the drama whose 
focus is the wrong committed and not the person wronged’.46 Thus, individuals 
originally and directly victimized and who are, in principle, the most interested 
in the prosecution of and sentencing of offenders for crimes inflicted on them 
are relegated to a background position. Indeed, retributive justice approach 
exponents justify the limited role assigned to victims in criminal justice as a sort 
of control mechanism to avoid arbitrariness in the process and, therefore, 
victims’ revenge or forgiveness should not play a role.47 Under this approach, 
victims’ participation in criminal proceedings has to be assessed paying very 
close attention to the accused’s right to a fair trial.48 Some retributivists have 
argued for the need to accord a procedural role to the victims so that doing 
justice to them becomes part of retributive punishment.49 However, those 
scholars have not addressed the unfolding impact of this victims’ enhanced role 
in terms of impartiality.50                  
The fact that the state or public prosecutor constitutes the counter-part 
of the accused person leaves the victims a witness status.51 As already said, this 
corresponds to the logics underlying a retributive criminal justice system, which 
primarily aims at reaching a proportional punishment. The emphasis on the 
protection of the rights of the accused so that no innocent is convicted 
complements that primary aim. Such emphasis is reflected in the role assigned to 
the public prosecutor who, as a state representative, has mandate to control 
victims’ subjective experiences or suffering from negatively affecting the 
outcome of a trial, which explains why retributive justice has been described as a 
theory which speaks for state punishment.52 Critics of the retributive justice 
paradigm have precisely highlighted the quite weak role played by victims as: i) 
State and offender are the key elements, ii) victim is ignored, iii) victims lack 
 
45 Michael Moore, ‘Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher’ (1999) 3 Buffalo 
Criminal Law Review 65, 72, 73. 
46 Cragg (1992) 19. See also Heikkilä (2004) 29; McGonigle Leyh (2011) 39.  
47 Moore (1999) 77.  
48 David Hall, ‘Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint’ (1991) 28 American 
Criminal Law Review 233, 256. 
49 George Fletcher, ‘The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution’ (1999) 3 Buffalo Criminal 
Law Review 51, 55.  
50 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 41.  
51 Heikkilä (2004) 28. 
52 Dennis Klimchuck, ‘Retribution, Restitution and Revenge, Law and Philosophy’ (2001) 20 Law 
and Philosophy 81, 83.  
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information, iv) victims’ ‘truth’ remains secondary, v) restitution is rare, and vi) 
victims’ suffering is ignored.53 
There is no surprise in that victims’ participation and voice in criminal 
proceedings with retributive justice framework have historically been limited 
because their interventions have been regarded as unlikely impartial or 
independent.54 However, even retributivists concede that compensation claims is 
an area where victims should have a voice.55    
To sum up, the retributive justice paradigm does not require or even less 
ambition a central role for victims in criminal proceedings. On the contrary, a 
victims’ enhanced status is perceived as a threat to the rights and guarantees 
crafted in favor of the accused, which are pivotal in retributive justice theories. 
To certain extent, the retributive justice paradigm explains why criminal justice 
systems have traditionally marginalized victims in criminal proceedings and 
have hence narrowed down their status mainly to that of (prosecution) 
witnesses.     
        
2.1.2. Victims’ Status and Utilitarian or Deterrent Theories  
Different from retributive justice, which is backward-looking, utilitarian theories 
are forward-looking as they focus on the benefits of criminal justice such as a 
predictable punishment as a result of an offence.56 Although deterrence aimed at 
by utilitarian theories has been considered a traditional goal of criminal justice, 
criminology literature has raised fundamental questions about assumptions of 
deterrence especially under the retributive justice paradigm.57 Empirical evidence 
has indeed proved that the punishment system has not worked as reflected in the 
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53 Zehr (1990) 212-213; Howard Zehr, Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice. New Perspectives on 
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record prison population in many countries and the overcrowding of prisons.58 
Studies have failed to prove that, for example, the death penalty deters and some 
evidence shows that it may even cause some persons to kill.59 Hence, deterrence 
may only work in relation to some offenders and some crimes.60   
Like retributive justice, utilitarian theories do not provide the victim 
with a central role in the criminal justice system. Punishment objectives such as 
deterrence and prevention sought by utilitarianism mainly focus on society 
and/or the offender.61 Although utilitarian approaches may conduct to victim-
friendly trials,62 they can also end up in outcomes which are completely 
detrimental to the victims due to the flexibility brought by utilitarianism to 
sanction proceedings.63 Be that as it may, victims’ interests are often overlooked 
when those conflict with other interests, which is not an exceptional situation,64 
as utilitarian or deterrent theories focus on crime prevention.65 In this scenario, 
victim-friendly responses such as payment of compensations are ruled out as 
these do not carry out a sufficient level of deterrent or preventive effect.66 A 
criminal justice system led by a utilitarian paradigm undertakes factors which 
are completely irrelevant for the victims when having to reach a judicial 
outcome.67 An example that may illustrate the potential negative effect of 
utilitarian theories on the status and interests of victims is the grant of amnesties 
or presidential pardons owing to political or extra-legal considerations.68 
Regardless of the legitimacy of the ends sought by these decisions, e.g., national 
reconciliation in a post-conflict context, the outcome thereof certainly cuts off 
victims’ chances to seek remedy for offences committed against them and annuls 
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any dimension of victims’ status in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, a central 
role for victims in criminal proceedings is not feasible under utilitarian theories.  
Similar to the retributive justice paradigm, utilitarian theories consider 
interests of the offender and society. Their justification for punishment of the 
crime is given in ‘broad terms’.69 In other words, the society as a whole is 
regarded as the crime victim. Sanctions are hence ‘not designed to meet the 
private interests of the individual victim, but rather, are imposed in the public 
interest […] ultimately, to provide public protection from crime through 
retribution and deterrence’.70 Victims’ status can hence be severely weakened. 
For instance, utilitarian considerations may advise to refuse the adoption of 
protective measures such as closed hearings out of victims’ concerns when 
testifying as witnesses and, instead, to conduct trials entirely public in order to, 
inter alia, more efficiently spread a message of zero tolerance for commission of 
certain offences. This clearly mirrors the notion whereby a deterrent theory aims 
to ‘reinforce the value structure inherent in the criminal law’.71  
 
2.1.3. Victims’ Status and the Restorative Justice Paradigm 
Whereas retributive and utilitarian justice paradigms both correspond to the 
traditional justifications of criminal justice and deny victims a central role in 
criminal justice, the modern movement of restorative justice that started in the 
early 1970s both represents a new paradigm in criminal justice and identifies 
victims as central actors in criminal justice. A generally accepted definition by 
Marshall of restorative justice presents this as ‘a process whereby parties with a 
stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of 
that offence and its implications for the future’.72 It is important, however, to 
note that restorative justice as such is not limited to criminal justice proceedings. 
The restorative justice paradigm, thus, includes a set of out-of-court practices 
such as family group conferencing, victim-offender mediation and peacemaking 
circles.73     
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For Randy Barnett, one of the first restorative justice scholars, crime is 
an offense by an individual against the rights of another individual and he 
advocated for the substitution of criminal court proceedings with civil court 
proceedings, i.e., a sort of civil model restorative justice approach.74 This 
restorative approach has been criticized as blurs the distinction between crimes 
and torts as well as misses what could be lost if the message conveyed by 
punishment is lost at all.75 
A subsequent restorative justice approach, the so-called victim-offender 
reparation model, by Howard Zehr has proven to be more popular. Victims’ 
needs constitute the starting point for restorative justice but without neglecting 
offender and community needs.76 Accordingly, the first step in restorative justice 
is to meet immediate needs in particular those of the victim. Victims’ 
participation translates empowerment for victims, which is ‘crucial to recovery 
and justice’.77 For victims, the ‘new lenses’ to see criminal justice brought by the 
restorative justice paradigm would mean that: i) victim’s needs are central, ii) 
victim and offender are key elements, iii) information is provided to victims, iii) 
victims are given chance to ‘tell their truth’, iv) victim’s suffering is lamented and 
acknowledged, v) victim is recognized, vi) balance righted by raising both victim 
and offender, vii) victim-offender relationships are central, and viii) victim and 
offender are central.78 However, this particular restorative justice approach has 
received some criticism due to a supposed over-individualized nature and 
overlooking of the public interest.79 Nevertheless, it is clear that restorative 
justice approach enhances victims’ status. The underlying logics are that the 
State is not the victim and the actual participants, i.e., victims and offenders, 
need to be given back significant power and responsibility in the process.  
A sort of communitarian model constitutes a third variety of the 
restorative justice approach and originated in Australia and New Zealand.80 The 
role of the community to reach a solution is emphasized because crime is 
regarded as affecting not only the victim and the offender but also the 
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community, approach indeed followed by some non-western indigenous 
societies.81 This approach has been criticized for taking for granted some 
assumptions such as the existence of an identifiable victim of crime and of a 
sufficiently defined sense of morality shared by the community in question.82   
Although the above-introduced restorative approaches present their own 
particularities, their focus on victims is what makes them similar to each other 
and, on the other hand, different from retributive and utilitarian paradigms of 
justice. Accordingly, besides restoring the offender and the community, the 
restorative justice paradigm seeks to restore the victim by reparation, including 
compensation and apology, and give him/her a participatory role in the (judicial 
or extra-judicial) process.83 Victims’ status under restorative justice gains 
considerable strength as crimes are seen to be committed against them and their 
communities. Thus, the 2006 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNDOC) Handbook on Restorative Justice envisages a central role for victims 
who ‘must be allowed to tell their story’.84 Since crime is mainly a breach of a 
social relationship,85 redressing the harm inflicted on victims rather than 
inflicting a punishment on the perpetrators becomes central.  
It is herein argued that the restorative justice paradigm constitutes 
possibly the only model to answer strong and sound criticism against the 
criminal justice system, which regards this system as a source of dissatisfaction 
and frustration for victims. Such a high dose of skepticism stems from the entire 
emphasis on punishment which becomes an obstacle for settlement of conflicts. 
Criminal justice systems primarily based on retribution can only increase the 
conflict.86 Nevertheless, it is also reckoned here that a radical reform of the 
criminal justice system is arguably a long-term project and necessary reforms 
can become extremely difficult to implement. Moreover, in spite of empirical 
studies at the national level showing an increase in victim’s satisfaction with 
restorative justice mechanisms meeting victims’ concerns,87 with benefits 
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exceeding the harms,88 extra-judicial mechanisms are not seen as alternatives to 
traditional justice crime institutions and imprisonment.89 This is particularly and 
understandably the case of serious offences. Bearing in mind these difficulties, it 
is herein argued that restorative justice elements have to be incorporated 
progressively and smoothly in criminal justice proceedings. This is arguably the 
soundest option to truly address the harm suffered by victims and also to heal 
other actors involved and/or affected by the crime such as the offenders and 
communities. Accordingly, a victims’ enhanced status reflected in a greater 
participation in criminal proceedings should in principle be implemented.90 In 
the next subsection, integration and combination of the presented criminal 
justice paradigms are briefly discussed.   
            
2.1.4. Victims’ Status in Criminal Justice Systems Led by Mixed Paradigms 
To begin with, no domestic criminal justice has adopted totally one or other 
criminal justice paradigm as each of them has its own advantages and 
weaknesses. On the contrary, national criminal justice systems have embraced 
those paradigms jointly. As a result, the lower or higher degree of presence of the 
restorative justice paradigm is arguably the principal factor to explain a stronger 
or weaker status of victims in a criminal justice system.   
Although the use of mixed theories has come under criticism from 
advocates of different paradigms,91 it is, however, necessary to determine 
whether the apparently opposed paradigms of retributive/utilitarian and 
restorative justice may be brought together in criminal justice. This point is 
important since victims’ status is mainly examined in this thesis at the 
international and hybrid criminal courts, which are by definition ‘criminal’ 
justice forums. It is argued herein that those paradigms are indeed not 
diametrically opposed as their goals can be integrated within the criminal justice 
system and, hence, are reconcilable as Zehr concedes ‘Polarization [between 
retributive and restorative approaches] may be somewhat misleading’,92 in the 
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sense that it may hide ‘important similarities and areas of collaboration’.93 Other 
restorative justice scholars also support the need for combining restorative and 
retributive/utilitarian elements to reach a broader sense of justice.94 The 
restorative justice paradigm may fulfil the several objectives of criminal law 
better than the other paradigms.95 Accordingly, the (increasing) incorporation of 
restorative justice elements within the still predominantly retributive/utilitarian 
(deterrent) oriented criminal justice system seems to be advisable and even 
necessary so that victims’ needs, rights and concerns are taken into account and 
enforced.   
Indeed, restorative justice has also been considered as an inverted 
constructive retributivism as the former shares some basic elements of the latter, 
i.e., blameworthiness of the unlawful behavior is expressed, offender’s 
responsibility is indicated, and the moral imbalance is repaired, but restorative 
justice presents these retributive justice elements in a constructive manner.96 
Therefore, the retributive/utilitarian paradigm and the restorative paradigm 
‘may be seen as two sides of a coin, rather than a pair of opposites’.97  
Even though the retributive/utilitarian response to the crime underlies 
national, international and hybrid criminal courts, it must and can be combined 
with the social constructiveness of restorative justice approaches as some 
retributive justice proponents such as Duff, Von Hirsch, Ashworth and Shearing 
admit.98 Actually, the ‘paying back’ idea is also present in restorative justice even 
though the offender’s ‘paying back’ role in punitive retributivism is reversed 
from a passive to an active role.99 Thus, the offender must himself pay back by 
repairing as much as possible the harm and suffering inflicted.100 This in 
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national, international and hybrid criminal courts may be implemented via 
compensation and other modalities of reparations for the victims. Concerning 
victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal courts, the 
retributive/utilitarian and restorative justice paradigms can therefore be 
reconciled regardless of the still predominantly retributive criminal 
proceedings.101 How these paradigms work in relation to victims’ status in 
transitional justice settings characterized by the massive commission of 
international crimes is later discussed in this chapter.102  
 
2.1.5. Philosophical Arguments for the Change of Paradigms  
At this point, it is necessary to present the philosophical arguments that 
justified/justify the change of paradigms guiding the criminal justice system, i.e., 
from a system almost exclusively oriented by the retributive and utilitarian 
paradigms to a system which has increasingly been including important 
restorative justice paradigm elements.  
First, the fact that retributive and utilitarian paradigms justify alone the 
infliction of pain on an offender has been considered as particularly disturbing 
from a moral viewpoint.103 Concerning the retributive paradigm, as del Vecchio 
highlights, the absolute justice of repaying evil with evil (as sustained by Kant 
and other philosophers) is ‘really an empty sophism’ and, therefore, it was 
instead necessary to consider a philosophical framework where ‘an evil is to be 
put right only by doing good’.104 Retribution has been considered not as a theory 
but only as a philosophical justification to deliberately inflict pain and suffering 
on a human being, which makes it not only ethically flawed but ‘also morally 
indefensible’.105 It has also been said that ethical justifications, or obligations, to 
sanction norm violations do not resist further scrutiny as ‘the necessity for […] 
restoration of an intuitive moral balance after a crime does not necessarily imply 
the intentional infliction of pain on the offender’ and, hence, keeping an 
exclusive retributive justice paradigm ‘is in itself ethically doubtful’.106 A criminal 
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justice system led predominantly by the retributive paradigm is not the most 
appropriate to restore the moral balance disrupted by a crime.107 Additionally, 
the ‘construction of the punitive proportionality is itself highly debatable’.108 
Therefore, it is not advisable to consider the criminal justice system exclusively 
as sanction of crimes punished according to criminal law.109      
Concerning the utilitarian paradigm, the levying of punishment is 
undertaken not for the criminal himself, but for its educational impact on the 
community, i.e., the crime is transformed in mainly a mere excuse for punishing 
and, thus, treating offenders as means to the ends of others in this manner may 
raise serious moral problems.110 The use of force against an individual merely 
based on the effect that such use will have on others may be questioned as the 
criminal justice system exclusively becomes a means to make it legitimate the use 
of force and, hence, it does not constitute a truth-seeking device.111 An 
exclusively utilitarian or instrumentalist response to crime is potentially 
‘insatiable’ as it may ‘lead to punishing the innocent or to draconian 
punishments, in order to increase the deterrent impact’ and the utilitarian 
justifications of punishment ‘are limited by some (possibly hidden) 
deontological principles’.112 It has even been argued that as the punitive criminal 
justice system has lost its moral function, it no longer has a moral authority to 
censure criminal behavior.113    
Retributive and utilitarian benefits should be incidental to the criminal 
justice system and, hence, they cannot provide, alone, a justification of the 
criminal justice system. Accordingly, something else was needed. Restorative 
justice precisely shifts the moral and ethical justifications of punishment under 
retributive and utilitarian paradigms as under the latter punishment is morally 
viewed and justified as an end in itself.114 Therefore, the crisis of retributive and 
utilitarian paradigms, due to the uncertainty of their moral status,115 justified the 
emergence and incorporation of the restorative justice paradigm.  
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Second, the previous argument is directly connected to the need for a 
theory of good, i.e., how one moves from the bad to the good,116 or, in other 
terms, restorative justice seen as a theory of social justice.117 Under this logic, 
restorative justice philosophy lies on a set of values which include, among others, 
non-domination, empowerment, respectful listening, equal concern for all 
stakeholders (victims included) and respect for human rights specified in 
international instruments.118 In comparison to retributive and utilitarian 
paradigms, the restorative justice paradigm is based on a different ethics of 
justice due to its framing values and principles.119 These come from various 
discursive traditions of justice including: i) theological roots and moral 
philosophy at which ‘compassion, forgiveness, healing and caring tend to come 
to the fore’;120 ii) political and social theories; and iii) ideals from communitarian 
philosophy which focus on how to repair collective relational fabrics affected by 
crime.121 Indeed, as pointed out by Braithwaite, restorative justice values may be 
considered as cultural universals as all cultures value redress of damage to 
persons and property, security, dignity, empowerment, based on justice and 
social support and they are indispensable to ‘our emotional survival as human 
beings’.122 Restorative justice aims to address the emotional dimensions of crime 
as much as possible, and to transform the destructive dimensions present in 
those emotions into constructive motivations, ‘which may contribute directly to 
the quality of social life while avoiding the ethically negative apriorism of pain 
infliction’.123    
Third, the ethical need to respond to crime cannot adopt manifestations 
that themselves violate the dialogical principle, which ‘includes the necessity of 
re-empowering the victim and meeting his or her needs’,124 as postulated by the 
restorative justice paradigm. The reparative and participatory dimensions of the 
restorative justice paradigm reflect a dialogical idea of justice which corresponds, 
in turn, to the dialogical condition that characterizes both human beings and 
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institutions.125 Accordingly, the so-called militaristic manner of criminal justice 
led almost exclusively by retributive/utilitarian paradigms is to be replaced by a 
system that meaningfully incorporates the ‘peaceful co-operative dialogue of 
restorative justice’.126                  
Fourth, as highlighted by Barnett, restorative justice is oriented by 
humanitarian goals, including provision of reparations to victims, which makes 
the criminal justice system more just overall speaking.127 Thus, the goal brought 
by the restorative justice paradigm is ‘not the suppression of crime: it is doing 
justice to victims’.128 Although the restorative justice paradigm is not a panacea, 
it may lead to a fairer and improved criminal justice system and society, which 
cannot arguably be offered by the traditional retributive and utilitarian justice 
paradigms alone.129 Therefore, a moral and ethical principle for the shift from a 
system only led by the retributive/utilitarian paradigms to one that also is guided 
by the restorative justice paradigm is ‘not to harm the guilty but to help the 
innocent’.130   
Fifth, restorative justice philosophy offers a balanced approach to justice 
as it elevates the roles of victims, communities and offenders.131 Restorative 
justice philosophical framework orients its pursued goals towards the primary 
actors of the criminal system, i.e., the victim, the offender and the community. 
Hence, criminal justice system exclusively led by retributive/utilitarian 
paradigms, which robs crime victims the opportunity to express their views and 
concerns, is replaced by a criminal justice system where via the increasing 
incorporation of restorative justice elements, i.e., led by mixed paradigms, 
provides more recognition and validation to victims.132 Restorative justice, as a 
philosophical framework, is not punitive or lenient in focus and brings 
important elements absent in a traditional criminal justice system oriented only 
by retributive/utilitarian paradigms.          
Sixth, a concept of equality of justice justified the need for a shifting of 
paradigm in the sense that not (equal) hurting of offenders but restitution of 
victims is sought and, thus, ‘Equality of justice means equal treatment of 
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victims’.133 Human rights should be equally enforced and respected.134 Thus, the 
restorative justice paradigm acknowledges inter alia a victim’s right to receive 
reparations from the party responsible and, hence, equality of justice demands 
equal enforcement of each individual victim’s right to restitution.135 
Seventh, even though the previous arguments are arguably and mainly 
supported by the natural law theory and constructive interpretivism, it is also 
possible to justify the shift of paradigms under legal positivism.136 As known, 
under the philosophy of legal positivism, what the state establishes as law, 
provided that all the correct political proceedings were adopted, is law and 
therefore whatever the state says is law, is law.137 Following the legal positivism 
philosophy, by shifting the criminal justice from only the retributive/utilitarian 
paradigm to also include the restorative paradigm, the state would have to 
enforce individual rights via, for example, the recovery of individual damages.138 
Moreover, since internal aspiration to do the morally right thing, community 
values and fear of community’s disapproval are among the most important 
elements of compliance with law,139 a criminal justice system that is also guided 
by the restorative justice paradigm is strengthened.  
The previous arguments justified/justify, from a philosophical 
perspective, the shift from a criminal justice system exclusively led by 
retributive/utilitarian paradigms to a system led by mixed paradigms as it 
incorporates restorative justice elements and, thus, is also led by the restorative 
justice paradigm. Through the inclusion of restorative justice elements, the 
deficiencies of criminal justice system may to an important extent be amended. 
Thus, as powerfully illustrated by Zehr, whereas justice only led by 
retributive/utilitarian paradigms was envisioned as the blindfolded goddess with 
balance in hand and impersonal, by the incorporation of restorative justice 
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paradigm elements to the criminal system, justice may be imagined as healing a 
wound.140  
 
2.1.6. Victims’ Rights Movement   
In addition to the restorative justice paradigm, the emergence of the so-called 
victims movement in the 1960s and 1970s have left an impact on new 
approaches to victim’s status in criminal justice as evidenced by two important 
components of this movement: victimology and feminist theories. Victimology, 
as a new discipline emerging out of criminology,141 proved to be important to 
strengthen the status of victims. Victimology shares with restorative justice 
paradigm a focus on and highlights victims’ participation in criminal 
proceedings. The role of the victim in the criminal incident and criminal 
proceedings called for increased rights of victims of crimes.142 The increase in 
popularity of this discipline responded to victims’ desires of re-emergence of 
restitution remedies and increase in victims’ participation in the criminal justice 
process.143 Victimology was accordingly seen in England, Australia, United States 
and Canada as an opportunity to discuss victims’ status away ‘from the 
normative tenets of criminology – criminal deviance and control’.144 Victimology 
considers that the crime victim has been neglected as a relevant actor in criminal 
justice. Victimology spawned academic reflexion as for victim’s status in 
criminal justice and also triggered state concern over the situation of victims in 
criminal proceedings. For example, in the United States, the victims’ rights 
movement was decisive to reach the President’s Task-Force on Victims of Crime 
in 1982 during the Reagan’s administration and with mandate to ‘address the 
needs of millions of Americans and their families who are victimized by 
crime’.145 Accordingly, victimology helped to realise the intrinsic relationship 
between victims and the criminal justice system.     
Feminist concerns also catalyze victims’ rights movement as, alongside 
homicide and assaults, rape and domestic violence constituted the first organized 
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victims groups of the 1970s. Women’s movement first focused on victims of 
domestic violence and sexual assault.146 Rape crisis groups were set as an 
organized support structure, based on the feminist ideals of the emancipation of 
women from the oppression of male hegemony.147 Much more recently, state 
agencies such as the United Kingdom Home Office have recognized how female 
violence victims can be accommodated by alternative rights agencies.148 The 
reasons underlying a search for non-judicial mechanisms in cases of domestic 
violence is explained by the Home Office as follows ‘the interests of the victim 
are important; they cannot however, be the final word on the subject of 
prosecution’.149 This represents a balance and cautious approach towards 
victims’ needs and sorrow without overinflating their status. 
  
2.1.7. Some Landmarks on Victims’ Status in the International Law Scenario  
The restorative justice paradigm and victims’ rights movement impacted not 
only at the domestic but also at the international level. Certain developments at 
the UN during the 1970s and early 1980s paved the way to the adoption of the 
UN General Assembly Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power (UN Victims’ Declaration),150 which has been 
considered as the Magna Carta for victims.151 In fact, the UN Victims’ 
Declaration was the first international instrument that explicitly established 
victims’ rights to access to justice and to receive reparations for the harm they 
suffered.152 Victims as defined in this declaration are:  
 
persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical 
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment 
of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of 
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criminal laws operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing 
criminal abuse of power.153 
 
This definition has been influential in the definition of victim under the 
ICC RPE as seen later.154 States are under the UN Victims’ Declaration 
recommended to: i) adopt measures to improve victims’ access to justice and fair 
treatment, ii) allow restitution from the offender and state compensation, iii) 
treat victims with dignity and respect, iv) provide information to the victims of 
their respective rights, and v) provide overall assistance.155 The UN Victims’ 
Declaration also exhorts States to criminalize abuse of power violations, provide 
remedies for harm inflicted and provide for social services.156   
  Victims accordingly include victims of crimes committed by state or 
private actors and victims include not only direct victims but also, where 
appropriate, immediate family members, dependents and those individuals who 
intervened in order to assist victims or prevent victimization.157 Victims indeed 
may be identified even when a perpetrator is unidentified.158 However, the UN 
Victims’ Declaration does not provide for rights of specific involvement in the 
trial such as the right to bring evidence although, for example, the Handbook on 
Justice for Victims interprets the Declaration as requiring States to provide some 
sort of review mechanism to challenge the decision not to prosecute.159 In any 
case, the wording of the Victims’ Declaration is broad enough to enable States to 
adapt their systems to implement the general aim of protection imbedded in the 
declaration. Be that as it may, the Victims’ Declaration constitutes an 
international law hallmark in enhancing victims status in criminal justice as 
victims’ right to present their views and concerns at certain stages of criminal 
proceedings was enunciated for first time at the international level. In spite of its 
soft-law nature, the UN Victims’ Declaration has influenced courts’ decisions 
dealing with victims’ status and has triggered similar processes of subsequent 
resolutions on victims’ status, which reveals certain consensus across common 
law and civil law jurisdictions on victims’ status.  
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 As a follow-up to the adoption of the UN Victims’ Declaration, a study 
on the status of the right to reparation for victims of human rights violations was 
commissioned to Professor Theo Van Boven by the then Sub-Commission on 
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Final version 
of the Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was submitted in 1997,160 and later, under 
Professor Cherif Bassiouni, continued and completed.161 After consultation with 
international actors, on 16 December 2005 the General Assembly finally adopted 
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines).162 The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines adopted a victim-based 
perspective in order to provide ‘mechanisms, modalities, procedures and 
methods’ for implementing existing international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law obligations.163   
Under the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, victims are:  
 
[…] persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical 
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment 
of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross 
violations of international human rights violations or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.164  
 
Immediate family members of the direct victim and persons who have 
suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent 
victimization also fall in this instrument’s definition of victims.165 Drafted in a 
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broad language, the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines call remedies for victims 
of serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations. This 
explains why they have been regarded as a Bill of Rights for victims of grave 
international crimes even though it does not create substantive international or 
national legal obligations.166   
In spite of the absence of a direct call for victims’ participation, the UN 
Basic Principles and Guidelines focus on three victims’ rights: i) equal and 
effective access to justice; ii) adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm 
suffered; and iii) the right to truth.167 Be that as it may, it is argued herein that 
these rights generally speaking correspond to the three dimensions of victims’ 
status, i.e., victims’ status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and 
reparations claimants as discussed in this thesis. Aspects relevant to the right to 
truth and especially the right to reparation are examined later.168 As for the right 
to access to justice, the State has to meet its obligation to investigate, prosecute 
and punish perpetrators of serious human rights and international humanitarian 
law violations as well as victims hold an individual right to enforce that 
obligation. The right to access to justice, as Bassiouni states, is hence the ‘right to 
be heard and the right to an effective remedy’.169  
 At the regional level, in Europe in particular, some important 
developments have also taken place. The Council of Europe Recommendation 
(85) 11 on the Position of the Victims in the Framework of Criminal Law and 
Procedure (CoE Recommendation (85) 11)170 constituted an important first step 
to enhance victims’ status in the Council of Europe as recommended the States 
Members of the Council to review their legislation and practice so that, inter 
alia: i) victims are informed of the final decision concerning prosecution and can 
ask for a review thereof; ii) questioning of the victims be conducted with due 
respect to their rights and dignity; iii) victims’ information of the court 
proceedings; and iv) the possibility for victims to obtain compensation from the 
offenders as outcome of the criminal process.171 Although of a soft-law nature, 
the Recommendation, as concluded by Brienen and Hoegen, ‘has had an impact 
on the vast majority of criminal systems of the Council of Europe’s Member 
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States’.172 The Netherlands and England and Wales best implemented the 
Recommendation, which demonstrated that the best practices do not depend on 
a specific legal system.173 However, it was also concluded that no country 
implemented the Recommendation perfectly.174  
The European Union has also contributed to enhance the victims’ status 
in criminal proceedings via its Council’s Framework Decision on the Standing of 
Victims in Criminal Proceedings (EU Framework Decision on Victims),175 
replaced by the Directive Establishing Minimum Standards on the Rights, 
Support and Protection of Victims of Crime of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (EU Directive on Victims) issued on 25 October 2012.176 The EU 
Framework Decision on Victims was the first ‘hard-law’ international 
instrument on victims’ status in criminal proceedings.177 Victim was defined as ‘a 
natural person who has suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, 
emotional suffering or economic loss, directly caused by acts or omissions that 
are in violation of the criminal law of a Member State’.178 The EU Framework 
Decision on Victims approached matters forcefully and speedily as set one-year 
time limit to implement most of its provisions, which provided for, inter alia, 
these victims’ rights: i) right to respect and recognition at all stages of the 
criminal proceedings; ii) right to receive information about the case, in 
particular, right to be provided with information by those responsible for 
decisions relating to the case; iii) right to protection for victims’ privacy and their 
physical safety; and iv) right to compensation from the offender.179 Attention 
should be drawn to the European Commission Report on the compliance with 
the Framework Decision on Victims, which concluded that ‘No Member State 
can claim to have transported all the obligations arising from the Framework 
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decision, and no Member State has correctly transported the First paragraph of 
Article 2’.180 The latter holds particular significance as that paragraph is generally 
speaking the root of all other concrete victims’ rights.181 This led to turn the 
principles of the Framework Decision on Victims into a directive,182 i.e., the EU 
Directive on Victims, which contains uniform rules for Member States and 
requires direct implementation in domestic law.183 Otherwise, a complaint can be 
filed before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It should be remembered that 
directives like framework decisions are binding as to the effect to be achieved but 
both leave the choice concerning the form and method to the Member States; 
however, unlike directives, framework decisions were not capable of direct effect 
and, therefore, only subject to the ECJ’s optional jurisdiction,184 and enforcement 
proceedings could be not taken by the European Commission in case of a failure 
to transpose the framework decision into national law.185 Victims under the EU 
Directive on Victims are defined as: 
 
(i) a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical, mental or 
emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused by a criminal 
offence;  
(ii) family members of a person whose death was directly caused by a criminal 
offence and who have suffered harm as a result of that person's death […];186 
 
The EU Directive on Victims further developed the rights contained in 
the EU Framework Decision on Victims, including among others: i) right to 
receive information about their case; ii) right to be heard, i.e., victims may be 
heard and may provide evidence; iii) right to return of property; iv) right to 
compensation from the offender; and v) right to protection, including protection 
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of victims with specific needs.187 Rights to understand/be understood and to 
interpretation/translation are also explicitly recognized.188 Like the EU 
Framework Decision on Victims,189 the EU Directive on Victims does not 
directly oblige States to grant victims the civil party status.190 However, the 
catalogue of victims’ rights under both instruments has certainly contributed to 
enhance one or more dimensions of the victims’ status, i.e., inter alia, as 
witnesses or civil parties, existent in EU national systems. The provisions of the 
EU Framework Decision on Victims and the EU Directive on Victims are 
detailed in this thesis, where relevant, when examining the English system.                         
Lastly, but equally important, relevant developments on victims’ status at 
the international human rights bodies, in particular the ECtHR and IACtHR, are 
examined as follows and, some of them, in further detail in later parts of this 
thesis. To begin with, it should be mentioned herein in general terms that 
victims’ status in criminal proceedings of serious human rights violations such as 
torture, arbitrary/extrajudicial execution and enforced disappearance of persons 
has been enhanced by international human rights bodies. These developments 
correspond to victims’ rights underlying the victims’ status as witnesses, victim 
participants/civil parties and reparations claimants.     
Thus, the ECtHR, in cases relating to violations of article 2 (right to life), 
article 3 (prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) read 
together with articles 6 (right to a fair trial), and 13 (right to an effective 
remedy), has regarded those provisions as granting victims certain participatory 
rights.191 Victims’ legitimate interest in serious human rights violations cases, i.e., 
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‘their close and personal concern with the subject matter of the inquiry […] to 
safeguard their interests’,192 has been explicitly referred to by the ECtHR as a 
ground for their involvement in criminal proceedings. The ECtHR has identified 
as victims’ rights the following.  
First, right to be informed of how proceedings are progressing and the 
respective decisions.193 Indeed, the right to information has been regarded as 
crucial under the ECtHR’s case law. Second, right to be heard during criminal 
proceedings, including investigation,194 and regardless of whether the State in 
question belongs to the civil or common law system.195 Third, right to have 
access to case files although this can be limited during the investigation due to 
potential prejudicial effects to other individuals and investigations.196 The 
ECtHR has found state responsibility when victims (and their families) were not 
given access to the investigation and other court documents.197 Fourth, right to 
be informed by the Prosecutor of his/her decision not to prosecute in serious 
human rights violations cases so that the victim can challenge (appeal) this 
decision.198 Accordingly, the ECtHR has found violations of article 2 of the 
ECHR when the State did not inform direct victims and/or their next-of-kin of 
decisions not to carry out prosecution.199 Fifth, dead victim’s relatives should be 
involved in the investigation without necessarily being civil parties,200 which is 
particularly important in civil law countries.201 Sixth, in an investigation, right to 
access witness statements before the appearance of the witness.202   
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In addition, the ECtHR has stressed the importance of the victim’s right 
to claim reparations in national proceedings, based on article 13 of the ECHR.203  
Furthermore, the ECtHR has found the application of article 6 (1) (right to a fair 
trial) concerning the civil party participation in criminal trials;204 however, this is 
subject to the condition according to which such proceedings must be decisive 
for the compensation of damages that victims suffered as result of the crime,  
which has been criticized as a restrictive interpretation.205      
In interpreting article 8 (right to fair trial) and article 25 (right to judicial 
protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),206 the 
IACtHR has in cases of enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killings and torture 
recognized inter alia the following aspects. First, the right of victims’ relatives to 
criminal investigation, prosecution, punishment and compensation:   
 
[right of the victim’s relatives] to have his disappearance and death to effectively 
investigated by the […] authorities; to have those responsible prosecuted for 
committing said unlawful acts; to have the relevant punishment, where 
appropriate, meted out; and to be compensated for the damages and injuries 
they sustained.207  
 
Second, victims’ rights to be heard and act in the respective 
proceedings,208 and, in particular, the right to a hearing, as developed by the 
IACtHR’s case law in application of article 8 (1) of the ACHR, has included inter 
alia the following elements: i) a person’s access to the state body or tribunal in 
charge of determining his/her rights and obligations;209 ii) in cases of amnesty 
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203 ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey, Appl. No. 22729/93, Judgment, 19 February 1998, para. 107.  
204 ECtHR, Perez v. France, Appl. No. 47287/99, Judgment, 12 February 2004, paras. 62-63.  
205 Ochoa (2013) 127. 
206 For a detailed analysis of the IACtHR’s case law on the rights to fair trial and judicial protection 
see, e.g., Elizabeth Salmón Gárate and Cristina Blanco, El Derecho al Debido Proceso en la 
Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (IDEHPUCP/Pontificia 
Universidad Católica del Perú 2012); and Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen and Amaya Úbeda, The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2011) 641-691.      
207 IACtHR, Case of Blake v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment of 24 January 1998, Series C No. 36, 
para. 97. 
208 IACtHR, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits. 
Judgment of 19 November 1999, Series C No. 63, para. 27.  
209 IACtHR, Case of Aptiz Barbera (First Court of Administrative Proceedings) et al. v. Venezuela, 
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 5 August 2008, Series C No. 
182, para. 72; IACtHR, Case of Cabrera García y Montiel Flores v. Mexico, Judgment of 26 
November 2010, Series C No. 220, para. 140. It should be added that, depending on the kind of 
proceedings, the right to a hearing does not necessarily have to be exercised orally in all 
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laws applied to serious human rights violations, these laws were considered as 
obstacles to the right to a hearing as they prevented victims’ next of kin and 
surviving victims from being heard by a judge, from judicial protection (article 
25 of the ACHR), and from resorting to an effective and adequate remedy to 
redress the violations perpetrated and to know the truth;210 iii) victims’ relatives 
to a hearing in cases of enforced disappearance of persons as previously 
examined; and iv) sexual violence victims’ right to a hearing, including special 
protective measures, as examined later.211          
Third, victims’ access to a criminal process conducted with due process 
guarantees.212 Indeed, the IACtHR has recognized that the right to a fair trial 
‘includes victims’ relatives right to judicial guarantees, and specifically to a 
criminal investigation for the purpose of identifying and, when appropriate, 
prosecuting and punishing those responsible’.213  
Therefore, under the IACtHR’s robust case law, victims of serious 
human rights violations or their next of kin ‘should have substantial possibilities 
of being heard and acting in the respective proceedings, both in order to clarify 
the facts and punish those responsible, and to seek due reparation’.214 The legal 
bases for victims’ participation in criminal proceedings in cases of serious 
human rights violations, under the IACtHR’s case law, have been said to be: i) 
the right to a fair hearing (article 8 (1) of the ACHR); ii) the right to judicial 
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February 2011, Series C No. 221, para. 239. See also Salmón Gárate and Blanco (2012) 110-111. For 
further discussion on amnesty laws, see Juan Pablo Pérez León Acevedo and Dan Kulawi, ‘Smoke 
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211 See infra Chapter III 3.3.2. 
212 IACtHR, Case of Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment of 25 November 2000, 
Series C No. 70, paras. 182-196; Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Merits, Judgment of 16 
August 2000, Series C No. 68, paras. 111-130.  
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protection (article 25 of the ACHR); and iii) the victims’ right to know the 
truth.215 Victims’ right to state reparations for serious human rights violations is 
based on article 63 (1) of the ACHR and, as observed, the IACtHR has 
acknowledged victims’ right to receive reparations related to criminal 
proceedings.     
However, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has adopted a more 
cautious approach. Even though the HRC has concluded that victims’ right to an 
effective remedy obliges States to investigate and prosecute human rights 
violations, it has considered that the ICCPR provides for neither a private right 
to demand criminal prosecutions nor a right to participate in the criminal 
proceedings.216 Despite this, the HRC has considered that the right to an effective 
remedy requires States to conduct prosecutions in cases of serious human rights 
violations and to provide compensation to the victims.217 Also, the HRC has 
concluded that States should give information to the victim concerning the 
violation as a manner to provide an effective remedy.218 Additionally, articles 13 
and 14 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and interpreted by the Committee Against 
Torture (CAT), provides for victims’ rights to a prompt and impartial 
investigation and to redress and adequate compensation.219   
In turn, although the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 
its article 7 (1) refers to the right to a fair trial ‘Every individual shall have the 
right to have his cause heard’, this treaty does not provide for the right to a 
victims’ effective remedy. This has led to quite limited case law from the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHR),220 situation not helped 
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by the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. Indeed, the ACmHR (in an 
individual case) only once explicitly concluded that the victims’ right to criminal 
proceedings access is included within the right to a fair hearing.221 It is, however, 
expected that the Court, or what, in the future, will be the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, will follow the jurisprudential developments on 
victims’ status from the other regional systems, especially in cases of serious 
human rights violations.  
At this point, it should be reminded that victims at international and 
regional human rights mechanisms hold primarily the status of parties to the 
cases litigated against an alleged defendant State.222 Also, whereas victims can 
directly access the ECtHR (after having met the respective admissibility 
requirements), victims cannot do it at the IACtHR and at the African Court on 
Human and People’s Rights that depends on a State’s optional declaration.223  
With regard to victims’ participation in criminal proceedings 
regulations/references under international instruments, international/regional 
human rights instruments and regional human rights courts’ decisions, it has 
been observed that they: i) barely dictate participation during specific criminal 
proceedings and, considering the wide diversity existent in national legal systems 
and in their approaches to victims’ status in criminal proceedings, victims’ rights 
are worded in a broad manner, setting minimum standards for States to meet; ii) 
provide wide reference to domestic law and practice; and iii) it has been 
preferred victims’ participation during early phases in criminal proceedings, as a 
way to ensure that States are adequately investigating and prosecuting alleged 
violations, rather than giving victims the right to be involved in decision-making 
such as sentencing.224 
Be that as it may, victims’ rights in criminal proceedings under, inter 
alia, the international sources surveyed in this sub-section include among others: 
the right to investigation and to prosecution, the right to effective access to law 
and justice, the right to be heard, the right to protection of their dignity and 
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security, the right to information, the right to truth, and the right to 
reparations.225 These rights underlie the victims’ status as witnesses, victim 
participants/civil parties and reparations claimants.         
 
2.2. Victims’ Status in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems  
Since the terms adversarial and inquisitorial are used to describe criminal justice 
systems, a general consideration thereof is necessary. Accordingly, in this 
section, the notion of adversarial and inquisitorial systems is presented. Then, 
victims’ status under each system is examined here in a general manner.  
 
2.2.1. Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems in General  
The two leading legal traditions considered in this thesis are the common law or 
Anglo-American and civil law, Romano-Germanic or European Continental law. 
The civil law tradition is the oldest and prevailing legal tradition worldwide.226 In 
turn, the common law tradition, original from England, is now present in 
countries like the United States, Canada and Australia. Whereas the adversarial 
system is also named as the common law or Anglo-American system, the 
inquisitorial system is also referred to as the continental European system.227 To 
be more accurate, however, it should be noticed that the ‘adversarial’ and 
‘inquisitorial’ terms refer to the procedural features of the (criminal justice) 
system and are not necessarily related to their historical origins. Damaška 
describes the adversarial system as ‘a mode of proceedings [that] takes its shape 
from a contest or dispute: it unfolds as an engagement of two adversaries before 
a relatively passive decision maker whose principal duty is to reach a verdict’.228 
In turn, Damaška presents the gist of a non-adversarial system as ‘an official 
inquiry’.229 However, Damaška himself acknowledges that the classification of a 
national system as inquisitorial or adversarial is difficult as ‘criteria remain 
uncertain for the inclusion of specific features into the adversarial and the 
inquisitorial types’.230 Moreover, adversarial features have been adopted 
 
225 For a further discussion, see Carlos Fernández de Casadevante Romani, International Law of 
Victims (Springer 2012) 133- 243.  
226 John Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal System of Western 
Europe and Latin America (2nd ed., Stanford University Press 1985) 1-3.   
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positively by inquisitorial systems and vice-versa.231 It is clear that a purely 
adversarial or inquisitorial system does not exist and, accordingly, references to a 
particular national system as either adversarial or inquisitorial must be 
understood as predominantly adversarial or inquisitorial. A very brief 
presentation of the main features of both systems follows which, where relevant, 
is discussed in a larger detail in other sections of this thesis when examining the 
English, American and French criminal justice systems.      
As for the role of the judge, in an adversarial system, this plays a 
function similar to a referee deciding on mainly procedural issues brought up by 
the parties and is passive in the search for truth. This general idea has to be 
nuanced as the judges may call and examine witnesses as evidenced in England 
and Wales,232 and the United States.233 In any case, the (relatively) passive role 
played by the judges matches the active role by the parties, the assumption that 
the tension between two equally armed parties will lead to the truth,234 and the 
role assumed by lay-men jury as fact-finders. In the inquisitorial system, 
professional judges are active in seeking for the truth.235 Thus, (s)he can 
interrogate the accused and witnesses as well as order the production of evidence 
and remains in control of the proceedings. The access to the dossier, i.e., a report 
of the pre-trial investigations prepared by the prosecutor or the pre-trial judge 
and unknown in the adversarial system, by not only the parties but also the 
judge, enables the latter to control the trial proceedings. Unlike the adversarial 
system, the judges normally play an important role during pre-trial under the 
inquisitorial model. For instance, the French juge d’instruction (investigating 
judge), who decides whether the evidence collected is enough for trial. It is 
important to note that while the defendant in the adversarial system is in 
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principle entitled to be tried by jury, juries are known in the inquisitorial system 
but most of the cases are under the competence of professional judges.236            
 With regard to the position of the parties, in the adversarial system, they 
present their respective case during the trial and in a public hearing with the goal 
to persuade the jury to take a favorable decision for either party. This dominant 
role relies on their intensive fact-finding activities during pre-trial.237 There is 
also a strict order, separating evidence introduced by the prosecution and the 
defence as the parties present their respective cases. The central role assigned to 
the parties in the adversarial system explains why trials in abstentia are generally 
inadmissible,238 and also the traditional decisive impact of the plea entered by the 
defendant on what proceedings should follow later, i.e., bringing the trial to 
sentencing.239 Additionally, the defendant may defend himself/herself in court 
and present his/her case but (s)he is limited to presentation of facts to his/her 
personal knowledge, i.e., (s)he can do so if (s)he decides to testify as witness of 
his/her own case and, thus, is cross-examined by the prosecution.240 Under the 
inquisitorial system, the parties may introduce additional evidence and suggest 
supplementary investigations but it is the judge who dominates the trial.241 Thus, 
the parties mainly supplement investigation, make observations and present 
their opinions. There is no distinction between evidence filed by the prosecutor 
and that by the defence because there are not two cases but only one. Parties’ 
relatively passive roles in inquisitorial systems underlie the common use of trials 
in abstentia although the right of the accused to be present at trial is 
recognized.242 In inquisitorial systems, judges’ active role makes them hear 
evidence even when the accused confessed although this certainly shapes the 
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procedures to be followed, and the defendant can be questioned by the court, 
prosecutor and defence councel and (s)he is not even allowed to take an oath.243 
Accordingly, the difference with the adversarial system is not on whether the 
defendant is obliged or allowed to speak in his/her defence but on what capacity 
does it.244 Victims’ status is discussed in the next sub-section.       
Concerning the rules of evidence, adversarial systems normally follow 
much stricter evidentiary rules than those used in inquisitorial systems.245 
Whether evidence introduced by one of the parties can be admitted or should be 
excluded becomes the main issue and its admissibility depends on factors such as 
content of evidence, how the information was obtained and its protection as well 
as its presentation in court.246 Evidentiary rules work as mechanisms at trial, 
which enable to keep the parties on the right track of presenting evidence. Even 
though the parties traditionally are not obliged to disclose results of pre-trial 
investigations, the court can assist parties via necessary coercive measures.247 
There has been progress via expansion and codification of disclosure obligations 
in adversarial systems.248 Variations within the adversarial model are related to a 
defence’s reciprocal obligation to disclose.249 Disclosure is, in any case, a vital 
issue in an adversarial model. In inquisitorial systems, trial judges normally have 
a dossier at hand making it easy to call for evidence just by referring to the 
dossier whereas adversarial-system lawyers can only speak of potential evidence. 
However, the contents of the dossier may be subject to dispute during trial. The 
so-called principle of ‘free proof’ is normally present in inquisitorial national 
systems.250 Rules of evidence in inquisitorial systems primarily constitute a 
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normative instrument for the judge to evaluate dossier contents and what was 
presented at trial.251 Results of pre-trial investigations are already disclosed when 
inserted in the dossier.        
 Among other features, it is pointed out that whereas the process in 
adversarial systems is normally divided between the trial phase, i.e., 
determination of guilt or innocence, and a later sentencing phase, in inquisitorial 
systems material for both conviction and sentence is usually examined and 
decided together.252 When it comes to appeals, the adversarial system limits it. 
Indeed, the right to appeal is not regarded as an essential part of the due 
process.253 When implemented, the appeals phase does not mean a trial de novo 
but consists in examining the court record to find errors claimed by the 
appellant.254 In contrast with the adversarial model, defence and prosecutor in 
the inquisitorial system can normally appeal and this consists in a full re-hearing 
of the case which may lead to replacement of the trial judgment.255 Thus, the 
appeals phase consists in principle of a trial de novo and is granted more 
generously.       
 
2.2.2. Victims’ Status  
Whereas in both adversarial and inquisitorial systems the parties to a criminal 
case are by definition the prosecution and the defence, victims’ status changes 
under one or the other system. In the adversarial system, victims were originally 
given a central role.256 However, this situation changed from the beginning of the 
eighteenth century when the State assumed the role once granted to the victim in 
the prosecution and victims’ interest were relegated to ‘a subservient position to 
those of the State’.257 The contemporary adversarial system is, thus, built on the 
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premise of a contest between the prosecution (State) and the defendant.258 
Hence, victims’ rights and interests are automatically excluded and they do not 
hold a status of parties to the proceedings.259 Accordingly, victims have 
traditionally and primarily played the passive role of witnesses during trial in 
adversarial systems. Victims can also play a limited role as a private prosecutor 
in certain crimes as detailed in the next section. Nevertheless, there have been 
important reforms across the common law world to enhance victims’ status,260 
such as the United States Federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).261 Thus, 
although victims are not civil parties or official victim participants, certain 
‘participation’ to voice their own interests and concerns and not as mere 
witnesses is possible but only during some specific procedural stages, sentencing 
in particular, via victims’ impact statements (e.g., United States) or victims’ 
personal statements (e.g., England).262   
In the adversarial system, even though victims are not properly speaking 
reparations claimants in criminal proceedings,263 they can still receive 
reparations as an outcome of the criminal trial, e.g., via compensation orders to 
be paid by the convicted.264 Victims can also rely on extra-criminal proceedings 
such as state funds and torts; however, some state compensation programs were 
said to frustrate many victims rather than appease them, which was worsened by 
their treatment as ‘third parties’ to the crime.265 The points mentioned in this 
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Publishing Company 1985) 3.  
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paragraph are dealt with in detail when examining the English and American 
adversarial systems.  
 What can be left clear here is the victims’ lack of power, especially the 
prosecution process, compared to their once exclusive status as private 
prosecutors in the adversarial system.266 Legislative amendments of the common 
law and executive measures adopted in the last years have certainly enhanced 
victims’ status in adversarial national systems, and these should encourage 
further discussion of the victim’s status in the adversarial system as a ‘significant 
constitutive agent of the justice system’.267 Nevertheless, regardless of 
improvements on victims’ status, victims are still largely excluded from the 
process, especially in comparison with inquisitorial systems. Additionally, their 
chances to claim and/or receive reparations from the offender are quite limited 
or inexistent.268 This situation is rooted in factors such as the still predominant 
perception of victims as mere ‘evidentiary cannon fodder’,269 and the absence of a 
victims’ right to be heard to provide their own narrative account.270 Thus, a 
significant proportion of victims have been dissatisfied with the manner that 
they are treated by the criminal justice system.271 Victims in adversarial systems 
have in most of the cases and traditionally been denied a proactive and 
meaningful role under the adversarial logics of a State vs. defendant dispute 
where victims are ‘conscripted’ into an operational role and mostly treated as 
servants or agents of the criminal justice system.272 Moreover, cross-examination, 
i.e., the questioning of a witness by a party other than the one who called 
him/her to testify,273 and orality, quintessential features of adversarial system 
litigation, have been said to lead to secondary victimization.274 This is 
particularly serious inasmuch as even when victims play their traditionally 
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communitarian control’ in Susan Miller (ed.), Crime Control and Women: Feminist Implications 
of Criminal Justice Policy (Sage 1998), 151, 154).  
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assigned and limited role of witnesses in an adversarial system, their status could 
be worsened rather than strengthened.    
Increasing adoption of pro-victim measures in adversarial systems to 
enable a larger participation of victims has also raised the question of whether 
victims would ‘potentially cause immense structural and normative problems 
within any adversarial system’ as this is construed as a confrontation of two 
parties.275 Current developments adopted to enhance victims’ status are 
illustrated later by references to the English and American systems, which allow 
to identify what victim-friendly measures have been undertaken and their 
impact on the victims’ status. It should be borne in mind that, after all, the 
victims’ right movement had their roots in common law jurisdictions.         
 In contrast to adversarial systems, victims’ status in inquisitorial systems 
is normally and at least in theory stronger. Accordingly, victims can appear at 
court not only as an information provider (witness) but also as an individual 
who suffered harm and has the right to be heard (victim as such).276 Concerning 
the latter, the role of victim as a partie civile (civil party) is the most common 
and this allows the victim to attach his/her civil claim for compensation to the 
state criminal proceedings.277 In this manner, the victim becomes a full-fledged 
party in the criminal proceedings,278 i.e., on an equal standing than the 
prosecutor and defence. As a civil party, the victim holds a set of procedural 
rights such as i) the right to call witnesses, ii) ask questions, iii) make closing 
arguments, and iv) the right to claim reparations at the end of the criminal 
proceedings.279 One of the axioms underlying the inquisitorial system, namely, 
the search for the truth, explains this central role granted to victims, who are 
indeed encouraged to participate so that the judicial bench can reach a more 
accurate judgment.280 The role of the victim in inquisitorial systems is, hence, 
directly connected with the inquisitorial judge’s role in finding the truth. 
 Moreover, victims within inquisitorial systems can challenge the 
prosecutorial discretion to forgo prosecution. Victims can accordingly launch on 
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275 Jonathan Doak, ‘Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials’, (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 294, 
297.  
276 See, in general, Brienen and Hoegen (2000). 
277 Ibid., 129 and 320.  
278 Mirjan Damaška (1986) 200, 212-213.  
279 Mirjan Damaška, ‘The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and 
Continental Experiments’ (2007) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 839, 841. 
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their own motion prosecution, e.g., France,281 often limited to certain minor 
offences though or appeal the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute, e.g., 
Germany.282 This avenue of action is not only symbolically important but also 
enables victims to use the state apparatus to begin investigations leading towards 
reparations. Thus, for example, investigations against the former dictator 
Augusto Pinochet for serious human rights violations were initiated by victims 
in Spain and Chile, both civil law countries.283 It should, however, be mentioned 
that victims not always constitute official parties to the proceedings.284   
 As part of the preparation of the dossier, witnesses’ statements are placed 
in it. Moreover, in case the victim wants someone to be interviewed, his/her legal 
counsel brings the name of such potential witness to the investigatory authority, 
i.e., either the investigating judge or the prosecutor. A narrative testimony 
characterizes inquisitorial trial proceedings and aims at presenting unrehearsed 
and un-manipulated evidence.285 This allows the victim to speak ‘more naturally’, 
in a narrative manner, unlike their interventions as cross-examined witnesses in 
adversarial systems. Additionally, the likelihood of secondary victimization is 
reduced by the fact that judges, and not the defence, are those who decide which 
witnesses are called to trial and, especially, how those are questioned.286 
Combined guilt and sentence phases may also be considered as another victim-
friendly inquisitorial feature inasmuch as victims will always be asked the impact 
of the crime on them during the determination of guilt.  
As presented, victims’ status in inquisitorial systems is multifaceted and 
enhanced. Victims can thus intervene to voice their own concerns and needs as 
parties to criminal proceedings during trial and even participate prior to it by 
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Transitional Justice in the Age of Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press 2005).  
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System’ in Delmas-Marty and Spencer (2002) 292, 301.    
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requesting investigations. In addition, victims’ participation as witnesses 
normally runs smoothly and they have the possibility to adhere a reparations 
claim to the criminal proceedings, bringing civil and criminal claims at the same 
time. Therefore, the inquisitorial system can be considered as more appropriate 
to enhance victims’ status in criminal proceedings as ‘it has the major advantage 
of allowing the victims to have a voice in the criminal process and of granting 
him several participatory rights in the pre-trial stages’.287 The dimensions of the 
victims’ status in the inquisitorial system are illustrated later with the French 
system.         
     
2.3. Victims’ Status in National Criminal Proceedings: Overview of National 
Models  
This section presents an overview of models of victims’ role/victims’ 
participation in national criminal systems. It is important to mention that a 
victim can normally play one or more of these roles in the same national system, 
either adversarial or inquisitorial. The elements examined in this section are 
much further discussed when examining the three dimensions of victims’ status 
as proposed in this thesis. 
 
2.3.1. Civil Party 
As already said, civil party or partie civile, in French, characterizes civil law 
jurisdictions.288 Generally speaking, victims who become civil parties can initiate 
a prosecution, have active participation in the proceedings and claim reparations 
for harms suffered.289 Accordingly, victims join the criminal proceedings led by 
the public prosecutor as parties introducing a civil claim to obtain reparations 
for damages caused by the crime. By initiating an independent action before the 
juge d’instruction (constitution de partie civile), victims join the proceedings.290 
This model is also referred to as ‘adhesion model’ as victims’ claim is of a civil 
nature which is adhered to or integrated into the criminal proceedings.291 Civil 
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and 87; Procedure Criminal Code (Austria), section 47; Procedure Criminal Code (Belgium), 
articles 63, 66 and 67; and New Procedure Criminal Code (Peru), articles 98-106.    
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claimants are, hence, those individuals, i.e., direct victims, but also immediate 
relatives or dependants, ‘entitled [...] to claim compensation from the offender 
for the material and moral losses [...] caused by the offence, but who present 
their claim in criminal court’.292 Therefore, victims have the right to lead and 
challenge evidence provided that this is pertinent to the claim for damages 
against the accused.293 In general, the civil party has procedural rights during 
pre-trial and trial stages, including asking authorities to conduct certain 
investigative actions, to be questioned in presence of their legal counsels, and the 
right to appeal decisions affecting their interests.294 In general, the civil party 
constitution provides three rights to the victims: i) they can use it to initiate a 
prosecution, ii) they have the right to participate and be heard as a party in the 
prosecution, and iii) they have a right to pursue a claim for civil damages in the 
criminal action.295 This indeed allows the victim to ‘participate in the 
establishment of the truth of the facts and responsibility’.296 However, in certain 
jurisdictions, civil parties hold a limited capacity to participate as, for example, 
they cannot appeal an acquittal and are excluded from the sentencing stage.297 
Victims’ status as a civil party, at the national level, is discussed in detail when 
examining the French system later.298   
An important advantage of this model is that victims have a voice in the 
criminal process and they are granted with a set of important participatory 
rights.299 A second advantage is that victims can profit from the burden of proof 
which lies with the prosecution as opposed to victims’ situation before civil 
courts.300 This provides the victim with a relatively inexpensive, easy and quick 
proceeding to obtain reparations from the defendant as the victim does not need 
to be involved in both civil and criminal proceedings based on the same facts 
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and the same crimes/unlawful acts. On the other hand, a (potential) 
disadvantage of this model, as illustrated by the French system, is that victims’ 
participation ‘tends to be limited to the pursuit of the civil claim [for 
damages]’.301 Limitations to victims’ participation and status relate to the nature 
and objective of criminal proceedings. This may lead a criminal court to refer the 
claim to a civil court and also the termination of a criminal case puts an 
automatic end to the civil claim, which may be later filed in a civil court.302 A 
second disadvantage is that the victim needs to take the initiative and expressly 
request the court compensation, substantiate such request, and execute the 
court’s decision.303   
 
2.3.2. Private, Secondary/Subsidiary or Auxiliary Prosecutor 
Victims can also participate in criminal proceedings by contributing to the 
prosecutor. Three variants can be identified under this model. First, the private 
prosecution present in civil law jurisdictions such as Argentina,304 Belgium,305 
France,306 Spain307, and Poland,308 as well as in common law jurisdictions such as 
Australia,309 England and Wales,310 and New Zealand.311 The victim prosecutors 
possess full prosecutorial rights including bringing charges, conducting 
prosecution and deciding on its termination but they are obligated to cover trial 
costs when there is dismissal or acquittal in the case.312 Moreover, this private 
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prosecution is limited to a special category of offences, i.e., petty crimes.313 Thus, 
victims have to deal with a heavy burden of responsibility and their views may be 
regarded as revenge. This model has indeed been described as ‘an antiquated 
institution that should be supplemented with, or even replaced by, the right to 
judicial review to discontinue a prosecution’.314 Further discussion is done when 
examining the three national systems considered in this thesis. 
Second, victim as a secondary or subsidiary prosecutor, which is 
triggered by the public prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with the case,315 e.g., 
subsidiary aggrieved party in Norway,316 and the Austrian Subsidiaranklager.317 
Victims who normally have joined as civil parties can begin or take over the 
investigation and prosecution and their powers are comparable to those of the 
public prosecutor.318 However, victims are liable to pay the trial costs in case of 
acquittal, which arguably constitutes a serious disincentive.   
Third, victims can participate on the prosecution’s side as auxiliary or 
accessory prosecutors, e.g., the figure of Nebenkläger in Germany,319 and 
Austria.320 Even though most of the prosecutorial work is conducted by the 
public prosecutor, victims are entitled to: attend trial, regardless of being heard 
as witnesses; adduce additional evidence; provide input on examining a witness 
by putting questions to him/her and by contesting the admissibility of questions; 
and to be heard in court as to a charge.321 This variant may be considered as 
more balanced due to the fact that victims can express their views and concerns, 
they are also relieved from the prosecutorial burden and even run no financial 
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risk in case of acquittal. Nevertheless, some studies have concluded that this 
model is underdeveloped in Germany.322   
 
2.3.3. Victim-Witness   
The third category is found both in civil law and common law countries. As 
already said, in the latter, victims’ status is mainly limited to participate as 
witnesses during trials. This corresponds to the notion, predominant in 
adversarial criminal models, where the very idea of a victim as a legitimate 
stakeholder with rights still generates considerable contention.323 An exclusively 
adversarial trial that leads to perpetrators’ punishment may be considered as a 
wholly inadequate response to victims’ harm.324 Victims as witnesses are not 
normally granted the same rights as civil parties or private, secondary/subsidiary 
or auxiliary prosecutor. Victims as witnesses swear under oath that their 
testimony at trial is a correct account of the facts although some jurisdictions 
allow victim-witnesses to forgo testifying at trial and submit their pre-trial 
testimony instead. In any case, especially in adversarial systems, victims as 
witnesses may be re-victimized due to certain cross-examination techniques.325 
In countries where the civil party institution exists, if victims want to testify as 
witnesses and become civil parties, they have to testify first and only then can 
become civil claimants.326 This scheme corresponds to the idea that victims 
cannot be civil parties and witnesses at the same time as they may be biased in 
their testimonies. Victims’ status as witnesses at the national level is examined 
later when discussing their situation in the English, American and French 
systems. 
           
2.3.4. Complainant  
This model of participation is present in all common law and civil law 
jurisdictions as the complainant procedure, or reporting procedure,327 normally 
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kicks off an investigation.328 This investigation may later lead to the state 
decision to prosecute, in which case the victim-complainant may be called as a 
witness. Moreover, when such state prosecution does not ensue, the victim is 
allowed to force a prosecution in certain jurisdictions.329 This model of victims’ 
role/victims’ participation is important as otherwise many crimes would go 
unnoticed and not punished.330 Additionally, this model in many cases opens up 
the other modes of victims’ roles/victims’ participation presented in this 
subsection. In civil law jurisdictions, the term ‘complainant’ refers to the 
individual required by law to inform the criminal justice authorities of his/her 
wish to prosecute the offender with regard to certain specific offences.331 An 
important number of offences cannot be prosecuted if the victim has not first 
filed a complaint, which enables the victim-complainant to retain the option to 
withdraw the complaint and end the prosecution.332 In common law 
jurisdictions, the term ‘complainant’ is properly used to refer to the victim 
during the criminal proceedings and mostly used in reference to victims of 
sexual offences.333 On the other hand, the victim-complainant possesses, if any, 
few rights in common law systems. 
        
2.3.5. Impact Statement Provider or Allocution 
Influenced by the victim rights movement as a restorative justice manifestation, 
victims have been granted with limited procedural standing mainly exemplified 
by victim impact statements (VIS) in the sentencing stage in certain common 
law jurisdictions,334 for example, in most US states,335 Canada,336 England and 
Wales,337 Ireland,338 Australia,339 and New Zealand.340 Generally speaking, these 
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statements can be submitted once the accused pleads or is found guilty and 
reflect the physical and emotional harm inflicted on victims as well as loss and 
property damage caused by the crime.341 These statements are heard for 
sentencing, parole and plea bargaining purposes. Although this model does not 
necessarily provide effective power to influence the prosecutorial or adjudicative 
process and is limited in moving victims’ status forward substantially, it has met 
resistance in the jurisdictions where implemented because of due process 
concerns.342 Furthermore, some scholars have perceived it as an institutionalized 
private revenge in criminal proceedings potentially leading to disparity in 
sentences,343 insofar as ‘in the context of sentencing whose primary aim is not 
restorative [...] there must be grave doubts about allowing a victim to voice an 
opinion as to sentence’.344 Further discussion on this model of participation is 
done when examining ‘participation’ of victims during sentencing in the English 
and American systems.345   
It is important to note that in some civil law jurisdictions, like The 
Netherlands, victim statements are also used for certain kinds of crimes. Unlike 
most of the common law countries, however, Dutch judges allow defendants to 
respond via the presiding judge the statements presented by victims in court.346 
Nevertheless, in the context of combined guilt and sentencing phases, the Dutch 
system has been not particularly comfortable with victims’ statements as this 
would affect the presumption of innocence and create the impression of an 
influenced judge.347      
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339 See, Victoria: 1A of Part 6 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (L-49/1991); South Australia: section 7A 
of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988; New South Wales: sections 26 to 30A of the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (L-92/1999).  
340 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, part 22, sections 17-27.  
341 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 84. 
342 As for the situation in, for example, New Zealand, see Peter Sankoff and Lisa Wansbrough, ‘Is 
There Really a Crowd’ Thoughts about Victim Impact Statements and New Zealand’s Revamped 
Sentencing Regime’, paper submitted for the 20th International Conference of the ISRCL, 
Brisbane, Australia (July 2006) 14-19. Available at: http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2006/Sankoff.pdf 
(last visit on 12 August 2012).     
343 Ashworth (1993a) 298.     
344 Ashworth (2005) 356.   
345 See infra Chapter IV 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.  
346 See Code of Criminal Procedure and Law of 17 December 2009, article 302. Referred to by 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 85; Renée Kool and Martin Moerings, ‘The Victim Has the Floor: The 
Victim’s Right to be Heard in Writing or Orally in the Dutch Courtroom’ (2004) 12 European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 46, 54.  
347 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 86; Kool and Martin Moerings (2004) 55.     
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2.3.6. Compensation Order Beneficiary 
In common law jurisdictions, victims’ status as reparations claimants in criminal 
proceedings is unknown.348 However, victims can still receive compensation 
from the offender and be awarded it in the course of the criminal proceedings, 
which is the situation of, inter alia, Cyprus,349 Ireland350 and England and 
Wales.351 This penal sanction is known as compensation order and the victim is 
referred to as the compensation order beneficiary or compensatee.352  
An important advantage of this mode of victims’ participation is that 
victims are not required to present a claim for civil damages as compensation 
order is a penal sanction which the court may impose ex officio. A second 
connected advantage consists in that the compensation order is ‘enforced by the 
state on behalf of the compensation order beneficiary’.353 On the other hand, the 
disadvantage is that the victim generally lacks an enforceable right to be present 
and clarify his/her claim in court as this is done by the public prosecutor.354 The 
potential compensation order beneficiary totally depends on the criminal justice 
authorities and cannot intervene even when the prosecutor does not inform the 
court of the victims’ sustained losses or injuries or when victims’ interests seem 
not be represented by the prosecutor. Nevertheless, in Ireland, the victim may 
actually address the court with regard to his/her compensation claim.355 
Compensation order beneficiaries are discussed in detail when examining the 
English and the American systems.356       
 
2.4. Victims’ Status in Transitional Justice Scenarios   
Transitional justice scenarios, i.e., societies in recovery process from or still 
enduring the commission of the most serious international crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, constitute the big picture 
where international, hybrid and national criminal courts work as important but, 
by no means, unique mechanisms.357 This section discusses how feasible is to 
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348 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 28.  
349 Criminal Procedure Law, Chapter 155 of the Statute Laws of Cyprus (1948), section 324. 
350 Criminal Justice Act (1993), section 6 (1).  
351 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 130 (4).  
352 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 28.  
353 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
354 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
355 Criminal Justice Act (1993), section 6 (1). See Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 478-479. 
356 See infra Chapter V 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.  
357 Thus, ‘The notion of transitional justice […] comprises the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may 
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apply retributive/deterrent or utilitarian justice and restorative justice paradigms 
in relation to victims’ status under the described circumstances.  
 
2.4.1. Victims and Retributive/Deterrent Mechanisms in Transitional Justice 
Settings 
International criminal courts have considered retribution and deterrence as their 
most important objectives as exemplified by the ICTY:  
 
[…] the Trial Chamber deems most important the concepts of deterrence and 
retribution […] in the context of gross violations of human rights which are 
committed in peace time, but are similar in their gravity to the crimes within the 
International Tribunal’s jurisdiction, reprobation (or stigmatization) is one of 
the appropriate purposes of punishment.358  
 
The ICC in its first sentence decision in Lubanga, when discussing the 
purposes of punishment took into account the contents of the ICC Preamble: 
 
[…] which provides that “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished”. The Preamble 
further provides that the States Parties are “[d]etermined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes”. The ICC was established “to these ends and for the 
sake of present and future generations”.359 
 
In turn, the ECCC in its first judgment in Duch (Case 001) stated that 
‘While an obvious function of a sentence is to punish, its goal is not revenge’. 
The feasibility of this kind of statements should however be examined 
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include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international 
involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional 
reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof’. UN Security Council, The Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary General, 
S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 8. See also Elizabeth Salmón Gárate, ‘Reflections on 
International Humanitarian Law and Transitional Justice: Lessons to be Learnt from the Latin 
American Experience’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 327, 328.    
358 Erdemović (IT-96-22-T), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 29 November 1996, para. 64. 
See also, e.g., Kupreskić et al. (IT-95-16-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, para. 848; 
Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-A), Appeal Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, para. 806; and 
Naletilić and Matinović (IT-38-94-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 31 March 2003, para. 739. As for 
the ICTR, see, e.g., Serushago (ICTR-98-39-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 1 May 1999, para. 20.         
359 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), Decision on Sentence pursuant Article 76 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 10 July 2012, para. 16.  
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carefully.360 To begin with, true retribution via only prosecutions is almost 
always unachievable in ‘radical evil’ situations, i.e., wide-scale commission of the 
most serious international crimes.361 This is explained by the impossibility to 
impose a punishment truly proportional to very serious international crimes,362 
and as prosecutions are by definition limited and selective,363 only some ‘radical 
evil’ gets sanctioned ‘whereas much escapes its grasp’.364 The latter is itself a 
contradiction as retributive justice is grounded in the idea of giving everyone a 
just desert.365 In addition, from a pragmatic perspective, in transitional justice 
scenarios achieving retribution in itself is partially limited regardless of how 
justified the desire for retribution may be.366 This situation is also complicated by 
the fact that transitional societies have to ‘deal with ordinary crime even as they 
confront the extraordinary evil of the past’,367 which is even more dramatic in 
those frequent cases where there are still ongoing international crimes in the 
country in question. In addition to prosecution, other retributive justice 
mechanisms such as lustration, financial penalties against perpetrators and 
triggered by victims and or their heirs via civil suits, and even national truth 
commissions that may ‘generate social opprobrium’,368 do not constitute 
sanctions proportional to serious human rights and international humanitarian 
law violations.   
As for the deterrent effect, scholars like Bassiouni have argued that ‘the 
relevance of prosecution and other accountability measures to the pursuit of 
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360 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 580. 
361 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963) 193; Hannah 
Arendt, The Human Condition (1958) 241 (‘Such offences [...] transcend the realm of human 
affairs and potentialities of human power’); and Carlos Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (Yale University 
Press 1996) viii and 142.     
362 It should be mentioned that sentencing practice of international and hybrid criminal courts 
points out the need that the sentence must be proportional to the crime and individualised. See, 
e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), 10 July 2012, para. 93; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 580; Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 
Appeal Judgment, 21 July 2000, para. 249. Although this is a necessary guarantee for the accused’s 
right to a fair and impartial trial, another question is whether a punishment rendered by an 
(international or hybrid) criminal court can be really proportional to the most serious 
international crimes. 
363 Aukerman (2002) 57.  
364 Drumbl (2005) 581, 600. 
365 Aukerman (2002) 61, 63.  
366 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
367 Ibid., 62. 
368 Stephan Landsman, ‘Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution 
and Truth Commissions’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 81, 84.   
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peace is that trough their effective application they serve as deterrence, and thus 
prevent future victimization’.369 The creation of the ICTY/ICTR by the UN 
Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,370 to contribute to 
restoration and maintenance of international peace and security illustrates a 
utilitarian/deterrent aim. In principle, deterrence theory may be more consistent 
than the retributive justice paradigm in justifying exemplary punishment for just 
a few individuals as the former does not require punishment of all the offenders. 
However, it is almost impossible to determine whether the threat of prosecution 
has ever prevented potential perpetrators from committing international crimes 
against a large number of victims.371 Accordingly, deterrent mechanisms will 
solely work against some offenders and some crimes.372 The deterrent effect of 
criminal prosecution for international crimes should not be taken for granted 
and its efficacy to avoid further and new victims may be questioned.  
Limitations of restorative and utilitarian/deterrent justice paradigms are 
exemplified via the challenge from important sectors of the population in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and on the legitimacy of the ICTY and the 
ICTR.373 In spite of shortcomings, victims of the most serious international 
crimes normally have a powerful thirst for justice both in contexts of 
international and national criminal prosecutions.374 Thus, as highlighted by 
Salmón Gárate, victims of serious human rights and international humanitarian 
law violations ‘have non-negotiable moral and legal demands for the truth about 
violations and for justice, while the perpetrators are anxious to avoid 
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369 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability’ 
(1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 9, 18.  
370 See infra Chapter II 3.1.1. for further details.  
371 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: A Facing History After Genocide and 
Mass Violence (Beacon Press 1998) 27, 146. 
372 Aukerman (2002) 67, 70.  
373 See, e.g., Human Rights Center, International Human Rights Clinic, University of California & 
Centre for Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability, and Social 
Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors (2000); Kingsley Chiedu 
Moghalu, ‘Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External Perceptions of the International 
Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda’ (2002) 26 The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 21.   
374 As for victims’ perceptions of the ICC investigations and prosecutions in, for example, Uganda 
see Phuong Pham et al., Forgotten Voices: A Population-based Survey on Attitudes About Peace 
and Justice in Northern Uganda (International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)/University of 
California Berkeley Human Rights Center, January 2005). As for victims’ families persistence for 
prosecution, in national criminal justice contexts, in, for example, Argentina, see U.S. Department 
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Argentina (2006).  
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prosecution’.375 Moreover, victims and survivors have sometimes perceived 
sentences from the international criminal tribunals as too lenient.376  
 
2.4.2. Victims and Restorative Mechanisms in Transitional Justice Settings  
Restorative justice mechanisms, in particular Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRCs) and reparations programmes, allow victims to play a 
central role and to stand better chances to heal relationships between them, 
offenders, and their societies. Since international criminal justice mainly reflects 
hegemonic Western punitive criminal justice values focusing primarily on 
retribution and deterrence and only secondarily on restoration,377 TRCs may be 
more suitable to fulfil restorative justice and better voice victims’ needs and 
viewpoints. Therefore, TRCs can meaningfully contribute to the personalization, 
humanization, recognition and restoration of the dignity of the victims.378 TRCs 
and other restorative mechanisms such as traditional dispute resolution379 
focused on reconciliation of a society, victims, storytelling and reparations seem 
to be in principle a better option if the main goal is healing individuals and 
societies after the trauma of international crimes.380  
TRCs, in particular, can focus on victims and facilitate their involvement 
as well as the participation of the other actors such as perpetrators and 
victims’/perpetrators’ communities.381 TRCs are in principle an efficient means 
to bring back the conflict to those who participated in it and also the possibility 
for the officials to grieve publicly with victims in an informal process.382 By 
involving all the stakeholders of the conflict, TRCs endeavour to address the 
sorrow and harm endured by victims. As restorative justice is multidirectional,383 
TRCs consider that in contexts of serious international crimes the distinction 
between victims and perpetrators is not necessarily clear as one same individual 
may assume several roles during an armed conflict, e.g., child soldiers. The 
manner of victims’ participation in TRCs, at which victims are encouraged to 
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375 Salmón Gárate (2006) 330.  
376 See Eric Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and The Promise of Justice in The Hague (2005) 
76, 105-109. 
377 Drumbl (2005) 600, 601.  
378 Salmón Gárate (2006) 343.    
379 Drumbl (2005) 594.  
380 Minow (1998) 57.  
381 This is related to the fact that the right to truth is held not only by the direct victims and their 
relatives but also by the respective society as a whole. See Salmón Gárate (2006) 341. 
382 For example, in opinion of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission Chairperson 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu ‘a judge does not cry’. Quoted in Minow (1998) 73.     
383 Aukerman (2002) 82, 83. 
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provide their testimonies in a narrative form, is in principle a guarantee to a 
more inclusive process for victims and a safeguard against potential re-
victimization as opposed to the situation that may exist in international, hybrid 
and national criminal courts. All of this also promotes national reconciliation 
and deals with impunity in a collective rather than an individual manner as 
exemplified by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,384 and 
pointed out by Hayner.385  
Indeed, TRCs can provide a special, if not unique, platform for 
traditionally excluded victims such as women and children to be heard as the 
experiences in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Liberia have shown.386 TRCs in 
general provide a good avenue for victims’ status to be enhanced. Thus, for 
example, in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, victim 
definition included not only direct victims, either individual or collective, but 
also their relatives.387 Moreover, the principles followed by this Commission 
explicitly acknowledged: i) respect for victims’ dignity; ii) their right to 
information; iii) the protection of their privacy; and, even more importantly, iv) 
their ‘right to have their views and submissions presented and considered at 
appropriate stages of the inquiry’.388      
Even though it can be argued that TRCs are better than trials at 
addressing victims’ fear, trauma or anger,389 some studies have called into 
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384 See, e.g., South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 34 of 1995, section 3. 
Objectives of Commission: ‘The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity 
and Reconciliation’.   
385 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (Routledge 2001) 
155.    
386 The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor made a special effort to 
hold special hearings on gender issues to encourage female participation. See Clara Ramírez-Barat, 
Making an Impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Outreach Programs for 
Transitional Justice (International Center for Transitional Justice January 2011) 25.  
The commissions in Sierra Leone and Liberia are, in turn, regarded as pioneers in ensuring 
participatory process for children. Whereas in the case of Sierra Leone children were invited to 
thematic hearings, in Liberia they were invited to statement-taking and hearings on issues relevant 
to them. See UNICEF and ICTJ, Children and Truth Commissions (2010) 11. 
387 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 34 of 1995, section 1. Definitions. 
‘victims’.   
388 Ibid., sections 11 (a), 11 (d), 11 (e) and 11(d) (ii) respectively. 
389 See, e.g., Jose Zalaquett, ‘Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma 
of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations’ (1992) 43 Hastings Law Journal 
1425-1438. 
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question the role of TRCs in healing traumatized victims.390 Moreover, some 
TRCs failed in advancing victims’ needs and perspectives, e.g., the Haiti Truth 
Commission did not publish its report and only released few pages of 
‘recommendations’.391 Even when it comes to relatively well-organized and 
functioning TRCs, not necessarily victims regard truth-seeking mechanisms as 
options to meet their needs for justice and reparations.392    
Concerning reparations programs, these can play a central role for 
victims’ status in transitional justice scenarios. As Greiff highlights ‘For some 
victims reparations are the most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the state 
to remedy the harms they have suffered’.393 Reparations programs are actually an 
attractive restorative mechanism in comparison with criminal prosecution as the 
latter may be perceived first and foremost as a struggle against perpetrators 
rather than a mechanism on behalf and for the victims. Reparations programs 
constitute an appealing option for victims’ status also when compared to other 
restorative mechanisms. Thus, truth-seeking has been said to be an empty 
gesture if not accompanied with tangible and positive manifestations.394 
However, reparations also present weaknesses in transitional justice scenarios as 
they may be overtly disproportionate to the damage inflicted, and this may lead 
to a trivialization of victims’ suffering.395  
 
2.4.3. Victims’ Status and a Combined Retributive/Deterrent-Restorative 
Approach in Transitional Justice Scenarios    
As discussed, although victims’ status in situations of massive human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations is enhanced via restorative justice 
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390 See, e.g., David Backer, Exit, Voice & Loyalty in Transitional justice Processes: Evidence on 
Victims’ Responses to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, paper presented at 
the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Illinois (2004) 16; Rosalind 
Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone (United 
States Institute of Peace 2005) 6-7.     
391 Reed Brody, Impunity continues in Haiti 1 (North American Congress on Latin America, 
Report on the Americas, Sept.-Oct. 1986).  
392 See, e.g., the conclusion in this sense reached by Fletcher et al. out of a comparative study in 
Argentina, Cambodia, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Timor-Leste: 
Laurel Fletcher, Harvey Weinstein and Jamie Rowen ‘Context, Timing and the Dynamics of 
Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 163, 219.         
393 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Introduction. Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human Rights 
Violations’ in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford University Press 2006) 
1, 2. 
394 Ibid., 2. Having said so, TRCs may provide a measure of reparations by setting up reparations 
policies for victims and their relatives. See Salmón Gárate (2006) 343.   
395 Minow (1998) 93.  
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rather than by retributive/deterrent justice mechanisms, the former also presents 
important limitations. Accordingly, it is argued herein that retributive/deterrent 
and restorative justice should not be seen as unrelated or conflicting but indeed 
as complementary and mutually reinforcing. Both retributive/deterrent and 
restorative justice, as indicated by Villa-Vicencio,  are necessary for democracy, 
rule of law and human rights culture in societies in transition.396 It is suggested 
here that integrating the two paradigms should not only be applied to the 
relation between international, hybrid and national criminal courts, and other 
transitional justice mechanisms, e.g., TRCs and reparations programs, but also 
within each international, hybrid and national criminal court. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to talk about a ‘restorative side’ of the criminal justice system,397 and 
in particular, a ‘restorative side’ of the international criminal justice system. Four 
arguments are discussed below to sustain the feasibility and convenience of a 
combined application of retributive/deterrent and restorative justice paradigms 
as the best alternative for victims’ status in contexts of spread and/or systematic 
commission of international crimes.     
First, taking into account the scenarios at which international and hybrid 
criminal courts are set up, the transitional justice approach, i.e., ‘the conception 
of justice in periods of political transition’,398 confirms the suitability of the 
proposed combined approach. Since transitional justice is a holistic approach 
including several measures which complement each other,399 international and 
hybrid criminal courts which strengthen victims’ status are implementing at least 
indirectly that justice approach. Thus, reparations for victims at the ICC and the 
ECCC may be considered as a good example of what Teitel has denominated 
transitional reparatory practices, which display both backward-looking and 
forward-looking purposes with regard to the victims and the societies.400 The 
IACtHR in Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, a seminal case triggered by the 
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396 Charles Villa-Vicencio, ‘Transitional Justice, Restoration and Prosecution’ in Dennis Sullivan 
and Larry Tifft (eds.), Handbook of Restorative Justice. A Global Perspective (Routledge 2006) 387, 
390.    
397 Charles Villa-Vicencio, ‘Restorative Justice. Ambiguities and Limitations of a Theory’ in Charles 
Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader (eds.), The Provocations of Amnesty: Memory, Justice and 
Impunity (Africa World Press 2003) 30, 41.  
398 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press 2000) 3. 
399 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), What is Transitional justice? 1 (Factsheet, 
2009), available at: http://www.ictj.org/static/Factsheets/ICTJ_TJ_fs2009.pdf (last visit on 12 
August 2012); Neil Kritz, ‘The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice’ in Neil Kritz (ed.), Transitional 
Justice, Vol. I: General Considerations (United States Institute of Peace Press 1995) xix-xxx.    
400 Teitel (2000) 127. 
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private involvement of the victim’s relatives in criminal proceedings actions,401 
laid part of the legal foundations of transitional justice in international law.402 
The IACtHR determined the state obligations of prevention, investigation, 
sanction of crimes and reparations for victims.403 It is argued herein that, at least, 
some of these dimensions are mutatis mutandi considered by international and 
hybrid criminal courts. It is also claimed herein that the transitional justice 
approach seeks to integrate the retributive/deterrent or utilitarian and restorative 
justice paradigms. Although some transitional justice advocates strongly resist 
‘restorative justice’ labels,404 they assert that this approach is victim-centered.405                        
Second, there have been important and relatively recent developments in 
international law that mark a clear trend towards an integrated combination of 
the retributive/deterrent and restorative justice approaches as the best alternative 
for victims in contexts of societies in transition. The 2005 UN Basic Principles 
and Guidelines, previously examined,406 when listing the forms of reparations, in 
a restorative justice context, consider judicial sanctions against persons 
responsible for serious international humanitarian law and human rights 
violations, which in principle corresponds to retributive justice, as satisfaction.407 
The ICC as such constitutes an excellent example of the above-mentioned 
synergy. Thus, the ICC Statute is a milestone in integrating, to its predominant 
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401 IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C 
No. 4.    
402 ICTJ (2009) 2.  
403 IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 29 July 1988, paras. 149-194. 
On the IACtHR’s case law on the state obligation to investigate (serious) human rights violations 
see, e.g., Salmón Gárate and Blanco (2012) 25-35.  
404 For instance, Mendez does not explicitly use the expression ‘restorative justice’ and solely 
employs it when commenting that communities, in certain cases, resort to customary law and 
traditional practices in order to engage in attempts to implement ‘restorative justice’. See Juan 
Mendez, National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the International Criminal Court 
(2001) 15 Ethics & International Affairs 25, 41.      
405 The term victim-centered has been used in many transitional justice processes to indicate that 
the process places the victim at its centre. See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, ‘A Victim-Centered 
Reflection on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and Prosecutions as a Response to Mass 
Atrocities’ (2006) 5 Journal of Human Rights 107-126. In turn, Mendez considers that the 
transitional justice components of the rights to see justice done, to know the truth, and to 
compensation and non-monetary modalities of restitution lie primarily with the victims and their 
families and, only then, with the society. See Juan Mendez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 
19 Human Rights Quarterly 255, 261. See also Julian Roberts, ‘Restorative Justice’ in von Hirsh, 
Ashworth and Roberts (2009) 163, 163 (‘Restorative theories are not necessarily victim-centered 
and victim-centered approaches are not necessarily restorative’.).   
406 See supra Chapter II 2.1.7.  
407 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 22 (f).  
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retributive and deterrent goals, an important restorative justice component. This 
contrasts with the ICTY’s timid case law references to restoration, rehabilitation 
or social defence in sentencing when the ICTY concluded that those goals ‘have 
not yet achieved the same dominance as retribution and deterrence in the history 
of this Tribunal’.408 The Preamble of the ICC Statute embodies the objects and 
purposes of the ICC as an institution. While the fourth and fifth paragraphs of 
the Preamble respectively read ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished’ and ‘[d]etermined 
to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes’ reflecting a retributive justice 
approach with a deterrent component, its second paragraph explicitly refers to 
victims ‘Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men 
have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity’. This arguably underlies a restorative justice approach embedded and 
present in the ICC Statute.   
It should, however, be left clear that international and hybrid criminal 
courts as such are still predominantly retributive. That is why even the ICC and 
the ECCC, where the victims’ status is more complete than at the other 
international and hybrid criminal courts, should not be referred to as ‘restorative 
justice’ mechanisms but they could instead be labelled as manifestations of 
‘victim-oriented justice’. In other words, international and hybrid criminal 
courts may integrate to their goals, victim-friendly measures but without altering 
or replacing their core objectives and mandate.409 Those measures would 
constitute ‘retributive/deterrent model victim-based measures’ providing victims 
with participatory rights, impacting the operation of criminal justice but without 
changing its rationale, which is different from restorative justice that questions 
or negates that rationale.410 Without neglecting the importance of restorative 
justice, the victim empowerment at the ICC was inspired first and foremost by 
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408 Brdjanin (IT-99-36-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 1 September 2004, para. 1092. As for 
rehabilitation, see, e.g., Erdemović (IT-96-22), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 29 November 
1996, para. 66. As for reconciliation and protection of society, see, e.g., Blaškić (IT-95-14-T), 
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, paras. 761-762; Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Judgment, 
Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, paras. 1203 and 1232; and Jelisić (IT-95-10-T), Judgment, Trial 
Chamber, 14 December 1999, para. 116.    
409 As for the distinction between ‘victim-oriented’ criminal justice and ‘restorative justice’ see, e.g., 
Ybo Buruma, ‘Doubts on the Upsurge of the Victim’s Role’ in Hendrik Kaptein and Marijke 
Malsch (eds.), Crime, Victims and Justice: Essays on Principles and Practice (Ashgate 2004) 1, 2-4. 
410 See Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, ‘Toward a framework for conceptualizing and 
evaluating models of criminal justice from a victim’s perspective’ (1996) 4 International Review of 
Criminology, 153, 153-160.  
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the victim rights movement.411 The victim accordingly participates in victim-
oriented/restorative justice-oriented mechanisms at, for example, the ICC and 
the ECCC to influence the criminal proceedings for their own interest by 
claiming reparations and being heard not merely as a witness. The judicial 
adjudication, on the other hand, is lacking in a purely restorative justice 
approach.  
Third, a delicate balance between restorative justice mechanisms, in 
particular TRCs, and retributive/deterrent justice mechanisms, e.g., criminal 
prosecutions by international and hybrid criminal courts has been feasible in the 
past. Although TRCs can be set as alternatives to (international) criminal 
prosecutions, they and international or hybrid criminal courts can work 
simultaneously and appropriately if there is a coordinated concurrent operation 
as illustrated in East Timor.412 Concerning Sierra Leone, even though the 
existence of two independent institutions, a TRC413 and the SCSL, raised 
inevitable complications and issues,414 they likely had an additive effect in the 
end.415 While recognizing the importance of a TRC for victims, the SCSL itself 
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411 As evidenced by the ICC Statute’s drafters reliance on the UN Victims Declaration and Van 
Boven Principles. See Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 24 May 1996, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17.   
412 The relation between the East Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes, established by UNTAET Resolution 2000/15 (6 June 
2000), despite some shortcomings, has been praised due to a coordinated concurrent operation. 
See Christopher Totten, ‘The International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions: A Framework 
for Cross Interaction in the Sudan and Beyond’ (2009) 7 Northwestern University Journal of 
International Human Rights 1, 13-14; Elizabeth Evenson, ‘Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: 
Coordination Between Commission and Court’ (2004) 104 Columbia Law Review 730, 754-755.      
413 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, section 6 (I). See also Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report (October 2004).  
414 It has been suggested that two autonomous institutions, i.e., a TRC and an international or 
hybrid criminal court, conducting parallel and complementary functions may originate 
coordination problems when there is an unclear demarcation of roles, functions and mechanisms 
to solve conflicts. See James Cockayne, ‘The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes 
Tribunals’ (2005a) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 616, 650-654. This may be connected to 
TRCs’ evolution to the point that they reflect many procedural aspects of criminal justice. See 
Carsten Stahn, ‘Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Reconciliation: 
The UN Truth and Reconciliation Commission for East Timor’ (2001) 95 American Journal of 
International Law 952, 954.           
415 William Schabas, ‘A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2004a) 15 Criminal Law Forum 3, 54. See 
also William Schabas, ‘Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 


was able to an important extent to reconcile the mandates of the SCSL and the 
Sierra Leonean TRC:  
 
Truth Commissions and International Courts are both instruments for 
effectuating the promise made by states that victims of human rights shall have 
an effective remedy. Criminal courts offer the most effective remedy – a trial 
followed by punishment of those found guilty, in this case of those who bear the 
greatest responsibility. Truth Commissions offer two distinct prospects for 
victims –of truth, i.e. learning how and why their loved ones were murdered or 
mutilated, and of reconciliation, through understanding and forgiveness of 
those perpetrators who genuinely confess and regret [...] [t]he work of the 
Special Court and the TRC is complementary and each must accommodate the 
existence of the other.416   
  
The almost necessary convergence of TRCs and criminal courts can be 
summarized as follows: whereas the former offers the advantage of listening to 
victims and their families with dignity and respect and not in a piecemeal 
fashion like in courts and often just as witnesses, the judicial ‘truth’ holds ‘a 
“tested” quality that makes it all the more persuasive’.417 Indeed, the 
complementary relationship between TRCs and (international, hybrid or 
national) criminal courts, as Schabas suggests, ‘may have a synergistic effect on 
the search for post-conflict justice as part of the struggle against impunity’.418 
The mutually complementary function of transitional justice mechanisms both 
restorative (e.g., reparations, truth-seeking) and retributive/deterrent (e.g., 
criminal prosecution) stands more chances to enhance victims’ situation. This 
can be seen through ‘lens of recognition’ as these mechanisms working together 
‘can be interpreted as efforts to institutionalize the recognition of individuals 
with equal rights’.419 The need for an integrated and combined use of 
mechanisms is actually confirmed by the victims’ perceptions. Based on surveys 
of victimized populations in relation to some of the ICC situations,420 it is 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2004b) University of California Davis Journal of International Law 
& Policy 145-169.       
416 Norman (SCSL-2003-08-PT), Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, Trial 
Chamber, 29 October 2003, paras. 33 and 44. 
417 Mendez (1997) 278.  
418 Schabas (2004a) 6.  
419 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations’ in Greiff (2006) 460.  
420 Pham et al. (2005) 4, 5; Phuong Pham et al., When the War ends: Peace, Justice, and Serious 
Reconstruction in Northern Uganda (ICTJ/University of California Berkeley Human Rights 
Center/Payson Center December 2007) 2-5; Phuong Pham and Patrick Vinck, Transitioning to 
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possible to, inter alia, conclude that: i) prosecutions are perceived by victims as 
an important but not unique accountability mechanism, being considered 
alongside other parallel transitional justice options ranging from compensation 
to amnesties; and ii) the ICC is perceived not only as a mechanism of justice but 
also as contributing to peace.   
Fourth, the victims’ right to truth also speaks about some unexpected 
similarities between apparently dissimilar mechanisms, i.e., between TRCs and 
(international/hybrid) criminal courts. Notwithstanding its statutory limitation, 
the ICTY early acknowledged its broader ‘truth finding’ role and in connection 
with victims’ situation.421 Although the ICC and the ECCC instruments do not 
refer to the right to truth as a victims’ right, their case law has regarded it as a 
‘victims’ central interest’422 or as a ‘right to truth’423 when victims participate in 
the proceedings. This is coherent with the case law of the IACtHR and the 
ECtHR, which has recognized that right as the victims’ right to access to 
justice,424 as well as the HRC, according to which, victims’ right to truth is a 
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Peace, A Population-based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda 
(University of California Berkeley Human Rights Center December 2010);  Patrick Vinck et al., 
Living with fear: A Population Based-survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social 
Reconstruction in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (ICTJ/ University of California Berkeley 
Human Rights Center/Payson Center August 2008) 2-3; South Consulting, Situation Analysis of 
Post-election Violence Areas (May 2009) 26-28 (concerning the situation in Kenya); South 
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Survey Findings); Darfurian Voices: Documenting Darfurian Refugees’ Views on Issues of Peace, 
Justice and Reconciliation (24 Hours for Darfur July 2010); and  Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, 
Building Peace, Seeking Justice: A Population-based Survey on Attitudes about Accountability and 
Social Reconstruction in The Central African Republic (University of California Berkeley Human 
Rights Center August 2010).       
421 ‘When called to appear by the Prosecutor, the victims may use this forum to have their voices 
heard and to live on in history. International criminal justice, which cannot accommodate the 
failures of individuals or States, must pursue its mission of revealing the truth about the acts 
perpetrated and suffering endured, as well as identifying and arresting those accused of 
responsibility’. Karadžić and Mladić (IT-95-5-R6, IT-95-18-R61), Review of the Indictments 
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Trial Chamber, 11 July 1996, para. 3.   
422 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), Decision on the Set of Procedural Rules 
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
(Single Judge), 13 May 2008, paras. 34-36.  
423 Ieng Sary (Case 002), Directions on Unrepresented Civil Parties’ Rights to Address the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber 03, 29 August 2008, para. 5.        
424 The IACtHR has concluded in its case law that ‘the right to the truth is subsumed in the right of 
the victim or his next of kin to obtain clarification of the events that violated human rights and the 
corresponding responsibilities from the competent organs of the State, through the investigation 
and prosecution [...]’. Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Series C 
No. 75, para. 48. See also Case of Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and 
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manner to prevent or end the psychological torture of families of victims of 
enforced disappearances or secret executions.425 These developments are also 
reflected in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines.426 The individual and 
collective dimensions of the right to truth have also received recognition.427   
The consideration of the victims’ right to truth can expand the horizon 
of international and hybrid criminal courts beyond a narrow conception of a 
criminal court. Criminal proceedings have indeed upheld victims’ right to 
truth,428 which is connected with the role that victims can play in criminal 
proceedings.429 Victims’ right to truth can actually be implemented and 
safeguarded through several transitional justice mechanisms including 
international criminal courts, national criminal courts and TRCs.430 Therefore, 
provided that criminal trials are used for what they are usually intended for,431 
they can indeed contribute to the truth.432 Accordingly, criminal trials should 
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guarantees under the IACtHR’s case law see Salmón Gárate and Blanco (2012) 42-45. As for 
ECtHR’s case law see, e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, Judgment, 10 May 2001, para. 
19.  
425 See, e.g., HRC, R.A.V.N. et al. v. Argentina, Comm. No. 343, 344 and 345/1988, Views, 5 April 
1990 (with the individual opinion of Mr. Bertil Wennergren); HRC, Sarma v. Sri Lanka, Comm. 
No. 950/2000, Views, 31 July 2003. Accordingly, the HRC has considered that, as a manner of 
providing an effective remedy mechanism, States should provide information to the victim 
concerning serious human right violations. See, e.g., HRC, Staselovich and Lyashkevich v. Belarus, 
Comm. No. 887/1999, Views, 3 April 2003, para. 11.  
426 As for the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, the principle 24 states that ‘victims and their 
representatives should be entitled to seek and obtain information on the causes leading to their 
victimization and to learn the truth in regard to these functions’. Principle 22 (b) further adds that 
‘verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth [...]’.  
427 See, e.g., Study on the Right to Truth, Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (2006), para. 59; IACtHR, Case of the 
“Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment of 24 November 2009, Series C No. 211, para. 310. 
428 See Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 entitled ‘Human 
Rights Council,’ Right to the truth, Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/5/7 (2007), para. 89.  
429 See, e.g., Updated set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Trough  
Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/1027Add.1  (2005), principle 19.    
430 See, e.g., Right to Truth, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/66, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/66 (2005). 
431 Mendez (1997) 278. 
432 See Diane Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2537, 2546 at footnote 32; Laurel Fletcher and Harvey 
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neither become places for ‘historic’ judgments nor become instruments to settle 
long-term social, political or ideological conflicts as this may result in an 
unsatisfactory ‘truth’ or even a mockery of justice.433 Actually, as pointed out by 
Schabas, historical truth has in some occasions been ‘presented as a by-product 
of the international criminal proceedings rather than as an objective’.434   
 
3. Shaping International Criminal Proceedings   
After failed attempts to establish an international criminal court to try the crimes 
committed by the Imperial German forces during the First World War,435 the 
IMT and IMTFE were set to prosecute the Nazi and the Japanese Imperial 
leadership respectively for their crimes committed during the Second World 
War.436 Although frequently criticized as examples of victor’s justice and for 
having allegedly breached the principle of legality because of new offences 
included in their statutes,437 the IMT and IMTFE set the path for future 
international and hybrid criminal courts. Due to, inter alia, a predominant 
presence of common law background drafters, the IMT and IMTFE proceedings 
were largely adversarial oriented.438 In this subchapter, the international and 
hybrid criminal courts considered in this thesis are presented as the judicial 
forums where victims’ status may take place.439 A very brief survey of those 
courts is followed by a general examination of how adversarial and inquisitorial 
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433 Mendez (1997) 279. 
434 William Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities. Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes 
Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2012b) 100. 
435 No international criminal court to try German military personnel was set up as envisaged in 
articles 228-230 of the Versailles Treaty. Nor was the provision (article 227) to determine the 
responsibility of the German Emperor (Wilhelm II) implemented. 
436 See, respectively, Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for 
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London 
Agreement), 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279; Special Proclamation – Establishment of an 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946.  
437 See, e.g., Richard Minear, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton University 
Press 1971) 74-124; Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn., Cambridge University Press 
2010) 113-115, 118-119; Cassese (2008) 323. 
438 For details on the adversarial and inquisitorial components at the IMT and IMTFE, see Orie 
(2002) 1456-1463.   
439 At a more general level, the criminalization of the most serious human rights violations and 
their international prosecution are important towards a new international public order. See 
Elizabeth Salmón Gárate, ‘La Globalización de la Justicia Internacional: Hacia un Nuevo Orden 
Público Internacional’ (2007c) 34 Ius et Veritas 245, 252.        
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components are present and co-exist at them, which has arguably led to mixed 
or unique international criminal proceedings. Victims’ status at international 
and hybrid criminal courts as the central issue of this thesis is not considered 
here but developed through the three following chapters. Also, when comparing 
certain issues on evidence, in particular related to witnesses, the analysis is 
mainly conducted in the next chapter as it falls into the dimension of the victims’ 
status as witnesses and may be considered as measures to minimise 
inconveniences to victim witnesses.440   
 
3.1. Overview of International and Hybrid Criminal Courts 
3.1.1. The ICTY and the ICTR 
As a consequence of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the UN 
Security Council pursuant its powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter, i.e., to maintain or restore international peace and security, decided to 
establish the ICTY and the ICTR in 1993 and 1994 respectively.441 The ICTY was 
given jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of 
the laws and customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity allegedly 
perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.442 The ICTR, in turn, 
was called upon to adjudicate genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations 
of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol 
II to the Geneva Conventions, allegedly perpetrated in Rwanda or in the 
neighbouring States in respect of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed by Rwandans between 1 January and 31 December 
1994.443 The ICTY and the ICTR have three main organs: the Registry, the Office 
of the Prosecutor and the Chambers; and have primacy over national courts.444 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, a completion mechanism is set 
to gradually complete the mandate of the ICTY and the ICTR in years to 
come.445      
The ICTY and the ICTR have made a great contribution to the fight 
against impunity.446 However, they have come under criticism. Thus, the ICTY 
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440 See Heikkilä (2004) 116 et seq.  
441 UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
442 ICTY Statute, articles 1-5. 
443 ICTR Statute, articles 1-4. 
444 ICTY Statute, article 9; ICTR Statute, article 8. 
445 See UN Doc. S/RES/1966 (2010).  
446 See, e.g., Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (2010) 133, 140; Ralph Zacklin, ‘The Failings 
of ad hoc International Tribunals’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 541, 541-542.  
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has been criticized for being too expensive and bureaucratic,447 delayed trials,448 
and alleged violation of the rights of the defendants.449 In turn, the ICTR has 
been criticized for not having prosecuted alleged crimes committed by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Forces.450  
A problem common to the ICTY and the ICTR is that trials at them 
became inaccessible to victims, mostly ordinary citizens. The late 
implementation of outreach programmes worsened the situation.451 Trials do not 
reach those who should first be reached: the victims. International criminal 
courts tend to be perceived as primarily responding to their patrons, i.e., the 
international community, and just incidentally to victims.452 This risks 
international criminal courts’ national ownership as they do not necessarily 
involve the local population. Thus, the ICTY and the ICTR created not only a 
physical but also a ‘symbolic’ distance.453 The ICTY/ICTR’s remoteness has also 
originated hurdles for witnesses and investigation. Although the ICTY has made 
efforts to bring corrective justice to victims,454 these efforts have not always being 
perfect according to victims’ rights advocates.455 Nor have victims’ experiences at 
it been uniformly positive.456     
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453 Frederic Mégret, ‘In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of International 
Criminal Justice’ (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 725, 730.   
454 Sometimes these measures have been criticized. See, e.g., José Alvarez, ‘Rush to Closure: Lessons 
of the Tadic Judgment’ (1998) 96 Michigan Law Review 2031-2112. 
455 See, e.g., Marie-Bénedict Dembour and Emily Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses 
at War Crimes Trials’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 151-177. 
456 See, e.g., Stover (2007).  
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3.1.2. The ICC 
In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago proposed that the creation of a permanent 
international criminal court be put back on the UN agenda.457 The General 
Assembly asked the International Law Commission to draft a Statute for such 
court, and this produced a final text in 1994.458 An ad hoc committee was 
established to work on that draft Statute, followed by a Preparatory Committee, 
whose draft Statute served as the basis for negotiation at the Rome Conference 
for an International Criminal Court. During the Rome Conference, the most 
difficult issues concerned how broad the ICC’s jurisdiction would be, which 
States would have to agree before its jurisdiction could be exercised,459 and the 
Prosecutor’s power to initiate proceedings proprio motu.460 The ICC Statute was 
adopted on 17 July 1998. A Preparatory Commission was established to adopt, 
inter alia, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) and Elements of 
Crimes,461 work concluded in July 2002. The ICC Statute entered into force the 1 
July 2002.  
The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and crime of aggression.462 Its temporal jurisdiction is limited to crimes 
committed since 1 July 2002.463 The ICC’s jurisdiction can be triggered by States 
Parties to the ICC Statute, the UN Security Council and by the Prosecutor 
proprio motu.464 The ICC can exercise jurisdiction on territorial and perpetrators’ 
nationality jurisdictional links but when the Security Council refers a situation to 
the ICC such restrictions are inapplicable.465 The ICC in a similar fashion than 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL has three main organs: i) Chambers, divided 
into Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals Chambers; ii) the Prosecutor; and iii) the 
Registry. The ICC works based on the principle of complementarity, i.e., only 
when a State is unwilling or unable to carry out proceedings genuinely, the ICC 
can step in.466 Admissibility of cases also requires that they are ‘of sufficient 
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457 UN Doc. A/RES/44/89, 11 December 1989. 
458 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May-22 
July 1994, UN Doc. A/49/10, chapter II, paras. 23-41. 
459 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.94; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.95; UN Doc. A/CONF. 
183/C.1/L.70; and UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.90.  
460 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C1/SR9, paras. 82-88. 
461 As provided for in articles 51 and 9 of the ICC Statute respectively. 
462 ICC Statute, articles 5-8.  
463 Ibid., article 11 (1). 
464 Ibid., articles 13-15.  
465 Ibid., article 12. 
466 Ibid., articles 1 and 17. 
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gravity’.467 The ICC is currently handling eight situations, each of them leading 
to one or more cases.468  
A preliminary appraisal of the first ICC situations and cases have been 
characterized inter alia by delayed proceedings as consequence of problems in 
disclosing evidence to the defence, the crafting of victims’ procedural rights 
during investigatory, pre-trial and trial phases, and also States reluctant to 
implement arrest warrants.469 The exercise of prosecutorial discretion has also 
come under criticism for, inter alia, not having taken into account ongoing 
national peace negotiation processes.470 Nevertheless, as already mentioned,471 
members of the victimized populations relating to the situations and cases of the 
ICC regard the ICC not only as an important mechanism of accountability or 
justice but also as contributing to peace. Accordingly, at least, in some of the ICC 
situations, the ICC has arguably contributed to international peace and 
security.472     
 
3.1.3. Hybrid Criminal Courts (the SCSL, the ECCC and the STL)  
In the late 1990s and 2000s, the Security Council considered some situations for 
hybrid criminal courts. As for the SCSL, the Security Council requested the 
Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with Sierra Leone to establish a 
special court to prosecute the most responsible for crimes committed in Sierra 
Leone’s armed conflict.473 The Secretary-General-drafted statute became part of 
the SCSL Constitutive Agreement of 16 January 2002.474 As mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis, the SCSL has recently completed its mandate after 
 
467 Ibid., articles 17 (1) (d) and 53 (1) (c).  
468 The situations of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic and 
Mali were self-referred to by ICC State parties; the situations of Darfur (Sudan) and Libya were 
referred to by the Security Council; and the situations of Kenya and Ivory Coast were began by the 
ICC Prosecutor proprio motu.     
469 See Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (2010) 178-179. 
470 See, e.g., Kenneth Rodman, ‘Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 99, 101, 124-125.  
471 See supra Chapter II 2.4.3. 
472 In particular, in the Uganda situation by indicting the Lord Resistance Army leaders and, to 
some extent, in the Darfur situation. See Philipp Kastner, International Criminal Justice in bello? 
The ICC between Law and Politics in Darfur and Northern Uganda (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2012) 156. 
473 UN Doc. S/RES/1315 (14 August 2000).  
474 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed on 16 January 2002.  
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rendering its appeals judgment in Taylor, the last pending case before it.475 
Accordingly, it is now replaced by the Residual SCSL, which ‘must continue after 
the closure of the [SCSL]’,476 and have the ‘power to prosecute the remaining 
fugitive [SCSL] indictee’,477 namely, Johnny Paul Koroma, former President of 
Sierra Leone.      
In turn, Cambodia requested assistance in 1997 to prosecute the most 
responsible for the Khmer Rouge’s genocide (1975-1979). Following 
negotiations between the UN and the Cambodian Parliament, this adopted the 
2001 Law establishing the ECCC.478 This Law was amended in 2004 based on a 
2003 agreement with the UN.479 By Resolution 1757 (2007), the Security Council 
brought into force the agreement between the UN and Lebanon setting up the 
STL to try suspects in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri and other dead or injured persons in relation to that attack.480   
The hybrid criminal courts that are considered in this thesis present the 
following general characteristics. First, the SCSL and the STL were constituted by 
agreement between the UN and a State (Sierra Leone and Lebanon). The ECCC 
was set up by national law in the light of negotiations between the UN and 
Cambodia. Second, whereas the SCSL and the STL were set up as independent 
organizations,481 the ECCC was constituted as part of the Cambodian national 
judiciary system.482 Third, their hybrid character is, inter alia, reflected in their 
applicable law, i.e., international and domestic crimes,483 excepting the STL that 
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475 Taylor (SCSL-03-01-A-1389), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 26 September 2013.  
476 Statute of the Residual SCSL, article 1 (1). 
477 Ibid., article 1 (2). 
478 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as 
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006) [hereinafter ECCC Law]. 
479 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning 
the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, UN Doc A/RES57/228B (Annex) (13 May 2003) [hereinafter ECCC 
agreement]. 
480 UN Doc. S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007), para. 1 (a). As for the Agreement see: Agreement between 
the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, UN Doc. S/RES/1757 Annex (2007) [hereinafter STL Constitutive Agreement].    
481 Kallon and Kamara, (SCSL-2004-15/16-AR72(E)), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé 
Accord, Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004, para. 85 (‘Description as hybrid should not be 
understood as denoting that is part of two or more legal systems’.).  
482 For further details see, e.g., Sarah Williams, Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals 
(Hart 2012).   
483 As for international crimes, the ECCC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity 
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. See ECCC Law, articles 4-6. The SCSL has 
jurisdiction over crime against humanity, violations of article common 3 to the Geneva 
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can only exercise jurisdiction over certain crimes under Lebanese law;484 and 
their judges’ mixed composition. Fourth, their financing is via: i) States’ 
voluntary contributions (SCSL); or ii) via shared financing: UN, the 
corresponding State (Cambodia) and donors’ contributions (ECCC), or the 
corresponding State (Lebanon) and States’ voluntary contributions (STL).  
Four reasons may explain the constitution of hybrid criminal courts. 
First, in a judiciary system’s breakdown caused by an armed conflict (Sierra 
Leone) and/or by historical factors that impede the judiciary from a fair justice 
administration (Cambodia and Lebanon),485 national courts are not a real option. 
Second, international criminal courts do not represent an option either due to 
the lack of will of the relevant organs/members of international organizations; 
and/or the lack of will of major powers to fund an international criminal court.486 
Third, hybrid criminal courts may merge the best of two worlds and also better 
capture the complex nature of international crimes that includes domestic 
elements.487 Fourth, hybrid criminal courts are seemingly more suitable to reach 
victims because of their proximity to the population most directly concerned, 
i.e., victims.488 Bearing in mind hurdles for victims and investigation, the 
locations of hybrid criminal courts (SCSL, ECCC) were decided to be proximate 
to the crime scene and, hence, enable them to have reasonably immediate access 
to witnesses and potentially evidentiary material.489 This has been helped by 
implementing early outreach programmes.490 However, operating hybrid 
criminal courts in the same countries where crimes were committed has raised 
concerns with respect to the security of, inter alia, victims participating at those 
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Conventions and Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. See SCSL Statute, articles 2-4. 
484 STL Statute, article 2. 
485 Cassese (2008) 333; Laura Dickinson, ‘Notes and Comments. The Promise of Hybrid Courts’ 
(2003) 97 American Journal of. International Law 295, 301.  
486 Cassese (2008) 333, 334. 
487 Mégret (2005) 745.   
488 Alain Pellet, ‘Internationalized Courts: Better than Nothing, Internationalized Criminal Courts. 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia’ in Romano, Nollkaemper and Kleffner (2004) 
437, 438. 
489 Marcus Benzing and Morten Bergsmo, ‘Some Tentative Remarks on the Relationship Between 
Internationalized Criminal Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court’ in Romano, 
Nollkaemper and Kleffner (2004) 407, 409.  
490 See Tom Perriello and Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, 
(ICTJ, Working Paper, 2006) 35-37. Available at: http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
SierraLeone-Special-Court-2006-English.pdf  (last visit on 12 August 2012); Norman Pentelovitch, 
‘Seeing Justice Done: The Importance of Prioritizing Outreach Efforts at International Criminal 
Tribunals’ (2008) 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 445, 479.   


forums. The locations of the STL and SCSL’s trial of Charles Taylor, outside 
Lebanon and Sierra Leone respectively, were indeed adopted to better protect 
among others potential witnesses.491 Indeed, important practical problems 
negatively impacting the work of the hybrid criminal courts may arise and have 
arisen. These problems include: i) challenges to ensure a harmonic and smooth 
coordination between the national and international components;492 ii) financial 
problems;493 and iii) security issues.494 
 
3.2. The ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL: Adversarial, Inquisitorial and 
Unique/Hybrid Procedural Elements  
3.2.1. Adversarial Elements 
To begin with, it should be mentioned that both the ICTY and the ICTR and 
later the SCSL were to a very large extent predominantly adversarial. However, 
elements of the inquisitorial system have progressively been added as discussed 
later.495 In any case, the prevalence of the adversarial system, arguably still in 
place,496 can be explained in, for example, the ICTY, due to factors such as 
common law background draftsmen, the perception of the adversarial system as 
better equipped to guarantee the accused’s rights, and the IMT and the IMTFE 
as antecedents.497 As for the SCSL, it was the common law background of the 
draftsmen the most relevant factor.498 The ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE) were initially copied by the ICTR RPE and this, in turn, by the 
SCSL RPE. However, they have evolved and, hence, present some differences 
with each other.499  
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491 See Raub (2009) 1042.    
492 See, e.g., Open Society Justice Initiative, Political Interference at the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Court of Cambodia (Jul. 2010) 16-17. Available at:  
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publicati
ons/political-interference-report-20100706/political-interference-courts-cambodia-20100706.pdf  
(last visit on 12 August 2012).   
493 See, e.g., Thordis Ingadottir, ‘The Financing of Internationalized Criminal Courts and 
Tribunals’ in Romano, Nollkaemper and Kleffner (2004) 271-289.  
494 See, e.g., Cassese (2008) 335. 
495 See infra Chapter II 3.2.2.  
496 Kordić et al. (IT-95-14/2-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 17 December 2004, para. 22. See 
also: Erdemović (IT-96-22-A), Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 
Appeals Chamber, 7 October 1997, para. 4; Schabas (2006) 601. 
497 Cassese (2008) 369. 
498 Nina Jørgensen, ‘The Proprio Motu and Interventionist Powers of Judges at International 
Criminal Tribunals’ (2009) in Göran Sluiter and Sergey Vasiliev (eds.), International Criminal 
Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law (Cameron May 2009) 121, 124.  
499 Schabas (2006) 85. 
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 With regard to judges’ role, judges were originally conceived as referees 
who would only become cognizant of the evidentiary material upon 
commencement of the trial. For instance, in the ICTY, the original ICTY RPE set 
a system in which the Trial Chamber Judges would approach each case as a 
tabula rasa, similar to common law fact-finders.500     
With regard to the role of the parties, the RPE introduced an adversarial 
model. After the opening statements,501 the parties present their cases in a 
traditional common law order,502 i.e., a witness can be examined in chief by the 
party who has called him/her followed by the subsequent cross-examination and 
re-examination,503 as examined later in further detail.504 As originally drafted, the 
ICTY RPE did not introduce a prosecutorial duty to search for exculpatory 
evidence as part of its investigations and only required prompt disclosure of this 
sort of evidence as was known to the Prosecutor.505 This corresponds to party-
driven proceedings.506 Trials in absentia of the accused were neither 
contemplated in nor formally excluded from the ICTY Statute although there 
‘was a brief flirtation with a watered down form of in absentia trial’,507 i.e., the so-
called ‘Rule 61 Procedure’.508 Nothing comparable existed in the ICTR and the 
SCSL. The defendant who gives evidence as witnesses has this status at trial.509 
Victims are not parties and their role is primarily of witnesses.510    
As for evidence, the complex and strict common law evidentiary rules 
are in general of limited application.511 As seen later,512 the order of presentation 
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500 Megan Fairlie, ‘Revised Pre-Trial Procedure before the ICTY from a Continental/Common Law 
Perspective’ in Sluiter and Vasiliev (2009) 311, 316. 
501 ICTY RPE, rule 84; ICTR RPE, rule 84; SCSL RPE, rule 84.  
502 This means evidence for the prosecution, evidence for the defence, prosecution evidence in 
rebuttal and the defence evidence in rejoinder. ICTY RPE, rule 85 (A). 
503 ICTY RPE, rule 85 (B) and (C); ICTR RPE, rule 85 (B) and (C); SCSL RPE, rule 85 (B) and (C). 
504 See infra Chapter III 2.2.2 and 3.2.2. 
505 ICTY RPE, rule 68 (IT/32, 11 February 1994). 
506 Fairlie (2009) 313. 
507 William Schabas, ‘In Abstentia Proceedings before International Criminal Courts’ in Sluiter and 
Vasiliev (2009) 335, 335. 
508 This procedure early applied to individuals such as Karadžić and Mladić, who had not been 
back then yet arrested, consisted in submission of evidence by the Prosecutor to the Trial Chamber 
for an international arrest warrant. However, this did not result in a verdict. The ICTY always 
stressed that this procedure was not a trial in abstentia. See, e.g., Raiić (IT-95-12-R61), Decision, 13 
September 1996, under B. Preliminary matters, para. 2.   
509 ICTY RPE, rule 85 (C); ICTR RPE, rule 85 (C); SCSL RPE, rule 85 (C).   
510 As for the victim’s status at the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, see infra, Chapters III, IV and V. 
511 See Orie (2002) 1472; Mark Klamberg, ‘General Requirements for the Admission of Evidence’ in 
Sluiter et al. (2013) 1016, 1018. 
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of evidence followed and the principle of live testimony are examples of 
adversarial features. Concerning the ICTY rules on disclosure, it should be 
mentioned that they were influenced by the United States Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.513 Accordingly, the Prosecutor: i) has the obligation to 
provide copies of material that accompanied the indictment as soon as possible 
after the initial appearance; ii) upon defence’s request, shall allow the inspection 
by the defence of evidentiary material in the Prosecution’s custody or control; iii) 
the Prosecutor shall give to the defence the list of witnesses (s)he intends to call 
at trial; iv) and the Prosecutor shall disclose to the defence any exculpatory 
material although the protection of witnesses or confidentially obtained 
information may lift the disclosure obligations.514 The alibi and any special 
defences trigger some obligations for the defence.515     
Additional adversarial features include that originally the ICTY RPE 
both distinguished between trial and sentencing stages,516 and followed a 
straightforward common law guilty plea procedure.517 Finally, the appeal is not a 
trial de novo,518 and presents only limited opportunities for new evidence.519      
 
3.2.2. Inquisitorial Elements  
Concerning judges’ role, this has been strengthened as the ICTY, the ICTR and, 
to a lesser extent, the SCSL,520 increasingly incorporated inquisitorial 
components. The ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL Trial Chambers have the power 
to order the parties to present additional evidence and the ICTY and the ICTR 
can additionally summon witnesses.521 Also, a judge at any stage, and not only at 
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512 See infra Chapter III 2.2.2 and 3.2.2. 
513 In particular, rules 16(a)(1)(C) and 16(b)(1)(A) of the United States Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. See Orie (2002) 1469.  
514 See respectively ICTY RPE, rules 66 (A); 66 (B), 67 (A) (i); 66 (A) (ii); 68, 68bis, and 69. ICTR 
RPE, rules 66 (A); 66 (B), 67; 66 (A) (ii); 68, 68 bis, and 69. SCSL RPE, rules 66 (A); 66 (B); 67, 68; 
and 69.    
515 See ICTY RPE, rule 67(B).   
516 Ibid., rules 86-88, 100 and 101(D).   
517 Ibid., rule 62 (A) (iii)-(v).  
518 Ibid., rule 111. 
519 On judges’ broad discretion on this issue, see Kupreskić et al. (IT-95-16-A), Appeal Judgment, 
Appeals Chamber, 23 October 2001, para. 42 et seq.  
520 Jørgesen (2009) 125. 
521 ICTY RPE, rules 85(A)(v) and 98; ICTR RPE, rules 85(A)(v) and 98; SCSL RPE, rule 85. As for 
case law of the ICTY and the SCSL see respectively, e.g., Kupreskić et al. (IT-95-16-T) Witness 
Summons by the Chamber pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Trial 
Chamber, 30 September 1998; Brima (SCSL-04-16-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber II, 20 June 2007, 
‘Annex A: Procedural History’, para. 60.   
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the end of the examination by the parties, can put any question to the witness,522 
which has often been applied by the Judges of these courts.523 The ICTY, the 
ICTR and the SCSL Trial Chambers, prior to the beginning of the trial, are 
entitled with extensive powers to: i) call upon the Prosecutor to reduce the 
number of witnesses;524 ii) shorten the estimated length of examination-in-chief 
of some witnesses;525 iii) determine the time available to the Prosecutor for 
presenting evidence;526 iv) to invite the Prosecutor to reduce the number of 
counts charged in the indictment ‘in the interest of a fair and expeditious trial’;527 
and v) after commencement of the trial, to fix a number of crime or incidents 
representative of the crimes charged.528 The introduction of a Pre-Trial Judge 
with a broad mandate, under the ICTY RPE,529 also increases judicial 
intervention although this Judge has only coordinating but not investigating 
functions. The ICTR RPE and the SCSL RPE go a step further as at the pre-trial 
and the pre-defence conferences, the Prosecution and the defence may be 
ordered to provide the Trial Chamber with copies of written statements of 
witnesses they intend to call to testify.530 At the ICTY, this has sometimes 
happened under rule 65 ter. Those provisions among others in principle give the 
judges more detailed information on the cases presented at trial and accordingly 
enable them to play a more active role. Although the ICTY Judges have 
progressively favored a proactive style of courtroom management in 
consideration of better ‘trial efficiency, trial fairness and the administration of 
justice trough trial’,531 the SCSL Judges did not adopt this extensive involvement 
and rejected a proposal to give them a more proactive role.532 Trial Chambers 
 
522 ICTY RPE, rule 85 (B); ICTR RPE, rule 85 (B); and SCSL RPE, rule 85 (B). 
523 See also Nancy Combs, ‘Judicial Powers During Trial Proceedings’ in Sluiter et al. (2013) 689, 
700-702.  
524 ICTY RPE, rule 73 bis (D); ICTR RPE, rule 73 bis (D); and SCSL RPE, rule 73 bis (D). 
525 ICTY RPE, rule 73 bis (B); ICTR RPE, rule 73 ter (C); and SCSL RPE, rule 73 ter (C). See, e.g., 
Galić (IT-98-29-AR73), Decision on Application by Prosecution for Leave to Appeal, Appeals 
Chamber, 14 December 2001, para. 7. 
526 ICTY RPE, rule 73 ter (E). 
527 ICTY RPE, rule 73 bis (D); ICTR RPE, rule 73 ter (D); and SCSL RPE, rule 73 ter (D). 
528 ICTY RPE, rule 73 bis (D). See, e.g., Milutinović (IT-05-87-T), Decision on Application of Rule 
73 bis, Trial Chamber, 11 July 2006. 
529 Pre-Trial Judge’s broad mandate consists in taking ‘any necessary measure to prepare the case 
for a fair and expeditious trial’. ICTY RPE, rule 65 ter (B).    
530 ICTR RPE, rule 73 bis and ter; SCSL RPE, rule 73 bis and ter.  
531 See, e.g., Orić (IT-03-68-T), Order Concerning Guidelines on Evidence and the Conduct of 
Parties during Trial Proceedings, Trial Chamber, 21 October 2004, para. 1.      
532 See Antonio Cassese, Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone submitted by the 
Independent Expert Antonio Cassese, 12 December 2006, para. 110.  
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can exercise some control over the mode and order of witness interrogation.533 
There is no jury at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL and, indeed, the ICTY has 
remarked the importance of conduction of proceedings by professional judges 
instead.534           
As for parties, prosecutor’s impartiality, and his/her obligation to 
establish the truth and present not only inculpatory but also exculpatory 
evidence have been explicitly recognized by the ICTY.535 The Prosecutor of the 
ad hoc tribunals accordingly, as Judge Shahabuddeen concluded, ‘is not required 
to be neutral in the case; she is a party. But she is of course, not a partisan’.536 The 
ICTY RPE allow the accused to make an opening statement after the parties’ 
statements ‘under the control of the Trial Chamber’ and without being cross-
examined,537 which at least in theory makes the accused be transformed from a 
mere ‘object’ of the trial (adversarial system) to an active party (inquisitorial 
system).538 Moreover, the ICTY has concluded that once a witness has taken the 
oath, (s)he becomes a ‘witness of truth’ and ceases to be ‘a witness for either 
party’.539       
As for evidence, as discussed later,540 it is possible to admit out of court, 
written evidence instead of live, oral testimony. What should be detailed now is 
that after the pre-trial brief, the defence ‘shall’ (ICTY) or ‘may’ (ICTR) file its 
own brief and although the required contents of the brief differ between the 
ICTY and the ICTR, the brief should generally speaking provide the Trial 
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533 ICTY RPE, rule 90 (F); ICTR RPE, rule 90 (F); SCSL RPE, rule 90 (F). 
534 Orić (IT-03-68-T), Order Concerning Guidelines on Evidence and the Conduct of Parties 
during Trial Proceedings, Trial Chamber, 21 October 2004, para. 11; Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), 
Decision on the Motion of the Prosecution for the Admissibility of Evidence, Trial Chamber, 19 
January 1998, para. 20.  
535 ‘[...] the Prosecutor of the Tribunal is not, or not only, a Party to adversarial proceedings but is 
an organ of the Tribunal [...] whose object is not simply to secure a conviction but to present the 
case for the Prosecution, which includes not only inculpatory, but also exculpatory evidence, in 
order to assist the Chamber to discover the truth in a judicial setting [...]’. Kupreskić et al. (IT-95-
16-T), Decision on Communications between the Parties and their Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 21 
September 1998.    
536 Barayagwiza (ICTR-97-19-AR72), Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review of 
Reconsideration), Appeals Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 31 March 2000, 
para. 68. 
537 ICTY RPE, rule 84 bis (A).  
538 Orie (2002) 1468; Kai Ambos, ‘International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial” 
or “Mixed”’ (2003) 3 International Criminal Law Review 1, 19.  
539 Kupreskić et al. (IT-95-16-T), Decision on Communications between the Parties and their 
Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 21 September 1998, consideration 3 (iii).   
540 See infra Chapter III 2.2.2 and 3.2.2.  
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Chamber with an idea of which aspects of the prosecution case the defence is 
likely to contest.541  
Additional inquisitorial features include that the Trial Chamber shall at 
the same time determine the guilt and penalty to be imposed within the same 
procedure.542 Appeals are allowed not only for the convicted person but also for 
the Prosecutor.543 The existence of a Pre-Trial Judge at the ICTY and his/her 
authority to order parties to explain their position in pre-trial brief(s) is not yet 
comparable to a dossier. However, the powers under the ICTR and the SCSL 
RPE to order the parties to file the written statements of prospective witnesses 
have a very similar effect to the dossier, i.e., judges can read in advance 
witnesses’ early statements.544 
 
3.2.3. Unique or Mixed Outcome 
As evidenced, the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL in a higher or lesser degree have 
increasingly incorporated inquisitorial system elements to their adversarial 
frameworks to the point that there is some consensus to refer to them as of a 
unique or mixed nature.545 In the particular case of the ICTY, the amendments 
introduced by the Judges to its RPE transformed the ICTY system from a largely 
adversarial one into a mixed or a sui generis model.546 Even though a rule can be 
traced back to either an adversarial or inquisitorial origin, ‘the final product may 
be an amalgam of both […] so as to render it sui generis’ as concluded by the 
ICTY.547 The identification of a rule as clearly non-inquisitorial led the ICTY to 
rely on common law systems of interpretation to ‘determine its scope and 
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541 ICTY RPE, rule 65 ter (F); ICTR RPE, rule 73 bis (F). As for the SCSL, see SCSL RPE, rule 73 bis 
(F) (similar to the ICTR rule)   
542 ICTY RPE, rule 87 (C). A similar change can be observed in the ICTR RPE although its rule 98 
(judgment, dealing only with determination of guilt) was not deleted unlike the ICTY RPE.     
543 ICTY Statute, article 25 (1); ICTR Statute, article 24 (1); and SCSL Statute, article 20 (1).   
544 See ICTR RPE, rules 73 bis and 73 ter; Orie (2002) 1470. As for the SCSL, see SCSL RPE, rules 73 
bis and 73 ter (similar to the ICTR rules). 
545 See, e.g., Ambos (2003) 5; Lal Chand Vohrah, ‘Pre-Trial Practices and Procedures’ in Gabrielle 
McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International 
Criminal Law, Vol. 1 (Springer 2000) 477, 545; Megan Fairlie, ‘The Marriage of Common and 
Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit’ (2004) 4 International Criminal 
Law Review 243, 318; and Rod Dixon, ‘Developing International Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals’ (1997) 7 Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 81, 83 and 97. 
546 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, 
Esad Lanzo, Trial Chamber, 1 May 1997, para. 15. 
547 Ibid., Loc. cit. 


meaning if there is any ambiguity’.548 What is decisive is not so much whether a 
rule comes from the adversarial or inquisitorial system but whether it assists the 
tribunals to implement their mandate and whether it meets basic fair trial 
standards.549 As for the latter, the ECtHR has found that the ICTY Statute and 
RPE provide all necessary due process guarantees ‘including those of impartiality 
and independence’.550  
In addition to the discussion on adversarial and inquisitorial 
components, an extra example to further illustrate the hybrid or sui generis 
nature of the proceedings at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL follows. This 
consists in that the initially relatively straightforward common law guilty 
procedure at the ICTY, i.e., bringing trial directly to the sentencing,551 was 
amended and accordingly since then it is only acceptable upon satisfaction of 
certain requirements.552 This change was incorporated as a consequence of an 
accused’s inadequate ‘confession’ of having killed civilians under duress in an 
ICTY case.553  
     
3.3. The ICC: Adversarial, Inquisitorial and Unique/Hybrid Procedural 
Elements  
3.3.1. Adversarial Elements  
As for the role of the judges, this is more active at the ICC than at the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the SCSL. A common law feature is that, in principle, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may only confirm or reject the charges or adjourn the hearing,554 and 
‘request the Prosecutor to consider’ either to provide further evidence or amend 
a charge because of a different legal qualification.555 However, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I in Lubanga decided to add a charge,556 which reflects the active role that Pre-
Trial Judges may assume. Be that as it may, as Damaška remarks, Pre-trial Judges 
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548 Ibid., para. 16. (the reference was to rule 85 (A)-presentation of evidence).  
549 See Dixon (1997) 98; Richard May and Marieke Wierda, ‘Trends in International Criminal 
Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha’ (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 725, 753 et seq., 764.  
550 ECtHR, Miaden Naletilić v. Croatia, Appl. No. 51891/99, Judgment, 4 May 2000, para. 1.b.   
551 ICTY RPE, rule 62 (iii)-(v).   
552 Ibid., rule 62 bis. See, e.g., the plea agreements in Sikirica et al. (IT-95-8), Judgment, Trial 
Chamber, 13 November 2001, para. 17 et seq.  
553 Erdemović (IT-96-22-T), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 29 November 1996, para. 10.    
554 ICC Statute, article 61 (7) (a), (b). 
555 Ibid., article 61 (7) (c) (i), (ii).  
556 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-803), Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 29 January 2007, paras. 200-237.   
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coordinate and supervise party interaction but do not search for evidence.557 
Moreover, the end-product of the pre-trial stage is not a dossier but two separate 
adversarial submissions. As for the Trial Chamber, it makes the parties and 
participants ‘responsible for identifying’ the relevant evidence,558 but reserves 
itself the right to intervene whenever it sees fit.559 However, in the ICC first trial 
judgment in Lubanga, Trial Chamber I seemingly did not take judges’ potential 
active role very seriously, which was indeed criticized in one dissenting 
opinion.560 Jury does not exist as the ICC Judges are professional judges.        
 As for the role of the parties, the positions of the Prosecution and 
defence are still predominantly adversarial-oriented. During pre-trial, in 
particular, the ‘two-case’ structure remains as Prosecution and defence still 
retain a dual monopoly in collecting information and evidence.561 The parties 
decide the order and the manner in which the evidence shall be submitted to the 
Trial Chamber.562 The ICC Statute explicitly rejects trials in absentia563 although 
several options were considered until the Rome Conference.564 The Prosecutor 
has a wide discretion to initiate an investigation which ultimately depends on the 
‘interests of justice’,565 and may even enter into agreements with States, 
intergovernmental organizations or private persons for cooperation.566 This may 
raise some concerns among civil law lawyers as they may consider it similar to a 
plea bargaining.567    
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557 Mirjan Damaška, ‘Problematic Features of International Criminal Procedure’ in Antonio 
Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 
2009) 175, 176. 
558 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 95. 
559 Ibid., Loc. cit. (citing Hearing of 1 April 2011). 
560 Judge Odio Benito criticized that the Chamber did not take into account certain additional 
video footage as evidence. See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, 14 March 2012, paras. 41, 
43.    
561 Damaška (2009) 176. 
562 ICC RPE, rule 140 (1).  
563 ICC Statute, article 63 (1). 
564 See A/CONF.183/2/Add.I, pp. 119-123; Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Vol. I (Proceedings of the Preparatory 
Committee during March-April and August 1996), UN Doc. A/51/22, para. 226.   
565 ICC Statute, article 53 (1) (c), (2) (c). 
566 Ibid., article 54 (3) (d). 
567 Håkan Friman, ‘The Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the Investigative Stage’ in Horst 
Fischer, Claus Kreß, Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes 
Under International Law (BWV 2001) 191, 201. 
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As for evidence, some general evidentiary principles contained in the 
ICC Statute preserve the traditional common law function of evidence.568 
Adversarial features are still prevalent in the ICC legal framework on evidence 
but civil law influence cannot be ignored such as the possibility to submit written 
or recorded testimony as exceptions to live, oral testimony as discussed later.569 
Even though the Presiding Judge directs the trial proceedings,570 when (s)he 
declines to do so the parties can ‘agree on the order and manner in which the 
evidence shall be submitted’.571 Finally, the disclosure obligations imposed on the 
prosecution correspond to disclosure as an inherently adversarial feature 
although they have lost a bit their character due to the fact that all the disclosed 
material and information has to be communicated to the Trial Chamber.572 The 
defence has limited disclosure obligations.573        
 Other adversarial features include that although the Prosecution can 
appeal against an acquittal, which goes against the common law tradition, both 
the enumeration of grounds for appeals and the character of appeals not as a trial 
de novo but as a review of the proceedings on points of fact and of law are in 
accordance with the common law tradition.574 The granting of appeal of 
interlocutory decisions before the judgment is passed is also a common law 
feature.575 
 
3.3.2. Inquisitorial Elements 
As for the role of the judges, the Pre-Trial Chamber is not limited to facilitate the 
parties by issuing the respective orders and arrest warrants.576 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber can inter alia: i) proceed proprio motu to preserve evidence that would 
be essential for the defence at trial and risks becoming unavailable,577 ii) provide 
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568 See ICC Statute, article 69.  
569 See infra Chapter III 2.2.2 and 3.2.2. 
570 ICC Statute, article 64.8. 
571 ICC RPE, rule 140 (1). 
572 Orie (2002) 1484. As for disclosure obligations see, among others, ICC RPE, rule 76 (names and 
prior statements of prospective witnesses must be disclosed by the Prosecutor); rule 77 (on 
defendant’s right to inspect books, documents and tangible objects in prosecution’s possession). 
573 See ICC RPE, rule 78; and rule 79(1) (a) and (b) (on disclosure of defences mentioned in article 
31 of the ICC Statute). 
574 See ICC Statute, article 81; ICC RPE, rules 150-153.  
575 See Orie (2002) 1491; ICC Statute, article 82; ICC RPE, rules 154-158.  
576 ICC Statute, article 57. 
577 Ibid., article 56 (3). Additionally, the Pre-Trial Chamber may act upon request of the 
Prosecutor, who does not want to miss a unique investigative opportunity. See ICC Statute, article 
56 (1) and (2). 
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for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses and other persons, and 
the protection and preservation of evidence or information;578 and iii) judicially 
review a Prosecutor’s decision not to commence an investigation.579 Pre-Trial’s 
more active involvement corresponds to its truth seeking role, as pointed out by 
the former ICC French Judge Jorda, who also said that ‘the objective of this 
confirmation hearing is to supplement the adversarial debate between the 
parties’.580 The confirmation hearing was indeed proposed by the French 
delegation during the drafting of the ICC Statute.581 During the Rome 
Conference, different approaches, i.e., common law and civil law, were 
considered concerning what role should be adjudicated to the Trial Chamber.582 
As the ICC Statute text stands, the Trial Chamber has ample powers to intervene 
and, accordingly, is not only in a position to question witnesses,583 but it may 
also request or order supplementary evidence to be produced.584 The Trial 
Chamber can even call its own witnesses as took place in Lubanga’s trial.585 The 
logics underlying the Trial Chamber’s active role is summarized when ICC 
English Judge Fulford refers to the Chamber’s ‘statutory authority to request any 
evidence that is necessary to determine the truth’.586 The Trial Chamber 
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578 ICC Statute, article 57 (3) (c); ICC Regulations of the Court, regulations 30 and 46 (2). E.g., Pre-
Trial Chamber I, some months into the investigations relating to the Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, decided proprio motu to convene a status conference to assess the need for it to 
provide for, inter alia, the protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence. 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC-01/04), Decision to Convene a Status 
Conference, 17 February 2005.  
579 ICC Statute, article 53 (3). 
580 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-45-EN), Transcript, 27 November 2006, p. 19 lines 7-10. It should 
be pointed out that the search for the truth is not incompatible with an adversarial system. It has 
been indicated that the search of truth is common to adversarial and inquisitorial systems but the 
method to arrive to it differs. In other words, the common law approach follows a more liberal 
approach, i.e., a sort of procedural truth rather than a material truth. See Ambos (2003) 21.   
581 See UN Doc. A/AC. 249/L.3 (1996), article 48. See too UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1. 
582 See Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 64’ in Triffterer (2008) 1199, 1201; ‘Working paper on article 64’, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.183/C1/WGPM/L.41.  
583 ICC RPE, rule 140 (2) (c). See also Combs (2013) 702. 
584 ICC Statute, articles 64 (6) and 69 (3). Trial Chamber I stated that ‘the Court has a general right 
(that is not dependent on the cooperation or the consent of the parties) to request the presentation 
of all evidence necessary for the determination of the truth, pursuant to Article 69 (3) of the 
Statute’. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), Decision on Victims’ Participation, 18 January 2008, 
para. 18 (see also para. 21).   
585 Trial Chamber I called four expert witnesses to testify in issues such as chid soldiers. Lubanga 
(ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber, para. 11.     
586 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1399-Corr), Decision on the Admissibility of Four Documents, 
Trial Chamber I, 13 June 2008 (corrigendum issued on 20 January 2011), para. 24.   


Presiding Judge, in consultation with the other Chamber members, can 
‘determine the mode and order of questioning witnesses and presenting 
evidence’.587 The Trial Chamber also has the authority to modify the legal 
characterization of the facts.588  
 With regard to the role of the parties, the drafters of the ICC Statute 
devised a role for the Prosecutor ‘resembling that of an officer of justice rather 
than a partisan advocate’.589 As the Prosecutor has the obligation to establish the 
truth and present not only inculpatory but also exculpatory evidence, (s)he can 
be arguably conceived as ‘both a party to the proceedings and also an impartial 
truth seeker or organ of justice’.590 As for the accused, this may ‘make an 
unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence’.591 Although plea 
bargaining under strict conditions is included in the ICC Statute, this is not 
binding for the Trial Chamber that can decide that a more complete presentation 
of the facts in the case is necessary ‘in the interests of justice, in particular the 
interests of the victims’.592 This corresponds to drafters’ intention to avoid the 
phenomenon of plea bargaining.593 Even though victims are not civil parties, i.e., 
an adversarial feature, they can participate in the proceedings and claim 
reparations besides their status as witnesses.594 
 As for the rules of evidence, although the ICC is strongly influenced by 
the common law approach, ‘it rejects many of its more anachronistic rules’.595 
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587 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 43.  
588 Ibid., regulation 55. See, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2049), Decision Giving Notice to the 
Parties and Participants that the legal Characterization of the Facts may be subject to Change in 
Accordance with regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, Trial Chamber I, 14 July 2009. 
This was reversed in appeal by the Appeals Chamber as Pre-Trial Chamber I included additional 
facts and circumstances not described in the charging document. See, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2205), Judgment on the Appeals of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of 
Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 Entitled ‘Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants 
that the legal Characterization of the Facts may be subject to Change in Accordance with 
regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court’, Appeals Chamber, 8 December 2009.     
589 Claus Kreß, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a 
Unique Compromise’ (2003) Journal of International Criminal Justice, 603, 608. See also: ‘Proposal 
Submitted by Germany for Article 44 (a)’, UN Doc. A/AC.249/WP.37; Preparatory Committee 
(1996), Vol. I, para. 226.   
590 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 144, 168.  
591 ICC Statute, article 67 (1) (h).  
592 Ibid., article 65 (4).  
593 ‘Revised Abbreviated Compliation’, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.4/CPR.3. See also: UN Doc. 
A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1, p. 32.  
594 See infra Chapters III, IV and V. 
595 Schabas (2010) 837. 
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Moreover, there is some important civil law influence, e.g., admissibility of 
witness’s written or recorded evidence as an exception to oral, live and in person 
testimony, as examined later.596 Also, as already detailed, the ICC has the power 
to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the 
determination of truth,597 and the Trial Chamber can order the production of 
evidence additional to that already collected during the trial or prior to it by the 
parties.598 Moreover, concerning agreements as to evidence by the parties, an 
ICC Chamber may consider the respective alleged fact as being proven ‘unless is 
of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the alleged facts is required 
in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims’.599  
As for other inquisitorial features, there is no need to divide the ICC 
proceedings into trial and sentencing hearings. However, the ICC Trial Chamber 
I in Lubanga decided to have sentencing hearings separated from the verdict.600 
Concerning appeals, the Prosecutor can appeal against acquittal,601 and also 
make an appeal on the convicted person’s behalf.602 The right to appeal is indeed 
more broadly conceived than it is in the inquisitorial system. Finally, even 
though the dossier as such is not included in the ICC legal framework, all the 
information gathered by the Pre-Trial Chamber is transmitted to the Trial 
Chamber.603 This includes all the material disclosed between the parties,604 and 
all the other documents transmitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber,605 which may be 
consulted by both parties and victims participating in the proceedings.    
 
3.3.3. Unique or Mixed Outcome  
As evidenced, the ICC procedural law contains elements of both the adversarial 
and inquisitorial systems. Even though the common law model has been 
basically adopted, there has been the incorporation of important and numerous 
civil law system elements,606 to the point that there is consensus to describe the 
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596 See infra Chapter II 2.3.1 and 3.3. 
597 ICC Statute, article 69 (3). 
598 Ibid., article 64 (6) (d). 
599 ICC RPE, rule 69. 
600 In an oral decision, the Chamber decided that there would be a separate sentencing hearing if 
the accused is convicted. See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06),Transcripts, T-99-ENG, 25 November 
2008, p. 39, lines 22-23. 
601 ICC Statute, article 81 (1) (a). 
602 Ibid., article 83 (1) (b); ICC RPE, rule 152 (2).  
603 ICC RPE, rule 131. 
604 Ibid., rule 121 (2) (c). 
605 Ibid., rule 121 (10). 
606 Cassese (1999) 168. 
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ICC procedural law as mixed or truly unique.607 A good example of this is the 
flexibility in the order of questioning witnesses as examined later.608 In addition 
to the examples and features already presented, three extra and final points are 
discussed herein to better illustrate the co-existence, not always easy, of 
adversarial and inquisitorial elements in a unique procedural structure like the 
ICC’s.     
First, the ICC Prosecutor’s role conceived as an organ of justice and not 
only a party may generate some problems when performing his/her disclosure 
obligations as evidenced in the ICC first cases.609 On the one hand, the former 
ICC Prosecutor in exercise of his attributions collected evidence on confidential 
basis although he relied on this excessively.610 On the other hand, the Prosecutor 
has the obligation to disclose to the defence, as soon as practicable, evidence in 
his/her possession which ‘he or she believes shows or tends to show the 
innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may 
affect the credibility of prosecution evidence’.611 The lack of authorization from 
the information’s provider to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence led to the 
Trial Chamber I in Lubanga to order the stay of proceedings as Lubanga’s right 
to fair trial was affected.612 This stay of proceedings was lifted only later when the 
relevant materials were made available to the defence.613 Even though the 
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence is generally accepted in adversarial 
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607 Ambos (2003) 5; Kress (2003) 605; and Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, ‘The Elaboration of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ in Roy Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Elements of 
Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational Publisher 2001a) 235, 251.    
608 See infra Chapter III 2.3.1.1.   
609 Besides the Lubanga case, referred to in the following notes, see too: Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-621), Decision on Article 54 (3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially 
Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the Defence’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, 20 June 2008, paras. 2, 33, 39 and 46.   
610 Up to fifty percent of the Prosecution’s evidence regarding Lubanga was covered by such 
agreements. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-52-ENG) Transcripts, 1 October 2007, p. 13, line 21. As 
for the Prosecutor’s powers to conclude confidentiality agreements see: ICC Statute, article 54 (3) 
(e).  
611 ICC Statute, article 67 (2). 
612 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1401), Decision on the Consequences of Non-disclosure of 
Exculpatory Materials covered by Article 54 (3) (e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the 
Prosecution of the Accused Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 
10 June 2008, Trial Chamber I, 13 June 2008, paras. 90-93. 
613 Lubanga (ICC-01/14-01/06), Reasons for Oral Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings, 23 
January 2009, paras. 36-46.  
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and inquisitorial systems,614 disclosure proceedings as such are adversarial as in 
inquisitorial systems there is a case dossier. Also, the ICC’s particular features 
may have made it more difficult for the former ICC Prosecutor to meet his 
disclosure obligations.  
Second, the dominant role of the Chamber and of the Presiding Judge is 
a good example of the disputes between common and civil law lawyers during 
the Rome Conference and later when drafting the ICC RPE, which was described 
by observers as a ‘clash of cultures’ between the civil and common law.615 In 
other words, the inquisitorial system favouring an active strong judge and the 
adversarial system based on the conduct of trial by parties via, in particular, 
cross-examination. The compromise solution reached allows the Chamber to 
question a witness but only before or after the Prosecution and the defence does 
it,616 which implicitly recognises cross-examination. ‘Cross-examination’ and 
other typical terms of art for either adversarial or inquisitorial system are, 
however, not present, which corresponds to drafters’ intention to leave it clear 
the mixed nature of the ICC’s proceedings. As Damaška acknowledges, since the 
ICC framework on trial stage is less definitive as it does not impose a single 
pattern on fact-finding activity, judicial involvement in fact finding would likely 
vary according to the composition of the chamber in question.617 The language 
adopted by the ICC Statute concerning trial proceedings ‘The parties may 
submit evidence relevant to the case […] The Court shall have the authority to 
request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the 
determination of truth’,618 hence, incorporates neither a purely adversarial nor 
inquisitorial model but points to a mixed model.619       
 
614 Orie (2002) 1483. The ECtHR considers that the disclosure of all relevant material to the 
defendant is a requirement of fairness. See, e.g., Jasper v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27052/95, 
Judgment, 16 February 2000; Fitt v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 29777/96, Judgment, 16 February 
2000; Rowe and Davis v. United Kingdom, Application no. 28901/95, Judgment, 16 February 2000.   
615 See Fernández de Gurmendi (2001a) 252; Claus Kreß, ‘Witnesses in Proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court: An Analysis from a Perspective of Comparative Criminal 
Procedure’ in Horst Fischer, Claus Kreß, Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds.), International and National 
Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law (BWV 2001) 309, 352; Peter Lewis, ‘Trial 
Procedure’ in Lee (2001), 539, 547-550. See Australian Proposal, Rule 90, PCNICC/1999/DP.1 (26 
January 1999); PCNICC/2000/WGRPE/INF/1 (24 May 2000) 66; and Colombian comments in 
PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP.15 (20 July 1998) and PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP.30 (2 August 1999) 
as well as Rules 6.18 and 6.18 bis in PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP33. 
616 ICC RPE, rule 140 (2). 
617 Damaška (2009) 176.  
618 ICC Statute, article 69 (3).  
619 Kreß (2003) 612; Ambos (2003) 32. 
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 Third, this amalgamation of the two systems originating a unique one 
can be both beneficial and problematic. For instance, concerning plea 
bargaining, the practical common law tradition advantages are adopted but the 
ICC is left the last word in search of the truth. However, the situation of the rules 
of evidence is more problematic as implementation of general principles closely 
linked to either the inquisitorial or adversarial system in the ICC mixed model 
may be difficult. 
 
3.4. The ECCC and the STL: Adversarial, Inquisitorial and Unique/Hybrid 
Procedural Elements  
3.4.1. Adversarial Elements 
As a preliminary point, it should be mentioned that, in this thesis, references to 
the ECCC Internal Rules, correspond to their current version (Rev. 8),620 unless 
otherwise determined. The ECCC Internal Rules explicitly state that ‘ECCC 
proceedings shall be fair and adversarial’.621 However, as shown later,622 this 
statement is not completely accurate. Be that as it may, some adversarial features 
present in the ECCC are examined as follows. Concerning the role of the judges, 
the Co-Investigating Judges can order the provisional detention of the charged 
person but only after an ‘adversarial hearing’ with him/her and his/her lawyer 
present.623 Bearing in mind the role allocated to the Co-Investigating Judges, the 
ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber’s functions are more limited than those of the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber.624 Some of the wide appellate powers (inquisitorial feature) 
were reduced via an amendment to the ECCC Internal Rules and, thus, 
departing from the inquisitorial system,625 the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber 
can hear only appeals against judgments or interlocutory decisions on the 
grounds of: (1) an error on a question of law invalidating the impugned decision, 
or (2) an error of fact that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.626 Also, such 
amendment put the ECCC’s appeals procedure in line with other international 
and hybrid criminal courts such as the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL.627   
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620 ECCC Internal Rules (Rev. 8), 3 August 2011.  
621 Ibid., rule 21 (1) (a). 
622 See infra Chapter III 2.4.1.1. 
623 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 63 (1) (a).  
624 As for the ECCC pre-trial proceedings, see ECCC Internal Rules, rules 71-78.   
625 Robert Petit and Anees Ahmed, ‘A Review of the Jurisprudence of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal’ 
(2010) 8 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights Law 165, 171 
626 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 104 (1).  
627 See Petit and Ahmed (2010) 169 (footnote 49). 
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 With regard to the STL, its procedure, as stated by the STL first 
President Antonio Cassese, is substantially based on the adversarial system.628 As 
for the role of the judge, there is no investigating judge proper (juge 
d’instruction). As for the accused, this can appear as witness on his/her own 
defence if (s)he desires so.629 Victims are not civil parties but they can participate 
in the proceedings as victim participants besides their status as witnesses.630 As 
for the rules of evidence, live testimony is the rule as examined later.631 Each 
party, i.e., the Prosecutor and defence, and victims participating in the 
proceedings are responsible for gathering evidence in support of its own case. 
Even in cases when exceptionally the Pre-Trial Judge gathers evidence upon 
request of a party or victim participating in the proceedings and in application of 
certain conditions,632 this evidence still has to be introduced by the parties or 
victim participants and, hence, they remain free from doing so. This constitutes 
a very important difference from evidence gathered by the inquisitorial 
investigating judge since evidence gathered by him/her normally becomes 
available at trial without initiative of the parties or victims. Parties have 
disclosure obligations.633 Finally, the STL RPE split the proceedings into two 
different stages: one to establish the guilt or innocence and the other aimed at 
sentencing.634        
      
3.4.2. Inquisitorial Elements 
Concerning the ECCC, as foreseen by the ECCC Agreement and the ECCC 
Law,635 the ECCC’s procedure is conducted according to the Cambodian 
criminal procedure, which in turn reflects the French inquisitorial system. As 
remarked by the ECCC in its first judgment in Duch:  
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628 STL President, Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Explanatory Memorandum by the Tribunal’s 
President, 25 November 2010, para. 4. See also STL President, Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
Explanatory Memorandum by the Tribunal’s President (as of 12 April 2012), para. 4.  
629 STL RPE, rule 144 (D). 
630 See infra Chapters III, IV and V. 
631 See infra Chapter III 2.41.1. 
632 See infra Chapter II 3.4.2.  
633 See STL RPE, rules 110 et seq. 
634 Ibid., rule 171. 
635 The Agreement creating the ECCC requires that its procedure shall be in accordance with 
Cambodian procedural law. See ECCC Agreement, article 12 (1); ECCC Law, article 33 new. See 
also ECCC Law, article 20 new (concerning the Co-Prosecutors), and article 23 (new) (concerning 
the Co-Investigating Judges).  
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Pursuant to the ECCC Agreement and the ECCC Law, the Chambers of the 
ECCC operate in accordance with Cambodian procedural law. Following its 
establishment, the ECCC adopted its Internal Rules. The purpose of the Internal 
Rules is to consolidate applicable Cambodian procedure in relation to 
proceedings before the ECCC. The ECCC Agreement and the ECCC Law 
envisage that additional rules may be adopted where existing procedures do not 
deal with a particular matter, in case of uncertainty regarding their 
interpretation or application, or where questions arise regarding their 
consistency with international standards. Thus, while Cambodian law governs 
the procedure before the Chamber, guidance is also sought from procedural 
rules established at the international level, where appropriate.636    
 
  As for the judges’ role, for first time in an international/hybrid criminal 
court, there are two ‘impartial’ Co-Investigating Judges who conduct 
investigations, question suspects and victims, hear witnesses, and in general 
collect evidence.637 Additionally, they inter alia may ‘order the provisional 
detention of a charged person after an adversarial hearing’,638 and bring up 
investigation to a conclusion by issuing a closing order, indicating whether the 
suspect is charged and commits him/her for trial, or dismiss the case.639 In case 
the person is committed for trial, the Co-Investigating Judges hand over the case 
file, i.e., the dossier,640 containing all the documents collected during 
investigation to the Trial Chamber;641 which differs from common law systems 
where parties present directly evidence to the Trial Chamber, and at the ECCC 
the parties have access to the case file.642 The Co-Investigating Judges must 
‘ascertain the truth’ and for that purpose ‘they shall conduct their investigation 
 
636 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 35. As for 
the reference to the use of international standards, see: ECCC Internal Rules, preamble, fifth 
paragraph (citing ECCC Agreement, article 12 (1) and ECCC Law, articles 20 new, 23 new and 33 
new).  
637 ECCC Law, article 23 new. The Co-Investigating Judges are responsible for collecting evidence 
to determine if the facts set out by the Co-Prosecutors constitute a crime under the ECCC’s 
jurisdiction and if the charged person is to be indicted and sent to trial before the Trial Chamber.   
638 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 63 (1) (a). 
639 Ibid., rule 67 (1). 
640 The case file, dossier, as defined in the ECCC Internal Rules glossary ‘ refers to all the written 
records (procés verbaux) of investigative action undertaken in the course of a Preliminary 
Investigation or a Judicial Investigation, together with all applications by parties, written decisions 
and any attachments thereto at all stages of the proceedings, including the record of proceedings 
before the Chambers’. 
641 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 69 (2).  
642 Ibid., rule 86. 
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impartially, whether the evidence is inculpatory or exculpatory’.643 In turn, the 
ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber in Duch decided on its own initiative to consider 
whether there had been any procedural irregularities before the Co-Investigating 
Judges.644 During trial, the Judges are granted powers to have a very tight control 
of what is meant to happen in the courtroom. Because of having received the 
dossier, the Trial Judges are in a situation to manage the proceedings and take 
substantive steps. At the courtroom, they are not ‘clean slates’ and can base their 
decisions at least partially on evaluations previously made by other subjects as 
contained in the dossier.645 The Presiding Judge conducts the trial proceedings 
and, together with the other judges, could under a provision (later deleted) of the 
original ECCC Internal Rules version ask the accused ‘any questions which they 
consider to be conductive to ascertaining the truth’.646 In any case, the ECCC 
Trial Chamber ‘may summon or hear any person as a witness or admit any new 
evidence which it deems conducive to ascertaining the truth’.647 The Trial 
Chamber may also conduct its own ‘additional investigation’.648 As examined 
later, the ECCC follows an inquisitorial order of witness examination.649 The 
level of the ECCC Trial Chamber’s involvement in the conduct of proceedings 
evidences the civil law judge’s role in trials.650 Based on wide appellate powers, 
there is a right to hear fresh evidence during appeals.651 Thus, for example, the 
Supreme Court Chamber may itself examine evidence or discover new evidence 
to determine issues before it.652  
As for the positions of the parties, despite the lack of explicit provisions, 
the ECCC system assumes that the accused may not be regarded as witness and, 
hence, his/her statement is not strictly speaking a ‘testimony’.653 That an accused 
is not allowed to give sworn statements confirms the previous point. This reflects 
the French inquisitorial system where the accused should not be put in the 
 
643 Ibid., rule 55 (5).  
644 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Appeal Against the Provisional Detention 
Order of Kaing Guek Eav Alias ‘Duch’, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 3 December 2007, paras. 9-12.  
645 See Guido Acquaviva, ‘New Paths in International Criminal Justice? The Internal Rules of the 
Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 129, 144.  
646 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 90 (1) (Rev. 5). The cited phrased was later deleted on 17 September 
2010 (Rev. 6). 
647 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 87 (4). 
648 Ibid., rule 93 (1).  
649 See infra Chapter III 2.4.1.1. 
650 See ECCC Internal Rules, rule 85. See also Combs (2013) 728. 
651 Petit and Ahmed (2010) 169. 
652 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 104 (1).  
653 Acquaviva (2008) 147.  
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dilemma to, on the one hand, be obligated to tell the truth and, on the other one, 
choose not to speak at all during his/her own trial.654 Unlike the other 
international and hybrid criminal courts, the ECCC’s legal framework provides 
no procedure for the acceptance of a plea guilty by an accused. The ECCC is the 
only forum, among the international and hybrid criminal courts examined in 
this thesis, at which victims can be civil parties.655 The Prosecutor is the party 
who initiates prosecution of crimes,656 conducts preliminary investigations,657 
and prosecutes cases throughout investigative, pre-trial, trial, and appeals stages. 
As for evidence, its discovery is court-driven rather than party-driven.658 The 
ECCC Internal Rules are also of a liberal nature. Indeed, they only include a very 
reduced number of technicalities as for evidence admissibility and give the 
judges an important leeway when weighing the evidence probative value. 
Moreover, the existence of the dossier or case file, accessible by all parties 
(including the civil parties), corresponds to ECCC’s work based on a single-case 
system. The dossier also makes that at the ECCC disclosure issues are not 
present, 659 unlike the other international and hybrid criminal courts examined in 
this thesis. Other inquisitorial features include: participation of the defendants 
throughout the judicial investigation;660 and the original ECCC Internal Rules 
provided with wider appellate powers, including the right to hear fresh evidence 
at appeal.661   
With regard to the STL, a clear influence of inquisitorial system elements 
lies on article 28 (2) of its Statute which indicates the adoption of RPE by the 
Judges guided ‘as appropriate, by the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, as 
well as by other reference materials reflecting the highest standards of 
international criminal procedure, with a view to ensuring a fair and expeditious 
trial’. Moreover, rule 3 of the RPE provides that, in interpreting them, the STL 
(in order of preference) after considering the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
the Treaties and international human rights standards, shall consider ‘(iii) the 
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654 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
655 With regard to the victims’ status at the ECCC, see infra Chapters III, IV and V. 
656 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 49. 
657 Ibid., rule 50. 
658 E.g., ECCC Internal Rules, rules 84, 87, 90 and 91.  
659 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 205. 
660 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Nuon Chea’s Appeal Regarding Appointment of an 
Expert, Pre-Trial Chamber, 22 October 2008, paras. 25-27. 
661 See Ibid., Loc. cit; ECCC Internal Rules, rule 104 (original text). The broad appeals scope, 
however, was later reduced as previously referred to. See supra Chapter II 3.4.1. 
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general principles of international criminal law and procedure, and, as 
appropriate, (iv) the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure’.   
As for the role of the judge, although there is no official juge 
d’instruction (investigating judge), in conceiving the powers of the Pre-Trial 
Judge, the STL RPE drafters largely drew upon the Lebanese experience and the 
Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., from an inquisitorial system, ‘short of 
assisting him the powers of a juge d’instruction’.662 The STL RPE have broaden 
the Pre-Trial Judge’s power so that (s)he can: i) expedite the pre-trial 
proceedings to the maximum extent feasible; ii) organize the evidentiary 
material in order to facilitate the task of the Trial Chamber; and iii) assist the 
parties to collect evidence.663 Concerning the last objective, the STL is vested to 
exceptionally gather evidence: i) at the request of a party or a victim participating 
in the proceedings when they demonstrate not to be in a position to collect 
evidence and the Pre-Trial Judge considers doing so in the interests of justice;664 
ii) when a party or victim participating in the proceedings is unable to collect ‘an 
important piece of evidence’ and the Pre-Trial Judge considers it as 
indispensable for the fair administration of justice, the equality of arms and the 
search for truth.665 Additionally, the Pre-Trial Judge is vested with, inter alia, the 
following powers: i) evaluate the charges brought by the Prosecutor in the 
indictment and, if necessary, request the Prosecutor to reduce or reclassify such 
charge;666 ii) facilitate the communication between parties;667 iii) rule on granting 
victims the status of victims participating in the proceedings;668 iv) issue 
summonses, warrants and other orders at the request of either party;669 v) draw 
up a complete file for the Trial Chamber that sets out the main differences 
between the parties on points of law and fact, and indicates Pre-Trial Judge’s 
view on the main points of law and fact in the case;670 and vi) rule on the 
disclosure of information provided on a confidential basis.671 Trial Chambers can 
exercise control over the mode and order of witness interrogation upon a party’s 
objection.672 As for the role of the accused, this is granted a role found in an 
 
662 STL President (2010), para 12; STL President (2012), para. 12. 
663 STL President (2010), para 12; STL President (2012), para. 12.  
664 STL RPE, rule 92 (A). 
665 Ibid., rule 92 (C).  
666 Ibid., rule 68. 
667 Ibid., rule 89 (A). 
668 Ibid., rule 86. 
669 Ibid., rule 88 (A).  
670 Ibid., rule 95. 
671 Ibid., rule 118.  
672 Ibid., rule 150 (G). 
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inquisitorial system inasmuch as the accused can answer questions of the judges, 
parties and victim participants, without having acquired the formal status of a 
witness on his/her own behalf.673 With regard to evidence, as seen later,674 the 
STL can exceptionally receive written evidence. Finally, the STL Trial Chamber 
can commence proceedings in abstentia after ‘all reasonable steps’ have been 
taken to secure the appearance of an accused before the Tribunal,675 as already 
applied by the STL.676  
 
3.4.3. Unique or Hybrid Outcome  
Notwithstanding the high level of inquisitorial elements in the ECCC’s 
procedural structure, which is arguably the most inquisitorial-oriented criminal 
judicial forum at the international level, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber when 
determining the validity of the ECCC Internal Rules Chamber noted that the 
focus of the Tribunal ‘differs substantially enough from the normal operations of 
the Cambodian criminal courts’ for it to warrant a ‘self contained regime of 
procedural law [suited to its] unique circumstances’.677 It is argued here that the 
ECCC has a mixed nature, arguably inquisitorial-oriented. This is indeed 
reflected in its legal instruments when in addition to the Cambodian 
(inquisitorial) procedural law, guidance from international procedural rules (of a 
unique or hybrid nature), where appropriate, is explicitly mentioned as already 
seen. The important due process safeguards contained in the ECCC legal 
framework,678 and applicable to the ECCC non-adversarial procedures, arguably 
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673 STL Statute, article 16 (5).  
674 See infra Chapter III 2.4.1.2. 
675 STL Statute, article 22; STL RPE, rule 106 (A).  
676 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/I/TC), Decision to Hold Trial In Abstentia, Trial Chamber, 1 February 
2012, para. 111; Merhi (STL-13-04/1/TC), Decision to Hold Trial In Abstentia, Trial Chamber, 20 
December 2013, para. 111. 
677 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Nuon Chea’s Appeal Against Order Refusing Request 
for Annulment, Pre-Trial Chamber, 26 August 2008, para. 14. 
678 In case when (1) Cambodian law does not deal with a particular matter, (2) there is uncertainty 
in Cambodian law, and (3) Cambodian law is inconsistent with international standards, the ECCC 
Constitutive Agreement provides that ‘guidance may be sought [from] procedural rules established 
at the international level’. ECCC Constitutive Agreement, article 12 (1).  
Accordingly, the applicable ECCC procedural law must be consistent with ‘international standards 
of justice, fairness and due process of law’. ECCC Constitutive Agreement, article 12 (2). 
Moreover, the ECCC is bound by the fair trial rights under articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR, as 
explicitly stated in the ECCC Law. See ECCC Law, article 33 new.  
Nevertheless, the ECCC has not addressed all concerns on due process guarantees expressed in 
doctrine. See Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical 
Introduction (Oxford University Press 2007) 326; Acquaviva (2008) 149.  
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evidence that international criminal justice proceedings do not necessarily have 
to be predominantly adversarial. Additionally, ECCC’s unique structural features 
include: i) a majority of national Cambodian judges,679 who also serve as 
Presidents of the Chambers;680 ii) it is the only court, among the international 
and hybrid criminal courts, with dual Co-Prosecutors and dual Co-Investigating 
Judges: one international and one national;681 and iii) the voting system requiring 
supermajority since at least one international judge must vote with the simple 
majority,682 which seeks to balance the majority of Cambodian judges to avoid 
political interference.683 
 With regard to the STL procedure, when crafted it clearly incorporated 
both adversarial and inquisitorial features,684 leading to an innovative 
procedure,685 which has been described as more inquisitorial oriented.686 As 
previously cited, article 28 (2) of the STL Statute and rule 3 of the STL RPE 
indeed refer to international criminal procedure standards and general 
principles which, as discussed, are of a unique or  hybrid nature. Four additional 
examples are given herein to illustrate that mixture or uniqueness. First, the Trial 
Chamber is provided by the Pre-Trial Judge with a complete file so that the Trial 
Chamber Judges can be familiar with the evidence collected against and in favor 
of the defendant as well as with the legal and factual problems that arise.687 
Nevertheless, the STL Pre-Trial Judge may be incapable of compiling an 
 
679 The ECCC Chambers’ composition (national/total judges) is as follows: 3/5 (Pre-Trial 
Chamber), 3/5 (Trial Chamber) and 4/7 (Supreme Court that hears appeals and serves as a final 
instance chamber). See ECCC Constitutive Agreement, article 3; and ECCC Law, articles 9 new 
and 11 new.  
680 ECCC Law, article 9 new. 
681 ECCC Constitutive Agreement, articles 5 (Investigating Judges) and 6 (Prosecutors); Law on the 
Establishment of the ECCC, articles 16 (Co-Prosecutors) and 23 (Co-Investigators).     
682 ECCC Constitutive Agreement, article 4; Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, article 14 new. 
683 Additionally, there is not a Registrar as the ECCC is co-administered by a Cambodian Director 
of the Office of Administration and a UN appointed Deputy Director. See ECCC Constitutive 
Agreement, article 8; Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, articles 30 and 31 new. This reflects 
the national predominance. There is no judge with the status of Chambers’ President either. There 
is, hence, no officer in a position to exert leadership at the court to handle political interference.  
684 STL President (2010), paras. 2-4; STL President (2012), paras. 2-4.  
685 See Cécile Aptel, ‘Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1107, 1116, 1124. 
686 Salvatore Zappalà, ‘Comparative Models and the Enduring Relevance of the Accusatorial-
Inquisitorial Dichotomy’ in Sluiter et al. (2013) 44, 52-53; Fausto Pocar and Linda Carter, ‘The 
Challenge of Shaping Procedures in International Criminal Courts’ in Linda Carter and Fausto 
Pocar (eds.)., International Criminal Procedure: The Interface of Civil Law and Common Law 
Legal Systems (Edward Elgar 2013) 1, 30. 
687 STL RPE, rule 95.   
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exhaustive file. In that situation, the Trial Chamber, hence, lacks an exhaustive 
file of the case and, in this scenario, the STL RPE envisage a return to the 
adversarial mode of conduct of proceedings.688 However, it is still left open the 
possibility of applying the inquisitorial conduct of proceedings. Second, the STL 
Pre-Trial Judge possesses the unique ability to submit to the Appeals Chamber 
interlocutory questions on legal issues that arise during the confirmation of the 
indictment.689 This procedure aims at both ensuring consistency in applicable 
law through the proceedings, and speeding up pre-trial and trial deliberations,690 
as already done.691 Third, as for statements from the accused, the civil law 
approach is essentially followed.692 The accused, however, unlike most 
inquisitorial jurisdictions must be advised of his/her right to remain silent before 
judges’ questioning and the STL RPE state that no adverse inference may be 
drawn from it.693 Fourth, the establishment of an independent and autonomous 
Defence Office is another new feature at the STL,694 and is aimed at assisting to 
redress the imbalance observed in adversarial systems between the Prosecution, 
normally well-equipped, and the defence, normally at disadvantage.      
 
4. Chapter Conclusions   
1. Victims’ status in criminal proceedings has been traditionally shaped by 
retributive and utilitarian paradigms, according to which, they do not play a 
central role but only a secondary role as witnesses. Perception of victims’ 
enhanced status as detrimental to the accused’s right to a fair trial (retributive 
paradigm) and a focus on the society/offender rather than on the individualized 
victim (retributive, utilitarian paradigms) led to a victims’ weak or limited status 
in criminal justice. An answer to this situation came from the restorative justice 
paradigm alongside the victims’ rights movement. Restorative justice recognizes 
victims a central role in any justice system and seeks to redress their harm 
suffered as crimes are seen as committed against individuals and their 
communities. Hence, in order to enhance victims’ status, restorative justice 
paradigm elements must be progressively and increasingly incorporated into 
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688 Ibid., rule 145 (B). See also STL President (2010), para 29; STL President (2012), para 29.    
689 STL RPE, rule 68 (G).  
690 STL President (2010) para. 11; STL President (2012) para. 11. 
691 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/I/TC), Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, 
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Appeals Chamber, 16 February 2011.  
692 An accused ‘may make statements to the Trial Chamber at any stage of the proceedings, 
provided such statements are relevant to the case at any issue’. STL RPE, rule 144 (A).  
693 Ibid., rule 144 (B).  
694 STL Statute, article 13. 
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criminal justice systems still driven by retributive, utilitarian paradigms. Such 
incorporation is also justified, indeed required, by powerful philosophical, 
ethical arguments. The combination of those paradigms should be done as they 
are not diametrically opposed and a radical reform of criminal justice systems is 
unfeasible. This combination is more convenient for victims’ status as the 
restorative (extra-judicial) mechanisms alone are not necessarily and/or fully 
satisfactory for victims.   
2. International law developments have also contributed to enhance 
victims’ status in criminal proceedings. International (UN Victims Declaration 
and the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines) and European instruments 
(Recommendation (85) 11, the EU Framework Decision on Victims and the EU 
Directive on Victims) contain similar victims’ definitions, i.e., persons who 
individually or collectively suffer physical or mental harm out of serious human 
rights, international humanitarian law violations/crimes, including also family 
members. They also present similar catalogue of victims’ (procedural) rights in 
criminal proceedings, including the rights to: information, protection and 
respect, participation, and reparations. The HRC, the CAT, the ECtHR and the 
IACtHR in applying and/or interpreting their instruments in serious human 
rights violations cases have put into practice and enhanced victims’ rights to 
reparations, an effective remedy and protection. Moreover, the ECtHR and the 
IACtHR in applying and/or interpreting their instruments in serious human 
rights violations cases have recognized victims’ certain participatory rights in 
criminal justice.   
3. Whereas the common law/adversarial system is characterized by a 
passive judge, confrontational/dominant parties, and strict rules of evidence, the 
civil law/inquisitorial system is characterized by an active judge, not so dominant 
parties and more relaxed rules of evidence. These features impact on victims’ 
status as in the adversarial system victims’ status is narrowed down to be witness 
and/or a limited participation as private prosecutors. However, there is a trend 
consisting in empowering victims via impact/personal statements and benefiting 
them with compensation orders. In contrast, victims in the inquisitorial systems 
may be not only witnesses but also civil parties, granting them with procedural 
rights to, for example, call witnesses and claim reparations. Victims can also be 
private prosecutors although this is limited to minor offences. Victims’ status is 
stronger in an inquisitorial system rather than in an adversarial one as in the 
former victims can voice their own interests and exercise procedural rights. Even 
when participating as witnesses, the re-victimization risk is lesser than in the 
adversarial system as this is based on orality and cross-examination.    
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4. Concerning victims’ status in any national criminal system, one or 
more models of victims’ role apply. Victims as witnesses and complainants are 
always present. Victim as a civil party is only available in inquisitorial system. 
Although victims can initiate a prosecution, participate as a party in the 
proceedings and claim civil damages, their status and participation are linked to 
and limited to the criminal proceedings outcome. Victims’ participation as 
private prosecutor is present in common and civil law jurisdictions but limited 
to petty crimes and carries a heavy burden on the victims. Victims as secondary 
prosecutors suffer the same shortcomings. The model of victims as auxiliary 
prosecutors, mainly in civil law systems, is more balanced on those points. In 
common law jurisdictions, judges can as a penalty order compensation for 
victims, which is ex officio enforceable unlike civil damages for civil parties. 
Victims can mainly in common law jurisdictions participate via impact 
statements heard for sentencing purposes. The six presented models of victims’ 
role underlie and can be accommodated within the three dimensions of victims’ 
status proposed in this thesis: i) victims as witnesses (victim-witnesses); ii) 
victims as victim participants and/or civil parties (civil party, and, in a broad 
sense of ‘participation’: private/secondary/auxiliary prosecutor, complainant, 
and impact statement provider); and iii) victims as reparations claimants (civil 
party and, although not reparations claimants, concerning the outcome of 
reparations: compensation order beneficiary).            
5. In transitional scenarios, i.e., contexts of massive commission of 
international crimes, international and hybrid criminal courts mainly driven by 
retributive/deterrent goals are limited by impossibilities to set proportional 
punishments and for all the perpetrators, and to determine whether further 
victimization was prevented. On the other hand, restorative mechanisms bring 
victims to the centre stage. Thus, the focus of TRCs and reparations programmes 
on victims do not lead to re-victimization, and the latter also provide tangible 
outcomes for victims. However, such mechanisms are also limited as victims do 
not necessarily regard truth-seeking as enough for their justice needs, and 
reparations may be disproportionate to the crimes committed. Additionally, 
victims’ thirst for justice suggests that criminal trials cannot be excluded from 
transitional scenarios. The holistic transitional justice approach; strong 
restorative justice elements at the ICC, the ECCC complementing their 
retributive/deterrent mandates; international/hybrid criminal courts and TRCs 
as complementary forums for victims; and victims’ right to truth present in both 
restorative mechanisms and those courts, hence, suggest that combining 
retributive/deterrent or utilitarian and restorative paradigms is the best 


alternative for victims. Therefore, to better shape and enhance victims’ status, 
international, hybrid and national criminal courts should incorporate and adapt 
some restorative-oriented justice features and goals to their retributive/deterrent 
goals and, thus, provide victims with participatory rights and the possibility to 
claim reparations.      
6. When setting up international and hybrid criminal courts factors such 
as the access of victims, and their impact on victims are taken into account. 
Although those courts have contributed to the fight against impunity and at least 
indirectly to the re-vindication of the most serious international crimes victims, 
diverse nature challenges have ended up in some disappointing outcomes. 
However, the trend is that more recent international and hybrid criminal courts 
(ICC, ECCC and STL) have built on the experiences of and learnt from mistakes 
made by the previous ones (ICTY, ICTR and SCSL). Also, the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL have progressively introduced corrective measures to better 
implement their mandates.   
7. International criminal proceedings are unique or mixed. Each court’s 
procedural law differs not only from any national system but also from each 
other although there are degrees of similarities among them. Whereas one end of 
the scale is proceedings at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL that still exhibit the 
highest degree of adversarial features, the other end is the ECCC proceedings 
with the strongest presence of inquisitorial elements. Among the examined 
international and hybrid criminal courts, the ECCC is arguably the only one 
fundamentally led by inquisitorial proceedings due to the Cambodian 
procedural law as complemented by international procedural rules (of a unique 
or hybrid nature). The ICC and the STL proceedings can be placed in the middle 
of the scale as they are arguably still adversarial oriented although the ICC 
proceedings present important and numerous inquisitorial features and the STL 
proceedings are partially based on the Lebanese (inquisitorial) system. Be that as 
it may, proceedings at international and hybrid criminal courts have been 
moving away from a predominantly-adversarial model to another one which has 
increasingly incorporated inquisitorial features.  
8. As for what features and/or systems as applied at the international 
level may be more meaningful for victims’ status, courts presenting a higher level 
of inquisitorial features (ECCC, STL and ICC) are in principle better judicial 
platforms for victims. First, the judge’s more active role at the ECCC, the ICC 
and the STL seems to provide better guarantees for victims as the judges can 
intervene proprio motu to, for example, produce evidence, call their own 
witnesses, question parties’ witnesses, control and intervene in witness 
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examination (ECCC and ICC in particular), and lead (ECCC) or supervise (ICC, 
STL) investigations. Such interventions are in many cases adopted in pursuance 
of ‘interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims’ or to ‘ascertain 
the truth’. The judge’s role at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL has indeed been 
strengthened along those lines. Judges assuming an active role may step in to 
guarantee principles such as justice, truth and victims’ interests so that the 
proceedings are not a mere adversarial two-party battle, which would exclude or 
undermine victims. Second, the same goes true as for the role assigned to the 
Prosecutor, who is regarded at international and hybrid criminal courts not only 
as a mere party but also as an organ of justice. This corresponds to an 
inquisitorial system and has increasingly percolated the originally adversarial 
vision of him/her at those courts. Third, rules of evidence have incorporated 
more victim-friendly measures, mainly from the inquisitorial system. The above-
mentioned points in general set up a more propitious frame for victims’ status to 
fit in.  
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Chapter III. Victims’ Status as Witnesses 
 
 
1. Introduction  
A victim participating as a witness qualifies as a fact witness, i.e., a victim who 
testifies about the events that (s)he has witnessed and, hence, provides evidence 
helping to establish the ‘crime base’ since his/her testimony is used to prove the 
specific crimes.695 Thus, a victim who is a witness is an ordinary witness, 
different from expert witnesses, and testify about facts about which (s)he 
possesses personal knowledge.696 His/her testimony shall then be connected 
through other evidence to political or military leaders, if the case is based on 
modes of superior authority liability.697 As Schabas points out, even if victims do 
not participate as civil parties or victim participants, ‘their presence is virtually 
indispensable as witnesses’.698 The act of testifying may have a therapeutic effect 
on victims as they may ‘find meaning in being heard, in having a witness who 
affirms that [their abuse] did happen, that it was terrible, [and] that it was not 
their fault’.699 The victims’ experience as witnesses is validated by this truth-
telling process, which may help them heal.700  
 Victims’ status as witnesses is present at all the international and hybrid 
criminal courts considered in this thesis. Indeed, this is also applicable to the 
IMT and IMTFE (not studied in this thesis) although victims’ intervention as 
witnesses played a relatively small role at those tribunals. As for the IMT, an 
important reason for it was that the Allies already had in their possession 
detailed and voluminous self-incriminating evidence compiled by the Nazis 
themselves.701 This evidence, alongside defendants’ confessions and information 
 
695 David Tolbert and Frederick Swinnen, ‘The Protection of, and Assistance to, Witnesses at the 
ICTY’ in Hirad Abtahi and Gideon Boas (eds.), The Dynamics of International Criminal Justice: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Richard May (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 193, 196.  
696 Schabas (2006) 471. 
697 Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers, 2003) 
633. 
698 Schabas (2011) 358. 
699 See Jamie O'Connell, ‘Gambling With the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators 
Console their Victims?’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 295, 330 (quoting a 
telephone interview with Mary Fabri, clinical psychologist).   
700 See Emily Haslam, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of 
Hope Over Experience’ in Dominic McGoldrick et al. (eds.), The Permanent International 
Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart Publishing 2004) 315, 316 (quoting Carlos Nino).  
701 Sam Garkawe, ‘The Role and Rights of Victims at the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal’ in Herbert Reginbogin and Christoph Johannes Safferling (eds.), The Nuremberg Trials: 
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given by other prosecution witnesses, made survivor testimony be largely 
unnecessary to achieve convictions.702 Even though the IMTFE unlike the IMT 
relied on witness testimony since most documentary evidence was destroyed,703 
the small number of prosecution victims,704 and the general legal framework and 
judgment outcome can be considered as not having paid due attention to the 
victims, in particular sexual violence victims.705       
 In contrast to it, victims’ status as witnesses at the international and 
hybrid criminal courts considered in this thesis has been quite important and 
active as detailed later. What should be mentioned here is that to facilitate the 
intervention of victims and witnesses, international and hybrid criminal courts 
have special units or sections which are primarily responsible for assisting 
victims and witnesses when they testify.706 These organs are the Victims and 
Witnesses Section (VWS) at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL;707 the Victims 
and Witness Unit (VWU) at the ICC and the STL;708 and the Witness and Expert 
Support Unit (WESU),709 and the Victims Support Section (VSS) both at the 
ECCC.710 Thus, for example, the ICC VWU as for victims and witness has, inter 
alia, the following functions: i) providing them with adequate protective and 
security measures and formulating long and short-term plans for their 
protection; ii) recommending to the ICC organs the adoption of protection 
measures and also advising relevant States on such measures; and iii) assisting 
them in obtaining medical, psychological and other appropriate assistance.711 
With regard to witnesses, the ICC VWU has the following additional functions: 
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International Criminal Law since 1945 (K.G. Saur 2006) 86, 90. For further reasons see also Ibid., 
91.   
702 Ibid., 91. There were only thirty-three Prosecution-witnesses before the IMT and only fourteen 
of them were women victims (three of them were Jewish and two women). See Luke Moffett, ‘The 
Role of Victims in the International Criminal Tribunals of the Second World War’ (2012) 12 
International Criminal Law Review 245, 252.   
703 See Ibid., 265-266.  
704 Out of the 419 witnesses that orally testified at the IMTFE, only 102 were Prosecution witnesses. 
See Philip Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial (University of Texas Press 1979) 18.  
705 See IMTFE, Vol. XX, pp. 49613-49620, 49632 and 49640 (referred to by Moffett (2012) 263). 
706 The Prosecution holds a more general mandate in relation to protection matters in, for example, 
at the ICC under articles 54 (3) (f) and 68 (1) of its Statute.   
707 ICTY RPE, rule 34; ICTR RPE, rule 34; SCSL RPE, rule 34. In the case of the ICTR, the exact 
name is Victims and Witnesses Support Unit.  
708 ICC Statute, article 43 (6); ICC RPE, rules 16-19; STL RPE, rule 50. At the STL, the Victims’ 
Participation Unit also has to be considered. See STL RPE, rule 51.  
709 Referred to in ECCC Internal Rules, rule 29 (3).  
710 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 12 bis. 
711 ICC RPE, rule 17 (2) (a). 
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i) advising them where to obtain legal advice to protect their rights, especially 
related to their testimony; ii) assisting them when they are called to testify at the 
ICC; and iii) adopting gender-sensitive measures to facilitate sexual violence 
victims’ testimony during all procedural stages.712 The ICC VWU has to give due 
regard to the particular needs of children, elderly persons and persons with 
disabilities when performing its functions.713 Generally speaking, the above-
mentioned organs of the other international and hybrid criminal courts have 
similar functions than the ICC VWU.714   
 As for the chapter structure, this consists of five subchapters (including 
this introduction and chapter conclusions). In the second subchapter, the legal 
framework of victims as witnesses is discussed. This includes a discussion of the 
most relevant points of the general legal regime applicable to victims when 
giving their testimonies at international and hybrid criminal courts. Dual status 
of victims as victim participants and witnesses is given special attention. The 
third subchapter examines the protective measures granted to victim witnesses. 
Considering that victims’ status as witnesses is essentially of a protective nature, 
such a detailed analysis is justified. As noticed throughout this chapter, these 
measures are also applicable to victims who intervene as victim participants or 
civil parties. The fourth subchapter deals with anonymity of witnesses and 
victims, i.e., withholding their identity from the accused, which constitutes a 
controversial issue especially during trial. Each of the three subchapters begins 
with a general presentation of the three national systems considered, followed by 
an extensive analysis of the situation at international and hybrid criminal courts, 
and ends with comparative conclusions among these courts with some 
references to the national systems examined. In each subchapter, the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the SCSL are examined under the same section as their RPE, in most 
cases, are the same, which is also the case for the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes 
and to a lesser extent the SCSL. The ICC is examined alone due to its importance 
and sui generis procedural regime. The ECCC and the STL are grouped together 
under the same sections, due to their nature as hybrid criminal courts, but each 
one has independent subsections. The chapter ends with chapter conclusions.  
 Lastly, but equally important, considering the almost intrinsic tension 
between the exercise of the dimension of victims’ status as witnesses and the 
 
712 Ibid., rule 17 (2) (b). 
713 Ibid., rule 17 (3). It should be mentioned that the VWU has established the ICC protection 
program. Participation in this program must be assessed based on a referral from the Prosecution, 
defence or victims’ legal representatives. See ICC Registry Regulations, regulations 80 and 96.   
714 See ICTY RPE, rule 34; ICTR RPE, rule 34; SCSL RPE, rule 34; ECCC Internal Rules, rules 29 
(3) and 12; and STL RPE, rule 51.  
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rights of the accused, it is important to bear in mind that the instruments of the 
international and hybrid criminal courts provide for a catalogue of the rights of 
the accused. Thus, for example, article 67 (Rights of the accused) of the ICC 
Statute includes a complete illustrative list of the rights of the accused.715 This 
article resembles article 14 of the ICCPR,716 other human rights instruments such 
as the ECHR and the ACHR,717 as well as other international and hybrid criminal 
 
715 ‘1. In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having 
regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to the 
following minimum guarantees, in full equality:  
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a 
language which the accused fully understands and speaks;  
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to communicate 
freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in confidence;  
(c) To be tried without undue delay;  
(d) Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to conduct the defence in person or 
through legal assistance of the accused's choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have 
legal assistance, of this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where 
the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay 
for it;  
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him or her. The accused shall also be entitled to raise defences and to present other evidence 
admissible under this Statute;  
(f) To have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as are 
necessary to meet the requirements of fairness, if any of the proceedings of or documents 
presented to the Court are not in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks;  
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without such silence 
being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence;  
(h) To make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence; and  
(i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.  
2. In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as 
practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or 
she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the 
accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to the 
application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide’. 
For a detailed analysis of this article see William Schabas, ’Article 67 – Rights of the Accused’ in 
Triffterer (2008a) 1247. See also ICC Statute, articles 55 (Rights of persons during an investigation) 
and 66 (Presumption of Innocence).     
716 For a detailed analysis of article 14 of the ICCPR see HRC, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: 
Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 
(2007). See also Sarah, Joseph, Jenny Schultz, and Melisa Castan, The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials and Commentary (2nd edn., Oxford University Press 
2012) 388-461.    
717 ECHR, article 6 (Right to a fair trial); ACHR, articles 8 (Right to a fair trial) and 25 (Right to 
Judicial Protection). For a detailed analysis of the ECtHR’s case law on article 6 of the ECHR see 
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courts instruments.718 Additionally, within the concept of the right to a fair trial, 
international jurisprudence has construed the notion of ‘equality of arms’.719 The 
general references under this paragraph are also applicable to the analysis 
conducted in the following chapters, i.e., victims’ status as victim 
participants/civil parties and, where pertinent, victims’ status as reparations 
claimants.  
 
2. Legal Framework of the Victims’ Status as Witnesses  
This section discusses the general legal framework of the victims’ status as a 
witness. It is first presented some important issues of witness standing in the 
English, American and French systems. A deep discussion of the standing of the 
victim as a witness at the international and hybrid criminal courts follows. 
Attention is, inter alia, given to the limitations and problems of the victims’ 
status as witnesses, oral/written witness testimony, order and manner of cross-
examination/questioning, witness credibility issues, orality in adversarial 
proceedings, child witnesses, proofing and familiarization of witnesses. In 
particular and where applicable, dual status as victim participant-victim witness 
at the international level is analyzed in detail. As for judges’ role relating to 
evidence and witnesses, it is herein mainly referred to the previous chapter 
discussion. 
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Van Dijk et al., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (2006 
Intersentia) 511-650. For a detailed analysis of the IACtHR’s case law on the rights to a fair trial 
and judicial protection see Salmón Gárate and Blanco (2012); and Burgorgue-Larsen and Úbeda 
(2011) 641-691.  
718 ICTY Statute, article 21; ICTR Statute, article 20; SCSL Statute, article 17; ECCC Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, article 35 new; STL Statute, article 16. See also 
Yvonne McDermott, ‘General Duty to Ensure the Right to a Fair and Expeditious Trial’ in Göran 
Sluiter et al. (2013a) 770.   
719 E.g., the ICTY Appeals Chamber has understood the principle of equality of arms as ‘being only 
a feature of the wider concept of a fair trial’. See Kordić (IT-95-14/2-A, Decision on the 
Application by Mario Cerkez for Extension of Time to File his Respondent’s Brief, 11 September 
2001, para. 5. In turn, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II has considered that ‘fairness is closely linked to 
the concept of “equality of arms”, or of balance between the parties during the proceedings. As 
commonly understood, it concerns the ability of a party to a proceeding in its favour’. Situation in 
Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05-20), Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal in Part 
Pre-trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s Applications for Warrants of Arrest under 
Articles 58, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 19 August 2005, para. 30.    
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2.1. National Systems  
2.1.1. English Adversarial System  
In England and Wales, victims have no locus standi as party to criminal 
proceedings.720 Victim’s status has been mainly limited to be a witness,721 i.e., 
provider of factual information relating to the circumstances of the crime. Thus, 
victims contribute towards the determination of guilt or innocence and, 
normally, are called by the prosecutor. Unlike the defendant, who can choose 
whether or not to ‘take the stand’, i.e., to testify under oath, the victim has no 
such choice.722 If the victim is called by the prosecution to testify, (s)he must do 
it.723 Victim’s status as mainly witness but not party is imbedded in the English 
system. Thus, for example, upon United Kingdom’s insistence, articles of the EU 
Framework Decision on Victims dealing with safeguards for communications, 
legal assistance and reimbursement of expenses were restricted to ‘the victims 
having the status of witnesses or parties’.724 The United Kingdom insisted on this 
phrasing since ‘partie civile’ is unknown in common law countries and the need 
for substantial legislation changes would be reduced.725 In any case, the ECJ has 
determined that a national court must interpret domestic legislation ‘to attain 
the result’ pursued by the decision, i.e., victims shall have a real and appropriate 
role in criminal proceedings.726 In England and Wales, the Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Act 2004 sought to implement the EU Framework Decision 
on Victims via a statutory Code of Practice.727    
Victims have found the experience of testifying unpleasant. Such 
dissatisfaction is to a large extent due to two adversarial features. First, cross-
examination of the victim witness as the examining party seeks to undermine the 
testimony of the witness either by contesting the facts, i.e., cross-examination ‘to 
the issue’, or by casting doubt on the credibility of the witness, i.e., cross-
examination ‘to credit’.728 This situation is worsened by the fact that judges in 
principle intervene as little as possible during cross-examination. It should be 
 
720 See Henham and Mannozzi (2003) 280.    
721 See, e.g., Anthony Bottoms, ‘The Duty to Understand: What Consequences for Victim 
Participation’ in Bottoms and Roberts (2010) 17, 28.  
722 See Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 259. 
723 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
724 See EU Framework Decision on Victims, articles 5-7.  
725 See Marc Groenhuijsen and Antony Pemberton, ‘The EU Framework Decision for Victims of 
Crime: Does Hard Law Make a Difference?’ (2009) 17 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice 43, 46.  
726 Criminal Proceedings against Pupino [2005] E.C.R. I-5285 ECJ. (16 June 2005).  
727 Home Office, Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (2005).   
728 Brienen and Hogen (2000) 259. 
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advisable that judges set some restrictions to the manipulation of witnesses via 
limits to the use of suggestive questioning.729 In theory, judges may call witnesses 
on their own motion,730 although this power has been advised to be used 
infrequently.731 Judges can also play a role in encouraging parties to produce 
their own witnesses or other evidence items even though there are conflicting 
authorities as for whether a judge may force either party to call a witness.732  
Be that as it may, there are few limits to adversarial examination.733 
Moreover, in application of the general rule against hearsay (subject to 
exceptions),734 a victim testifying cannot mention facts relating to him/her by a 
third party, which makes it difficult for victim-witness to provide evidence 
coherently.735 Because of cross-examination, witnesses, including victims, are 
denied the opportunity to tell their own story on their own words. Indeed, the 
goal is to manipulate a witness to guarantee victory for the respective party. 
Thus, the (English and Welsh) adversarial system ‘turns witnesses into weapons 
to be used against the other side’.736 This is ironic as victim witnesses are asked to 
swear an oath ‘to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth’, and 
makes the historical truth (as experienced by the victim) different from the 
judicial truth (victim witness). Second, orality also contributes to victims’ 
dissatisfaction since victims as witnesses have to testify live, in open court and ‘in 
the formal and daunting surroundings of a criminal courtroom, often in front of 
the alleged perpetrator of the offence’.737 Those excesses have only been regulated 
to a limited extent by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YJCEA).738 
However, these efforts have been qualified as hapless.739 Be that as it may, the 
 
729 Doak (2008) 199. 
730 R. v. Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153. 
731 R Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (Cmnd 9376 (HMSO), [11.36]; R 
v Roberts (1984) 80 Cr App R 89. 
732 To see the contrast see R. v. Oliva [1965] 1 WLR 1028 vis-à-vis R. v. Sterk [1972] Crim LR 391.   
733 Doak (2008) 199. 
734 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 114. The Criminal Justice Act sets five conditions under 
which a hearsay statement may be admissible in evidence. See Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 
116 (2). As for case law, see R. v. Sellick [2005] EWCA Crim 651, [50], [53]; R v. Xhabri [2005] 
EWCA Crim 3135, [2006] 1 All E.R. 776 1. As for case law of the UK Supreme Court, see R v 
Horncastle & Others [2009] UKSC 14 (examining the compatibility between hearsay law and 
article 6 of the ECHR).     
735 Spencer (2002) 194.  
736 William Pizzi, Trials Without Truth (New York University Press 1999) 197. 
737 Doak (2008) 250.  
738 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
739 See Diane Birch (2000) ‘A Better Deal for Vulnerable Witnesses?’ (2000) 20 Criminal Law 
Review 223-249.   
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Home Office Witness Charter sets the standards of service by the police and 
additionally victim-witnesses benefit from the rights set out in the Code of 
Practice for Victims of Crime although the latter instrument unlike the former is 
not statutory and, hence, not set out in law.740  
A witness’s previous statement is admissible as evidence of any matter 
stated of which oral evidence by him/her would be admissible provided that 
certain conditions are met, and that to the best of his/her belief it states the 
truth.741 Minors under 17 years, mentally impaired persons or those suffering 
from a mental disorder can be witnesses and are eligible for assistance.742 A 
witness may not be sworn unless: i) (s)he has attained 14 years; and ii) (s)he has 
a sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion and of the 
responsibility to tell the truth involved in taking the oath.743 Corroboration of a 
child’s testimony to secure conviction is no longer needed.744 Deposition of 
unsworn evidence may be taken as if that evidence had been given an oath.745 
Every person, including witnesses, has a right not to incriminate themselves 
under common law, English legislation,746 and under the fair trial provisions of 
article 6 of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR in Saunders v. United 
Kingdom.747 Communications made as part of the legal professional service are 
 
740 See Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), Implementing and complying with the Witness Charter 
–Operational Guidance for CPS Staff and Managers. Available at:  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/witness_charter_cps_guidance/ (last visit on 12 August 2012).  
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Home Office 2006).      
741 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 120 (4).  
742 YJCEA, section 16 (1) and (2).   
743 Ibid., section 55 (2). See also Criminal Justice Act (1988), section 33.     
744 Criminal Justice Act (1988), section 34. As for case law see, e.g., D.P.P v. M , [1998] Q.B. 913, 
[1997] 2 All E.R. 749 at 753, per Lord Justice Phillips. (‘The words of [the new provision] are 
mandatory. Care must always be taken where a question is raised as to whether a young child is 
capable of giving intelligible testimony. But where the child is so capable the court does not enjoy 
some wider discretion to refuse to permit the child’s evidence to be given […] A child will be 
capable of giving intelligible testimony if he or she is able to understand questions and to answer 
them in a manner which is coherent and comprehensible’.). 
745 YJCEA, section 56 (3).      
746 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (1974), section 20 (7); YJCEA, section 59 and schedule 3.  
747 ‘[...] although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention [...] the right to silence 
and the right not to incriminate oneself are generally recognised international standards which lie 
at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure [...]. The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, 
presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused 
without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the 
will of the accused’. ECtHR, Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, Judgment, 17 
December 1996, para. 68. As for national case law, see Brown v. Stott [2001] 2 W.L.R. 817.   
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privileged.748 A person who disobeys a witness order or witness summons shall 
be guilty of contempt as if this had been committed in court;749 and magistrates’ 
court can sanction a person appearing in the court who refuses to be sworn or 
give evidence.750 In the English system, like any adversarial system, witnesses are 
tightly controlled by the questions posed and the order of questioning is rigorous 
and follows a sequential pattern of examination in chief, cross-examination and 
re-examination.751  
The EU Framework Decision on Victims, besides the right to 
protection,752 laid down that: 
 
Each Member State shall safeguard the possibility for victims to be heard during 
proceedings and to supply evidence. 
Each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure that its authorities 
question victims only insofar as necessary for the purpose of criminal 
proceedings.753  
 
The EU Directive on Victims contains similar provisions (although these 
are more detailed) as well as some new provisions. Thus, victims have among 
others: i) the right to be heard during criminal proceedings ‘and may provide 
evidence’; and ii) the right to be protected from secondary victimization, ‘risk of 
emotional or psychological harm, and [Member States shall] […] protect the 
dignity of victims during questioning and when testifying’.754 It is also stated that 
when ‘a child victim is to be heard, due account shall be taken of the child’s age 
and maturity’.755  
With regard to witness proofing, i.e., generally speaking coaching or 
training of witness, the testimony of a coached witness has been regarded as 
unfair evidence and, hence, not admitted into evidence at trial.756 The Court of 
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748 R. v. Derby Magistrates' Court, Ex parte B [1996] AC 487. As for ECtHR’s jurisprudence see 
Campbell v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13590/88, Judgment, 25 March 1992.  
749 Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act (1965), section 3. 
750 Magistrates’ Court Act (1980), section 97. 
751 As for general characteristics of questioning witnesses comparing the adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems, see, e.g., Kreb (2001) 346-348; Orie (2002) 1443-1445; Heikkilä (2004) 112.  
752 EU Framework Decision on Victims, article 8. 
753 Ibid., article 3.  
754 EU Directive on Victims, articles 10 (1) and 18 respectively. See also articles 19-24. 
755 Ibid., article 10 (1).  
756 Louise Ellison, ‘Witness Preparation and the Prosecution of Rape’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 171, 
182. 
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Appeals in R. v. Momodou explicitly prohibited witness training and coaching.757 
It found a ‘dramatic distinction’ between this practice and witness 
familiarization, i.e., making the witness generally familiar with the court’s 
infrastructure and procedures so as not to be totally surprised or even re-
victimized.758 Based on the inherent risks of witness training, which leads to 
undesired influence on witness statement, the Court rejected it but welcomed 
familiarization upon condition that it does not involve discussions about 
evidence.759 A Crown Prosecution Code of Practice adds further guidance on this 
practice and confirms the ban on the prosecutor to ‘train, practice or coach the 
witness’.760 The Codes of Conducts for a Barrister acting as prosecution counsel 
and for a solicitor also explicitly prohibit to rehearse, practice or coach witnesses 
concerning their evidence or how they will deliver it.761  
   
2.1.2. American Adversarial System 
Although historically victims were central to the criminal process, they were 
relegated to the role of witnesses and ‘even precluded from observing the trial’.762 
In the United States, victims’ status is thus mainly limited to that of 
(prosecution) witness both at the state and federal levels. Victims are represented 
by the district attorney, but when their interests in presenting the charge are in 
conflict with the prosecutor’s conception of the public interest, the latter is given 
preference.763 However, what is the public interest may be constituted by 
‘elements that have little or nothing to do with the victim’s case-its strength or 
weaknesses-or the nature of the victim’s injuries or his outrage against the 
defendant or even his fear that the crime may be repeated’.764 Other factors such 
as the utility of the defendant in another case, correctional factors that make 
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757 R. v. Momodou, [2005] EWCA Crim 177, para. 61. 
758 Ibid., paras. 61-62. 
759 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
760 CPS, Pre-Trial Witness Interviews: Code of Practice (December 2005), para. 7.1.  
761 Law Society’s Code for Solicitor Advocates, para. 6 (5); Code of Conduct (Bar Council, Br 
Standards Board, 8th ed. October 2004), para. 705 (a) (b).  
762 Douglas Beloof, Paul Gassel and Steven Twist. Victims in Criminal Proceedings, (3rd edn, 
Carolina Academic Press 2010) 4. See also what was mentioned by an advocate who said that ‘It is 
not unusual for me to hear prosecutor say to the victim, you know at this point, it’s [the State] 
versus so and so, so really, what I need you to be, is a witness […]’. Christine Englebrecht, ‘The 
Struggle for “Ownership of Conflict”: An Exploration of Victim Participation and Voice in the 
Criminal Justice System’ (2011) 36 Criminal Justice Review 129, 142.  
763 Abraham Goldstein, ‘Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution’ (1982) 52 
Mississippi Law Review 515, 518.  
764 Ibid.. Loc. cit.  
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abandoning the victim’s case preferable than prosecuting the offender are 
present in prosecution’s decision where victim-witness’s interest is only one 
factor to consider.765 A person who only witnessed a crime is not a victim thereof 
and, therefore, not entitled to victim protection.766   
Even though no state has granted victims a right to refuse evidence to 
the prosecution, nine states have granted victims the right to refuse an interview 
with the defence.767 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides for that the accused must be ‘confronted with the witnesses against 
him; [and] have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour […]’. 
When a victim does not want to testify, prosecutors can issue a subpoena and use 
a body attachment to make sure that the victim-witness does. However, as 
recognized by a prosecutor, this ‘should be a last resource because it is re-
traumatizing to the victim’.768 Flawed evidentiary policies, e.g., destruction of 
rape kit evidence, or the absence of United States national, uniform regulations 
can defeat justice for victims and, in particular, increase reluctance of victims to 
testify.769  
The Federal Rules of Evidence, inter alia: i) state that, before testifying, a 
witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully;770 ii) regulate the 
mode and order of examining and cross-examining witnesses;771 iii) state that 
hearsay may be exceptionally admissible;772 and iv) state that every person is in 
principle competent to be a witness.773 Indeed, child witnesses, i.e., under 18 
years,774 are presumed to be competent for examination;775 however, in some 
states, unsworn child testimony needs to be corroborated to convict.776 The 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down, inter alia, that: i) a subpoena 
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765 Ibid., 519.   
766 Champlin v. Sargeant in and for County of Maricopa, 965 P.2d 763 (Ariz. 1998).  
767 The states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
and Wyoming. See Human Rights Watch, Mixed Results. US Policy and International Standards 
on the Rights and Interests of Victims of Crime (2008) 28.   
768 Interview cited in Ibid., Loc. cit.   
769 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
770 US Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 603.  
771 Ibid., rule 611 (b). 
772 Ibid., rule 802. As for some exceptions to this rule, regardless of whether the declarant is 
available as a witness, see rule 803; and when the declarant is unavailable as a witness, see rule 804. 
See also rule 807 (residual exception).   
773 Ibid., rule 601.    
774 18 USC § 3509-Child victims' and child witnesses' rights, (a) (2).    
775 Ibid., (c) (2).   
776  E.g., New York Criminal Procedure Law, § 60.20 (3).  
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must command the witness to attend and testify;777 ii) the possibility to issue a 
deposition subpoena for the witness;778 iii) a witness can be held in contempt 
when, without adequate excuse, disobeys an order by the competent court;779 and 
iv) the testimony must be in principle taken in open court,780 but it is possible to 
produce a witness’s written statement.781 A witness may refuse to answer 
questions or give documentary evidence only if the answer or document would 
incriminate the witness; and the answer only needs to furnish a link in the chain 
of circumstantial evidence necessary for a conviction.782 Moreover, the fifth 
amendment of the United States constitution provides for ‘No person shall be 
compelled in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself’.783 Lawyer-client 
communications are in principle privileged.784 As for witness proofing, witness 
preparation is a well-spread practice and is considered to be an umbrella 
expression including familiarization and proofing.785 Although some case law has 
discussed the ethical limitations of witness preparation,786 it is generally agreed 
that witness preparation is an integral part of the adversarial system and even a 
lawyer’s obligation.787 
 
2.1.3. French Inquisitorial System 
A dimension of victim’s status in France is his/her situation as witness in 
criminal proceedings. During pre-trial proceedings, victims can be heard by the 
police without consideration of factors such as age or family relationships 
according to the Code de Procédure Pénal (Code of Criminal Procedure) 
(CPP).788 During the questioning, witnesses are obligated neither to take an oath 
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777 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 17 (a).  
778 Ibid., rule 17 (f).   
779 Ibid., rule 17 (g).  
780 Ibid., rule 26. 
781 Ibid., rule 26.2.  
782 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S. Ct. 223, 95 L. Ed. 170 (1950).  
783 The fifth amendment in principle refers to an accused’s rights. However, the term witness has 
been understood to include ‘witnesses’ in a more general sense. See Akhil Reed and Renée Lettow, 
‘Fifth Amendment Principles: The Self-Incrimination First Clause’ (1995) 93 Michigan Law 
Review 857, 883-889.   
784 US Federal Rules of Evidence, rules 501 and 502.   
785 See John Applegate, ‘Witness Preparation’ (1989) 68 Texas Law Review 277, 278. 
786 State v. Earp, 571 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (Md. 1990); In re Eldridge, 37 N.Y. 161, 171 (N.Y. 1880).  
787 See Applegate (1989) 282, 287, 324, 333 et seq., 342, 352; Liisa Salmi, ‘Don’t Walk the Line: 
Ethical Considerations in Preparing Witnesses for Deposition an Trial (1999) 18 Review of 
Litigation 136, 141; Fred Zacharias and Shaun Martin, ‘Coaching Witnesses’ (1999) 87 Kentucky 
Law Journal 1001, 1010.  
788 See CPP, article 62.   
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nor to give a statement although there are exceptions to this rule.789 Witnesses 
can also be heard by the investigating judge (juge d’instruction),790 who can hear 
and question witnesses and to confront them with each other, or with the 
suspect.791 Witnesses, as a rule, are obligated to give evidence. During pre-trial 
proceedings, they are obligated to testify if summoned. During trial, they can 
also be summoned to testify in court.792 The prosecutor, the investigating judge 
and the court may call on the police to force witnesses to appear.793 However, 
certain witnesses can remain silent or to be heard without having to be sworn 
in.794 Communications obtained out of a professional relationship are 
privileged.795 Witnesses shall in principle take an oath to tell the truth before the 
investigating judges,796 and in court. Nevertheless, children under sixteen years, 
the civil party, and the relatives or in-laws of the person on trial are not heard 
under oath.797 As witness, the victim does not have the right to lie as (s)he 
participates in the search for the judicial truth.798  
The victim as a witness is normally summoned to give evidence during 
the trial, and, in general, is heard and questioned in the presence of the accused. 
Questioning techniques are generally speaking considerate, which is at least 
partially due to the fact that the court’s president directs the question as (s)he is 
the one who in principle puts the questions, including those from the parties, to 
the witness.799 The prosecution and the lawyers of the accused and of the civil 
party can also pose questions directly to the witness, requesting the floor from 
the president.800 A witness summoned has the obligation to attend court, take the 
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789 See Case law, Reims 18 May 1994, J.C.P. 1985 II. 20422. Cited by Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 
322.    
790 In addition to adopting judicial decisions, the investigating judges hold a fact-finding function 
(actes d’information). See Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 322.  
791 CPP, articles 114, 119, and 121. 
792 Ibid., articles 435, 437. Refusal to comply can lead to witness’s payment of a fine and costs. As 
for pre-trial see: Ibid., article 109; as for trial see: Ibid., article 438.  
793 Ibid., article 109, 397 (5), 439, 536 and 326. 
794 In this category, family members (up to the fourth degree) of the suspect or accused, including 
the person they live with; and persons bound by their professional vow of secrecy (e.g., doctors, 
CPP, article 378) 
795 CPP, article 437. See also Ibid., articles 226 (13) and (14). 
796 Ibid., articles 103 and 452. 
797 Ibid., articles 108, 335, 447 and 448.  
798 Jérôme Bensussan, ‘Quelques Réflexions sur un Barbarisme Juridique: La Place de la Victime 
dans le Procès Pénal’ in Yves Strickler (ed.). La Place de la Victime dans le Procés Pénal (Bruylant 
2009) 33, 34. 
799 CPP, article 454. 
800 Ibid., article 442.1. 
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oath and give evidence.801 Indeed, in Serves v. France, where the witness was 
fined because of having refused to take the oath, the ECtHR found no violation 
of article 6 of the ECHR as the fines imposed ‘did not constitute a measure such 
as to compel him to incriminate himself as they were imposed before such a risk 
ever arose’.802 As for witness proofing, this practice has not been authorized in 
the CPP and there is actually a standing prohibition against a counsel discussing 
the case with a witness prior to a hearing.803 
According to the CPP, victims that constitute themselves as civil parties 
cannot be witnesses during the pre-trial or trial stages of the case ‘The person 
who filed a civil party petition may not be further heard in the capacity of a 
witness. The civil party is however assimilated to a witness in respect of the 
payment of expenses, unless the court otherwise decides’.804 As a consequence, 
civil parties can only inform the court on an informal basis as a source of 
information (à titre de renseignement) without being questioned under oath,805 
i.e., civil parties provide unsworn oral statements. Since victims of crimes 
normally are prosecutor’s main witnesses, a practical solution is to hear the 
victim’s testimony as a witness and, only later, the victim is accepted as a civil 
party in the criminal proceedings.806 This pragmatic solution presents two 
advantages. First, the victim is given freedom for testifying or not and, in case 
(s)he does not want to testify, (s)he constitutes himself/herself in civil party and 
circumvents examination by the defence. Nonetheless, the latter option is not 
feasible when a victim’s testimony is pivotal to prove the case. If the victim 
desires to testify, (s)he can wait and join the proceedings as a civil party once 
(s)he was heard as witness. Second, victims who are civil parties prior to trial and 
heard by the investigating judge enjoy certain rights as parties.807 These rights 
include not to be questioned or confronted with other witnesses or the suspect 
without the presence of the victim’s lawyer unless the victim as civil party 
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801 Ibid., article 109. 
802 Serves v. France, Appl. No. 82/1996/671/893, 20 October 1997, para. 47. 
803 See Ian Meredith and Hussain Khan, Witness Preparation in International Arbitration -A Cross 
Cultural Minefield in 26 (9) MEALEY’S International Arbitration Report (September 2011).  
804 ‘La personne qui s'est constituée partie civile ne peut plus être entendue comme témoin. 
Toutefois, la partie civile est assimilée au témoin en ce qui concerne le paiement des indemnités, 
sauf décision contraire du tribunal’. CPP, article 422. See also CPP, article 335 (6). As for case law 
see the jurisprudence of the French Cour de Cassation (Cass crim., 6 November 1956, B. 709). 
Cited by Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 322.    
805 CPP, article 336.  
806 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 322.  
807 CPP, articles 104, 114, 115 and 120. 
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expressly renounces to this right. Moreover, the victim’s lawyer is entitled to 
obtain copies of the dossier.808  
 
2.2. The ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL  
2.2.1. The Limited Role of Victims as Witnesses   
Despite to references to ‘victims and witnesses’ in the instruments and the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, the victim as witness is the 
only substantial role that (s)he can formally play in those courts’ proceedings. 
The status of victims as witnesses is of particular relevance to those courts as 
these forums rely much more on eyewitness testimony than their post Second 
World War predecessors.809 There has been, however, an increasing tendency to 
rely on written evidence instead of oral evidence.810 Moreover, unlike some of the 
first cases, especially at the ICTY,811 the subsequent ones have focused on 
military and political leaders, for which other evidentiary materials must be 
additionally presented when using theories of liability such as command 
responsibility. In any case, it is undeniable the important role played by the 
victims as witnesses not only for the prosecution’s case but also, as 
acknowledged by the ICTY, in helping to ‘ensure that justice is done […] get to 
the truth and make sure that the right judgment is rendered’.812 However, as an 
ICTY’s former President, Judge Jorda, also made it clear the ICTY cannot ‘hear 
the tens of thousands of victims. Only those considered useful towards the 
establishment of the truth are invited to testify’.813 Accordingly, victims are only 
called to give evidence as witnesses at those courts provided that their testimony 
corroborates the arguments tried to be proved by the Prosecutor. Moreover, for 
example, at the SCSL, it was perceived prosecutorial insensitivity to local culture 
and victims,814 and that the Prosecutor’s approach or narrative gave a skewed 
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808 CPP, article 114. 
809 May and Wierda (1999) 744.  
810 See Stephen Kay, ‘The Move from Oral Evidence to Written Evidence: ‘The Law is Always Too 
Short and Too Tight for Growing Humankind’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
495-502.  
811 E.g., the cases of Tadić, Erdemović and Jelisić. 
812 ICTY/UNICRI, ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (2009) 106. 
813 ICTY Press Release, The ICTY and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, JL/P.I.S./591-e, The Hague, 17 May 2001.  
814 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 150; Chiseche Mibenge, Show Me a Woman! Narratives of Gender and 
Violence in Human Rights Law and Processes of Transitional Justice (Pennsylvania University 
Press 2011).  
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reading of the armed conflict,815 which in turn increased negative reactions 
towards the SCSL, affected the credibility of the SCSL,816 and alienated the 
population.817   
 
2.2.2. General Legal Regime of Victims as Witnesses  
When participating as witness, the victim is subject to the general legal regime 
applicable to any witness. Even though witnesses are brought by the parties to 
the ICTY, the ICTR or the SCSL, once they begin to testify they are no longer 
considered witnesses of either party but only witnesses of justice.818 Witnesses 
can also be summoned at the request of the judges themselves to complete the 
evidence produced by the parties.819 Victims as witnesses: i) cannot demand the 
presence of a lawyer when giving evidence; ii) may only speak in the context of 
the examination and cross examination;820 iii) do not have a right of access to 
evidence presented during the trial by the Prosecutor or the defence; iv) cannot 
demand to be kept informed of the course taken by the proceedings although 
those are of personal concern to them; and v) may not be present in the court 
when other witnesses are testifying.  
Witnesses must before testifying make a solemn declaration ‘I solemnly 
declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’.821 
Children are allowed to testify without making a solemn declaration as long as 
the Chamber considers that the child is sufficiently mature to be able to report 
the facts of which the child had knowledge and also understands the duty to tell 
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815 See James Cockayne, ‘Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes Trials as 
Unsuccessful Degradation Ceremonies’ (2005b) 4 Journal of Human Rights, 455, 460 (referring to 
International Crisis Group, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Promises and Pitfalls of a New 
Model, Africa Briefing (4 August 2003) 14).  
816 Cockayne (2005a) 641.   
817 E.g., the indictment of Hinga-Norman, who was perceived by local population as the 
responsible for restoring the government to power, was regarded by the Sierra Leone’s population 
as controversial as there was a vast number of crimes perpetrated by the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) rebels. See McGonigle Leyh 
(2011), 150.   
818 Jelisić (IT-95-10-T), Decision on Communication Between Parties and Witnesses, Trial 
Chamber, 11 December 1998.  
819 ICTY RPE, rule 98; ICTR RPE, rule 98. The SCSL Judges eliminated rule 98 but left rule 85 (A) 
(iv), which provides for the production of ‘evidence ordered by the Trial Chamber pursuant to 
Rule 98’. See, e.g., Blaškić (IT-95-14-T), Decision of Trial Chamber I in Respect of the Appearance 
of Colonel Robert Stewart, etc., Trial Chamber I, 25 March 1999.   
820 ICTY RPE, rule 85; ICTR rule 85; SCSL RPE, rule 85. 
821 ICTY RPE, rule 90 (A); ICTR RPE, rule 90 (A); SCSL RPE, rule 90 (B). The SCSL RPE also allow 
for an oath on a holy book.  
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the truth.822 This is consistent with international human rights law under which, 
as observed by Salmón Gárate, children have the right to participate and be 
heard in (criminal) proceedings.823 However, the ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE state 
that a judgment cannot be based on a child’s unsworn testimony, which 
constitutes an exception to the general rule, according to which, corroboration is 
not required.824 The SCSL RPE make no exception to that general rule and, 
hence, it would be in theory possible to be convicted based on a child’s unsworn 
testimony.825 However, during the existence of the SCSL such situation never 
arose.  
In Haradinaj et al., at the ICTY, an elderly and infirm witness testified as 
part of the Prosecution team via video-link connection without taking the 
solemn declaration although it was read to him several times.826 Even though the 
Trial Chamber agreed with the defence on that the witness ‘seemed confused by 
the oath-taking procedure’, it noted that when the witness was asked during his 
testimony if he would promise to tell the truth, he replied ‘[t]hat’s what I’m 
telling you, the truth, what happened to me […] Everything that happened to 
me, I told you the truth’.827 The Chamber concluded that the witness understood 
his obligation to tell the truth and admitted his evidence even though he never 
took the solemn declaration requested by the ICTY RPE.828 The situation in 
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822 ICTY RPE, rule 90 (B); ICTR RPE, rule 90 (C); SCSL RPE, rule 90 (C). 
823 Elizabeth Salmón Gárate, Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 
Vol. II: Los Derechos de los Niños y Niñas en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos: Estándares en Torno a su Protección y Promoción, (IDEHPUCP/Cooperación Alemana 
al Desarrollo-GTZ 2010a) 63-68.  
824 ICTY RPE, rule 90 (B); ICTR RPE, rule 90 (B). 
825 SCSL RPE, rule 90 (C).  
826 Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84-T), Reasons for the Decision on Witness 56’s Evidence, Trial 
Chamber, 15 February 2008, para. 2.  
827 Ibid., para. 7. Accordingly, the witness also appeared to understand the factual questions put to 
him. This circumstance was cited by the Trial Chamber as a cause to find that he was not confused 
about his role to be a witness in a trial proceedings. However, the Trial Chamber excluded the 
testimony as this was never tested by cross-examination, was not on its own sufficient for a 
conviction, and required corroboration although the Chamber considered that not necessarily 
restrictions on cross-examination constitute a violation of the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
Additionally, the Chamber noticed that aspects of the witness’s testimony that were directly related 
to the accused’s conduct and acts were entirely uncorroborated and also the presence of 
inconsistencies between the witness’s in court testimony and his prior statements. See Ibid., paras. 
8-9.   
828 Ibid., para. 185.  
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Haradinaj et al. seems to have been anticipated by the ICC RPE as discussed 
later.829 
An explicit reference to the principle of live testimony was included in 
the original version of the ICTY RPE,830 and still remains in place in the ICTR 
RPE and the SCSL RPE.831 Although the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL have 
shown strong preference for testimonial evidence provided in open court, their 
evidentiary regime allows great flexibility.832 Therefore, the witness may also 
testify out of court (and thus be heard) by deposition at the ICTY, the ICTR and 
the SCSL.833 According to the ICTY RPE, the ICTR RPE and the SCSL RPE, 
deposition can be ordered either proprio motu or at the request of one of the 
parties ‘where it is in the interests of justice to do so’, the Trial Chamber appoints 
a Presiding Officer to supervise the process and deposition happens as it were 
testimony in court, with examination-in-chief and cross-examination and, it can 
be given via video-link.834 Similar to other manners of evidence taken out of 
court, ‘deposition evidence may be accorded less weight than evidence given 
directly in the courtroom’.835  
The ICTY has the power to admit witness evidence in written form in 
lieu of oral testimony ‘where the interests of justice allow, in written form’,836 and 
also to dispend the attendance of a witness in person, ‘and instead admit, in 
whole or in part, the evidence of a witness in the form of a written statement or a 
transcript of evidence’ given by a witness in proceedings before the tribunal, ‘in 
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829 See infra Chapter III 2.31.1.  
830 ICTY RPE, rule 90 (A) (Rev. 18 as of 2 August 2000) (‘Subject to Rules 71 and 71 bis, witnesses 
shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers’.).  
831 ICTR RPE, rule 90 (A) (‘Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers unless 
a Chamber has ordered that the witness be heard by means of a deposition as provided for in Rule 
71’.); SCSL RPE, rule 90 (A). 
832 Schabas (2006) 470. 
833 ICTY RPE, rule 71; ICTR RPE, rule 71; SCSL RPE, rule 71. Deposition can be defined as ‘an out-
of-court testimony taken on oath before a court officer and with the opportunity for the opposing 
party to cross examine. The testimony is committed to writing for later use in court. In 
comparison with affidavits, depositions may be a more effective means for reconciling the interests 
of expediting the proceedings and the rights of the accused’. Mark Klamberg, Evidence in 
International Criminal Procedure. Confronting Legal Gaps and the Reconstruction of Disputed 
Events (Stockholm University 2012) 317. See also Schabas (2006) 476..   
834 ICTY RPE, rule 71; ICTR RPE, rule 71; SCSL RPE, rule 71. See also Schabas (2006) 476; Yvonne 
McDermott, ‘Regular Witness Testimony’ in Sluiter et al. (2013b) 859, 863-867.    
835 Naletilic et al. (IT-98-34-PT), Decisions on Prosecution Amended Motion for Approval of Rule 
94ter Procedure (Formal Statements) and on Prosecutor’s Motion to take Depositions for Use at 
Trial (Rule 71), Trial Chamber, 10 November 2000.  
836 ICTY RPE, rule 89 (F).  
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lieu of oral testimony which goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and 
conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment’.837 ‘The impact of crimes 
upon victims’ is listed as a factor for admitting written witness evidence.838 
Similar provisions are contained in the ICTR RPE and the SCSL RPE.839 These 
provisions have been criticized by common law lawyers.840 The ICTY has also 
applied the ‘flexibility principle’ in evidence admissibility,841 for instance, when 
handling admission of hearsay evidence.842 It should be remembered, as pointed 
out by Schabas, that hearsay:  
 
[…] refers to any evidence that is not related by the witness who has personal 
knowledge of the act in question. For example, when testimony of a witness who 
does not attend in court is produced in writing, by means of deposition, this too 
constitutes hearsay or ‘secondary evidence’.843  
 
Although hearsay evidence (in general) and affidavit evidence (in 
particular) have been admissible before the tribunals,844 that evidence is less 
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837 Ibid., rule 92 bis. Under this rule, witness evidence given in one case may be admitted as proof 
in another one ‘without the witness being required to attend in court’. Schabas (2006) 477. 
838 ICTY RPE, rule 92 bis (A) (i) (d). 
839 As for the ICTR, see ICTR RPE, rules 71, 90 and 92 bis (proof of facts other than by oral 
evidence). As for the SCSL, see SCSL RPE, rules 71, 85 (D) and 82 ter (on admission of written 
statements and transcripts).  
840 See e.g., Patricia Wald, ´To “Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence”: The Use of 
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings’ (2001) 42 Harvard 
International Law Journal 535, 548.     
841 Gideon Boas, ‘Admissibility of Evidence under the RPE of the ICTY: Development of the 
‘Flexibility Principle’ in Richard May et al. (eds.), Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in 
Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (Kluwer Law International 2001) 263, 264. 
842 See, e.g., Aleksovski, (IT-95-14/I-AR73), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appeal on the Admission 
of Evidence, Appeals Chamber, 16 February 1999, para. 15.  
843 Schabas (2006) 479-480. This connotation of the term hearsay is much broader than its other 
meaning, i.e., cases where, e.g., the witness ‘testifies to what someone else told the witness: ‘And he 
told me that he saw…’. Schabas (2006) 479. Hearsay can also be defined as ‘a statement made by 
some other than the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing (or quoted in a document), 
offered as evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted’. Marieke Wierda, ‘Hearsay’ in Cassese 
(2009) 342, 342.  
844 Aleksovski (IT-95-14/I-AR73), Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence’, 
Appeals Chamber, 16 February 1999, paras. 15 ff; Tadić (IT-94-19), Decision on the Defence 
Motion on Hearsay, Trial Chamber, 5 August 1996; Bagilishema (ICTR-95-1A-A), Judgment, 
Appeals Chamber, 3 July 2002, para 100; Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 
26 May 2003, para. 149; Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, para. 
286; Ndahimana (ICTR-01-68-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 16 December 2013, paras. 182-
186.   
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authoritative than direct evidence as ‘the witness cannot personally attest to the 
subject matter of the testimony’ but this does not make hearsay intrinsically 
unreliable.845 It should be also noticed that the explicit rule on affidavit under the 
ICTY RPE was repealed.846 Hearsay evidence has been found not to be 
inadmissible per se but it has been considered with caution.847  
Even though the admissibility of written witness statements depends on 
the relevance and ‘probative value’ of the evidence,848 hearsay evidence in writing 
can only be admitted if it does not directly concern the acts and conduct of the 
accused as charged in the indictment according to rule 92bis (A) of the RPE of 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL,849 which introduces an exclusionary rule for 
these issues departing from case law in favor of hearsay evidence.850 Nevertheless, 
under the RPE of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, if the witness can be cross-
examined (or when the statement is made by an unavailable witness), the hearsay 
in the form of a written statement/transcript of evidence may include evidence 
on the accused’s acts and conducts.851 Moreover, under rule 92 quinquies of the 
ICTY RPE, hearsay statements, including those concerning the accused’s acts 
and conduct, may be admissible if the absence of the witness in court was caused 
by improper interference such as threats, intimidation and coercion.852   
The possibility of admission of testimony via depositions and video-link, 
witness evidence in written form and hearsay evidence should be considered as 
victim-friendly measures since it allows victim witnesses not to face directly the 
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Affidavit is a ‘form of testimony, but it is in writing and taken out of the court, and is sometimes 
called a sworn declaration’. Schabas (2006) 477.    
845 Schabas (2006) 479. 
846 ICTY RPE, rule 94 ter (repealed).  
847 See, e.g., Kalimanzira (ICTR-05-88), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 22 June 2009, para. 75; Setako 
(ICTR-04-81), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 25 February 2010, para. 236, footnote 306; Munyakazi 
(ICTR-97-36), Judgment and Sentence, Appeals Chamber, 28 September 2011, para. 77; Gotovina 
et al. (IT-06-90), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 15 April 2011, para. 43.  
848 ICTY RPE, rule 89 (C); ICTR RPE, rule 89 (C); SCSL RPE, rule 89 (C).   
849 As for case law, see, e.g., Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84bis-PT), Decision on Prosecution's Motion 
for Admission of Transcripts of Evidence in Lieu of Viva Voce Testimony Pursuant to 92bis, Trial 
Chamber, 22 July 2011, para. 20; Karadžić (IT-95-5118-PT), Decision on Prosecution's Third 
Motion for Admission of Statements and Transcripts of Evidence in Lieu of Viva Voce Testimony 
Pursuant to Rule 92bis (Witnesses for Sarajevo Municipality), Trial Chamber (IT-95-5118-PT), 15 
October 2009, para. 5. 
850 Wierda (2009) 342, 342.  
851 See ICTY RPE, rules 92 ter and 92 quarter; ICTR RPE, rule 92 bis; SCSL RPE, rules 92 ter and 92 
quarter.   
852 Fergal Gaynor, ‘Admissibility of Documentary Evidence’ in Sluiter et al. (2013) 1044, 1051-
1052. 
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accused and avoid to potentially increase the risks of re-victimization, which 
would be the case if oral, live testimony were always required. However, 
although the explicit reference to the principle of live testimony is no longer 
present in the ICTY RPE, a written statement (as previously mentioned) cannot 
be admitted to prove the individual responsibility of the accused.853 Hence, live 
testimony remains indispensable to prove the individual guilt of the accused.854 
Moreover, when written evidence is admitted, it will not have the ‘same per se 
probative value’ as live testimony in court.855 The ICTY Appeals Chamber has 
actually ruled that the principle of cross-examination is not absolute provided 
that conviction is not based exclusively, or in a decisive manner, on the 
depositions of a witness not examined by the accused.856 Some of the points in 
the last paragraphs are further discussed later when examining protective 
measures for witnesses during trial.857    
Generally speaking, examination of witness follows the order present in 
the adversarial system,858 i.e., the witness is first asked to testify in chief, then 
cross-examined by the other party.859 The cross-examination is limited to the 
subject matter of the evidence-in-chief and matters affecting the credibility of the 
witness,860 which may be considered as a necessary provision to reduce the risks 
of victims’ secondary victimization via aggressive cross-examination. Once 
cross-examination is concluded, the party who has called the witness may re-
examine. A second cross-examination has only been allowed where new matters 
had emerged during cross-examination.861 Thus, cross-examination seeks to 
elicit information favourable to the cross-examining party or to cast doubt on 
the accuracy of the contradicting or prejudicial information provided in the 
 
853 ICTY RPE, rule 92 bis (A). 
854 Naletilić and Martinović (IT-99-34-T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Public Version 
of Trial Chamber’s ‘Decision on the Motion to Admit Statement of Deceased Witness [...] of 22 
January 2002, 27 February 2002, considerations 8, 11 and 14.  
855 Naletilić and Martinović (IT-98-34-T), Decision on the Admission of Witness Statements into 
Evidence, Trial Chamber, 14 November 2001, consideration 3.  
856 Martić (IT-95-11-A), Decision on Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Evidence 
of Witness Milan Babić, Appeals Chamber, 14 September 2006, paras. 12-14 and 18-20. This 
principle was previously formulated by the ECtHR in, e.g., ECtHR, A.M. v. Italy, Appl. No. 
37019/97, Judgment, 14 December 1999.        
857 See infra Chapter III 3.2.2.  
858 Schabas (2006) 472. 
859 See ICTY RPE, rule 85 (A); ICTR RPE, rule 85 (A); SCSL RPE, rule 85 (A). 
860 See ICTY RPE, rule 90 (H), ICTR RPE, rule 90 (G), SCSL RPE, rule 90 (F). 
861 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21), Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, 
Trial Chamber, 1 May 1997. 
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adverse party’s evidence-in-chief, including challenges to the witness 
credibility.862 Leading or suggestive questions are in principle allowed as far as 
they may impact on the determination of the witness credibility.863 In any case, 
cross-examination directed at witness credibility is not a ‘boundless exercise’ and 
should be conducted ‘within reasonable limits’; improper, repetitive, or unfair 
questions, including those which are ‘an unwarranted attack on the witness’ are 
unwelcome’.864 The ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE explicitly limit the cross-
examination matters to three categories: (i) ‘the subject-matter of the evidence-
in-chief’; (ii) ‘matters affecting the credibility of the witness’; and (iii) ‘where the 
witness is able to give evidence relevant to the case for the cross-examining party 
[…] the subject-matter of the case’.865 Questions by judges during cross-
examination that test witness credibility ‘fall entirely within the ambit of the 
Judge’s duty to contribute to the discovery of the truth’.866  
The ICTY has recently and consistently sustained that the use of video-
conference link does not breach the accused’s right to cross-examine the witness 
or confront the witness directly insofar as video-conferencing allows the cross-
examining party to observe the witness’s reactions, and also permits the 
Chamber to assess the testimony credibility and reliability in the same form as 
for a witness who is physically present in the courtroom.867 In turn, the ICTR has 
been somewhat more conservative when balancing the need to ensure witness 
testimony and the accused’s rights when the testimony is to be delivered via 
video-link, and has sustained that hearing witness testimony is preferable unless 
the interests of justice require otherwise.868  
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862 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, 
Esad Lanzo, Trial Chamber, 1 May 1997, para. 22.  
863 Prlić et al. (IT-04-74), Decision on Prosecution Motion Concerning Use of Leading Questions, 
the Attribution of Time to the Defence Cases, the Time Allowed for Cross-examination by the 
Prosecution, and Associated Notice Requirements, Trial Chamber, 4 July 2008, para. 18. 
864 See, e.g., Krajišnik (IT-00-39-T), Decision on Cross-Examination of Mirolad Dadidović, Trial 
Chamber, 15 December 2005, paras. 9-10. 
865 ICTY RPE, rule 90 (H) (i); ICTR RPE, rule 90 (G) (i).   
866 Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 26 May 2003, para. 102. 
867 See, e.g., Stanisić and Simatović (IT-03-69-T), Decision on Prosecution Motions to Hear 
Witnesses by Video-Conference Link, Trial Chamber, 25 February 2010, para. 9.  
868 See, e.g., Bizimungu et al. (ICTR-99-50-T), Decision on Confidential Motion from Mr. 
Bicamumpaka to Allow Video-Link Testimony for Witness CF-1, Trial Chamber, 23 January 2008, 
para. 3. 
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Previously inconsistent statements from a witness could be admitted 
only for assessment of witness credibility.869 It is advisable to use oral 
examination-in-chief when the witness’s credibility is likely to be an issue 
particularly interesting for the judges.870 Even though the RPE allow the cross-
examining party to be involved in very broad areas of cross-examination to both 
support his/her case and to undermine the witness credibility, it has been 
suggested that the RPE should provide more power to the trial judges to request 
the cross-examining party to explain the relevance of a line of inquiry which is 
seemingly irrelevant or obscure.871  
Judges may always intervene to ask their own questions although they 
are quite restrained and respect the adversarial proceedings. However, judges of 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL frequently interrupt victim witnesses when 
victims’ narratives become irrelevant for the goal of determining the accused’s 
guilt and also due to time constraints.872 Such an approach reflects the judicial 
rather than therapeutic purposes of the proceedings at these tribunals.873 Live 
testimony has been consistently encouraged,874 which corresponds to the 
adversarial nature of the trial and the accused’s right to examine witnesses 
against him/her. A witness cannot refuse to answer a question just because it 
might incriminate himself/herself. A witness can be compelled by the tribunals 
to deliver self-incriminating testimony, but it is said that such testimony shall 
not be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution against the witness with the 
exception of the offence of false testimony.875 A person can also challenge the 
obligation to answer a question if the revelation of a privileged communication 
between lawyer and client is compromised.876 However, the ICTY in Furundžija 
did not recognize the communication between the victim (witness) and her 
doctor as privileged.877 This can be criticized as detrimental from the victims’ 
viewpoint.  
  Even though there has been some academic discussion about whether 
the Security Council Resolutions setting up the ICTY and the ICTR created an 
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869 Popović et al. (IT-05-88), Decision on Appeals against Decision on Impeachment of a Party's 
Own Witness, Appeals Chamber, 1 February 2008, para. 31. 
870 Gaynor (2013) 1077-1078. 
871 Ibid., 1078. 
872 For some examples from the ICTY practice see Dembour and Haslam (2004) 158-161. 
873 See also Ibid., Loc. cit. 
874 E.g., Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 24 March 2000, paras. 62-64.   
875 ICTY RPE, rule 90 (E); ICTR RPE, rule 90 (E); SCSL RPE, rule 90 (E).  
876 ICTY RPE, rule 97; ICTR RPE, rule 97; SCSL RPE, rule 97. 
877 Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Decision on Motion of Defendant Anto Furundzija to Preclude 
Testimony of Certain Prosecution Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 16 July 1998.  


international law obligation for the victims to appear before those tribunals as 
witnesses,878 the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes mention nothing on this point. In 
the case of the SCSL, even though such obligation does not exist as it was not 
created by a Security Council Resolution but via an agreement, national law may 
establish that obligation.879 As for the ICTY and the ICTR, there is a general state 
obligation derived from their establishment via Chapter VII Security Council 
Resolutions to cooperate and provide judicial assistance in, for example, taking 
of testimony and witness’s appearance at those tribunals.880 Concerning the 
SCSL, the obligation to cooperate is only applicable to Sierra Leone,881 but it may 
be extensive to other third States if they agree so.882   
In any case, these tribunals’ RPE state that any person who without just 
excuse fails to comply with an order to attend before Chamber commits 
contempt of the tribunal.883 The ICTY Appeals Chamber also concluded that the 
ICTY may summon, subpoena or address other binding orders to individuals 
who act in their private capacity, and, ‘in case of non-compliance, either the 
relevant State may take enforcement measures as provided in its legislation, or 
the International Tribunal may instigate contempt proceedings’.884 Although not 
explicit in the tribunals’ statutes, it is implicit that victims can be forced to 
appear as witnesses.885 Even though there is a general reference to subpoena in 
these tribunals’ RPEs,886 their power to subpoena witnesses has been described as 
mainly judge-made.887 It has also been said that the ICTY and the ICTR are not 
 
878 See, e.g., Françoise Hampson, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
and the Reluctant Witness’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50 et ff; Kai 
Ambos, ‘The Right to Non-Self-Incrimination of Witnesses before the ICC’ (2002) 15 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 155, 167-169.   
879 As for this point see, in particular, SCSL Agreement, articles 15 and 17. See also Heikkilä (2004) 
76.  
880 See ICTY Statute, article 29 (2); ICTR Statute, article 28 (2). 
881 SCSL Constitutive Agreement, article 17. 
882 SCSL RPE, rule 8 (D). 
883 ICTY RPE, rule 77 (A) (iii); ICTR RPE, rule 77 (A) (iii); SCSL RPE, rule 77 (A) (iii).   
884 Blaskić (IT-95-14-AR108bis), Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of 
the Decision of Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 1997, Section III (Disposition).   
885 See Schabas (2006) 467.  
886 ICTY RPE, rule 54; ICTR RPE, rule 54; SCSL RPE, rule 54. 
887 Göran Sluiter, ‘Appearance of Witnesses and Unavailability of Subpoena Powers of the Court’ 
in Roberto Bellello (ed.), International Criminal Justice (Ashgate 2010) 459, 462; Klamberg (2012) 
199. 
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eager to subpoena witnesses, in particular sensitive witnesses,888 as voluntary 
appearance has been favored.889 
Finally, concerning witness proofing, at the ICTY, the ICTR and the 
SCSL, it has been considered as an important and useful practice ‘accepted since 
the inception of this tribunal’.890 Nevertheless, at the ICTY and particularly at the 
ICTR, various defence teams have raised concerns about the Prosecution’s 
lengthy proofing sessions with its witnesses which often result in new evidence 
being obtained for the first time during the trial process, and often only a day or 
so prior to the day when the witness is due to testify.891 The tribunals have not 
turned a blind eye to the issue of manipulation of witnesses, raised by the 
defence, and the possible truth distortion.892 However, the tribunals have 
preferred to assume that witness proofing advantages outweigh their risks and 
have stated that this practice neither amounts to rehearsing, practicing or 
coaching a witness,893 nor per se prejudices the accused’s rights.894  
From a legal viewpoint, witness proofing is consistent with the fact that 
these tribunals legal instruments, unlike the ICC, do not contain a general re-
envoi to the law outside their Statutes and RPE, and have applied common rule 
89 (B) as legal ground to admit witness proofing.895 Moreover, the ICTY and the 
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888 Heikkilä (2004) 75.  
889 For example, see Ntagerura (ICTR-96-10-I), Decision on the Defence Motion for Additional 
Protective Measures for Defence Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 4 February 2000, para. 12; Nahimana 
et al. (ICTR-99-52-I), Decision on the Prosecution’s Oral Motion for Leave to Amend the List of 
Selected Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 26 June 2001, para. 24. See also Heikkilä (2004) 75. For a 
subpoena to a witness see Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Decision on the Motion to Supoena a Witness, 
Trial Chamber, 19 November 1997.    
890 Limaj (IT-05-87-T), Decision on the Defence Motion on Prosecution Pratice of ‘Proofing 
Witnesses’, Trial Chamber, 10 December 2004, p. 2; Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-AR73.8), 
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, Appeal Chamber, 11 May 2007, 
paras. 9 et seq. See also Sesay et. al. (SCSL-04-15-T), Decision on the Gbao and Sesay Joint 
Application for the Exclusion of the Testimony of Witness TF1-141, Trial Chamber, 26 October 
2005, para. 33 (considering witness proofing as a legitimate practice).  
891 Limaj (IT-05-87-T), 10 December 2004, p. 3; Bagosora et al. (ICTR-96-7), Decision on 
Admissibility of Evidence of Witness DBQ, Trial Chamber, 18 November 2003, para. 14.  
892 Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Decision on Defence Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing, 
Trial Chamber, 15 December 2006, paras. 12, 15 and 21-2.  
893 Milutinović et al. (IT-05-87-T), Decision on Ojdanić Motion to Prohibit Witness Proofing, Trial 
Chamber, 12 December 2006, para. 16.    
894 Ibid., para. 22; Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), 15 December 2006, para. 14. 
895 Rule 89 (B) ‘generally confers discretion on the Trial Chamber to apply “rules of evidence which 
will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the 
Statute and the general principles of law [emphasis added]”’. Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-
AR73.8), 11 May 2007, para. 8. This may be contrasted with the wording under article 21 of the 
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ICTR have concluded that ‘discussions between a party and a potential witness 
regarding his/her evidence can, in fact, enhance the fairness and expeditiousness 
of the trial provided that these discussions are a genuine attempt to clarify a 
witness’ evidence’.896   
 
2.3. The ICC  
2.3.1. Witness Status   
2.3.1.1. Legal Features 
Although the term ‘witness’ is not defined in the ICC Statute or in the ICC RPE, 
a victim  can without any doubt qualify to testify as a witness,897 as evidenced by 
the ICC practice, and by some indications of what is understood by the term in 
the ICC RPE.898 In any case, the ICC in an official booklet has defined witness as 
‘a person who gives evidence before the Court by testimony. A witness is 
normally called by the Prosecutor, who is trying to prove the criminal case 
against an accused, or the defense’.899 A victim may hence be called as a witness 
by the Prosecutor, defense or the respective ICC Chamber but also by another 
victim who holds the status of victim participant at the ICC.900 Victims as 
witnesses are regarded within the ICC as a key source of information because 
they enable the Prosecution to know about the crimes committed so that (s)he 
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ICC Statute which reads as follows: ‘The Court shall apply: […] falling that [ICC Stature, RPE and 
where applicable international treaties and international rules and principles] general principles of 
law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world [emphasis added]’. See 
corroborating Ambos (2009) 604.     
896 Milutinović et al. (IT-05-87-T), 12 December 2006, para. 16; Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), 
15 December 2006, para. 14.  
897 Kreb (2001) 320. 
898 See ICC RPE, rule 66 (2); Kreb (2001), at 315.  
899 ICC, Booklet: Victims Before the International Criminal Court: A Guide for the Participation of 
Victims in the Proceedings of the Court (2006) 28. Available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/8FF91A2C-5274-4DCB-9CCE-
37273C5E9AB4/282477/160910VPRSBookletEnglish.pdf (last visit on 12 August 2012) It is 
important to mention that the term ‘witness’ in the context of an investigation should be read 
broadly to include anyone who might be called to testify during the pre-trial proceedings or at trial, 
even if the Prosecutor does not call him/her. This includes persons called upon by the Prosecutor 
to provide ‘written or oral testimony’ pursuant to article 15 (2) of the ICC Statute and individuals 
whose testimony or statements simply lead to other persons who do testify or to relevant 
information which could be use at trial. See Christopher Hall, ‘Article 19’ in Triffterer (2008) 637, 
664.      
900 See ICC (2006) 28.  


can start an investigation and then submit a sound case.901 Witnesses are 
frequently not represented by a legal counsel, and they do not take part in all 
proceedings but are called at specific times in order to testify.902 Unlike victim 
participants, when victims take the stand only as witnesses, they do not express 
their views and concerns but give evidence instead, often by answering questions 
posed.903 As determined by inter alia Trial Chamber I in Lubanga:  
 
[...] the process of victims “expressing their views and concerns” is not the same 
as “giving evidence”. The former is, in essence, the equivalent of presenting 
submissions, and although any views and concems of the victims may assist the 
Chamber in its approach to the evidence in the case, these statements by victims 
(made personally or advanced by their legal representatives) will not form part 
of the trial evidence. In order for participating victims to contribute to the 
evidence in the trial, it is necessary for them to give evidence under oath from 
the witness box. There is, therefore, a critical distinction between these two 
possible means of placing material before the Chamber.904   
 
Thus, whereas victims’ views and concerns (victim participants) do not 
constitute evidence and victims as victim participants cannot be questioned by 
the parties,905 victims as witnesses give evidence and can be questioned by the 
parties. Accordingly, when victims exercise the witness dimension of their status, 
the general framework on witness testimony is applicable to them. This, inter 
alia, includes that the witnesses are required to make the following statement 
before they testify ‘I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth 
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901 Jo-Anne Wemmers, ‘Victims’ Rights and the International Criminal Court: Perceptions within 
the Court Regarding the Victims’ Right to Participate’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 629, 637. 
902 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 238. 
903 ICC Statute, articles 68 and 69. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 238. 
904 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx), Decision on the Request by Victims a/ 0225/06, 
a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to Express their Views and Concerns in Person and to Present Evidence 
During the Trial, Trial Chamber I, 26 June 2009, para. 19. See also Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-
2138), Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present 
evidence and the views and concerns of victims, Trial Chamber III, 22 February 2012, para. 19.   
905 See Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2220), Decision on the Presentation of Views and Concerns by 
Victims a/0542/08, a/0394/08 and a/0511/08, Trial Chamber III, 24 May 2012, para. 7 (‘[...] the 
victims [participants] will not provide evidence. Therefore, any statement that they provide will 
not be given under oath. Further, the victims will not be questioned by the parties and their views 
and concerns will not form part of the evidence of the case’.). See also Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-T-
227-Red-ENG WT), Oral Decision, Trial Chamber III, 25 June 2012, p. 20 (‘[…] victims who fail to 
reach the threshold to be authorised to give evidence may still be permitted to express their views 
and concerns in person’.).  
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and nothing but the truth’.906 Exceptions to this rule may be accepted regarding 
children and individuals whose judgment has been impaired.907 However, the 
ICC RPE do not appear to state that a conviction cannot stand on such 
testimony alone. This is an important omission insofar as, by definition, a 
witness excused from taking the oath is an individual whose ‘judgment is 
impaired’.908 In principle, if an unsworn testimony is allowed, such testimony 
should be given less weight due to principles of a fair trial. In the particular case 
of child witnesses, a child who does not understand the nature of the solemn 
declaration may be permitted to testify without that formality if the person, i.e., 
an individual under 18 or a person whose judgment has been impaired and who 
in the Chamber’s opinion does not understand the nature of a solemn 
undertaking, is able to meet the requirements set by the RPE ‘describe matters of 
which he or she has knowledge and that the person understands the meaning of 
the duty to speak the truth’.909 However, there is no empirical evidence to 
support the affirmation that children lie more often than adults,910 and indeed, 
already from some early age, children can understand the difference between the 
truth and lies sufficiently to testify.911 In Lubanga, two former child soldiers, 
allegedly victimized, were already adults when gave testimony in person during 
the trial and, therefore, took the solemn undertaking.912  
Whereas the compellability rule consists in that witnesses are obligated 
to answer questions, there are some exceptions including the so-called 
confidential relationships,913 and the right to object to making certain 
incriminating statements.914 Thus, the ICC RPE state that the ICC shall give 
particular regard to recognizing as privileged communications made in the 
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906 ICC Statute, article 69 (1); ICC RPE, rule 66 (1).  
907 ICC RPE, rule 66 (2).  
908 Colleen Roham, ‘Rules Governing the Presentation of Testimonial Evidence’ in Kharin Khan, 
Caroline Buisman and Christopher Gosnell (eds.), Principles of Evidence in International Criminal 
Justice (Oxford University Press 2010) 499 539. 
909 ICC RPE, rule 66 (2). As for travaux préparatoires see ‘Report of the Working Group on 
Procedural Matters’, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.6, p. 5, fn. 6.   
910 See, e.g., New Zealand Commission, ‘The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable 
Witnesses: A Discussion Paper (October 1996), at 8.  
911 John Myers et al., ‘Hearsay Exceptions: Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to Psychological 
Science’ (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary Problems 3, 23.   
912 See, e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-230-Red2), Transcripts, 21 January 2010, p. 33, lines 13-
16. 
913 ICC RPE, rule 65. 
914 Even though a witness may object to making self-incriminating statements, (s)he may be forced 
to answer questions after receiving certain assurances. See ICC RPE, rule 74. A witness may also 
object to making statements incriminating certain family members. See ICC RPE, rule 75.  
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context of the professional relationship between a person and his/her medical 
doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist or counselor, in particular those related to or 
involving victims.915 From victims’ viewpoint, the just mentioned provision is 
important as witnesses who are compellable to provide testimony and refuse to 
do it can be punished for refusal to comply with an ICC’s direction.916 With 
regard to the ICC’s ability to require the attendance of witnesses, the Trial 
Chamber is under the ICC Statute empowered to ‘[r]equire the attendance and 
testimony of witnesses’, and expected to do so by ‘obtaining, if necessary the 
assistance of States as provided in the Statute’.917 The ICC Statute, in turn, 
imposes a duty upon States Parties in facilitating ‘voluntary appearance of 
persons as witnesses or experts before the Court’.918 Therefore, the problem for 
the ICC is that its Statute does not contemplate the compulsory attendance of 
witnesses via a mechanism such as a subpoena.919 As possible ways to sort out 
this limitation, it has been suggested that the ICC Statute cannot prevent the 
States Parties from enacting appropriate legislation to compel witnesses, whose 
testimony might then be taken by national authorities of the State Party, and the 
Trial Chamber ‘may also require the production of documents and other 
evidence’.920 Additionally, the Security Council could via a Chapter VII 
resolution empower the ICC to request States ‘to ensure the appearance of 
witnesses by use of compulsory means if necessary’.921          
Giving false testimony under an obligation to tell the truth is an offence 
against the administration of justice.922 A witness may object to making any 
statement that might tend to incriminate him or her.923  
According to article 69 (2) of the ICC Statute, the principle of live 
testimony ‘in person’ is in place at the ICC but also allowing exceptions:  
 
The testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person, except to the extent 
provided by the measures set forth in article 68 or in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. The Court may also permit the giving of viva voce (oral) or recorded 
testimony of a witness by means of video or audio technology, as well as the 
introduction of documents or written transcripts, subject to this Statute and in 
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915 Ibid., rule 73 (3). 
916 Ibid., rules 65 (2) and 171. 
917 ICC Statute, article 64 (6) (b). 
918 Ibid., article 93 (1) (e). 
919 Schabas (2010) 768. 
920 Bitti (2008) 1213. 
921 Kreb (2001) 325. 
922 ICC Statute, article 70 (1) (a).  
923 ICC RPE, rule 74 (3) (a).  
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accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These measures shall not 
be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused. 
 
The introduction of previously recorded audio or video testimony of a 
witness, or the transcript or other documented evidence of such testimony may 
be allowed by the Chamber if the absent witness was examined by the Prosecutor 
and the defence.924 If the witness is present, the conditions are that this does not 
object the submission of previously recorded testimony and the Prosecutor, the 
defence and the Chamber have the opportunity to examine the witness during 
the proceedings.925 The ‘introduction of documents or written transcripts’, under 
article 69 (2), constitutes an important exception to the approach followed by 
common law tribunals.926 Even though article 69 (2) manifests a preference for 
oral witness testimony, there are some exceptions under article 68 (2), 
concerning protective measures, and the RPE.927 Hearsay has been held to be in 
principle admissible by the ICC’s case law since:  
 
[…] any challenges to hearsay evidence may affect its probative value, but not 
its admissibility […] The Chamber reiterates that it will exercise caution in 
using such evidence in order to affirm or reject any assertion made by the 
Prosecution.928  
 
Some ICC Judges have used the expression ‘indirect evidence’ to refer to 
what might be described as hearsay in the common law system, stating that 
‘indirect evidence’ generally has less probative value than direct testimony.929 In 
any case, under the amended rule 68 (‘prior recorded testimony’),930 the 
requirements and proceedings to admit prior recorded evidence have been 
provided in much further detail. In addition to not being prejudicial to or 
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924 Ibid., rule 68 (a) (original version); ICC RPE, rule 68 (2) (amended version). The ‘introduction 
of documents or written transcripts’, under article 69 (2), constitutes an important exception to the 
approach followed by common law tribunals.   
925 ICC RPE, rule 68 (b) (original version); ICC RPE, rule 68 (3) (amended version). 
926 Schabas (2010) 841.    
927 Ibid., 839. For further discussion see infra Chapter III 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. 
928 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui. (ICC-01/04-01/07-717), Decision on the Confirmation of the 
Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 September 2008, paras. 137 and 139. 
929 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-424), Decision Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
15 June 2009, para. 51. 
930 Amended via ICC Assembly of States Parties, Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.7, Amendments to 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 27 November 2013.  
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inconsistent with the rights of the accused,931 when the witness is not present, 
any of the following conditions must be met (and subject to specific 
requirements): i) the Prosecutor and the defence had the opportunity to examine 
the witness during the recording; ii) the prior recorded testimony goes to proof 
of a matter other than the accused’s acts and conduct; iii) the prior recorded 
testimony comes from a person who has subsequently died, must be presumed 
dead, or is, due to obstacles that cannot be overcome with reasonable diligence, 
unavailable to testify orally; and iv) the prior recorded testimony comes from a 
person who has been subjected to interference.932 As for deposition, although 
there is no explicit provision in the ICC instruments, it may be covered by the 
rules on prior-recorded testimony and subject to examination of the witness by 
the Prosecutor and defence under rule 68.933  
The exceptions to the live testimony ‘in person’ constitute victim-
friendly measures as victim witnesses can be spared from having to face the 
accused directly and personally in the courtroom, which may lead to further 
traumatization. This point is also discussed later when dealing with special 
protective measures.934  
When the Trial Chamber Presiding Judge does not provide directions to 
determine the mode and order of questioning witnesses,935 the Prosecutor and 
the defence shall agree on this.936 The ICC RPE proposes a non-mandatory order 
of questioning: questioning of a witness by the party who called him/her 
followed by questioning by the other party, and the Trial Chamber may question 
a witness at any time but the defence has the right to be the last to examine the 
witness.937 In practice, it has been allowed to cross-examine witnesses, adopting 
the adversarial approach.938 In principle, questioning of victims ‘should be 
conducted in a neutral fashion. However, the Chamber may determine on a 
case-by-case basis that cross-examination […] is allowed’.939 Cross-examination 
is limited to matters raised during cross-examination-in-chief and matters 
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931 ICC RPE, rule 68 (1) (amended version).  
932 ICC RPE, rule 68 (2) (amended version).  
933 Klamgerg (2012) 319.  
934 See infra Chapter III 3.3.2.  
935 ICC Statute, article 64 (8); ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 43.  
936 ICC RPE, rule 140 (1). 
937 Ibid., rule 140 (2).  
938 Schabas (2010) 811. 
939 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), Directions for the Conduct of the 
Proceedings and Testimony in Accordance with Rule 140, Trial Chamber II, 20 November 2009, 
para. 32.  
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affecting witness credibility.940 Leading, closed and challenging questions may be 
exceptionally allowed by the Chamber although unwarranted insinuations as 
well as questions concealing speeches are not permitted and cross-examination 
must be respectful of the witnesses’ dignity.941 Moreover, as emphasized by Trial 
Chamber II in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui ‘cross-examination must at all times 
remain civil and respectful to the witness. The Chamber will not allow parties to 
assault the dignity or exploit the vulnerability of witnesses during cross-
examination’.942 This constitutes a necessary guarantee to forbid an aggressive 
cross-examination and, thus, reduces the risks of secondary victimization of 
victim witnesses. Rule 69 goes along the same line as states that agreements 
between the parties as to evidence may be accepted but subject to a restriction 
‘the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims’.   
Rule 140 (2) provides guidelines for the examination of a witness, which 
includes that the two parties ‘(b) […] have the right to question a witness about 
relevant matters related to the witness’s testimony and its reliability, the 
credibility of the witness and other relevant matters’. The objective of this round 
of questioning is: i) to diminish the negative effect of the testimony on the 
party’s case by challenging the witness credibility and bring to the surface 
weaknesses in his/her account of events; and ii) to elicit evidence which is 
favourable to the questioning party.943 Considering the potentially 
confrontational nature of questioning by the ‘party not calling the witness’, the 
Chamber is obliged to protect the psychological well-being and dignity of the 
witnesses and victims.944 The interpretation given to ‘other relevant matters’ is 
that it includes matters impacting on the accused’s guilt or innocence such as the 
credibility or reliability of the evidence.945    
Rule 67 (1) and (2) of the ICC RPE provides for that a Chamber may 
permit a witness to give oral testimony via live audio or video technology as far 
as such testimony allows the witness to be examined by both parties and the 
Chamber when (s)he testifies, in accordance with the rules on witness 
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940 See ICC RPE, rule 140 (2) (b); Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 
November 2009, para. 69.   
941 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, paras. 74-76. 
942 Ibid., para. 75. 
943 Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Structure of Contested Trial’ in Sluiter et al. (2013) 543, 613. 
944 ICC Statute, article 68 (1); ICC RPE, rule 88 (5). See also, e.g., Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-1023), 
Decision on Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings, Trial Chamber III, 19 November 2010, 
para. 15. 
945 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1140), Decision on Various Issues Related to Witness’ Testimony 
During Trial, Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2008, para. 32. 


examination as would apply if the witness were live in court. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that testimony via video-link is compatible with the 
accused’s right to examine or have examined witness against him/her, under 
article 67 (1) (e) of the Statute.946 Such testimony is not limited to exceptional 
circumstances provided that the accused’s rights are not affected.947  
Concerning credibility issues related to victims as witnesses, in Lubanga, 
the Trial Chamber rejected some witnesses’ testimonies because of 
inconsistencies and found their evidence not to be reliable.948 Additionally, six 
individuals who previously held the victim participant-witness dual status were 
found to have had falsified their testimony, which resulted both in rejection of 
their evidence and loss of their victim participant status,949 as discussed later.950 
In Ngudjolo Chui, the Trial Chamber also concluded that the testimonies of the 
prosecution’s three key witnesses were too ‘contradictory’, ‘overly inaccurate’ 
and ‘excessively imprecise’ that it could not find them credible or rely on their 
oral evidence.951 This arguably was a key factor leading to the Trial Chamber’s 
finding of Ngudjolo Chui as non-guilty and shows how witness credibility issues 
may affect victims’ interests in general.  
Overall speaking, in Lubanga and Ngudjolo Chui, the Trial Chambers, 
having considered the entirety of the witnesses’ accounts and other relevant 
factors,952 concluded that: i) there was an unregulated use of intermediaries and a 
lack of Prosecutor’s investigative oversight;953 ii) delayed and insufficient 
investigations;954 iii) a shortage of relevant witnesses;955 iv) a lack of attention to 
witnesses’ fundamental background details;956 and v) the OTP did not physically 
visit all the localities relevant to the charges which would have helped to clarify 
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946 See, e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1140), 29 January 2008, para. 41. 
947 Ibid., para. 10. 
948 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 479. 
949 Ibid., paras. 484 and 502. 
950 See infra Chapter III 2.3.2.2. 
951 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tEng), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber, 18 December 2012, paras. 159, 189, 190, 218-219. 
952 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 102; Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tEng), Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber, 18 December 2012, para. 53.   
953 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, paras. 482-483. 
954 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tEng), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber, 18 December 2012, para. 123. 
955 Ibid., para. 119. 
956 Ibid., para. 121. 
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several witness testimonies.957 Similar problems, in particular the OTP’s system 
of evidence review, which affect the credibility of witnesses and reliability of their 
testimonies have also been present in the ongoing Kenyatta.958  
In order to address the above-mentioned factors, which have negatively 
affected the credibility of witnesses, the OTP has started a major review of its 
investigative practices.959 In any case, the OTP should directly assess the 
credibility of its witnesses via its own staff and not intermediaries as early as 
possible during the investigations.960 The ICC launched a Court-wide initiative 
to set up guidelines, a code of conduct, and a contract for intermediaries.961 This 
is pivotal as intermediaries are not bound by the ICC operational instruments 
such as the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel or the ICC Staff Rules.962 
In turn, the Draft Guidelines Governing the Relationship between the Court and 
Intermediaries take into consideration the findings in Lubanga and deals with 
the policy and law on the use of intermediaries including security, payment and 
closer monitoring of intermediaries for accountability purposes.963 Additionally, 
both the ICC and the OTP should conduct timely investigations of allegations of 
false testimony and also witness interference. 
 
2.3.1.2. Witness Proofing  
With regard to witness proofing, the ICC has almost unanimously rejected this 
practice. Pre-Trial Chamber I in Lubanga considered some measures proposed 
by the Prosecutor under the category of ‘witness familiarization’ as not only 
permissible but as part of the ICC’s duty to provide for the ‘safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity, and privacy of victims and witnesses’,964 but 
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957 Ibid., para. 118. 
958 Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-728), Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64 (4) 
and Related Requests, Trial Chamber V, 26 April 2013, paras. 122-123.  
959 See OTP, Draft Strategic Plan for 2013-2015, p. 11. 
960 See also International Bar Association, Witnesses before the International Criminal Court 
(2013) 49.    
961 ICC, Report of the Bureau on Victims and Affected Communities and the Trust Fund for 
Victims, Including Reparations and Intermediaries-Annex: Draft Resolution on Victims and 
Affected Communities, Reparations and Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-ASP/12/38, 15 October 
2013, para. 7.  
962 International Bar Association (2013) 45.  
963 Draft Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries for the Organs 
and Units of the Court and Counsel Working with Intermediaries, April 2012. See also 
International Bar Association (2013) 45.  
964 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-679), Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and 
Witness Proofing, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 8 November 2006, para. 21 (citing article 68 (1) of the ICC 
Statute). Those practices were: i) opportunity for the witness to acquaint him/herself with the 
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conducted by the VWU and not by the party intending to call the witness.965 
However, the Chamber considered proposed measures properly constituting 
‘witness proofing’ as prohibited since there was no legal basis for this practice 
under article 21 (1) of the ICC Statute, which lists the legal sources applicable by 
the ICC including ‘general principles of law’.966 Trial Chamber I largely 
concurred with Pre-Trial Chamber I’s findings.967 Moreover, it considered that 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL RPE and jurisprudence are not automatically 
applicable to the ICC.968 Accordingly, Trial Chamber I first held that the VWU 
would continue to carry out witness familiarization, but added that it should be 
conducted ‘in consultation with the party introducing the witness’.969 Second, 
unlike Pre-Trial Chamber I, Trial Chamber I ordered that copies of their 
statements be made available to witnesses prior to their testimony.970 Third, the 
Trial Chamber kept the bar against witness proofing as put forward by the 
Prosecutor.971   
Important arguments have been raised to suggest re-examining the 
decision of banning witness proofing, including the facilitation of fair and 
expeditious conduct of the proceedings and as a way to protect vulnerable 
witnesses.972 Indeed, based on similar arguments, Trial Chamber V departed 
from ICC’s consolidated practice and authorized witness proofing or 
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lawyer who will examine him/her; ii) familiarize witness with the courtroom, court’s participants 
and its proceedings; iii) reassuring witness’s role in the proceedings; iv) discussing matters related 
to witness’s safety and security to determine the need of protective measures; v) reinforcing to the 
witness that (s)he is under the obligation to tell the truth when testifying; and vi) explaining the 
process of examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination. See Ibid., para. 14.   
965 Ibid., paras. 23-27. 
966 Ibid., paras. 28-42.  
967 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1049), Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and 
Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, Trial Chamber I, 30 November 2007.  
968 Ibid., para. 44. See also McDermott (2013b) 867. 
969 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1049), 30 November 2007, para. 49. 
970 Ibid., para. 50. 
971 I.e., putting questions to the witness that the examining lawyer seeks to ask him/her, and in the 
order anticipated; and inquiring as to possible additional information about potentially 
incriminatory and potentially exculpatory nature. Ibid., para. 57.  
972 See American University Washington College of law, War Crimes Research Office, Witness 
Proofing at the International Criminal Court (July 2009) 20-39; Ruben Karemaker, B. Don Taylor 
III, and Thomas Wayde Pittman, ‘Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A Critical 
Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 683, 
693-698. The contradictory testimony of the first witness at the ICC in Lubanga, under the 
pseudonym ‘Dieumerci’, raised some questions among some observers about the impact of ban on 
witness proofing on vulnerable witnesses, in particular children. See American University 
Washington College of law, War Crimes Research Office (2009) 18.  
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preparation in relation to the Kenya trials;973 however, it set some safeguards to 
avoid that the reliability of the evidence be affected during trial.974       
Nonetheless, it is herein argued that the ICC’s almost unanimous 
practice of banning witness proofing is justified.975 First, there is no legal basis in 
the ICC Statute or the ICC RPE for it and, furthermore, as Pre-Trial Chamber I 
by referring to both civil and common law jurisdictions determined ‘the practice 
of witness proofing […] is not embraced by any general principle of law’,976 one 
of the legal sources applicable by the ICC as already said. Second, adequate and 
in-depth witness familiarization may make up for most of the Prosecution’s 
concerns relating to his/her proposal of ‘witness proofing’.977 Third, the risks of 
distorting the truth due to the ‘rehearsal of in-court testimony’ in advance and 
the consequent absence of ‘helpful spontaneity’ during testimony at trial,978 
arguably outweigh the advantages of witness proofing.         
 
2.3.2. Dual Status Victim Participant-Victim Witness979  
2.3.2.1. Legal Features 
Neither the ICC Statute nor the ICC RPE establish whether a victim who 
participates in the proceedings as a victim participant can also be a witness. Even 
though some voices, including the ICC’s former Judge Claude Jorda,980 were 
opposed to a simultaneous victims’ status as a witness and as a participant in 
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973 Trial Chamber V considered that the merits of witness preparation, namely, facilitation of a fair 
and expeditious trial, and protection of the well-being of witnesses outweigh potential risks of 
witness proofing. For further discussion, see Ruto and Arap Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-524), Decision 
on Witness Preparation, Trial Chamber V, 2 January 2013, paras. 31-42 and 50. See also Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-716), Decision on VWU Submission Regarding Witness Preparation, Trial 
Chamber V, 11 April 2013, para. 4 (clarifying that non-substantive contact between the calling 
party and the witness in the 24 hours prior to the witness’s testimony would be appropriate and 
that from the time the witness starts to testify until the end of his/her testimony, the contact would 
be restricted to the examination in court, unless allowed by the Chamber).          
974 Those safeguards consist in: i) the use of cross-examination; ii) clear guidelines establishing 
permissible and prohibited conduct contained in a witness preparation protocol; and iii) video-
recording of the preparation sessions. Ibid., paras. 44-48 and 51 and 52.  
975 See corroborating Ambos (2009); Wayne Jordash, ‘The Practice of “Witness Proofing” in 
International Criminal Tribunals: Why the International Criminal Court Should Prohibit the 
Practice’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 501, 520-523.  
976 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-679), 8 November 2006, para. 37. 
977 Ambos (2009) 614.   
978 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1049), 30 November 2007, paras. 46-52.  
979 See also infra Chapter IV 4.3.1.2. 
980 Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and the Role of Victim’ in Cassese, Gaeta 
and Jones (2002) 1387, 1409. 
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order to fully safeguard the rights of the accused, this dual status has been 
recognized in the ICC case law. However, as the Trial Chamber did in Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui, it has been clarified that ‘the Chamber will only grant 
applications on behalf of victims whose testimony can make a genuine 
contribution to the ascertainment of the truth’,981 and setting guarantees to fully 
protect the rights of the accused.982 In any case, as pointed out by Trial Chamber 
III in Bemba victims who ‘fail to reach the threshold to be authorised to give 
evidence may still be permitted to express their views and concerns in person’.983 
It should be mentioned that the detailed analysis of whether victim participants 
have the right to lead and challenge evidence is conducted in the next chapter.    
  What this sub-section deals with is two main concerns, besides 
testimonies that may result in delays, when a victim holds the dual status victim 
participant-witness. Firstly, a dual status victim participant-witness could 
provide evidence to the ICC after obtaining access to the confidential part of the 
case file and, hence, this would enable the dual status victim participant-witness 
to conform or even adjust his/her testimony to the available evidence that the 
Prosecutor intends to rely on.984 Secondly, dual status victim participant-
witness’s credibility could be questioned because of his/her financial interests in 
the trial outcome as a reparations claimant or other interests such as conviction 
or certain sentence, which may in turn give an incentive for a dual status victim 
participant-witness to change his/her testimony.985 Bearing these issues in mind, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, during the 
pre-trial proceedings, imposed two procedural safeguards in order to preserve 
the admissibility and probative value of the evidence offered by dual status 
victim participant-witnesses.986 First, to prevent the dual status victim 
participant-witness from having access to the confidential part of the case record 
that includes the bulk of evidence upon which the parties intend to rely during 
the confirmation hearing, including other witnesses’ statements.987 Second, to 
prevent the dual status victim participant-witness from attending any hearing of 
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981 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 20. 
982 Ibid., paras. 21-23. See also Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2138), 22 February 2012, para. 23.  
983 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2138), 22 February 2012, para. 20. 
984 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 312. See also Karim Khan and Rodney Dixon, Archbold. International 
Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 1152.  
985 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 312; Khan and Dixon (2009) 1152; Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1353.     
986 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 312. 
987 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-632), Decision on the Application for 
Participation of Witness 166, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 23 June 2008, para. 31. See also 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 312.  
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a witness in the same case, even if the hearing is public.988 Those procedural 
effects were to remain in effect until the moment that the dual victim 
participant-witness no longer remained an anonymous victim participant.989 The 
Single Judge also found this approach to be compatible with the initial request of 
the dual status victim participant-victim witness as he requested anonymity vis-
à-vis the two suspects.990 
 Although Trial Chamber I in Lubanga did not establish the parameters 
for the rights of dual status victim participant-witnesses, the Chamber rejected 
treating victims appearing at the ICC automatically as witnesses.991 Whether 
holding dual status would negatively affect the accused’s right is also considered 
when revising victims’ applications for participation and deciding participation 
modalities.992 The Trial Chamber also left it clear that a victim who has ‘dual 
status does not [have] rights in addition to those of someone who is only a victim 
or a witness’.993 The issue of disclosure and dual status victim participant-witness 
arose in Lubanga’s trial when the defence requested the ICC to order the 
Registry to provide them with the un-redacted victim application forms for those 
dual status victim participant-witnesses. The ICC identified three issues.994 First, 
the ICC highlighted the accused’s right to a fair hearing under article 67 (1) of 
the ICC Statute. Second, the ICC is required to protect the ‘safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses’ pursuant 
to, inter alia, article 68 (1). Third, the ICC noted the Prosecutor’s obligation to 
disclose to the defence exculpatory material, including copies of any statements 
made by those witnesses (s)he intends to call, and to disclose to the defence 
evidence in his/her possession or control which the Prosecutor ‘believes or 
shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of 
the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence’, 
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Leyh (2011) 312.  
989 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-632), 23 June 2008, para. 32. See also McGonigle 
Leyh (2011) 312.    
990 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-632), 23 June 2008, para. 33. 
991 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), Decision on Victims’ Participation, Trial Chamber I, 18 
January 2008, para. 132. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 312.    
992 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), Decision on Victims’ Participation, Trial Chamber I, 18 
January 2008, paras. 132 and 134. 
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pursuant to article 67 (2). Moreover, the Chamber noted that only the 
Prosecutor has a positive obligation to disclose exculpatory material and that this 
obligation cannot be imposed on other ICC organs.995 The Trial Chamber 
concluded that when it comes to dual status victim participant-witnesses, the 
Prosecutor will likely need to disclose their prior statements,996 including their 
victim application forms; however, the Prosecutor first needs to notify the 
victim’s legal representative to allow to raise any objection to the disclosure.997   
In the ICC’s case-law, it has been determined, via agreement between the 
Judges and victims, that when a legal representative becomes aware of the dual 
status of his/her client, the representative, after securing his/her client’s 
authorization, should provide to the extent possible the Prosecution with the 
individual’s name, date of birth and other identifying information.998 Then, the 
Prosecution should confirm in writing whether the person holds dual status and 
whether it is intended to apply for protective measures,999 or the victim’s legal 
representative may alternatively ask the ICC whether his/her client is in the ICC 
protection programme.1000  
The Trial Chamber may order the victim participants’ legal 
representative to transmit to the parties the application forms of dual status 
victim participants-witnesses although with some redactions such as victims’ 
contact information, which happened in Ruto and Sang.1001 In any case, dual 
status victims have been allowed to testify by the ICC Judges even when they 
were not called by a party.1002      
The ICC via the Registry will communicate with a dual status victim to 
obtain his/her consent to share this status information with the legal 
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995 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1637), 21 January 2009, para. 10. 
996 Ibid., paras 12-13. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 313.   
997 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1637), 21 January 2009, paras. 12-13. 
998 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1379), 5 June 2008; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 
Corrigendum to Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial and on 86 Applications by 
Victims to Participate in the Proceedings, Trial Chamber III, 12 July 2010. See also McGonigle 
Leyh (2011) 313.  
999 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1379), 5 June 2008, paras. 52-78; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-
Corr), 12 July 2010, paras. 50-54. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 313-314.  
1000 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1379), 5 June 2008, paras. 52-78; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-
Corr), 12 July 2010, paras. 50-54. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 313-314.  
1001 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-919), Order Authorizing Disclosure of Victims’ Applications, 
Trial Chamber V(A), 9 September 2013, p. 4.   
1002 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx), 26 June 2009. See also Sigall Horovitz, ‘The Role of 
Victims’ in Carter and Pocar (2013) 166, 186.  
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representative.1003 When the dual status victim participant-witness will be 
brought outside the court-room, and after having completed his/her testimony, 
(s)he and his/her legal representative may maintain contact.1004 Any party’s 
contact with a dual status victim participant-witness should be done via the legal 
representative and, if the dual status victim is the one who wants to contact a 
party, the VWU facilitates so.1005 Indeed, the VWU has to be informed of all dual 
status victim participants-victim witnesses in order ‘to advise those concerned to 
seek the appropriate legal advice’.1006 In urgent situations, to preserve or collect 
evidence, the party who directly contacted the dual status victim, then, shall as 
soon as possible inform the dual status victim’s legal representative.1007 Although 
legal representatives may contact their dual status clients, they are forbidden to 
discuss their testimonies in advance, and meetings with their clients are often 
supervised by an ICC’s agent.1008 However, such prohibition is not necessarily 
fully applicable in the Kenyan trials as Trial Chamber V has allowed witness 
proofing, as discussed later,1009 and in which there are dual status victims.1010 In 
any case, a legal representative may request access to materials related to his/her 
client and be present during interviews of the dual status victim participant-
witness if the individual consents.1011 Therefore, notice to the legal 
representatives must precede all contacts between the Prosecutor, the defence, 
and a dual status victim.1012  
 
2.3.2.2. Related Legal Issues 
During the trial in Lubanga, six victim participants testified before the Chamber 
as Prosecution witnesses and three as witnesses called upon request of the victim 
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1004 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Transcripts, Trial Chamber III, 26 January 2011, p. 48, lines 11-12. 
1005 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1379), 5 June 2008, para. 59; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 
12 July 2010, para. 53. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 314.  
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1007Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1379), 5 June 2008, para. 60; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 
12 July 2010, para. 53. 
1008 Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), Transcript, 20 October 2009, pp. 8-9, 95. Cited by McGonigle 
Leyh (2011) 314, footnote 544.  
1009 See infra Chapter III 2.3.1.2.  
1010 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1129-Corr-Red2), Corrigendum of Prosecution’s Fourth 
Request for In-Court Protective Measures for Trial Witnesses dated 24 December 2013, Office of 
the Prosecutor, 2 January 2014, paras. 25, 47 and 53.    
1011 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 314. 
1012 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1379), 5 June 2008, paras. 24-27. 
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participants’ legal representatives. Concerning the Prosecution witnesses, five of 
them (the sixth being the father of one of the other five) testified about their 
experiences as child soldiers, i.e., abducted and forced to participate in the 
hostilities. The Trial Chamber paid attention to the trauma and psychological 
impact of the events on alleged former child soldiers holding dual status, 
including important findings by an expert witness on the topic of children with 
trauma and called by the judges themselves, especially concerning child’s ability 
to answer and remember events.1013 Due to contradictions, weaknesses and 
inconsistencies in their evidence, e.g., as for their ages and true identities,1014 the 
Trial Chamber in its judgment not only found their evidence unreliable but also 
decided to withdraw their right to participate as victim participants,1015 as ‘In the 
view of the Majority, given the Chamber’s present conclusions as to the 
reliability and accuracy of these witnesses, it is necessary to withdraw their right 
to participate’.1016 The Chamber further added that ‘It would be unsustainable to 
allow victims to continue participating if a more detailed understanding of the 
evidence has demonstrated they no longer meet the relevant criteria’.1017 
Consequently, alleged former child soldiers’ testimonies were considered 
unreliable for the purposes of determining Lubanga’s individual criminal 
responsibility.1018 Essentially, unsupervised actions of three of the Prosecutors’ 
principal intermediaries led to an outcome characterized by evidence that ‘was, 
at least, in part inaccurate or dishonest’.1019   
It is herein agreed with the Trial Chamber’s decision not to consider 
dual status victim participant-witnesses’ testimonies obtained in such 
conditions. However, in agreement with Judge Odio Benito’s dissenting opinion, 
removing those dual status victim participants-witnesses of their status as victim 
participants is here criticized as excessive. First, imposing on victim participants-
witnesses a higher evidentiary threshold (beyond reasonable doubt) than that 
imposed on victims who only participate in the proceedings as victim 
participants and who were not subject to thorough examination can be 
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14 March 2012, para. 30.   
1014 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
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considered ‘unfair and discriminatory’.1020 Second, not considering evidence 
provided by those dual status victim participants-witnesses would have been 
enough as, in the reparations stage, the Trial Chamber when evaluating the 
reparations claims can always determine whether those victims meet the 
respective criteria.1021 Third, withdrawal of the victim participant status by the 
Chamber may produce unnecessary psychological harm on the victims and lead 
to secondary victimization.   
As for the three victim participants, two alleged former child soldiers 
and their guardian, called upon request of the victim participants’ legal 
representatives and who were allowed to give evidence in person during the trial 
in Lubanga, it was concluded that their evidence contained internal 
inconsistencies concerning abductions and military service,1022 which 
undermined their credibility and, therefore, their status as victim participants 
was withdrawn.1023 In the case of those three individuals, however, this decision 
was justified as there were material doubts about the identities of the victim 
participants as it was shown the real possibility that two of them stole identities 
at the instigation of the third individual.1024  
It should be mentioned that concerning victim participants called to 
testify as witnesses by victim participants’ legal representatives in Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui, four victim participants were in principle allowed to do it.1025 
However, only two finally did so as the other two victim participants’ accounts 
were found not credible by their own legal representative (legal representative of 
the main group of victim participants), who successfully requested Trial 
Chamber II to remove them from the list of witnesses.1026 Moreover, although 
the legal representative did not ask the Chamber to withdraw the victim status of 
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the two individuals in question, she requested to end her legal representation as 
for them.1027 Paying attention to the serious doubts casted by the legal 
representative on the credibility of those two victim participants and considering 
that these did not provide any satisfactory clarification, Trial Chamber II 
withdrew their status as victim participants.1028 Due to the very particular 
circumstances in this case, the withdrawal of victim participant status may be 
found as sound.           
  
2.4. The ECCC and the STL 
2.4.1. Witness Status  
2.4.1.1. The ECCC  
Victims’ status at the ECCC includes being witnesses. Practice Direction on the 
Classification and Management of Case-Related Information defines witnesses at 
the ECCC as follows: 
 
“Witness” means a person, other than a civil party, who: i. has given or agreed 
to give evidence in connection with proceedings before the Court, or ii. has been 
identified by a party, Co-Investigating Judges or a Chamber, as appropriate, as 
an individual who has been, or may be, asked to give evidence in the course of 
preliminary investigations or in proceedings before the Court.1029 
 
A witness ‘shall take an oath or affirmation in accordance with their 
religion or beliefs to state the truth’ before being interviewed by the Co-
Investigating Prosecutors or testifying before the Chambers.1030 According to 
internal rule 24 (2) (f), a child who is less than 14 years old, among other 
witnesses, shall make a statement without having taken an oath. The other 
categories of witnesses, listed under internal rule 24, who shall testify without 
having taken an oath include the father, mother, ascendants, sons, daughters, 
descendants, brothers, sisters, brother-in-laws, sister-in-laws, husband or wife of 
the civil parties.1031     
 
1027 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-3064), Décision Relative au Maintien du Statut 
de Victime Participant à la Procédure des Victimes a/0381/09 et a/0363/09 et à la Demande de Me. 
Nsita Luvengika en Vue D'être Autorisé à Mettre Fin à Son Mandat de Représentant Légal Desdites 
Victimes, Trial Chamber II, 7 July 2011, para. 40. 
1028 Ibid., paras. 48-49.  
1029 Practice Direction ECCC/004/2009/Rev.1, Practice Direction on the Classification and 
Management of Case-Related Information, article 2.e.  
1030 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 24 (1). 
1031 See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 
52.   
	

As for the right against self-incrimination, a witness may object to make 
any statement that might incriminate him/her and this right is applicable 
throughout the stages of criminal proceedings.1032 The Trial Chamber hears 
testimony based on a common witness list that the ECCC creates after receiving 
suggestions from the parties.1033 This is explained because, due to its inquisitorial 
procedural influence, the ECCC works on a ‘single case’ scheme and ‘there is 
absent the partisan “ownership” of evidence’.1034 Also, at least in theory and 
generally speaking, in inquisitorial systems, the witness is expected to present a 
coherent and uninterrupted narration of the facts, and only then the actual 
questioning begins.1035 At the ECCC, the Chamber shall hear the witnesses in the 
order that it considers useful.1036 In practice, for example, the Trial Chamber 
since the commencement of the substantive proceedings in the trial against 
Duch (Case 001) and then in Nuon Chea et al. has first questioned the witnesses, 
followed by the Co-Prosecutors, the civil parties and the defence.1037  
When a witness, among other individuals, who knowingly and willfully 
interferes with the administration of justice including when without just excuse 
fails to comply with an order to attend or produce documents or other evidence 
before the Co-Investigating Judges or Chambers, (s)he may be sanctioned or 
referred to the appropriate authorities by the ECCC.1038 The Co-Investigating 
Judges or Chambers may proprio motu or at a party’s request remind a witness 
his/her duty to tell the truth and the resulting consequences out of breaching this 
duty.1039 A summon can be issued to order a witness to appear before the 
ECCC.1040 Witnesses can be summoned and questioned by the Co-Investigating 
Judges.1041 However, the obligation to cooperate on, for example, issues 
concerning the appearance of a witness at the ECCC, is limited to Cambodia,1042 
unless other third States agree so.1043 In case of refusal to appear, the Co-
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1033 Ibid., rules 80 (1), (2), and 80 bis. 
1034 Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Trial’, in Luc Redymas, Jan Wouters and Cedryc Ringaert (eds.), International 
Prosecutors (Oxford University Press 2012) 700, 764. 
1035 For a comparison between witness questioning under the adversarial and inquisitorial models 
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Investigating Judges may issue an order requesting the Judicial Police to compel 
the witness to appear.1044 During the trial, each party may request the Chamber 
to hear any witnesses present in the courtroom who were not properly 
summoned to testify,1045 and the accused has the right to summon witnesses 
against him/her and whom (s)he had no opportunity to examine during the pre-
trial stage.1046 In any case, communication between lawyers and their clients are 
privileged.1047 
As for hearsay evidence, following international practice, the Trial 
Chamber has found that out-of-court statements which go to proof of the 
accused’s acts and conduct, as charged in the indictment, are not allowed unless 
the defence could confront them.1048 The exception is when the absence of the 
witness in court is caused by ‘threats, intimidation or other forms of improper 
interference’.1049 Hearsay statements that go to proof of matters other than 
accused’s acts or conduct (and found prima facie relevant, reliable and not 
excluded by the Internal Rules) have been admitted.1050 For example, the Trial 
Chamber in the first trial within Nuon Chea et al. admitted 1114 statements and 
transcripts of witnesses and civil parties in place of oral testimony.1051 The 
absence of oral testimony and opportunity for confrontation are relevant factors 
when evaluating what, if any, probative value and weight may be given to 
statements or transcripts admitted instead of oral testimony.1052  
With regard to witness proofing at the ECCC, the parties were not 
permitted to proof witnesses and, instead, the WESU was responsible for 
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familiarizing witnesses with the proceedings as well as preparing them for their 
testimony.1053 Nevertheless, when civil parties appeared at the ECCC, the Judges 
expected civil parties’ lawyers to have fully prepared their clients for their 
testimonies as evidenced in Duch.1054 Accordingly, civil parties are seemingly not 
only allowed but even required to proof their clients before participating at the 
ECCC.  
 
2.4.1.2. The STL  
At the STL, victims’ status also includes the witness dimension. The Pre-Trial 
Judge proprio motu, when warranted by the interests of justice or requested by 
the Prosecutor or the defence, can issue a summons to appear to a witness.1055 
Before giving evidence, every witness shall make the following solemn 
declaration ‘I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth’.1056 Concerning the sequence of testimony by a witness,1057 
after the opening statements of the parties and of any victim participant, the 
witnesses called before the Trial Chamber shall first be examined by the 
Presiding Judge and any other Chamber member, then by the party that called 
the witness, and subsequently cross-examined by the other party, if the other 
party elects to exercise its right of cross-examination. The witness may also 
subsequently be re-examined by the calling party.1058 In any case, the Trial 
Chamber, in the interests of justice, may decide to depart from the order of 
proceedings set in the RPE.1059 It should be noted that the Trial Chamber in its 
first pre-trial conference in Ayyash et al. determined that during trial: 
 
[…] the party calling the witness will question that witness first. The witness 
may then be cross-examined by the other parties, that is, Defence or Prosecutor, 
as required. The Judges of course may ask questions at any time. The Trial 
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Chamber has also decided that it may use Rule 145, that is, it can depart from 
that model of presentation of witness evidence where required by the interests 
of justice.1060  
 
  Cross-examination, according to rule 150 (I) ‘shall be limited to the 
subject-matter of the evidence-in-chief and matters affecting the credibility of 
the witness and, where the witness is able to give evidence relevant to the case for 
the cross-examining Party, to the subject-matter of that case’. A child under 18 
years who, in the Chamber’s opinion, does not understand the nature of a 
solemn declaration, shall be permitted to testify without that formality provided 
that the Chamber considers that ‘the child is sufficiently mature to be able to 
report the facts of which the child had knowledge and understands the duty to 
tell the truth. However, a judgment cannot be based on such testimony alone’.1061 
A witness who has heard the testimony of another witness shall not, for that 
reason alone, be disqualified from testifying.1062 A witness may object to making 
any statement that might tend to incriminate him/her. Nonetheless, the 
Chamber may compel the witness to answer the question.1063 Testimony 
compelled in this way shall not be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution 
against the witness for any offence with the exception of contempt or false 
testimony.1064 A Chamber, proprio motu or at a party’s request, may warn a 
witness of the duty to tell the truth and resulting consequences from a failure to 
do so.1065 Being a witness and refusing or failing to answer a question without a 
reasonable excuse is considered contempt.1066 Legal professional 
communications between a person and his/her legal counsel are privileged.1067  
The STL RPE have as a rule the presentation of evidence through the 
witness coming to testify before the judges and, hence, giving the possibility to 
the accused (and victims) to examine witnesses on the evidence brought by 
them.1068 The STL can exceptionally receive written evidence ‘which it deems to 
have probative value’ as long as the accused’s fair trial rights are protected.1069 
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The Trial Chamber may admit, in lieu of oral testimony, witness’s evidence in 
the form of a written statement, or a transcript of evidence given by a witness at 
the STL, which is a victim-friendly measure, provided that this evidence goes to 
proof of a matter other than the accused’s acts and conduct as charged in the 
indictment,1070 or goes to proof of the acts and conduct of the accused as charged 
in the indictment if in this latter case the witness is present in the court, available 
for cross-examination and any judge’s question, and attests that the written 
statement accurately reflects that witness’s declaration.1071 Therefore, hearsay in 
the form of a written statement can be admitted. In any case, the Trial Chamber 
must conduct a careful balancing considering the accused’s rights when 
admitting witness statements without cross-examination.1072 Depositions can 
also be taken upon Trial Chamber’s order ‘[w]hether it is in the interests of 
justice’.1073 Concerning the appearance of a witness at the STL, only Lebanon has 
the obligation to cooperate,1074 but this obligation can be made extensive to third 
states if these agree so.1075 The STL RPE explicitly establish that the STL may 
issue a summons to appear to a witness.1076  
Finally, with regard to witness proofing, even though the STL RPE are 
silent on this matter, the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing 
before the Tribunal leaves it open as it is stated that the counsel is not allowed to 
improperly manipulate the recollection of witnesses, ‘if allowed to proof a 
 
1070 Ibid., rule 155 (A). This rule also lists both factors in favour of and against admitting evidence 
in the form of a written statement. See also Ibid., rule 155 (B) and (c). For details on statements 
under rule 155 as well as depositions see STL, Practice Direction on the Procedure for Taking 
Depositions Under Rules 123 and 157 and for Taking Witness Statements for Admission in Court 
Under Rule 155, STL-PD-2010-02, 15 January 2010. As for principles in deciding applications to 
admit into evidence, under rule 155, statements which do not comply with the above-referred 
Practice Direction see Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), Decision on Compliance with the Practice 
Direction for the Admissibility of Witness Statements under Rule 155, Trial Chamber, 30 May 
2013, para. 31. The Trial Chamber in Ayyash et al. found that the statements of 23 of the proposed 
witnesses, and, where applicable, associated exhibits, ‘bear sufficient indicia of reliability and are 
therefore admissible under Rule 155’. Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), First Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion for Admission of Written Statements under Rule 155, Trial Chamber, 20 
December 2013, para. 33.       
1071 STL RPE, rule 156 (A). For the STL first trial in Ayyash et al., the Prosecutor has estimated a 
number of about 170 witnesses under rules 155 or 156. See Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/T26), 
Transcripts, 29 October 2013, p. 14, line 17.    
1072 See Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 30 May 2013, para. 31.      
1073 STL RPE, rule 157. 
1074 STL Constitutive Agreement, article 15.      
1075 STL RPE, rule 21.   
1076 Ibid., rule 78. 
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witness’.1077 Having said so, it remains to be seen whether the STL Trial Chamber 
will in practice permit witness proofing or whether it will follow the same 
approach than that of the ICC and the ECCC, i.e., ban on witness proofing but 
allowing witness familiarization, due to its similarities with those two courts, in 
particular with the ICC.       
 
2.4.2. Dual Status Victims 
2.4.2.1. The ECCC1078  
Similar to the national Cambodian proceedings,1079 victims at the ECCC cannot 
be simultaneously civil party and formal witness. According to internal rule 23 
(4) ‘The Civil Party cannot be questioned as a simple witness in the same 
case’.1080 As evidenced in countries where the civil party status exists, the 
rationale of this practice is that the civil party has something to gain, either a 
gain of financial or another nature, by the accused’s conviction,1081 which may 
distort the commitment to truth expected from a witness. Thus, it is expected to 
preserve the accused’s right to a fair trial and the integrity of the proceedings.     
The Trial Chamber noticed the difference between victims as witnesses 
and victims as civil parties in its first trial judgment in Duch:  
 
The ECCC legal framework distinguishes between the survivors who testified as 
witnesses and the survivors who were joined as Civil Parties and also provided 
evidence before the Chamber. Pursuant to Internal Rule 23(6), upon joining as a 
Civil Party, a victim becomes a party to the proceedings. These survivors were 
accordingly no longer questioned as witnesses and were exempted by the 
Internal Rules from the requirement to testify under an oath or affirmation.1082  
 
The legal framework, referred to by the Trial Chamber, includes the 
Practice Direction on the Classification and Management of Case-Related 
Information which, as previously cited, defines witness as a ‘person, other than a 
civil party […]’.1083 Moreover, civil parties are not listed under internal rule 24 
 
1077 STL, A Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing before the Tribunal, STL-CC-
2011-01, 28 February 2011, p. 3, para. 6 (h).   
1078 See also infra Chapter IV 4.4.1.1. 
1079 2007 Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code, article 312 (‘A civil party may never be heard as a 
witness’.). 
1080 See also ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (3) (a) (Rev. 5); ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (6) (Rev. 3). 
Additionally, see Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1308.    
1081 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 323. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1353.   
1082 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 53.  
1083 See also Practice Direction ECCC/004/2009/Rev.1, article 2.e (previously cited).  
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which enumerates those witnesses who shall testify without taking an oath. 
Therefore, victims as witnesses and victims as civil parties constitute two 
distinguishable and not cumulative categories.  
 However, as mentioned in the above-quoted paragraph and as examined 
in further detail later,1084 civil parties can provide unsworn testimony. Indeed, 
during the trial proceedings in Duch, 22 civil parties provided evidence.1085 As 
noticed by the Trial Chamber in its Judgment in Duch, besides the persons 
explicitly mentioned under internal rule 24 (2), individuals exempted from the 
requirement of testifying under oath or affirmation ‘Included in this category are 
the Accused, the Civil Parties’.1086 The Trial Chamber also added that ‘These 
individuals may nevertheless testify and have their statements put before the 
Chamber and assessed as evidence where relevant and probative’.1087 Concerning 
the fact that civil party testimony is not taken under oath, it should be examined 
what value can be assigned to this unsworn testimony. In principle, it should be 
given less weight than evidence provided under sworn testimony insofar as the 
former is regarded as less persuasive than the latter.1088 Thus, this may in theory 
be considered a disadvantage for the victim constituted in civil party since the 
testimony of a victim (witness) may in principle be given a heavier weight than 
the testimony delivered by a civil party.  
Nevertheless, in practice, in, for example, Duch, the ECCC Judges 
treated civil party testimony, in particular that given by direct victims, as witness 
testimony.1089 In Duch, the Trial Chamber stated that although civil parties are 
exempt from taking the oath, they ‘may testify and have their statements put 
before the Chamber and assessed as evidence where relevant and probative’, and 
acknowledged the distinctive features of civil party’s participation during trial as 
previously quoted.1090 Thus, in the Duch Trial Judgment, the Chamber used the 
testimony of both civil parties and witnesses to support particular findings as 
appropriate. The Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea et al. has adopted the same 
approach by exercising its duty to appropriately and independently weigh all 
 
1084 See infra Chapter IV 4.4.1.1.   
1085 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 54. 
1086 Ibid., para. 52, footnote 78.  
1087 Ibid., para. 52. 
1088 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 206.  
1089 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1090 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras. 52 and 
53. 
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evidence presented and also to safeguard trial proceedings fairness.1091 
Accordingly, ‘the weight to be given to Civil Party testimony will be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis in light of the credibility of that testimony’,1092 based on ‘a 
reasoned assessment of this evidence any doubt as to guilt will be interpreted in 
the Accused’s favour’.1093  
Moreover, the Judges and parties have often referred to civil parties as 
witnesses.1094 Indeed, there was no indication in the first ECCC trial judgment 
(in Duch) that the ECCC gave less weight to unsworn testimony from civil 
parties,1095 which also has seemingly so far been the case in Nuon Chea et al.1096 
This arguably corresponds to the fact that civil party’s testimony has been 
subject to adversarial argument.1097 The outcome in the trial judgment in Duch 
was in spite of the fact that some individuals who testified acknowledged to have 
based some of their factual knowledge on previous testimonies heard at the 
ECCC.1098 The problem with this is that these civil parties’ testimonies, 
knowingly or not, were tailored to fit what the civil party in question heard 
and/or were bolstered with facts not previously known to them.1099 Furthermore, 
unlike with regard to witnesses, the ECCC Internal Rules do not prevent civil 
parties from viewing proceedings prior to giving their statements as they hold 
the right to be present in all proceedings. In fact, in Duch, a group of direct 
victims who may have given sworn testimony on the accused’s guilt chose to 
participate as civil parties and, therefore, testified without taking an oath, 
attended all proceedings and additionally could claim reparations. In turn, in 
 
1091 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Request to Recall Civil Party TCCP-187, for Review 
of Procedure Concerning Civil Parties’ Statements on Suffering and Related Motions and 
Responses (E240, E240/1, E250, E250/1, E267, E267/1 and E267/2), Trial Chamber, 2 May 2013, 
para. 21.  
1092 Ibid., para. 22. 
1093 Ibid., p. 10. 
1094 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 206; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 15 August 2013, paras. 23-30 
(referring to evidence provided by both witnesses and civil parties under the sections titled 
‘Statements and Transcripts of Available Witnesses Proposed in Place of Oral Testimony’ and 
‘Statements of Deceased Witnesses’).    
1095 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras. 52-
54. See also Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 1 July 2009, pp. 9, 73. 
Transcripts cited by McGonigle Leyh (2011) 206, footnote 232. 
1096 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 2 May 2013, para. 21; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 15 August 
2013, paras. 8, 20 and 24.   
1097 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 2 May 2013, para. 14. 
1098 Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 21 July 2009, p. 40. Cited by 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 206, footnote 233. 
1099 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 206.  



Duch’s trial, for example, two direct victims testified as witnesses.1100 Even 
though one of them sought to participate as a civil party, he filed his application 
too late, and the other chose to be a witness.1101  
Thus, victims at the ECCC have to choose between intervening as a 
witness (if called by one of the parties, normally the Prosecutor or civil parties) 
or to participate as civil parties during trial proceedings since the deadline for 
the submission of civil party applications is set before the beginning of the trial, 
under the amended/current Internal Rules.1102 Accordingly, unlike the 
Cambodian criminal procedure, a victim cannot be first a witness and then 
become a civil party during trial due to precisely the above-mentioned deadline. 
The ECCC legal framework may therefore be criticized as puts the victim in a 
disjunctive to choose one or other dimension of his/her status and, what is 
worse, with an almost irreversible effect. However, there is also the possibility for 
the victims to withdraw his/her civil party status,1103 and, later, may be called as a 
witness.     
Based on the previous paragraphs, it is concluded that although victims 
cannot simultaneously be civil parties and witnesses, victims as civil parties can 
provide evidence via unsworn testimony and the ECCC has seemingly provided 
to their testimony no less weight than to sworn testimony. Furthermore, as seen 
later,1104 civil parties have been examined and cross-examined like witnesses in 
the ECCC’s practice. In this regard, it may be considered that when it comes to 
their testimony victims may in practice hold a sort of ‘dual status’ at the 
ECCC,1105 i.e., civil party and mutatis mutandi relatively similar to a ‘witness’. In 
any case, it is important to take precautions to avoid that the civil parties’ 
testimony be ‘contaminated’ with what they may have learnt from previous 
testimonies at trial and/or the Judges need to be more attentive when examining 
the contents of the evidence provided.       
 
2.4.2.2. The STL1106 
As for the STL, the original version of its rule 150 (Testimony of Witnesses) (D) 
as a matter of principle precluded victims from holding the dual status of victim 
participant-witness ‘A victim participating in the proceedings shall not be 
 
1100 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1101 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1102 ECCC Internal Rule, rule 23 bis (2). See also infra Chapter IV 2.4.1.1.   
1103 ECCC Internal Rule, rule 23 bis (5).  
1104 See infra Chapter IV 4.4.1.1. 
1105 See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 206.  
1106 See also infra Chapter IV 4.4.1.2. 
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permitted to give evidence unless a Chamber decides that the interests of justice 
so require’.1107 Accordingly, this rule provided that a victim has to decide at the 
outset whether (s)he wishes to be a participant in the proceedings or a witness. 
However, bearing in mind that the situation may change and, for example, 
parties may realize later in the proceedings that a victim might be important as a 
witness, an application could be made to the competent Chamber to solve the 
dilemma.1108   
Be that as it may, the rule was amended by the Plenary of the STL Judges 
in February 2012 and, hence, its text reads now as follows ‘A victim participating 
in the proceedings may be permitted to give evidence if a Chamber decides that 
the interests of justice so require’.1109 The position of victims holding the dual 
status of victim participant-witnesses was accordingly clarified and enhanced. As 
the Plenary stated, the previous version of rule 150 (D) according to which 
victim participants ‘shall not be permitted to give evidence unless a Chamber 
decides that the interests of justice so require’ was unduly restrictive.1110 
Moreover, this amendment seeks to reverse the presumption of not being 
simultaneously a victim participant and a witness in favor of allowing victims to 
play the role of victim participants and also appear as witnesses. Additionally, 
this amendment brings rule 150 (D) in harmony with article 17 of the STL 
Statute on victims’ rights, which recognizes that victims participating in the 
proceedings shall be permitted or required to express their views and concerns 
through their legal representatives when considered appropriate by the Pre-Trial 
Judge or Chamber.1111 Accordingly, it was considered unnecessary to state that 
victim participants should give evidence ‘under oath’ as the STL RPE already 
require that every witness called to the witness box makes a solemn declaration 
before giving evidence.1112 Finally, as the Plenary of the STL Judges when 
adopting the amendment pointed out,1113 the Trial Chamber will take a decision 
on the most appropriate ways for witnesses who also hold the status of victim 
participants to give evidence. Also, as mentioned in Ayyash et al., in case of the 
 
1107 STL RPE, rule 150 (D) (original text). 
1108 STL President (2010), para. 21. 
1109 STL RPE, rule 150 (D) (text as amended by the Fourth Plenary of Judges, February 2012). 
1110 STL Office of the President, Summary of the Accepted Rule Amendments and Some Key 
Rejected Rule Amendment Proposals. Pursuant to Rule 5 (1) of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Fourth Plenary of Judges, February 2012), p. 19. 
1111 See also STL President, Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Explanatory Memorandum by the 
Tribunal’s President (as of 12 April 2012), para. 21.  
1112 STL RPE, rule 150 (A).  
1113 STL (2012) 19. 
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participation of a dual status victim participant-witness, tailored protective 
measures may be required and ‘it must be managed carefully in order to 
safeguard the rights of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial, as well as the 
interests of the Prosecution and the [victim participants] themselves’, which has 
to be determined by the competent Chamber in due course.1114   
 
2.5. Comparative Conclusions  
Concerning victims’ status, the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL are similar to the 
adversarial systems of England and Wales and the United States as the status of 
witness is almost exclusively the only substantial role assigned to victims at those 
tribunals. Consequently, since victims can only be witnesses at the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the SCSL, they do not have the opportunity to express their own views 
and concerns and in their own words as their testimonies are limited to an 
important extent to the prosecution’s strategy although they are in theory 
considered witnesses of justice at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL. The ICTY, 
the ICTR and the SCSL have adopted the typical adversarial manner and order 
of examination and cross-examination, i.e., the victim examined by the party 
who called him/her as a witness (normally the Prosecutor) and followed by 
cross-examination by the other party (normally the defence). Additionally, the 
principle of orality (live, in person testimony) when victims testify at the ICTY, 
the ICTR and the SCSL also follows the adversarial system.  
When it comes to the ICC, the ECCC and the STL victims’ role as 
witnesses is just a dimension of their status, which is also the case of the French 
inquisitorial system. The inquisitorial system influence is also present in the 
manner and order in which the victim as witness is interrogated and gives 
his/her testimony. Therefore, only when there is no agreement between the 
parties, the ICC RPE suggests the adversarial order of questioning although 
adversarial cross-examination has been followed in the ICC’s practice. At the 
ECCC and the STL, Presiding Judges are normally the first to examine the 
witness. Indeed, judge’s more active role on questioning and gathering evidence 
at the ICC, the ECCC and the STL, similar to the French system, is an important 
factor to evaluate how victim-friendly a court may be as detailed in the previous 
chapter. Witnesses can be called not only by parties and complementarily by 
judges but also by victim participants (ICC, STL) and civil parties (ECCC) in a 
similar manner than in the French system. Also, under the inquisitorial system 
 
1114 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on the VPU’s Access to Materials and the 
Modalities of Victims’ Participation in Proceedings before the Pre-Trial Judge, Pre-Trial Judge, 18 
May 2012, para. 61. 
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influence, especially at the ECCC, questioning of the witness at least in theory 
should only start after the witness’s first narration of facts.    
Be that as it may, what is common to all the examined international and 
hybrid criminal courts is that their rules of procedure and evidence have 
incorporated victim-friendly measures, mainly from the inquisitorial system, 
e.g., the admission of testimony via deposition and video link, witness evidence 
in written form and hearsay evidence, i.e., a flexible and liberal approach to 
evidence, not unhindered by technical rules like those especially existent in 
common law countries.1115 The above-mentioned point constitutes a sound 
exception to the principles of oral, in person and live testimony and cross-
examination, and is recognized in a higher or lower degree at international and 
hybrid criminal courts, creating better conditions to prevent a secondary 
victimization and encourage victims’ participation. In any case, those exceptions 
to the principle of oral, live and in person testimony have been conducted with 
due regard to the right of the accused to a fair and impartial trial.     
 It should, however, be left clear that in spite of inquisitorial features on 
the examination/questioning of witnesses in a higher or lesser degree at the 
examined international and hybrid criminal courts, the victim as a witness, 
unlike victim participants, almost by definition cannot express his/her own views 
and concerns and on his/her own ways but has to adapt them to the 
prosecutorial strategy. In other words, victim’s status as a witness at, on the one 
hand, the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, and, on the other one, the ICC, the 
ECCC and the STL does not differ as much in the objective for which is called as 
how and under what circumstances the victim as a witness gives his/her 
testimony. Moreover, adversarial features, when questioning witnesses, in 
particular cross-examination, are present at the international and hybrid 
criminal courts, in a higher (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL) or lesser degree (ICC, ECCC 
and STL). In any case, cross-examination is not unrestricted as it is subject to the 
matter of the evidence in-chief and matters affecting the witness credibility, and 
should be conducted with due respect for witness’s dignity in order to avoid re-
victimization. Thus, cross-examination, which seeks to inter alia affect the 
witness credibility, has to be conducted within reasonable limits. Testimony via 
video-link ought to be taken in a venue of appropriate solemnity, where the 
witness’s safety can be guaranteed, and which is conducive to the provision of 
truthful testimony.1116 
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1115 See Richard May and Marieke Wierda, ‘Evidence before the ICTY’ in Richard May et al. (eds.). 
Essays on the ICTY Procedure and Evidence (Kluwer 2001) 249, 251. 
1116 See also McDermott (2013b) 877. 
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     Additional features common to the considered international and hybrid 
criminal courts, which reflect a combination of the features found in the national 
systems examined, include: i) the witness needs to take a solemn declaration or 
oath to tell the truth before testifying, with some exceptions including child 
witnesses; ii) a witness testifies in person; iii) out-of-court witness testimony by 
deposition is also admissible even though it may be given less weight; iv) the 
prohibition of self-incrimination and/or not to use self-incriminating evidence 
for further prosecution; v) sanctions to victims when, as witnesses, they give false 
testimony (contempt of the court); vi) the witness normally does not have a legal 
representative; vii) the witness testifies at a specific time; viii) hearsay evidence 
via a written statement can be admissible although it may have less probative 
weight and it cannot concern the accused’s acts and conduct unless the witness 
can be cross-examined, or (s)he is found unavailable, and/or his/her absence in 
court is caused by improper interference such as intimidation; ix) certain 
privileged communications, e.g., legal or medical professional relationship; and 
x) child and mentally impaired victims can give their testimony although when 
this is unsworn has less weight. Even within these similarities, there are some 
differences. Thus, unlike the ICTY, the ICTR and the STL, at the ICC, the SCSL 
and the ECCC, the unsworn testimony of a child or a mentally impaired person 
may at least in theory be sufficient for the conviction of the accused. The just-
mentioned situation might raise some concerns about some due process 
guarantees although conforms the principle of non-corroboration and even 
common law jurisdictions developments. Similar to the three considered 
national systems, the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the ECCC based on their 
instruments and/or practice may via subpoena obtain the compulsory attendance 
of witnesses. Under the ICC Statute, this is not contemplated. Concerning 
judicial assistance to ensure witness’s appearance at court, all States shall 
cooperate with the ICTY, the ICTR, due to their Security Council Resolution 
constitution. As for the ICC, only States Parties to the ICC Statute are obligated. 
When it comes to the SCSL, the ECCC and the STL, that obligation is limited to 
the respective country. It must be noticed that at the ICC and the STL when 
victims take the stand only as witnesses, they give evidence unlike when victims 
are participants where they express their views and concerns (victim 
participants), which are not evidence. Moreover, victim participants, unlike 
witnesses, cannot be questioned by the parties. 
Credibility issues of victims as witnesses, causing the rejection of the 
respective testimonies, were present in the ICC’s first completed trials due to 
mainly an excessive use of intermediaries and problems with the OTP’s system 



of evidence review; however, the ICC and its OTP have been adopting measures 
to reverse this situation.       
Concerning witness proofing, the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the 
STL (implicitly) allow this practice based on considerations of fairness, 
expeditiousness and in order to clarify a witness’s testimony, and thus are similar 
to national systems like the American one. On the other hand, the ICC and the 
ECCC follow systems such as the English and the French ones and, hence, this 
practice is prohibited due to risks of truth distortion in the testimony and, in 
particular at the ICC, because of the lack of a general law principle allowing 
witness proofing as a source applicable by the ICC.1117 However, at all the 
considered international and hybrid criminal courts, witness familiarization is 
permitted and encouraged, which also corresponds to the trend across the 
considered national systems. Moreover, ECCC’s practice shows that civil parties 
are expected to be proofed. Be that as it may, both the ICTY and the ICC when 
deciding whether to allow or ban the practice of witness proofing paid a close 
look at national systems.1118  
 With regard to the dual status victim, i.e., victim as a witness and as 
participant, it does not exist at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL as victims lack 
the role of victim participants or that of civil parties. Even though the ICC legal 
framework is silent about the possibility for a victim to be simultaneously victim 
participant-victim witness, the ICC’s case law has granted victims dual status 
victim participant-victim witness, i.e., a victim participant can also be a witness if 
his/her testimony genuinely contributes to the determination of the truth and is 
consistent with the rights of the accused. In granting this dual status, it has been 
referred to, inter alia, national legislation, including the French CPP,1119 but it 
has been adopted certain procedural safeguards to preserve the admissibility and 
probative value of the evidence and protect the rights of the accused. These 
safeguards, i.e., no dual status victim’s access to the confidential part of the file 
and prohibition to attend other witnesses’ hearing in the same case, remained 
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1117 As previously noticed, the exception to the ICC’s consolidated practice of banning witness 
proofing is represented by Trial Chamber V’s decision to allow it for the Kenya trials. See supra 
Chapter III 2.3.1.2.  
1118 As for the ICC, see Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-679), 8 November 2006, paras. 37-40 (citing, 
e.g., the Code of Conduct of the Bar Council of England and Wales and R. v. Momodou). As for the 
ICTY, about the crafting of standard practices on this regard see the considerations by Minna 
Schräg, a Senior Trial Attorney at the ICTY Office of the Prosecution between 1994 and 1995, 
making reference to, for example, the practice in the United States. Minna Schräg, ‘Lessons 
Learned from ICTY Experience’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 427, 432, 
footnote 9.  
1119 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-632), 23 June 2008, paras. 21 and 27. 
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until the dual status victim participant-witness no longer was an anonymous 
victim and sought to address two main concerns. First, a dual status victim once 
has acceded to the confidential part of the case file, (s)he may adjust his/her 
testimony to the available evidence that the Prosecutor intends to rely on. 
Second, dual status victim’s credibility may be questioned as (s)he has some 
(financial) interests in the trial outcome, i.e., to seek reparations and/or to get 
accused’s conviction/certain sentence. Indeed, even though former child soldiers 
held dual status in Lubanga, problems about their credibility led the Trial 
Chamber not only to find their testimonies unreliable, which was a justified 
conclusion, but also to remove their status as victim participants, which can be 
considered as excessively unnecessary unless there is likelihood of stolen 
identities (Lubanga) or when victim participants cannot clarify serious 
credibility doubts brought by their own legal representatives (Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui). In any case, the rights granted to dual status victims are not 
larger than those granted to a victim playing the role of either a participant or a 
witness alone. Dual status victim’s legal representative or the VWU enables 
communication between the dual status victims and any of the parties.             
  Similar to the French and Cambodian systems, the ECCC does not admit 
the simultaneous official status of a victim as a civil party and as a witness in the 
same case. Concerns similar to those existent at the ICC, in particular the 
existence of financial interests that may make the victim as a witness change 
his/her testimony, underlie this civil law feature. However, the situation for 
victims in this point is even more difficult at the ECCC than in the French or 
Cambodian systems. Whereas in the French and Cambodian systems the victim 
as a witness during trial normally testifies first and then becomes a civil party in 
the same case, at the ECCC that option is not possible. This means that the 
victim has to choose between his/her status as a witness and his/her role as a civil 
party. In principle, the heavier evidentiary weight given to a witness’s sworn 
testimony in contrast to an unsworn testimony from the civil party is the main 
advantage to go for the witness option. Nevertheless, in the ECCC practice, such 
difference in evidentiary weight has not apparently taken place and indeed some 
civil parties have tailored their testimonies to what they heard at court, which is 
criticized herein. On the other hand, the fact that witnesses’ testimonies are 
limited to the Prosecution’s strategy as opposed to freedom for victims to express 
their own accounts and equipped with procedural rights constitute strong 
advantages for the civil party option. In any case, at the ECCC, considering that 
civil parties can provide unsworn testimony, the fact that their testimony (in 
particular direct victim testimony) has been treated by the Judges as witness 
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testimony, that the Judges and parties have often referred to civil parties as 
witnesses, and that their testimony is subject to adversarial argument and has not 
seemingly been given less weight than witness testimony, in those aspects, civil 
parties at the ECCC may in practice be considered as holding a sort of ‘dual 
status’, i.e., civil party and mutatis mutandi relatively similar to a ‘witness’.   
The STL has evolved from a situation very similar to that at the ECCC, 
i.e., need to choose between dimensions of the victims’ status, to one that is 
closer to the ICC. Thus, victims’ status as victim participants and witnesses 
simultaneously and in the same case was framed as exceptional under the 
original version of the STL RPE. Hence, a choice similar to that at the ECCC was 
in place. A new STL rule reversed this as there is currently a presumption in 
favor of allowing the dual status victim participant-victim witness. Therefore, 
victims’ status at the STL has arguably been enhanced.    
 
3. Protective Measures 
This subchapter examines the judicial measures adopted in favor of victims and 
witnesses at international and hybrid criminal courts. A number of particular 
concerns such as threat of reprisals and avoidance of further victimization 
brought about by criminal proceedings themselves underlie the need to protect 
victims and witnesses.1120 Since protective measures at the international level 
were influenced by and/or are similar to protective measures adopted at the 
national level, protective measures in the English, American and French systems 
are briefly examined. Then, a detailed discussion of the legal regime of protective 
measures in each of the international and hybrid criminal courts follows. It 
should be mentioned that the analysis is limited to judicial protective measures 
as they concern the criminal proceedings as such and provide the general level of 
protection necessary to ensure the safety and security of the immense majority of 
witnesses.1121 However, it is here noticed the existence of non-judicial measures, 
in particular relocation of witnesses, which can be adopted by other organs of 
international and hybrid criminal courts in exceptional cases where victims as 
witnesses ‘face situations in which it is impossible to return their homes’.1122 
Accordingly, these non-judicial measures are considered as part of ‘long term 
measures’ for witnesses that testified before the respective courts and part of the 
functions of the respective VWUs, VWS or Registrars as explicitly laid down in 
 
1120 Schabas (2011) 359. 
1121 See Tolbert and Swinnen (2006) 219. 
1122  Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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the ICTR, the SCSL and the ICC RPE.1123 Although the ICTY RPE do not contain 
an explicit provision on this regard, its VWS has provided some post-trial 
protection, including relocation.1124 In turn, the ICC evacuated 150 refugees from 
Eastern Chad to a more secure location considering the issuance of arrest 
warrants in the Darfur situation.1125 
  
3.1. National Systems 
3.1.1. English Adversarial System 
The YJCEA brought measures aimed at facilitating the gathering and giving of 
evidence by vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. These measures, collectively 
known as ‘special measures’, are subject to the court’s discretion and were 
considered as:  
 
[…] the most radical rewriting of the orthodox rules for treatment of witnesses 
in the adversarial system in the common law world. Whilst other jurisdictions 
had experienced with some special measures for child witnesses such as pre-trial 
video recorded cross-examination, none had made any of them mandatory for 
any particular category of vulnerable witnesses […].1126  
   
Whereas vulnerable witnesses include child witnesses under 18 and any 
witness whose quality of evidence is likely to be diminished due to a mental 
disorder, a significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning or a 
physical disability or disorder;1127 intimidated witnesses are those suffering from 
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1123 ICTR RPE, rule 34 (A) (iii); SCSL RPE, rule 34 (A) (iii); ICC RPE, rules 16 (4) and 17 (2) (a) (i).  
Concerning relocations of the ICC witnesses, the ICC Appeals Chamber found that: ‘The 
Prosecutor cannot unilaterally “preventively relocate” witnesses either before the Registrar has 
decided whether a particular witness should be relocated or after the Registrar has decided that an 
individual witness should not be relocated. 2. In cases of disagreement between the assessment of 
the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the Registry (hereinafter: “VWU”) and the Prosecutor, the 
ultimate arbiter of whether the serious measure of relocation should be undertaken is the 
Chamber’. See Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-776), Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the “Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive 
Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules” of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Appeals Chamber, 26 November 2008, paras. 1 and 2. See also VWU, Considerations 
on Preventive Relocation (As part of the ICC Protection Program established by the VWU).       
1124 See Tolbert and Swinnen (2006) 219-225; ICTY/UNICRI, ICTY Manual on Developed 
Practices (2009) 189. 
1125 See Schabas (2010) 825.  
1126 Laura Hoyano, ‘Coroners and Justice Act 2009: Special Measures Directions Take Two: 
Entrenching Unequal Access to Justice?’ (2010) 5 Criminal Law Review 345, 345.   
1127 YJCEA, section 16. 
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fear or distress in relation to testifying in the case.1128 Sexual crimes complainants 
fall under the latter category unless they wish to opt out.1129 The original 
differentiation between child witnesses in need of special protection and those 
who give evidence in all other types of cases, which was an arbitrary 
distinction,1130 is no longer applicable.1131 As a result, all child witnesses are in the 
same position regardless of the crime. The YJCEA provides for a set of measures 
including: i) screening the witness from the accused; ii) giving evidence by live 
link; iii) giving evidence in private; iv) removal of wigs and gowns; v) video 
recording the evidence-in-chief; vi) video recording the cross-examination or re-
examination; vii) examining the witness through an intermediary; and viii) 
providing aids to communication.1132 As for intimidated witnesses, the court 
when determining whether the witness qualifies for any of the special measures 
must take into account the following factors: i) the nature and alleged 
circumstances of the crime; ii) witness’s age; iii) witness’s social, cultural and 
ethnic background; iv) any witness’s religious beliefs or political opinion; v) 
witness’s domestic and employment circumstances; and vi) any behavior 
towards the witness on, inter alia, the accused or his/her family.1133 When a child 
wishes to give oral evidence in chief and/or testify in the courtroom instead of 
using video-link,1134 the court in assessing whether this would diminish the 
quality of the testimony has to consider certain factors.1135  
Concerning sexual crimes, section 41 of the YJCEA provides that no 
evidence may be adduced or question asked by or on behalf of the accused about 
any sexual behavior of the complainant without judge’s leave. This is applicable 
to the complainant’s previous sexual activity, whether it is alleged to have 
occurred with a third party or with the accused himself. The Coroners and 
Justice Act (CJA) (2009) added special provisions on sexual offences tried in the 
Crown Court to the YJCEA.1136 These provisions are not applicable if the sexual 
 
1128 Ibid., section 17. 
1129 Ibid., section 17 (4).  
1130 Laura Hoyano, ‘Variations on a Theme by Pigot: Special Measures Directions for Child 
Witnesses’ (2000) Criminal Law Review 250, 251.  
1131 See Coroners and Justice Act, section 101 (amending section 21 of the YJCEA).  
1132 YJCEA, sections 23-29.  
1133 YJCEA, sections 17 (2) and 46 (4).  
1134 Ibid., section 21 (4).  
1135 These factors are: i) the child’s age and maturity; ii) the child’s ability to understand the 
consequences of giving evidence in a different manner; iii) the relationship (if any) between the 
witness and the accused; iv) the child’s social and cultural background and ethnic origins; and v) 
the nature and alleged circumstances of the offence. See YJCEA, section 21 (4) (c).  
1136 CJA, section 101 (inserting a new section 22A into the YJCEA).   
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offence complainant is under 18 years,1137 to whom the provisions on child 
witness apply.  
Whereas the original YJCEA enabled the court to make a direction 
allowing a witness to give evidence by live-link,1138 the CJA amended this by 
allowing the court to also direct that a person specified by the court can 
accompany the witness when (s)he is giving evidence by live-link, and the court 
must take the witness’s wishes into consideration when it determines who is to 
accompany the witness.1139 In any case, the Criminal Justice Act (1988) enables 
the court to allow witnesses outside the United Kingdom to give evidence by link 
and without the need to fall in a special ‘category’ of witnesses, e.g., vulnerable or 
intimidated witnesses.1140 Section 51 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003) is 
applicable to witnesses who may be eligible to give evidence via video link but 
who are in the United Kingdom. A video recorded statement can be admitted as 
witness’s evidence in chief,1141 but the prohibition on asking a witness questions 
about matters considered by the court as covered adequately in the recorded 
statement has been removed.1142 The Criminal Justice Act permits the admission 
of previous statements of a witness who would normally have been called upon 
to testify, but is unable to attend,1143 due to, for example, fear.1144 Although there 
are some instruments on the regulation of questioning laying down some ethical 
standards,1145 they are neither legally binding nor exhaustive.  
The compatibility of protective measures with the accused’s rights is now 
examined. First, the Court of Appeal has determined that the right to examine 
witnesses is not free-standing but merely a constitutive component of a fair 
trial.1146 Even though few English cases directly address the right to 
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1137 YJCEA, sections 22 (A) (1) and (3). 
1138 Ibid., section 24. 
1139 CJA, section 102 (inserting subsections (1A) and (1B) into section 24).  
1140 Criminal Justice Act, section 32 (1).  
1141 YJCEA, section 27. Section 103 of the CJA amended this section in order to relax restrictions 
on a witness giving additional evidence-in-chief after the witness’s video-recorded statement has 
been admitted.    
1142 Coroners and Justice Act, section 103 (2) (amending section 27 of the YJCEA).  
1143 Criminal Justice Act, section 116.  
1144 Ibid., section 116 (2) (e). As for case law (corresponding to its predecessor, section 23 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 and arguably still applicable) see R v O’Loughlin [1988] 3 All ER 431.  
1145 See The Code of Conduct for the Bar of England and Wales, 8th edn. (London, General 
Council of the Bar) reinforced by the Written Standards for the Conduct of Professional Work 
(London, General Council of the Bar).  
1146 R. v Campbell (Neville) [2005] EWCA Crim 2078; R. v. Xhabri [2006] 1 Cr App R 26.  
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confrontation,1147 Lord Coleridge in R. v Smellie denied the existence of such a 
right at common law.1148 Indeed, there is no common law authority to suggest 
that this right has to involve physical confrontation.1149 Moreover, under the 
ECHR and ECtHR’s jurisprudence, although the right to examine is 
recognized,1150 the right to confrontation is not part of the fair trial and, 
accordingly, special measures to shield vulnerable witnesses from the accused do 
not contravene the ECHR provided that they are strictly necessary.1151  
Second, the general principle of English criminal procedure is that all 
evidence must be given in public, with access being afforded to the press, unless 
a departure from the principle of open justice is strictly necessary.1152 Granting 
special measures arguably falls into these exceptions. Moreover, article 6 (1) of 
the ECHR is more permissive and broader than domestic principles, and this is 
reflected in related case law.1153 The House of Lords has actually established that 
common law provides exceptions to the general principle of orality and the use 
of special measures does not violate article 6 of the ECHR.1154  
Third, as for the restriction on evidence or questions about 
complainant’s sexual history under the YJCEA, a majority of the House of Lords 
in R. v A considered that although it pursued desirable goals, the Parliament 
adopted a legislative scheme which made an ‘excessive inroad’ into the right to 
fair trial since, as Lord Steyn concluded, ‘a prior relationship between a 
complainant and an accused may sometimes be relevant to what decision was 
made on a particular decision’.1155 However, the YJCEA was found compatible 
with article 6 of the ECHR by referring to the Human Rights Act (1998), as it was 
read subject to an implied provision whereby evidence or questioning, required 
to ensure a fair trial, should not be inadmissible.1156 Thus, sometimes relevant 
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1147 Doak (2008) 87.  
1148 R. v Smellie (1919) 14 Cr App Rep 128. Cited by Doak (2008) 87.   
1149 Doak (2008) 87. 
1150 ECHR, article 6 (3). 
1151 ECtHR, Van Mechelen et al. v. Netherlands, Appl. Nos. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 
22056/93, Judgment, 23 April 1997, paras. 49 et seq.   
1152 See, e.g., Attorney General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] A. C. 440 (see Lord Diplock’s 
explanation).  
1153 European Commission of Human Rights, X v. Austria (1965), Appl. No. 1913/63; 2 Dig. 438 
(upholding the exclusion of the public from the trial of an accused for sexual offences against 
children).   
1154 R. (on the application of D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court [2005] 1 WLR 393.   
1155 R. v A (Complainant’s Sexual History) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1546 (Opinion of Lord Steyn).  
1156 Ben Emmerson, Andrew Ashworth and Alison MacDonald (eds.), Human Rights and Criminal 
Justice (2nd edn., Thomson 2007) 656.   
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sexual experiences between the complainant and the accused would be admitted 
although a judge would still be justified in excluding evidence of an isolated 
incident distant in time and circumstances.1157  
Fourth, in, for example, cases against the United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
has found that the protection of witnesses’ safety or privacy can limit the open 
and public nature of the proceedings although when it is strictly necessary and 
permissible under article 6 (1) of the ECHR.1158 For instance, this concerns 
limitations to public proceedings to protect minors as determined by the 
ECtHR.1159    
Under the EU Framework Decision on Victims, the right to protection 
contained provisions on protection of privacy of victims, to avoid contact 
between victims and perpetrators in court criminal proceedings and stressed the 
need to protect vulnerable victims ‘from the effects of giving evidence, in open 
court’ and, thus, they should be able to testify in a suitable manner.1160 The EU 
Directive on Victims includes more detailed provisions, including: i) right to 
protection; ii) right to avoid contact between victim and offender; iii) right to 
protection during criminal investigations; iv) right to protection of privacy; v) 
individual assessment of victims to identify specific protection needs; vi) right to 
protection of victims with specific protection needs during criminal proceedings; 
and vii) child victims’ right to protection during criminal proceedings.1161  
     
3.1.2. American Adversarial System 
Since the status of victims as witnesses by definition involves a protective 
dimension, some states and the federal government provide for victims a right to 
‘reasonable protection’ from the offender and, even more importantly, as 
established in the federal CVRA, ‘the right to be treated with fairness and with 
respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy during criminal proceedings’.1162 
Several states have actually adopted such sort of provisions as part of their state 
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1157 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1158 ECtHR, Jasper v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27052/95, 16 February 2000, para. 52 (finding 
no violation of article 6 (1) of the ECHR); ECtHR, T. v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 
24724/94, 16 December 1999, paras. 83-89. (finding no need to examine article 6 (1) of the ECHR).  
1159 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, Appl. No. 6289/73, 9 October 1979.  
1160 EU Framework Decision on Victims, article 8. 
1161 See respectively EU Directive on Victims, articles 18-24. 
1162 18 U.S.C § 3771 (a)(8).    
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constitutions.1163 The Victims’ Right and Restitution Act (1990) had already 
recognized crime victims, inter alia:  
 
(1) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victims’ dignity 
and privacy. […] 
(4) The right to be present at all public court proceedings related to the offence, 
unless the court determines that testimony by the victim would be materially 
affected if the victim heard other testimony.1164        
 
To protect the privacy of victims when testifying, some judges have 
ordered courtrooms closed during sensitive testimony, e.g., minor victims’ 
testimony in sexual assault cases.1165 The United States Supreme Court has 
concluded that although safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being 
of a minor constitutes a compelling interest, ‘it does not justify a mandatory 
closure rule’.1166 A court can accordingly establish on a case-by-case basis 
whether the closure is necessary to protect the minor victim’s welfare upon 
consideration of factors such as the minor victim’s age, psychological maturity 
and understanding of the nature of the crime, victim’s desires, and the interests 
of parents and relatives.1167 Some state case law has established that, in the case of 
a traumatized victim, there was more than a ‘substantial likelihood’ of harm if 
the press were allowed to be present to cover the trial and, thus, press access was 
denied.1168 Since closing a courtroom may have a limited effect if trial 
participants are free to disclose the proceedings, some courts have imposed ‘gag 
orders’ on trial participants barring discussion with the media.1169 Moreover, 
although a press agency could re-file its motion once a victim testified, the court 
could still seal the documents if the interests favoring non-disclosure outweighed 
the public’s right to access.1170 A Circuit Court noted that using a pseudonym 
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1163 E.g., Colorado Revised Statute, § 24-4.1-302.5 (‘1. In order to preserve and protect a victim’s 
right to justice and due process, each victims shall have the following rights: (a) The right to be 
treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout 
the criminal justice process’.); Utah Constitution, article 1, § 28; Connecticut Constitution, 
amended. XXIX; Illinois Constitution, article 1 § 8.1 (7).    
1164 Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-647 Stat. 4820 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
10606 (1990)) § 502.  
1165 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 154.   
1166 Globe Newspaper Co. V. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 475 U.S. 596, 603 (1981). 
1167 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1168 State in the Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super Ch. 1997). 
1169 See, e.g., KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 459 U.S. 1302 (1982).  
1170 See, e.g., MLW, 2009 U.S. D. Ct., Lexis 3345 (D. Mass. Jan. 20 2009).  
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protects better than sealing the record inasmuch as a seal may be lifted after the 
case is over.1171 State statutes have been passed prohibiting disclosure of 
information that might be used to locate a victim.1172      
With regard to sexual offences, for instance, the Florida Legislature 
passed the Crime Victims Protection Act, which restricts disclosure of the 
identity of victims of sexual conduct and accordingly all court records are 
confidential.1173 For this, the state or victim must demonstrate, inter alia, one of 
the following situations: i) victim’s identity is not already known in the 
community; or ii) the disclosure of the victim’s identity would endanger the 
victim because of a) the likelihood of retaliation, harassment or intimidation, b) 
causing severe emotional or mental harm to the victim, or c) making the victim 
unwilling to testify as a witness.1174 Some state case law has determined that if 
there is sufficient proof, in camera hearing must be held to determine whether 
prior sexual conduct is ‘relevant to a material issue in the case’ and, during the in 
camera hearing, the parties may call witnesses, including the victim.1175 This 
corresponds to the compelling interest of protecting the privacy of sexual assault 
victims against unwarranted invasions of privacy and harassment concerning 
their sexual conduct as acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court.1176 
Rape shield statutes have constituted efforts to impose on courts and juries the 
view that prior sexual behavior is generally irrelevant, which is also embodied in 
the Federal Rule of Evidence 412. However, this rule admits exceptions including 
evidence of sexual behavior between the alleged victim and the accused. 
Admissibility of pattern evidence has also limited the rape shield in some state 
case law.1177 On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined 
that when there is lack of circumstances enhancing its probative value:  
 
[…] evidence of a rape victims’ unchastity, whether in the form of testimony 
concerning her general reputation or direct cross examination testimony 
concerning specific acts with persons other than the defendant, is ordinarily 
insufficiently probative value of her general credibility as a witness or of her 
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1171 In re Zito, No. 09-70554 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2009 (order).  
1172 Texas Crim. Proc. Code. Ann., § 56.09; Utah Code Ann., § 77-38-6(1).   
1173 Fla. Stat. § 92.56.  
1174 Ibid., § 92.56 (1).  
1175 People v. Bryant, 94  P.3d 630 (Colo. 2004). 
1176 Michigan v. Lucas , 500 U.S. 145 (1991) 1146; The Florida Star v. BB.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).  
1177 State of North Carolina v. Summers, 302 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. Ct of App. 1983).  
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consent to intercourse with the defendant on the particular occasion charged to 
outweigh its highly prejudicial effect.1178     
 
With regard to child witnesses, they are allowed to testify on closed-
circuit television or videotape if the court finds that the child could not testify in 
person because of fear, or that there is a substantial likelihood that the child 
would suffer emotional trauma.1179 Several states have allowed the prosecution to 
use hearsay statements recounting child victims’ statements rather than 
requiring them to testify themselves.1180 Even though the United States Supreme 
Court has determined that the Confrontation Clause, i.e., the right of an accused 
to ‘be confronted with witnesses against him’ according to the United States 
Constitution VI amendment, requires the exclusion of hearsay that is 
‘testimonial’,1181 some hearsay statements used to admit statements by child 
victims will seemingly continue to be admissible.1182 It should be mentioned that 
some states require that questions to children be phrased in an ‘age appropriate’ 
language,1183 which facilitates the search for truth by asking the prosecution and 
defence to formulate questions that the child can understand.1184   
 
3.1.3. French Inquisitorial System  
Unlike other national jurisdictions, the absence of special legislation on witness 
protection put the French system behind in this matter.1185 To a limited extent, 
this situation has improved by the introduction of a new title (XXI) (‘On 
Witness Protection’) to the CPP.1186 However, this title deals mainly with 
anonymity of a witness as a protective measure as discussed later.1187 What 
should be mentioned here is that the accused facing this kind of witnesses can 
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1178 United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-272 (8th Cir. 1978). See also John Myers, Myers on 
Evidence in Child, Domestic and Elder Abuse Cases, Vol. 1 (Aspen Publishers 2005) 833.  
1179 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b).  
1180 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 556. 
1181 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). See also Beloof, 
Cassell and Twist (2010) 563. 
1182 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 563. See also, Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2004); 
and People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2004).  
1183 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 564 (citing, as an example, the Cal. Evid. Code, § 765).  
1184 See Paul Cassell, ‘Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah’s Victim’s 
Rights Amendment’ (1994) 4 Utah Law Review 1373, 1412-1413.   
1185 See Jean Pradel, ‘La Protection du Témoin Contre les Pressions’ (1996) 2 Revue Internationale 
de Criminologie et de Police Technique 160-168; Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 345.    
1186 Introduced by Law No. 2001-1062 on Daily Security, 15 November 2001, as amended by Law 
No. 2002-1138 on Orientation and Scheduling for Justice, 9 September 2002.     
1187 See infra Chapter III 4.1.3.  
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request to hear and have his/her lawyer questioning the witness but via remote-
location and, hence, the witness’s voice is unidentifiable.1188 In addition, the 
protection of persons who benefit of exemptions from or reductions in penalties 
due to their contribution to avoid commission of a crime, help stop it, reduce its 
damage or assist to identify the perpetrators or accomplices thereof can be 
granted pseudonyms.1189 Be that as it may, the CPP and Criminal Code contain 
several provisions that may afford protection to the victims.1190 During pre-trial 
phase, witness protection is primarily implemented via preventive detention of 
the accused, and the investigating judge can undertake certain security 
measures.1191 Witnesses who are being threatened or who fear retaliation may ask 
public prosecutor’s permission to give the address of the police station in the 
report instead of their own address,1192 which can also be authorized by the 
investigating judge during the preliminary judicial investigation.1193 The court 
has limited powers to protect the witness during trial. The Cour de Cassation has 
determined that if the accused requests to hear a witness, the court can only 
refuse it when there is a risk of reprisals or intimidation, under strict conditions, 
and the court should provide an elaborated motivation for a decision not to hear 
a witness.1194 The assisted witness benefits from the right to be assisted by a 
lawyer who is in advance informed of the hearings and has access to the 
dossier.1195 The assisted witness does not take an oath.1196  
In order to protect victims’ dignity, article 306 of the CPP allows 
derogation of the principle of public hearings. Closed hearing is a right if 
requested by the victim participating as a civil party in criminal cases on rape, 
torture or barbaric acts accompanied by sexual aggression. On the contrary, 
accused’s request to a close hearing does not proceed if the victim opposes it. 
Accordingly, the protection of the victim as a civil party prevails or, eventually, 
his/her wish to disclose the facts committed prevails over the accused’s right to a 
public trial. The Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation has indeed 
determined that ‘the scope of the measure of closed hearing should be left to the 
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1188 CPP, article 706-61. 
1189 Ibid., article 706-63-1. See also Criminal Code, article 132-78.  
1190 As for the Criminal Code see articles 222, 322, and 434-(15) (threatening or intimidating 
witnesses as an aggravating circumstance or as an offence). 
1191 See, respectively, CPP, articles 144 and 138. 
1192 Ibid., article 62-1. 
1193 Ibid., article 153.  
1194 Crim. 12 January 1989, Bull. crim., n° 13, D. 1989, Somm. 174 et obs.; Crim. 6 March 1991, D. 
1992, Somm. 96 et obs. Cited by Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 346. 
1195 CPP, section 133-3. 
1196 Ibid., section 133-7.  
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civil party victim’s decision’.1197 This extensive interpretation provides the victim 
broad powers to shape the publicity of the trial according to his/her own criteria, 
which is herein questioned from the perspective of the accused’s rights. The only 
restriction set by the Criminal Chamber consists in that the requesting (or 
opposing) person has the dual situation of (direct) victim and civil party. For 
example, a deceased rape victim’s mother was not allowed to oppose the close 
hearing although she already was a civil party.1198 Nor do victims participating as 
witnesses have the right to request a close hearing, which is only granted when a 
victim becomes a civil party. To sum up, the court has the authority on its own 
initiative or at request of the public prosecutor and/or civil party to hold the trial 
behind closed doors to protect the victim from unwarranted publicity.1199 For the 
benefit of all witnesses, there are restrictions to the disclosure of personal 
information and publicity before, during and after the trial including: i) police 
officers members are bound to secrecy like all persons involved in the criminal 
proceedings;1200 and ii) publication of documents or evidentiary pieces is an 
offence, and the law emphasizes the prohibition to publish any information 
concerning civil parties during the process before verdict.1201       
 As for child witnesses, the CPP provides for the audiovisual recording of 
the testimonies of minors who are victims of one of the sexual offences envisaged 
under the CPP.1202 The priority of the audiovisual recording over the audio 
recording is guaranteed because neither the minor nor his/her legal 
representative can request the audio recording and, indeed, only an investigating 
judge or a prosecutor can order to prefer only the audio recording based on the 
child’s interest.1203 A minor victim of offences mentioned in the CPP is assisted 
by a lawyer when listened to by the investigating judge and there are also specific 
provisions applicable to the other stages of the proceedings.1204 The presence of a 
psychologist, a doctor, a specialist on children, a family member or an ad hoc 
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1197 ‘L’étendue de la mesure de huis clos doit être laisée à l’appreciation de la victim partie civile’. 
Crim., 2 March 2005, Bull. crim. n° 75; J.C.P., 2005, IV, 1905; Dr. Pénal, 2005, com. n° 82, note A. 
Maron. Cited by Nathalie Pignoux, La Réparation des Victimes d’infractions Pénales (L’Harmattan 
2008) 292. 
1198 Crim. 30 October 1985, Bull. crim. n° 337; J.C.P., 1987, II, 20727, note P. Conte. Cited by Ibid., 
Loc. Cit.   
1199 CPP, articles 306, 400.  
1200 CPP, article 11. 
1201 Act of 2 July 1931, section 2. 
1202 CPP, article 706-52. See also Ibid., article 706-47. Law n° 2007-291 of 5 March 2007 envisaged 
to generalize this practice and re-enforce the equilibrium of the criminal process.    
1203 See Pignoux (2008) 291.  
1204 CPP, article 706-51. 
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manager next to the child during the hearings and confrontations is also an 
important support.1205 
 Although the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation has stated that 
the confrontation with witnesses is demanded by the ECHR,1206 the investigating 
judge can prefer not to proceed with it if there are risks of intimidation, pressure 
or reprisals.1207 Furthermore, the Criminal Chamber considered that the ECHR 
provisions are not applicable before the investigating judges as these proceedings 
do not constitute a confrontation between the accused and the witness. The 
victims, either as civil parties or witnesses, keep their status. i.e., witnesses cited 
by the investigating judge and obligated to appear, take an oath and testify, and 
civil parties hold their status rights.1208 Lastly, but equally important, in Diennet 
v. France, the ECtHR concluded that although public and media may be 
excluded from the trial to, inter alia, protect the parties’ private life or juvenile 
interests, holding proceedings, totally or partially, in camera must be strictly 
required by the circumstances of the case.1209 Therefore, the ECtHR found a 
violation of article 6 (1) of the ECHR in this case.1210          
 
3.2. Situation at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL  
3.2.1. Protection before Trial  
To begin with, the protection of witnesses is contained in the Statutes and RPE. 
Thus, the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes contain a positive obligation to provide 
protection to victims and witnesses as they indicate that:  
 
[…] the Tribunal shall in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide for the 
protection of victims and witnesses. Such protective measures shall include, but 
shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection 
of victims’ identity.1211   
 
The travaux préparatoires of the ICTY Statute, i.e., the Secretary-
General’s Report, do not help too much in clarifying the duty to protect the 
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1205 Ibid., article 706-53.  
1206 Crim. 26 March and 4 June 1998, Bull. crim. n° 115 and n° 184. Cited by Lionel Dreyfuss, 
‘Résultats de L’ Enquête Menée Auprés des Victimes’ in Strickler (2009) 95, 105. 
1207 Crim. 8 February 1990, Bull. crim. n° 70, D., 1990, IR 109. Cited by Dreyfuss (2009) 105. 
1208 Crim. 4 January 1990, Bull. crim., n° 4. Cited by Dreyfuss (2009) 105.   
1209 ECtHR, Diennet v. France, Appl. No. 18160/91, Judgment, 26 September 1995, para. 34.   
1210 Ibid., para. 35. 
1211 ICTY Statute, article 22; ICTR Statute, article 21. 
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witness and refers to the (then future) elaboration of RPE by the ICTY Judges.1212 
Although the SCSL Statute does not contain an identical statutory provision on 
protection of victims and witnesses, it refers to ‘measures ordered by the Special 
Court for the protection of victims and witnesses’.1213 Moreover, the SCSL RPE 
like the ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE state that potential witnesses and victims can 
be granted protective measures in the pre-trial and trial phases.1214   
 The Prosecutor has to apply to a Judge or the Trial Chamber under rule 
69 of the ICTY RPE, and the SCSL RPE, and to the Trial Chamber under rule 69 
of the ICTR RPE, if (s)he wishes to withhold the identity of witnesses from the 
defence. However, full consideration needs to be given to the rights of the 
accused. Accordingly, the ‘full respect for rights of the accused and due regard 
for the protection of victims and witnesses’ are provided for in articles 20 (1) and 
19 (1) of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes respectively.1215 Case law has stated that 
when examining non-disclosure of the identity of a witness to the defence and, 
in general, other protective measures, first consideration has to be given to the 
accused’s rights.1216 The tension between the rights of the accused and the need 
to protect victims as witnesses and how to conciliate these conflicting interests 
requires, as the ICTY mentioned in Haradinaj, that the Chamber exercises its 
duty:   
 
[…] to strike a fair balance between the right of the Accused to a fair trial on the 
one side, and the protection of victims and witnesses and the right of the public 
to access of information on the other side, the right of the Accused 
encompassing, in particular, the right to be allowed adequate time for the 
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1212 UN Doc. S/25704, Secretary-General Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 808 
(1993), 3 May 1993, para. 108.  
1213 SCSL Statute, article 17 (2). 
1214 ICTY RPE, rule 69; ICTR RPE, rule 69; SCSL RPE, rule 69.  
1215 In the case of the SCSL, the wording is slightly different: ‘The accused shall be entitled to a fair 
and public hearing, subject to measures ordered by the Special Court for the protection of victims 
and witnesses [emphasis added]’. SCSL Statute, article 17 (2).   
1216 Musema (ICTR-96-13-A), Appeals Chamber Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2001, 
para. 68. See also the separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Dolenc in Bagosora et al.: ‘The 
minimal guarantees under Article 21 (4) are “non-negotiable” and cannot be balanced against 
other interests. The use of word “minimum” demonstrates that these enumerated rights are an 
essential component of every trial’. Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-I), Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Pavel Dolenc on the Decision and Scheduling Order on the Prosecution Motion 
for Harmonization and Modification of Protective Measures for Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 5 
December 2001, paras. 11 and 14. See also Brdanin and Talić (IT-99-36), Decision on Motion by 
Prosecution for Protected Measures, Trial Chamber, 3 July 2000, para. 31.    
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preparation of a defence, and to cross-examine witnesses testifying against the 
Accused.1217                
 
 In order to grant protective measures for, inter alia, victims as witnesses, 
three requirements must be met by the moving party. First, the testimony is 
relevant and important to the party’s case. This requirement is met when the 
elements of the proposed testimony provide some relevance and some 
importance to the case, taking into account that the parties are free to design 
their own strategy.1218 Second, there must be a real, objective fear for the safety of 
the witness. The evaluation of risk and danger has to be done on a witness-by-
witness basis,1219 and also the party seeking protective measures carries the 
burden of proof of establishing ‘exceptional circumstances’.1220 Generally 
speaking, do not constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’: i) general allegations of 
dangerous conditions or threats to the welfare of victims and witnesses; and ii) 
the fear that the Prosecutor may have difficulties in finding witnesses who are 
willing to testify in future cases.1221 Third, only the least restrictive measures 
should be applied.1222   
 Once the likelihood that a particular victim or witness may be in danger 
has been established, the Trial Chamber will limit the accused’s right to the 
extent that the identity of the victim or witness will not be disclosed to the 
defence until such time required to provide adequate time for the defence to 
prepare before trial, according to the ICTY case law.1223 Under rule 69 (C) of the 
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1217 Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84), Decision on Prosecution’s Application for Pre-Trial Protective 
Measures for Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 20 May 2005, p. 4. See also Karemera et al. (ICTR-97-24), 
Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion for No Contact Order, Trial Chamber, 21 August 2008, 
para. 5.  
1218 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (ICTR-97-21), Decision on Nyiramasuhuko’s Strictly Confidential Ex 
Parte Under Seal Motion for Additional Protective Measures for Some Defence Witnesses, Trial 
Chamber, 1 March 2005, para. 23.  
1219 Lukić and Lukić (IT-98-32/1), Order on Milan Lukic’s Request for Protective Measures, 23 July 
2008, pp. 3-4.    
1220 Gotovina (IT-06-90), Decision on Prosecution Motion for Non-Disclosure to Public of 
Materials Disclosed Pursuant to Rules 66 and 68, Trial Chamber, 14 July 2006, pp. 6-7.   
1221 See respectively, Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84), Decision on Second Haradinaj Motion to Life 
Redactions of Protected Witness Statements, Trial Chamber, 22 November 2006, para. 2; Brđanin 
(IT-99-36), Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protected Measures, Trial Chamber, 3 July 
2000, para. 30.   
1222 Bagosora et al. (ICTR-96-7), Decision on Interlocutory Appeals of Decision on Witness 
Protection Orders, Appeals Chamber, 6 October 2005, para. 19.   
1223 Tadić (IT-94-1), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for 
Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 10 August 1995, para. 72.   
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ICTY RPE, the identity of the victim or witness ‘shall be disclosed in sufficient 
time prior to the trial to allow adequate time for preparation of the defence’. 
Under rule 69 (C) of the ICTR RPE, disclosure of identifying details can be made 
on a rolling basis during trial if adequate time is given to the defence to prepare 
cross-examination. SCSL rule 69 (C) is more specific as states that the identity of 
the victim or witness shall be disclosed ‘in sufficient time before a witness is to be 
called’. The importance for the defence to be aware of the identity of a 
Prosecution witness sufficiently in advance of his/her testimony has been 
pointed out by case law as identifying information assists in in-court cross-
examination.1224 An evaluation of the context of the entire security situation 
affecting the witness, and not only reliance on parties’ submissions, must be 
conducted.1225 Also, a protective measure order may be granted based on the fear 
expressed by someone other than the witness.1226 The ICTR has considered the 
fact that when the witness has testified openly and without pseudonym does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion of lack of need of protective measures, 
pseudonyms included.1227                 
 Non-disclosure of the witness’s identity is only granted if the party 
seeking it shows the existence of exceptional circumstances via bringing specific 
evidence of an identifiable risk to the security and welfare of the particular 
witness or his/her family, which means that broad allegations of dangerous 
conditions for victims and witnesses in general is not enough as a justification 
for the granting of non-disclosure request.1228 Accordingly, the prevailing 
circumstances in the former Yugoslavia have not been considered by themselves 
as equivalent to exceptional circumstances as found by the ICTY in Brdanin ‘To 
be exceptional, the circumstances must therefore go beyond what has been, since 
before the Tribunal was established, the rule-or the prevailing (or normal) 
circumstances-’.1229 Nevertheless, the SCSL adopted an approach different to that 
of the ICTY and the ICTR with regard to the non-disclosure of the identity of a 
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1224 Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-I), Decision and Scheduling Order on the Prosecution Motion for 
Harmonisation and Modification of Protective Measures for Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 5 
December 2001, para. 15.   
1225 Bagilishema (ICTR-95-1A), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Witness Protection, Trial 
Chamber, 17 September 1999, para. 6.   
1226 Gatete (ITCR-00-61), Decision on Defence Motion for Protection of Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 
10 April 2007, para. 2.  
1227 Karemera et al (ICTR-97-24). Decision on the Defence Motions for Reconsideration of 
Protective Measures for Prosecution Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 29 August 2005, para. 11.  
1228 Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84), Decision on Second Haradinaj Motion to Lift Redactions of 
Protected Witness Statements, Trial Chamber, 22 November 2006, para. 2. 
1229 Brdanin and Talić (IT-99-36), 3 July 2000, para. 11.  
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witness. Thus, the SCSL granted witness protection measures globally to a group 
of persons, based on security reports from the region even where the existence of 
threats or fears concerning specific witnesses had not been demonstrated.1230 The 
SCSL partially justified in, for example, Sesay, the adoption of blanket protective 
measures by differentiating the Sierra Leone’s political and security situation 
from that in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.1231 Thus, for instance, the group of those 
witnesses living in Sierra Leone and who have not waived their right to 
protection received confidentiality measures.1232 Even though this evidences how 
important is that international and hybrid criminal courts adopt flexible 
decisions when granting protection to victims and witnesses paying attention to 
the security situation in the respective country or region, the location of the 
ICTY and the ICTR outside the places where crimes were committed should not 
have been the only or main reason considered by the SCSL to adopt a very broad 
and different approach.  
 In order to justify the need for non-disclosure to the accused of the 
identity of witness as a protective measure, the Prosecution needs to 
demonstrate that:  
 
[…] there is a likelihood that the particular witness will be interfered with or 
intimidated once their identity is made known to the accused and his defence 
team […] It is not sufficient to show that the witness is put at risk of 
interference resulting from disclosure of his identity to the public or the media. 
The likelihood of interference must be objective while the witnesses may 
personally feel that he or she may be at risk, any subjective fears expressed by 
the witness ‘are not in themselves sufficient to establish any real likelihood that 
they may be in danger or risk’. In order to warrant an interference with the 
rights of the accused, those fears must be well-founded in fact.1233   
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1230 Brima et al. (SCSL-2004-16-T-551), Decision on Joint Defence Application for Protective 
Measures for Defence Witnesses Appearing from September 4, 2006 Onwards, Trial Chamber, 13 
September 2006, p. 3. See also Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T-782), Decision on Urgent Defence 
Application for Protective Measures for Witnesses and for non-public materials, Trial Chamber, 
27 May 2009, para. 31 and pp. 13-14. 
1231 Sesay (SCSL-2003-05-PT-033), Annex to the Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for 
Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure: Orders 
for Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Discloure, Trial 
Chamber, 23 May 2003, paras. 21-22 and 25. See also Tolbert and Swinnen (2006) 209-210.  
1232 Norman et al. (SCSL-04-14-T), Decision on Prosecution Motion for Modification of Protective 
Measures for Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 8 June 2004. See also Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 825.      
1233 Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-I), Decision on Protective Measures for Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 30 
October 2008, para. 19. See also Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-I), Decision on Accused's Motion for 
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The prosecution also has to bring ‘specific evidence of such a risk 
relating to particular witnesses’ rather than an indeterminate risk about 
witnesses in general.1234 Accordingly, a witness testifying before the tribunal is 
evaluated according to his/her particular circumstances.1235 It is important to 
mention that the general principle is that ‘applications by either party for 
protective measures are determined on an ex parte basis where the persons to be 
protected would otherwise be identified’.1236 Nevertheless, the party seeking the 
relief on ex parte basis has to identify why unfair prejudice would be caused by 
revealing the details of the application, or the application itself, to the other 
party.1237 Concerning the clause of ‘sufficient time prior to trial’ for disclosure of 
identity, contained in rule 69 (C),1238 it will depend on each witness’s personal 
circumstances.1239  
Factors in granting an early disclosure of the identities of Prosecution’s 
witnesses are whether the trial date is getting closer and whether early disclosure 
is to the defence, including the accused only.1240 Additional points concerning 
non-disclosure to the accused of identities of victims and witnesses are examined 
later when discussing anonymity.1241   
In addition to non-disclosure to the accused, victims and witnesses can 
have their identities protected from the public during pre-trial and Trial 
Chambers have ordered the defence that, inter alia:  
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Modification of Protective Measures: Witnesses KDZ490 and KDZ492, Trial Chamber, 25 March 
2010, para. 9.  
1234 Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-I), 30 October 2008, para. 19.  
1235 Gotovina (IT-06-90), Decision on Prosecution Motion for Non-Disclosure to Public of 
Materials Disclosed Pursuant to Rules 66 and 68, Trial Chamber, 14 July 2006, pp. 6-7.  
1236 Simić (IT-95-9), Decision on (1) Application by Stevan Todorovic to re-open the Decision of 
27 July 1999, (2) Motion by ICRC to re-open Scheduling Order of 18 November 1999, and (3) 
Conditions for Access to Material, Trial Chamber, 28 February 2000, para. 40.   
1237 Kordić and Čerkez (IT-95-14/2), Order to Prosecution to Refile its Ex Parte Filing in Response 
to Motion by Kordic for Disclosure in Relation to Witness AT, Appeals Chamber, 31 March 2003, 
para. 4.   
1238 ICTY Statute, rule 69 (c). The ICTR rule 69 (c) reads as follows: ‘within such time as 
determined by Trial Chamber to allow adequate time for preparation of the Prosecution and the 
Defence’. The SCSL rule 69 (c), in turn, reads as follows: ‘in sufficient time before a witness is to be 
called to allow adequate time for preparation of the prosecution and the defence’.  
1239 Brdanin and Talić (IT-99-36), 3 July 2000, para. 34. 
1240 Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84), 22 November 2006, para. 23.  
1241 See infra Chapter III 4.2. 
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(1) […] shall not divulge to the media any non public documents provided by 
the Prosecutor, including the witness statements or any other materials 
disclosed to the Defence […]  
(2) […] shall not disclose to the public:  
(i) any name or information enabling witnesses to be identified, or the 
whereabouts of the confirmed or potential witnesses disclosed by the 
Prosecutor;  
(ii) any documentary evidence, physical or otherwise, or any written 
statement of a confirmed or potential witness or the contents, in whole 
or in part, of any non-public evidence, statement or prior testimony 
 (3) If the Defence deems it necessary to disclose such information in order to 
prepare and present its case, it shall inform each recipient of any non-public 
information that he or she is forbidden to copy, reproduce or publicise them, in 
whole or in part, or to disclose or show them to any other person […].1242      
 
3.2.2. Protection during Trial  
Before the beginning of the trial, a Judge or Chamber may proprio motu or at the 
request of the parties, or of the victim or witness concerned, or of the VWS order 
protective measures for witness when testifying during the trial under rules 75 
and 79, ‘provided that the measures are consistent with the rights of the 
accused’.1243 A protective measure enjoyed by a witness during pre-trial under 
rule 69 may continue to apply during the trial, depending on the nature of the 
Chamber’s initial order. Granting protective measures depends on the particular 
circumstances and merits of each case. 1244 Considerations will substantially differ 
depending on whether the application is for anonymity from the accused or only 
from the public and media. In the latter case, measures are often granted 
provided that it has been identified a legitimate fear of security threat or danger 
that requires protective measures, and that the effect of which on the public 
nature of proceedings would be justified in the circumstances.1245 The 
anonymous witness issue, i.e., anonymity vis-à-vis the accused, is discussed 
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1242 Hadžihasanović and Kubura (IT-01-47), Order on Protective Measures, Trial Chamber, 1 
February 2002, paras.1 and 2.   
1243 ICTY RPE, rule 75; ICTR RPE, rule 75; SCSL RPE, rule 75. As for case law,  see, e.g., Karadzić 
(IT-95-5/18-T), Decision on Motion for Protective Measures for Witness KW46, Trial Chamber, 
12 October 2012, paras. 7-8. 
1244 Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures 
for Witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ at Trial, Trial Chamber, 11 June 1998.  
1245 Slobodan Milosević (IT-02-54-30), Decision Granting Protective Measures for Individual 
Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 19 February 2002; Krnojelac (IT-97-25), Order on Protective Measures 
for Witnesses at Trial, Trial Chamber, 26 October 2000.   
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later.1246 It should be mentioned that when deciding whether to order protective 
measures, a Judge or a Chamber may hold in camera proceedings.1247    
A first category of protective measures consists in the general 
confidentiality measures under rules 75 and 79, which aim first and foremost to 
prevent disclosure of the identity of the witness and any other identifying 
information to the public and the media. The requesting party must prove that: 
i) the witness has a legitimate fear of a security threat or danger; ii) the security 
threat or danger has been identified; iii) the security threat or danger requires 
protective measures; and iv) the effect of the protective measures on the public 
nature of proceedings would be justified in the circumstances.1248 The analysis 
has to be conducted on a case-by-case basis and must be objectively founded.1249 
Also, the measure sought must be the least restrictive of the accused’s rights.1250 
There is a wide range of confidentially measures including the use of 
pseudonyms, screening of witnesses from the public gallery, the use of one-way 
closed-circuit television, facial or voice distortion, permitting testimony by an 
away-video link, the redaction of information from the broadcast and 
transcripts, and testimony in closed sessions.1251 It is important to bear in mind 
that the right to a public trial is recognized in international human rights 
instruments as an important component of the right to a fair trial.1252 The 
Statutes of the tribunals reflect this consensus ‘The hearings shall be public 
unless the Trial Chamber decides to close the proceedings in accordance with its 
rules of procedure and evidence’1253 as complemented by this provision ‘In the 
determination of charges against him, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and 
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1246 See infra Chapter III 4.2.2.  
1247 ICTY RPE, rule 75 (B); ICTR RPE, rule 75 (B); SCSL RPE, rule 75 (B). 
1248 See, e.g., Slobodan Miloševic (IT-02-54), Decision Granting Protective Measures for Individual 
Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 19 February 2002; Krnojelac (IT-97-25), Order on Protective Measures 
for Witnesses at Trial, Trial Chamber, 26 October 2000.  
1249 See, e.g., Slobodan Milosević (IT-02-54-30), Decision on Prosecution Motion for Trial Related 
Protective Measures for Witnesses (Bosnia), Trial Chamber, 30 July 2002, paras 3 and 5; 
Ngirabatware (ICTR-05-86), Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Special Protective Measures for 
Prosecution Witnessses and Others, Trial Chamber, 6 May 2009, para. 4; Mladić (IT-95-5/18-T), 
Decision on Prosecution Motion on Urgent Protective Measures and Conditions for Witness RM-
377 Pursuant Rule 70, Trial Chamber, 18 October 2013, paras. 8-11.  
1250 See Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 822 (referring to case law). 
1251 ICTY RPE, rules 75 and 79; ICTR RPE, rules 75 and 79; SCSL RPE, rules 75 and 79.  
1252 ICCPR, article 14 (1); ECHR, article 6 (1); and ACHR, article 8 (5).  
1253 ICTY Statute, article 20 (4); ICTR Statute, article 19 (4).   
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public hearing, subject to article [21 (ICTR)/22 (ICTY)] of the Statute’.1254 
Articles 21 (ICTR Statute) and 22 (ICTY Statute) introduce, as an exception to 
the right to public trial, protective measures for victims and witnesses and read 
as follows:  
 
[The ICTY/ICTR] shall provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for the 
protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures shall include, but 
shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection 
of the victim’s identity.   
 
Article 17 of the SCSL similarly establishes that ‘The accused shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to measures ordered by the Special 
Court for the protection of victims and witnesses’. In turn, rule 78 of the ICTY 
RPE, the ICTR RPE and the SCSL RPE establishes that ‘all proceedings before a 
Trial Chamber, other than deliberations of the Chamber, shall be held in public, 
unless otherwise provided’. Public trials are not only of the interest of the parties 
but also of the general public and the international community, as they have ‘an 
educational function and the publication of its activities helps to achieve this 
goal’.1255  
Like during pre-trial, when the Prosecutor requests non-disclosure of the 
identity of a witness under rule 69, and even with stronger reason than in the 
pre-trial stage, blanket requests during the trial phase have to be rejected as 
stated by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Milošević ‘the Chamber must determine the 
legal basis for the granting of trial related measures under these Rules and 
whether the Prosecution has satisfied the Chamber, in respect of each individual 
witness, that measures sought are appropriate’.1256  
The existence of an ongoing armed conflict and its impact on the 
security of witnesses play an important role as to whether and what kind of 
confidentiality protective measures may be adopted as identified by the ICTY in 
Tadić.1257 Although the circumstances in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
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1254 ICTY Statute, article 21 (2); ICTR Statute, article 20 (2). The SCSL Statute states that ‘The 
accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to measures ordered by the Special 
Court for the protection of victims and witnesses’. SCSL Statute, article 17 (2).    
1255 Tadić (IT-94-1-T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for 
Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 10 August 1995, para. 32. 
1256 Slobodan Milosević (IT-02-54-30), Decision on Prosecution Motion for Trial Related 
Protective Measures for Witnesses (Bosnia), Trial Chamber, 30 July 2002, para. 5. 
1257 ‘[T]he fear of reprisals during an ongoing conflict particularly given the mandated duty of the 
International Tribunal to protect victims and witness and the inability of the International 
Tribunal to guarantee the safety of the victim or witness due to the lack of a fully-funded and 
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Sierra Leone have certainly changed, political tensions and in particular in cases 
concerning former senior political and military leaders, which are indeed most 
of these tribunals’ dockets, still merit granting protective measures in favor of 
victims participating as witnesses.1258  
In any case, the frequent use of closed sessions is herein criticized as a 
court that sits in private may create a negative impression,1259 and the principal 
advantage of press and public access is that it helps ensure the fairness of a 
trial.1260 Moreover, publicity of hearings is an important component of the 
accused’s rights and, thus, guarantees the accused’s right to a fair and impartial 
trial enshrined in the tribunals’ statutes. As identified by the ICTY’s case law, the 
denial of a public hearing to the accused cannot take place without a good 
reason,1261 or exceptional reasons.1262 These findings are also similar to the 
ECtHR’s case law previously examined in, inter alia, some cases against the 
United Kingdom and France.1263 The IACtHR’s case law has also highlighted the 
importance of public criminal proceedings as a general rule.1264  
Furthermore, concerning a hierarchy of protective measures and maybe 
bearing in mind the increase in closed hearings, the ICTY in Milosević, among 
protective measures including the use of pseudonym, voice or visual distortion, 
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operational witness programme’. Tadić (IT-94-1-T), 10 August 1995, para. 42. Later, in the same 
case, the Trial Chamber stated that it had to ensure that ‘any curtailment of the accused’s right to a 
public hearing is justified by a genuine fear for the safety of the witnesses and/or members of his 
family’. Tadić (IT-94-1-T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures 
for Witness S, Trial Chamber, 13 August 1996, para. 6.    
1258 See Pascale Chifflet, ‘The Role and Status of the Victim’ in Gideon Boas and William Schabas 
(eds.), International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2003) 75, 83; Tolbert and Swinnen (2006) 213. 
1259 John R. W. D. Jones, ‘Protection of Victims and Witnesses’ in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones. (2002) 
1355, 1368.  
1260 Vladimir Tochilovski, Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 305.  
1261 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution for Protective Measures 
for the Prosecution Witnesses Pseudonymed ‘B’ Trough to ‘M’, Trial Chamber II, 28 April 1997, 
para. 33.   
1262 See, e.g., Blaskić (IT-95-14-R), Decision on Defence’s Request for Relief with Regard to Ex 
Parte Filings, Appeals Chamber, 20 November 2006, p. 3; Naletilić and Martinović (IT-98-34-A), 
Decision on Vinko Martinović’s Withdrawal of Confidential Status of Appeal Brief, Appeals 
Chamber, 4 May 2005, p. 3.     
1263 See respectively supra Chapter III 3.1.1 and 3.1.3.  
1264 See, e.g., IACtHR, Case of Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment 
of 22 November 2005, Series C No. 135, paras. 166-168. See also Salmón Gárate and Blanco (2012) 
323-332.    
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considered that the use of closed sessions is the most extreme and, hence, a party 
seeking a closed session has to raise strong reasons for doing so:  
 
The more extreme the protection sought, the more onerous will be the 
obligation upon the applicant to establish the risk asserted [...]. Therefore, the 
Trial Chamber will, for example, only order closed session under Rule 79 in 
circumstances where it is shown that the risk of witness is sufficiently founded 
and that not other less restrictive protective measure can adequately deal with 
that risk.1265 
 
To complement this finding, the Trial Chamber indicated that other 
protective measures concealing the identity of a witness from the public, 
including the use of pseudonym and distortions ‘are considered less of an 
infringement on the public nature of proceedings’,1266 which is similar to the 
SCSL’s findings in Taylor.1267           
Concerning other protective measures, although the rule is that a witness 
should be present at the seat of the Tribunal, testimony by video-link is allowed 
explicitly under the ICTY RPE and the SCSL RPE,1268 if the following criteria, 
identified by the ICTY in Tadić are met: i) the party must demonstrate that the 
testimony of a witness is sufficiently important to make it unfair to do without it; 
and ii) the witness is unable or unwilling to come to the tribunal.1269 These 
criteria have been complemented by other elements added by subsequent case 
law, namely: i) the accused will not be prejudiced in the exercise of his/her right 
to confront the witness;1270 and ii) practical considerations, e.g., logistics, 
expenses, and security risks, of holding a deposition in the proposed location do 
not outweigh the potential benefits to be gained by doing so.1271 Under the case 
law of the ICTY and the ICTR, age and bad health were considered as good 
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1265 Slobodan Milosević (IT-02-54-30), 30 July 2002, para. 5.  
1266 Ibid., para. 7. 
1267 Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T-427), Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Additional 
Protective Measures for the Trial Proceedings of Witnesses TFI-515, 516, 385, 539, 567, 388, and 
390, Trial Chamber, 13 March 2008, p. 4.     
1268 ICTY RPE, rule 71 bis; SCSL RPE, rule 75 (B) (c).  
1269 Tadić (IT-94-1-T), Decision on the Defence Motions to Summon and Protect Defence 
Witnesses and on the Giving of Evidence by Video-Link, Trial Chamber, 25 June 1996.  
1270 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Decision on the Motion to Allow Witnesses K, L and M to give 
Their Testimony by Means of Video-Link Conference, Trial Chamber, 28 May 1997, para. 17 
1271 Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-T), Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Deposition of Witness 
OW, Trial Chamber, 5 December 2001, para. 14.   
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reasons for witnesses to be unable or unwilling to travel to the seat to the 
tribunal to testify.1272 However, the ICTY in Tadić also added that:  
 
[…] the evidentiary value of testimony provided by video-link, although 
weightier than that of testimony given by deposition, is not as weighty as 
testimony given in the courtroom. Hearing witnesses by video-link should 
therefore be avoided as much as possible.1273  
  
Nevertheless, the ICTY later took a different approach in 
Hadžihasanović and Kubura by concluding that ‘testimony by video-conference 
link has as much probative value as testimony presented in the courtroom and 
does not infringe the rights of the accused to confront the witness directly’.1274 It 
is herein considered that this position is more victim-friendly and more coherent 
as does not assume that the way of delivering a testimony necessarily determines 
its probative value since this has to be examined on case-by-case basis and 
cannot be hence determined prima facie or in abstracto.      
Unlike the ICTY RPE and the SCSL RPE, the ICTR RPE does not 
explicitly provide for taking testimony via video-link. However, the ICTR has 
received video-link testimony much more often than the ICTY. In evaluating 
whether the video-link testimony of a crucial witness would violate the accused 
right’s to be present at trial and to personally confront the witness, the Appeals 
Chamber in an ICTR case, Zigiranyirazo, considered a three-pronged test ‘(1) 
whether ‘presence’ [....] refers to physical presence in court [...]; (2) if so, whether 
the right to be physically present in court is categorically inviolable; and (3) if the 
right may be limited in certain situations […]’.1275 The Chamber concluded that 
the right to be present is not absolute,1276 and in reference to the principle of 
proportionality to restrict accused’s human rights, the Chamber considered that 
although security and logistics concerns are of importance, the Trial Chamber in 
this specific case did not properly exercise its discretion in imposing limitations 
on the accused’s right to be present at his/her trial.1277    
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1272 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), 28 May 1997, para. 20; Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41), 5 December 
2001, para. 16. 
1273 Tadić (IT-94-1-T), 25 June 1996. 
1274 Hadžihasanović and Kubura (IT-01-47), Decision on Prosecution Motion for Receiving 
Testimony by Video-Conference Link, Trial Chamber II, 11 March 2004.  
1275 Zigiranyirazo (ICTR-01-7), Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Appeals Chamber, 30 October 
2006, para. 8.  
1276 Ibid., para. 13. 
1277 Ibid., paras. 17-19. 
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In any case, even though the defence’s right to examine/cross-examine 
witnesses is stated under the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL Statutes,1278 the ICTY 
has established that the accused’s right to cross-examination is not absolute and 
that not all restrictions on cross-examination necessarily entail a violation of the 
right to a fair trial.1279 The Chamber must indeed control the manner of 
questioning witnesses so that they are not harassed or intimidated.1280 
Additionally, the ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE state that the ‘Victims and 
Witnesses Section shall ensure that the witness has been informed before giving 
evidence that his or her testimony and his or her identity may be disclosed at a 
later date in another case’.1281 This is arguably a sound provision since witnesses 
are in advance informed of potential negative outcomes and, therefore, the risk 
at surprising victims via unexpected changes or, even worse, a potential 
secondary victimization can be reduced.  
 Special measures have also been adopted to protect victims of sexual 
crimes. This is here considered necessary and sound as sexual violence was 
widespread and systematic in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, and due to the fact that victims of sexual violence have special 
needs since testifying may lead to their re-traumatisation. Accordingly, the 
Chamber may allow testimony by one-way close circuit testimony so that victim 
is prevented from seeing the accused. The victim-witness, hence, testifies from a 
separate room and thus (s)he is prevented from confronting the accused and the 
public. In this way, it is expected to relieve the witness from reliving the crimes 
and, therefore, reduce the risk of re-traumatisation. Placement of screens that 
prevent the witness from seeing the accused while the accused sees the witness 
on the courtroom monitors may also be ordered by the Chamber.1282 Moreover, 
the gender of the person posing the questions may be relevant as, for instance, 
female victims of sexual crimes may feel more comfortable when the person 
questioning them is another woman.1283 
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1278 ICTY Statute, article 21 (4) (e); ICTR Statute, article 20 (4) (e); SCSL Statute, article 17 (4) (e) 
(‘To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him 
or her’.).  
1279 Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84-T), 15 February 2008, para. 8. See also Martić (IT-95-11-T), Decision 
on Defence Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Milan Babić, Together With Associated Exhibits 
from Evidence, Trial Chamber, 9 June 2006, para. 56.  
1280 ICTY RPE, article 75 (D), ICTR RPE, article 75 (D); SCSL RPE, article 75 (C).  
1281 ICTY, RPE, rule 75 (C); ICTR RPE, rule 75 (C).  
1282 Tadić (IT-94-1-T), 10 August 1995, para. 51.  
1283 Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 848. 
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  In addition, the ICTY RPE, the ICTR RPE and the SCSL RPE contain 
specific rules of evidence in cases of sexual violence,1284 which inter alia provide 
the following. First, corroboration of the victim’s testimony is not required, 
which is explicitly mentioned in rule 96 (i) of the ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE 
‘In cases of sexual assault […] no corroboration of the victim’s testimony shall be 
required’. Nevertheless, the SCSL RPE do not contain a similar explicit 
provision. This may correspond to the fact that Judges may have realized that 
since there was in general no corroboration requirement, it was not necessary to 
insert a special provision.1285 In any case, rule 96 (i) has been applied in the case 
law of the ICTY and the ICTR.1286 For example, in Tadić, the Trial Chamber in 
commenting that rule concluded that it ‘accords to the testimony of a victim of 
sexual assault the same presumption of reliability as the testimony of victims of 
other crimes, something which had long been denied to victims of sexual assault 
in common law’.1287 In turn, the Trial Chamber in Kunarac et al. stated that rule 
96 overrules the requirement that exists or used to exist in some domestic 
jurisdictions according to which evidence of a rape complainant must be 
corroborated.1288 Rule 96 (i) is therefore a welcome addition, especially 
considering that, during war time, it is very unlikely that corroborative evidence 
such as blood, semen and other medical or physical evidence is/will be available 
as supporting evidence.1289         
Second, consent is not allowed as a defence if the victim has been subject 
to physical or psychological constraints, consent is thus vitiated by captivity.1290 
Rule 96 (ii) of the ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE provides for that:  
 
consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim 
(a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, 
duress, detention or psychological oppression, or 
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1284 ICTY RPE, rule 96; ICTR RPE, rule 96; SCSL RPE, rule 96. For a detailed discussion on these 
rules see Brouwer (2005) 260-269. 
1285 Schabas (2006) 497, footnote 274. 
1286 See, e.g., Tadić (IT-94-I-T), Opinion and Judgment, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, para. 536; 
Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber, 21 May 1999, 
para. 70.    
1287 Tadić (IT-94-I-T), Opinion and Judgment, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, paras. 535-539. See 
also, e.g., Musema (ICTR-96-13-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000.  
1288 Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, 
para. 566.  
1289 Kelly Askin, ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan 
Tribunals’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 97, 111.   
1290 Furundžija (IT-95-17/1), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, para. 271. 
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(b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so 
subjected, threatened or put in fear;  
 
  In Kunarac et al., the ICTY Trial Chamber criticized rule 96 (ii) as not 
being consistent with the traditional legal understanding of the concept of 
consent in rape as in domestic systems at which consent constitutes an aspect of 
the legal definition of rape, the absence of consent is actually an element of the 
offence.1291 The Chamber considered that the use of the word ‘defence’, which 
technically speaking implies the shifting of the burden of proof to the accused, ‘is 
inconsistent with this understanding’.1292 It seems to be that the accused does not 
need to prove the existence of consent but rather the Prosecutor has to prove the 
lack of consent; however, this will generally speaking be quite obvious in the 
context of a sexual crime trial. In any case, in Kunarac et al., the judges requested 
that the issue of absence of consent was brought up in spite of the coercive 
circumstances determined by the Prosecutor. Paying attention to the findings in 
Kunarac et al.,1293 the respective provisions of the SCSL RPE were formulated 
differently and indeed are identical to the corresponding provisions in the ICC 
RPE.1294 Be that as it may, the ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE call for a special 
hearing or voir dire to be held prior to evidence of the victim’s consent is 
admitted. Accordingly, the accused is required to ‘satisfy the Trial Chamber in 
camera that the evidence is relevant and credible’.1295 This provision was 
removed from the SCSL RPE and is not present in the ICC RPE. The importance 
of the existence of a consent rule consists in, among other reasons, the fact that 
questions concerning non-consent will most likely originate that victims become 
reluctant to come forward as witnesses, which in turn will become an obstacle to 
achieve justice for sexual crime victims. It should also be borne in mind that 
posing the question of consent may give the impression that the victim is not 
believed and, hence, consented.       
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1291 Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, 
para. 463. 
1292 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1293 See Schabas (2006) 497. 
1294 SCSL RPE, rule 96 (‘(i) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a 
victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment 
undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent;  (ii) Consent cannot be 
inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving 
genuine consent;  (iii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance 
by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence’.). 
1295 ICTY RPE, rule 96 (iii); ICTR RPE, rule 96 (iii). 
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Third, the victim’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct is inadmissible. 
Rule 96 (iv) of the ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE states that ‘prior sexual conduct 
of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence’. This rule, commonly known as 
the ‘rape shield’ provision, has been adopted in many national systems in order 
to prevent oppressive cross-examination of sexual crime victims.1296 Thus, rule 
96 (iv) addresses an unfair stereotype according to which a sexually active 
woman is presumed to have consented to the sexual activity upon which the 
prosecution is based. The inadmissibility of the victim’s prior or subsequent 
sexual conduct, considering the nature of the crimes prosecuted before these 
tribunals, responds to the fact that admission of such evidence would ‘lead to a 
confusion of the issues’ essentially trying ‘to call the reputation of the victim into 
question’ and would only bring ‘further distress and emotional damage to the 
witness’.1297 For example, in Delalić et al., the Trial Chamber ordered a reference 
to a prior sexual conduct of a witness to be removed from the record, noting the 
need for protection of the witnesses’ privacy and the necessary balance between 
those considerations and the principle of public proceedings.1298 Rule 96 (iv) of 
the SCSL RPE addresses the issue under discussion in this paragraph but in 
somewhat a different way. Nevertheless, it has been said to have the same 
practical effect than the ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE.1299     
An important reason to have special evidentiary rules in cases of sexual 
violence cases is that because of ‘fear of reprisals, retraumatization and feelings 
of shame’, victims are generally reluctant to appear as witnesses before the 
tribunals.1300 Moreover, as Schabas points out, those rules seek ‘to counteract a 
variety of abuses and stereotypes that have long hampered the effective 
prosecution of [sexual violence] crimes’.1301 It should be mentioned that rules 96 
(ii) and 96 (iii) are seemingly more victim-friendly than the equivalent 
provisions in the ICC Statute as they contain a more firm language ‘consent shall 
not be allowed as a defence if’ in contrast to the Chamber ‘shall be guided by 
principles (a) to (d)’. Indeed, rule 96 initially did not allow a defence of consent 
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1296 Schabas (2006) 498. 
1297 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for the Redaction of the Public 
Record, Trial Chamber, 5 June 1997, para. 48; Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Judgment, Trial 
Chamber, 16 November 1998, para. 70. 
1298 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for the Redaction of the Public 
Record, Trial Chamber, 5 June 1997. 
1299 Schabas (2006) 499. 
1300 See Khan and Dixon (2009) 802.  
1301 Schabas (2006) 496. 
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at all but, due to fair trial concerns, it was amended in order not to exclude 
completely the possibility for the defence to raise the issue of consent.1302    
 Lastly, but equally important, it should be borne in mind that protective 
measures can be augmented or lifted,1303 which is important as the security 
situation of a victim as a witness may change throughout time. As for 
augmenting protective measures, the applying party must on the preponderance 
of probabilities demonstrate that the witness is in need of such additional 
protection.1304 As for lifting protective measures, factors include: i) no need to 
maintain the original protective measures in the light of the time passed since 
the testimony; ii) witness’s willingness; and iii) the need to use the protected 
information in forthcoming contempt proceedings for disclosure of protective 
information.1305 Unlike the ICTR RPE and the SCSL RPE, the ICTY RPE 
explicitly establish that the competent Chamber via the VWS shall ensure that 
‘the protected victim or witness has given consent to the rescission, variation, or 
augmentation of protective measures’ but on exceptional circumstances the 
Chamber may ‘order proprio motu the rescission, variation, or augmentation of 
protective measures in the absence of such consent’.1306  
 
3.3. The ICC  
3.3.1. Protective Measures   
3.3.1.1. Presentation 
As a preliminary point, it should be left clear that protective and special 
measures at the ICC can be granted not only to victims who are witnesses but 
also those who take the stand before the ICC as victim participants as indicated 
in the text of the ICC, and the travaux préparatoires.1307 Article 68 (1) of the ICC 
Statute states that: 
 
The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so 
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1302 Brouwer (2005) 267.  
1303 ICTY RPE, rule 75 (D); ICTR RPE, rule 75 (F)-(J); SCSL RPE, rule 75 (F)-(J).  
1304 Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T-615), Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motion for Additional 
Protective Measures for Witness TF1-395, Trial Chamber, 3 October 2008, p. 3. 
1305 Blaškić (IT-95-14), Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Variance of Protective Measures in 
the Prosecutor v. Seselj & Margetic Case, Appeals Chamber, 24 January 2006.   
1306 ICTY RPE, rule 75 (J). 
1307 See, e.g., article 68 of the ICC Statute refers to the ‘Protection of the victims and witnesses’. As 
for the discussions at the Rome Conference on this issue see: ‘Canada: proposal regarding article 
68’, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.58/Rev.1 and A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.58/Rev.1 (6 
July 1998).  
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doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender 
as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in 
particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender 
violence or violence against children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures 
particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These 
measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused and a fair and impartial trial.   
 
  Since article 68 (1) is broadly framed, the ICC judges are free to propose 
protective measures not specifically authorized under the ICC RPE.1308 These 
measures, in general, involve an order preventing release to the public, press and 
information agencies of the identity of the victim or witness in question.1309 As 
established under article 68 (2), these measures ‘[are] an exception to the 
principle of public hearings’ and, thus, a Chamber ‘may, to protect victims and 
witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow 
the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means’.   
As for the ICC RPE, while rules 87 and 88 deal with measures that the 
ICC may order to facilitate the testimony of victims and witnesses before it, they 
actually serve different purposes.1310 This delineation of functions was contained 
in the Australian RPE proposal,1311 and reflected in the current ICC RPE. While 
protective measures (rule 87) would apply when seeking to protect the identity 
or location of a victim or witness or another person at risk from the public or 
media, special measures (rule 88) would be more flexible and, hence, allow the 
ICC to design measures to facilitate the testimony of certain vulnerable victims 
and witness. The latter is examined later. It is important, however, to mention 
that not only special measures but also protective measures can be ordered for 
the presentation of evidence of traumatized and vulnerable witnesses as 
determined by the ICC.1312 For example, in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, 19 
Prosecution witnesses and two victim participants, called as witnesses upon 
request of the legal representative of the main group of victim participants, 
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1308 Schabas (2010) 824. 
1309 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1310 Helen Brady, ‘Protective and Special Measures for Victims and Witnesses’ in Lee (2001a) 434, 
440. 
1311 Proposal submitted by Australia, PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP. 19 (26 July 1999).  
1312 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1140), Decision on Various Issues Related to Witness’ Testimony 
During Trial, Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2008, para. 35. See also Lubanga, (ICC-01/04-01/06-
1119), 18 January 2008, para. 128. 
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received in-court protective measures pursuant to rules 87 and 88.1313 Also, when 
determining whether to grant protective or special measures, the ICC Chambers 
may hold in camera proceedings.1314  
Lastly, but equally important, it should be added that once protective 
(and also special) measures are ordered, they ‘shall continue to have full force 
and effect’ concerning other ICC proceedings and ‘shall continue after 
proceedings have been concluded, subject to revision by a Chamber’.1315 
Moreover, the Chamber needs to ‘seek to obtain, whenever possible, the consent 
of the person in respect of whom the application to rescind, vary or augment 
protective measures has been made’.1316 
  
3.3.1.2. Legal Discussion 
With regard to protective measures, rule 87 (1) allows a Chamber to order them 
either proprio motu or at request of the Prosecutor, the defence, a witness or a 
victim or his/her legal representative, if any. During the drafting of this rule, 
there was some debate about the reference to legal representative of a witness.1317 
It was finally agreed that there is no obligation to provide legal representative for 
a victim who appears as a witness; however, if the witness has his/her own legal 
representative, the legal representative may request a protective measure on the 
witness’s behalf.1318 Thus, the expression ‘a witness or a victim or his or her legal 
representative, if any’, in rule 87, sub-rules 1 and 2 (b)-(d) recognizes this 
possibility. The VWU is not mentioned explicitly as possessing a ‘standing’ to 
request a protective measure, but it has only a ‘consultative status’. This may be 
criticized as that unit is normally the best place to make such a request since it is 
more familiar with the witnesses’ situation and ‘not yet coloured by having a 
stake in the proceedings’.1319   
The procedure to request a protective measure as set out under rule 87 
(2) is clear. First, a motion or request cannot be submitted ex parte. Second, a 
 
1313 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tEng), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 
Trial Chamber, 18 December 2012, para. 23, footnotes 43 and 44. 
1314 See respectively ICC RPE, rules 87 (3) and 88 (2). 
1315 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 42 (1). 
1316 Ibid., regulation 42 (4). As for variation of protective measures see also Banda (ICC-02/05-
03/09-368), Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application for Variation of Protective Measures 
Pursuant to Regulation 42 of the Regulations of the Court by Lifting Certain Redactions 
Authorised Pursuant to Rule 81 (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, Trial Chamber IV, 13 
July 2012, paras. 6-9.  
1317 See Brady (2001a) 441. 
1318 See Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1319 Ibid., 442. 
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witness or a victim applying for a protective measure serves the request on the 
Prosecutor and the defence, who may respond to it. Third, a motion or request 
affecting a particular victim or witness must be served on that person, as well as 
the other party, and each may respond. Fourth, there is a procedure when the 
Chamber proceeds on its own initiative. Fifth, the motion or request, and any 
responses, can be filed under seal. The prohibition on ex parte applications 
under rule 87 is explained by its nature and purpose, i.e., this rule deals with 
measures vis-à-vis the accused or his/her counsel, or, conversely vis-à-vis the 
Prosecutor. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that exceptional circumstances 
may make necessary to order a protective order on an ex parte basis. This is, for 
example, the case when accused’s lawyers or family members threaten the victim 
or witness.1320 Rule 88 on special measures is, however, flexible enough to allow 
the Prosecutor or witness to make an ex parte application to request the ICC to 
order, as a ‘special measure’, a protective measure. Such approach presents the 
advantage to keep the general rule, i.e., prohibition of ex parte applications for 
protective measures and, at the same time, it enables the ICC ‘to engineer the 
most suitable measures, based on the circumstances of a case before it, including 
allowing an ex parte application in extreme cases’.1321  
Requests for protective measures at the ICC have to be based on 
objective grounds, such as actual threats. Accordingly, personal beliefs as to the 
existence of threats or subjective fears may be considered by the ICC, but they 
are insufficient by themselves to grant protective measures.1322 Additionally, the 
ICC in Lubanga pointed out that decisions involving the provision of protective 
measures are necessarily fact-specific and, hence, no uniform model of decision-
making can apply for all cases.1323 In determining appropriate protective 
measures, the VWU assessed ‘the level of any threat, the likelihood of harm and 
the overall risk to the particular applicant; and then [considered] each 
application on its individual merits, on a fact-sensitive rather than a mechanical 
or formulistic basis’.1324 As for the test of a ‘high likelihood of harm’, applied by 
the VWU, the Chamber considered that it ‘should be interpreted in a sufficiently 
flexible and purposive manner to ensure proper protection for any witness who, 
following careful investigation, faces an established danger of harm or death’.1325  
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1320 Ibid., 444. 
1321 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1322 See OSCE-ODIHR/ICTY/UNICRI, Victims & Witnesses (2011) 36.  
1323 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1311-Anx 2), Decision on Disclosure Issues, Responsibility for 
Protective Measures and other Procedural Matters, Trial Chamber, 24 April 2008, para. 77.  
1324 Ibid., para. 78. 
1325 Ibid., para. 79. 
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According to the ICC’s emerging case law, protective measures must be 
necessary and proportionate, as well as subject to the accused’s right to a fair 
trial.1326 Hence, necessity and witness security are the requirements for granting 
protective measures.1327 Necessity requires the existence of an established danger 
of harm or death (based on evidence),1328 and that protective measures are not 
‘routinely granted’.1329 Although the ICC has considered the public character of 
the proceedings as fundamental,1330 it has sometimes made exceptions to the 
principle of public hearings considering the witnesses’ protective needs.1331         
 It is important to mention that both article 68 and rules 87 and 88 are 
open-ended. This feature takes into account the wide range of individual rights 
of witnesses and victims, i.e., ‘safety, physical and psychological well being, 
privacy and dignity’; the different kinds of circumstances before the ICC; and 
new technological developments that may arise in the future and which the ICC 
may use.1332 Among ‘appropriate’ protective measures, these may first include the 
filing of proceedings under seal.1333 Second, participants in the proceedings may 
be prohibited by the Chamber from disclosing information leading to the 
identification of the protected persons to a third party.1334  
Third, the Chamber can order that the name or other information that 
could lead to identification of the protected person be expunged from the 
 
1326 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1795-Red), Décision Prononçant des Mesures 
de Protection au Profit du Témoin 323 lors de sa Déposition à l'audience - Version Publique 
Expurgée, Trial Chamber II, 27 January 2010, para. 6; Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-
01/07-1667-Red), Ordonnance Relative aux Mesures de Protection de Certains Témoins Cités à 
Comparaître par le Procureur et par la Chambre (règles 87 et 88 du Règlement de procédure et de 
preuve), Trial Chamber II, 9 December 2009, para. 6. 
1327 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1372), Decision on the Prosecution's Application for an Order 
Governing Disclosure of Non-public Information to Members of the Public and an order 
Regulating Contact with Witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 3 June 2008, para.8. 
1328 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1557), Decision on the Prosecution and Defence Applications for 
Leave to Appeal the Trial Chamber's "Decision on Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for Protective 
Measures and other Procedural Matters, Trial Chamber I, 16 December 2008, para. 27.  
1329 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 24 March 2009, p. 63. 
1330 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-701), Order on the reclassification as public of documents ICC-
01/05-01/08-498-Conf and ICC-01/05-01/08-503-Conf, Appeals Chamber, 24 February 2010; 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1667-Red), 9 December 2009, para. 4.  
1331 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 16 January 2009, pp. 3-4.  
1332 Brady (2001a) 446.  
1333 ICC RPE, rules 87 (2) and 88 (4). See also Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(ICC-01/04), Judgement on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
Entitled ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’, Appeals 
Chamber, 13 July 2006, paras. 21-23.     
1334 ICC RPE, rule 87 (3) (b).  
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record.1335 In Abu Garda, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided that the identity of the 
witness could be kept confidential vis-à-vis the public and media by expunging 
the name and address of the witness from the public records.1336 Not disclosing 
victims’ identities to the public and media was understood in Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui during pre-trial as a way to minimize the risk faced by them by 
participating in proceedings.1337 However, the interest of the accused’s right to 
due process guarantees increases during the trial phase. Thus, in Lubanga, 
redactions ‘were reviewed by the Chamber and some were lifted during the 
course of the trial’ until further disclosure was no more possible ‘under the 
present circumstances’.1338 Due to concerns for witnesses’ personal safety or that 
of their families, many witnesses, in the judgment in Lubanga, are referred to by 
number rather than by name and certain details that might reveal their identity 
were omitted.1339 Nevertheless, the parties and participants were aware of the 
relevant identifying information.1340 These considerations were also adopted by 
Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui.1341  
Fourth, a Chamber may order that the testimony be given by electronic 
or other special means, whereby the image or voice is distorted.1342 In Lubanga, 
three dual status victims, who testified in January 2010, were granted in-court 
protective measures that included voice and face distortion and pseudonyms.1343 
Also, for example, in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber II determined 
that witnesses’ images and voices were distorted before being publicly broadcast 
due to the harassment suffered by other witnesses upon their return to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the fear by the witnesses benefited in 
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1335 Ibid., rule 87 (3) (a).  
1336 Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), Public Redacted Version of ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Protective Measures Dated 22 September 2009’, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 9 October 
2009, p. 4.  
1337 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/047-01/07-474), Decision on the Set of Procedural Rules 
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
(Single Judge), 13 May 2008, paras. 20-22.  
1338 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 
14 March 2012, para. 117.   
1339 Ibid., para 115. 
1340 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1341 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG), 18 December 2012, paras. 63 and 65.  
1342 ICC RPE, rule 87 (3) (c). As for case law, see Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-
2663-Red), Decision on the Application for the Institution of Protective Measures for Witnesses 
a/0381/09, a/0018/09, pan/0363/09 and Victim a/0363/09, Issued on 27 January 2011, Trial 
Chamber II, 22 February 2011. 
1343 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 
14 March 2012, para. 21.  
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this decision of suffering similar targeting.1344 When the possibility for the ICC to 
use electronic means for testimony was first suggested, it was considered that 
such measure would be used ‘when the witness is not able to attend the Court 
due to illness, injury, age or other justifiable reason’.1345 Rule 67 (1) establishes 
that such testimony can only be authorized when it permits the witness to be 
examined by the Prosecutor, the defence, and by the Chamber although victims 
or their representatives are not mentioned. It is also specified that facilities 
selected for that testimony must be ‘conducive to the giving of truthful and open 
testimony and to the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and 
privacy of the witness’.1346 The Trial Chamber in Lubanga has determined that 
evidence given via video link is ‘generally enjoined to protect the psychological 
well-being and dignity of its witnesses, subject to the fundamental dictates of a 
fair trial’.1347 The ICC case law has consistently found that the determination of 
whether or not a witness may be allowed to give viva voice (oral) testimony 
through video technology is connected with the witness’s personal 
circumstances, including the well-being of a witness.1348  
Fifth, a Chamber may order that a pseudonym be used for the 
witness.1349 Trial Chamber I, in Lubanga, granted a Prosecutor’s application to 
have the voice and images distorted as well as to employ pseudonyms for twenty 
protected witnesses.1350  
Sixth, a Chamber may order proceedings to be held in camera.1351 
Measures such as proceedings in camera or permitting the presentation of 
evidence by electronic or other special means is facilitated by article 68 (2) of the 
ICC Statute:   
 
As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in article 67, the 
Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, 
conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of 
evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures shall 
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1344 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2663-Red), 22 February 2011, para. 15. 
1345 Preparatory Committee Final Draft, p. 109, fn. 14.   
1346 ICC RPE, rule 67 (3). See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), 29 January 2008, para. 41.  
1347 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2285-Red), Redacted Decision on the Defence Request for a 
Witness to Give Evidence Via Video-Link, Trial Chamber I, 9 February 2010, para. 15.  
1348 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2101), Public Redacted Decision on the “Prosecution Request to 
Hear Witness CAR-OTP-PPPP-0036’s Testimony Via Video-link”, Trial Chamber III, 3 February 
2012, para. 7. See also, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2285-Red), 9 February 2010, para. 16. 
1349 ICC RPE, rule 87 (3) (d).  
1350 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 16 January 2009, pp. 1-5.  
1351 ICC RPE, rule 87 (3) (e).   
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be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence or a child who is a 
victim or a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, having regard to all 
the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness.  
 
This provision allows a departure from the normal course of ‘public 
hearings’ in order to protect victims and witnesses, when it is necessary, 
including ‘special measures’ such as reading partially or totally a witness’s 
statement in open court or in private provided that, as the ICC has pointed out, 
‘these steps do not detract from the fairness of the proceedings’.1352 For example, 
in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, the Chamber ordered closed sessions when 
certain witnesses would enter and exit the courtroom and when potentially 
identifying questions would be put to them.1353 However, the interest of the 
accused’s right to a public hearing grows stronger during the trial phase. Thus, 
for instance, the Trial Chamber in Lubanga stated that it would review 
applications concerning protective measures, including the use of closed 
sessions, based on an individual analysis.1354 Be that as it may, during the trial in 
Lubanga, testimony was frequently heard in ‘private session’, which the public 
was thus unable to follow, but also the Chamber ordered the public 
reclassification of any portions that do not contain information which may 
create a security risk.1355 Trial Chamber II followed the same approach in 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui.1356 In any case, as noticed by Schabas, instead of 
being an exception to the rule, ‘restriction on the principle of public hearings 
seems to be the rule’.1357 As previously commented,1358 the excessive or too 
frequent use of in camera hearings is criticized as goes in detriment of the 
principle of public hearings, which is an important component of the accused’s 
rights as acknowledged by article 67 (1) of the ICC Statute ‘In the determination 
of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard to 
the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially and to the 
following minimum guarantees in full equality […]’.  
Seventh, documents pertaining to the Prosecution may be classified as 
confidential in order to protect, inter alia, the psychological well-being, dignity 
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1352 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), 15 January 2009, para. 17. 
1353 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2663-Red), 22 February 2011, para. 15. 
1354 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1140), 29 January 2008, paras. 25 and 35.  
1355 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para 116. 
1356 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG), 18 December 2012, para. 64.  
1357 Schabas (2010) 825. 
1358 See supra Chapter III 3.2.2.  
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and privacy of the witness, in accordance with article 68 (1) of the ICC Statute as 
determined in Bemba.1359 Nevertheless, the Chamber in the same case paid 
special attention to strike a balance between the protection of a witness and the 
Chamber’s duty to ensure the publicity of the proceedings as enshrined in 
articles 64 (7) and 67 (1) of the ICC Statute.1360 Bearing in mind that the 
provision of non-public information is governed by the principles of necessity 
and witness security, this kind of information should only be shown to members 
of the public if it is truly necessary for the preparation and presentation of the 
case of a party or participant.1361 The Trial Chamber in Lubanga listed as 
additional examples of protective measures that ‘iii) a witness should be able to 
control his or her testimony, and, if so, to what extent; iv) breaks in the evidence 
should be allowed as and when requested; v) a witness can require that a 
particular language is used’.1362  
It is necessary to bear in mind that although the obligation to identify, 
protect and respect the well-being and dignity of witnesses lies mainly with the 
party or participant calling the witness, the other party, participants and the ICC 
hold responsibilities in this regard.1363 Indeed, the importance of protective 
measures for victims and witnesses definitively lies on their nature as ‘the legal 
means by which the Court can secure participation of victims in the 
proceedings’.1364 However, these measures shall be fact specific and, hence, no 
uniform model of decision-making can apply to all cases, as already 
mentioned.1365 What it is even more important is how to reach the appropriate 
balance concerning the intrinsic tension between protective measures for 
victims/witnesses and the rights of the accused. The ICC Statute explicitly gives 
prevalence of the latter over the former as laid down in article 68 (1) of the ICC 
Statute which establishes that ‘These measures shall not be prejudicial or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial’. The 
ICC Statute thus reflects the trend in international criminal procedure whereby 
whereas adoption of protective measures in favour of victims/witnesses at 
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1359 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2101), 3 February 2012, para. 12.  
1360 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1361 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1372), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for an Order 
Governing Disclosure of Non-Public Information to Members of the Public and an Order 
Regulating Contact with Witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 3 June 2008, paras. 8-9.  
1362 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1140), 29 January 2008, para. 35. 
1363 Ibid., para. 36.  
1364 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 128-129.   
1365 Lubanga (ICC-01/04/06-1311-Anx 2), Decision on Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for 
Protective Measures and other Procedural Matters, Trial Chamber I, 24 April 2008, para. 77.    
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different stages of the proceedings has to be taken into account, these cannot 
justify (serious) restrictions to the rights of the accused as these are not only 
human rights of the accused but also ‘part and parcel of the epistemological 
mechanism for fact finding in criminal proceedings’.1366  
This delicate balance is also exemplified when it comes to restrictions on 
disclosure. Although rule 81 (4) (‘Restrictions on Disclosure’) orders the 
Chamber to take, inter alia, ‘necessary steps’ to protect witnesses and members 
of their families, ICC case law has appropriately emphasized that when less 
restrictive protective measures are sufficient and feasible, a Chamber must 
choose those measures over more restrictive measures.1367 This evidences that 
protective measures should solely restrict the accused’s rights only as long as 
necessary.1368  
Redactions of victims’ applications have also being decided, for example, 
in the Uganda situation where the Prosecutor and the defence were given a 
redacted copy of the victims’ applications, expunging any information that may 
identify applicants.1369 The use of summary evidence pursuant to article 68 (5) of 
the ICC Statute has been considered as primarily a witness protection measure 
because it allows the Prosecutor not to divulge the witnesses’ identities prior to 
the confirmation hearing provided that it is used in a manner not inconsistent 
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.1370  
In any case, according to article 68 (5) of the ICC Statute and rule 81 (4) 
of the ICC RPE, the non-disclosure of the identity of victims or witnesses is only 
applicable to the proceedings prior to the commencement of the trial.1371 This 
point is examined in further detail when discussing anonymity prior to trial.1372 
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1366 Salvatore Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’ (2010) 8 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 137, 145. 
1367 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-773), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled ‘First Decision on the Prosecution Requests 
and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81’, Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2006, 
para. 33. 
1368 Tochilovsky (2008) 221.   
1369 Although this Decision adopted the 1 February 2007 is not public, references to it can be found 
in Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-101), Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation 
a/0010/06 , a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II (Single Judge), 10 August 2007, paras. 2 and 3. 
1370 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-773), 14 December 2006, paras. 44, 54 and 51.   
1371 Article 68 (5) reads as follows: ‘Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to 
this Statute may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her family, 
the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of 
the trial, withhold such evidence or information and instead submit a summary thereof. Such 
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3.3.2. Special Measures  
As previously mentioned, special measures primarily seek to protect certain 
vulnerable witnesses and victims. Article 68 places a special emphasis on victims 
of sexual or gender violence, or violence against children. Thus, article 68 (1) 
states that the ICC ‘shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender 
[…] and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, 
where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against 
children’.1373 Thus, certain categories of victims and witnesses are identified to be 
in situations of extreme danger due to the nature of the crimes and their status. 
These two factors would assist in identifying ‘a particular group of victims, the 
survivors, who are always at risk of re-victimization’.1374 The Prosecutor is 
requested to take protective measures ‘particularly during the investigation and 
prosecution of such crimes’.1375 Such obligation is implemented by the use of 
personnel and investigators, who possess legal and psychological expertise on 
trauma and crime against women and children, as stated in other ICC Statute 
provisions.1376      
Paragraph 2 of article 68 of the ICC Statute is more specific by 
establishing that:  
 
In particular, such measures [‘conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or 
allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means’] shall be 
implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence or a child who is a victim 
or a witness.  
 
Special measures adopted in, for example, testimony of sexual violence 
victims constitute a limitation to the defence’s right to examine witnesses,1377 
which is explicitly stated under article 67 (1) as follows ‘[…] the accused shall be 
entitled […] (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her 
[…]’. Protective measures for sexual violence victims, including testimony via 
closed-circuit television, which prevents direct visual contact between witness 
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measures shall be exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
of the accused and a fair and impartial trial’.  
1372 See infra Chapter III 4.3.1. 
1373 See also, e.g., ICC RPE, rule 19 (g), which emphasizes the need for expertise on the elderly ‘in 
particular in connection with armed conflict and exile trauma’. For commentaries on the relevant 
factors referred to in article 68 (1), see Jones (2002) 1359-1361. 
1374 David Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 68’ in Triffterer (2008a) 1275, 1282.  
1375 ICC Statute, article 68 (1).  
1376 Ibid., articles 42 and 36 (8) (b).  
1377 Schabas (2008a) 1264.   
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and the accused, as well as support of the witness by a person who is close to 
him/her in the courtroom may be given in exceptional circumstances under 
article 68 (2) of the ICC Statute.1378 
Rule 88, a descendant of article 68 (2),1379 mainly enables the ICC to 
order ‘special measures’ including, but not limited to, ‘measures to facilitate the 
testimony of a traumatized victim or witness, a child, an elderly person or a 
victim of sexual violence, pursuant to article 68, paragraphs 1 and 2’.1380 For 
example, Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui stated that it would be 
‘particularly vigilant in preserving the psychological well-being and privacy of 
Victim a/0363/09, who is a minor’.1381 Be that as it may, the drafters of rule 88 
gave enough deal of flexibility to the ICC so that this can order necessary and 
appropriate measures tailored to the particular circumstances.1382 Indeed, in 
exercise of the Trial Chamber’s powers and functions as established in article 64, 
ICC’s case law has reassured to ensure the adoption of appropriate steps to 
guarantee the protection of victims and witnesses, ‘and particularly those who 
have suffered trauma or who are in a vulnerable situation’.1383     
Rule 88 allows a Chamber to order a special measure either on its own 
initiative or at the request of the Prosecutor, the defence, a witness or a victim or 
his/her legal representative, if any. Similar to rule 87, when rule 88 was drafted, it 
was concluded that the expression ‘a witness or a victim or his or her legal 
representative, if any’ acknowledges that although there is no obligation to 
provide legal representation for a victim appearing as a witness, under certain 
circumstances that person may have his/her own legal representative.1384  
As previously mentioned, rule 88 provides for that the ICC may order a 
special measure such as, but not limited to, measures to facilitate the testimony 
of ‘a traumatized victim or witness, a child, an elderly person or a victim of 
 
1378 See also Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 830. Article 68 (2) has been interpreted as introducing 
a presumption according to which sexual violence victims should testify in camera. This 
presumption may be overturned if they, for instance, decide to testify in public. See Brouwer 
(2005) 242-243.  
1379 Brady (2001a) 447.  
1380 ICC RPE, rule 88 (1).  
1381 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2663-Red), 22 February 2011, para. 15. For 
references to in-court protective measures in favour of women and adopted under rules 87 and 88, 
see, e.g., Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG), 18 December 2012, para. 23, footnotes 43 and 
44.   
1382 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2663-Red), 22 February 2011, para. 15.   
1383 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), 29 January 2008, para. 35.  
1384 See Brady (2001a) 447. 
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sexual violence’. Italy proposed adding disabled persons to this list.1385 In order 
to avoid re-opening a number of rules to add references to these special classes, 
Canada proposed what became rule 86 (‘general principle’),1386 a rule of general 
applicability, that also included the special needs of persons with disabilities 
when they appear as victims or witnesses before the ICC:  
 
A Chamber in making any direction or order, and other organs of the Court in 
performing their functions under the Statute or the Rules, shall take into 
account the needs of all victims and witnesses in accordance with article 68, in 
particular children, elderly persons, persons with disabilities and victims of 
sexual or gender violence.   
 
Similar to rule 87, the subject of a special measure should consent to it. 
Nevertheless, under rule 88 (1) this is not an absolute obligation as it is indicated 
that ‘The Chamber shall seek to obtain, whenever possible, the consent of the 
person in respect of whom the special measure is sought prior to ordering that 
measure’. Rule 88 contains a somewhat different proceeding for making an 
application for a special measure than the one set in rule 87 for applying for a 
protective measure as rule 88 allows an application for a special measure to be 
made, if necessary, on a ex parte basis or in camera or both.1387   
According to rule 88 (2), special measures may include, ‘but are not 
limited to, an order that a counsel, a legal representative, a psychologist or a 
family member is permitted to attend during the testimony of a traumatized 
victim or witness’, which is also applicable to a child, an elderly person or a 
victim of sexual violence.1388 Rule 88 (5) obliges the Chamber to be vigilant in 
controlling the manner of questioning witnesses to ‘avoid any harassment or 
intimidation, paying particular attention to attacks on victims of crimes of sexual 
violence’.1389 This is required insofar as ‘violations of the privacy of a witness or 
victim may create risk to his or her security’.1390 In connection with this rule, the 
Trial Chamber may order the parties and participants to disclose in advance the 
questions or the topics they seek to cover during their questioning in order to 
 
1385 See Rule 6 (29) (e) in PCNICC/2000/WGRPE (6)/DP.3 (13 March 2000).  
1386 See Brady (2001a) 448.  
1387 ICC RPE, rule 88 (2). In case of an inter partes application for a special measure, the procedure 
established in rule 87 (2) (b)-(d) is applicable.  
1388 See Brady (2001a) 449. 
1389 This aspect was contained in the 1999 Paris Seminar, as part of the Preparatory Commission 
work on RPE. See Proposal submitted by France, Commentary on document 
PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP.19 (PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP.34, 4 August 1999).  
1390 ICC RPE, rule 88 (5).  
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particularly protect traumatized or vulnerable witnesses.1391 Trial Chamber I in 
Lubanga identified as a possible measure that the testimony of vulnerable 
witnesses be treated as confidential and access to it ‘is to be limited to the parties 
and participants in the proceedings’.1392   
Since rule 68 deals with special measures to facilitate the giving of 
testimony by particularly vulnerable victims and witnesses, rule 68 (‘prior 
recorded testimony’) may be used together with an order under rule 88.1393 
Article 69 (2) and rule 68 allow the Trial Chamber the production of a witness’s 
recorded audio or video testimony, even when the Pre-Trial Chamber has not 
authorized this. Such exception to the principle of testimony in person is 
applicable when: i) the Prosecutor and the defence had the opportunity to 
examine the witness when the recording was made; ii) the prior recorded 
testimony goes to proof of a matter other than the accused’s acts and conduct; 
iii) the prior recorded testimony comes from a person who has subsequently 
died, must be presumed dead, or is, due to obstacles that cannot be overcome 
with reasonable diligence, unavailable to testify orally; iv) the prior recorded 
testimony comes from a person who has been subjected to interference; v) or if 
that witness is present before the Trial Chamber and does not object, subject to 
the right of the Prosecutor, the defence, and the Chamber to examine the 
witness.1394  
Previously recorded testimony may be introduced in lieu of ‘live’ 
evidence if there are some factors including that: i) the testimony relates to issues 
not materially in dispute; ii) it is not central to core issues in the case; and iii) it is 
corroborative of other evidence.1395 Additionally, measures adopted by the 
Chamber must not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the accused’s rights.1396 
Be that as it may, Trial Chamber I in Lubanga as for rule 68, adopted pursuant to 
article 69 (2) of the ICC Statute, said that it is: 
 
[…] directed at the ‘testimony of a witness’ in a broad sense, given that the 
various forms of testimony that are specifically included in the rule are audio- 
or video- records, transcripts or other documented evidence of ‘such’ testimony 
 
1391 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), 29 January 2008, para. 33. 
1392 Ibid., para. 35. 
1393 Brady (2001a) 455.  
1394 ICC RPE, rule 68 (amended version). See also ICC RPE, rule 68 (original version). 
1395 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-07-2289), Corrigendum to the Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony of Witness P-02 and 
Accompanying Video Excerpts, Trial Chamber II, 27 August 2010, para. 14.    
1396 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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[…] the ambit of Rule 68 permits the introduction of witness statements, in 
addition to video- or audio-taped records or transcripts, of a witness’s 
testimony because these are all clear examples of the ‘documented evidence’ of a 
witness’s testimony.1397   
 
The live questioning of a witness in open court has undeniable 
importance. However, under rule 68, which also permits the introduction of 
written statements,1398 having evidence read can also present important 
advantages as concluded by the ICC:  
 
21. […] since oral testimony is, for obvious reasons, of a different nature to a 
written statement: most importantly the evidence can be fully investigated and 
tested by questioning, and the Court is able to assess its accuracy, reliability and 
honesty, in part observing the demeanour of the witness. 
22. However, there can be equal material advantages in having evidence read, in 
whole or in part […] relevant examples are that it avoids witnesses 
unnecessarily repeating their evidence once it has been recorded. Furthermore, 
there is a real potential for war crimes trials to last an excessive period of time 
and the court is entitled to bear this issue in mind when weighing the possibility 
of receiving non-oral evidence.1399     
 
 Rule 68 also connects with rule 112 (4) (‘recording of questioning in 
particular cases’), which establishes that:   
 
the Prosecutor may choose to follow the procedure [of audio or video-recording 
the questioning of a person] […] when questioning other persons, in particular 
where the use of such procedures would assist in reducing any subsequent 
traumatisation of a victim of sexual or gender violence, a child or a person with 
disabilities in providing their evidence. The Prosecutor may make an 
application to the relevant Chamber.      
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1397 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1603), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for the 
Admission of the Prior Recorded Statements of two Witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 15 January 2009, 
para. 18. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1399), Decision on the Admissibility of Four 
Documents, Trial Chamber I, 13 June 2008, para. 22. 
1398 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1603), 15 January 2009, para. 18. 
1399 Ibid., paras. 21 and 22; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-886), Decision on the “Prosecution 
Application for Leave to Submit in Writing Prior-Recorded Testimonies by CAR-0TP-WWWW-
0032, CAR-OTP-WWWW-0080, and CAR-OTP-WWWW-0108, Trial Chamber III, 16 September 
2010, para. 5. 
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At this point, it should be added that the VWU in Bemba adopted a 
‘Protocol on the Vulnerability Assessment and Support Procedure Used to 
Facilitate the Testimony of Vulnerable Witnesses’ to be able to consider 
vulnerable witnesses’ needs,1400 which has been followed in other cases.1401 
Vulnerable witnesses are defined as those who face an increased risk to: ‘a. Suffer 
psychological harm through the process of testifying and/or b. Experience 
psychosocial or physical difficulties, which affect their ability to testify’.1402 This 
Protocol also notes that witness’ vulnerability can be determined by factors 
relating to the nature of the crime, i.e., sexual violence, violence against children, 
and crimes involving excessive violence.1403          
It is necessary to mention that protective, and arguably special measures, 
remain in force in relation to other ICC proceedings and continue after they 
have been concluded, subject to revision by a Chamber.1404       
Special evidentiary rules applicable in sexual violence crimes are also 
included in the ICC RPE. First, under rule 63 (4), the general principle of non- 
corroboration is complemented with a specific emphasis on sexual crimes as 
follows ‘a Chamber shall not impose a legal requirement that corroboration is 
required in order to prove any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, in 
particular, crimes of sexual violence’.1405 This emphasis was added considering 
that victims of sexual violence in many national systems were often treated 
differently from victims of other crimes.1406 Rule 63 (4) highlights the point that a 
sexual crime victim is as reliable a witness as any other crime witness, which is 
coherent with the equality and principle of non-discrimination stated under 
article 21 (3) of the ICC Statute. Rule 63 (3) has to be read and applied in 
connection with rules on relevance or admissibility of evidence, especially, article 
69 (4) of the ICC Statute. Thus, when there is relevant, credible and probative 
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1400 Bemba (ICC-ICC-01/05-01/08-974-Anx2), Protocol on the Vulnerability Assessment and 
Support Procedure Used to Facilitate the Testimony of Vulnerable Witnesses, Registrar, 25 
October 2010. 
1401 E.g., Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-93-Anx2), Protocol on the Vulnerability Assessment and 
Support Procedure Used to Facilitate the Testimony of Vulnerable Witnesses, Registrar, 16 April 
2012. 
1402 Bemba (ICC-ICC-01/05-01/08-974-Anx2), 25 October 2010, para. 5. 
1403 Ibid., para. 6. See also Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 849.  
1404 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 42.  
1405 ICC RPE, rule 63 (4).  
1406 See Donald Piragoff, ‘Evidence’ in Lee (2001) 349, 355. Rule 63 (4) came from the Australian 
proposal. See PCNICC/1999/DP.1 (26 January 1999), rule 101 (i). See also a proposal by Costa 
Rica, PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP.3 (24 February 1999).  
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evidence on a sexual crime from a single victim, an accused may be convicted as 
corroboration is not required.     
Second, under rule 70 of the ICC RPE:   
 
(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive 
environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine 
consent; 
(b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent; 
(c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance 
by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence;  
  
This evidentiary rule is quite important insofar as seeks to prevent any 
misinterpretation of certain actions by victims and witnesses of sexual crimes, 
which took place in oppressive and extreme circumstances ever present in sexual 
violence scenarios. In turn, rule 72 provides for that in case a party wants to 
introduce or elicit, including by means of the questioning of the victim or 
witness, evidence that the victim consented to an alleged crime of sexual 
violence, an in camera procedure will be held to establish whether that evidence 
is relevant or admissible.1407 The victim is not present during the in camera 
procedure, which protects the victim from confrontation with painful statements 
that have not been previously tested.1408 Moreover, this rule seeks to protect 
sexual crime victims from a painful examination when consent should not be an 
 
1407 ICC RPE, rule 72 (‘1. Where there is an intention to introduce or elicit, including by means of 
the questioning of a victim or witness, evidence that the victim consented to an alleged crime of 
sexual violence, or evidence of the words, conduct, silence or lack of resistance of a victim or 
witness as referred to in principles (a) through (d) of rule 70, notification shall be provided to the 
Court which shall describe the substance of the evidence intended to be introduced or elicited and 
the relevance of the evidence to the issues in the case.  2. In deciding whether the evidence referred 
to in sub-rule 1 is relevant or admissible, a Chamber shall hear in camera the views of the 
Prosecutor, the defence, the witness and the victim or his or her legal representative, if any, and 
shall take into account whether that evidence has a sufficient degree of probative value to an issue 
in the case and the prejudice that such evidence may cause, in accordance with article 69, 
paragraph 4. For this purpose, the Chamber shall have regard to article 21, paragraph 3, and 
articles 67 and 68, and shall be guided by principles (a) to (d) of rule 70, especially with respect to 
the proposed questioning of a victim.  3. Where the Chamber determines that the evidence 
referred to in sub-rule 2 is admissible in the proceedings, the Chamber shall state on the record the 
specific purpose for which the evidence is admissible. In evaluating the evidence during the 
proceedings, the Chamber shall apply principles (a) to (d) of rule 70’.). 
1408 Brouwer (2005) 266-267. 
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issue at all and, at the same time, allows the accused’s right to bring evidence of 
consent in cases where consent is relevant. When it is intended to introduce or 
elicit victim’s consent of an alleged sexual crime, the Chamber must hear in 
camera the views of the Prosecutor, the defence, the witness and the victim or 
his/her legal representative, if any, and has to take into consideration ‘whether 
that evidence has a sufficient degree of probative value to an issue in the case and 
the prejudice that such evidence may cause’.1409 Even if the Chamber determines 
the evidence as admissible, it ‘shall state on the record the specific purpose for 
which the evidence is admissible’.1410 It should also be mentioned that since the 
ICC has not included consent as an element of the crime of rape or any of the 
other sexual crimes, the Prosecutor can focus on the coercive environment and 
also prevent the issue of consent from being raised.1411    
Third, subject to article 69 (4),1412 under rule 71 of the ICC RPE, 
evidence of prior or subsequent sexual conduct of a victim or a witness shall not 
be admitted by the Chamber.1413 Additionally, rule 70 of the ICC RPE reads as 
follows ‘Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim 
or witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior or 
subsequent conduct of a victim or witness’. Rule 71 acknowledges the 
presumption that prior or subsequent sexual conduct cannot be admitted into 
evidence, which is in accordance with the equality and principle of non-
discrimination under article 21 of the ICC Statute.1414 Unlike the ICTY RPE and 
the ICTR RPE, the ICC RPE do not completely prohibit the introduction of 
evidence of prior or subsequent sexual conduct. Thus, the reference to article 69 
(4) in rule 71, i.e., the potential, exceptional admission of previous or subsequent 
sexual conduct of the victim, may be considered as not fortunate as that sort of 
evidence should never be admissible.1415 
Those special evidentiary rules and, in general, special, protective 
measures in cases of sexual violence at the ICC and the other international and 
hybrid criminal courts arguably constitute an area in international criminal 
justice at which international human rights law has influenced in order to 
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1409 ICC RPE, rule 72 (2).  
1410 Ibid., rule 72 (3).  
1411 Brouwer (2005) 266. 
1412 ‘The Court may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, 
inter alia, the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a 
fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness […]’.  
1413 ICC RPE, rule 71.  
1414 Brouwer (2005) 268. 
1415 Ibid., 269. 
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protect those victims from re-victimization or secondary victimization. Indeed, 
the case law of the IACtHR, applying the ACHR and the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women (‘Convention of Belem Do Para’), in the context of serious human rights 
violations, has drawn particular attention to the sexual violence victims’ right to 
be heard in criminal proceedings. As noticed by Salmón Gárate, under the 
approach adopted by the IACtHR, sexual violence victims have been given a 
differentiated treatment when being heard by a public authority in criminal 
proceedings.1416 Thus, the IACtHR, taking into account the Guidelines for 
Medico-Legal Care for Victims of Sexual Violence adopted by the World Health 
Organization and the Istanbul Protocol adopted by the UN Human Rights 
Commissioner according to which States have an enhanced obligation to 
investigate cases of violence against women with due diligence,1417 has identified 
inter alia the following guidelines and requirements in the course of sexual 
violence criminal proceedings: 
 
[…] i) the victim’s statement should be taken in a safe and comfortable 
environment, providing privacy and inspiring confidence; ii) the victim’s 
statement should be recorded to avoid the need to repeat it, or to limit this to 
the strictly necessary; iii) the victim should be provided with medical, 
psychological and hygienic treatment, both on an emergency basis, and 
continuously if required, under a protocol for such attention aimed at reducing 
the consequences of the rape; iv) a complete and detailed medical and 
psychological examination should be made immediately by appropriate trained 
personnel, of the sex preferred by the victim insofar as this is possible, and the 
victim should be informed that she can be accompanied by a person of 
confidence if she so wishes; […] and vi) access to advisory services or, if 
applicable, free legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings should be 
provided.1418      
 
The delicate balance between the rights of the accused and special 
measures ordered for vulnerable victims and witnesses as seen in this sub-section 
characterizes the ICC’s legal framework and practice. It is herein concluded that 
the adoption of special measures has to be adopted following a thorough case-
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1416 Salmón Gárate and Blanco (2012) 117. 
1417 IACtHR, Case of Fernández-Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of 30 August 2010, Series C No. 215, para. 193.  
1418 Ibid., para. 194. See also IACtHR, Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. V. Mexico, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of 31 August 2010, Series C No. 216, para. 
178.       
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by-case analysis and taking procedural safeguards related to the rights of the 
accused.   
 
3.4. The ECCC and the STL  
3.4.1. Obligation to Protect Witnesses and Victims and Requesting Protective 
Measures  
3.4.1.1. The ECCC 
With regard to the ECCC, both the Agreement between the ECCC and the UN 
and the ECCC Constitutive Law state that the ECCC, i.e., the Co-Investigating 
Judges, the Co-Prosecutors and the Chambers, ‘shall provide for the protection 
of victims and witnesses. Such protective measures shall include, but not be 
limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the 
victim’s identity’.1419 Internal rule 29 (1) also reflects this general obligation as 
‘The ECCC shall ensure the protection of Victims who participate in the 
proceedings, whether as complainants, or Civil Parties, and witnesses’.  
Accordingly, protective measures are applicable to victims participating 
as complainants, civil parties or witnesses, and in the particular case of a civil 
party these protective measures are afforded as a matter of ‘procedural right’.1420 
Moreover, internal rule 29 (2) provides for that the Co-Investigating Judges or 
the Chambers when issuing an order ‘shall take account of the needs of victims 
and witnesses’.1421 Furthermore, in cases when direct communication could place 
the person’s life or well being in danger, the Co-Investigating Judges or the 
Chambers may communicate with the lawyers of victims, witnesses, 
complainants or civil parties, or victims’ association.1422 The ECCC Practice 
Direction on Protective Measures pays especial attention to reach a balance 
between, on the one hand, the security of victims or witnesses and, on the other 
one, the rights of the accused, stated under the Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers,1423 as those measures have to respect the fundamental 
principles applicable to the ECCC, ‘in particular: a) the needs of victims and 
witnesses; b) the rights of the suspect, charged person or accused; and c) the 
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1419 ECCC Agreement, article 23 (‘Protection of Victims and Witnesses’); ECCC Law, article 33 
new. 
1420 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 488.  
1421 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 29 (2).  
1422 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1423 ECCC Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, article 35 new. 
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fairness of the proceedings’.1424 This same Direction in its article 4 (2) provides 
that the Co-Prosecutors when discharging their disclosure obligations under the 
Internal Rules ‘shall respect the protective measures as previously ordered by the 
Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers [...]’. The ECCC has established that a 
protective measure request has to be justified by a specified risk and 
demonstration of why the lack of protective measures would imperil the safety 
and/or well-being of the person in question.1425    
Concerning the mechanism to request protective measures, the ECCC 
Co-Investigating Judges and the Chambers on their own initiative or upon 
request, and after consultation with the Victims Support Section or the WESU, 
may ‘order appropriate measures to protect victims and witnesses whose 
appearance before them is liable to place their life or health or that of their family 
members or close relatives in serious danger’.1426 In case of proprio motu 
measures, the existence of ‘indications in the case file of such risk’ is the factor to 
be considered.1427 Internal rule 29 (9) clarifies that appeals against decisions 
relating to protective measures do not have suspensive effect, with the exception 
of decisions lifting such measures. Requests for protective measures are in 
writing.1428 According to article 2 (4) of the Practice Direction on Protective 
Measures:  
 
The Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers may, on their own motion or on 
the request of the parties or their lawyers, hold an in camera hearing to 
determine whether to order protective measures. They may decide to use 
remote means to permit the participation of the interested party or parties. 
 
As part of the proceedings in Duch, civil party group 1 filed a request to 
withdraw protective measures, i.e., pseudonym, concealing identity from the 
public, remote participation and distortion of voice and physical features, which 
 
1424 ECCC/03/2007/Rev.1, Practice Direction on Protective Measures, Amended on 29 April 2008, 
article 1.3.  
1425 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Protective Measures for Civil Parties, Trial 
Chamber, 2 June 2009.  
1426 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 29 (3).  
1427 Ibid., Loc. cit. This rule additionally states that ‘Protective measures for victims shall be 
requested no later than 15 days after the indictment becomes final. Protective measures for 
witnesses shall be requested no later than the date for the filing of the witness list referred to in 
Rule 80. On an exceptional basis, later applications may be considered by the Chamber’.  
1428 ECCC/03/2007/Rev.1, Practice Direction on Protective Measures, Amended on 29 April 2008, 
article 1.3. 
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the Supreme Court Chamber granted.1429 In adopting this decision, the Supreme 
Court Chamber took note of article 4 (4) of the Practice Direction on Protective 
Measures, which establishes that to vary a protective measure, the Co-
Investigating Judges or competent Chamber ‘shall seek to obtain, whenever 
possible, the consent of the person in respect of whom the application to cancel 
or vary the protective measures has been made’ and it was also noted article 4 (1) 
of the Practice Direction which states that:  
 
Protective measures once ordered shall continue to apply mutatis mutandis 
throughout the entire proceedings in the case concerned and in relation to any 
other proceedings before the court and shall continue until they are cancelled or 
varied pursuant to the provisions of this Practice Direction.1430 
 
It must be mentioned that the ECCC Internal Rules explicitly state that 
civil parties may appeal: i) decisions on protective measures issued by the Co-
Investigating Judges (before the Pre-Trial Chamber);1431 and ii) decisions ‘on 
protective measures under rule 29(4)(c)’ by the Trial Chamber (before the 
Supreme Court Chamber).1432  
 
3.4.1.2. The STL  
Unlike other international and hybrid criminal courts, the STL Statute contains 
no specific regulation on the issue of protection of witnesses and victim 
participants, referring only to the contents of the STL RPE ‘The judges of the 
Special Tribunal shall, as soon as practicable after taking office, adopt Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence for […] the protection of victims and witnesses […] 
and may amend them, as appropriate’.1433  
Thus, the matter of protection of witnesses and victim participants is 
absent in the STL Statute even though the UN International Independent 
Investigation Commission set up to investigate the assassination of the former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 other individuals, continuously 
pointed out that there are important challenges to guarantee the security of 
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1429 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Group 1- Civil Parties’ Co- Lawyers’ 
Request to Cancel Protective Measures (F23/1), Supreme Court Chamber, 25 March 2011.  
1430 Ibid., pp. 2 and 3. 
1431 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 74 (4). 
1432 Ibid., rule 104 (4). See also ECCC Internal Rules, rule 105 (2).  
1433 STL Statute, article 28.  
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witnesses and persons cooperating with the STL.1434 However, as analyzed later, 
the STL RPE filled that gap since they contain quite detail regulations on 
protective measures for witnesses and victims participants and, therefore, follow 
the standards established in previous international and hybrid criminal courts.     
At the STL, the Trial Chamber, either proprio motu or at the request of a 
party, the victim or witness concerned, as well as the Victims’ Participation Unit 
or the VWU, may order appropriate measures for the privacy and protection of 
victims and witnesses, provided that the measures are consistent with the rights 
of the accused,1435 which are stated in the STL Statute.1436 It is also added that a 
party requesting the Trial Chamber the adoption of protective measures ‘shall 
seek to obtain the consent of the person in respect of whom the protective 
measures are sought’.1437 Considering the accused’s rights, protective measures 
are granted on exceptional basis.1438 As established in the STL’s emerging case 
law, which referred to jurisprudence of other international/hybrid criminal 
courts, protective measures can only be granted under specific conditions, 
namely, there must be a real, objective fear for the security of the witness or 
victim participant, the measure should be strictly necessary, and the measure 
should be the least restrictive one necessary to provide for the applicant’s 
protection.1439  
In Ayyash et al., the STL Prosecutor has been working with witnesses in 
order to address whether, and if so, what protective measures may be required at 
trial pursuant to the STL RPE.1440 This certainly constitutes an important step to 
establish later what protective measures should be granted during trial and on a 
timely basis so that the trial is not delayed and the protective measures adopted 
can appropriately meet concerns of victims and witnesses. Moreover, as the Pre-
Trial Judge noted, the preparation of the case for trial has actively been pursued 
 
1434 See, e.g., UN Document S/2007/424, Eighth report of the International Independent 
Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 
(2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007)  para. 58 (Jul. 12, 2007). 
1435 STL RPE, rule 133 (A).  
1436 STL Statute, article 16 (Rights of the Accused). See also STL Statute, article 15 (Rights of 
Suspects During Investigation).   
1437 STL RPE, rule 133 (B).  
1438 STL Statute, article 16 (2) (‘The accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to 
measures ordered by the Special Tribunal for the protection of victims and witnesses’.). 
1439 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on the Legal Representative of Victims’ First, 
Second and Third Motions for Protective Measures for Victims Participating in the Proceedings, 
Pre-Trial Judge, 19 December 2012, para. 19.  
1440 See STL, Fourth Annual Report (2012-2013), p. 29; STL, Third Annual Report (2011-2012), p. 
33. 
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and most of the pending issues have been (or are being resolved), which includes 
the fact that the Appeals Chamber already ruled on the appeal of the victim 
participants’ legal representative concerning protective measures for certain 
victim participants.1441  
Even though protective measures ordered in favor of a victim or a 
witness continue until they are rescinded, varied or augmented,1442 they cannot:  
 
[…] prevent the Prosecutor from discharging any disclosure obligation […] in 
the subsequent proceedings, provided that the Prosecutor notifies the Defence 
to whom the disclosure is being made of the nature of the protective measures 
ordered in the first proceedings.1443 
  
The STL RPE also state that:  
 
[…] the party to the subsequent proceedings seeking to rescind, vary or 
augment protective measures ordered in the first proceedings, after having 
sought the consent of the witness in respect of whom the submission is made, 
must apply to the Chamber seised of the subsequent proceedings.1444  
 
Via 2013 amendment, the STL RPE now establish that the Chamber 
must ensure that ‘the protected victim or witnesses has consented to the 
rescission, variation or augmentation of the protective measures’, and only 
exceptionally, ‘the Chamber may proprio motu order the rescission, variation or 
augmentation of protective measures without this consent’.1445 As determined by 
the Plenary of Judges amending the STL RPE, the amended rule follows a similar 
ICTY RPE provision.1446  
Lastly, but equally important, as discussed later,1447 victim participants 
can appeal protective measures for victim participants and the variation of such 
measures.   
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1441 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Order Setting a New Tentative Date for the Start of Trial 
Proceedings, Pre-Trial Judge, 2 August 2013, para. 46. See also Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 
Decision on the Legal Representative of Victims’ Request for Leave of Eleven Weeks to Comply 
with the Pre-Trial Judge’s Decision on Protective Measures, Pre-Trial Judge, 10 May 2013.  
1442 STL RPE, rule 133 (G) (i).  
1443 Ibid., rule 133 (G) (ii).  
1444 Ibid., rule 133 (H).  
1445 Ibid., rule 133 (J).  
1446 STL Office of the President, Summary of the Accepted Rule Amendments and Some Key 
Rejected Rule Amendment Proposals. Pursuant to Rule 5 (1) of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Fifth Plenary of Judges, February 2013), p. 33.  
1447 See infra Chapter IV 6.4.2.2.
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3.4.2. Set of Specific Protective Measures  
3.4.2.1. The ECCC 
Under the ECCC legal framework, protective measures shall include, inter alia, 
the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim’s 
identity.1448 As a first possible protective measure, declaring that the contact 
address of the person to be protected is that of his/her lawyer or Victims’ 
Association is mentioned in the Internal Rules.1449 Second, a pseudonym can be 
used when referring to the protected person.1450 Third, the Co-Investigating 
Judges or the Chambers can authorize ‘recording of the person’s statements 
without his/her identity appearing in the case file’.1451 Thus, Pre-Trial Chamber 
can keep names confidential, for example, in Ieng Sary (Case 002) the lawyers of 
some civil parties requested and were granted protective measures consisting in 
their clients’ names not being mentioned in public and that they be redacted 
from the record for the purposes of the hearing and decision on the appeal 
against the accused’s provisional detention.1452 However, internal rule 29 (6) also 
establishes that ‘No conviction may be pronounced against the Accused on the 
sole basis of statements taken under [those] conditions’.   
Fourth, when a charged person or accused requests to be confronted 
with a protected person, ‘technical means may be used that allow remote 
participation or distortion of the person’s voice and or physical features,’1453 if 
such technology allows ‘the witness to be interviewed by the Co-Investigating 
Judges or the Chambers, and the parties, at the time the witness so testifies’.1454 
Moreover, not only the principle of testimony in person is explicit in the Internal 
Rules but also audio video-link technologies shall not be used if they would be 
seriously prejudicial to, or inconsistent with defence rights.1455 In Nuon Chea et 
al. (Case 002), a witness testified through video-link from France.1456 Also, in 
Nuon Chea et al., ill-health of those testifying, which is directly related to the 
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1448 ECCC Law, article 33 new; ECCC Agreement, article 23.  
1449 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 29 (4) (a). 
1450 Ibid., rule 29 (4) (b). 
1451 Ibid., rule 29 (4) (c). 
1452 Ieng Sary (Case 002), Decision on Civil Party Request for Protective Measures Related to 
Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order, Pre-Trial Chamber, 8 July 2008, p. 2.  
1453 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 29 (4) (d). 
1454 Ibid., rule 26 (1). 
1455 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1456 See Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Information on Witnesses. Available at:  
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/2?page=9 (last visit on 12 August 2012).   
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advanced age and physical frailty of many civil parties and witnesses, prompted 
the Trial Chamber to authorize video-link evidence in some cases.1457   
Fifth, as an exception to the public hearings principle, the Chambers 
may conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or permit the presentation of 
evidence via electronic or other special means.1458 Internal Rule 79 (6) (c) 
establishes that the trial chamber hearings ‘shall be conducted in public’ but it 
also adds that ‘to give effect to protective measures ordered [...] it may, by 
reasoned decision, order that all or part of the hearing be held in camera’. In any 
case, when it comes to judicial investigations, ‘[i]n order to preserve the rights 
and interests of the parties, judicial investigations shall not be conducted in 
public’,1459 and Pre-Trial Chamber hearings shall be generally conducted in 
camera.1460 The internal rules on in camera pre-trial hearings are criticized herein 
as they transform the principle of public hearings into an exception.    
The importance of public hearings and their intrinsic connection with 
the accused’s right to a fair trial is reflected in a decision on protective measures 
by the ECCC Trial Chamber where it was established that:   
 
The OCIJ [Office of the Co-Investigating Judges] itself did not envisage that 
measures adopted by it would continue in effect throughout the trial phase. 
Instead it stressed that it is for the Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber alone 
to determine whether to impose limits on the right to a public hearing at the 
trial stage, in accordance with the adversarial principle and with respect for 
defence rights.1461 
   
In the five above-examined protective measures, the person’s request 
and identity shall be recorded in a classified register separate from the dossier.1462 
The Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers can accordingly order that the 
identity of the witness is not disclosed.1463 Additionally and where necessary, the 
Co-Investigating Judges and the Chambers may order appropriate judicial 
 
1457 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Severance of Case 002 Following Supreme Court 
Chamber Decision of 8 February 2013, Trial Chamber, 26 April 2013, para. 133, footnote 230.    
1458 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 29 (4) (e). 
1459 Ibid., rule 56. 
1460 Ibid., rules 71 (4) and 72 (4). See also Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 832.  
1461 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Protective Measures for Civil Parties, Trial 
Chamber, 2 June 2009, para. 9; citing Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Order on Protective 
Measures (Document D98), Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 8 August 2008, paras. 2-7. 
1462 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 29 (5). 
1463 Ibid., rules 28 (7) (b) and (e). 
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guarantees as provided in the ECCC Internal Rules and/or the physical 
protection of a victim or witness in safe residence in Cambodia or abroad.1464  
 The Office of the Co-Investigating Judges and the ECCC Trial Chamber 
have emphasised a case-by-case analysis when deciding to grant protective 
measures for victims and witnesses and, thus, ‘indiscriminate measures in 
relation to an unlimited number of individuals, absent a clear justification, 
jeopardised the fundamental rights of the accused in a criminal trial’.1465 The Co-
Investigating Judges indeed clarified that in order to support such a request, the 
application must: i) include the identity of the parties or individuals benefiting 
from them; and ii) indicate how, absent those measures, the lives and wellbeing 
of those victims and witnesses or their families would be imperiled.1466 A genuine 
fear from the applicant or his/her family and an objective justification for this 
fear have also been pointed out by the Trial Chamber in Duch as required and in 
accordance with jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR, cited by the 
Chamber.1467 A specific risk hence underlies granting protective measures in 
favour of designated persons. Accordingly, the Co-Investigating Judges rejected 
protective measures requested that did not reach ‘the required level of specificity 
and failed to show how the absence of protective measures would place the life or 
security of each applicant in danger’.1468 In any case, the Co-Investigating Judges 
and Trial Chamber in Duch also considered the objective criteria applied by the 
UN when evaluating the current security situation in Cambodia, and the length 
of time elapsed since the commission of alleged crimes.1469 Concerning security 
issues for victims and witnesses who want to testify in court, the Cambodian 
scenario is different from the situations in countries related to investigations and 
prosecutions at other international and hybrid criminal courts. In the latter, 
victims as witnesses were called to testify within a much shorter period after 
crimes were committed than at the ECCC. Also, the security situations in those 
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1464 Ibid., rule 29 (7).   
1465 Kaing Guek  Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Protective Measures (Document D6), 
Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 30 July 2007, p.1 (noting that the request did not specify the 
names of the individuals concerned, or how the failure to provide protective measures would 
endanger the lives and security of hundreds of individuals references in the request); Kaing Guek  
Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Protective Measures for Civil Parties, Trial Chamber, 2 
June 2009, para. 7. 
1466 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Document D6, 30 July 2007, p. 1. 
1467 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Protective Measures for Civil Parties, 2 
June 2009, para. 7. 
1468 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Additional Decision on Motion for Protective measures 
(Document D12/VI), 9 October 2007, para. 7.   
1469 Ibid., para. 13; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 2 June 2009, para 8. 


countries were/are still (much) more precarious than in Cambodia when 
witnesses took the stand at trial.  
Moreover, both the ECCC Co-Investigating Judges and the Trial 
Chamber found that alleged fear and reluctance on the part of some witnesses 
and victims to testify as inconclusive and, indeed, ‘a number of witnesses were 
ready to testify publicly and that for the majority, the risk level was low’.1470 It 
was noted that many potential witnesses were already well-known to the public 
via earlier declarations in the media, and that the inclusion of their names in the 
case file as potential witnesses was unlikely to create additional risk for them.1471 
All of this may explain why, in the first completed ECCC trial, i.e., in Duch, 
protective measures were afforded in a limited number of cases.1472 Be that as it 
may, when grating protective measures, the ECCC Trial Chamber, for example, 
ordered the non-disclosure of Civil Party applicant E2/62’s identity and 
identifying information to the public, ruling:  
 
(a) That Parties to the proceedings shall refer to this Civil Party by the 
pseudonym E2/62; 
(b) That the identity of Civil Party E2/62 and any other information that could 
identify her as a party to the proceedings shall not be disclosed to the public or 
the media;  
(c) That technical means be used to allow remote participation or the distortion 
of Civil Party’s E2/62’s voice and physical features should the Accused or a 
Charged Person before the ECCC request a confrontation with Civil Party 
E2/62.1473  
  
On the other hand, provisional detention has been found by the Pre-
Trial Chamber in Duch and Ieng Thirith (Case 002) as ‘a necessary measure to 
prevent the Charged Person from exerting pressure on witnesses or destroying 
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1470 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 2 June 2009, para. 8. See also: Kaing Guek Eav alias 
Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2007, para. 15.  
1471 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2007, para. 15; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch 
(Case 001), 2 June 2009, para. 8.    
1472 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 54. As for 
protective measures decisions see: Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Protective 
Measures for Civil Parties E2/62 and E2/89 and for Witnesses KW-10 and KW-24, E135, Trial 
Chamber, 7 August 2009. See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Protective 
Measures for Witnesses and Experts and on Parties’ Request to Hear Witnesses and Experts – 
Reasons, E40/1, Trial Chamber, 10 April 2009.  
1473 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Confidential Decision on Protective Measures for Civil 
Parties E2/62 and E2/89 and for Witnesses KW-10 and KW-24 (E135), 7 August 2009, p. 3, para. 4. 
Cited by Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 25 March 2011, p. 2, footnote 2.    
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any evidence’.1474 It was actually considered to be essential that witnesses are not 
in any fear or suffering from any pressure preventing them from testifying.1475   
It is important to mention that the Practice Direction on the 
Classification and Management of Case-Related Information states that:  
 
7.1. In order to allow effective protection of witnesses in subsequent phases of 
proceedings, in public hearings and filings submitted prior to the testimony of 
each witness, he / she will be referred to by number, initial, pseudonym or other 
means deemed appropriate. A witness may waive the application of this sub-
article in writing. 
[…] 
7.3. If a person who has applied to be joined as a civil party is also the subject of 
a request for protective measures, the civil party application will be treated as 
strictly confidential until a decision is made on the protective measures 
request.1476  
 
Lastly, but equally important, it should be mentioned that there are no 
principles of evidence for cases of sexual crimes in the ECCC Internal Rules, 
which is herein criticized as the ECCC has jurisdiction over, inter alia, rape as a 
crime against humanity.1477 
  
3.4.2.2. The STL  
With regard to the STL, rule 133 of its RPE establishes a non-exhaustive list of 
protective measures, which may be decided in camera proceedings.1478 These 
measures have been described by the Appeals Chamber as extensive.1479 There 
are three categories of protective measures. First, those measures:  
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1474 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention 
Order of Kaing Guek Eav aka Duch, Pre-Trial Chamber, 3 December 2007, para. 36; Ieng Thirith 
(Case 002), Decision on Appeal of Provisional Detention Order, Pre-Trial Chamber, 9 July 2008, 
para. 52.   
1475 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 3 December 2007, para. 36.  
1476 Practice Direction ECCC/004/2009/Rev.1, Practice Direction on Classification and 
Management of Case-Related Information, articles 7.1 and 7.3.  
1477 See ECCC Law, article 5. See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial 
Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras. 361-366 (findings on rape and rape as torture). 
1478 STL RPE, rule 133 (C).  
1479 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), Decision on Appeal by Legal Representative of 
Victims Against Pre-Trial Judge’s Decision on Protective Measures, Appeals Chamber, 10 April 
2013, paras. 31 and 40. 
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[…] to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity or 
whereabouts of a victim or a witness, or of persons related to or associated with 
a victim or witness, by means such as:  
(a) expunging names and identifying information from the Tribunal’s public 
records;  
(b) non-disclosure to the public of any records identifying the victim or witness;  
(c) applying image- or voice- altering devices.  
(d) giving testimony through closed circuit television or video-conference link; 
and  
(e) assignment of a pseudonym.1480   
 
As an example of this first category of protective measures, in Ayyash et 
al., the Pre-Trial Judge ordered that the transcript of a status conference should 
be made public but ‘subject to the necessary redactions being made’,1481 which 
was adopted taking into account, inter alia, the emphasis of victim participants’ 
legal representatives on the need to maintain the anonymity of victims 
participants who were granted it.1482 The President of the STL has also 
highlighted that, when making public some decisions, there is the need for 
redactions to protect the interests sought to be safeguarded by the Registrar and 
the Prosecutor.1483 The Pre-Trial Judge in Ayyash et al. has in turn reclassified as 
public the identity of some victim participants upon request of their legal 
representatives.1484 
In addition to the examples previously mentioned, the Pre-Trial Judge in 
a decision in Ayyash et al., relying on, among other sources, jurisprudence of the 
ICTY and the ICTR, inter alia: i) recalled that the accused’s counsel shall protect 
the confidentiality of evidence in the proceedings, as well as information relating 
to witnesses, and their whereabouts during and at the conclusion of the 
proceedings; ii) ordered the defence that, if it wishes to make contact with a 
witness at risk identified by the Prosecution, to give prior notice to the latter and 
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1480 STL RPE, rule 133 (C) (i).  
1481 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Order to Redact the Confidential Transcript of the Status 
Conference of 26 July 2012 and Make Public the Redacted Version, Pre-Trial Judge, 17 August 
2012, para. 12.  
1482 Ibid., paras. 9 and 11.  
1483 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision of President on Forum and Redactions, STL 
President, 25 September 2012, para. 9. Concerning redactions of victims’ names see also Merhi 
(STL-13-04/1/TC), 20 December 2013, para. 75. 
1484 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on the Victims’ Legal Representatives Request for 
Reclassification as Public of Identities of Seven Victims Participating in the Proceedings, Pre-Trial 
Judge, 21 September 2012.  
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the Victims’ Participation Unit, which will arrange the contact after having 
ensured that the witness agrees; iii) ordered the Prosecution to provide the 
defence, with a list of witnesses, to be updated regularly, indicating those who are 
at risk;  iv) ordered the defence, when it discloses material, to inform all third 
parties of the obligation not to disseminate or copy that material, to return it to 
the defence after use, and of the sanctions in case of violation of those rules; v) 
ordered all third parties not to disseminate material in the proceedings of which 
they may have knowledge or any information contained therein, which may be 
subject to a protective measure, unless that material or information becomes 
public during open session proceedings; and vi) ordered the Prosecution to 
disclose to the defence the evidentiary materials that do not require other 
protective measures than those mentioned in this decision.1485    
According to rule 123 (D), ‘Deposition evidence may be taken either at 
or away from the seat of the Tribunal, and it may also be given by means of a 
video-conference’. In turn, rule 124 lays down that ‘At the request of either 
Party, the Pre-Trial Judge or a Chamber may, in the interests of justice, order 
that testimony be received via video-conference link’. Based on these provisions, 
the STL’s President issued a Practice Direction to provide guidelines for the 
establishment of video-conference links,1486 which inter alia set minimum 
technical requirements,1487 and that the ‘proposed location that is appropriate for 
the conduct of proceedings, the safety of the respective participants, and the 
integrity of the proceedings’.1488      
The second category of protective measures explicitly mentioned in the 
STL RPE corresponds to closed sessions.1489 The principle is that all the 
proceedings before a Chamber, other than Chamber’s deliberations, shall be held 
in public, unless otherwise decided by the Chamber after hearing the parties.1490 
However, the STL RPE also allow private hearings, i.e., ‘Trial Chamber may 
order that the press and the public be excluded from all or part of the 
proceedings for reasons of, inter alia: […] non-disclosure of the identity of a 
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1485 See Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision Relating to the Prosecution Request Seeking 
Measures for the Non-Dissemination of Material of 2 May 2012, Pre-Trial Judge, 25 May 2012, pp. 
22-24. See also Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision Authorizing the Withdrawal of the 
Prosecution Application of 21 December 2011 and the Modification of the Application of 15 
March 2012 Requesting Protective Measures, Pre-Trial Judge, 14 June 2012.        
1486 STL, Practice Direction for Video-Conference Links at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, STL-
PD-2010-03, 15 January 2010.  
1487 Ibid., article 1 (3). 
1488 Ibid., article 2.  
1489 STL RPE, rule 133 (C) (ii). 
1490 Ibid., rule 136.  


victim or witness as provided for in Rule 133’.1491 As stated in Ayyash et al., the 
confidentiality of the identities of the witnesses or victim participants ‘vis-à-vis 
the public is only envisaged by Rule 133’.1492 In Ayyash et al., status conferences 
during pre-trial were held in closed sessions ‘in order to facilitate the exchange of 
participants’, with summaries of the proceedings being made public 
afterwards.1493 In any case, although the STL contemplates an exceptional interim 
non-disclosure of the identity of victims and witnesses to the defence until 
appropriate protective measures have been implemented,1494 ‘the identity of the 
victim or witness shall be disclosed in sufficient time prior to the trial to allow 
adequate time for preparation of the defence’.1495 Although this point is 
examined in further detail when discussing anonymity in the next subchapter,1496 
it should be mentioned here that the STL RPE explicitly allow, on exceptional 
basis, anonymous witnesses during not only pre-trial but also trial.1497    
A third category of protective measures endeavors ‘to facilitate the 
testimony of vulnerable victims and witnesses, such as one-way closed circuit 
television or shielding the accused from the direct view of the witness’.1498 
Additionally, when it deems necessary, the Chamber may control the manner of 
questioning to avoid any harassment or intimidation.1499 The STL RPE establish 
that the VWU shall ensure that the witness has been informed, before giving 
evidence, that his/her testimony and identity may be disclosed at a later date in 
other proceedings before the STL,1500 and, thus, a potential risk of re-
traumatization should be reduced. Finally, the STL RPE also require the Trial 
Chamber, when appropriate, to state in the protective measure order whether 
the transcript of proceedings relating to the evidence of the witness to whom the 
measures relate shall be made available for use in other proceedings before the 
STL.1501   
It should be noticed that although when writing this thesis the first case 
Ayyash et al. has yet not reached the trial stage and, hence, it has not been yet 
 
1491 Ibid., rule 137 (iv).  
1492 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 19 December 2012, para. 19. See also, Ayyash et al. (STL-11-
01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, para. 31.  
1493 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 17 August 2012, para. 3.  
1494 STL RPE, rule 115 (A). 
1495 Ibid., rule 115 (C). 
1496 See infra Chapter III 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.2.2. 
1497 STL RPE, rules 93 and 159. 
1498 Ibid., rule 133 (C) (iii).  
1499 Ibid., rule 133 (E).  
1500 Ibid., rule 133 (D).  
1501 Ibid., rule 133 (F).  
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applied judicial protective measures for this stage, the decisions and steps to 
guarantee the security of victims and witnesses during pre-trial already adopted 
(as demonstrated via some examples) should be mutatis mutandi considered as 
illustrative when the Trial Chamber has to adopt protective measures during 
trial. 
Additionally, the Pre-Trial Judge has determined that ‘the participation 
of dual status victims may require tailored protective measures’, which ‘shall be 
determined by the appropriate Chamber in due course’.1502   
 Last but not at least, it should be added that like in the case of the ECCC, 
the STL legal instruments do not contain principles of evidence in cases of sexual 
crimes. As for the STL, this may be justified due to the nature of the crimes 
under its jurisdiction which, unlike the ECCC, do not concern in principle 
sexual violence crimes.1503  
 
3.5. Comparative Conclusions  
At international and hybrid criminal courts, protective measures, i.e., protective 
measures in general and special measures, granted in favor of victims and 
witnesses pursue four main objectives.1504 First, to minimize serious risks to the 
security of victims and witnesses as they generally still live in volatile societies 
characterized by the presence of ongoing armed conflicts and commission of 
international crimes. Second, reduction of trauma associated with giving 
testimony, i.e., to prevent that victims suffer from secondary victimization.1505 
This objective in particular may be taken as an example of how restorative justice 
manifestations can be integrated into criminal justice systems, national or 
international, led predominantly by the retributive/deterrent justice paradigm. 
 
1502 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on the VPU’s Access to Materials and Modalities 
of Victims’ Participation in Proceedings before the Pre-Trial Judge, Pre-Trial Judge, 18 May 2012, 
para. 61.  
1503 The law applicable to the STL corresponds to the Lebanese national law on acts of terrorism, 
crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report 
crimes and the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle. See STL Statute, article 2.  
1504 These four main objectives are mentioned and discussed in further detail by Brouwer (2005) 
231-235. The first three goals listed are identified in, for example, the UN Victims’ Declaration, 
article 6 (d); and Recommendation (85)11.   
1505 The ICTY has addressed the meaning of secondary victimisation for survivors of gender crimes 
as follows: ‘testifying about the event [sexual violence] is often difficult, particularly in public, and 
can result in rejection by the victim’s family and community. In addition, traditional court practice 
and procedures have been known to exacerbate the victim’s ordeal during trial. Women who have 
been raped and have sought justice in the legal system compare this experience to being raped a 
second time’. Tadić (IT-94-1-T), 10 August 1995, para. 46.      
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Third, prevention of serious incursions into the privacy and dignity of victims 
and witnesses, which is achieved via confidentiality measures and has particular 
relevance in sexual violence cases. Fourth, to encourage victims and witnesses to 
testify, otherwise they would be reluctant to go to the courts and consequently 
trials would not be even possible.  
At international and hybrid criminal courts, protective measures benefit 
not only victims taking part as witnesses when testifying but also victim 
participants when delivering their statements (ICC, STL) or civil parties (ECCC) 
when delivering their statements/testimonies. There is a general obligation in the 
legal frameworks and practice of the international and hybrid criminal courts to 
protect the safety, physical, psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of 
victims and witnesses in general. Accordingly, this obligation, as exemplified in 
the American system, has as a natural and logic consequence that victims as 
witnesses have a right to be treated with fairness and respect (right to protection) 
at international and hybrid criminal courts. Granting protective measures to 
victim participants or civil parties can also be considered as a procedural right.         
At international and hybrid criminal courts, protective measures can be 
ordered by the respective Judges or Chambers and, depending on the court and 
procedural stage, those measures may be ordered either proprio motu or upon 
the request of the parties, victims or witnesses or their legal representatives if 
any, or Victims and Witnesses Units. Whereas at the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL 
and the STL, the respective Victims and Witnesses Units can ask the respective 
Chambers the adoption of protective measures, at the ICC and ECCC, those 
units only hold a consultative status in this regard. At international and hybrid 
criminal courts, when deciding whether to order protective measures, a Judge or 
a Chamber may hold in camera proceedings. Protective measures, in particular 
those that keep the identity of the victim or the witness from the public and 
media, can be granted if certain requirements are met such as: i) a real, legitimate 
and objective fear for the safety of the witness, having identified the security 
threat and the need for protective measures, and, hence, subjective fears on their 
own are insufficient (necessity); ii) the effect on the public nature of the 
proceedings would be justified in the circumstances; and iii) the least restrictive 
measures should be adopted (proportionality). The analysis conducted by 
international and hybrid criminal courts has to be implemented on a case-by-
case, individual basis, taking into account factual circumstances, and with full 
respect for the accused’s rights. Tests like the ‘high likelihood’ of harm should be 
interpreted in a purposive and flexible manner in order to guarantee protection 
to victims and witnesses who are facing a serious risk.  
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The ongoing security situation in the country or region from which cases 
are investigated and prosecuted certainly has played an important role when 
deciding whether and what sort of protective measures should be granted. Thus, 
whereas the SCSL decided to grant blanket protective measures due to security 
concerns in Sierra Leone, the ICTY and the ICTR have always based their 
analysis on an individual, case-by-case basis. The latter approach has also so far 
been adopted by the ICC even though some of its situations involve ongoing 
commission of crimes and, thus, may present serious security risks for victims 
and witnesses. However, it is argued here that this is the best approach in 
consideration of other competing interests, in particular the accused’s right to a 
fair trial. At the other end of the spectrum, the few protective measures so far 
adopted in the ECCC’s practice corresponds to: i) its legal framework, i.e., unlike 
trial, non-public judicial investigations and pre-trial hearings are to be generally 
conducted in camera under the ECCC Internal Rules, which is criticized herein 
as the rules on in camera pre-trial hearings transform the public hearing 
principle into an exception; ii) the readiness of a number of victims to testify 
publicly; iii) the fact that they were already known; and iv) all of this in the 
Cambodian context where the crimes under the ECCC’s jurisdiction occurred 
many years ago. Be that as it may, protective measures can be lifted or modified 
according to the changes in the situation of a victim and a witness through 
procedural stages, which is a sound and necessary approach due to the length of 
international criminal proceedings. The lifting and modification of protective 
measures are also connected with the ICTY, the ICTR and the STL RPE whereby 
the witness should be informed before testifying that his/her testimony and 
identity may be disclosed later in another case. The ICTY RPE, the STL RPE and 
the ICC Regulations of the Court explicitly oblige the competent Chamber to in 
principle obtain consent from the protected victim or witness on rescission, 
variation or augmentation of protective measures. Under explicit ECCC Internal 
Rules, civil parties can appeal decisions on protective measures.1506 At the STL, 
victim participants can appeal protective measures for victim participants and 
the variation of such measures.1507           
In granting protective measures, the legal instruments and practice of 
the international and hybrid criminal courts, in a similar fashion than the 
considered national systems, have always paid close attention to the rights of the 
accused and regarded them not only as a limit to excessive or disproportional 
protective measures but also as the key factor in the equation where competing 
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1506 For further discussion on interlocutory appeals by civil parties see infra Chapter IV 6.4.2.1. 
1507 See infra Chapter IV 6.4.2.2. 
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interests have to be balanced, i.e., on the one hand the protection of victims and 
witnesses, and on the other one, the safeguard of the rights of the accused. 
Protective measures, such as closed hearings, have normally been granted more 
easily during pre-trial rather than at trial. This approach is not surprising 
because it is especially during the trial phase where the protection of the rights of 
the accused has to be given first consideration over other competing interests. 
The above-mentioned point is arguably the only manner to fully guarantee the 
due process and fair trial guarantees that must characterize any criminal trial, 
where, after all, determination of individual criminal liability of the accused is at 
stake.  
Protective measures at international and hybrid criminal courts 
primarily endeavor to protect the identity and privacy of the victims and 
witnesses from an unwarranted intromission from the public and media. In 
other words, protective measures are in principle directed vis-à-vis actors 
external to the criminal proceedings. Therefore, protective measures constitute 
an exception to the accused’s right to public hearings. At international and 
hybrid criminal courts, protective measures that prevent a disclosure of the 
identity of victims and witnesses from the accused have been exceptionally 
accepted but during the pre-trial phase. Accordingly, prior to the trial, disclosure 
of the identity of victims and witnesses to the accused, but not necessarily to the 
public and media, has to take place. This issue will be examined in more detail 
under the next subchapter on anonymous victims and witnesses. What has 
already been noticed in detail is that non-disclosure of the identity of witnesses 
and victims to public and media during pre-trial becomes more restricted during 
trial precisely due to concerns about the rights of the accused. Be that as it may, 
the set of protective measures recognized and used in the legal framework and 
practice of international and hybrid criminal courts, which shows important 
similarities to those adopted in national systems and in particular the English 
and the American ones, includes, inter alia: i) filing of proceedings under seal; ii) 
parties and participants are prohibited to disclose identifying information of the 
protected person to third parties; iii) identification of the protected person is 
expunged from the record; iv) testimony given via electronic or other special 
means, whereby the image or voice is distorted; v) use of pseudonyms; vi) 
testimony by video-link, as an exception to give the testimony in person, and 
about which an anachronistic trend consisting in giving less evidentiary weight 
to this testimony than to live testimony has been reversed; and vi) holding in 
camera proceedings. Closed sessions have been considered by the case law of the 
ICTY and the SCSL as the most extreme since it compromises the principle of 
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public hearings, which is an important component of the accused’s right to a fair 
trial. However, closed sessions have been adopted on regular basis in the practice 
of the international and hybrid criminal courts. In any case, the excessive or too 
frequent use of closed hearings is criticized herein as private hearings may give 
the wrong impression and publicity of hearings is a fundamental part of the 
accused’s rights and, thus, guarantees his/her right to a fair and impartial 
trial/proceedings.    
As a subcategory of the broader notion of protective measures, the legal 
framework and practice of international and hybrid criminal courts have 
included and adopted measures (‘special measures’ in the ICC terminology) 
specially but not exclusively tailored to facilitate, inter alia, the testimony of 
certain vulnerable or traumatized victims and witnesses, in particular victims of 
sexual violence and children. These measures inspired by and/or similar to those 
existent in national systems, in particular adversarial ones, seek to first and 
foremost to avoid re-traumatization of those victims and witnesses and 
constitute a limit to the defence’s right to examine/cross-examine witnesses. 
These measures include inter alia: i) in camera proceedings; ii) the control on the 
manner of questioning or cross-examining a witness, which is connected with 
the limits to cross-examination and confrontation; iii) a person accompanying 
the traumatized/vulnerable victim or witness during his/her participation in 
court; and iv) production of a witness’s recorded audio, video testimony or 
written statements in lieu of live evidence, being that submitting written 
statements may offer certain advantages although live questioning of a witness in 
open court is undeniably important. There are also in the legal framework of the 
international and hybrid criminal courts, the ECCC and the STL being the 
exceptions, explicit special evidentiary principles applicable to sexual violence 
crimes. These include the principle of non-corroboration complemented with a 
specific emphasis on sexual crimes, the non-inference of consent from words 
and behavior of the sexual crime victim or when this did not resist or kept silent 
in oppressive and coercive environments. Moreover, past or subsequent sexual 
behavior of the sexual violence victim at international and hybrid criminal 
courts is in general inadmissible and, in this aspect, these provisions are more 
protective than similar English and American rules/case law arguably due to the 
nature of international crimes. Developments on the protection of sexual 
violence victims, alongside other vulnerable victims, have been present not only 
in international and hybrid criminal courts but also mutatis mutandi under and 
been influenced by international human rights law. As for child witnesses, the 
adoption of special measures to facilitate the child witness’s needs has reported, 
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or at least tries to put forward, important improvements to reduce the trauma 
and stress experienced by children when testifying. At international and hybrid 
criminal courts, measures such as dispensation of taking solemn declaration to 
children who do not understand it but still are able to provide a comprehensible 
account of the events and admittance of child witnesses’ videotaped evidence 
instead of direct testimony may go on that direction. 
The influence, in particular, of the American and English systems on the 
design of protective measures at the international and hybrid criminal courts is 
strong. This is especially evident in the early practice of the ICTY. This tribunal 
as the first among the new generation of international and hybrid criminal 
courts had to pay close attention to national practice to fill gaps in a novel 
international criminal procedural law. Thus, the ICTY in its first Decision on 
Protective Measures in Tadić approvingly cited, for example, United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, to conclude that one-way closed circuit television 
can be used without violating the right to confrontation ‘when the court finds it 
necessary to protect a child witness from psychological harm’.1508 In the same 
decision, the ICTY cited and agreed with both English and American legal 
sources prohibiting disclosure to the public of identifying information of a 
complainant in a sexual assault case, including still or moving pictures, except at 
the court’s discretion;1509 and limitations to the press to disclose the identities of 
sexual assault victims.1510  
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1508 Tadić (IT-94-1-T), 10 August 1995, para. 47 (Citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)).  
1509 Ibid., para. 39 (Citing the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 section 4).   
1510 Ibid., para. 40 (‘Even the United States of America, with its constitutionally-protected rights to 
a public trial and free speech - which thus places great importance on the right of public disclosure 
- is more amenable than in the past to measures to protect victims and witnesses. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has held that state sanctions imposed on the press for disclosing the 
identities of sexual assault victims before trial may be constitutional, and three state statutes 
provide for such sanctions. Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524 (1989) [...] In this regard, courts have 
been willing to close certain proceedings to account for the concerns of witnesses. If a partial 
closure is requested, i.e., excluding only certain spectators, there must be a "substantial reason" for 
such closure, whereas a full closure to the public and press requires an "overriding interest." [....] 
Partial closures of the courtroom have been justified on the grounds of a witness' fear of 
retribution from perpetrators still at large (Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
110 S. Ct 373 (1989)); to protect the dignity of an adult witness during a rape trial (United States ex 
rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1076 (1977), see also Douglas v. 
Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir.), cert. granted 468 U.S. 1206 (1983), vacated and remanded, 
739 F.2d 531 (1984), in which protection of an adult prosecution witness from embarrassment was 
held to be sufficient for partial closure of a rape trial); and to protect a minor rape victim from fear 
of testifying before disruptive members of the defendant's family (U.S. v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349 
(9th Cir. 1989) see also Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151, 155 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 
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The influence of Anglo-American legal sources goes beyond the ICTY as 
the subsequent instruments and practice of international and hybrid criminal 
courts have incorporated with higher or lower degrees of intensity the protective 
measures contained in the ICTY RPE and practice, which in turn were 
influenced by Anglo-American legal sources. Protective measures which, at the 
end of the day, have to be applied in still adversarial-oriented, hybrid procedural 
frameworks. The relatively lower attention to protective measures in the legal 
framework and practice of the ECCC, excepted some measures applicable during 
judicial investigations/pre-trial hearings, in comparison with those of the other 
international and hybrid criminal courts may be partially explained by the 
influence of the French inquisitorial system. Thus, findings in a report on 
implementation of the EU Framework Decision on Victims (2009), which 
followed the methodology employed by Brienen and Hoegen in its 2000 study on 
implementation of the CoE Recommendation 85 (11), reveal generally speaking 
a more robust practice on treatment and protection of witnesses in England 
(United Kingdom) than in France.1511 This general outcome seems to confirm 
the conclusions in the study by Brienen and Hoegen where, based on legislature 
initiatives, England and Wales ranked higher than France in treatment and 
protection of victims. Indeed, while the former was overall among the highest 
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U.S. 842 (1959) in which the reluctance and fear of a child witness in a rape case to testify in the 
presence of a full courtroom justified closure of the courtroom to all but press, members of the bar, 
and close friends and relatives of the defendant). Complete closure for a limited time has been 
justified to protect the safety of a witness and his family (United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 
(9th Cir. 1979)); to preserve confidentiality of undercover agents in narcotics cases (United States 
ex. rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975)) [...] Twenty-six 
state statutes allow for closure of trials to protect witnesses’.).    
1511 As for hearings in ‘camera’, whereas in England (United Kingdom) this is a protective measure 
given on court’s discretion and based on the vulnerability of certain witnesses, in France hearings 
‘in camera’ are reserved for certain types of offences and victims and upon their request. While in 
England (United Kingdom) unlike France revealing identity of victims of certain offences in open 
court is prohibited, in both countries there is a prohibition revealing the identity of victims of 
certain offences to the press. Indeed in the United Kingdom, unlike France, the court may impose 
restrictions on press coverage of the proceedings. Concerning questioning, in England (United 
Kingdom) there are limits to repetitive questioning unlike France although in the latter repetitive 
questioning is limited for certain vulnerable victims. In both England (United Kingdom) and 
France, television-link and/or video recording are allowed for questioning of child-witnesses and 
in both there is a trusted adult present or a child-friendly environment. In England and Wales, 
unlike France, there are specialized rape or domestic violence teams questioning victims of sexual 
and domestic violence although both countries failed to allow such questioning to be conducted in 
the presence of a companion. See Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima, Project Victims in 
Europe, Implementation of EU Framework Decision on the Standing Victims in the Criminal 
Proceedings in the Member States of the European Union (2009) 49, 51, 54, 89-93.      
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ranked in Europe, France obtained poor records in the treatment and protection 
of victims.1512 Moreover, the explicit consideration of provisional detention and 
having the contact address of a person other than the witness’s, e.g., a lawyer, as 
protective measures under the ECCC are very similar to the French system, in 
which the situation of civil party as beneficiary of protective measures is much 
stronger than when the victim is only a witness. The important and relatively 
recent developments in the adversarial systems examined arguably seek to 
address the traditionally unfriendly adversarial proceedings for victims, which as 
already discussed can more easily lead to re-traumatization.   
 
4. Anonymity of Witnesses and Victims  
Whereas protective measures, as previously analyzed, have been normally 
granted in order to safeguard the security and safety of victims and witnesses, 
and avoid secondary victimization, a much more controversial situation is when 
the accused and his/her counsel do not know the true identity of the victim, i.e., 
anonymous witnesses. In this section, witness anonymity and, where applicable, 
anonymous victim participants/anonymous civil parties are examined.    
 
4.1. National Systems   
4.1.1. English Adversarial System  
Case law has allowed anonymity,1513 which follows a trend permitting it only 
when the evidence is important enough to make it unfair to oblige the Crown to 
proceed without it.1514 This has been considered as in the opposite direction of 
the ECtHR case law,1515 as the latter prohibits reliance on anonymous witnesses 
whose evidence is likely to be decisive to the outcome of the case.1516 In any case, 
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1512 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 1158-1159. Concerning the treatment of victims during 
questioning, the categories of analysis and comparison considered were: i) the manner of 
questioning concerning children, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable victims and the 
frequency of questioning; and ii) the protection of the victim from publicity. In these categories, 
the English system generally speaking scored better than the French system. See Ibid., 1108-1140.   
1513 The first anonymity cases arose in 1989 in a Northern Ireland bombing prosecution, and in 
1992 the first English case permitting the witness to testify anonymously may have been based on 
statutory sources stating that hearsay statements may be admitted as evidence ‘where a witness is 
too afraid to testify’. See Liza Karsai, ‘You Can’t Give my Name: Rethinking Witness Anonymity in 
Light of the United States and British Experience’ (2011) 79 Tennessee Law Review 29, 72.      
1514 See R. v. Taylor (Gary) [1995] Crim. L.R.253; Emerson, Ashworth and MacDonald (2007) 567. 
1515 Emerson, Ashworth and MacDonald (2007) 567. 
1516 See, e.g., ECtHR, Doorson v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 20524/92, Judgment, 26 March 1996; 
para. 76; ECtHR, Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, Appl. Nos. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93, 
22056/93, Judgment, 23 April 1997, para. 58. 
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the House of Lords held that in rare and exceptional circumstances a judge may 
permit a witness to conceal his/her identity entirely from the accused.1517 
According to the Court of Appeal, it is the trial judge who has to determine 
whether those circumstances exist, and the Court also established some factors 
relevant to the judge’s discretion in R. v Taylor.1518 Those factors were: i) the 
existence of real grounds for fear if the witness’s identity is revealed; ii) the 
evidence must be sufficiently important to make it unfair for the Crown to 
proceed without it; iii) the Crown must satisfy the court that the witness’s 
creditworthiness has been fully investigated and disclosed; iv) the court must be 
satisfied that there will be no undue prejudice to the accused; and v) the court 
should balance the need for protection of the witness against the unfairness (or 
appearance thereof) to the accused.1519 Nevertheless, case law permitting 
anonymity raised concerns related to the accused’s rights, which was reflected in 
R. v Davis (Iain) where the House of Lords held that anonymous witness 
testimony violated the accused’s right to a fair trial.1520 However, the main reason 
for this conclusion arguably was that the three anonymous witnesses were the 
‘sole’ or ‘decisive’ evidence against the accused.1521 Be that as it may, the House of 
Lords invited the legislature to develop witness anonymity rules to change the 
common law.1522  
The answer came first via the (provisional) 2008 Criminal Evidence 
(Witness Anonymity) Act and later largely ‘re-enacted’ by the CJA (2009).1523 
Section 88 (3) lays down three conditions to make a witness anonymity order: i) 
the necessity to protect the safety of the witness or of another person or a serious 
property damage; ii) having regard to all circumstances, the effect of the 
proposed order would be consistent with the accused’s right to a fair trial; and 
iii) the importance of the witness’s testimony is such that in the interests of 
justice the witness ought to testify and: a) the witness would not testify if the 
proposed order were not made or b) there would be real harm to the public 
interest if the witness were to testify without the order. Concerning the first 
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1517 Attorney General v Leveller Magazine [1979] A.C. 440, and Scott v Scott [1913] A.C. 417. 
1518 R. v Taylor (Gary) [1995] Crim.L.R. 253; The Times, August 17, 1994.  
1519 Ibid., Transcript of the Decision, 17-18. 
1520 R. v Davis (Iain), [2008] UKHL 36, paras. 35 and 61.  
1521 Ibid., paras. 61 and 96. 
1522 Ibid., paras. 44 and 45 (See Opinion of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry).  
1523 Section 86 (1) of the CJA defines a ‘witness anonymity order’ to be an order made by a court 
that requires such specified measures to be taken in relation to a witness in criminal proceedings as 
the court considers appropriate to ensure that the identity of the witness is not disclosed in or in 
connection with the proceedings.  
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condition, the court must have regard, in particular, to any witness’s reasonable 
fear of suffering death, injury or serious property damage.1524 Additionally, there 
are established relevant considerations for the court, including: i) the accused’s 
general right to know the witness’s identity; ii) the extent to which the witness’s 
credibility would be a relevant factor when weighing his/her evidence; iii) 
whether the witness’s evidence might be the sole or decisive evidence implicating 
the defendant; iv) whether the witness’s evidence can be properly tested; and v) 
whether there is another alternative measure to protect the witness.1525  
Concerning the compatibility of the CJA with the ECHR and ECtHR’s 
case law, it has been said that it dilutes the accused’s right under article 6 of the 
ECHR by broadening the grounds based on which an anonymity order may be 
granted.1526 Indeed, an important omission is the requirement whereby 
convictions shall not be solely or decisively based on anonymous testimony, 
being envisaged only as ‘a relevant consideration’ for the court.1527 Since the 
courts are not in principle obliged to refuse to issue an order under those 
circumstances, an accused may at least in theory be convicted solely or decisively 
on the basis of an anonymous witness’s testimony.1528 This indeed goes against 
reiterated ECtHR’s case law, starting with its seminal case Kostovski v. The 
Netherlands, according to which, anonymous testimony should not form the sole 
or decisive basis for any conviction.1529 Furthermore, in Al-Khawaja and Tahery 
v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR concluded that ‘Even when “counterbalancing” 
procedures are found to compensate sufficiently the handicaps under which the 
defence labours, a conviction should not be based either solely or to a decisive 
extent on anonymous statements’.1530  
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1524 CJA, section 88 (6). 
1525 Ibid., section 89 (2).  
1526 Jonathan Doak and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘Anonymous Witnesses in England and Wales: 
Charting a Course from Strasbourg’ (2009) 73 Journal of Criminal Law 508, 528. 
1527 CJA, section 89 (2) (c). 
1528 Doak and Huxley-Binns (2009) 529.  
1529 Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 11454/85, Judgment, 20 November 1989, para. 44; 
Doorson v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 20524/92, Judgment, 26 March 1996; para. 76; Van 
Mechelen v. The Netherlands, Appl. Nos. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93, 22056/93, Judgment, 23 
April 1997, para. 55; Krasniki v. Czech Republic, Appl. No. 51277/99, Judgment, 28 February 2006, 
para. 76; Birutis and others v. Lithuania, Appl. Nos. 47698/99 and 48115/99, Judgment, 28 March 
2002, para. 29.     
1530 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, Judgment, 20 
January 2009, para. 37. (Citing Doorson v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 20524/92, Judgment, 26 
March 1996, para. 76). See also Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom, Application Nos. 
26766/05 and 22228/06, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 15 December 2011, para. 119.  
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As for the conditions established under the CJA to grant anonymity, 
they seem to establish a lower threshold than the ECtHR’s ‘strictly necessary’ 
standard for measures restricting the accused’s rights.1531 Thus, the CJA 
introduces a seemingly lower standard (‘necessary’) which is even absent in one 
of the conditions to grant anonymity.1532 The CJA also allows prevention of a 
(serious) property damage or real harm to the public interest as possible grounds 
for granting anonymity whereas cases before the ECtHR have invariably 
involved threats to the person’s life or integrity. However, in other aspects, the 
CJA arguably meets the standards set under the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Be that 
as it may, in R. v. Mayers and Others, the Court of Appeal’s first case applying 
the provisional Criminal Evidence Act, largely re-enacted by the CJA, the Lord 
Chief Justice emphasized that the judge’s role involves a ‘delicate balance’ 
between the accused’s right to a fair trial under article 6 of the ECtHR and the 
rights of the witnesses under articles 2 (life), 3 (physical security) and 8 (private 
life).1533 In any case, when the Court of Appeal has been called to apply the new 
statutory provisions, i.e., Criminal Evidence Act, it has ‘displayed little 
inclination to hold that the relevant criteria for the making of an anonymity 
order were not satisfied’.1534 It remains to be seen the judicial evaluation of the 
exact situation of the CJA provisions on anonymous witnesses and its 
compatibility with human rights standards.     
          
4.1.2. American Adversarial System  
Even though the United States Supreme Court has not forbidden the use of 
anonymous witness, it has not specifically upheld such practice either.1535 
Moreover, although some state and federal laws permit the delay in disclosure of 
witness’ names, they remain silent as to the admissibility of an anonymous 
witness at trial.1536 In addressing anonymity, courts have in particular relied on 
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1531 Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, Appl. Nos. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93, 22056/93, 
Judgment, 23 April 1997, para. 58. 
1532 CJA, section 88 (5). 
1533 R v. Mayers [2008] EWCA Crim 2989; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1915, para 6. 
1534 Ben Emmerson, Andrew Ashworth and Alison Macdonald (eds.), Human Rights and Criminal 
Justice (3rd edn., Thomson/Sweet and Maxwell 2012) 665. Thus, for instance, in R v. Mayers, the 
Court considered only in one of the four appeals that the trial judge lacked power to issue an 
anonymity order. See R v. Mayers [2008] EWCA Crim 2989; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1915, para. 52. See 
also Powar [2009] EWA Crim 594, [2009] 2 Cr. App. R. 8, p. 120. See also Emmerson, Ashworth 
and Macdonald (2012) 664-665.     
1535 Karsai (2011) 30. 
1536 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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two United States Supreme Court cases.1537 In the first one, Alford v. United 
States, the Court mentioned that ‘There is a duty to protect him from questions 
which go beyond the bonds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy 
or humiliate him’.1538 In the second case, Smith v. Illinois, even though the Court 
found a violation of the Confrontation Clause when a trial court precluded 
questioning seeking a prosecution witness’s real name,1539 this finding was 
actually reached because in this case no reason was given to excuse the witness 
from answering.1540 Indeed, as Justice White explained, the result might have 
been different if there was an important government purpose behind non-
disclosure, i.e., protection of a witness whose life was threatened.1541 
  In any case, complete anonymity has been authorized in state case law 
and Circuit Courts in response to, inter alia, a danger to a witness’s life.1542 Thus, 
in Ohio v. Quintero, the Court of Appeals of Ohio upheld a complete anonymity 
order where ‘revealing the name of the witness might subject the witness to 
harm’.1543 In People v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, the California Court of 
Appeal overturned an order requesting the prosecutor to reveal a twelve-year-
old witness’s identity who observed the accused to flee the homicide crime 
scene.1544 In People v. Frost, the Court of Appeals of New York determined that 
the lower court had appropriately concluded that ‘the witness’s concerns for 
safety outweighed defendant’s interest in obtaining information concerning 
[witness]’s true identity for purely collateral impeachment purposes’.1545 The 
accused was apparently never provided the witness’s true identity.1546 In United 
States v. Borda and Unites States v. Zelaya, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld a complete non-disclosure order.1547 In the latter case, it was determined 
that an ‘actual threat’ to the witnesses justified non-disclosure if it would not 
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1537 The cases referred to in this paragraph have been cited and examined in further detail by Ibid., 
30, 36-37. 
1538 Alford v. United States 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931). 
1539 Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968). 
1540 Ibid., 134 (White, J., concurring). 
1541 Ibid., 133-134 (White J., concurring). 
1542 The cases referred to in this paragraph have been cited and examined in further detail by Karsai 
(2011) 39-44.  
1543 Quintero, 1990 Ohio App. Lexis 752, *1. 
1544 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 343-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
1545 People v. Frost, 790 N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003). 
1546 Ibid., 1187.  
1547 United States v. Borda, No. 96-4752, No. 96-4753, No. 96-4806, No. 96-4807, No. 96-4856, 
1999 U.S. App. Lexis 9031, at *1 n.1 (4th Cir. May 11, 1999); United States v. Zelaya, 336 F. App’x 
355, 358 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).   
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deny ‘effective cross-examination’.1548 In turn, although the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals was ‘bother[ed]’ that the witness’s true name was never 
provided to the accused before or during the trial, it affirmed the accused’s 
conviction in United States v. Ji Wu Chen.1549 It is important to mention that, the 
cases referred to herein, have generally been about drug and counterfeit good 
trafficking and (international) gangs. Also, the government obtained a ruling 
permitting a witness to testify anonymously and wear light disguise in a case on a 
dirty bomb plot.1550 Indeed, it is expected that once terrorism cases are tried in 
federal courts, the issue concerning the need for anonymous witnesses will be 
discussed again.1551 The above-referred cases constitute good examples of the 
tension between the right to confrontation and the risks faced by some witnesses 
as well as the trend whereby not all ‘courts view witness anonymity as a 
Confrontation Clause violation, even with respect to material witnesses’.1552   
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a more recent case (United 
States v. Ramos-Cruz), upheld previous case law by allowing anonymous 
witnesses granted on demonstration of actual danger and the defence’s capacity 
to effectively cross-examine the witnesses and, thus, no violation of the 
confrontation clause was found.1553  
 With regard to delay in disclosure, although the accused is not granted 
with the right to a list of prosecution’s witnesses before the trial under the 
United States Constitution,1554 Federal statutory law establishes that witnesses 
shall be disclosed to the accused in capital offence cases.1555 Some states also 
authorize delaying disclosure of witness’s identity.1556 Accordingly, witness’s 
identity may be protected until (s)he testifies at trial. However, this delay can be 
criticized as precludes pre-trial investigation and may make an independent 
investigation very difficult.1557 In any case, the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
of Appeals has found that the constitutional right of cross-examination ‘has 
never been held to encompass a right to pre-trial disclosure of prosecution 
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1548 United States v. Zelaya, 336 F. App’x 355, 358 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), 358. 
1549 273 F. App’x 838. 839 (11th Cir. 2008). 
1550 See Karsai (2011) 47. 
1551 See Ibid., 45. 
1552 Ibid., 60.  
1553 United States v. Ramos-Cruz, F.3d (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2012) (No. 08-4647).
1554 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).  
1555 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2006). Cited by Karsai (2011) 49.   
1556 See, e.g., Fla. R. Crim. Proc. R. 3.220 (West 2010). Cited by Karsai (2011) 49.  
1557 See, for further analysis, Karsai (2011) 50-54.   
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witness’.1558 The focus of courts which have permitted some level of anonymity 
has been the existence of a genuine risk of harm to the witness and whether the 
accused ‘can place the witness in the proper context and explore bias and 
credibility issues on cross-examination’.1559             
   
4.1.3. French Inquisitorial System 
Article 706-58 of the CPP allows anonymous witness in cases of crimes punished 
with at least a three-year imprisonment sanction and when there is a grave risk 
against the life or physical integrity of the witness or of his/her family members. 
Accordingly, upon justified request from the Prosecutor of the Republic or the 
investigating judge, the judge of liberties and detention in a reasoned decision 
may ‘authorize that this person’s statements will be recorded without his identity 
appearing in the dossier’.1560 It is also mentioned that the judge of liberties and 
detention can proceed proprio motu during the witness’s hearing. The 
anonymous witness’s identity and address are registered in another verbal 
process as part of a dossier different from that of the case. The witness’s identity 
and address are registered in a parallel record, open to the Grand Instance 
Tribunal. As a necessary safeguard, article 706-62 of the CPP explicitly states that 
no conviction can be rendered based solely on an anonymous witness’s 
testimony. Moreover, the Cour de Cassation has seemingly considered the notion 
of anonymous witness more restrictively and apparently under a negative 
approach.1561   
 Concerning human rights standards, it is important to mention that the 
ECtHR in Rachdad v. France, found France responsible for violation of article 6 
of the ECHR since the petitioner’s conviction was based only on an anonymous 
witness.1562 In French legislation, the conditions to admit anonymous witnesses 
are arguably less strict than the ECtHR’s standards and this observation is also 
applicable to the modifications to the CPP, i.e., the legal frame for the 
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1558 United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 
831 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. Denied, 131 S. Ct. 620 (2010).  
1559 Karsai (2011) 60. 
1560 CPP, article 706-58 (‘autoriser que les déclarations de cette personne soient recueillies sans que 
son identitité apparaisse dans le dossier de la procédure’.).  
1561 Cass. Crim., 17 October 1991, Dr. pénal, 1992, comm. 27. Cited by Muriel Guerrin, ‘Le 
Témoignage Anonyme au Regard de la Jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de 
l'homme’ (2002) 45 Revue Trimestrielle Des Droits De L’Homme 25, 48.   
1562  Rachdad v. France, Appl. No. 71846/01, Judgment, 13 November 2003, paras. 24-25. 
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anonymous testimony as already presented.1563 In turn, the Cour de Cassation 
has assessed anonymous witness’s testimony in reference to its ‘decisive’ 
character, and also verifying if, in combination with other evidentiary materials, 
the anonymous testimony constitutes the only evidence.1564 Accordingly, the 
proceedings are often validated by establishing that the anonymous witness was 
not ‘indispensable for the determination of the truth’.1565 However, in Delta v. 
France, the ECtHR was relatively more severe than the Cour de Cassation as the 
former indicated that the anonymous witness is prohibited unless enough 
safeguards are taken, not only when such witness alone contributes to the judge’s 
conviction but also when there is not too a decisive contribution.1566 Be that as it 
may, the Cour de Cassation has adopted the same criterion than the ECtHR’s 
when finding that under no circumstances can anonymous witnesses constitute 
the only evidence to establish the accused’s guilt.1567   
 
4.2. The ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL 
4.2.1. Anonymity Prior to Trial 
The permissibility of non-disclosure of witnesses’ identities to the defendant 
during pre-trial proceedings as a protective measure has already been discussed 
and it is herein referred to the analysis previously done.1568 Accordingly, in this 
subsection, some extra considerations particularly relevant to witness’s 
anonymity are added. During the pre-trial stage, more precisely after 
confirmation of the indictment, the Prosecutor may request a Judge or a 
Chamber to order not to disclose the identity of a witness or a victim who may 
be at risk or in danger.1569 The disclosure exemption is applicable until the victim 
or witness in danger or risk is brought under the protection of the tribunal 
(ICTY) or until the Chamber decides otherwise (ICTR, SCSL) as established in 
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1563 See Clara Salomon-Corlobé, ‘Le témoignage anonyme et le procès équitable’ (2011). Available 
at: http://m2bde.u-paris10.fr/content/le-t%C3%A9moignage-anonyme-et-le-proc%C3%A8s-
%C3%A9quitable-par-clara-salomon-corlob%C3%A9 (last visit on 12 August 2012). 
1564 Cass. Crim., 24 October 1989, Bull. Crim. No. 373. Cited by Guerrin (2002) 55.    
1565 ‘pas indispensable à la manifestation de la vérité’. Cass. crim., 3 February 1993, J.C.P. 1994. I. 
22197, note P. Chambon; 6 March 1991, Dr. pénal 1991, comm. 213; 21 January 1991, Bull. crim. 
no 32, D. 1991, somm. p. 213, obs. J. Pradel; 24 October 1989, Bull. crim. no 373. Cited by Guerrin 
(2002) 55.     
1566 Delta v. France, Appl. No. 11444/85, Judgment, 19 December 1990,  para. 36. 
1567 See Guerrin (2002) 58. 
1568 See supra Chapter III 3.2.1.  
1569 See, e.g., Tadić (IT-94-1-T), 10 August 1995, para. 15.  
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rule 69 (A).1570 Additionally, rule 69 (C) lays down that, subject to rule 75 
(protective measures), ‘the identity of the victim or witness shall be disclosed in 
sufficient time prior to the trial to allow adequate time for preparation of the 
defence’ (ICTY) or ‘shall be disclosed in sufficient time before a witness is to be 
called to allow adequate time for preparation of the prosecution and the defence’ 
(ICTR, SCSL). The standard of ‘until such person is brought under the 
protection of the tribunal’ has been qualified by some scholars as troublesome 
due to the fact that ‘the Tribunal is unable to maintain such protection’.1571 Rule 
69 hence permits the Prosecutor to request temporal exemptions from the 
general rules on disclosure during pre-trial proceedings.1572   
Importantly for the admissibility of anonymous testimony, the ICTY in 
Blaskić differentiated the period prior to trial from the period after the beginning 
of trial.1573 Thus, during preliminary proceedings and continuing for ‘a 
reasonable time’ before the commencement of the trial, ‘victims and witnesses 
merit protection, even from the accused’.1574  
 
4.2.2. Anonymity During Trial 
4.2.2.1. Presentation  
Witness anonymity, i.e., non-disclosure of the witness’ identity to the accused, in 
trial is not explicitly provided under the legal frameworks of the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL. However, the ICTY has so far allowed only once witness 
anonymity during trial proceedings.1575 In Tadić, Trial Chamber II stated 
conditions to grant anonymity to witnesses:  
 
First and foremost, there must be real fear for the safety of the witness or her or 
his family […]. 
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1570 The SCSL rule 69 (A) wording is slightly different from that of the ICTR as reads as follows: 
‘until the Judge or Chamber decides otherwise’. As for relevant case law on rule 69 see supra 
Chapter III 3.2.1.  
1571 Christine Chinkin, ‘The protection of Victims and Witnesses’ in Gabrielle McDonald and 
Olivia Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: 
The Experience of International and National Courts, Vol. 1 (Kluwer Law International 2000) 451, 
461. 
1572 In addition, see rule 66 of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL RPE which deals with the Prosecutor’s 
disclosure obligations.  
1573 Blaškić (IT-95-14-T) Decision on the Application of the Prosecutor Dated 17 October 1996 
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 5 November 1996.  
1574 Ibid., para. 24. 
1575 See, e.g., OSCE-ODIHR/ICTY/UNICRI, International Criminal Law and Practice Training 
Materials: Witnesses and Victims (2011a) 24.  
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Secondly, the testimony of the particular witness must be important to the 
Prosecutor’s case […]. 
Thirdly, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there is no prima facie 
evidence that the witness is untrustworthy […]. 
Fourthly, the ineffectiveness or non-existence of a witness protection 
programme is another point that […] has considerable bearing on any decision 
to grant anonymity […].  
Finally, any measures taken should be strictly necessary. If a less restrictive 
measure can secure the required protection, that measure should be applied 
[…].1576  
 
This decision additionally laid down four guidelines:   
 
Firstly, the Judges must be able to observe the demeanour of the witness, in 
order to assess the reliability of the testimony. Secondly, the Judges must be 
aware of the identity of the witness, in order to test the reliability of the witness. 
Thirdly, the defence must be allowed ample opportunity to question the witness 
on issues unrelated to his or her identity or current whereabouts, such as how 
the witness was able to obtain the incriminating information but still excluding 
information that would make the true name traceable. Finally, the identity of 
the witness must be released when there are no longer reasons to fear for the 
security of the witness.1577      
 
Other ICTY Chambers have applied these guidelines in later cases.1578 
The Chamber in Tadić reserved the right to exclude the evidence brought by 
anonymous witness later if it eventually turned out that the accused’s right to 
cross examination (article 21 (4) of the ICTY Statute) had been unfairly 
limited.1579 Even though the Trial Chamber concluded that the knowledge of the 
witness’s identity is not necessarily essential for the principle of due process,1580 it 
also stated that the accused or his/her counsel should at least be given the 
opportunity to question the witness on issues not related to his/her identity.1581 
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1576 Tadić (IT-94-1), 10 August 1995, paras. 62-66.    
1577 Ibid., para. 71. 
1578 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Decision on the Motion by the Prosecution for Protective Measures 
for the Prosecution Witnesses Pseudonymed ‘B’ through ‘M’, Trial Chamber, 28 April 1997, para. 
60; Blaskić (IT-95-14-T), Decision on the Application of the Prosecutor Dated 17 October 1996 
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 5 November 1996, 
para. 41. 
1579 Tadić (IT-94-1), 10 August 1995, para. 84.   
1580 Ibid., para. 68. 
1581 Ibid., para. 71. 
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Factors that strongly influenced the Trial Chamber’s decision in Tadić were: i) 
the lack at the ICTY of any kind of police force which could protect witnesses 
from intimidation or reprisals, unlike a national court working under normal 
conditions; ii) the Serb-controlled regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the 
crimes happened, were still lawless and covered with impunity, which made the 
witnesses not able to rely on local police officers who were actually themselves 
participants in the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign; and iii) the absence of 
arrangements to re-locate witnesses, i.e., lack of witness protection 
programmes.1582 Considering these circumstances, anonymity was considered as 
the only means available to protect certain witnesses.1583  
Nevertheless, in the strong dissent by Justice Stephen (Australia), 
granting full witness anonymity was considered as opposed to proceedings 
conducted with the full respect of the accused’s rights as laid down in article 20 
(1) of the ICTY Statute.1584 Be that as it may, the ICTY has no longer allowed full 
anonymous witnesses during trial. Thus, for example, in the later Blaskić 
decision referred to in the previous subsection, the Trial Chamber seemingly 
adopted some of Judge Stephen’s considerations. 
   
4.2.2.2. Legal Discussion  
Important arguments may be raised in favor of the Tadić decision allowing 
anonymous witnesses.1585 First, the ICTY did not provide blanket anonymity but 
the Trial Chamber subjected it to requirements as complemented by specific 
guidelines and given when it was demonstrably necessary.1586 Second, in practice 
witness anonymity was not as onerous as originally thought. Only two out of the 
four persons benefited were called to testify and one of those two agreed to give 
evidence in public without protection. Concerning the only witness who testified 
anonymously, the defence counsel could see him and, although the accused 
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1582 See John R. D. Jones (2002) 1365. 
1583 See Christine Chinkin, ‘Due Process and Witness Anonymity’ 91 American Journal of 
International Law (1997) 75-79.  
1584 Tadić (IT-94-1), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for 
Victims and Witnesses, Trial Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on the Prosecutor’s 
Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses of 10 August 1995. 
1585 In favour of the ICTY decision on allowing anonymous witnesses see, e.g., Mercedeh Momeni, 
‘Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect Victim and 
Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal of the 
Former Yugoslavia’ (1997) 41 Howard Law Journal 155, 178; Chinkin (1997) 78; Brouwer (2005), 
252-253.    
1586 See Olivia Swaak-Goldman, ‘The ICTY and the Right to Fair Trial: A Critic of the Critics’ 
(1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 215, 220. 
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could not, he could still hear the witness’s undistorted testimony in the original 
language. Third, the judges knew the witness’s identity, limiting the cross-
examination and that was taken into account when assessing the value of that 
witness’s evidence.1587 Fourth, the nature of crimes,1588 the high security risks and 
on-going hostilities, as remarked by the Chamber, arguably justified the 
admission of testimony by an anonymous witness. In other words, anonymous 
witness’s testimony could be admissible as an exceptional measure in exceptional 
circumstances. Fifth, many of the arguments in favor of anonymous witnesses 
were related to sexual violence victims, group whose protection was emphasized 
by the UN Secretary-General,1589 which is connected with the efforts to avoid 
potential re-traumatization.1590 
Sixth, as the Trial Chamber considered, article 6 of the ECHR could have 
only limited relevance since it, like article 14 of the ICCPR, does not specify 
witness protection as among its primary objectives.1591 Indeed, the ECtHR in 
Kostovski v. The Netherlands concluded that the disadvantages that an accused 
must face when addressing the evidence of an anonymous witnesses can be 
counterbalanced by safeguards provided by the trial court.1592 Likewise, as 
already examined, while domestic courts normally emphasize the importance of 
protecting the accused’s right to a fair trial, including knowing the prosecution 
witnesses’ identities, it has been acknowledged that exceptions may be justified 
by the need to adjust the balance of fairness.   
Seventh, paying attention to the standards identified in Kostovski v. The 
Netherlands, the ICTY adopted the four above-mentioned guidelines due to:  
 
[…] the need to provide for guidelines to be followed in order to ensure a fair 
trial when granting anonymity. It believes that some guidance as to what 
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1587 Ibid., 221. 
1588 Ibid., 218.   
1589 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808 
(1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), para. 108.  
1590 Chinkin (1997) 78. 
1591 The Chamber, concerning case law surrounding article 6 of the ECHR and corresponding 
article 14 of the ICCPR, noticed that neither convention ‘lists the protection of victims and 
witnesses as one of its primacy concerns. As such, the interpretation given by the other judicial 
bodies to Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR is only of limited relevance in 
applying the provisions of the Rules and Statute of the [ICTY] as these bodies interpret their 
provisions in the context of their legal framework, which do not contain the same provisions’. 
Tadić (IT-94-1), 10 August 1995, para. 27.    
1592 Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 11454/85, Judgment, 20 November 1989, paras. 37-45.  
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standards should be employed to ensure a fair trial can be ascertained both from 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and from domestic law.1593  
 
Furthermore, the ICTY also added that ‘these standards must be 
interpreted within the context of the unique object and purpose of the 
International Tribunal, particularly recognizing its mandate to protect victims 
and witnesses. The following guidelines achieve that purpose’.1594  
However, due to important and legitimate concerns mainly relating to 
the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial by allowing an anonymous witness 
during trial, it is here argued that the best option is not allowing anonymous 
witnesses during trial proceedings based on the following arguments.1595  
First, as identified by Judge Stephen in his dissent in Tadić, there is no 
ICTY legal framework provision that allows for withholding the witness’s 
identity during trial.1596 Moreover, rule 69 (B), relating to protection of victims 
and witnesses, requires that the witness’s identity ‘shall be disclosed in sufficient 
time prior to the trial to allow adequate time for preparation of the defence’. 
Additionally, rule 75 (A) requires that whatever measures are adopted for the 
protection of victims and witnesses must be ‘consistent with the rights of the 
accused’. Furthermore, also in agreement with Judge Stephen, whereas the ICTY 
Statute requires ‘that proceedings are conducted with full respect for the rights of 
the accused’, the ICTY only refers to ‘with due regard for the protection of 
victims and witnesses’ and, hence, the only one of the accused’s rights subject to 
concerns of victims and witnesses is the right to a public trial.1597   
Second, minimum guarantees provided to the accused to confront 
witnesses would be violated by anonymous witnesses, as an extreme protective 
measure, since the defence would be only able to conduct an effective cross-
examination if the witness’s identity is known by him/her.1598  
Third, as identified by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Blaskić:  
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1593 Tadić (IT-94-1), 10 August 1995, para. 70. 
1594 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1595 Against anonymous witnesses see, e.g., Salvatore Zappalà, ‘The Rights of the Accused’ in 
Cassese et al. (2002) 1319, 1333; M. Leigh, ‘Witnesses Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due Process’ 
(1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 80, 83; Julian Nicholls, ‘Evidence Hearsay and 
Anonymous Witnesses’ in Roelof Haveman, Olga Kavran and Julian Nicholls (eds.), Supranational 
Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (Intersentia 2003) 239, 286-288.    
1596 Tadić (IT-94-1), Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses of 10 August 1995.  
1597 Ibid. 
1598 Ibid. 
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[…] from that time forth [the start of the trial] […] the right of the accused to 
an equitable trial must take precedence and require that the veil of anonymity 
be lifted in his favour, even if the veil must continue to obstruct the view of the 
public and the media.1599  
 
The ICTY in Blaskić, by distinguishing between pre-trial and trial rights 
of the accused relative to those of the witness, lifted the ‘veil of anonymity’ in 
time for the defense to adequately prepare for cross-examination. The ICTY in 
Blaskić specifically recognized the interconnection of the accused’s right to 
‘reasonable time’ for preparation of his/her case and the time when witnesses 
must disclose their identities to the defense.1600 Thus, even though the Judges in 
Blaskić considered that victims and witnesses deserve protection not only from 
the media and public but also from the accused prior to trial, they concluded that 
the accused’s right to a fair trial shall prevail and, hence, the veil of anonymity 
has to be lifted.1601 Moreover, in Brdanin and Talić, the ICTY stated that ‘the 
rights of the accused are made the first consideration and the need to protect 
victims and witnesses is a secondary one’.1602 This case also raised the parameters 
for what could be regarded as exceptional circumstances as for witness 
anonymity, concluding that a general climate of intimidation is an insufficient 
justification.1603        
Fourth, the ineffectiveness or non-existence of a witness protection 
programme at the ICTY as a factor given considerable bearing on granting 
anonymity in Tadić was later no longer applicable. The ICTY progressively 
entered into bilateral framework relocation arrangements with States to facilitate 
the relocation of witnesses and their families who could not return to the 
region.1604 Thus, the ICTY refused in Blaškić to force the defence to waive 
sufficient cross-examination preparation to provide protection for a witness via 
shielding his/her identity after the beginning of the trial.  
Fifth, the ICTY itself in Tadić paid very close attention to the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence, in particular Kostovski v. The Netherlands. Thus, the ICTY 
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1599 Blaškić (IT-95-14-T), 5 November 1996, para. 24.  
1600 Blaškić (IT-95-14-T), Decision of Trial Chamber I on the Applications of the Prosecutor Dated 
24 June and 30 August 1996 in Respect of the Protection of Witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 2 October 
1996, para. 5.  
1601 Blaskić (IT-95-14-T), 5 November 1996, para. 24.  
1602 Brdanin and Talić (IT-99-36), Decision on the Motion by the Prosecution for Protective 
Measures, Trial Chamber, 3 July 2000, para. 20.   
1603 Ibid., paras. 22 et seq. 
1604 UNICRI-ICTY (2009) 202.  
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approvingly cited the general rule in Kostovski v. The Netherlands according to 
which ‘In principle, all the evidence must be produced in the presence of the 
accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument’.1605 The ICTY 
reached this conclusion as a direct result of the following standard laid down in 
Kostovski v. The Netherlands:  
 
If the defence is unaware of the identity of the person it seeks to question, it may 
be deprived of the very particulars enabling it to demonstrate that he or she is 
prejudiced, hostile or unreliable. Testimony or other declarations inculpating an 
accused may well be designedly untruthful or simply erroneous and the defence 
will scarcely be able to bring this to light if it lacks the information permitting it 
to test the author's reliability or cast doubt on his credibility.1606  
 
Sixth, although the majority opinion in Tadić considered that ECtHR’s 
decisions regarding the accused’s fair trial rights were of little relevance, the 
ECHR and the ICCPR actually served as basis and were the antecedents of article 
21 (2) and (4) of the ICTY as identified by Judge Stephen referring to the UN 
Secretary-General’s Report.1607  
Lastly, but equally important, it is significant to notice that witness L, 
who testified anonymously in Tadić, was discovered to have lied under oath 
during the course of the trial proceedings.1608 This constitutes a good example of 
the inherent risk of allowing anonymous witnesses at international and hybrid 
criminal courts.  
As previously discussed,1609 although the ICTR and the SCSL adopted the 
ICTY guidelines when taking far-reaching protective measures, they have not so 
far granted full anonymity to witnesses.1610 Nevertheless, Trial Chamber III of the 
ICTR in Bagosora pointed out the following:  
 
There is nothing within the statute that indicates that an accused right to a fair 
trial is somehow hampered or compromised in service of witness protection. 
The concepts of protective measures for witnesses, including delayed disclosure 
of identity, did not streak like a meteor across the existing statutory and 
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1605 Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 11454/85, Judgment, 20 November 1989, para 41 
(cited in Tadić (IT-94-1), 10 August 1995, para. 54). 
1606 Ibid., para. 42 (cited in Tadić (IT-94-1), 10 August 1995, para. 54).  
1607 Judge Stephen referred to the Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the 
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (3 may 1993).   
1608 Referred to by Swaak-Goldman (1997) 221.  
1609 See supra Chapter III 3.2. 
1610 See, e.g., OSCE-ODIHR/ICTY/UNICRI (2011a) 24.  
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regulatory landscape of the accused right to a fair trial and effective cross-
examination.1611    
 
Accordingly, whilst not permitting anonymous witnesses, the ICTR and 
also the SCSL have in several cases authorized that disclosure of the witnesses’ 
identities to be delayed beyond the beginning of the trial, in application of a 
‘rolling disclosure’ system. Under this system, individual witnesses’ identities are 
required to be revealed within sufficient time prior to the witness giving evidence 
to permit the accused to adequately prepare his/her defence. Therefore, the 
timing of disclosure is measured back from the date on which the particular 
witness is expected to testify. For example, while in Bagosora the ICTR Chamber 
allowed the Prosecutor not to disclose the identities of the witnesses until 35 days 
before the witness was called to give evidence,1612 the SCSL ruled in Gbao to 
disclose witness’s identity only 42 days prior to that particular witness’s 
testimony.1613 Nevertheless, these measures are here questioned as they 
jeopardize the defendant’s right to a fair trial by significantly reducing the 
amount of time the defence has to prepare its case.1614 It should, however, be 
mentioned that when the ICTR adopted the decision in Bagosora, the ICTR RPE 
also specified that disclosure must be made prior to trial even though rule 69 (C) 
was later amended to confirm the basis for such decisions.  
 
4.3. The ICC  
4.3.1. Anonymity Prior to Trial 
As already discussed,1615 whereas protective measures seek first and foremost the 
non-disclosure of identity of victims and witnesses to the public and media, 
some measures have also been granted to protect their identity vis-à-vis the 
defence. This section examines this point in further detail.  
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1611 Bagosora et al. (ICTR-48-91-I), Decision and Scheduling Order on the Prosecution Motion for 
Harmonization and Modification of Protective Measures for Witnesses, Trial Chamber, 5 
December 2001, para. 16.  
1612 Ibid., para. 2. 
1613 Gbao, (SCSL-2003-09-PT), Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective 
Measures for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-public Disclosure, Trial Chamber, 10 October 
2003, para.58. 
1614 See, corroborating, Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-I), Separate Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pavel 
Dolenc on the Decision and Scheduling Order on the Prosecution Motion for Harmonisation and 
Modification of Protective Measures for Witnesses, 5 December 2001; Joanna Pozen, ‘The Non-
Disclosure of Witnesses’ Identities in ICTR Trials’ (2006) 38 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 281, 298.    
1615 See supra Chapter III 3.3.   
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 Article 68 (5) of the ICC Statute establishes that: 
 
Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Statute may 
lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her family, 
the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the 
commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information and instead 
submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which 
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial. 
 
In turn, rule 81 (4), which details article 68 (5), states that:  
 
The Chamber dealing with the matter shall, on its own motion or at the request 
of the Prosecutor, the accused or any State, take the necessary steps to ensure 
the confidentiality of information, in accordance with articles 54, 72 and 93, 
and, in accordance with article 68, to protect the safety of witnesses and victims 
and members of their families, including by authorizing the non-disclosure of 
their identity prior to the commencement of the trial [emphasis added].1616 
 
  Accordingly, as previously examined, non-disclosure of the identity of a 
witness is limited to pre-trial proceedings since his/her identifying information 
has to be disclosed to the defence prior to trial. Keeping the identity of the victim 
or witness undisclosed to the defence during the pre-trial stage can be grounded 
on the general consideration that, at this stage, it is neither necessary nor wise for 
the Prosecutor to supply all evidence collected by him/her, which would not 
undermine the accused’s rights.1617 Otherwise, the Prosecutor’s duty to guarantee 
confidentiality and protection of victims and witnesses would be conflicted.1618 
Hence, the Prosecutor has to be able to submit necessary evidence in a manner 
to preserve confidentiality, and, if possible, the anonymity of witnesses during 
the pre-trial stage.1619 Nevertheless, the Prosecutor’s obligation to disclose 
exculpatory information, as provided for in article 67 (2) of the ICC Statute, shall 
be borne in mind on this regard. The same article states that in ‘case of doubt as 
to the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide’ as determined in the 
ICC’s case law already examined.1620 In application of article 68 (5) together with 
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1616 See also Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 842-843.  
1617 See Donat-Cattin (2008a) 1293.  
1618 See ICC Statute, article 54 (1) (b), (c) and 3 (f). 
1619 See Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice in the ICC, Proposal for Rome Diplomatic 
Conference. Cited in Donat-Cattin (2008a) 1293.  
1620 See supra Chapter III 3.3.1. 
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article 61 (5) of the ICC Statute and rule 81 (4), Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single 
Judge) in Lubanga allowed the:  
 
Prosecution to request the Chamber to authorise (i) the non-disclosure of the 
identity of certain witnesses on whom the Prosecution intends to rely at the 
confirmation of charges hearing and (ii) the reliance on the summary evidence 
of their statements, the transcripts of their interviews and/or the investigators’ 
notes and reports of their interviews.1621 
   
Therefore, the Court can order the non-disclosure of witnesses’ 
identities vis-à-vis the defence for the purposes of the confirmation of charges 
hearing to protect the safety of Prosecution witnesses.1622 Thus, the non-
disclosure of the identity of witnesses on whom the Prosecutor intends to rely 
during the confirmation of charges hearing or portions of their prior statements 
constitutes an exception to the rule whereby the identity of them and their prior 
statements need to be disclosed.1623 The Pre-Trial Chamber has determined that 
even if prejudice were to result from the authorized redactions, it would not be 
inconsistent with a fair and impartial trial due to the fact that the redactions are 
only for the proceedings leading up to the confirmation charges hearing, which 
is an early stage of the case proceedings.1624 The Appeals Chamber has 
established, in the course of pre-trial proceedings, that three of the most 
important considerations when a Chamber has to decide  whether to authorize 
non-disclosure of the identities of witnesses are: i) the danger to the witness or 
his/her family that disclosure may entail; ii) the necessity for the protective 
measures; and iii) an assessment of whether the measures will be prejudicial to, 
or inconsistent with, the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.1625 It 
was further pointed out that there should be an examination as to whether less 
restrictive protective measures are sufficient and feasible in those 
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1621 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-437), First Decision on Rule 81, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single 
Judge), 15 September 2006, p. 9.  
1622 Ibid., p. 7. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-462), Decision on the Arrangements for 
Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 22 September 2006.   
1623 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-568), Decision Establishing General Principles Governing 
Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Appeals Chamber, 13 October 2006, paras. 1, 34, 35.   
1624 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-160), Decision on the Prosecution Request for 
Authorisation to Redact Statements of Witnesses 4 and 9, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 23 
January 2008, para. 31. 
1625 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-773), 14 December 2006, paras. 21-23.   
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circumstances.1626 Pre-Trial Chambers have followed the same criteria 
concerning non-disclosure of the identity of witnesses, i.e., i) it should only be 
granted after exhausting the possibility of employing less extreme measures 
(principle of necessity); ii) it must be strictly limited to exigencies of the situation 
(principle of proportionality); and iii) it must not infringe the right of the 
defendant to a fair and impartial trial.1627  
Be that as it may, the procedural status of anonymous victims and 
witnesses has been more limited than that of their non-anonymous counter-
parts. Thus, as determined by Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) in Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui whilst non-anonymous victim participants are, inter alia, 
granted access to the confidential part of the record of the case and the 
possibility to attend closed session hearings, anonymous victim participants lack 
it.1628 It should be mentioned, however, that Pre-Trial Chamber III (Single Judge) 
in Bemba did not make that difference although it did not grant all victims in 
general access to ex parte or confidential decisions and documents.1629 Even 
though the modalities of victims’ participation are discussed in detail in the next 
chapter, it is herein argued that limiting the scope of participation of anonymous 
victim participants in contrast to non-anonymous ones constitutes an important 
measure to provide victims an exceptional protective measure but at the same 
time reducing the risks of compromising the accused’s rights. In any case, under 
one or another approach anonymous victim participants can only access public 
documents. As for testimonies by anonymous witnesses, during pre-trial, the 
Appeals Chamber determined that consideration may be given to the fact that 
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1626 Ibid., para. 33. 
1627 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-108), Decision Establishing General Principles Governing 
Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 19 May 2006; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-102), 
Decision on the Final Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 
May 2006. See also Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11-106), Decision Ordering the Victims and 
Witnesses Unit to Submit Observations, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 6 June 2011, para. 5; Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-475), Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled ‘First Decision on the Prosecution Request for 
Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements’, Appeals Chamber, 13 May 2008, para. 71 (stating 
that there must be ‘an objectively justifiable risk to the safety of a witness and/or a family 
member’).   
See also Bernhard Kuschnik, ‘International Criminal Due Process in the Making: New Tendencies 
in the Law of Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings before the ICC’ (2009) 9 International Criminal 
Law Review 157, 164; Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 843.    
1628 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, pp. 12-13. 
1629 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation, Pre-Trial Chamber 
III (Single Judge), 12 December 2008, para. 99.   
	

the defence’s alibi to challenge the evidence is affected because the defence does 
not know the identities of the witnesses and will only receive summaries, not the 
full statement or other information which could authenticate them.1630 In turn, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui stated that the probative 
value of evidence of anonymous witnesses contained in summaries could be 
affected if not corroborated.1631 It added that even though corroboration of 
summary evidence of anonymous witnesses is not a requirement for its 
admissibility, lack thereof could affect the probative value of such summary 
evidence.1632   
In Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, the Appeals Chamber has held that 
‘persons other than witnesses, victims and members of their families, may, at this 
stage of the proceedings [pre-trial proceedings], be protected through the non-
disclosure of their identities by analogy with other provisions of the Statute and 
the Rules’.1633 However, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that this measure for 
persons at risk must be adopted after ‘a careful assessment […] on a case by case 
basis, with specific regard to the rights of the [accused]’.1634   
 
4.3.2. Anonymity During Trial 
4.3.2.1. General Aspects  
Neither the ICC Statute nor the ICC RPE explicitly provides the figure of 
anonymous witnesses. Indeed, during the Preparatory Commission negotiations 
on the ICC RPE, the most difficult question was relating to anonymous 
witnesses.1635 Italy argued for the appointment of a guardian to the witness’s 
identity exceptionally.1636 However, the use of anonymous witnesses at trial was 
opposed by a large number of delegations, especially common law countries, due 
to concerns about the accused’s right to a fair trial and considering that whereas 
non-disclosure of witness’s identity to the public or media may be necessary in 
certain circumstances, non-disclosure of witness’s identity to the defence was a 
very different category.1637 Even though the Netherlands and Italy came up with 
 
1630 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-773), 14 December 2006, para. 51. 
1631 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-717), 30 September 2008, paras. 156-160. 
1632 Ibid., para. 160. 
1633 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-475), 13 May 2008, para. 56. 
1634 Ibid., para. 2.  
1635 Brady (2001a) 450. 
1636 Proposal submitted by Italy, PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP.20 (28 July 1999). 
1637 See Brady (2001a) 451.  
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modified proposals,1638 there was no consensus and, indeed, the delegations 
agreed not to agree. Instead, the ‘invaluable tool of “constructive ambiguity” 
came to rescue’.1639   
Although there is no explicit mention of the possibility of granting 
anonymity, rule 88 (1) refers to the possibility for the Chamber to ‘order special 
measures, such as, but not limited to, measures to facilitate the testimony of a 
traumatized victim or witness, a child, an elderly person or a victim of sexual 
violence, pursuant to article 68, paragraphs 1 and 2 [emphasis added]’. In turn, 
article 68 (1) refers to the adoption of ‘appropriate measures’. Rules 87 (3) and 
88 (1), as already examined, include non-exhaustive lists of protective measures. 
Accordingly, the ICC legal framework in principle does not preclude the 
admission of anonymous witnesses’ testimonies.  
 
4.3.2.2. Anonymity of Victim Participants and of Victim Witnesses   
Concerning the ICC practice, it is necessary to first conduct a separate analysis of 
anonymous victim participants and, then, to proceed with the discussion of 
anonymous victim witnesses since the victim participant status and the victim 
witness status are different in nature although the same victims can hold a dual 
status victim participant-victim witness.   
As for victim participants, the Trial Chamber I in Lubanga did not rule 
out the possibility of victims as anonymous participants:  
 
130. Both the prosecution and the defence resisted any suggestion that victims 
should remain anonymous as regards the defence during the proceeding leading 
up to and during the trial. However, the Trial Chamber rejects the submissions 
of the parties that anonymous victims should never be permitted to participate 
in the proceedings. Although the Trial Chamber recognizes that it is preferable 
the identities of victims are disclosed in full to the parties, the Chamber is also 
conscious of the particularly vulnerable position of many of these victims, who 
live in an area of ongoing conflict where it is difficult to ensure their safety.  
131. However, the Trial Chamber is of the view that extreme care must be 
exercised before permitting the participation of anonymous victims, particularly 
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1638 In order to reflect the principle of equality of arms, the Netherlands proposed adding to the 
Italian proposed rule that the defence should also be able to ask the ICC to withhold the defence 
witness’s identity from the Prosecutor at trial and use the procedure of the guardian of the 
witness’s identity. See PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP.35 (5 August 1999). In turn, Italy introduced a 
modified proposal whereby a Chamber could order witness anonymity in exceptional 
circumstances, when it considers that the witness was subjectively reliable and genuine, and the 
Chamber could appoint an independent guardian to assist it in this task.   
1639 Brady (2001a) 453. 
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in relation to the rights of the accused. While the safety and security of victims 
is a central responsibility of the Court, their participation in the proceedings 
cannot be allowed to undermine the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. The 
greater the extent and the significance of the proposed participation, the more 
likely it will be that the Chamber will require the victim to identify himself or 
herself. Accordingly, when resolving a request for anonymity by a victim who 
has applied to participate, the Chamber will scrutinise carefully the precise 
circumstances and the potential prejudice to the parties and other participants. 
Given the Chamber will always know the victim’s true identity, it will be well 
placed to assess the extent and the impact of the prejudice whenever this arises, 
and to determine whether steps that fall short of revealing the victim’s identity 
can sufficiently mitigate the prejudice.1640      
  
These findings, which have been followed by other Trial Chambers in 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui and Bemba,1641 are connected with the argument of 
the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) in Lubanga whereby rules 81 
and 87 were regarded as a valid ground for granting anonymity.1642 The Counsel 
referred to ECtHR’s jurisprudence by sustaining that anonymous witnesses are 
permissible, subject to certain conditions, in particular, to strike a balance 
between the accused’s rights and the protection of victims and witness.1643 
However, it was also acknowledged, as the ECtHR’s did in Doorson, that a guilty 
verdict may not be founded solely on the evidence of anonymous witnesses.1644 
The Trial Chamber in Lubanga noted and endorsed the ECtHR’s standard in, 
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1640 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 130-131. See also Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-2340), Decision on the defence observations regarding the right of the legal 
representatives of victims to question defence witnesses and on the notion of personal interest -
and- Decision on the defence application to exclude certain representatives of victims from the 
Chamber during the non-public evidence of various defence witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 11 March 
2010, paras. 36-37. 
1641 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG), Decision on the Modalities of 
Victim Participation at Trial, Trial Chamber II, 22 January 2010, paras. 92 and 93; Bemba (ICC-
01/05-01/08-2027), Second Order Regarding the Applications of the Legal Represenatives of 
Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns of the Victims, Trial Chamber III, 21 
December 2011, para. 19. See also Lorraine Smith-van Lin, ‘Victims’ Participation at the 
International Criminal Court: Benefit or Burden?’ in William Schabas et al. (eds.), The Ashgate 
Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 181, 192.   
1642 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1020), Observations du Bureau du Conseil Public suite à 
l'invitation de la Chambre de Première Instance, 9 November 2007.  
1643 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 78. 
1644 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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inter alia, Doorson according to which ‘a conviction should not be based either 
solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous statements’.1645  
In general, when ordering redactions, as a manner to expunging 
identifying information of a victim or a witness that could potentially put an 
individual at risk,1646 the ICC must consider its obligation to protect victims and 
witnesses and also fair trials.1647 Thus, in Lubanga, the Trial Chamber ordered 
the VRPS to lift redactions in victims’ applications relating to exculpatory 
information or information material to the preparation to the defence.1648 In 
reaching this decision, the Chamber balanced security concerns with the 
defence’s right to receive information, under article 67 (2) and rule 77, and 
determined that ‘the mere assertion that someone is in danger’ does not 
necessarily correspond to reality.1649 This conclusion is a clear example of the 
need for a continuous revision of authorized redactions so that the accused’s 
rights are guaranteed.1650  
Based on the above-discussed ICC decisions, the ICC practice has so far 
in certain circumstances considered that anonymity may be given to victims 
participants in the proceedings leading up to and during the trial itself. 
Concerning the trial proceedings, as acknowledged by Trial Chamber I in its 
judgment in Lubanga:   
 
Many of the victims in the case were granted protective measures and, in 
particular, anonymity because of their vulnerable position living in areas of 
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1645 Doorson v the Netherlands, Appl. No. 20524/92, Judgment (Merits), 20 February 1996, para. 
76. (Approvingly referred to by the ICC Trial Chamber I. See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), 18 
January 2008, para. 131, fn. 114).  
1646 Frequently, in applications to become victim participants, it is authorised redactions, including 
the place and time where and when the person was victimized, and also the: i) applicant’s name; ii) 
parents’ name; iii) place of birth; iv) exact date of birth although year of birth shall not be redacted; 
v) tribe or ethnic group; vi) occupation; vii) current address; viii) phone number and email 
address; ix) name of other victims of, or of witnesses to, the same incident; x) identifying features 
of the injury, loss or harm allegedly suffered; and xi) name and contact details of the intermediary 
assisting the victim in filing the application to participate. See, e.g., Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-699), 
Decision Defining the Status of 54 Victims who Participated at the Pre-Trial Stage, and Inviting 
the Parties’ Observations on Applications for Participation by 86 Applicants, Trial Chamber III, 22 
February 2010, paras. 27 and 33.   
1647 See ICC Statute article 57 (3) (c); ICC RPE, rules 86 and 89 (1).  
1648 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2586-Red), Redacted Decision on the Disclosure of 
Information from Victims’ Applications Forms (a/0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07), Trial 
Chamber I, 23 November 2010. 
1649 Ibid., para. 6. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 255.  
1650 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2586-Red), 23 November 2010, para. 4. 
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ongoing conflict. Consequently, of 129 victims, the identities of only 23 have 
been disclosed to the parties and participants in the proceedings.1651    
 
Although the Trial Chamber provided them with anonymity as a 
protective measure, it limited their participation rights.1652 This is arguably a 
sound solution for two reasons.1653 First, had victims been forced to choose 
between their personal security and their participatory rights, the aim and 
purpose of article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, i.e., victim participants’ right to 
present their views and concerns, would have been affected. Second, the defence 
has a right not to be confronted with anonymous individuals, especially if those 
are numerous. On the contrary, a defence’s effective right requires the disclosure 
of victim participants’ identities when they wish to bring evidence. Accordingly, 
the Chamber’s approach gets a good balance between the accused’s rights and 
victim participants’ interests.1654 
Therefore, victims have been allowed to preserve anonymity unless they 
seek to participate in such a manner that would make anonymity incompatible 
with the accused’s rights.1655 It has not been allowed anonymous victim 
participants when victim participants were engaged in adding evidence against 
the accused as this would violate the principle against anonymous accusations or 
when they sought to question witnesses.1656 Trial Chamber III in Bemba, by 
following the same approach, concluded that for those victim participants who 
want to directly present their views and concerns before the Chamber, i.e., to 
have a more active participation, it was necessary to ‘relinquish their anonymity 
vis-à-vis the parties’.1657 Nevertheless, the Chamber appropriately added that: 
 
[…] the identity of victims need not be disclosed to the parties unless and until 
the Chamber grants them permission to testify and/or present their views and 
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1651 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 18. 
1652 Ibid., paras. 14 xi), 18. 
1653 See Kai Ambos, ‘The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues’ (2012) 12 International Criminal Law 
Review 115, 121.  
1654 See also Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1655 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG), 22 January 2010, paras. 92 and 93; 
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2027), 21 December 2011, para. 19.    
1656 See, e.g., Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG), 22 January 2010, paras. 
92 and 93.  
1657 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2027), Second Order Regarding the Applications of the Legal 
Representatives of Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns of the Victims, Trial 
Chamber III, 21 December 2011, para. 19 
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concerns. This approach reflects the security concerns expressed by victims and 
the fact that certain victims appear to have consented to their identities being 
disclosed only if the Chamber grants them permission to appear.1658 
 
In turn, the Appeals Chamber in Ngudjolo Chui, corresponding to victim 
participants’ participation during the appeals stage, has concluded that 
anonymity does not violate the right to a fair trial; however, ‘should the 
anonymous victims wish to participate as individuals at a hearing or to make 
individual observations they would have to disclose their identities to the 
parties’.1659    
Thus, even though anonymity of a victim participant is admissible at the 
ICC, it impacts on the respective individual status. Accordingly, the modalities 
of participation granted to non-anonymous victim participants may be wider 
than those granted to anonymous victim participants as evidenced in ICC case 
law discussed later.1660 Indeed, as previously exemplified, as an anonymous 
participant or witness, the victim’s status is more limited than that of a non-
anonymous individual even during the pre-trial proceedings. Hence, it is herein 
argued that these differentiations constitute pragmatic manners to implement a 
necessary balance between the participation of anonymous victims vis-à-vis 
minimum rights of the accused and due process guarantees, especially during the 
trial phase of a case. Also, as Trial Chambers indicated in Lubanga and Bemba, 
although anonymous victims should not be precluded from participation, the 
Registry should remind them of the availability of protective measures rather 
than complete anonymity.1661 This suggestion is arguably mutatis mutandi 
applicable to victims seeking to provide testimony as anonymous witnesses. 
Furthermore, as indicated by the Trial Chamber in Lubanga, victims are often 
able to give direct evidence on the alleged offences and, as a result, a general ban 
on their participation in the proceedings if they may be called as witnesses would 
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1658 Ibid., Loc. cit. See also Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2220), Decision on the Presentation of Views 
and Concerns by Victims a/0542/08, a/0394/08 and a/0511/08, Trial Chamber III, 24 May 2012, 
para. 12. 
1659 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-140), Decision on the Participation of Anonymous Victims 
in the Appeal and on the Maintenance of Deceased Victims on the List of Participating Victims, 
Appeals Chamber, 23 September 2013, para. 19.  
1660 See infra Chapter IV 3.3.3 and 4.3.1.  
1661 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1556-Con-Anxl), Corrigendum to ‘Decision on the Applications by 
Victims to Participate in the Proceedings’, Trial Chamber I, 13 January 2009, paras. 126-133; 
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807), Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial and on 86 
Applications by Victims to Participate in the Proceedings, Trial Chamber III, 30 June 2010, para. 
70.  
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be contrary to the aim and purpose of article 68 (3) and the Chamber's 
obligation to establish the truth.1662 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber also noticed 
that:   
 
[…] when […] [considering] an application by victims who have this dual 
status, [the chamber] will establish whether the participation by a victim who is 
also a witness may adversely affect the rights of the defence at a particular stage 
in the case. The Trial Chamber will take into consideration the modalities of 
participation by victims with dual status, the need for their participation and the 
rights of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial.1663   
 
One possible safeguard, concerning victims as anonymous participants, 
can consist in an innovative suggestion brought up by the legal representative of 
a victim whereby the identity of a ‘key’ person for each group of victims wishing 
to participate may be revealed.1664 Bearing in mind the large groups of victims 
participating and that victims of the same group normally come from the same 
area and suffered the same crimes, that proposal may be sound. It would also 
allow the VWU to maximize its resources and enhance the effectiveness of the 
proceedings by focusing on one individual who accepted to disclose his/her 
identity on behalf of the other victims of the group.1665   
With regard to anonymous victim witnesses, Trial Chamber I in the 
ICC’s first judgment in Lubanga noticed that:  
 
Measures to protect the identity of many of the witnesses in this case were 
ordered by the Chamber due to concerns for their personal safety or that of 
their families. For similar reasons, many witnesses are referred to in this 
Judgment by number rather than by name and certain details that might reveal 
their identities have been omitted. It is to be emphasised that whenever the 
Chamber ordered protective measures for witnesses, the parties and participants 
were aware of the relevant identifying information [emphasis added].1666  
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1662 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), 18 January 2008, para. 133.  
1663 Ibid., para. 134.  
1664 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-57), Transcripts, Trial Chamber I, 29 October 2007, pp. 31-
32. The VWU also formulated a similar proposal. See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1078), Lubanga 
Registry Report, Registry, 12 December 2007, para. 25. 
1665 See also Anne-Marie de Brouwer and Marc Groenhuijsen, ‘The Role of Victims in International 
Criminal Proceedings’ in Sluiter and Vasiliev (2009) 149, 181.  
1666 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 115. 
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Accordingly, even though the identity of an important number of 
witnesses in the Lubanga’s trial was not disclosed to the public and media, the 
general rule was that the defence knew of witnesses’ relevant identifying 
information. The same approach was followed by Trial Chamber II as explicitly 
stated in the ICC’s second judgment in Ngudjolo.1667      
Trial Chamber I in Lubanga authorized:   
 
[…] three victims to give evidence as witnesses during the trial and evidence 
was presented on behalf of a school. These three witnesses, who testified in 
January 2010, were granted incourt protective measures that included voice and 
face distortion and pseudonyms.1668 
 
ICC Trial Chambers have established as one of the requirements for the 
presentation of evidence by victims that ‘Under no circumstances the Chamber 
will allow victims to testify anonymously vis-à-vis the Defence’,1669 and that 
‘Victims are not allowed to testify anonymously’.1670 In Bemba, the Trial 
Chamber established that ‘the identity of victims need not be disclosed to the 
parties unless and until the Chamber grants them permission to testify’.1671  
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the considerations for non-
disclosure of the identity of certain witnesses to the defence originally established 
in the course of pre-trial proceedings were found by Trial Chamber I as ‘equally 
applicable to the trial stage of the case’.1672 In arriving to this conclusion, the 
Chamber has held that its responsibility under article 64 (6) (e) to ‘provide for 
the protection of the accused, witnesses and victims’ includes protection for all 
those at risk, in the context of trial, on account of the ICC’s activities.1673 If the 
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1667 Trial Chamber II emphasised that ‘whenever the Chamber ordered protective measures for 
witnesses, the parties and participants were always aware of the relevant particulars’. Ngudjolo 
Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG), 18 December 2012, para. 63.       
1668 Ibid., para. 21. (Referring to the Decision on the request by victims a/0225/06, a/0229/06 and 
a/0270/07 to express their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, 
26 June 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2002-Conf paras 39-40; public redacted version filed on 9 July 
2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx.) 
1669 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 22. 
1670 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2138), 22 February 2012, para. 23.  
1671 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2027), 21 December 2011, para. 19. 
1672 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2206-Red), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Applications to Vary 
Protective Measures under Regulation 42 of 14 July and 17 August 2009, Public Redacted Version, 
Trial Chamber I, 22 February 2010, para. 15.  
1673 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1924-Anx2), Decision on ‘Prosecution Request for Non-Disclosure 
of the Identity of Twenty-Five Individuals providing Tu Quoque Information’ of 5 December 2008, 
Public Redacted Version, Trial Chamber, 9 April 2009, para. 2.  
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individual’s identity is relevant to the case, the witness’s unwillingness to have 
his/her identity revealed ‘cannot alone justify non-disclosure’.1674 It was thus 
ordered the disclosure of the identities of two witnesses to the defence but not to 
the public during trial as ‘although the witness suggests that disclosure would 
jeopardize his security and that of his family, the prosecution has not provided 
any reasons in support of his contention’.1675  
Pursuant to article 64 (6) (e) of the Statute and rule 81 (4), Trial 
Chamber I has considered redactions to the witnesses’ whereabouts within the 
ICC Protection Program to be necessary and fair as ‘disclosure would put the 
witness, and possibly others, at risk, on account of the activities of the Court; the 
information is irrelevant to known issues in the case; and the redactions do not 
render the material unusable or unintelligible’.1676  
Similar to the situation at the ICTY, important arguments can be 
brought concerning the exceptional admissibility of anonymous witnesses 
during trial in certain circumstances and taking appropriate safeguards for the 
rights of the accused. Four arguments are raised as follows.1677 First, as already 
analyzed, there is no explicit prohibition of anonymous witnesses in the ICC 
legal framework, which indeed provides the ICC with the necessary leeway on 
this issue. Second, for disclosure-purposes, the witness testimony cannot be 
considered as a mere piece of ‘information’ in the sense of article 68 (5). 
Additionally, this article only regulates the Prosecutor’s pre-trial powers. 
Therefore, it has been sustained that it does not restrict the judges’ power who 
can decide to withhold information provided to them by the Prosecutor from the 
accused.1678 Third, in addition to examined domestic systems as complemented 
by international developments,1679 national criminal codes provide support for 
total anonymity, being that in certain jurisdictions anonymous testimony is 
allowed in court whereas in others it is only permissible as hearsay evidence and 
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1674 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2209-Red), Public Redacted Decision on Variation of Protective 
Measures under Regulation 42 on Referral from Trial Chamber II on 22 July 2009, Trial Chamber 
I, 16 March 2010, para. 36. 
1675 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1676 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2465-RED), Public Redacted Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s 
Request for Non-Disclosure of Information in Transcripts of Re-Interviews with Prosecution 
Witnesses, Trial Chamber I, 7 June 2010, para. 16. 
1677 In favour of the exceptional use of anonymous witnesses, see Anne-Marie de Brouwer and 
Marc Groenhuijsen, ‘The Role of Victims in International Criminal Proceedings’ in Sluiter and 
Vasiliev (2009) 149, 180; Kreb (2001) 378-379. 
1678 Kreb (2001) 378-379. See also Brady (2001a) 453 (not denying the possibility to use anonymous 
witness). 
1679 See infra Chapter III 4.1. 
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in some others under both options.1680 Actually, admissibility of evidence 
originating from anonymous hearsay has not been completely ruled out in the 
ICC’s case law.1681 Furthermore, due to the nature of the crimes under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction and the limitations faced by the ICC to guarantee witness security as 
opposed to national systems, it would be at least de lege ferenda advisable and 
with stronger reason than in national systems not to rule out completely the 
exceptional admissibility of anonymous witnesses at the ICC. Fourth, in some 
cases a fair and impartial trial cannot be possible and, therefore, justice is denied 
since crucial witnesses would be unable to testify unless the ICC has the 
discretion to order anonymity for witness but of course adopting the necessary 
safeguards for the accused’s rights.1682 
Nevertheless, like it was done at the ICTY, it is herein argued that the 
best approach is not to admit anonymous witnesses during trial at the ICC based 
on the following reasons.1683 First, although the ICC Statute lacks any reference 
to witness anonymity, article 68 (5) of the ICC Statute indeed explicitly lays 
down that disclosure of evidence or information leading to witness/his family’s 
grave endangerment authorizes the Prosecutor to ‘withhold such evidence or 
information prior to the commencement of the trial’. The ICC RPE also supports 
the restriction on anonymous witnesses during trial as rule 81 (4) establishes that 
as protective measure in favor of the witnesses (and also victims) the Chamber 
can authorize ‘the non-disclosure of their identity prior to the commencement of 
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1680 See, e.g., the Protection of Witness Act 1993 (The Netherlands); Code of Criminal Procedure 
(The Netherlands) article 226 (a)-(f); the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 1997 
(New Zealand); Code of Criminal Code 1997 (Poland), article 184 (1) and (4); Code of Criminal 
Procedure 1987 (Germany), and article 68 (3). Cited by Brouwer and Groenhuijsen (2009) 180 (fn. 
107).    
1681 Trial Chamber II stated that: ‘[it] took a cautious approach in assessing evidence originating 
from anonymous hearsay. It did not rule out such evidence ab initio, instead assessing its probative 
value on the basis of the context and conditions in which such evidence was obtained, and with 
due consideration of the impossibility of cross-examining the information source’. Ngudjolo  Chui 
(ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II, 18 
December 2012, para. 56.  
1682 See Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, Recommendations and Commentary for the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Part I, Siracusa Paper and Paris Recommendations on Participation and 
Protection Submitted to the Second Session of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC, 26 July – 
13 August 1999, 28-30. 
1683 Against anonymous witnesses at trial before the ICC, see, e.g., Michael Kurth, ‘Anonymous 
Witnesses before the International Criminal Court: Due Process in Dire Straits’ in Carsten Stahn 
and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 615, 630-631; Zappalà (2010) 150-151; Nicholls (2003) 298-299.    
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the trial’.1684 Rule 81 (5) explicitly requires that all material that is withheld 
during pre-trial in order to protect victims and witnesses ‘may not be 
subsequently introduced into evidence during the confirmation hearing or the 
trial without adequate prior disclosure to the accused’. Additionally, rule 76 
requires the Prosecutor to ‘provide the defence with the names of witnesses 
whom the prosecutor intends to call to testify and copies of any prior statements 
made by those witnesses’ in time for the defence to prepare for trial. An 
important number of commentators have actually referred to one or more of 
these sets of provisions to conclude the inadmissibility of anonymous witnesses 
during trial at the ICC under the ICC legal instruments.1685 Furthermore, even 
though there is not as such an explicit provision prohibiting anonymous 
witnesses, as previously examined, an important number of delegations strongly 
opposed proposals allowing anonymous witnesses during trial when negotiating 
and drafting the ICC RPE.   
Second, the ICC has far-reaching obligations to protect victims and 
witnesses, which include less restrictive measures than full anonymity for 
witnesses during trial. Indeed, the ICC has a mandate to set a long-term and 
complex protection program including allocation of new identities, re-locations, 
etc., under the ICC VWU’s mandate,1686 in order to prevent any risk of reprisal. 
Therefore, these options are not only less restrictive than full anonymity but also 
preserve the right of the accused to due process, which is a minimum or core 
human right. Furthermore, as presented,1687 an important argument claimed by 
the ICTY to grant full anonymity was the lack of funding for a sophisticated 
witness protection program which is not, at least to an important extent, 
applicable to the ICC.  
Third, the special measures listed as examples under rule 88 are not 
similar to orders for anonymous witnesses. Moreover, rule 88 has to be read 
together with the other previously detailed provisions in the ICC Statute and 
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1684 See also Human Rights Watch, Commentary to the Preparatory Commission on the ICC, 
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (July 1999) 44. 
1685 See e.g., Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (2010) 483; Kurth (2009) 630; Nicholls 
(2003) 298, 299; John Jackson and Sarah Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: 
Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions (Cambridge University Press 2012) 377, 
footnote 47; David Donat-Cattin (2008a) 1293 (‘During the Pre-Trial [...] it is neither necessary 
nor wise that the Prosecutor be required to supply all the evidence she/he has collected’.).  
1686 See ICC Statute, article 43 (6); ICC RPE, rules 16-19. 
1687 See supra Chapter III 4.2.2.1. 
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RPE. Out of this combined reading, the better interpretation is that an 
anonymous witness order can only exist prior to the commencement of trial.1688  
Fourth, although the ICC has allowed anonymity of victim participants 
to a notable extent, one thing is victims’ participation as anonymous victim 
participants and another quite different thing is their intervention as anonymous 
victim witnesses.1689 The difference between victim participants and victims 
witnesses as for expressing their views and concerns in one case and giving 
evidence in the other has been identified by Trial Chambers as previously 
cited.1690 Even though the victim participants could at least sometimes be 
considered as ‘accusers’,1691 a victim who can be dual status victim participant 
and victim witness when takes the stand as a witness has at least formally a 
different role. On the one hand, victim participants: i) participate voluntarily, ii) 
communicate the ICC their own interests and concerns; and iii) can say what 
they want to say.1692 On the other hand, victim witnesses: i) are called by the 
defence, the Prosecution, other victims participating in the proceedings or the 
Chamber; ii) serve the interests of the ICC and the party that calls them; and iii) 
give evidence in testifying and answering related questions.1693 In any case, if the 
victim does not meet the threshold necessary to provide evidence as witness, 
which as determined by ICC Trial Chambers includes respect of the accused’s 
rights to a fair and impartial trial and not anonymous testimony,1694 the victim 
can still present their views and concerns as victim participants.1695    
Sixth, the potential risks if victim participants are allowed to give 
evidence as anonymous witnesses are exemplified in Lubanga. Thus, for 
example, three victim participants authorized to give their testimonies directly 
before Trial Chamber I during the trial lost their right to participate as victim 
participants and their testimonies were dismissed due to internal inconsistencies 
and especially because of the real possibility of two of those victims having stolen 
identities at the request of the third witness.1696  
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1688 See Brady (2001a) 453. 
1689 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (2010) 484.  
1690 See supra Chapter III 2.3.1.1. 
1691 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (2010) 484.  
1692 See Thomas Funk, Victims’ Rights and Advocacy (Oxford University Press 2010) 103. 
1693 See Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1694 See Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 22; Bemba 
(ICC-01/05-01/08-2138), 22 February 2012, para. 23.    
1695 See Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2138), 22 February 2012, paras. 20 and 23. See also Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 22.  
1696 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, paras. 499, 500 and 501. See also supra Chapter III 2.3.2.2. 
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Seventh, as for the national systems examined, some of their legislative 
and jurisprudential practices allowing anonymous witnesses have not lived up to 
the ECHR and ECtHR’s standards in relation to the right of the accused to a fair 
and impartial trial.     
Withholding the identity of the witness from the accused but not from 
his/her counsel may be considered as a half-way solution; however, this does not 
work when the accused represents himself, and this measure would violate the 
Code of Professional Conduct for Counsels before the ICC, which requires the 
defence counsel to put his/her client’s interests before other interests.1697   
 
4.4. The ECCC and the STL  
4.4.1. Anonymity Prior to Trial    
4.4.1.1. The ECCC  
With regard to the ECCC, there is no explicit provision about the admissibility 
of anonymous witnesses during pre-trial or trial phase, which is related to the 
use of the dossier or case file. However, as previously referred to,1698 concerning 
the right against self-incrimination of witnesses, the Co-Investigating Judges or 
the Chambers may ‘Order that the identity of the witness and the content of the 
evidence given shall not be disclosed, in any manner, and provide that the breach 
of any such order will be subject to sanctions under Rules 35 to 38’.1699   
In addition, it is also allowed for the Co-Investigating Judges or the 
Chamber to ‘Use protective measures, as foreseen in Rule 29 to ensure that the 
identity of the witness and the content of the evidence given are not 
disclosed’.1700 The Co-Investigating Judges and the Chambers, under rule 29 (4) 
(c), ‘may make a reasoned order adopting measures to protect the identity 
appearing in the case file’.  
Furthermore, the Practice Direction on Classification and Management 
of Case-Related Information defines strictly confidential material as that 
material which can only be accessed by the judges and other persons expressly 
given by the ECCC.1701 Protective measures requests and associated documents 
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1697 Code of Professional Conduct for Counsels before the ICC, article 16 (1). See for further details 
articles 14-18. In addition, see Kurth (2008) 625.   
1698 See supra Chapter III 2.4.1.1. 
1699 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 28 (7) (b).  
1700 Ibid., rule 28 (7) (e).  
1701 Practice Direction ECCC/004/2009/Rev.1, Practice Direction on Classification and 
Management of Case-Related Information, article 2.  
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as well as documents and information subject to protective measures are in 
principle strictly confidential.1702   
 
4.4.1.2. The STL 
The STL RPE, unlike instruments of the other international and hybrid criminal 
courts, explicitly recognize the use of anonymous witness evidence. Moreover, 
rule 93 lays down a specific proceeding to question anonymous witnesses 
conducted by the Pre-Trial Judge although that questioning may be conducted 
‘at any stage of the proceedings’, and this can be requested by the Prosecutor, the 
defence, or a victim participant’s legal representative.1703 There are two possible 
grounds based on which the Pre-Trial Judge shall question the witness in the 
absence of the parties or a victim participant’s legal representative. In addition to 
a serious risk that imperative national security might be jeopardized,1704 the other 
ground consists in:  
 
[…] a serious risk that a witness or a person close to the witness would lose his 
life or suffer grave physical or mental harm as a result of his identity being 
revealed, and measures for the protection of witnesses as provided for in Rule 
133 would be insufficient to prevent such danger.1705  
 
The admissibility of anonymous testimonies hence constitutes a truly 
exceptional measure to be adopted only when the set of (other) protective 
measures does not provide enough protection and in cases of serious risk at the 
life or grave physical or mental harm of the witness if his/her identity is revealed. 
In addition, there are other safeguards to balance the adoption of this 
exceptional measure. Accordingly, the Prosecutor, the defence or a victim 
participant’s legal representative are given the opportunity to ‘convey questions 
to the witness without revealing his identity’.1706 These questions shall be 
transmitted by the Pre-Trial Judge to the witness, and (s)he may also question 
the witness proprio motu.1707 Moreover, the Pre-Trial Judge shall give to the 
Prosecutor, the defence and victim participants’ legal representatives ‘a 
provisional transcript of the witness’s answers’, and they shall also be given ‘the 
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1702 Ibid., article 5.1. See also also Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 844.  
1703 STL RPE, rule 93 (A). 
1704 Ibid., rule 93 (A) (ii). 
1705 Ibid., rule 93 (A) (i). 
1706 Ibid., rule 93 (B). 
1707 Ibid., rule 93 (B).  
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opportunity to submit additional questions to the Pre-Trial Judge for transmittal 
to the witness’.1708 Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Judge:    
 
[…] shall provide a copy of the final transcript to the Prosecutor, the Defence, 
and the legal representatives of victims participating in the proceedings. He 
shall also provide them with a copy of a declaration stating his opinion as to the 
veracity of the witness’s statement, as well as the potential for any serious risk 
resulting from the witness’s identity or affiliation being revealed.1709  
  
With regard to victims applying to become victim participants, the Pre-
Trial Judge in Ayyash et al. has stated that withholding the applicants’ identities 
and their applications is justified to protect their interests during pre-trial 
proceedings.1710 However, the Pre-Trial Judge also emphasized that, subject to a 
Chamber’s authorization, the parties may either be provided with some or all of 
the victim participants’ identities, or be granted access to some or all of their 
applications.1711 Nevertheless, the Pre-Trial Judge concluded by saying that ‘At 
this stage of proceedings […] withholding the identity of the applicants and their 
Applications does not prejudice the rights of the Accused or the interests of the 
Prosecution’.1712 In case persons who have been granted the victim participant 
status ‘wish to remain anonymous or seek other protective measures, a request to 
that end should be submitted to the Pre-Trial Judge as soon as possible, pursuant 
to Rule 133 (A) of the Rules’.1713 Thus, concerning anonymous victim 
participants, under the Pre-Trial Judge’s practice, upheld by the Appeals 
Chamber,1714 anonymity has been allowed during pre-trial proceedings in Ayyash 
et al. as this is compatible with balancing the accused’s rights against the victim 
participants’ interests, but subject to some stringent limitations.1715 Furthermore, 
even if one or more victims are permitted to participate anonymously, ‘they will 
do so through the same common legal representative as the other participating 
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1708 Ibid., rule 93 (C).  
1709 Ibid., rule 93 (D).  
1710 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, Pre-
Trial Judge, 8 May 2012, para. 130. 
1711 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1712 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1713 Ibid., para. 131. 
1714 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, paras. 28 and 39. 
1715 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 19 December 2012, paras. 28-31. 
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victims’.1716 Such a disposition is necessary as, otherwise, the anonymous victim 
participants would be in a better standing than the non-anonymous victim 
participants.1717  
As previously noticed, in ordering redactions of confidential transcripts 
of a status conference, the Pre-Trial Judge in Ayyash et al. took into account, 
inter alia, the emphasis of victim participants’ legal representatives on the need 
to maintain the anonymity of victim participants who were granted such 
anonymous status.1718  
In cases of applicants who were denied the status of victim participants, 
the Pre-Trial Judge has correctly reached the following conclusion: 
 
[…] a degree of anonymity is required in order to ensure that their personal 
information is protected and not disclosed to the Parties, since they would not 
be participating in the proceedings at any stage. Having been deprived of the 
entitlements and protections that the Tribunal has made available to ensure the 
security of VPPs [victims participating in the proceedings], these applicants 
would have no remedy should their interests be prejudiced. The Pre-Trial Judge 
therefore considers that all of the Applications should remain confidential and 
ex parte for the time being.1719   
 
The Pre-Trial Judge has stated that withholding the victim participant 
applications from the parties is also consistent with other international criminal 
courts’ practice, in particular the ICC.1720 However, the Pre-Trial Judge paid also 
a close attention to the accused’s rights by emphasizing that:  
 
[…] withholding the Applications from the Parties at this stage of proceedings 
(namely the determination of VPP [victims participating in the proceedings] 
status) does not amount to barring the Parties ad infinitum from accessing 
information related to VPPs. Rule 87 of the Rules recognises that a degree of 
such access is in fact anticipated in the interests of transparency, in a manner 
consistent with the rights of the accused, the VPPs, and the Rules. The effect of 
 
1716 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on the VPU’s Access to Materials and the 
Modalities of Victims’ Participation in Proceedings before the Pre-Trial Judge, Pre-Trial Judge, 18 
May 2012, para. 80. 
1717 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1718 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 17 August 2012, para. 11.  
1719 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on Defence Motion of 17 February 2012 for an 
Order to the Victims’ Participation Unit to Refile its Submission Inter Partes and Inviting 
Submissions on Legal Issues Related to Applications for the Status of Victim Participating in the 
Proceedings, Pre-Trial Judge, 5 April 2012, para. 44. 
1720 Ibid., para. 51.  
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the decision not to order the VPU [Victims’ Participation Unit] to re-file its 
Transmission of Application to include the Parties as recipients is therefore 
limited to the determination of VPP status.1721 
 
Nevertheless, as the Pre-Trial Judge acknowledged, this does not 
prejudice any future determination on whether the parties should have access to 
the applications or the information contained therein and, if it is the case, to 
what extent and under which modalities.1722 Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Judge 
introduced the necessary clarification whereby he stated that his finding is: 
 
[…] without prejudice to any future determination on whether or not the 
Parties should have access to the Applications or the information contained 
therein, and if so, to what extent and subject to which modalities. It is also 
without prejudice to such decisions as the Trial or Appeals Chambers may make 
in the future regarding the modes of participation of victims in the proceedings, 
which are the subject of Rule 87 of the Rules.1723  
 
Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Judge ordered ‘that the annexes to the 
Transmission of Applications remain confidential and ex parte until further 
notice’.1724  
 
4.4.2. Anonymity During Trial 
4.4.2.1. The ECCC  
With regard to the ECCC, the legal framework does not contain an explicit 
provision about anonymous witnesses. However, an implicit permission of 
anonymous witnesses and civil parties may be deduced from some ECCC 
Internal Rules, which are absent in the RPE of other international and hybrid 
criminal courts and also connected to the use of the dossier in the ECCC in 
contrast to disclosure proceedings in other courts. The ECCC Internal Rules on 
non-disclosure of the witness’s identity and referred to in the previous 
subsection are not only limited to pre-trial proceedings as there is always a 
reference to ‘Chambers’, i.e., Trial Chambers included, in general and not only to 
Co-Investigating Judges. Thus, when rule 29 (4) (c) provides as a protective 
measure ‘a reasoned order adopting measures to protect the identity appearing 
in the case file’, the reference to the decision-making judicial body is once again 
 
1721 Ibid., para. 53. 
1722 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1723 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1724 Ibid., p. 21. 
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not only limited to Co-Investigating Judges but also includes Chambers, i.e., 
Trial Chambers included. This reading is also confirmed by the explicit and 
necessary safeguard under rule 29 (6), according to which ‘No conviction may be 
pronounced against the Accused on the sole basis of statements taken under the 
conditions set out in sub-rule 29(4) (c) above’. Indeed, concerning protective 
measures, it is established that the person’s request and identity shall be recorded 
in a classified register separate from the dossier.1725 Moreover, the Co-
Investigating Judges or the Chambers (once again a general reference, arguably 
including the Trial Chamber) can order that the identity of the witness is not 
disclosed.1726 This holds a close similarity with the French system. As previously 
examined, under article 706-58 of the French CPP, the anonymous witness’s 
identity and address are registered in another verbal process as part of a dossier 
different from that of the case. Thus, the witness’s identity and address are 
registered in a parallel record, open to the French Grand Instance Tribunal. This 
similarity is better understood if it is borne in mind that the procedural criminal 
law of Cambodia is based on the French civil law system.  
Lastly, but equally important, concerning the witness’s right against self-
incrimination, under rule 28 (7) (b), it is established that not only the Co-
Investigating Judges but also Chambers, i.e., Trial Chamber included, can ‘order 
that the identity of the witness and the content of the evidence given shall not be 
disclosed, in any manner, and provide that the breach of any such order will be 
subject to sanctions under Rules 35 to 38’.1727 Additionally, internal rule 80 (1) 
lays down that: 
 
The Co-Prosecutors shall submit to the Greffier of the Chamber a list of the 
witnesses [...] they intend to summon 15 (fifteen) days from the date the 
Indictment becomes final. The Greffier shall place the list on the case file and, 
subject to any protective measures, forward a copy of the list to the parties 
[emphasis added].   
 
 
1725 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 29 (5). See also Practice Direction ECCC/004/2009/Rev.1, Practice 
Direction on the Classification and Management of Case-Related Information, article 6. Strictly 
Confidential Section of the Case File (‘[...] the following categories of documents and information 
are in principle strictly confidential: a. Requests for protective measures and associated documents 
(including Witness and Expert Support Unit risk assessments) b. Documents and information 
subject to protective measures […]’.). 
1726 ECCC Internal Rules, rules 28 (7) (b) and (e). 
1727 See, in particular, ECCC Internal Rule, rule 35 (Interference with the Administration of 
Justice).  
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Also, as previously mentioned,1728 the Practice Direction on 
Classification and Management of Case-Related Information defines strictly 
confidential material as that material which can only be accessed by the judges 
and other persons expressly given by the ECCC.1729 Protective measures requests 
and associated documents as well as documents and information subject to 
protective measures are in principle strictly confidential.1730  
Accordingly, the ECCC legal framework implicitly foresees the 
possibility of anonymous witnesses and civil parties during trial.1731 Be that as it 
may, the Trial Chamber in the first completed ECCC trial in Duch heard 
testimony from 24 witnesses,1732 and none of them was anonymous. In addition, 
the records of interviews of a number of witnesses were read out.1733 There was 
no anonymous civil party either. Moreover, 22 civil parties, out of a total of 93 
civil parties,1734 were heard during the trial and civil parties’ names were listed in 
an annex to the judgment,1735 with only one witness’s name redacted but which 
appears in the Appeals Judgment,1736 as civil party group 1 filed a request to 
withdraw protective measures for Civil Party Appellant E2/62, which the 
Supreme Court Chamber granted.1737 The trial judgment list also includes the 
identities of the three civil parties who withdrew their applications during the 
trial.1738 In any case, not using anonymous witnesses is coherent with the need to 
fully guarantee the accused’s right to a fair trial as discussed in previous sections.  
 
1728 See supra Chapter III 4.4.1.1. 
1729 Practice Direction ECCC/004/2009/Rev.1, Practice Direction on Classification and 
Management of Case-Related Information, article 2.  
1730 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1731 See also Acquaviva and Heikkilä (2013) 845. 
1732 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, Annex I: 
Procedural History, para. 19. 
1733 The records of interviews of the following witnesses were read in court: Khieu Ches (E3/456), 
Pes Math (E3/457), Nhem En (E3/458), Nhep Hau (E3/460), Kung Phai (E3/461, E3/462, E3/396, 
E3/244), Makk Sithim (E3/484, E3/396), Tay Teng (E3/485, E3/486, E3/218, E3/242), Soam Sam Ol 
(E3/487), Meas Pengkry (E3/446, E3/242, E3/218), Uk Bunseng (E3/490), Horn (Hân) Iem 
(E3/491), Phach Siek (E3/495), Kaing Pan (E3/496), and (in summary form) Chey Sopheara 
(E3/488); see “Written Record of Proceedings – 4, 5, 11 and 12 August 2009,” comprising 
documents E1/57, E1/58, E1/61 and E1/62. See Ibid., Annex I: Procedural History, para. 19, fn. 34.   
1734 See Ibid., para.  637. 
1735 Ibid., Annex III: List of Civil Parties, pp. 258-270.  
1736 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, p. 321. 
1737 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Group 1- Civil Parties’ Co- Lawyers’ 
Request to Cancel Protective Measures F23/1, Supreme Court Chamber, 25 March 2011. 
1738 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, Annex III: List 
of Civil Parties, p. 270.  
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4.4.2.2. The STL  
Similar to the analysis under the ICC sub-section, it is examined herein first 
anonymity of witnesses and, then, anonymity of victim participants although the 
same victim can hold a dual status victim participant-victim witness. Concerning 
anonymous witnesses, as already referred to,1739 rule 115 (C) establishes that ‘the 
identity of the victim or witness shall be disclosed in sufficient time prior to the 
trial to allow adequate time for preparation of the defence’. However, unlike the 
other international and hybrid criminal courts, the STL RPE provide for the 
exceptional participation of anonymous witnesses during trial proceedings. Rule 
93 (A) explicitly allows anonymous witnesses, on exceptional basis, ‘at any stage 
of the proceedings’. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber cannot convict solely on an 
anonymous witness’s statement under rule 159 of the RPE. The Guide on the 
Procedure of the STL, prepared by the STL Chambers, in commenting those two 
provisions, establishes that:  
 
Given the specific nature of terrorist cases, the RPE allow exceptionally for a 
witness (be it, for example, an intelligence officer or an individual whose life, or 
that of his close family, is in danger) to give evidence, at any stage in the 
proceedings, anonymously, i.e., without his identity being revealed to the Parties 
or even to the Trial Chamber. His deposition is then recorded by the Pre-Trial 
Judge, who is the only person to have knowledge of his identity and who can ask 
him any questions he considers necessary, including those sent to him in 
writing by the Parties or the legal representatives of the victims. He should then 
send a record of the witness’s deposition (if appropriate, in redacted form so as 
not to reveal the identity of the witness), giving an assessment as to the 
credibility of the deposition. The Trial Judges cannot, under any circumstances, 
convict solely on the basis of the evidence of an anonymous witness [emphasis 
added].1740          
 
  Some related comments follow. First, as referred to, rule 93 (A) clearly 
states that questioning of anonymous witnesses may be conducted ‘at any stage 
of the proceedings’. Although this provision is under Part 5 (Confirmation of 
Charges and Pre-Trial Proceedings) of the STL RPE and it is the Pre-Trial Judge 
who interviews the anonymous witness, according to rule 149 (F) under Part 6 
(Proceedings before the Trial Chamber), a Chamber, i.e., the Trial Chamber, 
‘may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, pursuant to Rules 93 
 
1739 See supra Chapter III 4.4.1.2.   
1740 STL Chambers, The Procedure of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. A Snapshot, January 
2010a, para. 101.  
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[anonymous witnesses written statements] […] in written or other form’. The 
explicit reference to ‘any stage of proceedings’ used in rule 93 (A) contrasts with 
the language used in other STL RPE under Part 5 where it is normally mentioned 
‘during pre-trial phase’,1741 or just ‘proceedings’.1742 Moreover, when Antonio 
Cassese, as former President of the STL, commented this category of evidence in 
the STL RPE Explanatory Memorandum, explicitly said that ‘concerning 
anonymous witnesses […] who may be crucial in trials of terrorism […] Rule 93 
provides for a procedure […] [emphasis added]’.1743 Therefore, the previous 
considerations confirm that anonymous witnesses’ written statements are not 
only admissible during pre-trial but also trial proceedings if the requirements 
and safeguards detailed previously are met and adopted respectively. Indeed, 
both the Pre-Trial Judge and the Appeals Chamber in Ayyash et al. have already 
explicitly referred to the application of rule 93 to the trial proceedings, i.e., a 
witness may be granted anonymity during trial if the exceptional and stringent 
requirements under rule 93 are met.1744 Additionally, as Cassese noticed, the STL 
RPE ‘create a careful distinction between the various categories of written 
probative value’.1745 Accordingly, although anonymous testimony is arguably 
allowed during trial, its probative value may be considered not as strong as other 
evidence.  
Second, due to the nature of crimes that the STL has jurisdiction over, 
i.e., primarily terrorism, granting anonymity to witnesses may be necessary due 
to high concerns of risk against the life and limb of those who will testify. As 
Antonio Cassese, in his position as the first STL President explained:  
 
[…] concerning anonymous witnesses […], who may be crucial in trials of 
terrorism (either because they are persons who fear for their lives or those of 
persons close to them or because they are intelligence officials not prepared, or 
allowed, to disclose their identities), Rule 93 provides for a procedure whereby, 
the anonymous witness in camera before the Pre-Trial Judge alone, so that only 
that judge is in a position to know his identity.1746  
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1741 See, e.g., STL RPE, rules 89 (A) and 91 (A). 
1742 See, e.g., Ibid., rule 91 (H). 
1743 STL President (2010), para. 36. See also STL President (2012), para. 36.  
1744 See, respectively, Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 19 December 2012, para. 26; Ayyash et al. 
(STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, para. 36.      
1745 STL President (2010), para. 35. See also STL President (2012), para. 35.    
1746 STL President (2010) para. 36. See also STL President (2012), para. 36.      
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       The Appeals Chamber in Ayyash et al. has highlighted that a witness 
‘would receive this protection [anonymity] only because of risks related to their 
giving of evidence, which may be involuntary’.1747   
Third, according to rule 159 (A), the statements of anonymous 
witnesses, made under rule 93 and before the Pre-Trial Judge shall be subject to 
rule 149 (D), which reads as follows:   
 
A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. In particular, the Chamber may 
exclude evidence gathered in violation of the rights of the suspect or the accused 
as set out in the Statute and the Rules.  
 
Even more importantly, a necessary safeguard for the accused’s right to a 
fair trial is included explicitly in rule 159 (B), which lays down that ‘A conviction 
may not be based solely, or to a decisive extent, on the statement of a witness 
made pursuant to Rule 93 [statements of anonymous witnesses]’. This safeguard 
was qualified as fundamental by Cassese.1748  Be that as it may, it is yet to be seen 
whether and to what extent the STL Trial Chamber will allow the intervention of 
anonymous victim witnesses. It is herein argued that similar and previously 
discussed reservations to anonymous witnesses during trial can be raised. 
In any case, the identities of 24 out of 29 Prosecution witnesses, about 
whom the defence had asked disclosure for trial, were disclosed and, as for the 
other five Prosecution witnesses, the Prosecution withdrew them in Ayyash et 
al.1749 It should be also remembered that, in application of rule 110 (A) (ii), for 
the witness who will be called to testify at trial, it is required disclosure of all 
statements in Prosecution’s possession regardless of their form and source.1750 
However, under rule 116 (A) (ii) and (iii), redactions of information that would 
threaten the safety of witnesses may be allowed provided that the Prosecution 
adopts counterbalancing measures as determined in Ayyash et al.1751      
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1747 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, para. 36. 
1748 STL President (2010), para. 36. See also STL President (2012), para. 36.     
1749 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on the Motion by the Ayyash Defence to Compel 
the Disclosure of the Identities of 29 Proposed Prosecution Witnesses, Pre-Trial Judge, 4 
September 2013, para. 11.  
1750 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Public Redacted Version of “Decision on the Prosecution 
Application for Non-Disclosure of Certain Statements of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 116” Dated 
20 December 2012, Pre-Trial Judge, 28 May 2013, para. 16.        
1751 Ibid., paras. 17, 21 and 22. See also Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01), Annex E Submissions of the 
Prosecution, Guidelines and Memorandums in Relation to the Application for Redactions to the 
Statements of 14 Witnesses, Confidential and Ex Parte, Office of the Prosecutor, 13 February 2013; 
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Concerning anonymous victim participants, the Appeals Chamber, 
upholding a Pre-Trial Judge’s previous decision,1752 has banned anonymous 
victim participation during trial proceedings in Ayyash et al. by considering inter 
alia that: 
 
[…] anonymous participation by victims is inherently prejudicial to the 
accused, regardless of how active or passive their desired method of 
participation and even for victims who do not seek to give or tender evidence. 
[…] If VPPs [victim participants] are not required to disclose their identity at 
all, this would amount to an anonymous accusation against the accused, in 
breach of fair trial guarantees under Article 16 of the Statute. 
[…] anonymity is so prejudicial to the rights of the accused and the fair conduct 
of the trial that this exceptional measure should not be available in these 
proceedings, especially in consideration of the fact that extensive protective 
measures are otherwise available […].1753 
 
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber concluded and ordered that: 
 
[…] anonymous participation of VPPs [victim participants] in the proceedings 
is generally prejudicial to and inconsistent with the rights of the accused and the 
fairness of the trial and is not a valid form of victim participation within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the Statute. This includes “passive” or “silent observer” 
VPPs. The Pre-Trial Judge was therefore correct in finding that […] anonymous 
participation by victims is inherently prejudicial in the present proceedings and 
that the identities of VPPs should be disclosed sufficiently in advance to give the 
Defence adequate time to prepare.1754   
  
This absolute prohibition of anonymous victim participants during trial 
is herein criticized for five reasons. First, neither the STL Statute nor the STL 
RPE explicitly prohibit anonymous victim participants during trial. Second, if a 
victim as witness can exceptionally be authorized under the STL RPE to give 
evidence anonymously, a fortiori (with stronger reason) a victim should be 
exceptionally allowed to participate as victim participant anonymously during 
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Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on Prosecution’s Applications to Authorise Necessary 
Redactions Dated 8 and 18 March 2013, Pre-Trial Judge, 25 July 2013, para. 22; Ayyash et al. (STL-
11-01/PT/PTJ), Reconsideration of the Decision on Prosecution’s Applications to Authorise 
Necessary Redactions Dated 8 and 18 March 2013, of 25 July 2013, Pre-Trial Judge, 9 August 2013, 
para. 31.  
1752 See Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 19 December 2012, paras. 22-27 and 38-39.  
1753 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, paras. 27, 28 and 31. 
1754 Ibid., para. 39. 


trial. This argument is directly related to the different nature of the status of 
victims as witnesses vis-à-vis victims as victim participants. Thus, by definition 
victims’ status as witnesses is more clearly oriented to affect the accused than 
victims’ status as victim participants as whereas the former provides testimony, 
i.e., evidence, the latter provides views and concerns that are not evidence. This 
argument was acknowledged by Judge Baragwanath who, in his concurring 
opinion to the Appeals Chamber decision, mentioned that ‘[Witness] status is 
more obviously calculated to prejudice an accused than a mere second-stage 
victim, whose identification may or may not allow the Defence to embark on a 
process of enquiry whether that is to go’.1755 Indeed, even though the Appeals 
Chamber correctly determined that victim anonymity and witness anonymity 
have to be treated as separate and distinct matters, it by referring to rule 93 
explicitly stated that a victim participant who also testifies as a witness may be 
granted anonymity provided that the exceptional and stringent requirements 
under rule 93 are met.1756  
Third, although the Appeals Chamber paid closed attention to the ICC’s 
practice whereby anonymous victim participants are neither explicitly prohibited 
nor banned altogether, the Appeals Chamber did not find it persuasive since, as 
understood by the Chamber, such practice does not fully consider the potential 
prejudice against the accused.1757 This finding is particularly striking as the legal 
framework of the victim’s status as victim participant at the STL was precisely 
modeled upon the ICC’s legal framework and practice.  
Fourth, the approach adopted by both the Appeals Chamber and the 
Pre-Trial Judge regards the inherent prejudice of the accused’s rights brought by 
anonymous victim participants during trial as an irrebuttable presumption. This 
goes against the advisable case-by-case analysis which should be present when 
deciding to grant or not anonymity to victim participants.  
Fifth, the ratione personae scope of this decision is too broad as not only 
victim participants interested in presenting their views and concerns before the 
Chamber but also ‘passive’ or ‘silent’ victim participants are not allowed to be 
anonymous victim participants.   
Therefore, it is herein concluded that although the accused’s right to a 
fair trial must prevail over the victim participants’ entitlement to participate in 
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1755 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), Decision on Appeal by Legal Representative of 
Victims Against Pre-Trial Judge’s Decision on Protective Measures, Appeals Chamber, Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Baragwanath, 10 April 2013, para. 23. 
1756 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, para. 36.  
1757 Ibid., para. 26. 
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the trial proceedings in case of conflict,1758 the absolute, irrebuttable and 
complete exclusion of anonymous victim participants during trial is excessive. A 
more balanced approach is to allow anonymous victim participation but limiting 
victims’ modalities of participation in order to protect the accused’s rights.  
 
4.5. Comparative Conclusions 
With the exception of the STL, which explicitly allows (on exceptional basis) 
anonymous testimony during pre-trial and trial, the legal instruments of 
international and hybrid criminal courts do not contain explicit provisions on 
anonymous witnesses and/or anonymous victim participants or civil parties. 
This contrasts with the specific legal provisions in the English and French 
systems, which explicitly allow the exceptional participation of anonymous 
witnesses, including during the trial stage of the proceedings although some of 
this national practice has not met the ECtHR’s standards. When it comes to pre-
trial proceedings, the possibility of non-disclosure of the identities of witness and 
victims to the defence is a feature common to the legal instruments of 
international and hybrid criminal courts and understood as an exceptional 
protective measure. With regard to trial proceedings, the disclosure of identities 
of witnesses and victims either before the trial begins (ICTY, ICC, STL) or before 
the witness in question testifies (ICTR, SCSL) but in any case during the trial is 
the common and general rule. The ‘rolling disclosure’ system at the ICTR and 
the SCSL, existing also in the American System, has been criticized as goes in 
detriment of the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial. At the ECCC, the 
disclosure of identities of witnesses and civil parties is implicit under the case-file 
or dossier. Precisely, due to the possibility to exclude their identities from the 
case file, there is arguably an implicit anonymity permission, which is similar at 
least concerning witnesses to the French system. However, there was no 
anonymous civil party or witness during the ECCC first completed trial/case.  
In shedding light on whether anonymous witnesses (ICTY, ICC) and/or 
anonymous victim participants (ICC) are admissible, the ICTY and the ICC have 
considered the possibility of granting anonymity as an exceptional measure 
during trial. Although the ICC’s practice has so far been relatively generous in 
granting anonymity in the case of anonymous victim participants via, for 
example, redactions, it has adopted necessary safeguards. A very important 
safeguard when assessing whether to grant anonymity to a witness as adopted in 
the international and hybrid criminal courts (explicit in the ECCC and the STL 
instruments) consists in not considering his/her testimony as the decisive or sole 
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1758 Ibid., para. 38. 
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evidence to establish criminal liability. This pivotal provision is also present in 
legislation and/or case law of the examined national systems as complemented 
by the ECtHR’s case law.        
   When identifying the criteria to follow for the adoption of anonymity 
measures during trial, the dialogue between international, hybrid criminal courts 
and domestic case law, and in particular the English one, has been reciprocal. 
Thus, on the one hand, the ICTY in Tadić, in determining and applying the 
conditions for granting anonymity to the witness, relied largely on the criteria 
laid down by the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Taylor.1759 The strong dissent 
to the Tadić decision by Judge Stephen also referred to, inter alia, English and 
American legal authorities. The (back then) novel nature of the ICTY explains 
why it had to search in long-standing national legal traditions to interpret its 
provisions and to fill the gaps of its own legal instruments, which is the case of 
anonymous testimony. On the other hand, Lord Brown in R. v. Davis before the 
House of Lords referred to, inter alia, the analysis conducted by the ICTY in 
Tadić (both the majority and separate opinions) and Blaskić, when assessing the 
admissibility of anonymous witnesses.1760 Additionally, for example, the ICTY, 
the ICC, the STL and domestic courts, as examined in English and French case 
law, have paid close attention to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and standards when 
adopting a decision to allow anonymous witnesses and/or victims in order to 
strike a balance between the accused’s right to a fair trial and the protection of 
victims testifying as anonymous witness or, at the ICC, intervening as 
anonymous victim participants as well.   
 There is no trend consisting in explicitly including the exceptional 
admission of anonymous witnesses during trial in the legal instruments of 
international and hybrid criminal courts unlike some national developments, 
e.g., England and Wales. Thus, whereas the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the 
ICC legal instruments keep silence on the anonymous (witness) issue and the 
ECCC arguably incorporates an implicit permission, the STL explicitly allows it 
during trial. Certainly, arguments such as protection of the security and safety of 
the victims and witnesses, importance of witness’s testimony, reduction of the 
risk of their re-victimization would in principle justify anonymity of witnesses 
during trial. However, in the particular cases of the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL 
and the ICC, a more coherent interpretation of their legal instruments, which 
differ from the ECCC and the STL legal frameworks on this particular issue, 
constitutes a powerful argument to be reluctant to the admission of anonymous 
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1759 Tadić (IT-94-1), 10 August 1995, paras. 62-66. (citing R. v Taylor).   
1760 R. v. Davis (Iain), [2008] UKHL 36, paras. 91-95.  
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witnesses during trial. The full protection of the accused’s right to a fair trial, its 
prevalence over the use of anonymity to protect victim witnesses, the 
development of protection programmes for victims and witnesses, and 
alternative less restrictive protective measures support such approach. 
Accordingly, the approach adopted by the ICTY (Tadić excepted), the ICTR, the 
SCSL, the ICC and the ECCC Trial Chambers consisting in not allowing victims 
to testify anonymously during trial is found herein coherent. Moreover, even in 
the case of the STL RPE, which explicitly allow anonymous witnesses during 
trial, similar reservations should be raised when the first STL trial begins.         
 Be that as it may, the possibility for victims to intervene as anonymous 
victim participants (ICC, STL) or anonymous civil parties (ECCC) constitutes an 
important avenue for anonymity as an exceptional measure to protect victim 
participants or civil parties in international criminal justice trials. Therefore, 
although it is undeniably preferable that the identities of victim participants and 
civil parties are known by the accused at trial, international and hybrid criminal 
courts should authorize their anonymity exceptionally. Inter alia, the difference 
in nature between the victim participant or civil party status and the victim 
witness status underlines and justifies this finding. Thus, whereas the ICC’s 
practice of not completely prohibiting anonymous victim participation during 
trial is advisable, the STL’s emerging approach according to which under no 
circumstances are anonymous victim participants allowed in trial is herein 
criticized. Therefore, the ICC’s approach is a more balanced one as it allows 
anonymous victim participation but it limits victims’ modalities of participation 
to protect the accused’s rights.   
 
5. Chapter Conclusions 
1. The witness dimension of the victims’ status is present at all international and 
hybrid criminal courts either as the almost exclusive dimension of their status 
(ICTY, ICTR and SCSL), i.e., similar to adversarial systems, or just as dimension 
thereof (ICC, ECCC, STL), i.e., similar to inquisitorial systems. However, when 
victims as witnesses give testimony, adversarial features such as cross 
examination and orality are applicable at these courts in a higher (ICTY, ICTR, 
SCSL) or a lesser lever (ICC, ECCC, STL). The adversarial order to call witnesses 
is present because of the instruments (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL) or practice (ICC). At 
the ECCC and the STL, after the Judges question the witness, an adversarial 
order can be followed. In any case, victims as witnesses cannot express their own 
views and concerns, which correspond to the victim participant status, and those 
views and concerns do not constitute evidence. Instead, victims as witnesses are 
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called to give evidence normally under oath and viva voice although submission 
of written statements has been increasingly accepted, which reflects inquisitorial 
system influence. Victim participants, unlike witnesses, cannot be questioned by 
the parties. Testimonies by victims as witnesses are limited to an important 
extent by the prosecutorial strategy although they are expected to tell the truth. 
Therefore, the international and hybrid criminal courts where victims are almost 
exclusively witnesses limit the victims’ status as they cannot express their own 
views and concerns.  
2. The legal regime for victims as witnesses when testifying at 
international and hybrid criminal courts includes both similar and different 
features. On the one hand, testifying in person after having taken a solemn 
declaration or oath to tell the truth at a specific time and normally without a 
legal representative constitute important common features. Additionally, the 
prohibition of self-incrimination, the possibility for children and mentally 
impaired victims to testify even unsworn, certain privileged communications, 
and witness familiarization are also common features. Moreover, these common 
features reflect certain consensus in the examined national systems. On the other 
hand, the unsworn testimony of a child or mentally impaired person in theory 
may be enough to convict the accused in some international and hybrid criminal 
courts (ICC, SCSL, ECCC), unlike the other courts’ instruments and/or case law 
the ICC Statute does not contemplate a subpoena mechanism, and the scope of 
the States’ obligation to cooperate for witness attendance varies. Victim-friendly 
provisions and/or practices have included testimony via depositions and video 
link, admission of witness evidence in written form and hearsay evidence as 
exceptions to the principle of oral, live and in person testimony and, hence, it is 
reduced the risk of secondary victimization but with due regard to the accused’s 
rights. Moreover, cross-examination is not unlimited and needs to be conducted 
respecting victim witness’s dignity. To avoid serious issues concerning witness 
credibility similar to those present in the ICC’s first completed trials, the ICC 
and its OTP have been undertaking measures. Whereas witness proofing is 
allowed in some courts (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, STL (implicitly) and the ECCC as 
for civil parties) and thus similar to the American system, it is prohibited in the 
ICC and the ECCC.1761 This prohibition is similar to the situation in the English 
and French systems.  
3. Victims can assume a dual official status as witnesses and as victim 
participants at the ICC and the STL only. However, concerns as for this dual role 
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1761 The exception is given by ICC Trial Chamber V in the Kenya trials. See supra Chapter III 
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including witness’s testimony being adjusted after his/her access to the 
confidential part of the case file and his/her credibility questioned because of the 
existence of (financial) interests have been addressed by the ICC via safeguards 
such as restricting access to the confidential part of the case file and prohibiting 
witnesses from attending witness’s hearing at least while they remain 
anonymous. The ICC indeed has not only dismissed testimonial evidence by 
dual status victims but also withdrawn their victim participant status when 
serious credibility problems arose, being the latter in some cases excessive as 
dismissal of the testimony could have been enough. At the ECCC, similar to the 
French system, the victim has to choose between being a civil party or a witness 
with the respective advantages and disadvantages of one or the other. On the one 
hand, in theory sworn witness testimony should be given heavier weight than 
unsworn testimony although this has not been the case in the ECCC practice. 
Indeed, civil parties providing testimonies have acknowledged to base them on 
what they heard at court, which is criticized here. On the other one, the civil 
parties’ testimonies/statements are not limited to the prosecutorial strategy 
unlike witnesses’ testimony. This need to choose (unlike the French system 
where the victim can be first witness and then civil party) can be criticized as 
may weaken victims’ status. Accordingly, civil parties cannot be simultaneously 
witnesses at the ECCC. In any case, at the ECCC, considering that civil parties 
can provide unsworn testimonies during trial, the fact that those testimonies are 
subject to adversarial argument and have not been seemingly given less weight 
than witness testimony, that the Judges/parties have referred to civil parties as 
witnesses, and that the Judges have treated civil party testimony (in particular 
direct victim testimony) as witness testimony, in those aspects, civil parties at the 
ECCC may in practice be considered as holding a sort of ‘dual’ status, i.e., civil 
party and mutatis mutandi relatively similar to a ‘witness’. At the STL, a 
disjunctive scheme similar to the ECCC’s, i.e., need to in principle choose 
between dimensions of the victims’ status at the STL, has been replaced by a RPE 
provision in favor of allowing dual status as a rule (and not only exceptionally), 
which arguably enhances victims’ status.   
4. Protective measures at international and hybrid criminal courts can be 
granted by a Judge or Chamber and, depending on the court and procedural 
stage, those measures can be ordered motu proprio, or upon request of the 
parties, victims, witnesses or Victims and Witnesses Units. Protective measures 
at international and hybrid criminal courts granted to victims and witnesses 
endeavor to minimize serious risks for their security, prevent serious incursions 
in their privacy and dignity, reduce trauma related to give testimony by avoiding 
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or reducing secondary victimization risks, and encourage witnesses to testify. All 
of this corresponds to the logics of incorporating restorative justice measures in 
international criminal justice primarily led by retributive/deterrent or utilitarian 
justice paradigms. Protective measures, granted not only to victims as witnesses 
but also to victim participants (ICC, STL) and civil parties (ECCC), are 
manifestations of both an obligation for the international and hybrid criminal 
courts to protect victims and witnesses and a correlative right of victims and 
witnesses to be protected when giving their testimony as a witness or 
participating as a victim participant or civil party, which is similar to the national 
systems examined.  
5. To order protective measures, it must be met certain conditions such 
as a real, legitimate and objective fear for the witness’s security based on an 
identified security threat or danger and not only the witness’s subjective fear 
(necessity); the effect on the public nature of the proceedings would be justified 
in the circumstances; and proportionality. These conditions have to be examined 
by international and hybrid criminal courts on case-by-case and individual basis, 
using factual analysis; and with full respect for the accused’s rights. This exercise 
is mutatis mutandi similar to the one conducted by the analyzed national 
systems. In carefully balancing, on the one hand, the protection of victims and 
witnesses and, on the other one, the accused’s rights, the international and 
hybrid criminal courts tend to give special primary consideration to the latter 
during the trial phase while during pre-trial those judicial forums tend to be 
more flexible. Moreover, the adoption of blanket protective measures regardless 
of specific security considerations has to be criticized based on the above-
mentioned considerations. In any case, protective measures can be augmented or 
lifted according to the changes, throughout time, in the security situation of a 
particular victim or witness. Under the ICC, the ICTY and the STL instruments, 
Chambers when deciding to vary a protective measure shall in principle seek the 
protected person’s consent. Civil parties can appeal decisions on protective 
measures at the ECCC, and victim participants can do so at the STL.                  
6. The international and hybrid criminal courts instruments and 
practices have considered an open-ended list, set of protective measures for 
victims and witness, which has been influenced by and/or keeps a strong 
similarity with those adopted in national jurisdictions, especially Anglo-
American systems. Accordingly, protective measures at international criminal 
justice forums have included sealed proceedings, prohibition to disclose 
protected person’s identifying information to third parties, expunging protected 
person’s identifying information from the judicial records, use of pseudonyms, 
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video-link testimony, distortion of voice and image, and in camera or closed 
proceedings. Even the most extreme of these measures, closed sessions, have 
become a regular practice at the international and hybrid criminal courts. The 
excessive frequency of closed hearings is criticized as public hearings is an 
important component of the accused’s rights and guarantees the accused’s right 
to a fair and impartial trial/proceedings, and indeed courts sitting in private may 
give the wrong impression. Additionally, protective measures specially tailored 
to protect vulnerable groups of victims and witnesses such as sexual violence 
victims and children have been adopted at international and hybrid criminal 
courts, holding similarities with the national systems examined although in some 
cases the former have been more generous arguably due to the mixed or sui 
generis nature of international criminal proceedings. Control of cross-
examination or questioning of the witness; in camera or closed proceedings; 
someone accompanying the victim or witness; production of a witness’s 
recorded video or audio testimony and written testimony; and the possibility for 
children and mentally impaired people to give unsworn testimony and/or video-
taped evidence are examples of these special measures. There are also special 
evidentiary principles applicable to sexual crimes, including the principle of non-
corroboration as complemented with a specific emphasis on sexual crimes, the 
restrictions to infer victim’s consent in oppressive environments, and irrelevance 
of victim’s previous or subsequent sexual behavior. Protection of sexual violence 
and other vulnerable victims has also taken place mutatis mutandi under and 
been influenced by international human rights law. Be that as it may, the 
international and hybrid criminal courts when examining whether and to what 
extent to grant special measures have considered other competing interests such 
as the principle of live questioning and the rights of the accused, including the 
right to examine/cross-examine witnesses, which leads to the conclusion that 
those measures must in principle be regarded as exceptional. Moreover, 
protective and special measures on concealing the identity of victims and 
witnesses during trial should be limited to protect their identities vis-à-vis the 
public and media rather than vis-à-vis the defence. Protective and special 
measures constitute an exception to the principle of public hearings.  
7. The legal instruments of the international and hybrid criminal courts 
do not contain explicit provisions on anonymous witnesses, with the exception 
of the STL, which explicitly allows anonymous witnesses during pre-trial and 
trial on exceptional basis. Nevertheless, provisions common to the legal 
instruments contemplate the possibility of non-disclosure of the identity of 
victims and witnesses to the defence during pre-trial proceedings, i.e., before 
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beginning of the trial (ICTY, ICC, STL) or prior to a particular witness’s 
testimony (ICTR, SCSL), as an exceptional protective measure. The ‘rolling 
disclosure’ system at the ICTR, the SCSL, also applied in the American system, 
can be criticized as affects the accused’s rights. Concerning the ECCC, the use of 
the dossier, similar to the French system, differs from the other courts’ disclosure 
proceedings and, indeed, the respective ECCC provisions arguably may be 
interpreted as an implicit authorization for anonymous witnesses even during 
trial. 
8. Granting anonymity to witnesses during trial at international and 
hybrid criminal courts which do not contain, in their legal frameworks, an 
explicit prohibition or permission thereof, i.e., the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL 
and the ICC, might be in principle acceptable as an extraordinary protective 
measure. Concerns about security and safety of witnesses, courts’ obligation to 
protect them, importance of their testimony, and reduction of the risk of re-
victimization constitute some of the most important grounds to justify 
anonymity not only for victim witnesses but also for victim participants. 
However, at those courts which keep silence/ambiguity about permission of 
anonymous witnesses, the best approach would consist in not granting 
anonymity to victim witnesses during trial based on a more coherent and 
systematic reading of their respective legal instruments, which refer to the need 
to disclose relevant identifying information of the witnesses prior to trial (ICTY, 
ICC) or before the witness in question testifies (ICTR, SCSL). The reasons 
underlying these dispositions are undoubtedly the full respect for the right of the 
accused to a fair and impartial trial, which grows in strength during trial in 
contrast to pre-trial proceedings insofar as the trial proceedings directly lead to 
the determination of criminal responsibility of the accused. Additionally, the 
development of witness protection programmes and the adoption of other 
protective measures, which are less restrictive for the rights of the accused, 
support this conclusion. Furthermore, although the examined national systems 
allow the exceptional intervention of anonymous witnesses, some of their 
legislative and jurisprudential practices have not met the standards set in the 
ECtHR’s case law as for the rights of the accused.  
9. Even though it is herein agreed with the practice of exceptionally 
granting anonymity to victim participants (ICC) or civil parties (ECCC), this 
should not be considered as an argument to extent anonymity to victim 
witnesses during trial at courts whose legal instruments keep silence on this 
issue. This corresponds to a basic difference in nature between the role of the 
victim as witness, i.e., as a provider of evidence, and his/her role as victim 
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participant or civil party, i.e., as an individual expressing his/her own views and 
concerns. It is absolutely pivotal to keep this distinction in mind since the same 
victim can hold an official/formal dual status as victim witness and as a victim 
participant (ICC, STL) and, therefore, attention should be drawn to which 
specific role anonymity is sought for. Thus, the ICC’s case law on not allowing 
anonymous victim witnesses during trial is consistent with the above-mentioned 
consideration and also coherent with the practice of the ICTY (Tadić excepted), 
the ICTR, the SCSL and the ECCC. Moreover, grating anonymity to victims 
when they participate as victim participants providing their statements in the 
particular case of the ICC’s practice (not only during pre-trial but also during 
trial) may be considered as a manner to indirectly ‘compensate’ the inadvisability 
of allowing them to be heard as anonymous witnesses. Even at the courts whose 
instruments explicitly (STL) or implicitly (ECCC) allow anonymous witnesses 
during trial, a necessary guarantee contained in their legal instruments is not to 
consider anonymous testimony as the sole or main evidence for conviction. This 
safeguard reflects similar developments in the examined national systems and in 
the light of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. In any case, even in the STL, reservations 
as for anonymous witnesses should be raised when its first trial begins based on 
the discussed arguments. However, the STL’s emerging approach consisting in 
completely and irrebuttably prohibiting anonymous victim participants during 
trial is criticized herein as inter alia it does not appropriately take into account 
the difference in nature between victim witness and victim participant. In 
contrast, the ICC’s approach is more balanced as it allows anonymous victim 
participation but it limits victims’ modalities of participation to protect the 
accused’s rights. Be that as it may, the dialogue between national and 
international criminal jurisdictions on the issue of anonymous witnesses has 
been active.   
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Chapter IV. Victims’ Status as Victim 
Participants/Civil Parties 
 
 
1. Introduction      
This chapter deals with the status of victims as victim participants (ICC, STL) 
and as civil parties (ECCC) and consists of seven subchapters (including this 
introduction). Although as established by the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber 
‘unlike at the ICC and STL, victims before the ECCC have the status of a 
party’,1762 victims’ status as participants (ICC, STL) and as civil parties (ECCC) 
are studied together since they properly speaking constitute the participatory 
dimension of the victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal courts. As 
for the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, even though victims lack the status of 
victim participants or civil parties, references to specific limited instances of 
victim’s ‘participation’ during some particular procedural stages are examined. It 
is important to mention that although in the Anglo-American systems victims 
are not civil parties (unlike the ECCC and the French inquisitorial system) or 
formally speaking victim participants (unlike the ICC and the STL), some 
specific procedural rights in particular procedural stages can be exercised and, 
thus, they are considered here. It is important to remember, as indicated in the 
general introduction to this thesis, that although certain legal entities may 
qualify as victims at the ICC and the ECCC, the analysis is only focused on 
natural persons. Concerning some general references to the rights of the accused, 
it is herein referred to those included under the introduction to the previous 
chapter.1763   
In the second subchapter, legal definitions of victims and especially the 
legal requirements to be granted either the official victim participant status or 
civil party status and then properly speaking to participate in the criminal 
proceedings at the ICC, the ECCC and the STL are examined in detail. The 
following four subchapters analyze and discuss in detail the modalities of 
participation or procedural rights of victims, either as victim participants (ICC, 
STL) or as civil parties (ECCC). These subchapters follow the sequence of 
procedural stages in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, these subchapters 
examine respectively investigation/pre-trial, trial, sentencing and appeals 
 
1762 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 488.   
1763 See supra Chapter III 1. 
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proceedings. The analysis of victims’ status during investigation/pre-trial and 
trial is particularly detailed due to not only a larger amount of available sources 
but also bearing in mind the importance of these stages (especially trial). In each 
and every subchapter, a general presentation of the three national systems 
considered is followed by the detailed analysis of victims’ status as victim 
participants or civil parties at the ICC, the ECCC and the STL. The modalities of 
victims’ participation/victims’ procedural rights are presented and discussed, 
normally followed by an additional analysis of relevant legal issues. Each 
subchapter contains comparative conclusions where the status of victims at the 
ICC, the ECCC and the STL is analytically and comparatively summarized and, 
where pertinent, compared with the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL and the 
presented national systems. This chapter ends with general conclusions.     
At this point, it is relevant to mention that the ICC, the ECCC and the 
STL have specific sections devoted to providing support to victim 
participants/civil parties and with similar mandates. Accordingly, the ICC has 
two distinct bodies, both within the Registry, devoted to providing support to 
victims and which interact with each other, namely, the Victims Participation 
and Reparations Section (VPRS) and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims 
(OPCV). The VPRS, as a specialized unit dealing with victims’ participation and 
reparations and assistance to victims,1764 has, inter alia, the following obligations: 
i) receiving applications for victim participation and transmit them to the 
relevant Chamber, and subject to the ICC Statute,  in particular article 68 (1),1765 
to provide a copy of them to the Prosecution and defence who are entitled to 
reply them;1766 ii) assisting victims ‘in obtaining legal advice and organize their 
legal representation’,1767 including, where necessary, common legal 
representation;1768 and iii) providing ‘notice or notification to victims or their 
legal representative’.1769 In turn, the OPCV has the mandate to ‘provide support 
and assistance to the legal representative[s] for victims and to victims, including, 
where appropriate: (a) Legal research and advice; and (b) Appearing before a 
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1764 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 86 (9). 
1765 ‘The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological 
well-being, dignity and privacy of victims […]’.  
1766 ICC RPE, rule 89 (1). 
1767 Ibid., rule 16 (1) (b). 
1768 Ibid., rule 90 (2)-(4). 
1769 Ibid., rule 16 (1) (a). 
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Chamber in respect of specific issues’.1770 Additionally, the OPCV can be 
appointed by a Chamber as the legal representative for victims.1771  
As for the ECCC, the Victims Support Section (VSS) (previously called 
Victims Unit) has the mandate to, inter alia: i) assist lodging complaints and 
assist victims in submitting civil party applications, under the supervision of Co-
Prosecutors and Co-Investigating Judges respectively; ii) maintain a list of 
lawyers who wish to represent victims; iii) provide general information to 
victims, especially civil parties; and iv) assist and support civil parties and 
complainants’ attendance in court proceedings.1772 It also receives, processes and 
transfers the applications for becoming civil parties to the Co-Investigating 
Judges or Trial Chamber.1773 With regard to the STL, the Victims’ Participation 
Unit (VPU), which is part of the Registry, has the mandate to assist victims 
participating in the proceedings and, hence, their functions include, inter alia: i) 
inform the victims of their rights; ii) receive applications from victims who want 
to participate, review that they are complete, and once this has been done 
transmit them to the Pre-Trial Judge; iii) ensure that the victims and their legal 
representatives receive documents filed by the parties and files submitted by the 
Pre-Trial Judge subject to confidentiality/justice interests; iv) provide 
administrative and logistical assistance to victim participants; and v) draw up 
and maintain a list of counsel for victim participants’ representation.1774         
A last preliminary point concerns legal aid for victim participants and 
civil parties, who in most of the cases do not have economic means to, inter alia, 
afford legal representation expenses. Rule 90 (5) of the ICC RPE lays down that 
‘A victim or group of victims who lack the necessary means to pay for a common 
legal representative chosen by the Court may receive assistance from the 
Registry, including, as appropriate, financial assistance’, and the ICC in practice 
has tried to do so, existing an specific budget for this aim.1775 In turn, at the STL, 
the VPU, under the Registrar’s authority, has the function to ‘in accordance with 
the applicable Legal Aid Policy, administer and monitor the provision of funds 
to the legal representatives of indigent victims’.1776 In contrast to the ICC and the 
STL, the ECCC lacks a formal legal aid system for civil parties and although 
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1770 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 81 (4).  
1771 Ibid., regulation 80 (2).  
1772 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 12 bis.  
1773 Practice Direction on Victim Participation (Rev.1), Practice Direction 02/2007/Rev.1, article 3 
(6) and (7).  
1774 STL RPE, rule 151 (B) and (C).  
1775 See, for further details, McGonigle Leyh (2011) 329-330.    
1776 STL RPE, rule 51 (C) (ii).  
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some efforts have been taken to provide civil parties with legal representation 
even when they cannot afford it, the responsibility is still primarily assumed by 
civil society groups.1777 In any case, it should be borne in mind the pivotal 
importance of the existence and appropriate functioning of a legal aid system for 
victims so that they are able to fully exercise their procedural rights.1778 The 
above-mentioned consideration results of the highest value to fulfill in practice 
what has been provided for victims as modalities of participation/procedural 
rights under the respective legal instruments and/or case law of the ICC, the 
ECCC and the STL. 
 
2. Legal Definitions of Victims and Requirements to Participate as Victim 
Participants/Civil Parties  
This sub-chapter deals with a presentation of victims as victim participants (ICC, 
STL) or civil parties (ECCC). Accordingly, after a general survey of the three 
considered national systems, the analysis at the level of the international and 
hybrid criminal courts is conducted. First, some general remarks about the status 
as victim participants or civil parties and respective definitions are discussed. 
References to the situation at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL are 
incorporated. Second, a detailed analysis of the legal requirements to be granted 
the status of and participate as victim participants or civil parties follows.   
 
2.1. National Systems 
2.1.1. English Adversarial System 
Victims in England and Wales do not have the official status of civil parties or 
victim participants in criminal proceedings. However, due to some domestic law 
developments, the EU Framework Decision on Victims and the ECtHR’s case 
law, it has been said that victims have acquired certain procedural rights,1779 as 
recognized by the Law Commission.1780 In other words, as detailed later, victims 
can participate at certain specific procedural stages especially during pre-trial 
proceedings (via private prosecutions) or sentencing (via victims’ statements). 
Although the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime is not statutory, i.e., not set 
out in law, it establishes the services a victim can expect to receive from criminal 
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1777 See, for further details, McGonigle Leyh (2011) 219-220. 
1778 See ICC, Report of the Court on Legal Aid: Legal and Financial Aspects of Funding Victims’ 
Legal Representatives before the Court, Eight Session, ICC-ASP/8/25, 18-26 November 2009, p. 2.   
1779 Doak (2008) 245. 
1780 Law Commission of England and Wales, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and 
Related Topics (Paper No 245) (1997) [5.22]. Cited by Doak (2008) 245.   
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justice agencies and is important for the definition of victims. Victim’s definition 
is in principle limited to direct victims:   
 
The person who has made the allegation (or on whose behalf the allegation has 
been made) must be the direct victim of the criminal conduct. This Code does 
not require services to be provided to third parties or indirect victims such as 
witnesses of violent crimes.1781   
 
Nevertheless, indirect victims are also admitted in the following cases:  
 
Where a person has died as a result of criminal conduct, or is unable to receive 
services as a result of disability, the victim’s family spokesperson is entitled to 
receive services under this Code. A family spokesperson should be nominated 
by the close relatives of the person who has died.1782  
   
Accordingly, besides direct victims, family members of the deceased or 
disabled person can also be considered as indirect victims. Moreover, when a 
person is under the age of 17, his/her parent or guardian is entitled to receive 
services as well as the young person unless the former is investigated/charged for 
criminal conduct that victimized the latter or when does not represent the young 
person’s best interests.1783 A person is entitled to receive services provided that 
there is an allegation of a criminal conduct.1784 The Code refers to categories of 
vulnerable and intimidated victims based on the definitions given by sections 16 
and 17 of the YJCEA,1785 as detailed in the previous chapter.1786 
The definition of victims under article 2 (1) (a) of the EU Directive on 
Victims, which is quite similar to that contained under the EU Framework 
Decision on Victims,1787 reads as follows ‘(i) a natural person who has suffered 
harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was 
directly caused by a criminal offence’. Also, this article has explicitly added 
family members of a victim whose death is caused by a crime under the category 
of victims: 
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1781 Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, section 3.2.  
1782 Ibid., section 3.4. 
1783 Ibid., section 3.5. 
1784 Ibid., section 3.11. 
1785 Ibid., section 4. 
1786 See supra Chapter III 2.1.1 and 3.1.1. 
1787 EU Framework Decision on Victims, article 1 (‘[…] ‘victim’ shall mean a natural person who 
has suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss, 
directly caused by acts or omissions that are in violation of the criminal law of a Member State’.). 
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(ii) family members of a person whose death was directly caused by a criminal 
offence and who have suffered harm as a result of that person's death; 
(b) ‘family members’ means the spouse, the person who is living with the victim 
in a committed intimate relationship, in a joint household and on a stable and 
continuous basis, the relatives in direct line, the siblings and the dependants of 
the victim; 
 
The ECJ considered that ‘victim’, for purposes of the EU Framework 
Decision on Victims, does not include legal persons as this only applies to 
natural persons who have suffered harm directly caused by acts or omissions in 
violation of the criminal law of a member state.1788             
 
2.1.2. American Adversarial System  
Besides witnesses, victims do not have an official status as civil parties or victim 
participants in American criminal proceedings. However, some legal definitions 
of victims and corresponding case law are examined here as during specific 
procedural stages, especially sentencing, victims can participate. The CVRA is 
particularly important as intents ‘to transform the federal criminal justice 
system’s treatment of crime victims and to serve as a model for reform of the 
criminal justice legal culture in the fifty states’.1789 The CVRA begins with the 
statement that ‘a crime victim has the following rights’, some of which can be 
considered as participatory rights.1790 The definition of ‘crime victim’ reads as 
follows:  
 
[…] the term “crime victim” means a person directly and proximately harmed 
as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of 
Columbia. In the case of a crime victim who is under 18 years of age, 
incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardians of the crime victim 
or the representatives of the crime victim’s estate, family members, or any other 
persons appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the crime victim’s rights 
 
1788 ECJ, Criminal Proceedings Against Dell’Orto (C-467/05), 28 June 2007, paras. 48, 52-60.  
1789 Jon Kyl, Steven Twist and Stephen Higgins, ‘On the Wings of their Angels: The Scott Campbell, 
Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act’ (2005) 
Lewis & Clark Law Review 581, 593.  
1790 ‘(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any 
parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused [...] (4) The right 
to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, 
sentencing, or any parole proceeding [...] (5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for 
the Government in the case [...] (6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law’. 18 
U.S.C. § 3771 (a).       
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under this chapter, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such 
guardian or representative.1791 
 
This definition is grounded on the federal restitution statutes,1792 and is 
broader than the definition contained in rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which limits the meaning of victim to the ‘individual 
against whom the defendant committed an offence for which the court will 
impose a sentence’.1793 Accordingly, the CVRA could be applied to victims of 
counts dismissed in, for example, a plea agreement.1794 ‘Harm’ under the CVRA 
is limited to harm which is ‘directly and proximately’ caused by the offence. Such 
terms necessarily resort to ‘foreseeability’, concept interpreted in a liberal 
manner under other victims’ statutes.1795 Crime foreseeability presents far-
reaching consequences, as highlighted by the United States Supreme Court 
Justice David in his concurring opinion in Payne v. Tennessee ‘Murder has 
foreseeable consequences. When it happens, it is always to distinct individuals, 
and, after it happens, other victims are left behind’.1796 The CVRA, paying 
attention to victims ‘left behind’, defines who can serve as a victim’s 
representative and, thus, does not limit it to a single member of the family but 
allows ‘family members’ to do it. Surviving family members are included in the 
protection of most victims’ rights enactments, either some states authorize 
family members to appear as victims’ representatives or other states incorporate 
family members explicitly as ‘the victim’ in homicide cases.1797 In United States v. 
Hunter, the Federal District Court of Utah interpreting the term ‘crime victim’ 
under the CVRA found that ‘a person must be directly harmed as a result of the 
offense and the harm must be proximate to the crime’ and also established that 
‘proximate’ means:   
 
[…] lying very near or close […] (1) “soon forthcoming; imminent”; (2) “next 
preceding” <proximate cause>; and (3) “nearly accurate, approximate” […]. 
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1791 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (e). 
1792 See Ibid., §§ 3663 (a) (1) (A), 3663A (2004).  
1793 See also Kyl, Twist and Higgins (2005) 594.  
1794 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1795 See, e.g., United States v. Metzger, 233 F.3d 1226, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Moore, 178 F.3d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 1999). 
1796 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 838-39 (1991) (Scouter, J. Concurring). 
1797 See respectively, e.g., Florida Constitution, article I, § 16 (b); Georgia Code Annotated, § 17-17-
3 (11).   
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“Proximate cause” […] emphasizes “the continuity of the sequence that 
“produces an event and refers to a cause of which the law will take notice”.1798 
     
In In re Antrobus, Judge Tymkovich of the Tenth Circuit concurred to 
note that ‘The harm must “proximately” result from the crime’.1799 Whereas 
some state constitutions and statutes refer only explicitly to the person directly 
affected, others also include (immediate) family members if the direct victim is 
dead, incapacitated or a minor.1800 Moreover, in Beck v. Commonwealth, a capital 
murder case, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the victim impact 
testimony, for sentencing purposes, from non-family members is allowed if the 
declarant is not ‘so far removed from the victims as to have nothing of value to 
impart to the court’.1801 In turn, in cases of child victims, the Victims’ Rights 
Statute of Wisconsin states that ‘a parent, guardian, or legal custodian, is also a 
victim’.1802 However, there are some important gaps as, for instance, in some 
state laws the designation of victim is left up to the discretion of prosecutors or 
police officers or the status is only acknowledged once the suspect is arrested and 
charged.1803 Indeed, some states explicitly include an ‘alleged victim’ within the 
statutory definition of ‘victim’ and others do it implicitly.1804 As for case law, 
sometimes references to the complainant as ‘victim’ has been found as not 
violating an accused’s right to fair trial unlike some other case law.1805    
 
2.1.3. French Inquisitorial System   
In the French system, victims can participate as civil parties in criminal 
proceedings, i.e., as parties like the prosecutor and the defence. If the victim has 
undergone personal and direct damage under article 2 of the CPP,1806 (s)he may 
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1798 United States v. Hunter, 2008 WL 53125 (D. Utah 2008).   
1799 In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1225 (10th Cir. 2008) (Judge Tymkovich concurring).  
1800 As for the first category, see, e.g., California Constitution, article 1 § 28. As for the second 
category, see, e.g., Arizona Constitution, article 2 § 2.1; Massachusetts Statute, 258 B § 1; Oregon 
Revised Statutes, § 131.007. See also Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 41-43.        
1801 Beck v. Commonwealth 484 S.E.2d 898, 906 (Va. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1018. 
1802 Wisconsin Statutes § 950.02(4)(a)(1).  
1803 See, e.g., Delaware Code, Title 11, § 9410 (5); Ohio Revised Code Annotated, § 2930. 01 (H), 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-38-2 (9) (a).  
1804 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 68.  
1805 See respectively, State v. Robinson, 838 A.2d 243 (Conn. App. 2004); State v. Cortes, 851 A.2d 
1230 (Conn. App. 2004).  
1806 ‘Civil action aimed at the reparation of the damage suffered because of a felony, a misdemeanor 
or a petty offence is open to all those who have personally suffered damage directly caused by the 
offence’. (‘L'action civile en réparation du dommage causé par un crime, un délit ou une 
contravention appartient à tous ceux qui ont personnellement souffert du dommage directement 
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come at the criminal court as a partie civile (civil party), in cases concerning 
crimes (felonies),1807 délits (misdemeanors),1808 and contraventions (petty 
offences).1809 
There are two manners to become civil parties, either by joining in a 
prosecution already started, or by starting a new one.1810 Under the first manner, 
the victim may join the criminal proceedings (par voie d’intervention) and this is 
not subject to formalities.1811 The victim may intervene before or during the 
court proceedings (audience). Additionally, the victim may become a civil party 
before the investigating judge as established in accordance to article 85 of the 
CPP ‘Any person claiming to have suffered harm from a felony or misdemeanor 
may petition to become a civil party by filing a complaint with the competent 
investigating judge’.1812 In this case, the admissibility of the civil action is 
subordinated to the prosecution’s inaction.1813   
During criminal proceedings, the victim may join the proceedings at any 
moment leading up to the close of argument, via a statement recorded at the 
clerk’s office, by filing a submission with the court or verbally.1814 It is also 
possible to oneself apply for civil party constitution if the offender is sentenced 
by default.1815 Under the second manner to become civil party, the victim may 
bypass the public prosecutor’s decision not to bring an action, either by 
complaining of a crime and becoming civil party before the most senior 
investigating judge, or by directly denouncing the offender before the tribunal 
correctionnel or the tribunal de police (via direct citation in matière délictuelle, as 
provided in articles 388 et seq. of the CPP). In any case, the victim is obligated to 
deposit a monetary sum in advance.1816 Victim’s compensation depends on the 
accused’s conviction. This rule and its exceptions are discussed later.1817 To avoid 
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causé par l'infraction’.). As for case law of the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation see inter 
alia Crim., 4 April 2012, Arrêt n ° 2066 (11-81.124).    
1807 See CPP, articles 85-87. 
1808 See Ibid., articles 85-87 and 418.  
1809 See Ibid., article 2.  
1810 Dervieux (2002) 226.  
1811 CPP, article 3. 
1812 ‘Toute personne qui se prétend lésée par un crime ou un délit peut en portant plainte se 
constituer partie civile devant le juge d'instruction compétent’. See also CPP, article 87. 
1813 Ibid., article 85.  
1814 Ibid., articles 419 and 420. 
1815 Ibid., articles 419 and 420. 
1816 As for direct citation, see Ibid., articles 392 and 533. As for constitution before the investigating 
judge, see Ibid., article 88.  
1817 See infra Chapter V 2.1.3.  
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abusive or dilatory civil party constitutions, some limitations have been 
introduced.1818 Thus, the civil party has to wait in matière délictuelle three 
months before (s)he can do it.1819    
The two objectives for bringing a civil action/civil party constitution 
before a criminal court are to obtain a ruling on the accused’s guilt and to obtain 
compensation for the damage suffered.1820 Nevertheless, the Criminal Chamber 
of the Cour de Cassation has determined that the claim for damages is not a 
necessary condition to constitute civil parties.1821 Moreover, in interpreting and 
applying articles 418 and 2 of the CPP, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de 
Cassation has also determined that once a victim has become a civil party, (s)he 
is free not to request reparations for his/her harm.1822 In any case, the Criminal 
Chamber of the Cour de Cassation has often established that although civil party 
constitution can have as a unique object to corroborate the public action, the 
conditions under article 2 of the CPP cannot be disregarded.1823 Accordingly, the 
faculty to prompt the repression is only separated from the right to financial 
reparation in order to serve this right better.1824 Therefore, neither the civil party 
constitution depends on a claim for damages nor does the civil action 
admissibility automatically mean that the respective damages will be awarded to 
the claimant.1825 With regard to the non-dependence of the civil party 
constitution on claiming damages, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de 
Cassation has established that the claim for damages is not a requirement to 
become civil parties.1826 Also, the Cour de Cassation, interpreting and applying 
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1818 Law n° 2007-291, 5 March 2007 Concerning the Equality of Arms in the Criminal Procedure, 
JO, 6 March 2007. See also Sophie Corioland ‘Statut de la Victime et Prospectives Législatives’ in 
Strickler (2009) 125, 132.  
1819 CPP, article 85. 
1820 See Dervieux (2002) 227. 
1821 Crim., 10 October 1968, Bull. crim. n° 248; Crim., 15 October 1970, Bull. crim. n° 268; D., 1970, 
jurisp., pp. 733-734, note J.-L. Costa; Crim., 8 June 1971, D., 1971, jurisp., pp. 594-597, note J. 
Maury; R.T.D.Civ., 1971, pp. 884-885, obs. P. Hébraud; Crim., 7 October 1987, unpublished, 
appeal n° 86-93027. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 253.   
1822 Crim., 26 October 1982, Bull. crim. n° 233. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 253.  
1823 Crim., 4 July 1990, unpublished, appeal/pourvoi n° 90-80372; Crim., 7 May 1996, unpublished, 
appeal n° 95-81384. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 262.    
1824 Pignoux (2008) 262. 
1825 Ibid., 227. See also infra Chapter IV 2.1.3.   
1826 Crim., 10 October 1968, Bull. crim. n° 248; Crim., 15 October 1970, Bull. crim. n° 268; D., 1970, 
jurisp., pp. 733-734, note J.-L. Costa; Crim., 8 June 1971, D., 1971, jurisp., pp. 594-597, note J. 
Maury; R.T.D.Civ., 1971, pp. 884-885, obs. P. Hébraud; Crim., 7 October 1987, unpublished, 
appeal n° 86-93027. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 253.    
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some CPP provisions,1827 has concluded that upon civil party constitution, it is 
up to him/her to request reparation for the harm inflicted.1828     
The Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation has found that, in cases 
of civil party constitution before the investigating judge, its admissibility is not 
precluded by the fact that the damage has been compensated before the civil 
jurisdiction since civil party constitution can be motivated by the aim at 
corroborating the public action.1829 However, in a decision that went against the 
rest of its case law, the Criminal Chamber, in a case before the tribunal 
correctional, determined the inadmissibility of civil party constitution for a 
victim previously compensated in the civil jurisdiction.1830 Be that as it may, the 
admissibility of the civil action does not automatically imply that damages will 
be awarded to the victim.1831   
At this point, it is important to make some precisions about two 
concepts that although directly related are autonomous: the civil action and civil 
party constitution. Concerning the nature of the civil action, the Criminal 
Chamber of the Cour de Cassation had never granted a criminal character to 
it.1832 It has stated that ‘the civil action exercised before the repressive jurisdiction 
has for only object the reparation of damages’.1833 With regard to civil party 
constitution, the Chamber has affirmed that ‘the victim of the offence can be 
constituted as a civil party even when (s)he has for only object setting in motion 
the public action to determine the accused’s culpability’,1834 or that ‘victim’s 
intervention may be only motivated by the desire to corroborate the public 
action and obtain the accused’s culpability’.1835 The Chamber also affirmed that 
‘the right to civil party constitution has for essential object to put in motion the 
public action to establish the culpability’ and ‘constitute a prerogative attached to 
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1827 CPP, articles 2 and 418 (on civil party constitution).  
1828 Crim., 26 October 1982, Bull. crim. n° 233. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 253.  
1829 Crim., 30 October 2001, unreported, appeal n° 01-81530. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 263.  
1830 Crim., 17 June 1998, unreported, appeal n° 96-81099. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 261. 
1831 Dervieux (2002) 237. 
1832 Pignoux (2008) 269. 
1833 Crim., 5 December 1989, Bull. crim. n° 462. (‘l’action civile exercée devant la jurisdiction 
répressive a pour seul objet la réparation des dommages’.). Cited by Pignoux (2008) 269.  
1834 Crim., 18 July 1999, unreported, appeal n° 88-86594; Crim., 16 December 1980, Bull. crim. n° 
348 (‘la constitution de partie civile de la victime de l’infraction est recevable, alors même qu’elle a 
pour seul object la mise en mouvement de l’action publique en vue d’etablir la culpabilité du 
prévenu’.). Cited by Pignoux (2008) 254.   
1835 See, e.g., Crim., 21 March 2000, Bull. crim. n° 123 (‘l’intervention de la victime peut n’être 
motivée que par le souci de corrober l’action publique et d’obtenir que soit établie la culapbilité du 
prévenu’.). Cited by Pignoux (2008) 254.  


the person’.1836 Even the determination of truth as a sole interest has been found 
admissible.1837 Accordingly, civil party constitution should not be confused with 
civil action as such. In any case, there is doctrinal consensus of the double 
finality of the victim’s action/civil party constitution, i.e., reparative and 
repressive.1838 It should be noticed that the ECtHR has evolved concerning the 
applicability of article 6 (1) of the ECHR guarantees to civil parties. Unlike 
previous cases,1839 in Perez v. France, the ECtHR did not require a financial 
reparation claim for the applicability of article 6 (1) as the mere civil party 
constitution should be enough to show ‘the importance they [victims] attach not 
only to the criminal conviction of the offender but also to securing financial 
reparation for the damage sustained’.1840    
The Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation has considered that the 
next of kin of the direct victim suffer a direct and personal harm caused by the 
crime and, accordingly, they can constitute themselves civil parties even if the 
direct victim is still alive.1841 Accordingly, the next of kin suffer a personal harm, 
understood as own harm distinct from direct victim’s harm, and the next of kin 
undergo a direct harm out of the damaging fact suffered by the direct victim.1842 
Losses and injuries may be material, moral or both, and the victim’s right may be 
transferred to his/her heirs, assignees, creditors and also third parties.1843 Due to 
his/her incapacity, the minor cannot apply him/herself for civil party 
constitution and, thus, his/her legal representatives should do it on his/her 
behalf.1844 Certain associations, e.g., associations fighting against discrimination 
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1836 Crim., 16 December 1980, Bull. crim. n° 348. (‘le droit de se constituer partie civile a pour objet 
essential la mise en movement de l’action publique en vue d’établir la culpabilité […] une 
prérogative attachée à la personne’.). Cited by Pignoux (2008) 269.  
1837 Crim., 10 May 1984, J.C.P., 1985, II, 20413, note C. Roca. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 254. 
1838 See Pignoux (2008) 265-269 (discussing the dual and unitary conceptions of civil action/civil 
party constitution).  
1839 See, e.g., ECtHR, Tomasi v. France, Appl. No. 12850/87, Judgment, 27 August 1992; ECtHR, 
Acquaviva v. France, Appl. No. 19248/9119248/91, Judgment, 21 November 1995. For further 
discussion see Judith Levy-Amsallem, ‘L'action Civile «à la Française» et la Convention EDH. 
Exercice d'un «Droit à la Vengeance Privée» ou Compensation Morale de la Souffrance Éprouvée? 
in Strickler (2009) 135-156.      
1840 ECtHR, Perez v. France, Appl. No. 47287/99, Judgment, 12 February 2004, para. 64. 
1841 Crim., 9 February 1989, arrêt Latil-Janet, D., 1989, somm. comm.., p. 389, note J. Pradel; Crim., 
23 May 1991, Bull. crim. n° 220; D., 1992, somm. comm.., p. 95, note J.Pradel; Crim., 11 July 1994, 
Bull. crim. n° 269; J.C.P., 1995, II, 22441, note F. Eudier. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 250-251.   
1842 Pignoux (2008) 250-251. 
1843 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 319.  
1844 Pignoux (2008) 244. 
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or sexual abuse, may join the criminal proceedings as a civil party, if established 
by law.1845   
 
2.2. The ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL  
2.2.1. Preliminary Considerations  
At the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, victims lack the status of victim 
participants or civil parties as already said. Thus, victims’ status at the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the SCSL is limited to that of being witnesses. Nevertheless, when the 
ICTY Statute was being discussed, there was a proposal to allow the appointment 
of a separate counsel for victims that would be ‘similar to the concept of partie 
civile employed in many civil law countries’.1846 However, this was later rejected 
mainly by United States delegates due to a large extent the fear that third-party 
participation would cause conflicts with the Prosecution’s case and since victims’ 
interests were considered to be represented adequately by the Prosecutor.1847 
Accordingly, the reasons for limiting victims’ status to almost exclusively the role 
of witnesses in the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL and, thus, to deny them a civil 
party or victim participant status were basically four.   
First, the mandate given to these tribunals, i.e., more concerned to 
punish criminal acts perpetrated in the respective countries rather than to satisfy 
the victims’ personal interests. Thus, for example, Security Council Resolution 
827 (1993) stated the ICTY was established ‘for the sole purpose of prosecuting 
persons responsible for serious violations of international law […]’.1848 Second, 
the adversarial structure of these international criminal proceedings is also a 
factor for having limited victims’ status at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL 
mainly to that of witnesses. Third, since the Prosecutor is entrusted to protect 
the interests of the international community, it is assumed that ‘victims’ interests 
would be co-extensive with those of the international community and would be 
adequately protected by the Prosecutor’.1849 Fourth, victims’ role as a sort of third 
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1845 CPP, article 2 (1)-(21).  
1846 Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Vol. I (Transnational Publishers1995) 167.  
1847 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1848 UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). However, this resolution also stated that ‘the work of the 
International Tribunal shall be carried out without prejudice to the right of the victims to seek 
through appropriate means, compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of 
international humanitarian law’.  
1849 Morris and Scharf (1995) 167. 
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parties was considered to eventually interfere in the Prosecutor’s case and lead to 
delay in the proceedings.1850  
Nevertheless, it is herein taken issue with the assertion or assumption 
related to the necessary coincidence between victims’ interests and Prosecutor’s 
interests. This is illustrated by cases at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL where, 
for example, there was available evidence of the accused’s responsibility for 
sexual crimes but corresponding charges were absent,1851 when the Prosecutor 
did not file appeals for rape acquittals,1852 or when a rape count was dropped in 
exchange for a guilty plea on the other counts.1853 These cases demonstrate that 
the Prosecutor may consider other understandable and/or legitimate interests 
and priorities over the also legitimate interests of the victims. The argument 
about delay in the proceedings if the victims were granted a role beyond their 
mere participation as witnesses is contradicted by practice of civil law countries 
where there is no important delays caused by civil party status.1854 Moreover, 
victim participation can contribute to establish the truth and make the 
proceedings more transparent and without disrupting the tranquility of 
proceedings.1855  
Therefore, the exclusive focus on the Prosecution’s interest and the 
disregard for victims’ interests can be qualified as a very narrow approach.1856 
Even though the former ICTY/ICTR Prosecutor Carla del Ponte put forward the 
issues of victim participation and compensation before the Security Council in 
November 2000, inviting any change in the legal instruments of the tribunals,1857 
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1850 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1851 E.g., in Butare (Kanyabashi, Ndayambaje, Ntzeriyayo and Nsabimana). See Coalition for 
Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, Rights and Democracy, and International Centre 
for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Letter to Carla del Ponte (12 March 2003). 
1852 For example, in Kajelijeli and Kamuhanda at the ICTR. 
1853 Serushago (ICTR-98-39-S), Sentence, Trial Chamber, 5 February 1999, para. 4; Banović (IT-02-
65/1-S), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 28 October 2003, paras. 9-19.    
1854 See, in general, Brienen and Hoegen (2000). 
1855 Brouwer (2005) 286. 
1856 See, e.g., David Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 68’ in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article (Nomos 1999a) 
869-888; Brouwer (2005) 286.  
1857 Prosecutor Del Ponte stated that ‘Nor should we forget the role of victims in the justice process. 
The voices of survivors and relatives of those killed are not sufficiently heard. Victims have almost 
no rights to participate in the trial process, despite the widespread acceptance nowadays that 
victims should be allowed to do so. And those remarks apply equally to the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
where the position of victims is no better, and where the accused have also amassed personal 
fortunes at the expense of their country and its citizens […] I would therefore respectfully suggest 
to the Council that present system falls short of delivering justice to the people of Rwanda and the 
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no amendment has been introduced. Despite all these constraints, there are some 
forms of ‘participation’ of victims, such as submission of amicus curiae briefs (in 
the trial proceedings) and victims’ impact statements for sentencing purposes, 
discussed later in this chapter.      
 
2.2.2. Definition of ‘Victims’  
Rule 2 (A) of the ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE defines ‘victim’ as ‘A person 
against whom a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly 
been committed’. Rule 2 (A) of the SCSL RPE definition is quite similar as it 
establishes that ‘A person against whom a crime over which the Special Court 
has jurisdiction has allegedly or has been found to have been committed’. The 
ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL RPE definition of victims is ‘strictly limited to 
“direct victims”’,1858 excluding dependants of the victims and their relatives. This 
definition is more limited than the one in the UN Victims Declaration, which in 
spite of its non-binding nature has been considered as a kind of international 
standard definition since it was adopted unanimously by all States Members of 
the UN.1859 That definition is also more limited than those contained in 
international and regional instruments on victims previously referred to.1860 
Moreover, at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL RPE victim definitions 
seemingly only recognize a victim from the moment the accused’s guilt has been 
established and not since (s)he reported it.1861 The ICTY and the ICTR RPE 
definition (also applicable to the SCSL) has indeed been considered as 
‘insufficient by many observers and has generated interesting criticism about the 
ad hoc tribunals’ procedure by experts and non-governmental organisations, 
especially those based in the so-called civil law countries’.1862  
Furthermore, although the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL RPE have been 
amended several times by frequently adopting civil society’s suggestions, the 
definition of ‘victim’ has remained unchanged. An important reason for such 
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former Yugoslavia, and I would give you to give serious and urgent consideration to any change 
that would remove this lacuna in our process’. ICTY Press Release, Address to the Security Council 
by Carla del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, to the UN Security Council, JL/P.I.S./542-E, The Hague, 24 November 2000.    
1858 David Donat-Cattin, ‘The Role of Victims in ICC Proceedings’ in Flavia Lattanzi and William 
Schabas (eds.), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I (Il Sirente 
1999c) 251, 260. 
1859 Donat-Cattin (1999a) 884; Heikkilä (2004) 16.  
1860 See supra Chapter II 2.1.7.  
1861 It should be, however, mentioned that article 2 (25) of the IACtHR’s Rules of Procedure uses 
the expression ‘alleged victim’.  
1862 Donat-Cattin (1999c) 260-261. 
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judges’ inaction may consist in the lack of victim participant status at these 
tribunals and, hence, a lack of practical relevance for amending the definition of 
victim. This reflects the predominant focus of these tribunals on retributive 
justice.1863       
 
2.3. The ICC 
2.3.1. General Considerations 
In spite of the major and distinctive role assigned to victims at the ICC, as victim 
participants, a definition of victims was not specifically discussed during the ICC 
Statute elaboration.1864 However, during the negotiation and drafting of the ICC 
RPE, discussions about definition of victims took place. Victim definition was in 
particular discussed in the so-called Paris Seminar which, in contrast to the UN 
Victims Declaration, considered organizations as potential victims and did not 
enumerate the included indirect victims.1865 During the Preparatory Commission 
Sessions in 2000, the vast majority of delegations supported in principle a broad 
definition based on the UN Victims Declaration,1866 which had been on the table 
of negotiations for years. Nevertheless, this definition did not pass the test of 
debates as raised many difficulties to agree on terms including ‘collectively’, 
‘emotional suffering’, and ‘family’.1867 A group of Arab States brought a simple 
and straightforward definition that mostly eliminated the sources of conflict.1868 
This proposal would later lead to the current definition of ‘victims’ under rule 85 
of the ICC RPE, which reads as follows:  
 
(a) ‘Victims’ means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;  
(b) Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct 
harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or 
science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and 
other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.  
  
 
1863 See Brouwer and Groenhuijsen (2009) 156.  
1864 Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, ‘Definition of Victims and General Principle’ in Lee (2001b) 
427, 428. However, already at the Preparatory Committee attention was drawn to the UN Victim 
Declaration. See 1996 Report of the Preparatory Committee, Vol. I, at 59. 
1865 Paris Draft Rule X (Workshop 1), in UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/INF/2, p. 3. 
1866 The respective proposal was reproduced as Rule Q in the Mont Tremblant Document, at 74. 
See Fernández de Gurmendi (2001b) 430. 
1867 Ibid., 432. 
1868 PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(2)/DP.4 (13 June 2000).   
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Unlike the Paris definition, rule 85 definition does not differentiate 
between individual and collective victims, nor between direct and indirect 
victims. Nevertheless, as it is not required that victims are the direct targets, it 
can also include indirect victims.1869 At a more general level, the ICC definition 
of victims is coherent with international law under which, as observed by 
Salmón Gárate, the notion of victim is not subject to discriminatory restrictions 
or special personal characteristics.1870 Rule 85 like the Paris definition considers 
also organizations or institutions as victims. Moreover, the ICC definition of 
victims is broader than that provided under the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL 
RPE on three grounds. First, whereas the latter limits ‘victim’ definition to direct 
victims, the former includes all those who have suffered harm, i.e., immediate 
family members or dependants of those who suffered harm may be included. 
Second, the ICC definition includes not only natural persons but also certain 
organizations and institutions. As for the latter, in order to be granted victim 
participant status, they have to meet the rule 85 (b) criteria, i.e., demonstrate that 
direct harm was inflicted to their property and that such property was dedicated 
to any of the listed purposes. Thus, in the DRC situation, a headmaster of a 
school was accepted to act on behalf of the school and the school was granted the 
victim participant status.1871 Moreover, Trial Chamber I in Lubanga determined 
that he could participate in the proceedings on his own behalf and on behalf of 
the school,1872 and indeed he was authorized to testify before the Chamber.1873 In 
the next sub-section, the requirements under rule 85 (a) concerning natural 
persons are discussed in detail as this category constitutes by far and almost by 
definition the most numerous, indeed virtually exclusive, component of victims 
at the ICC. Third, the ICC definition recognizes a victim as such from the 
moment (s)he reports the crime unlike the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL.  
Accordingly, the ICC victim definition under rule 85 provides a sound 
and comprehensive option in order to protect victims’ interests in or rights to, 
 
1869 See Birte Timm, ‘The Legal Position of Victims in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ in 
Fischer, Kreß and Lüder (2001) 289, 303-304.  
1870 Elizabeth Salmón Gárate, ‘La Sentencia del Penal Castro Castro de la Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos y sus Aparentes Effectos Controversiales en el Ordenamiento Jurídico 
Peruano’ in Edgar Carpio and Camilo Suárez (eds.), El Estado Contra los Derechos. Pena de 
Muerte, Violencia de Género y Autoamnistía (Palestra 2007b) 13, 30-31.  
1871 Situation in DRC (ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, 31 January 2008, paras. 139-143. See also 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 242.    
1872 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1556), Decision on the Applications by Victims to Participate in 
the Proceedings, Trial Chamber I, 15 December 2008, paras. 105-111.  
1873 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 21.  
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inter alia, participate in the proceedings, be informed of their rights and 
opportunities, and seek reparations. It is important to mention herein that 
participatory rights are contained under several provisions of the ICC Statute 
and the ICC RPE, which allow the identification of two participation schemes.1874 
These schemes and the respective modalities of participation, which are 
discussed in detail later,1875 can be summarized as follows. First, submission of 
‘representations’ by victims as part of the authorization of investigations initiated 
by the Prosecutor ex proprio motu (article 15 (3) of the ICC Statute) and 
submission of ‘observations’ (article 19 (3) of the ICC Statute) in the proceedings 
related to challenges to the jurisdiction of the ICC or the admissibility of a case. 
It is not necessary a formal application for this kind of participation,1876 i.e., it is 
not required to apply for the official or formal victim participant status. 
However, it is necessary to fulfill the victim definition under rule 85.1877 Second, 
a more complex participation scheme, under article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute and 
rules 89 et seq. Article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute constitutes the legal ground for 
victim participation sensu stricto,1878 or article 68 (3) victim participation.1879 
Article 68 (3) reads as follows:  
 
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit 
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which 
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal 
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
 
As said, this scheme constitutes sensu stricto the participation regime 
under the ICC legal instruments and is triggered by individuals who apply to 
become victim participants. In order to hold the victim participant status and 
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1874 See Brouwer and Groenhuijsen (2009) 158; Baumgartner (2008) 412-413. 
1875 See infra Chapter IV 3.3, 4.3 and other sub-sections dealing with the ICC in this chapter.  
1876 See Baumgartner (2008) 413.  
1877 See Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (ICC-01/11-9), Decision on the VPRS Request for 
an Extension of Time to Report on Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Regulation 35 of the 
Regulations of the Court, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 28 July 2011.  
1878 See Baumgartner (2008) 413.  
1879 See Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Article 68 (3) and Personal Interests of Victims in the Emerging Practice 
of the ICC’ in Sluiter and Stahn (2009) 635, 688; Christoph Safferling, International Criminal 
Procedure (Oxford University Press 2012) 310; Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1314, 1316, 1324 and 
1330.  
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participate as such, under the participation regime sensu stricto, applicants shall 
meet the respective requirements laid down under rule 85 (victim definition) 
and article 68 (3) as discussed in the next subsection. What should be remarked 
now is, as highlighted by Schabas, that when the ICC Statute was being drafted, 
‘few could have imagined the importance that [article 68 (3)] […] would have 
upon the proceedings at the Court’.1880  
It should be again noted that references to victim participant status in 
this thesis and, in particular, in this chapter, concern individuals who upon 
application are granted the victim participant status, i.e., what it may be called an 
‘official’ or ‘formal’ victim participant status, unless otherwise indicated.1881 The 
legal regime of a victim as a participant generally speaking means for the victim 
participants the following: i) their participation is voluntary; ii) they can 
communicate to the ICC their own interests and concerns; iii) they decide what 
they desire to say; iv) their participation is feasible at all proceedings stages when 
considered appropriate by the Judges; v) they are always entitled to be 
represented at the ICC by a legal representative; and vi) they normally 
participate via a legal representative, and they do not need to appear in 
person.1882 As examined in the previous chapter, it is also important to remember 
that, according to the ICC’s case law, expressing views and concerns (victims as 
victim participants) is different from ‘giving evidence’ (victims as witnesses).1883          
 
2.3.2. Requirements to Become and Participate as Victim Participants 
2.3.2.1. Applying for the Victim Participant Status   
Under rule 89 (1), victims must apply in writing to participate in the 
proceedings, i.e., for leave to present their ‘views and concerns’ according to the 
following proceeding:  
 
In order to present their views and concerns, victims shall make written 
application to the Registrar, who shall transmit the application to the relevant 
Chamber. Subject to the provisions of the Statute, in particular article 68, 
paragraph 1, the Registrar shall provide a copy of the application to the 
Prosecutor and the defence, who shall be entitled to reply within a time limit to 
 
1880 Schabas (2010) 827.  
1881 In the Kenyan trials, under the Trial Chamber V’s approach, victims can be granted the 
‘official’ victim participant status via registration. This registration option is applicable if the 
victims only want to participate via their legal representatives, i.e., not appearing directly before the 
Chamber. For a critical discussion on this option, see infra Chapter IV 2.3.2.1.  
1882 ICC (2006) 10; Funk (2010) 103.   
1883 See, e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx), 26 June 2009, para. 19; Bemba (ICC-01/05-
01/08-2138), 22 February 2012, para. 19.   
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be set by the Chamber. Subject to the provisions of sub-rule 2, the Chamber 
shall then specify the proceedings and manner in which participation is 
considered appropriate, which may include making opening and closing 
statements.  
 
The rejection of the application is regulated under rule 89 (2):  
 
The Chamber, on its own initiative or on the application of the Prosecutor or 
the defence, may reject the application if it considers that the person is not a 
victim or that the criteria set forth in article 68, paragraph 3, are not otherwise 
fulfilled. A victim whose application has been rejected may file a new 
application later in the proceedings.  
 
In any case, victim participants cannot initiate proceedings against the 
accused. The time invested by the ICC to process the applications for victim 
participation has raised concerns. Indeed, whereas the Trial Chamber in Bemba 
set the period prior to the beginning of trial as a deadline for applications, the 
Trial Chamber in Lubanga set the deadline after the start of the trial.1884 Since the 
ICC Statute/RPE keep silence on standards of review of applications, the 
Chambers have exercised broad discretion. Thus, whereas Pre-Trial Chamber I 
in the DRC situation applied the ‘grounds to believe’ standard to review 
applications,1885 Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) in Katanga and Ngudjolo 
applied a ‘intrinsic coherence’ test,1886 accepting that ‘indirect proof (i.e., 
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence) is admissible’ provided that the 
applicant can show how (s)he was impeded from finding direct proof for his/her 
claim.1887   
The Appeal and Trial Chambers adopted similar approaches and carried 
out only prima facie assessments.1888 It should be mentioned that a decision to 
grant victim participant status during pre-trial continues to apply during trial, 
i.e., the victim is not requested to reapply provided that (s)he wishes to 
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1884 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 243. 
1885 Pre-Trial Chamber I considered that the ‘grounds to believe’ standard of article 55 (2) related to 
the persons’ rights during an investigation represents a less demanding standard, which is 
appropriate to examine the victim applications for the investigation stage of a situation. Situation 
in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEn-Corr), 17 January 2006, paras. 99-100.  
1886 Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-101), 10 August 2007, para. 14. 
1887 Ibid., para. 15. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 256.  
1888 Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red), Grounds for the Decision on the 345 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings Submitted by Victims, Trial Chamber II, 23 
September 2009, para. 32; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2659-Corr-Red), 8 February 2011, para. 29.  
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participate in all the proceedings stages.1889 Nevertheless, since at pre-trial just a 
preliminary assessment is conducted, Trial Chambers have followed different 
approaches. Thus, whereas Trial Chamber I in Lubanga reassessed the 
applications,1890 Trial Chambers II, III and IV did not review them unless 
requested by the parties based on new material or information,1891 which is quite 
time-consuming for the parties.1892 Under either approach, victims’ applications 
must go through up to a four-tiered review process, depending on the stage of 
proceedings when the application was first examined.1893    
Although there is no explicit provision about what evidentiary standard 
should be used when assessing the victims’ applications, the ICC has evaluated 
them under a prima facie review standard as mentioned. The victim participant 
status is neither automatic nor unconditional. The lower standard of proof, i.e., 
prima facie, in contrast to a more demanding standard, e.g., ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’, corresponds to the situation at that stage when it is not yet clear whether 
the crimes have actually been committed by the defendant. No final 
determination could have been conducted as this would have violated the 
principle of presumption of innocence (article 66 of the ICC Statute).1894 Trial 
Chamber I noticed that it would be untenable to conduct a substantive 
assessment of reliability of a victim’s application before the beginning of the 
trial.1895 Nevertheless, as soon as a Chamber notices that its prima facie 
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1889 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 86 (8). Nevertheless, a Chamber can modify a 
previous ruling under rule 91 (1).  
1890 See, e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1556), 15 December 2008, paras. 54-59.  
1891 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-699), 22 February 2010, paras. 17-18; Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-
01/04-01/07-933-tEng), Decision on the Treatment of Applications for Participation, Trial 
Chamber II, 26 February 2009, paras. 10-11; Banda and Jarbo (ICC-02/05-03/09-231), Decision on 
the Registry Report on Six Applications to Participate in the Proceedings, Trial Chamber IV, 17 
October 2011, paras. 15-16 (establishing that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s analysis remains valid in 
principle and does not need to be revisited at subsequent stages of the proceedings, unless: i) a 
victim concerned was authorized to participate uniquely on the basis of the commission of a crime 
corresponding to a charge not confirmed; or ii) new information has emerged.).    
1892 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 257. 
1893 Thus, victims in a situation, e.g., the DRC situation, could have their applications reviewed by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber in the context of this situation. Then, the Pre-Trial Chamber can review 
their application in the case context. Following to the confirmation of charges, and considering the 
Trial Chamber’s approach, they could have their application reviewed once again. See McGonigle 
Leyh (2011) 257.  
1894 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1191), Decision on the Defence and Prosecution Requests for 
Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Trial Chamber I, 26 
February 2008, para. 24. 
1895 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 99. 
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evaluation is not correct, it withdraws the individual’s right to participate as Trial 
Chamber I did in Lubanga.1896 Such procedure reaches a balance between unduly 
restricting victims’ admission and the defence interest not to be confronted with 
‘false’ victims.1897 However, the practical application of this approach whereby 
inconsistencies of dual victim participants-victim witnesses’ evidence led to 
stripping them off from their status as victim participants may be criticized as a 
disproportional decision as previously discussed.1898   
Victims’ participation application procedure has demanded an 
important amount of time and resources from the ICC, parties and the victims. 
Completing application forms, still complicated for the victims, and the 
observations on the applications filed by the Prosecution and defence and then 
considered by the Chamber underlie this situation, as evidenced in Lubanga.1899 
Moreover, this problematic context can be exacerbated in cases presenting a 
much higher number of applicants, e.g., in Bemba at which victim participant 
status was granted to more than 4000 applicants. Furthermore, since victims are 
afraid of being identified publicly, almost in all cases they ask for redaction of 
identifying information, i.e., their names and any passage that may lead to their 
identification is blackened,1900 which has to be in principle checked by the 
competent Chamber. As warned by the ICC Judge Van den Wyngaert, the ICC 
‘may soon reach the point where [the] individual case-by-case approach 
becomes unsustainable’.1901 In order to make the application procedure more 
efficient, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) in Gbabgo, then followed by Pre-
Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), have introduced collective application forms, 
i.e., victims can apply collectively, and individual victims can provide their 
consent for a third person to make a joint single application for all of them, but 
the victim participation is individual provided that they meet the 
requirements.1902 In Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II, upon consultation with the 
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1896 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2482), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 484. 
1897 Ambos (2012) 118. 
1898 See supra Chapter III 2.3.2.2.  
1899 See Lucia Catani, ‘Victims at the International Criminal Court. Some Lessons Learned from the 
Lubanga Case’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 905, 917-918.  
1900 See for further details supra Chapter III 3.3.1.2.  
1901 Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and 
Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’ (2011) 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 475, 
483.  
1902 Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-86), Second Decision on Issues Related to the Victims' Application 
Process, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 5 April 2012, paras. 27, 34 and 35; Gbagbo (ICC-
02/11-01/11-138), Decision on Victims' Participation and Victims' Common Legal Representation 
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Registry, which included a review of the lessons learnt in Gbagbo,1903 did not 
follow a collective approach but instead ordered a simplified victim application 
process with a one-page application form, for the VPRS to implement.1904 
Additional actions to speed up the application process may include: i) 
the VPRS staff members should in the field assist victims when filing the 
application forms and if there is reliance on intermediaries, it is necessary to 
control them to avoid that intermediaries manipulate victims and witnesses, i.e., 
giving false testimony, as severely criticized by Trial Chamber I in the judgment 
in Lubanga;1905 ii) unlike Trial Chamber I in Lubanga, which allowed 
applications until the end of the presentation of evidence, other Chambers’ 
approaches to set the deadline for it at the time before the beginning of hearings 
or after the commencement of trial should be followed;1906 and iii) not to permit 
parties to file submissions on every application, as established under rule 89, but 
only to hear them on pertinent legal issues relating to their admission although 
this has the drawback of depriving the Chamber from parties’ input when the 
Chamber has to decide on the applications.1907  
It must be mentioned that Trial Chamber V, in the two Kenya-related 
cases, i.e., Ruto and Sang and Muthaura and Kenyatta, issued two identical 
decisions setting a new application procedure for victims who want to 
participate in the respective trials of these cases and which departs significantly 
from the previous ICC practice in an attempt to make the process simpler. The 
Chamber distinguished two categories of victims. First, victims who wish to 
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at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
(Single Judge), 4 June 2012, para. 4; Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-33), Decision on Issues Related to 
the Victim’s Application Process, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 6 February 2012, paras. 7-8; 
Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-191), Decision on Victims’ Participation in Proceedings Related 
to the Situation in Uganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 9 March 2012.       
1903 Although the Registry mentioned some benefits from the Gbagbo collective application 
approach such as improvement in victims’ well-being and in the application process, the Registry 
did not advise its application in Ntaganda as, inter alia, in some cases it may not be 
feasible/advisable to physically bring together victims groups for the application process because of 
victims’ discomfort or security concerns. See Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-54), Observations in 
Compliance with the Decision ICC-01/04-02/06-54-Conf, Registry, 6 May 2013, paras. 7-10.   
1904 See Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-67), Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims’ 
Application Process, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 28 May 2013. 
1905 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, paras. 482-483. 
1906 Whereas in Katanga and Ngudjolo the deadline for victims to submit their applications was set 
before the commencement of the trial, in Bemba the deadline was set to be during the presentation 
of evidence by the Prosecutor.   
1907 Catani (2012) 919.  
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appear directly before the Chamber, in person or via video-link, to present their 
views and concerns need to follow the procedure under rule 89,1908 i.e., 
application individually assessed by the Chamber and subject to parties’ 
observations, as previously quoted and explained. Second, victims who wish to 
participate under the common legal representation system, i.e., to express their 
views and concerns through a legal representative, can register with the Registry 
via a less detailed process by sending their personal data and this registration is 
not subject to the Chamber’s individual assessment or the parties’ 
observations.1909 Moreover, unregistered (or unidentified) victims shall 
‘nevertheless be voiced, in a general way, through common legal 
representation’.1910      
This mechanism is only applicable to the trial proceedings in the two 
above-mentioned Kenyan cases. Whether or not some other Chamber would 
decide to adopt those proceedings remains to be seen. What must be mentioned 
is that, according to rule 89, victim participant status is granted upon application 
judicially assessed, as applied in ICC’s consistent practice, and not based on mere 
‘registration’ as suggested by Trial Chamber V. Furthermore, article 68 (3) of the 
ICC Statute refers to the RPE procedure.1911 Therefore, the proceedings to 
become victim participants and the categories of victims detailed by Trial 
Chamber V are not foreseen under the ICC legal framework and do not 
correspond to the ICC’s consolidated practice. Considerations concerning the 
victims’ interests (due to, inter alia, security concerns), the large number of 
victims, efficient proceedings, the accused’s rights, and a fair and impartial trial 
 
1908 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, 
Trial Chamber V, 3 October 2012, paras. 25, 56-58; Muthaura and Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-
498), Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participations, Trial Chamber V, 3 October 2012, 
paras. 24, 55-57. 
1909 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, paras. 25, 48-50; Muthaura and 
Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, paras. 24, 47-49.  
1910 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 52; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 51. 
1911 See also Tatiana Batchvarova, ‘Comment on the Victims Decision of Trial Chamber V’ in 
William Schabas, PhD Studies in Human Rights Blog (15 October 2012). Available at: 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.fi/search?updated-max=2012-10-28T07:47:00Z&max-
results=10&start=30&by-date=false (last visit on 20 October 2012).  
In justifying its decision, Trial Chamber V stated that ‘in conducting its analysis of the Rules, and 
Rule 89(1) in particular, the Chamber has placed primary importance on the letter as well as the 
object and purpose of Article 68(3) of the Statute […] [and it] will apply Rule 89(1) of the Rules in 
the manner that it considers to be most consistent with the norms indicated in Article 68(3) of the 
Statute’. Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 22; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 21.        
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were taken into account by the Chamber to make the application procedure 
‘simpler’.1912 However, these considerations also existent in the other ICC cases 
have not led the other Chambers to adopt similar steps which arguably go 
beyond what is laid down in the ICC instruments. Moreover, the practical 
benefits aimed by Trial Chamber V by implementing these too ‘creative’ 
application proceedings remain to be fully seen and they may be even counter-
productive,1913 although victims have seemingly and so far expressed their 
general satisfaction with the registration alternative.1914 In any case, Trial 
Chamber V made it explicit that the principles contained in their two identical 
decisions are not applicable to reparations proceedings.1915     
 
2.3.2.2. Analysis of the Requirements  
Under this sub-section, it will be analyzed the requirements or eligibility 
conditions to be granted the victim participant status, which corresponds to the 
definition of (natural person) victims under rule 85 (a): ‘[…] natural persons 
who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court’. This is examined under requirements i)-iv) below. 
Then, it is examined the requirements to determine whether victim participants 
should be allowed to participate, when and how. This corresponds to article 68 
(3):  
 
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit 
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner 
which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a 
fair and impartial trial.   
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1912 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, paras. 23-24, 30-38; Muthaura and 
Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, paras. 22-23, 29-37.  
1913 See also Batchvarova (2012). 
1914 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-566-Anx), Periodic Report on the General Situation of 
Victims in The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang and the Activities of the 
VPRS and the Common Legal Representative, Registry, 23 January 2013, para. 11. The VPRS has 
been in regular contact with victim communities in both Kenyan cases and in 2013 filed five 
reports to the Chamber concerning victims’ general situation. See, e.g., Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-
01/11-980-AnxA), Fifth Period Report on the General Situation of Victims in the Case of the 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang and the Activities of the VPRS and the 
Common Legal Representative in the Field, VPRS, 24 September 2013. See also ICC, Report of the 
Court on the Implementation in 2013 of the Revised Strategy in Relation to Victims, ICC-
ASP/12/41, 11 October 2013, para. 31. 
1915 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 2; Muthaura and Kenyatta (ICC-
01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 2.   
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           Article 68 (3) conditions are examined under requirement v) below in this 
sub-section. It must be noticed that only after the applicant has been granted the 
victim participant status (requirements i)-iv) below)), the assessment of whether 
the victim participants’ personal interests are affected (requirement v) below) is 
conducted in order to decide whether the victim participants can participate, 
during which stages and under what modalities. This has been the consistent 
practice at the ICC in conformity with the ICC legal instruments.1916   
i) The Applicant must be a Natural Person and Prove his/her Identity. As 
for natural person, rule 89 (3) states the possibility for a victim who is a child or 
disabled to have his/her application made by a person acting with his/her 
consent on his/her behalf. Trial Chamber I in Lubanga determined that the 
person acting on behalf of someone else does not necessarily have to be his/her 
relative or legal guardian since rule 89 (3) does not include such restriction.1917 
Nevertheless, the Chamber retains the right to disallow participation under rule 
89 (3) if it is determined, on a case-by-case analysis, the unsuitability of the 
arrangement for participation.1918 Whereas Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) in 
Lubanga has not allowed minors to apply on their own behalf,1919 Trial Chamber 
I in Lubanga, and also Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, allowed 
it ‘depending always on their individual circumstances (viz. the age and the 
apparent maturity of the child) and the interests of justice overall’.1920 In Ruto et 
al., Pre-Trial Chamber III, in application of rule 89 (3), in case of a child or a 
disabled person, reminded that the application can be brought by a person acting 
on the applicant’s behalf and the identity of and link between both must be 
proven.1921  
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1916 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 257-258. See also Batchavarova (2012); Brouwer and Heikkilä 
(2013) 1301-1302. However, an exception has come from Trial Chamber V that mistakenly 
considered article 68 (3) requirements as somehow, to some extent, pre-conditioning the granting 
of the victim participant status. See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, paras. 
8-21; Muthaura and Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, paras 9-22.          
1917 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1556), 15 December 2008, para. 67. 
1918 Ibid., para. 72.  
1919 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-545), Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in 
Connection with the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Applicants a/0189/06 
to a/0198/06, a/0200/06 to a/0202/06, a/204/06 to a/208/06, a/210/06 to a/213/06, a/215/06 to 
a/218/06, a/219/06, a/223/06, a/0332/07, a/0334/07 to a/0337/07, a/0001/08, a/0030/08 and 
a/0031/08, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 4 November 2008, para. 33.  
1920 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1556), 15 December 2008, paras. 94, 96. See also Katanga and 
Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red), 23 September 2009, para. 98. See also McGonigle Leyh 
(2011) 251.   
1921 Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-249), Decision on Victims’ Participation at the Confirmation of 
Charges and in the Related Proceedings, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 August 2011, para. 43.  
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Concerning proof of identity, there was some disagreement among the 
ICC Chambers. Thus, whereas Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge) in the 
Ugandan situation required victims to produce documents very difficult to 
obtain in the context of ongoing armed conflict and lack of security,1922 Pre-Trial 
Chamber I (Single Judge) considered a much broader list of documents, at the 
investigation stage, as proof of identity.1923 However, bearing in mind the above-
mentioned difficulty, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge) in Kony et. al 
reconsidered his decision and became more flexible to accept documents to 
prove identity.1924 On the other hand, Trial Chamber I has pointed out that in 
establishing the proof of identity for a victim applicant, it will ‘seek to achieve a 
balance between the need to establish an applicant’s identity with certainty, on 
the one hand, and the applicant’s personal circumstances, on the other’.1925 The 
list of documents accepted as proof of identity by Trial Chamber I, is similar to 
Pre-Trial Chamber I’s,1926 including official, non-official and other 
documents,1927 which has been also the case of other Trial Chambers,1928 and of 
 
1922 Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-101), Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation 
a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II (Single Judge), 10 August 2007, para. 16. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 244.     
1923 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG), Corrigendum to the ‘Decision on the 
Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the Investigation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo by a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to a/0080/06 and 
a/0105/06 to a/0110/06, a/0188/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/209/06, 
a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/022/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06 to a/0230/06, a/0234/06 to a/0236/06, 
a/240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, a/0237/06 to a/0239/06 and a/0241/06 to 
a/0250/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 31 January 2008, para. 27.     
1924 Prosecutor v. Kony et al., (ICC-02/04-5-282), Decision on victim's application for participation 
a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0/0070/06, a/0081/06, a/0082/06, a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to 
a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, 
a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 14 March 
2008, para. 6.   
1925 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 87. 
1926 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG), 31 January 2008, para. 27.    
1927 Trial Chamber I considered, inter alia, i) official identification documents, e.g., a national 
identity card, a passport, a birth certificate, a death certificate, a marriage certificate, a family 
registration booklet, a will, a  driving license or a humanitarian agency card; ii) non-official 
documents, e.g., a voting card, a local authority letter, a camp registration card, documents relating 
to medical treatment, an employee identity card, a pupil identity card or a baptism card; or iii) 
other documents, e.g., a certificate or attestation of loss of specified official documents, school 
documents, a church membership card, an association or political party membership card, 
documents issued in rehabilitation centres for children associated with armed groups, nationality 
certificates or pension booklets. See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 87-
89. See also Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-374), Decision on the Requests of the Legal 
Representative of Applicants on Application Process for Victims’ Participation and Legal 
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Pre-Trial Chambers (Single Judges) in more recent cases such as Gbagbo and 
Ruto et al.1929  
Moreover, when an applicant is unable to produce any of the listed 
documents, ‘a statement signed by two credible witnesses attesting to the identity 
of the applicant’ and, where relevant, including their relationship with one 
another, and accompanied by the two witnesses’ proof-of-identity were also 
considered.1930 Absent this, the applicant could still explain the absence of 
identifying documents.1931 As for organizations or institutions applying to 
participate as victims, it has been accepted any document setting it up under the 
respective country’s legislation.1932 Trial Chamber I in Lubanga determined that 
it would consider the ‘overall picture provided by the applicant’, including the 
applicant’s own account and any document submitted.1933  
A flexible approach when assessing proof of identity is herein considered 
as advisable due to the unstable contexts where individuals applying for victim 
participant status come from. Such flexibility should be higher for purposes of 
participation during pre-trial proceedings than during the trial stage as in the 
latter the right of the accused to a fair trial is particularly sensitive. Thus, during 
trial such control must be especially strict. This is illustrated, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, concerning the situation of three individuals who held the 
victim participant status and were allowed to give their testimonies directly 
before Trial Chamber I in Lubanga. The Chamber found that there was a real 
possibility that two of them stole identities at the instigation of the third victim 
participant in order to claim that they had been abducted and used as child 
soldiers.1934  
Accordingly, a more strict screening bearing in mind victims’ 
participation at trial is not only necessary for the accused’s rights but also for the 
(alleged) victims themselves, as Trial Chamber I in Lubanga understandably not 
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Representation, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 August 2007, para. 15. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 
245.       
1928 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01708-699), 22 February 2010, paras. 35-36; Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-
01/04-01/07-933-tENG), 26 February 2009, para. 30.  
1929 Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-138), 4 June 2012, para. 25; Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-249), 5 
August 2011, para 42.  
1930 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 88. See also Situation in the DRC 
(ICC-01/04-374), 17 August 2007, para. 15.   
1931 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 88. 
1932 Ibid., para. 113. 
1933 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2659-Corr-Red with AnxA-red2), 8 February 2011, para 28. 
1934 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, paras. 499-502.  
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only dismissed the evidence provided by those three individuals but also 
withdrew their status as victim participants.1935 Actually, although the defence 
teams have been unable to challenge most of victims’ applications on grounds of 
insufficient or unreliable proof of identity, defence teams have been able to do it 
during trial after victims were allowed to participate.1936 This shows the need to 
implement a better screening process before individuals are granted victim 
participant status by the Judges or permit challenges to applications prior to the 
beginning of trial, which also benefits applicants who can legitimately offer 
identity proof.1937 To avoid delays, it would be convenient that the ICC Judges 
give additional guidelines on this issue to the ICC Registry as this receives 
victims’ applications to participate and, thus, serves as a first filter to guarantee 
efficiency.             
ii) Crimes under the Jurisdiction of the ICC. By jurisdiction, for example, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I,1938 has understood that the crimes must be part of article 5 
of the ICC Statute, i.e., ratione materiae jurisdiction constituted by genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, as well as meet 
the ratione temporis, i.e., the crime must have been committed after the 1 July 
2002, ratione loci and ratione personae jurisdiction criteria.1939   
iii) Harms Suffered. Although neither the ICC Statute nor the ICC RPE 
define the term ‘harm’, for example, Pre-Trial Chamber I has found that ‘harm’ 
includes economic loss, physical suffering and emotional suffering,1940 making 
express references to the 2005 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines and 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the ECtHR.1941 Trial Chamber I referring to 
 
1935 Ibid., para. 502. 
1936 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 246. 
1937 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1938 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-228), Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo and of the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 28 July 2006, p. 14. See also Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101), 17 January 2006, 
paras. 83-93; Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-138), 4 June 2012, para. 27.         
1939 See ICC Statute, articles 11 and 12. 
1940 Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-111-Corr), Decision on the Applications for 
Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to 
a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 14 December 2007, 
paras. 30, 38-50.   
1941 See, e.g., Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, paras. 115-116 
(inter alia, citing as for the IACtHR: Case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment of 10 September 1993, Series C No. 15, para. 52; Case of El Amparo v. Venezuela, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 14 September 1996, Series C No. 28, paras. 28-63. As for the 
ECtHR: Selmouni v. France, Appl. No. 25803/94, Judgment, 28 July 1999, para. 123; Ayder and 
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Principle 8 of the 2005 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines,1942 and also in line 
with jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the ECtHR,1943 concluded that harm may 
be suffered individually or collectively, and may include physical, mental, 
emotional, and economic harm or may consist in a substantial impairment of 
victim’s fundamental rights.1944 On the other hand, the Appeals Chamber 
considered that the collective nature of the harm ‘does not mandate either its 
inclusion or exclusion in the establishment of whether a person is a victim before 
the Court’ considering it as not relevant or determinative.1945 In any case, the 
Appeals Chamber and Trial Chamber I have considered that the harm must be 
personal to the victim, i.e., the harm must be suffered personally but 
harm/victims may be direct or indirect ones.1946 The Appeals Chamber also 
found that harm may include ‘material, physical, and psychological harm’.1947   
The Appeals Chamber, confirming Trial Chamber I’s findings, 
considered that the harm suffered by one victim as a consequence of a crime 
under the ICC’s jurisdiction can originate harm suffered by other victims, e.g., 
when there is a close personal relationship between the direct and indirect 
victims which is the case of the relationship between a child soldier and his/her 
parents.1948   
It has been presumed that close family members or next of kin have 
suffered on account of the direct victim’s harm.1949 The ICC’s findings on 
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Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 23656/94, Judgment, 8 January 2004, paras. 141 et. seq.). See also 
Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-138), 4 June 2012, para. 28.       
1942 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 92. 
1943 As for the IACtHR, see Case of Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 1 July 2006, Series C No. 148, para. 386; Case of ‘Las Dos 
Erres’ Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 
24 November 2009, Series C No. 211, para. 226. As for the ECtHR, see Bazorkina v. Russia, Appl. 
No. 69481/01, Judgment, 27 July 2006, paras. 178-180 (2006); Ayder v. Turkey, Appl. No. 
23656/94, Judgment, 8 January 2004, paras. 110-111, 141.    
1944 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, 18 January 2008, paras. 91-92. 
1945 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and The 
Defense against Trial Chamber I’s Decision, on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Appeals 
Chamber, 11 July 2008, para. 35.  
1946 See, respectively, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, paras. 1, 107; Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-2904), Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to 
Reparations, Trial Chamber I, 7 August 2012, para. 228.    
1947 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 32.  
1948 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1949 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al. ( ICC-02/04-01/05-371), Judgment on the Appeals of the 
Defence Against the Decisions Entitled ‘Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation 
a/0010/06, a/0064/06, a/0070/06, a/0081/06, a/0082/06, a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to 
a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, 
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indirect victims are consistent with the robust jurisprudence of the IACtHR and 
the ECtHR in cases of enforced disappearance, torture and extrajudicial 
executions.1950 Trial Chamber I also considered, under the category of indirect 
victims, persons who suffered harm when intervening to assist victims and those 
who prevented potential direct victims from being victimized and, thus, they 
were granted victim participant status.1951 Additionally, persons who witnessed 
extremely violent nature crimes and consequently suffered psychological harm 
were granted victim participant status.1952 Moreover, although an application 
based on friendship has not been granted,1953 victim participant status has been 
given to extended family members, e.g., a direct victim’s nephew,1954 but 
requiring additional information or evidence to support an emotional harm 
claim resulting from the direct victim’s death.1955 Be that as it may, considering 
extended family members is important due to the socio-cultural contexts of the 
countries where notions of extended families are accepted. Indeed, the HRC has 
concluded that ‘cultural traditions should be taken into account when defining 
the term “family” in a specific situation’.1956  
As for submission of applications on behalf of deceased persons, neither 
the ICC Statute/RPE nor the travaux préparatoires deals with this issue.1957 Pre-
Trial, Trial and Appeals Chambers have determined that victims cannot submit 
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a/120/06, a/021/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06’ of Pre-Trial Chamber II, Appeals Chamber, 23 
February 2009, para. 36.    
1950 As for the IACtHR’s case law see, e.g., Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment of 29 November 2006, Series C No. 162, para. 218; Case of the ‘Street Children’ 
(Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment of 19 November 1999, Series C No. 63, 
paras. 156, 157, 238. As for the ECtHR’s case law see, e.g., Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 
15/1997/799/1002, Judgment, 25 May 1998, paras. 130-134. More generally, the right to be heard in 
serious human rights violations cases held by the direct victims’ relatives has been recognized by 
the IACtHR. See Salmón Gárate and Blanco (2012) 114-116.   
1951 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1813), Redacted version of ‘Decision on “indirect victims”’, Trial 
Chamber I, 8 April 2009, paras. 50-51. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 249.    
1952 Kony et al. (ICC-02/04-01/05-324), Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal, 
Appeals Chamber, 27 October 2008, paras. 11-14.  
1953 Nevertheless, in Abu Garda, it was seemingly accepted that a direct victim’s friend could in 
principle be indirect victims. See Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09-255), Decision on Applications 
a/0655/09, a/0656/09, a/0736/09 to a/0747/09, and a/0750/09 to a/0755/09 for Participation in the 
Proceedings at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 19 March 2010, 
paras. 26-32.  
1954 Situation in DRC (ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG), 31 January 2008, para. 15. 
1955 Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09-255), 19 March 2010, paras. 26-32. 
1956 HRC, Hopu and Bessert v. France, Comm. No. 549, 29 July 1997, para. 10.3. 
1957 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 251. 
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participation applications on a deceased person’s behalf.1958 Therefore, deceased 
person’s relatives may solely submit applications for participation in their own 
names for mental or material harm suffered as a result of their relative’s death.1959 
Nonetheless, when a victim participant or a victim applicant dies, their 
successors have been permitted to continue their participation.1960 Pre-Trial 
Chamber III and Trial Chamber III taking into account IACtHR’s case law, and 
Trial Chamber II have concluded that a deceased victim’s close relative can take 
over the application on the deceased person’s behalf but solely limited to the 
views and concerns expressed by the deceased victim.1961 Thus, in case of victim 
applicant’s death, his/her successors and ‘appropriate individuals’ (including 
non-relatives), as Trial Chamber III determined in Bemba, can continue with the 
participation to reflect the deceased victim’s views and concerns and, hence, a 
victim’s death ‘should not extinguish the opportunity for the Chamber to 
consider his or her views and concerns’.1962 Both the deceased applicant and the 
person acting on his/her behalf, who also alleged personal harm to 
himself/herself either as a direct consequence of the alleged crimes or on account 
of crimes perpetrated against the deceased, have been treated as victims who 
suffered personal harm.1963   
In Muthaura et al., Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge) concluded that 
the deceased cannot present his/her own views and concerns on the particular 
matters arising in concreto, during proceedings that have started and are 
conducted after his/her death.1964 However, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 
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1958 See, respectively, Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-545), 4 November 2008, para. 19; Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red), 23 September 2009, para. 52; Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 38.  
1959 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 252.  
1960 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
1961 See respectively Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), 12 December 2008, paras. 44 and 47; Bemba 
(ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 12 July 2010, paras. 82 and 83; Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-
01/07-1737), Motifs de la Deuxième Décision Relative aux Demandes de Participation de Victimes 
à la Procédure, Trial Chamber II, 22 December 2009, para. 30. See also Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-3018), 14 June 2011.  
1962  Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 12 July 2010, paras. 83 and 85. 
1963 Ibid., para. 84.  
1964 Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11-267), Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation 
of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 26 
August 2011, para. 51 (stating that the IACtHR’s case law invoked by other ICC Chambers to 
justify the successors’ participation on behalf of a deceased person cannot be transposed to the case 
in question due to: i) human rights institutions, unlike criminal courts, do not deal with individual 
criminal responsibility, but with State responsibility; and ii) the IACtHR’s case law relates to 
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following ICC’s consistent case law, determined that a deceased person’s 
relatives ‘may be admitted as victims themselves, to participate in the 
proceedings on their own behalf if they prove that they have personally suffered 
mental or material harm as a result of the death of the said person’.1965  
Concerning the appeals stage, the Appeals Chamber has considered that 
‘resumption of a deceased victim’s participation by an heir/successor is not 
deemed appropriate’, and, hence, it rejected a request to resume participation on 
behalf of the deceased victim.1966 Nevertheless, this does not mean ‘that the views 
and concerns expressed by the victims prior to their death are now disregarded 
[…]. These views and concerns remain a part of the case record under review 
even if the deceased victim is no longer participating’.1967      
iv) Causal Link. Pre-Trial Chamber I established that the victim 
applicants ‘must demonstrate that a sufficient link exists between the harm they 
have suffered and the crimes for which there are reasonable grounds to believe 
[the suspect] bears criminal responsibility and for which the Chamber has issued 
an arrest warrant’.1968 Pre-Trial Chambers have stated that, in an application for 
participation during the case stage, the harm suffered by the applicant must 
appear to have arisen ‘as a result’ of the crime charged.1969 Trial Chamber I had 
determined that rule 85 does not have the effect of restricting victims’ 
participation to crimes contained in the Charging Document confirmed by a 
Pre-Trial Chamber insofar as the causal link could be established between the 
harm and any crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction.1970 Nevertheless, the Appeals 
Chamber appropriately overruled the Trial Chamber’s finding as the former 
determined that the harm, for purposes of participation in the trial, must be 
linked not to any crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction but only to the charges 
confirmed against the accused.1971 Accordingly, only victims able to demonstrate 
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successors’ right to receive reparation for the harm suffered by the deceased person while at the 
ICC there is a clear distinction between participation and reparations.). 
1965 Ibid., para. 57.   
1966 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-140), 23 September 2013, para. 26. 
1967 Ibid., para. 25. 
1968 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-172-tENG), Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings Submitted by VPRS 1 to VPRS 6, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 June 2006, pp. 6-8.  
1969 Banda and Jerbo (ICC-02/05-03/09), Decision on Victims’ Participation at the Hearing on the 
Confirmation of the Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 October 2010, para 2; Bemba (ICC-01/05-
01/08-320), Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Single Judge), 12 
December 2008, paras. 62-63.  
1970 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 93-94.   
1971 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, paras. 2 and 64. See also Banda and Jarbo 
(ICC-02/05-03/09-231), 17 October 2011, para. 20.    
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a causal link between their harm suffered and the confirmed charges against the 
accused will be permitted to participate in the trial proceedings,1972 which has 
been applied in the ICC’s consistent case law.1973 Such findings are considered 
herein as coherent with the flow of sequential stages in a criminal case and also 
bearing in mind that reparations have to be connected with crimes for which the 
accused was found guilty and not any ICC’s crime. The confirmation of charges 
precisely narrows down the universe of crimes to be proved during trial. In any 
case, as determined in Gbagbo, the causal link cannot be determined in abstracto 
but instead has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, considering the application 
form information and, when available, supporting material.1974  
Trial Chamber I confirmed the existence of two categories of victim 
participants: i) direct victims, whose harm is the result of the commission of a 
crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction; and ii) indirect victims who suffer harm as a 
result of the harm suffered by direct victims.1975 Indirect victims need to prove 
that, as a result of their relationship with the direct victim, the loss, injury or 
damage suffered by the latter, harm to them was inflicted.1976 However, Trial 
Chamber I excluded from the category of indirect victims ‘those who suffered 
harm as result of the (later) conduct of direct victims’,1977 e.g., individuals 
victimized by child soldiers.1978 It is herein considered that although such 
decision does not necessarily reflect victimization in a broader spectrum, it was 
necessary to avoid an overflow of potential victims.1979 The above-mentioned 
findings actually stemmed from a consultation by the Registry as to whether 
applicants who allegedly suffered crimes by child soldiers (direct victims) might 
be considered as indirect victims,1980 to which the Trial Chamber answered 
appropriately in negative. The already existing backlog in the ICC cases would 
have been worsened by too many additional potential victims had Trial Chamber 
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1972 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 251-252. 
1973 See, e.g., Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 47; Muthaura and 
Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 46. 
1974 Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-138), 4 June 2012, para. 29.
1975 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1813), 8 April 2009, para. 44.   
1976 Ibid., para. 49.   
1977 Ibid., para. 52.     
1978 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
1979 Ibid., para. 51.  
1980 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1501-Conf-Exp), Second Report to Trial Chamber I on Victims’ 
Applications under Regulation 86(5) of the Regulations of the Court, Registry, 21 November 2008, 
para. 14.    
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I decided otherwise. In deciding so, Trial Chamber I avoided to seriously 
compromise ICC’s efficiency and scarce resources.1981   
Therefore, it is important for the Prosecution to appropriately select 
what crimes to charge in order not to leave out important incidents of violence 
against victims. Otherwise, important limitations similar to those in Lubanga 
may arise. In Lubanga, the charges were confined to the enlistment, recruitment 
and use of child soldiers although it was well-known that the armed forces under 
Lubanga’s control, child soldiers included, perpetrated other serious 
international crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction.1982      
Finally, it should be mentioned that the deceased person’s relatives have 
to demonstrate the existence of a harm directly linked to them.1983   
v) Victim Participants’ Personal Interests Are Affected and Others. Once 
an applicant meets the criteria corresponding to the definition of victims under 
rule 85 (a) to become a victim participant, the Chambers have to establish 
whether his/her participation is consistent with article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, 
which refers to both victim’s personal interests being affected and whether 
his/her participation is appropriate and consistent with the accused’s rights and 
a fair and impartial trial. The ‘personal interests’ concept is examined here in 
detail whereas the tension with the accused’s rights is examined in the several 
procedural stages under later sub-sections.   
Pre-Trial Chamber I when examining whether victims’ personal 
interests are affected has adopted an approach called systematic, i.e., 
reassessment of personal interests in relation to a whole procedural stage.1984 Pre-
Trial Chamber I in its first decision on victims’ participation concluded that the 
assessment of whether victims’ personal interests are affected is relating to stages 
of the proceedings rather than to each specific procedural activity or evidence 
and also found that the victims’ personal interests are affected in general during 
the investigation stage of a situation, i.e., prior to the naming of a suspect, since 
victims’ participation during this phase can serve to clarify the facts, to punish 
perpetrators of crimes and to request reparations for the harm suffered.1985 In a 
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1981 For a critical view of limiting indirect victims in this manner, see Valentina Spiga, ‘Indirect 
Victims Participation in the Lubanga Trial’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 183, 
198. 
1982 See Mark Drumbl, ‘Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Décision sur la Confirmation des 
Charges. Case no. ICC-01/04-01/06’ (2007) 101 American Journal of international Law 841-848.  
1983 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG), 31 January 2008, para. 25.  
1984 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 258-259; Van den Wyngaert (2011) 482. 
1985 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 63. See also 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 269. 


subsequent decision, corresponding to the pre-trial stage of a case, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I (Single Judge) in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui found that victims 
present a personal interest in the result of the pre-trial phase of the case, i.e., 
whether there is enough evidence supporting substantial grounds to believe that 
the suspect(s) are responsible for the charged crimes.1986 Pre-Trial Chamber III 
in Bemba has followed the systematic approach, and Trial Chamber II in 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui to a certain degree recognized it.1987    
Trial Chamber I in Lubanga adopted a different approach, the so-called 
piecemeal or casuistic approach, i.e., personal interests examined in each specific 
procedural issue within the same procedural stage.1988 Thus, Trial Chamber I 
found that article 68 (3) demands that the victim has to show the reasons why 
his/her interests are affected by the evidence or an specific issue and, hence, a 
general interest in the outcome of the trial is likely to be insufficient.1989 The 
Appeals Chamber seemingly endorsed the approach followed by Trial Chamber 
I by qualifying it as the correct proceeding to determine victim participation in 
accordance with article 68 (3).1990 In turn, Trial Chambers have implemented this 
approach by asking victims to show in discrete written applications and giving 
notice to the parties, how their personal interests are affected by a specific 
evidentiary piece or witness before allowing their participation as well as to 
requesting them to abide by disclosure obligations and protection orders.1991 In 
some Pre-Trial Chambers’ decisions, concerning victims’ participation during 
the investigation stage of a situation, the casuistic approach has been followed as 
seen later.1992   
Even though the re-evaluation of ‘personal interests’ at each specific 
procedural instance is a better approach from the accused’s right perspective as 
requested by article 68 (3), it may be considered as inefficient and burdensome. 
Accordingly, this approach may be problematic, with the arguable exception of 
the investigation stage of a situation due to the particular nature of this early 
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1986 Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 43. 
1987 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), 12 December 2008; Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-
01/07-1788-tENG), 22 January 2010. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 259. 
1988 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 259-261; Van den Wyngaert (2011) 482-483; Solange Mouthaan, 
‘Victim Participation at the ICC for Victims of Gender Based-Crimes: A Conflict of Interest?’ 
(2013) 21 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 619, 628. 
1989 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para 96. 
1990 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 104.  
1991 See, e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 96, 98. The piece-meal 
approach has been followed de facto in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui and Bemba. McGonigle Leyh 
(2011) 261. 
1992 See infra Chapter IV 3.3.2.2. 
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stage as discussed later.1993 Indeed, the backlog experienced by the ICC indicates 
that the piecemeal approach is substantially hindering the efficiency of 
proceedings. It may also be regarded as not completely necessary because while 
victims who meet the standard for participation under the ICC Statute/RPE 
cannot be deprived of that right, the ICC may handle victims’ exercise of their 
status as participants by limiting at what stage and in what manner victims may 
exercise that participatory status,1994 instead of a highly time and resource-
consuming re-evaluation of the ‘personal interests’. Nevertheless, the problem 
with the systematic approach is that ‘essentially invalidates the personal interest 
precondition found in Article 68 (3)’.1995 Therefore, the casuistic approach can be 
considered as more consistent with the article 68 (3) requirements, including the 
accused’s right to a fair trial.1996      
A deeper question which has yet to be clearly delimited by the ICC 
Chambers is to exactly identify what personal interests stand for to trigger 
victims’ participation in the ICC proceedings. This lack of clarity originated, to 
an important extent, out of the direct importation and incorporation of the 
‘personal interests’ criterion from the obscure language contained in article 6 (b) 
of the 1985 UN Victims Declaration without further precision as to its meaning 
and objective.1997 A primary task for the ICC would therefore consist in 
delineating the sphere of personal interests recognized by it as suitable to be 
legitimately pursued by the victims as participants. This is connected with the 
concept of ‘judicially recognizable personal interests’, i.e., not all personal 
interests can trigger victims’ participation but only those which explicitly are 
recognized by the ICC.1998 The practical consequences of an accurate 
delimitation arguably would directly impact on the number of victim applicants 
and reshape the scale of victims’ participation at a macro-level.1999   
Unfortunately, the ICC Chambers have not standardized completely 
their approaches. On the one hand, Pre-Trial Chamber I and Trial Chamber I 
considered reparations, protection, contribution to clarification of facts and 
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1993 See infra Chapter IV 3.3.2.  
1994 See American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, Victim 
Participation before the International Criminal Court (2007) 61-62.  
1995 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 259. 
1996 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 
July 2008.  
1997 See Vasiliev (2009) 688. 
1998 Haslam (2004) 326.  
1999 Vasiliev (2009) 689. 
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offenders’ punishment as victims’ personal interests.2000 Moreover, in Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) determined that victims’ 
interests are not only limited to find what occurred, which was linked to the 
victims’ right to truth,2001 but also to secure a certain level of punishment for 
those found criminally responsible.2002 In Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
concluded that a victim’s personal interest ‘flows from the (i) the desire to have a 
declaration of truth by a competent body (right to truth); (ii) their wish to have 
those who victimized them identified and prosecuted; and  (iii) the right to 
reparation’.2003 On the other hand, although the Appeals Chamber agreed on 
reparations and protection as victims’ personal interests, it considered that 
victims’ interests may not intersect with the prosecutorial function.2004 This 
finding was buttressed by Judge Pikis who concluded that, according to the ICC 
Statute, ‘The burden of proof of the guilt of the accused lies squarely with the 
Prosecutor’ and ‘It is not the victims’ domain either to reinforce the prosecution 
or dispute the defence’.2005   
The Pre-Trial Chamber I/Trial Chamber I’s position is found here in 
principle as more coherent with the underlying concept of restorative-oriented 
justice approach and not a purely restorative justice approach, i.e., limiting 
personal interests only to reparations. This was actually remarked by Judge 
Song’s dissent to the Appeals Chamber’s decision when he pointed out that 
personal interests also encompass the interest ‘to see justice is done’.2006 Such 
finding was grounded on some ICC Statute and RPE provisions,2007 and also 
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2000 See respectively: Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEn-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 63; 
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 98.  
2001 Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras. 32-36.  
2002 Ibid., para. 38. 
2003 Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09-121), Decision on Victims’ Modalities of Participation at the 
Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 25 September 2009, para. 3. 
2004 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), Decision on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to 
a/0003/06 and a/105/06 Concerning the “Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber” of 2 
February 2007, Appeals Chamber, 13 June 2007, para. 28.      
2005 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, Decision on 
the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/105/06 Concerning the “Directions 
and Decision of the Appeals Chamber” of 2 February 2007, 13 June 2007, para. 16.  
2006 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), Separate opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song, Decision on the 
Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/105/06 Concerning the “Directions and 
Decision of the Appeals Chamber” of 2 February 2007, 13 June 2007, paras. 10-12.       
2007 See ICC Statute, article 65 (4) and ICC RPE, rule 69 (providing for that when the parties agreed 
on an alleged fact, a Chamber may still decide that ‘a more complete presentation of the alleged 
facts is required in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims’); and ICC RPE, 
rules 93 and 191 (laying down that a Chamber may seek the views of victims when deciding the 
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jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the ECtHR, which may be interpreted as 
recognizing the victims’ interest that justice is done,2008 although this case law has 
not explicitly dealt with the notion of ‘personal interests of victims’ as a criterion 
for their admission into criminal proceedings.2009 Be that as it may, attention also 
needs to be drawn to the Appeals Chamber’s majority position as this arguably 
constitutes a more balanced and careful approach to craft victims’ participation 
before the ICC.2010 The ICC legal instruments do not provide ground to equate 
victims’ participation with the prosecutorial function, i.e., the absence of those 
entitlements has been interpreted as exclusion thereof.2011 The Appeals 
Chamber’s approach would actually fit better within the ICC’s mandate which is 
first and foremost ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes’.2012   
Accordingly, the fact that victims’ personal interests may arguably 
include the ‘special interest’ of victims that the alleged perpetrators should be 
brought to justice should not re-configure victims’ role to the point of 
undertaking prosecutorial functions. Nor should the fact the ICC may be 
considered as a ‘victim-oriented’ or ‘victim-friendly’ court be misrepresented to 
consider the ICC as a (pure) restorative justice mechanism.  
 
2.4. The ECCC and the STL    
2.4.1. General Considerations and Joining the Proceedings 
2.4.1.1. The ECCC 
With regard to the ECCC, it is first necessary to mention that the text of Internal 
Rules has suffered several changes, including the legal regime of civil parties. As 
a result, although the references to the Internal Rules herein employed (unless 
otherwise indicated) correspond to their current version (Rev. 8), the ECCC in 
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granting of an assurance to a witness or an expert ‘that he or she will not be prosecuted, detained 
or subjected to any restriction of personal freedom’.). Cited by Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), 
Separate Opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song, 13 June 2007, para. 13. For a critical view of Judge 
Song’s interpretation see Vasiliev (2009) 672-674.  
2008 IACtHR, Case of Blake v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment of 24 January 1998, Series C No. 36, 
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2009 Vasiliev (2009) 673. 
2010 It should be mentioned that the contents and scope of ‘personal interests’ as interpreted by the 
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Duch (Case 001) applied previous versions, in particular Rev. 3 and Rev. 5.2013 
However, as the Supreme Court Chamber noticed in its Appeal Judgment in 
Duch, ‘notwithstanding [...] numerous revisions to that regime, the definition of 
a civil party as envisaged in the original version of Internal Rule 23(2) has 
remained essentially unchanged, thus confirming its lasting validity before the 
ECCC’.2014   
The ECCC Internal Rules glossary defines ‘victim’ as ‘a natural person or 
legal entity that has suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the ECCC’. Besides their constitution as civil parties, 
victims can be victim complainants, i.e., may file a complaint with the ECCC in 
order to make the Co-Prosecutors aware of specific crimes as detailed later.2015 
What can be mentioned here is that victim-complainants tick a box on an 
application form, providing details about their complaints and also prompting 
the Co-Prosecutors to be informed of alleged crimes, and complaints do not 
need to be specific as may contain general statements.2016 Victim-complainants 
are not granted as many rights and safeguards as when they become civil 
parties.2017   
As previously said, the ECCC, due to the influence of the French 
inquisitorial system via the Cambodian procedural law as reflected in the ECCC 
Internal Rules, is the first institution among the international and hybrid 
criminal courts considered in this thesis where victims can participate as civil 
parties and once admitted in the proceedings acquire a number of procedural 
rights, which was pointed out by the Supreme Court Chamber in Duch.2018 
Indeed, internal rule 23 (1) details that the dual purpose of civil party action is to 
‘a) Participate in criminal proceedings against those responsible within the 
jurisdiction of the ECCC by supporting the prosecution; and b) Seek collective 
and moral reparations’. The expression ‘by supporting the prosecution’ 
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2013 See, e.g., Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 
35, footnote 52; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court 
Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 11, footnote 22.       
2014 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 412. 
2015 Victims Associations are authorised to lodge complaints with the Co-Prosecutors on behalf of a 
Victim. See Victims associations, General Information. Available at: 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support/victims-association (last visit on 20 October 2012).    
2016 See Practice Direction on Victim Participation (Rev.1), Practice Direction 02/2007/Rev.1, 
article 2 (3); McGonigle Leyh (2011) 174. 
2017 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 174. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1304. 
2018 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 488.  
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presumes and requires that civil parties must be on the same side as the 
Prosecutor, i.e., trying to obtain the conviction of the accused. Thus, should do a 
victim call for a dismissal of charges due to, for example, national reconciliation 
aims, (s)he would in principle be outside that purpose.2019 Although not 
necessarily all civil parties seek reparations, those who do so need to join the 
ECCC proceedings as civil parties.  
Additionally, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Ieng Sary (Case 002), found that 
‘a victim’s interest in participating in pre-trial proceedings stems from two core 
rights- the right to truth and the right to justice’.2020 Neither of these rights is 
explicitly stated in the ECCC legal instruments nor have the Judges fleshed out 
the contents of these rights. Nonetheless, the specific dual purposes alongside the 
recognition of a victim’s right to truth and justice have been used by civil party 
lawyers to argue about participation scope.2021 Victim’s status as an actual party, 
and not only as a victim participant, to the ECCC proceedings is actually 
reflected in the requirements for a victim to become and participate as a civil 
party. Accordingly, as determined by the ECCC, unlike the ICC and the STL, 
victims do not have to demonstrate how their personal interests are affected in 
order to participate as civil parties, and there is no special requirement to 
demonstrate any special interest in any procedural stage,2022 as also seen later.    
With regard to the proceedings to join as civil party, originally, internal 
rule 23 (3) and (4) (Rev. 3) provided the opportunity for victims to apply in 
writing to be joined as a civil party before the Co-Investigating Judges or before 
the Trial Chamber. However, an amended version of the Internal Rules, i.e., 
internal rule 23 (5) (Rev. 4), removed from the Trial Chamber the competence to 
decide on civil party admissibility. This amended regime also corresponds to the 
current internal rule 23 bis (2) (Rev. 8), which establishes that a victim who 
wishes to be joined as a civil party shall submit his/her application in writing not 
later than 15 days after the Co-Investigating Judges notify the parties of the 
judicial investigation conclusion and, subject to victim protection, the Co-
Investigating Judges must notify the Co-Prosecutors and the charged person.2023 
Thus, under the amended Internal Rules, as determined by the Supreme Court 
 
2019 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 175.  
2020 Ieng Sary (Case 002), Directions on Unrepresented Civil Parties’ Rights to Address the Pre-
Trial Chamber in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber, 29 August 2008, para. 5. 
2021 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 175. 
2022 Nuon Chea (Case 002), Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 March 2008, para. 49. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 182.   
2023 See also, Practice Direction on Victim Participation (Rev.1), Practice Direction 02/2007/Rev.1, 
article 3 (1) and (3). 
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Chamber in Duch ‘the power to decide civil party admissibility is vested in the 
Co-Investigating Judges, subject to appeal to the Pre-Trial Chamber’.2024 In 
addition, the glossary of the Internal Rules defines civil party as ‘a victim whose 
application to become a Civil Party has been declared admissible by the Co-
Investigating Judges or the Pre-Trial Chamber in accordance with these IRs 
[Internal Rules]’. According to internal rule 23 bis (4), the civil party applications 
‘must contain sufficient information to allow verification of their compliance 
with these IRs [Internal Rules]’.2025 Moreover, under internal rule 23 bis (5), the 
civil party may expressly abandon his/her civil party action at any moment 
during the pre-trial stage but this does not ‘stop or suspend the criminal 
prosecution’, and during the trial and beyond, the civil party may withdraw from 
the consolidated group.  
Concerning the standard of review of civil party applications, since the 
original text of the Internal Rules did not provide guidance on how to review the 
civil party applications, the Co-Investigating Judges, who were the first to review 
those applications, applied a prima facie standard.2026 Since the Co-Investigating 
Judges are not in a situation to make final determinations on the harm suffered, 
which is finally determined in the Trial Chamber’s judgment, the Co-
Investigating Judges make only a prima facie determination granting or denying 
civil party status.2027   
Concerning the standard of review, the current text of rule 23 bis (1) 
reads as follows ‘When considering the admissibility of the Civil Party 
application, the Co-Investigating Judges shall be satisfied that facts alleged in 
support of the application are more likely than not to be true’. In Duch, the Co-
Investigating Judges referred to rule 23 bis (1) (Rev. No. 5) which states that they 
shall be ‘satisfied that facts alleged in support of the [civil party] application are 
more likely than not to be true’. The Judges stated explicitly that the level of 
proof is particular to the admissibility of civil party applications and different 
from sufficiency of evidence criteria under internal rule 67,2028 which concerns 
closing orders by the Co-Investigating Judges.    
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2024 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 511.  
2025 It is also established, inter alia, that ‘[…] In particular, the application must provide details of 
the status as a Victim, specify the alleged crime and attach any evidence of the injury suffered, or 
tending to show the guilt of the alleged perpetrator […]’. 
2026 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 182.  
2027 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicants from Current 
Residents of Prey Veng, Co-Investigating Judges, 9 September 2010, para. 10. 
2028 Ibid., para. 9. 


In Duch, the Supreme Court Chamber recalling what Judge Lavergne 
said at the initial trial hearing, noticed ‘that the initial prima facie assessment of 
civil party applications was distinct from the determination of the merits of such 
applications […] a more rigorous standard of proof would be applied to finally 
determine civil party admissibility’.2029 This more rigorous standard, as 
determined by the Trial Chamber and confirmed by the Supreme Court 
Chamber is ‘more likely than not to be true’ or ‘preponderance of evidence’ as 
this ‘standard is common to civil claims across the world’,2030 and ‘the ultimate 
finding on eligibility of the civil party applicant for reparation is established at a 
level higher than prima facie’.2031     
In Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), it was stressed that when considering 
admissibility of civil party applications, it must be satisfied that facts supporting 
the application are ‘more likely than not to be true’.2032 It is suggested herein, in 
accordance with the ECCC’s practice and the practice of the ICC and the STL, 
that although the current text of the Internal Rules says explicitly ‘more likely 
than not to be true’, the assessment of civil party applications should be 
evaluated with a prima facie consideration as arguably implied by the Supreme 
Court Chamber in establishing that: 
 
[…] significant differences may occur between the pretrial and reparations 
stages of a case, including the quantity and quality of evidence affecting a civil 
party’s standing and reparation claims, resulting from evidence adduced by the 
civil party and from the findings as to the criminal responsibility of the accused 
person. Therefore, the Supreme Court must adapt a standard appropriate to the 
reparations stage of proceedings.2033 
 
Although the Supreme Court Chamber in Duch has interpreted the 
‘more likely than not to be true’ standard as more demanding since it was 
applied during the reparations stage in Duch, the high number of civil parties 
(almost 4000) admitted as civil parties in Nuon Chea et al., evidences that 
admissibility of civil party applicants has not been affected by the ‘more likely 
than not to be true’ standard. 
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2029 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 511.  
2030 Ibid., para. 531.  
2031 Ibid., para. 519.  
2032 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Appeals against Orders of the Co-Investigating 
Judges on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applications, Pre-Trial Chamber, 24 June 2011, para. 94. 
2033 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 512.  
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Accordingly, it can be concluded that when deciding the admissibility of 
civil party applicants in Nuon Chea et al., the ‘more likely than not to be true’ 
standard has been applied in a flexible manner that, for practical effects, can be 
considered similar to a prima facie standard. In other words, it may be argued 
that the ‘more likely than not to be true’ standard can be applied in a more 
relaxed manner, i.e., similar to the prima facie standard when determining the 
admissibility of civil party applications and, in a more demanding manner, in a 
later stage when reparations are ordered. Indeed, Co-Investigating Judges in 
Nuon Chea et al. have applied a prima facie assessment, under the ‘more likely 
than not to be true’ standard of the amended Internal Rules, when determining 
the admissibility of civil party applications since they are not in a position to 
make final determinations,2034 which are to be made in the Trial Chamber’s 
judgment. In any case, the Supreme Court Chamber (or the ECCC’s case law in 
general) should clarify the exact interpretation to be given to the ‘more likely 
than not to be true’ standard in different procedural stages.      
Be that as it may, the Trial Judgment in Duch summarized its two-step 
determination of applications for civil party status in the following terms:  
 
Initial decisions on the admissibility of Civil Party applications ascertained that 
the criteria for participation as a Civil Party were satisfied. In common with the 
practice before comparable tribunals, the Chamber undertook a prima facie, 
assessment of the credibility of the information provided by the applicants. This 
process is distinct from the Chamber’s determination of the merits of all 
applications in the verdict, on the basis of all evidence submitted in the course of 
proceedings [emphasis added].2035  
[…]  
Once declared admissible in the early stages of the proceedings, Civil Parties 
must satisfy the Chamber of the existence of wrongdoing attributable to the 
Accused which has a direct causal connection to a demonstrable injury 
personally suffered by the Civil Party.2036 
  
This two-step determination, later adopted by the Co-Investigating 
Judges in Nuon Chea et al.,2037 presents the advantage to allow the ECCC to 
conduct fast initial examination of applications, which was needed due to the 
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2034 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 9 September 2010, para. 10.   
2035 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 636. 
2036 Ibid., para. 639. 
2037 Between 25 August 2010 and September 2010, the Co-Investigating Judges issued 25 orders on 
the admissibility of victims who had submitted applications to become civil parties in Case 002. See 
Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, para. 19.  
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backlog of applications.2038 Nonetheless, this generated civil parties’ 
disillusionment and frustration as they can have their status revoked in the trial 
judgment after having participated in the whole trial proceedings, which 
happened in Duch as discussed later.2039 Additionally, the costs for the ECCC to 
review the applications twice and the time invested by team members to face at 
trial individuals who did not have real standing constitute important problems 
under this approach.2040 
The Supreme Court Chamber concluded that although the Trial 
Chamber did not act outside the Internal Rules, the legal framework for deciding 
civil parties’ inadmissibility ‘was patently obscure.2041 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber did not commit an error of 
law by assessing whether victimhood had been sufficiently demonstrated since 
any ambiguity that may have been caused by the ECCC concerning the civil 
party’s standing at the start of the trial did not prejudice civil parties’ access to 
trial proceedings.2042 However, the Supreme Court Chamber noticed a 
‘fundamental misunderstanding between the Trial Chamber and the Civil Party 
Appellants as to the merits and legal effect of the initial review of the 
applications’.2043 This observation was necessary as no decision granting the civil 
party status informed victims that these were only conditionally given the civil 
party status and pending the satisfaction of additional criteria to be learnt by 
them later.2044 The Supreme Court Chamber also appropriately recognized the 
anguish and frustration caused to the victims because of the revocation of their 
civil party status.2045  
Furthermore, the Chamber acknowledged that some civil parties due to 
the novel character of the civil party at the ECCC may have confused as for 
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2038 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 184. 
2039 See infra Chapter IV 4.4.2.1. 
2040 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 184. 
2041 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 493.  
2042 Ibid., para. 500. 
2043 Ibid., para. 501.  
2044 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 199. Indeed, one of the few mentions concerning a later review of 
applications was given by Judge Jean-Marc Lavergne when said that ‘I think it is perfectly clear that 
during the substantive proceedings we [the Trial Chamber Judges] shall examine each of the 
applications to be perfectly certain that the alleged harm did in fact occur’. Case of Kaing Guek Eav 
alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 17 February 2009, p. 42, lines 5-10.  
2045 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber 3 February 
2012, para. 501. 
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whether submission of evidence was still expected of them.2046 Accordingly, the 
Chamber appropriately decided to grant the civil party appellants’ motions to 
submit additional evidence to remedy any missed opportunity and regardless of 
the availability of that evidence during the first instance proceedings.2047 Based 
on the analysis of evidence thus submitted, the Supreme Court Chamber in some 
cases reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision to revoke the civil party status as 
seen later,2048 in application of the same evidentiary standard (higher than prima 
facie) applied by the Trial Chamber for civil party applicant eligibility for 
reparations, as previously examined.  
It should be finally added that even though formal charges have not been 
yet laid in Cases 003 and 004, the Co-Investigating Judges have been receiving 
civil party applications, which have been placed or are in the process of being 
placed in the respective case files, and have rejected some of them.2049 Therefore, 
there are civil parties already admitted to cases 003 and 004.2050  
 
2.4.1.2. The STL 
With regard to the STL Statute, two observations are presented here as for 
victims’ status as participants. First, article 17 provides that victims may present 
their ‘views and concerns’ at various stages of the proceedings:   
 
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Special Tribunal 
shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages 
of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Pre-Trial Judge or the 
Chamber and in a manner that is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
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2046 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2047 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 501. 
2048 See infra Chapter IV 6.4.1.1.  
2049 Case 003, Lawyer’s Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File 
No. 003, Co-Investigating Judges, 26 February 2013; Case 004, Lawyer’s Recognition Decision 
Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File No. 004, Co-Investigating Judges, 01 April 
2013. See also Case 003, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the Appeal Against 
Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant, Pre-Trial Chamber, 28 February 2012, para. 3.     
2050 Case 003, Lawyer’s Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File 
No. 003, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 26 February 2013, para. 15; Case 004, Lawyer’s 
Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File No. 004, Office of the 
Co-Investigating Judges, 01 April 2013, para. 14. See also Case 003, Order on the Reconsideration 
of the Admissibility of the Civil Party Application of Robert Hamill, Co-Investigating Judges, 24 
February 2012, paras. 36-39; Case 003, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the 
Appeal Against Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant, Pre-Trial Chamber, 13 
February 2013.  
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rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may 
be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the Pre-Trial 
Judge or the Chamber considers it appropriate. 
 
Second, article 25 rules out the possibility for victims to claim 
compensation before the STL. Accordingly, victims cannot act as civil parties. 
The Report of the UN Secretary General clarified this point by establishing that 
the fact that victims can present their views does not imply that they are 
recognized as civil parties, and that one of the ‘distinctive features’ of civil law, 
i.e., ‘the participation of victims as “parties civiles”’ is absent in the STL 
Statute.2051 Indeed, as the former President of the STL, Antonio Cassese, said ‘the 
main raison d'être of “parties civiles”, namely their participation in criminal 
proceedings for the purpose of seeking compensation is removed’.2052 In any 
case, article 25 (1) establishes that the STL ‘may identify victims who have 
suffered harm as a result of the commission of crimes by an accused convicted 
by the Tribunal’. Be that as it may, for this identification, which may lead to 
compensation outside the STL as examined in the next chapter,2053 victim 
participation at the STL may be quite important.2054     
Concerning the STL RPE, as pointed out by the former President of the 
STL, Antonio Cassese, although the STL proceedings do not aim at determining 
compensation but rather at establishing the accused’s criminal responsibility, the 
STL RPE drafters ‘deemed it fair and appropriate to grant extensive participation 
in proceedings to victims’.2055 The STL Judges when drafting the RPE sought to 
limit the number of victims participating at the STL and, therefore, to avoid 
‘flooding’ it.2056 Thus, rule 2 (A) distinguishes the notions of ‘victim’ and ‘victim 
participating in the proceedings’ since whilst the former is ‘a natural person who 
has suffered physical, material or mental harm as a direct result of an attack 
within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction’,2057 the latter consists in someone ‘who has 
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2051 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
S/2006/893 (15 November 2006), paras. 31-32. 
2052 STL President (2010), para. 15. See also STL President (2012), para. 15.    
2053 See infra Chapter V 2.2.1 and 3.2.1.   
2054 STL President (2010), para. 16; STL President (2012), para. 16.    
2055 STL President (2010), para. 16. See also STL President (2012), para. 16.     
2056 STL President (2010), para. 18; STL President (2012), para. 18.    
2057 STL RPE, rule 2 (A). See also STL Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation, 
STL/BD/2012/04, 4 May 2012 (corrected 21 June 2012), article 1 (‘Victims who have been granted 
the status of victim participating in proceedings by order of the Pre-Trial Judge pursuant Rule 
86(c)(i) of the Rules’ and also ‘Group of victims participating in the proceedings: Two or more 
victims participating in the proceedings who are grouped together for the purpose of being 
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been granted leave by the Pre-Trial Judge to present his views and concerns at 
one or more stages of the proceedings after an indictment has been 
confirmed’.2058 Other safeguards have included the exclusion of legal persons 
from the victim participant category, screening of victims conducted by the Pre-
Trial Judge before they can participate, victims’ participation not before the 
confirmation of an indictment, and designation of one legal representative to act 
on behalf of multiple victims.2059   
A person who claims to be a victim of a crime under the STL’s 
jurisdiction has to request the Pre-Trial Judge to be granted victim participant 
status.2060 Thus, (s)he can later be allowed by the Pre-Trial Judge or the 
competent Chamber to present his/her views and concerns provided that this ‘is 
not prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial’.2061 Victims who want to be granted the status of victim 
participants have to meet certain requirements as discussed later. The standard 
of evidence for it, under rule 86 (B) (i), is that ‘the applicant [must] provide 
prima facie evidence that he is a victim as defined in Rule 2’, which has been 
applied by the Pre-Trial Judge in Ayyash et al.2062 The Judge has also stated that 
the decision on admissibility of victim participant applications should be 
conducted in ‘non-contentious proceedings in the absence of the Parties’, who 
are entitled to only be heard on legal issues.2063     
 
2.4.2. Requirements to Participate as Civil Parties (ECCC)/Victim 
Participants (STL)   
2.4.2.1. The ECCC 
With regard to the ECCC, as applied in Duch, Rule 23 (2) (Rev.3) established 
that:  
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represented by a shared legal representative pursuant to a decision of the Pre-Trial Judge under 
Rule 86 (D)’.).  
2058 STL RPE, rule 2 (A). 
2059 STL President (2010), para. 19; STL President (2012), para. 19.    
2060 STL RPE, rule 86.  
2061 STL Statute, article 17. See also STL President (2010), para. 5; STL President (2012), para. 5.   
2062 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, paras. 27, 32, 51, 57, 58, 61, 62, 73, 84. See also 
Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, 
Pre-Trial Judge, 2 May 2013, paras. 9, 13 and 29.     
2063 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Decision on Defence Motion of 17 February 2012 for an 
Order to the Victims’ Participation Unit to Refile its Submission Inter Partes and Inviting 
Submissions on Legal Issues Related to Applications for the Status of Victim Participating in the 
Proceedings,  Pre-Trial Judge, 5 April 2012, para. 33.   
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The right to take civil action may be exercised by Victims of a crime coming 
within the jurisdiction of the ECCC, without any distinction based on criteria 
such as current residence or nationality. In order for Civil Party action to be 
admissible, the injury must be: a) physical, material or psychological; and b) the 
direct consequence of the offence, personal and have actually come into being. 
 
The current equivalent provision, rule 23 bis (1) (Rev.8) reads as follows: 
 
1. In order for Civil Party action to be admissible, the Civil Party applicant shall:  
a) be clearly identified; and   
b) demonstrate as a direct consequence of at least one of the crimes alleged 
against the Charged Person, that he or she has in fact suffered physical, material 
or psychological injury upon which a claim of collective and moral reparation 
might be based.2064   
 
From the joint reading of the two versions, it is clear that the 
requirements to become and participate as civil party remain to a large extent the 
same. It should be noticed that once victims are granted the civil party status, 
they do not need to receive a previous judicial authorization to participate.2065 
This corresponds to the status of civil parties as parties unlike the victim 
participant status, in which case victim participants’ personal interests need to be 
affected for them to be allowed to participate.    
i) Crimes Within the ECCC Jurisdiction.2066 In Duch civil parties had to 
demonstrate that the events presented in their respective applications fell within 
the ECCC jurisdiction. The current version of the ECCC Internal Rules clarifies 
that within the universe of all the crimes under the ECCC’s jurisdiction, ‘the 
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2064 In addition to this rule, see also current rule 23 bis (2) which states that ‘All Civil Party 
applications must contain sufficient information to allow verification of their compliance with 
these IRs. In particular, the application must provide details of the status as a Victim, specify the 
alleged crime and attach any evidence of the injury suffered, or tending to show the guilt of the 
alleged perpetrator’. See also Practice Direction on Victim Participation (Rev.1), Practice Direction 
02/2007/Rev.1 (amended on 27 October 2008), article 3 (3) and (5).   
2065 See also Valentina Spiga ‘No Redress Without Justice. Victims and International Criminal Law’ 
(2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1376, 1386.    
2066 ECCC Ratione materiae jurisdiction consists in genocide, crimes against humanity, grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the destruction of cultural property during armed 
conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict and crimes against internationally protected persons pursuant to the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. See ECCC Law, articles 2, 4-8. In turn, ECCC ratione 
temporis jurisdiction covers crimes committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979. See 
ECCC Law, article 2. Finally ratione personae jurisdiction is over ‘Senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible’. ECCC Law, article 2.     



crimes alleged against the Charged Person’ are those to be taken into account. 
This clarification is coherent with one of the already detailed purposes of civil 
parties’ participation, i.e., seeking ‘collective and moral reparations’,2067 in 
relation to the ‘commission of the crimes for which an Accused is convicted’.2068 
Accordingly, civil party applicants will have to refer, within the universe of 
crimes under the ECCC’s jurisdiction, to the crimes allegedly committed by the 
accused. In Nuon Chea et al., the Pre-Trial Chamber adopted an expansive 
interpretation of the phrase ‘the crimes alleged against the Charged Person’ to 
include crimes relating to policies ‘in areas other than those chosen to be 
investigated [by the Co-Investigating Judges]’ due to the fact that the civil party 
admission ‘in respect of mass atrocity crimes should […] be seen in the context 
of widespread and systematic actions resulting from the implementation of 
nation-wide policies’ and bearing in mind that the co-accused were charged 
under the criminal liability modality of joint criminal enterprise.2069 In Cases 003 
and 004, it was determined that since there is no charged person to be held 
responsible for the remedy of harms inflicted to the victims, rejecting civil party 
applications ‘at this stage does not infringe the rights of the victims’.2070 However, 
at the moment of writing this thesis and as previously mentioned,2071 there are 
civil parties already admitted to cases 003 and 004.2072  
ii) The Injury Suffered by the Civil Party Applicant had to be Physical, 
Material or Psychological. The Supreme Court Chamber in Duch determined 
that physical injury denotes ‘biological damage, anatomical or functional’, which 
can be ‘described as a wound, mutilation, disfiguration, disease, loss or 
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2067 ECCC Internal rules, rule 23 (1) (b)   
2068 Ibid., rule 23 quinquies (1) (a). 
2069 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, paras. 77-78. 
2070 Case 003, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the Appeal Against Order on the 
Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant Robert Hamill, Pre-Trial Chamber 02, Opinions of Judges 
Prak Kimsan, Judge Ney Thol, and Judge Huot Vuthy, 24 October 2011, para. 15; Case 004, 
Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the Appeal Against Order on the 
Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant Robert Hamill, Pre-Trial Chamber 02, Opinions of Judges 
Prak Kimsan, Judge Ney Thol, and Judge Huot Vuthy, 14 February 2012, para. 15.  
2071 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.1.1. 
2072 Case 003, Lawyer’s Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File 
No. 003, Co-Investigating Judges, 26 February 2013, para. 15; Case 004, Lawyer’s Recognition 
Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File No. 004, Co-Investigating Judges, 
01 April 2013, para. 14. See also Case 003, Order on the Reconsideration of the Admissibility of the 
Civil Party Application of Robert Hamill, Co-Investigating Judges, 24 February 2012, paras. 36-39; 
Case 003, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the Appeal Against Order on the 
Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant, Pre-Trial Chamber, 13 February 2013.   
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dysfunction of organs, or death’.2073 The Supreme Court Chamber also defined 
material injury as ‘material object’s loss of value, such as complete or partial 
destruction of personal property, or loss of income’.2074 As for psychological 
injury, the Supreme Court Chamber endorsed the definition provided by the 
Trial Chamber in Duch, which defined it as including ‘mental disorders or 
psychiatric trauma, such as post-traumatic stress disorder’.2075 In Nuon Chea et 
al., similar considerations have been applied.2076  
iii) The Injury had to be a Direct Consequence of the Offence, Personal 
and must have Actually Come into Being. It should be noticed that the ‘personal 
and must have actually come into being’ conditions are no longer explicitly 
mentioned in the current rule 23 bis. The Supreme Court Chamber in Duch 
established that, for legal standing, it is necessary that a person sustained an 
injury, and, for clarity, added that its use of the term ‘direct victim’ refers to 
those persons ‘whose rights were violated or endangered by the crime 
charged’.2077 The Supreme Court Chamber also found it not to be contentious 
with those persons who suffered injury as a ‘direct consequence’ of the crime.2078  
As previously referred to, victims who wish to participate as civil parties 
must demonstrate that the harm suffered is not merely linked to any crime 
under the ECCC’s jurisdiction, but more specifically, as determined in the 
ECCC’s case law, ‘the applicant must demonstrate that he or she has suffered 
injury as a direct consequence of at least one of the crimes alleged against the 
charged person(s)’.2079 This is coherent with the current text of rule 23 bis (1) (b) 
that refers to ‘the crimes alleged against the Charged Person’ as already 
examined.   
Under certain circumstances, the Trial Chamber allowed the civil action 
to be pursued on behalf of deceased civil party applicants by their successors 
provided that the civil party had filed a civil party application as, otherwise, 
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2073 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 415.  
2074 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2075 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 641; Ibid., 
Loc. cit.   
2076 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, para. 83.  
2077 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 416.  
2078 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2079 Ieng Thirith et al. (Case 002), Decision on Appeals Against Co-Investigating Judges’ Combined 
Orders D250/3/3 and 250/3/2 on Admissibility of Civil Party Applications, Pre-Trial Chamber, 27 
April 2010, para. 28.  
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successors can only seek reparation in their own right.2080 However, the Supreme 
Court Chamber found the Trial Chamber’s requirement ‘to limit the scope of 
eligible successors to circumstances where the direct victim had personally filed a 
civil party application before his or her death has no basis in applicable law’.2081   
In any case, by interpreting this requirement and referring to the 
Cambodian and French Procedural Criminal Codes and the UN Basic Principles 
and Guidelines, the Trial Chamber stated that responsibility is not limited to 
persons against whom crimes were perpetrated ‘but may also be the direct cause 
of injury to a larger group of victims’.2082 The Trial Chamber in Duch 
acknowledged that even though immediate family members of a victim fall 
within the scope of internal rule 23 (2), ‘direct harm may be more difficult to 
substantiate in relation to more attenuated familial relationships’.2083 
Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber appropriately paying attention to the 
Cambodian cultural context and, hence, regarding the nature of familial 
relationships, considered that harm alleged by members of a victim’s extended 
family may exceptionally ‘amount to a direct and demonstrable consequence of 
the crime’ when the applicants can show the alleged kinship and also 
circumstances generating special affection or dependence bonds in relation to 
the deceased.2084 The Cambodian cultural and social context and, in particular, 
the nature of extended family in Cambodia were also considered by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Nuon Chea et al.2085 
However, requiring proof of alleged kinship and also requesting proof of 
circumstances originating special bonds of affection or dependence on the 
deceased led to revoke more than twenty civil parties’ applications in Duch as in 
practice they were additional criteria not included in the Internal Rules, Practice 
Directives on Participation or Trial Chamber’s previous practice.2086 Be that as it 
may, the Supreme Court Chamber endorsed Trial Chamber’s reasoning and 
upheld approximately 60% of the revocations of civil party status,2087 as detailed 
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2080 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Motion Regarding Deceased Civil Party, 
E2/5/3, Trial Chamber, 13 March 2009, paras. 10-12. See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 
001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 641.   
2081 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 421. 
2082 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 642. 
2083 Ibid., para. 643. 
2084 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2085 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, paras. 83 and 84. 
2086 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 182.  
2087 For an analysis of each civil party see Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, 
Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, paras. 537-622.  
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later.2088 In particular, concerning indirect victims who are not ‘immediate 
family’ members, the need for the criteria laid down by the Trial Chamber would 
result logic since, as stated by the Supreme Court Chamber, absent bonds tying 
the claimants (indirect victims, whether family or not) emotionally, physically or 
economically to the direct victim, ‘no injury would have resulted to them from 
the commission of the crime’.2089  
Based on, inter alia, jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the ICC, the 
Supreme Court Chamber in Duch accepted the presumption whereby crimes 
such as ‘forced disappearance, imprisonment, torture and murder of a family 
member will likely bring about suffering, anguish and other kinds of injury, such 
as financial damage, to this victim’s close family members’.2090 As for the scope of 
this presumption of injury, the Supreme Court Chamber upheld the Trial 
Chamber’s finding by paying close attention to the Cambodian familial 
relationships and cultural context as families not only consist of couples and 
their offspring but also ‘other family members, such as ageing parents’ or 
‘siblings and their families’ or ‘grandparents, cousins, uncles and aunts’.2091 As 
for the trial judgment in Duch, the ECCC Internal Rules, article 13 of the 
Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure and case law of the IACtHR and the 
ICC constituted the sources for the acceptance of both direct and indirect 
victims as civil parties.2092  
Concerning indirect victims, the Supreme Court Chamber also 
emphasized that they need to have suffered injury as a direct consequence of the 
crimes perpetrated against the direct victims(s).2093 The Supreme Court Chamber 
found that indirect victims, i.e., those who personally suffered injury as a direct 
result of the crime, can also qualify as civil parties.2094 Moreover, indirect victims 
were found not to be limited to any specific class of persons such as family 
members and, hence, may include ‘common law spouses, distant relatives, 
friends, de facto adopters and adoptees, or other beneficiaries, provided that the 
injury on their part can be demonstrated’.2095 Furthermore, indirect victims’ 
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2088 See infra Chapter IV 6.4.1.1. 
2089 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 447. 
2090 Ibid., para. 448. 
2091 Ibid., para. 449. 
2092 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras. 642-643.  
2093 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 417. 
2094 Ibid., para. 418. 
2095 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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exercise of the rights is autonomous of the direct victims’ rights and, hence, 
indirect victims may be granted civil party status even when ‘the direct victim is 
alive and does not pursue the civil party action him or herself’.2096 The IACtHR 
has reached similar findings when discussing the autonomous right to 
reparations of victim’s close relatives.2097 
The Trial Chamber in Duch recognized four categories of civil parties: i) 
those claiming to be direct survivors of prisons S-21 or S-24; ii) those claiming to 
be the immediate family members of a S-21 or S-24 victim; iii) extended family 
members of a S-21 or S-24 victim; and iv) a deceased civil party applicant’s 
successor.2098 In any case, it is important to bear in mind the individual identity 
of the victim civil party although they are put in groups and also in order to 
avoid some tensions between direct victims and indirect victims participating as 
civil parties.2099 Lastly, but equally important, Pre-Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea 
et al., when examining the causal link, highlighted that in cases of mass atrocity, 
e.g., genocide and crimes against humanity, the admission as a civil party should 
be:  
 
[…] seen in the context of dealing with widespread and systematic actions 
resulting from the implementation of nation wide policies in respect of which 
the individual liability alleged against each of the accused also takes collective 
dimensions due to allegations for acting together as part of a joint criminal 
enterprise.2100       
 
Indeed, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea et al., considered that 
internal rule 23 bis (1) does not require a causal link between the harm and the 
investigated facts but instead ‘it explicitly requires a causal link between the 
harm and any of the crimes alleged’.2101 Therefore, whereas the facts investigated 
are limited to certain areas, their legal characterization ‘include crimes which 
represent mass atrocities allegedly committed by the Charged Persons by acting 
 
2096 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
2097 See, e.g., Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, Interpretation of the Judgment of 
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 25 November 2003, Series C 
No. 102, para. 152 (a); Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, 
Merits, Judgment of 19 November 1999, Series C No. 63, para. 92.b.   
2098 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras 641-642. 
2099 See Madhev Mohan, ‘The Paradox of Victim-Centrism: Victim Participation at the Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 733, 758-766. 
2100 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, para. 78.  
2101 Ibid., para. 42. 
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in a joint criminal enterprise together and with others against the population and 
throughout the country’.2102   
iv) The Civil Party Applicant shall be Clearly Identified. Although this 
requirement was not originally present in the Internal Rules, the Trial Chamber 
at the initial hearing in Duch indicated that sufficient applicant’s proof-of-
identity would be required. Even though the Chamber adopted a flexible 
approach based on a case-by-case analysis of materials before it, it concluded 
that ‘[i]f the Chamber is to permit an Applicant to participate in criminal 
proceedings and to seek collective and moral reparations […], the identity of 
that person must be unequivocal’.2103 This standard is similar to the ‘clearly 
identified’ one present in the current rule 23 bis. Be that as it may, applicants’ 
proof of identity during Duch was not particularly problematic as most victims 
possessed documents to prove their identities unlike African regions plagued 
with ongoing conflicts. However, there were problems to prove the connection 
between indirect and direct victims as frequently there was a lack of documents 
proving such relationship.2104 In Nuon Chea et al., the Pre-Trial Chamber stated 
that although the specific condition of admissibility of clear identification was 
not yet identified when the civil party applications were filed, the applicants were 
still required to submit proof of identification as indicated in the victim 
information form.2105 It should be mentioned that, according to article 15 of the 
Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code, ‘a civil action can be filed on behalf of a 
victim by his/her guardian if the victim is a minor or an adult under legal 
guardianship’. 
Besides the above-examined four requirements, in Nuon Chea et al., the 
Pre-Trial Chamber paid attention to whether the application of broader civil 
party admissibility criteria affects the balance to be maintained with the rights of 
the other parties involved in the proceedings.2106 In examining so, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber noted that the purpose of the civil party action is, as detailed in the 
previous sub-section, to participate in the criminal proceedings by supporting 
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2102 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2103 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision of the Trial Chamber Concerning Proof of 
Identity for Civil Party Applicants, Trial Chamber, 26 February 2009, para. 6.  
2104 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 181.  
2105 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicants from Current 
Residents of Preah Sihanouk Province, Annex Concerning Civil Party Applicants Whose 
Applications Are in the View Majority, Inadmissible, D/404/2/4.3, Pre-Trial Chamber, 2 
September 2010, p. 5. 
2106 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, paras.  96-99.  
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the prosecution and to seek collective and moral reparations.2107 Bearing in mind 
this dual purpose, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that the admission of a large 
number of civil parties as such supports no concern about having ‘an adverse 
effect on the rights of the accused’.2108  
 
2.4.2.2. The STL 
With regard to the STL, in deciding whether to grant the status of victim 
participants, under rule 86 (B) (i)-(iv), the Pre-Trial Judge shall consider in 
particular the following cumulative criteria:  
 
(i) whether the applicant has provided prima facie evidence that he is a victim as 
defined in Rule 2;   
(ii) whether the applicant’s personal interests are affected;  
(iii) whether the applicant’s proposed participation is intended to express his 
views and concerns; and; 
(iv) whether the applicant’s proposed participation would be prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. 
 
Although the Pre-Trial Judge in Ayyash et al. noticed that in principle 
these four criteria are cumulative requirements ‘which an applicant must satisfy 
in order to be granted VPP [victim participant] status’,2109 he appropriately and 
very importantly added that:  
 
[…] it would be unduly burdensome to require applicants to address all the 
criteria contained in Rule 86(B) of the Rules in their Applications. Persons 
requesting VPP status are only required to provide prima facie evidence that they 
are victims and to indicate the reasons why they wish to participate in the 
proceedings. The other factors mentioned in Rule 86(B) of the Rules are matters 
for judicial interpretation only. Therefore, an Application may be treated as 
complete regardless of whether it provides evidence directly relevant to those 
matters, provided that the Pre-Trial Judge can derive sufficient information 
from the Application to rule on whether it complies with the required criteria 
[emphasis added].2110 
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2108 Ibid., para. 97.  
2109 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, para. 24. 
2110 Ibid., para. 25. See also Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 28 November 2012, paras. 5-9; 
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Accordingly, based on this judicial interpretation, to be granted the 
victim participant status at the STL, the applicants are fundamentally required to 
prima facie demonstrate that they are victims. Thus, the applicants do not need 
to provide evidence of the other factors to be granted victim participant status as 
they are ‘for judicial interpretation only’. As seen later in this sub-section, the 
consideration of those factors, especially the existence of affected personal 
interests, are particularly relevant for allowing participation of those who already 
hold the victim participant status. The interpretation provided by the Pre-Trial 
Judge in Ayyash et al. is also consistent with the requirements to become victim 
participant and, once this status has been granted, to be then allowed to 
participate at the ICC meeting the article 68 (3) requirements as previously 
examined.2111      
Additionally, the STL Pre-Trial Judge may also consider other criteria 
listed under rule 86 (B) (v)-(x).2112 However, as the Pre-Trial Judge determined 
in Ayyash et al., these factors are not even mandatory for judicial 
interpretation.2113      
i) The Applicant is a Natural Person. Legal persons are excluded.2114 To 
bring an application, a natural person must have legal capacity, and if the victim 
is a minor, under 18 years within the Lebanese civil law, or otherwise lacks legal 
capacity, the application can be brought by a person acting on the applicant’s 
behalf.2115 Applicants must demonstrate prima facie proof of their identity and, 
when represented, proof of both the identity and the connection between the 
victims and his/her representative is needed.2116 In order to prove the applicant’s 
identity, the Pre-Trial Judge has considered identification documents,2117 and 
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2113 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, para. 24.  
2114 Ibid., para. 30; STL President (2010), para. 19; STL President (2012), para. 19. 
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when these cannot be provided, ‘other reliable documents whose primary 
purpose is not to be used as identification documents, but which nonetheless 
contain information identifying the applicant’.2118   
ii) The Harm Suffered Was a Direct Result of an Attack within the 
Tribunal’s Jurisdiction.2119 In order to prevent the victims from being too 
numerous and, hence, avoid the ‘flooding’ of the STL, the STL President’s 
Explanatory Memorandum on RPE states it was necessary to define ‘victim’:  
 
[…] rather narrowly so as to include only those natural persons who have 
suffered material, physical or mental harm as a direct result of an attack within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal [...] individuals who may have suffered indirect 
harm, are thus excluded.2120   
 
However, the Pre-Trial Judge pointed out that the use of the adjective 
‘direct’ in rule 2 ‘refers to the requirement (“direct result”) and does not refer to 
the notion of harm itself’.2121   
Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Judge concluded that not only ‘victims who 
have suffered direct harm’ (‘direct victims’) but also ‘victims who have suffered 
harm as a result of the harm suffered by the direct victim (‘indirect victims’) can 
be admitted as victim participants at the STL.2122 Three arguments were given to 
reach this conclusion. First, a teleological argument, i.e., ‘direct result’ was 
interpreted in the light and the spirit of the Statute, and it was noted that neither 
article 25 nor rule 86 (G) includes a requirement that the harm suffered by the 
victim be a direct result of the commission of crimes.2123 Second, the exclusion of 
indirect victims from participation in the proceedings was found to be contrary 
to international practice, i.e., the ICC and in particular the ECCC as the latter 
has allowed participation of indirect victims as civil parties although its Internal 
Rules require the victim to demonstrate that (s)he suffered injury as ‘a direct 
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2118 Ibid., para. 33 (ii). 
2119 As for STL’s jurisdiction see article 1 (establishing jurisdiction over persons responsible for the 
attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
and in the death or injury of other persons and, potentially over attacks connected with and of 
gravity similar to the attack against Hariri that took place between 1 October 2004 and 12 
December 2005), and article 2 (establishing jurisdiction ‘over provisions of the Lebanese Criminal 
Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against 
life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences’.).   
2120 STL President (2010), para. 19; STL President (2012), para. 19.  
2121 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, para. 39. 
2122 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2123 Ibid., para. 40. 
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consequence’ of the crime.2124 Third, the Pre-Trial Judge found his interpretation 
of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ victims consistent with international human rights 
standards, in particular the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines.2125 Fourth, the 
Lebanese Code of Obligations and Contract provides for the awarding of 
reparations for indirect harm.2126      
Although the Pre-Trial Judge found the meaning of the word ‘direct’ in 
rule 2 (A) as a ‘limiting factor that restricts the recognition of victim status only 
where persons are closely connected to the Attack or the direct victim thereof’, 
he added that the notion of closeness of relationships is context-dependent.2127 
Therefore, he addressed the question of how closely an indirect victim has to be 
related to the direct victim, and on what basis, to be granted victim participant 
status.2128 Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Judge found that not only first degree 
relatives but also persons in relationships of like proximity to the direct victim, 
and other extended family members who have ‘a special bond of affection with 
or dependence on the direct victim’ can be considered to have suffered harm as a 
direct result of the attack.2129 The Judge also added that the harm suffered by the 
indirect victims and the closeness of the relationship between them and the 
direct victims determine what evidence requirements are applicable to proving 
the indirect victims’ harm.2130 To prove the direct result and under a prima facie 
standard, while direct victims need to show at a minimum their presence at the 
scene of the attack at the relevant time,2131 indirect victims in addition have ‘to 
show their kinship, close personal relationship or bond of special affection with, 
or dependence on, the direct victim, as appropriate’.2132  
It is herein agreed with the Pre-Trial Judge’s findings as the STL RPE’s 
definition of victims is in principle restrictive and a narrow interpretation would 
have constituted a step backwards in victims’ participatory standing as evidenced 
in the practice of the ICC and the ECCC. This would especially be true 
considering the relatively low number of applicants to be victim participants 
before the STL as opposed to the much larger number that the ICC and the 
ECCC deal with. Indeed, in Ayyash et al., there were originally 73 
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2131 Ibid., paras. 50-51. 
2132 Ibid., para. 52. 
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applications,2133 and 58 applicants were allowed to participate in the proceedings 
as victim participants in the first decision.2134 Additionally, the other STL RPE 
safeguards previously referred to are found here as enough guarantees to avoid 
or at least reduce considerably the risks of delay and ‘flood’ of the STL related to 
victim participation. These mechanisms should be enough to handle a 
potentially (exponential) increase in the number of victims due to the inclusion 
of indirect victims, which considering the STL’s very limited resources may have 
a major impact on its efficiency.2135   
It must be also added that the Pre-Trial Judge, in his Fourth Decision on 
Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, clarified that the ‘causal link required 
between the harm suffered and “an attack within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction” 
must be read as requiring a nexus between the harm alleged and a crime 
specifically charged in the Indictment’.2136 Therefore, it is required a causal nexus 
between harm suffered by an applicant and a relevant crime charged in the 
indictment,2137 i.e., not any crime within the STL’s jurisdiction. This finding is 
consistent with the jurisprudence of the ICC and the ECCC previously 
examined. It should also be noted, as discussed in detail later,2138 that victims can 
only be granted the victim participant status once the indictment is confirmed at 
the STL.2139       
iii) The Applicant Has Suffered Physical, Material or Mental Harm. 
Under rule 2, harm was understood as ‘injury, loss, damage; material or tangible 
detriment’.2140 ‘Physical harm’ was said to encompass substantial bodily injuries, 
which ordinarily requires a degree of medical treatment for the victim.2141 
‘Material harm’ was interpreted as damage to, or destruction of property, loss of 
income or of means of subsistence and other financial loss forms.2142 ‘Mental 
harm’ was interpreted to encompass emotional, psychological or psychiatric 
nature harm, and emotional distress must be serious.2143 Moreover, first-degree 
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2133 Ibid., para. 6. 
2134 Ibid., viii. Disposition.  
2135 Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘Challenges Raised by Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 165, 168.   
2136 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 2 May 2013, para. 15. 
2137 Ibid., para. 23. 
2138 See infra Chapter IV 3.4.1.2. 
2139 STL RPE, rule 86 (A). 
2140 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, para. 63 (citing Bryan Garner (ed.), Black’s Law 
Dictionary (9th edn. West 2009).  
2141 Ibid., para. 66. 
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2143 Ibid., para. 78. 
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relatives (indirect victims) are presumed to have a special bond of affection with 
the direct victim and, hence, the harm suffered by the former ‘can be presumed 
in case of death of the direct victim’ in line with and citing the ECCC and ICC 
case law.2144  This presumption was also extended to persons in a similar close 
relationship with the deceased if the former satisfy prima facie the existence of a 
relationship with the latter.2145 Extended family members’ harm can 
exceptionally amount to a direct result of the attack in case the applicant can 
establish close personal relationship with the direct victim.2146        
iv) The Applicant’s Personal Interests Are Affected. The Pre-Trial Judge 
correctly pointed out that as victims are not parties within the meaning of rule 2, 
i.e., in contrast to the Prosecutor and the defence, but only participants, they 
‘cannot intervene in the proceedings as of right. They must show that their 
personal interests are affected’.2147 However, the Pre-Trial Judge added that when 
determining whether a person is a victim, in the sense of rule 2, the notion of 
‘personal interests’ is of limited relevance as its existence can be presumed once 
it is determined that the person in question has suffered physical, material, or 
mental harm as a direct result of an attack within the STL’s jurisdiction.2148 In 
any case, the Pre-Trial Judge stated that ‘“personal interests” will assume 
additional importance when deciding on specific the modalities for the VPPs 
[victims participating in the proceedings] proposed participation’.2149   
v) Whether the Applicant’s Proposed Participation is Intended to Express 
his Views and Concerns. This criterion was understood as the general motivation 
of persons seeking to participate in the proceedings as victim participants and 
also the modalities to participate.2150 Thus, it was required that applicants are 
driven to contribute to the pursuit of justice, e.g., to establish the truth or to 
obtain recognition of the harm suffered by them.2151 In this stage, the Pre-Trial 
Judge determined the first aspect of the notion, i.e., to determine whether those 
who seek to participate are motivated by a legitimate objective, to be the only 
relevant as the determination of the specific participation modalities becomes 
only relevant when establishing those modalities at the appropriate stage of the 
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proceedings.2152 Moreover, if the applicant has not stated any specific reason for 
participation, ‘the Pre-Trial Judge has considered whether, taking into account 
the entirety of his application, his willingness to do so was demonstrated’.2153  
vi) Whether the Applicant’s Proposed Participation Would be Prejudicial 
to or Inconsistent with the Rights of the Accused. This requirement can be met in 
at least three manners.2154 First, ensuring the victim participants meet the criteria 
above-discussed. Second, victim participants will ordinarily be represented by 
common legal representatives who are required to ensure the integrity and 
expeditiousness of the proceedings. Third, concrete measures can be taken, if 
necessary, so that victims’ participation does not prejudice the accused’s rights. 
The Pre-Trial Judge added that:  
 
After having conducted an individual assessment of the Applications, the Pre-
Trial Judge finds that, in respect of those applications that meet the other 
criteria in Rule 86(B) of the Rules, there are no reasons to conclude, at this 
stage, that the applicants’ participation in the proceedings would be prejudicial 
to, or inconsistent with, the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial.2155 
 
vii) Other Criteria. The Pre-Trial Judge also examined some of the other 
criteria, which according to rule 86 (B) (v)-(x), he can deem as relevant.2156 As for 
rule 86 (B) (v), the fact that a person may be a witness does not deprive him/her 
of his/her right to participate as a victim.2157 As for rule 86 (B) (vi), the fact that 
the interests of an applicant may diverge from the other victim participants’ 
interests shall not serve to deprive that person of his/her right to participate as a 
victim. As for rules 86 (B) (vii) and (viii) on the impact of victims’ participation 
on the integrity, dignity, decorum, objectivity, duration of or efficiency in the 
proceedings, it was noted that victim participants will ordinarily be allowed to 
participate, not on their own account but via a common legal representative. As 
for rule 86 (B) (x), whether the proposed victims’ participation would otherwise 
be in the justice interests is to be determined at the time it arises, if at all. 
However, the Pre-Trial Judge added that the interests of justice and those of 
victims would normally be complementary as ‘victims are likely to have an 
interest in seeing that crimes are investigated and - where appropriate – 
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2152 Ibid., para. 97. 
2153 Ibid., para. 98. 
2154 Ibid., para. 100. 
2155 Ibid., para. 101. 
2156 Ibid., para. 102. 
2157 Ibid., para. 102 i).  
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prosecuted’.2158 Like with the ICC, although victims arguably have a specific 
interest in that the alleged perpetrators of the crime are brought to court and 
justice is done,2159 it is necessary not to equate victims’ personal interests to a 
prosecutorial function nor consider the STL as a (pure) restorative justice 
mechanism.   
In any case, ‘personal interests’ should not in principle be revaluated at 
every point in the proceedings as it would otherwise generate delays and because 
once victims are determined to hold personal interests in a particular case, it may 
be assumed that these interests are affected in subsequent proceedings,2160 at least 
within the same procedural stage, e.g., during trial. The identified criteria have 
been applied by the Pre-Trial Judge in a second decision in the same case 
granting victim participant status to 9 out of 15 victim participant status 
applicants, who had not been granted the status due to incomplete applications 
under the first decision.2161 The same criteria were again applied in two later 
decisions by the Pre-Trial Judge who granted an applicant the victim participant 
status in a third decision and denied four applicants the victim participant status 
as they failed to provide prima facie evidence that they are victims, as defined in 
rule 2, in a fourth decision.2162   
          
2.5. Comparative Conclusions  
At the ICC and the STL, victims can be granted the status of victim participants 
to express their own views and concerns. At the ECCC, victims can participate as 
civil parties in criminal proceedings by supporting the prosecution and to seek 
reparations, which reflects the French system influence via Cambodian law. 
Whereas the timing and modalities of participation concerning victim 
participants are subject to the respective chamber’s authorization at the ICC and 
the STL, civil parties at the ECCC do not in principle need to receive a chamber’s 
previous authorization to participate once their civil party applications have 
been successful.2163 Nevertheless, as seen later, the modalities of 
participation/procedural rights held by victim participants and those held by 
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2158 Ibid., para. 102 v).  
2159 See also Hemptinne (2010) 172. 
2160 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2161 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Second Decision on Victims’ Participation in the 
Proceeding, Pre-Trial Judge, 3 September 2012, paras. 1-13 and p. 5.  
2162 See, respectively, Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Third Decision on Victims’ Participation 
in the Proceedings, Pre-Trial Judge, 28 November 2012, paras. 6-9 and p. 5; Ayyash et al. (STL-11-
01/PT/PTJ), 2 May 2013, para. 29 and p. 10. 
2163 See also Spiga (2012) 1386.   
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civil parties are generally speaking similar and this, in practice, makes victim 
participants’ status to get closer to that of civil parties at the examined 
international and hybrid criminal courts. At the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, 
victims cannot participate as civil parties or victim participants; however, they 
can ‘participate’ in very specific procedural instances, which is similar to the 
Anglo-American systems. Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL instruments, 
which implicitly refer to an ‘alleged’ victim, similar to the American system, at 
the ICC, the ECCC and the STL there is not such implication. At the ICC, 
victims without holding the official victim participant status, i.e., without being 
granted the formal victim participant status upon application, can participate in 
very specific instances as detailed later,2164 if they fulfill the victim definition (rule 
85).      
In order to grant the status of victim participants (ICC, STL) or civil 
parties (ECCC) and participate as such, the legal instruments and practice of the 
international and hybrid criminal courts have followed to an important extent 
and mutatis mutandi the same standards and criteria. Thus, the ICC, the ECCC 
and the STL have applied a prima facie standard of review when deciding on the 
admissibility of the applications for granting the victim participant or civil party 
status. In practical terms, the initial admissibility of the victims as victim 
participants or civil parties does not mean that their status cannot be reviewed 
again according to the progress of a case throughout different procedural stages, 
which at the ICC may mean up to four revisions. The prima facie standard of 
admissibility is in principle a sound approach as, when processing the 
admissibility of applications, it is not yet known whether the accused committed 
the crimes. However, some of its practical effects such as the Trial Chamber’s 
decision to withdraw the status of victim participants in the judgment in 
Lubanga due to inconsistencies in the dual victim participant-victim witness’s 
evidence should be criticized.2165   
At the ECCC, the ‘more likely than not to be true standard’ explicitly 
introduced by amendments to the Internal Rules should and have been used in a 
flexible manner when examining civil party applications, which in practice 
corresponds to a prima facie standard. Currently, victims can only join as civil 
parties before the Co-Investigating Judges (previously, they could also do it 
before the Trial Chamber). At the ECCC, the two-step determination of civil 
parties applications, i.e., first, the prima facie standard in the admissibility 
process and, second, considering all the trial evidence discussed in the merits 
 
2164 See infra Chapter IV 3.3.1 and 3.3.3.1. 
2165 See for further discussion on this issue supra Chapter III. 2.3.2.2.    
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judgment in application of a more demanding evidentiary standard, i.e., ‘more 
likely than not to be true’ (as applied during the reparations stage), led to 
revocation of status of an important number of civil parties in Duch. Although 
this two-step determination is necessary to prevent a backlog of applications, it is 
necessary to inform the victims of the conditional/revisable character of their 
civil party status in order to avoid their frustration and disillusionment. 
Concerning the purposes of civil party action before the ECCC, as detailed in its 
rules, they are to participate in the proceedings by supporting the prosecution 
and to seek collective and moral reparations, i.e., civil party participation 
includes both the right to participate as parties in the accused’s criminal trial and 
to pursue a related civil action for collective and moral reparations. Case law has 
also referred to the rights to truth and justice. In any case, not necessarily all civil 
parties have to seek reparations but those who want them at the ECCC have to 
join the proceedings as civil parties. The French system is similar as there is a 
double purpose for civil party constitution, i.e., reparative and repressive, civil 
claim for damages is not necessary for civil party constitution and a civil party is 
free to request reparations for his/her harm. To speed up the admissibility 
process, especially concerning numerous victim applicants, steps such as 
collective applications, simplified victim application process, earlier deadlines 
and court’s assistance, as mostly already implemented by the ICC, and non-
contentious proceedings as adopted by the STL are advisable. However, Trial 
Chamber V’s decision to allow victims to become victim participants via 
‘registration’, i.e., without judicial assessment of the individual applications, 
when they do not want to participate in person, despite its (potential) benefits, 
can be criticized by going beyond what it is established under the ICC legal 
framework and for substantially departing from the ICC’s consistent practice.              
With regard to the requirements to be granted the status of victim 
participants or civil parties, which mainly consist in that the applicants can 
demonstrate that they are victims, and then participate as victim participants or 
civil parties, there are important similarities across the legal instruments and 
practices of the ICC, the ECCC and the STL but also some important differences, 
examined as follows. First, whereas at the ICC and the ECCC, the applicant 
cannot only be a natural person but also a legal one, similar to the French 
system, at the STL only natural persons can apply. At the three courts, the 
applicants have to prove their identities. However, their practice has been 
flexible as to the scope of identifying documents, i.e., not only official ones. This 
is especially relevant for the ICC taking into account the difficulties to obtain 
official documents in ongoing armed conflict scenarios. Nevertheless, 
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considering the outcome of some victim participants who were presumed to 
have stolen identities in Lubanga, it is necessary to conduct strict (earlier) 
controls of the provided identifying information. This is especially important 
bearing in mind the victim’s future participation during trial and considering the 
right of the accused to an impartial and fair trial. Similar to the examined 
national systems, under the ICC, the STL and the ECCC instruments and/or 
practice, minors or disabled people can have their applications submitted by a 
representative on their behalf. Proof of the representative’s identity and the link 
with the represented person is additionally required.                                              
Second, in relation to the crimes for which participation is sought, these 
have to fall within the material, temporal, geographical and personal jurisdiction 
of the ICC, the ECCC or the STL.   
Third, the existence of harm, about which the ICC, the ECCC and the 
STL (explicitly in its Statute) have found that it includes physical, material or 
mental harm. According to the ICC case law, direct or indirect harm must be 
personal to the victim. There is consensus across the three courts that the harm 
suffered by a ‘direct’ victim can give rise to harm on other individuals, i.e., 
‘indirect victims’ such as direct victim’s relatives. The ICC, the ECCC and the 
STL have applied presumptions of harm inflicted on close relatives, e.g., a 
mother with respect to her child. Persons harmed when assisting direct victims, 
preventing potential direct victims from being victimized and those who 
witnessed especially violent crimes were also considered by the ICC as having 
suffered harm and, thus, indirect victims. Moreover, the ICC, the ECCC and the 
STL have considered extended family members as victims by paying attention to 
the cultural contexts where victims come from (in particular the ICC and the 
ECCC) although it has normally been required additional information or 
evidence to support a harm claim resulting from the direct victim’s harm. The 
scope of indirect victims has been extended beyond family members, including 
persons who by trying to assist victims suffered harm or who witnessed violent 
crimes (ICC) and common law spouses, friends and de facto adopters (ECCC) 
provided that the harm is demonstrated. The IACtHR and ECtHR case law, the 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines were cited by the three courts to interpret 
the ‘harms suffered’ criterion, which is mutatis mutandi similar to some of the 
national practice examined.     
At the ICC, deceased person’s relatives may participate for their own 
harm suffered as a result of their relatives’ death and, hence, both have been 
considered as having suffered personal harm. Deceased victim applicant/victim 
participant’s relatives can take over the deceased’s application and participation 
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but limited to the latter’s views and concerns. However, during the ICC appeals 
stage, an heir/successor cannot reassume the deceased victim’s participation. In 
turn, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber has allowed indirect victims to 
constitute civil parties regardless of whether the direct victim is still alive and of 
whether (s)he pursues the civil party action himself. This is similar to some of 
the French Cour de Cassation’s jurisprudence although this has been lately 
replaced by a condition of having the civil action triggered by the deceased 
person.   
Fourth, concerning the existence of a causal link between the crime and 
harm inflicted, whereas the ICC RPE do not require a direct link, both the ECCC 
Internal Rules and the STL RPE demand so. However, as said, similar to the ICC, 
both the ECCC and the STL have recognized not only direct but also indirect 
victims. Accordingly, indirect victims suffer harm as a result of the harm 
suffered by direct victims. The ICC appropriately identified that for trial 
participation purposes the link has to be established only with those crimes 
confirmed, out of the universe of crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, as these 
are the ones considered during trial, which is similar to the current version of the 
ECCC Internal Rules. The ECCC in applying its Internal Rules has established 
that the causal link is not between harm and any crime under the ECCC’s 
jurisdiction but between harm and crimes alleged against the charged person. 
The STL’s case law has followed the approach of the ICC and the ECCC, i.e., 
nexus between harm and not any crime under the court’s jurisdiction but a 
crime charged in the indictment. The ICC excluded those individuals who 
suffered harm as a result of the conduct of direct victims, e.g., child soldiers’ 
victims, from the category of victim participants, which may be justified to avoid 
a flood of applicants. Having said this, Prosecutors should bear in mind the 
importance of carefully selecting which crimes are charged so as not to leave out 
important groups of victims.   
When it comes to indirect victims, although evidence of the existence of 
bonds, relationship with or dependence on the direct victim may be considered 
as burdensome and even as an extra requirement, it is arguably necessary to 
prove that the harm suffered by the indirect victims comes from the harm 
inflicted to the direct victim precisely due to those bonds. International human 
rights sources, especially regional human rights courts’ jurisprudence, have been 
important to interpret the causal link as well as the existence of harm criteria. 
When it comes to the examined national practice, especially the Anglo-
American one, the focus is on direct, proximate causal link, i.e., primarily direct 
victims, but indirect victims are also allowed mainly when the direct victim is 
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death, disabled or incompetent. In turn, when interpreting the causal link 
criterion, the ECCC referred to the French CPP.2166         
Fifth, under the ICC and the STL legal instruments and practice, Judges 
additionally have to evaluate whether victim participants should be allowed to 
participate considering, inter alia, whether the victim participants’ personal 
interests are affected and also victim participation’s consistency with the 
accused’s rights. The STL has determined that fundamentally applicants have 
only to demonstrate that they are victims to be granted the victim participant 
status and, thus, the affected personal interests requirement (under the STL 
RPE) is much more relevant for modalities of participation, i.e., once victims 
already hold victim participant status. Thus, even though the STL has considered 
that personal interests are presumably affected when harm is determined to 
exist, it has pointed out its importance when determining participation 
modalities. On the other hand, at the ECCC, once a victim is admitted as civil 
party, there is no special requirement to demonstrate any affected personal 
interest during the proceedings. Civil party constitution per se, as established in 
the Internal Rules, has the dual purpose of supporting the prosecution and 
seeking reparations. The lack of a specific need to demonstrate affected personal 
interests arguably corresponds to the fact that the victim as civil party is a party 
and not only a participant at the ECCC. In interpreting ‘personal interests’, ICC 
Pre-Trial Chambers have followed a systematic approach, i.e., the assessment of 
victims’ personal interests should be assessed considering whether they are 
affected in relation to a whole procedural stage.2167 On the other hand, the ICC 
Trial Chambers, the Appeals Chamber, and Pre-Trial Chambers (concerning the 
investigation stage),2168 have followed a casuistic approach, i.e., assessing whether 
victim’s personal interest is affected by a specific issue or evidence within the 
same procedural stage. Although the casuistic approach better safeguards the 
accused’s rights and is consistent with the personal interest pre-condition, it is in 
general inefficient, time-consuming and burdensome.   
As for the content of ‘personal interests’, whereas ICC Pre-Trial 
Chambers and Trial Chambers have considered that those include not only 
reparations, protection and declaration of truth but also victims’ wish to see 
those who victimized them punished, the ICC Appeals Chamber has been 
cautious so as that victims’ personal interests do not intersect with the 
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2166 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 642, 
footnote 1075 (citing article 2 of the French CPP).   
2167 See also infra Chapter IV 3.3.2.2.    
2168 See, for discussion, infra Chapter IV 3.3.2.2.  
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prosecutorial function. Even though the desire for justice to be done is arguably 
a victim’s personal interest, this should not be interpreted as equating victims’ 
personal interests to the Prosecutor’s mandate nor to consider the ICC as a pure 
restorative mechanism. As for the STL, its emerging practice has considered 
interests of victims and justice as complementary since victims have an interest 
that crimes are investigated and prosecuted. Observations similar to those made 
for the ICC are applicable to the STL.    
 
3. Victims’ Participation in Investigation/Pre-Trial Proceedings   
In this sub-chapter, the scope and the modalities of participation/procedural 
rights of victim participants/civil parties in pre-trial proceedings, i.e., inter alia, 
investigation and confirmation of charges hearing, are examined. The analysis is 
focused on the ICC, the STL (victim participants) and the ECCC (civil parties). 
As for the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, victims’ status is presented in a very 
general manner since their role at this stage is exclusively limited to that of 
witnesses. 
  
3.1. National Systems 
3.1.1. English Adversarial System  
The victim can report the offence to the police.2169 The crime victim as such does 
not have a right to start a prosecution; however, like any citizen (personally 
affected by the offence or not) holds the right to institute a private 
prosecution.2170 Nevertheless, the right to bring a private prosecution is subject to 
the risk that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take it over and, if (s)he 
deems it appropriate, to discontinue it.2171 Moreover, the very residual use of 
private prosecution in the contemporary criminal justice system is only of a 
symbolic value.2172 In case of a public prosecution, the victim has no right to join 
in as civil party.2173 During the investigation, the victim has no right. Although 
the Victim’s Charter mentions that they can expect the police to keep them 
informed, they do not hold a legal right to information.2174 English law does not 
make it a precondition for the prosecution of certain types of offence that the 
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2169 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 257. 
2170 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, section 6 (1). See also Spencer (2002) 153. 
2171 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, section 6 (2). 
2172 Doak (2008) 125. 
2173 Spencer (2002) 156; Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 259. 
2174 Spencer (2002) 169.  
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victim consents and, hence, the victim has no legal right to put a stop to an 
investigation or a prosecution.2175   
The victim also lacks a legal right to insist on the police to take action.2176 
Although the police will normally seek the victim’s views about prosecution, the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) takes the last decision on starting proceedings, 
i.e., to decide whether to prosecute a case. According to the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors, a two-fold test is applicable, i.e., a realistic prospect of conviction 
and whether it would be in the public interest to proceed.2177 Concerning the 
public interest, ‘prosecutors should take into account any views expressed by the 
victim [or his/her family] regarding the impact that the offence has had’.2178 
However, the Code of Crown Prosecutors also states that since the Prosecution 
does not act for victims or their families as solicitors, the Prosecutors have to 
‘form an overall view of the public interest’.2179 This provision makes the link 
between the public interest and victim’s views ambiguous and indeed the 
victim’s consent is not necessarily required for the public interest.2180  
Accordingly, the victim has no right to be involved in the charging 
decision, but the Prosecutor is obligated to consider victims’ interest to decide 
whether to prosecute or not.2181 It is the failure to prosecute cases where the 
taking of life or degrading, inhuman treatment happened and not the failure to 
give appropriate weight to victims’ desires as such, which in principle is a 
potential violation of articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR.2182 Having said so, there is a 
state obligation to conduct the investigation on its own motion, and ensure 
effective participation of the victim or victim’s family according to the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence.2183 Article 3 investigative obligation was considered in R (B) v 
Director of Public Prosecutions and the claimant was awarded damages as the 
Prosecutor had dropped the case due to the claimant’s mental problems.2184  
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2176 Ibid., 170. 
2177 See Code for Crown Prosecutors (2010), sections 4.5-4.17.  
2178 Ibid., section 4-18. 
2179 Ibid., section 4-19. 
2180 See Doak (2008) 120; Joanna Shapland and Matthew Hall, ‘Victims at Court: Necessary 
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2181 Doak (2008) 122.  
2182 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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105-109. See also ECtHR, Edwards and Lewis v. United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 39647/98 and 
40461/98, Judgment, 27 October 2004, para. 74.  
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Moreover, in cases against the United Kingdom, the ECtHR found 
violations of article 2 of the ECHR as the State had denied victims’ certain 
participatory rights in inquest proceedings, which are independent judicial 
investigations set up to determine the facts surrounding a suspicious death and 
where victims’ families can participate via their counsel.2185 The ECtHR criticized 
the lack of reasoning provided to victims for decisions not to prosecute and for 
not subjecting such decisions to judicial review.2186 It was also criticized that 
victims’ families had problems obtaining copies of witness statements before that 
witness was called to testify,2187 which puts victims’ families in disadvantage to 
prepare and in their ability to participate in questioning.2188  
In any case, the prosecutors in certain cases have the obligation to 
inform the victims of their decisions, e.g., when they stop a case or substantially 
alter the charge.2189 The CPS is obligated to ensure that victims are informed of 
charging decisions and, in some cases, the police is responsible for this; and 
when a Crown Prosecutor decides that there is insufficient evidence to bring any 
proceedings, the CPS has to notify the victim of this fact.2190 Furthermore, if after 
an individual has been charged and following case review, the CPS takes a 
decision to substantially alter or drop any charge, the CPS must notify the 
victims, and in all other circumstances the police is responsible for 
notification.2191 The prosecutor may decide in accordance with CPS guidance 
that is inappropriate or unnecessary to notify the victims or that, for legal 
reasons, no explanation beyond setting out the tests in the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors can be provided, which in any case must be recorded.2192 In certain 
types of cases,2193 the CPS must offer to meet the victims to explain a prosecution 
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2185 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 107. 
2186 See, e.g., ECtHR, McKerr v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28883/95, Judgment, 4 August 2001, 
para. 130; ECtHR, Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, Judgment, 4 August 2001, 
para. 122.  
2187 See, e.g., ECtHR, McKerr v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28883/95, Judgment, 4 August 2001, 
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2189 Code for Crown Prosecutors (2010), section 4.20. 
2190 Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (2006), section 7.2 and 3. 
2191 Ibid., section 7.4. 
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2193 These include cases involving a death allegedly caused by criminal conduct, such as murder, 
manslaughter, sexual offences, racially and religiously aggravated offences. See Code for Crown 
Prosecutors (2010), section 7.6. 
	

decision when the prosecutor decides not to bring proceedings or where a 
decision is taken to drop or substantially alter charges in respect of relevant 
criminal conduct.2194 The Divisional Court has highlighted the importance that if 
a prosecution is ‘not to follow a plausible explanation will be given’.2195 However, 
in cases of plea negotiations, decisions lie entirely with the Crown Prosecutors 
and there is no statutory obligation to inform or consult with the victim.2196 It 
should be remembered that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe issued a recommendation calling for States to permit victims to challenge 
decisions not to prosecute or to alternatively allow private prosecutions.2197  
The EU Framework Decision on Victims, inter alia, established that 
‘Each Member State shall safeguard the possibility for victims to be heard during 
proceedings and to supply evidence’ and the right to receive information.2198 The 
EU Directive on Victims contains similar provisions although these are more 
detailed, including: i) right to be heard, i.e., victims may be heard and may 
provide evidence;2199 ii) right to information;2200 iii) right when making a 
complaint;2201 and iv) rights in the event of a decision not to prosecute.2202        
 
3.1.2. American Adversarial System   
As mentioned, victims lack civil party status or an official victim participant 
status; however, there is some participation during pre-trial. The police is called 
to investigate after a crime is committed, a potential victim is interviewed by the 
police and gives his/her statement, the case is then given to the District Attorney 
who represents the state where the crime was committed, not to the victim’s 
lawyer.2203 The CVRA, applicable to victims of federal crimes, contains rights for 
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2194 Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (2006), section 7.7. 
2195 R. v DPP ex parte Manning and Melbourne [2001] Q. B. 330, DC.  
2196 Although the Attorney’s 2005 Guidelines on the Acceptance of Pleas and the Prosecutor’s Role 
in the Sentencing Exercises imposes an obligation to speak to the victim or victim’s family and to 
inform them about his/her decision, victims lack a formal input in the decision. See Doak (2008) 
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2197 See Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on the Role of Public Prosecution in the 
Criminal Justice System, 724th Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, Doc.No. R (2000) 19 (2000), 
para. 34. 
2198 EU Framework Decision on Victims, articles 3-5.  
2199 EU Directive on Victims, article 10. 
2200 Ibid., articles 4 and 6. 
2201 Ibid., article 5. 
2202 Ibid., article 11. 
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victims during pre-trial including the following.2204 First, right to be notified of 
and present during the defendant’s initial appearance and, in case the bail is to 
be set or denied during the initial appearance, the victim holds the right to be 
reasonably heard.2205 Second, right to be reasonably heard when the court 
determines whether the defendant will be released before trial,2206 as victims have 
the right ‘to be reasonably protected from the accused’.2207 Nevertheless, it is not 
indicated which weight the court should give to the victims’ statements, i.e., this 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.2208 This right, as a District Court 
determined, can be satisfied by a written statement.2209 Third, right to be notified 
and present at a waiver of indictment hearing, and when the release of the 
defendant becomes an issue or when the defendant refuses to waive indictment 
and bail must be continued or modified, a victim has the right to be heard.2210 
Fourth, right to be notified of and present at the defendant’s arraignment and 
the victim holds the right to be heard concerning the plea and the continuation 
or resetting of bail.2211  
The victim lacks formal authority to prevent the prosecutor from 
pursuing a formal charge and the latter may proceed over the victims’ 
objection.2212 Individuals (victims included) cannot make out a complaint in a 
federal court, unlike many state procedures, where this is subject to a subsequent 
probable cause review by the prosecutor and/or magistrate.2213 Whereas in a 
 
2204 See, in general, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a) ‘(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of 
any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or 
escape of the accused. (3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, 
unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the 
victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding. (4) The 
right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, 
sentencing, or any parole proceeding’.  
2205 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a) (2) and (4). See also U.S. v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321-28 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (detailing court’s actions to correct inadequate notice to victims about a defendant’s 
arraignment and bail hearing).  
2206 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a) (4). 
2207 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a) (1). 
2208 See Jefri Wood, The Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004 and the Federal Courts (Federal Justice 
Center 2008) 3.  
Available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/cvra0806.pdf (last visit on 
20 October 2012).   
2209 United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746-50 (N.D. III. 2005).  
2210 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a) (2) (3) and (4); Wood (2008) 4. 
2211 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a) (2) (3) and (4); Wood (2008) 4.  
2212 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 205. 
2213 The complaint is normally sufficient for a misdemeanor but not felony prosecution. Ibid., 204. 
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federal court the decision not to prosecute is almost absolute, some state 
jurisdictions allow a crime victim to seek judicial review of the prosecutor’s 
decision not to prosecute according to statute.2214 Most state jurisdictions permit 
the victim to access the grand jury,2215 historically allowed at common law, and 
this access varies from state to state as some states allow access without 
limitation whereas others after exhausting other remedies.2216 Although a victim 
may appear at a grand jury only as a witness, the court discretionally may 
authorize attendance beyond this, and some state constitutional amendments 
appear to permit a victim’s presence in grand jury proceedings.2217 While most 
state constitution amendments allow victims’ appearance only where a 
defendant has the right to be present, when the formal charging mechanism is 
preliminary hearing, state constitutional provisions or their statutory equivalents 
seem to permit victim’s presence as the defendant also has the right to be present 
at preliminary hearings.2218  
Private persons may lawfully spend any amount on a private 
investigation and this can be led by a private counsel.2219 Even though private 
prosecutions are possible, these are limited by the law of due process,2220 
excluded in cases involving serious crimes and where the public prosecutor has 
expressly refused to prosecute.2221 Indeed, they are normally limited to petty 
 
2214 Ibid., 239. As for the federal level see, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971).  
2215 The grand jury is constituted by laypeople, summoned to court to review the evidence in order 
to establish whether an indictment should be issued against the defendant.  
2216 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 239. See also Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944), 
264 (on the common law right of citizen to approach Grand Jury). Whereas West Virginia is the 
only state in declaring access to the Grand Jury to be a state constitutional right, Tennessee is 
among many states that have codified a procedure for a citizen’s direct access to the Grand Jury. 
See Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 272. Another approach to victims’ access to the Grand Jury 
consists in the right of a private party, which does not exist absent a request from the Grand Jury 
or prosecutorial or judicial approval. This is exemplified by the federal laws. See Ibid., 273.  See 
also In re New Haven Grand Jury 604 F.Supp. 453 (D. Conn. 1985). In jurisdictions where a 
preliminary hearing can be a substitute for the Grand Jury, the preliminary hearing procedure has 
not provided private citizens access to the indictment process. See Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 
281.   
2217 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 284. The exception is when the victim is present via a privately 
funded attorney who is actively participating in the grand jury process with the permission of the 
Public Prosecutor. See Ibid., Loc. cit.  
2218 See Ibid., 284-285. 
2219 Ibid., 196.  
2220 See, e.g., State of New Jersey v. Kinder 701 F.Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1988). 
2221 See, e.g., State v. Harton, 163 Ga.App. 773, 296 S.E.2d 112 (1982); Beloof, Cassell and Twist 
(2010) 239.   
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offences.2222 In states where private/auxiliary prosecutions are not prohibited by 
statute, private prosecutors are treated as representing state interests rather than 
those of the victims who hired them.2223   
Once criminal charges are filed, various pre-trial matters concerning 
victims may arise. First, unlike defendants, victims do not have the constitutional 
right to counsel appointed at state expense although in few cases courts have 
appointed counsel for the victim, especially when a victim of limited means 
needs legal representation.2224 Some states allow appointment of counsel for a 
victim in special circumstances, especially in cases involving children.2225 Second, 
victims generally do not possess a direct manner to obtain discovery, i.e., 
information, from the defendant in the criminal system.2226 Most states do not 
give victims an explicit right to discover from the state,2227 and they then rely on 
more general provisions, e.g., the general right to ‘fairness’.2228  
Third, even though a victim may not formally obtain a dismissal, (s)he 
may employ informal influences to try to get the state to move to dismiss 
charges.2229 Only some states have statutory provisions for the Prosecutor to 
consult with the victim concerning a contemplated dismissal.2230 Otherwise, a 
victim could communicate with the trial court as amicus curiae, normally with 
the permission of the court.2231 In any case, the courts may reject a prosecutor’s 
dismissal motion for several reasons, including when dismissal is contrary to the 
public interest and, which in turn includes victims’ considerations.2232 Fourth, 
concerning plea bargains, some states provide victims the state constitutional or 
statutory right to confer with the prosecution and others allow victims to be 
heard by the court prior to the court’s decision on plea bargain and the 
 
2222 People v. Wyner, 270 Misc. 673, 142 N.Y.S.2d 393 (County Court, Westchester County, 1955) 
2223 Juan Cardenas, ’The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process’ (1986) 9 Harvard Journal of 
Law & Public Policy 357, 381. 
2224 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 323. 
2225 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (h).  
2226 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 373. See also United States v. Sacane, 2007 WL 451666 (D. 
Conn. 2007). 
2227 Exceptions are, e.g., South Carolina Constitution, article I, § 24; Oregon Revised Statute, § 
135.857. 
2228 See Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 374; State ex rel. Hilbig v. McDonald, 839 S.W.2d 854 
(Tex. 1992).  
2229 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 401. 
2230 E.g., Arizona Revised Statute § 8-290.09.  
2231 People v. Michael M., 475 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y.Co. Ct. 1984). 
2232 See Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 405; United States v. Cowan 524 F.2D 504 (5th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. Biddings 416 F. Supp. 673 (D. III. 1976). 
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consultation with the prosecutor can be advisory or mandatory. 2233 Although the 
victim has no statutory right in any jurisdiction to veto a plea offer extended by 
the prosecutor to the defendant, some courts have acknowledged the important 
role that victims may play in the plea negotiation process 2234     
 
3.1.3. French Inquisitorial System  
For some crimes referred to as complainant offences, filing a complaint is an 
essential condition. Moreover, according to article 2 of the CPP, criminal 
prosecution cannot only be initiated by the public prosecutor but also by the 
victim as a private prosecutor and this can summon the accused to appear in 
court. Nevertheless, after the victim has started the criminal proceedings, the 
public prosecutor has to take over,2235 and actually cannot bring private action 
concerning all punishable acts.2236  
Pre-Trial proceedings can be broadly speaking divided into two 
procedural stages: investigation/prosecution and instruction préparatoire 
(preparing instruction, judicial investigation or ‘information’).2237 The victim 
lacks an official role during the preliminary investigation stage.2238 However, like 
anyone else, (s)he has the right to report the crime, in which case the report is 
called a plainte, but even the police is not obligated to inform him/her of the 
progress of the proceedings.2239 Although the victims cannot control the acts 
during the preliminary investigation, the victims can control the ensuing 
proceedings, which is reflected in the possibility to lodge an appeal with the 
General Prosecutor if, following his report, it is decided to close the case without 
further action, with the possibility that he instructs the Prosecutor of the 
 
2233 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 422. For mandatory consultation see, e.g., Michigan Compiled 
Laws 780.756 § 6.(3).  
2234 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 422. As for case law, see Mckenzie v. Risley 842 F.2d 1525 (9th 
Cir. 1988); State of Oregon v. McDonnell 794 P.2d 780 (Or. 1990). 
2235 Laurent-Atthalin, Cass. 8 December 1906, D.P. 1907, I, 207. Cited by Brienen and Hoegen 
(2000) 321. 
2236 The victim can only do so, if the crime does not require a judicial investigation by the 
Instructing Judge, which means that the victim is not permitted to prosecute felonies. See CCP, 
articles 388, 392, 531 and 551. 
2237 Dervieux (2008) 234-235. 
2238 Ibid., 238. The investigation stage is opened following the reporting of an offence, a victim’s 
complaint or the findings of the Police or Public Prosecutor. This stage differs according to 
whether it takes place in the case of a délit (or exceptionally contravention) or as for a crime, in 
which case it is obligatory. Ibid., 234.   
2239 Dervieux (2002) 238.  
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Republic to initiate a prosecution.2240 Be that as it may, once a prosecution has 
been formally instituted, the victim plays a more important role as (s)he is 
informed by the public prosecutor if the case is dropped;2241 reparation for 
damage to him/her may be a condition for dropping the case; and (s)he plays a 
major role in the mediation process.2242 Furthermore, a victim may become a 
civil party by filing a complaint before the investigating judge, or directly 
summon the accused before the tribunal de police or the tribunal 
correctionnel.2243  
During the preparing instruction or judicial investigation, which is 
designed to bring the case to a point where it can be tried,2244 the civil party has 
specific rights. First, (s)he can be questioned by the investigating judge or be 
confronted with the accused only in presence of his/her lawyer.2245 Second, in the 
course of the instruction or judicial investigation, the parties, i.e., including the 
civil party, may file with the investigating judge a written and reasoned 
application: to be heard or interrogated, to hear a witness, to obtain a 
confrontation or an inspection of the scene of the offence, to order one of the 
other parties to disclose an element useful for the instruction, or for any other 
step to be taken which seems to them necessary for the discovery of the truth.2246 
Concerning visits to places, the hearing of a witness or another civil party or an 
interrogation of the person under judicial examination, the civil party has the 
right that this be done in the presence of his/her lawyer.2247 The civil party can 
demand an expert’s assessment, in particular a medical or psychological 
report.2248 In case the judge does not wish to comply with the request, motivation 
is required.2249  
Third, the civil party has the right to be notified of all important 
procedural actions and decisions,2250 i.e., the victim is informed from his/her first 
 
2240 CPP, article 40-3. 
2241 Ibid., article 40-1. 
2242 Dervieux (2002) 238-239. 
2243 Ibid., 239. 
2244 The instruction is compulsory in the case of crimes and has as main objectives to seek that an 
offence has been committed, to discover the perpetrator if not known or to verify the basis of the 
accusation against an individual. See Dervieux (2002) 239.  
2245 CPP, article 114.  
2246 Ibid., article 82-1.  
2247 Ibid., article 82-2. 
2248 Ibid., article 82. 
2249 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 320. 
2250 CPP, articles 89, 183 and 186. 
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hearing of the several rights to be used during the instruction préparatoire.2251 
The investigating judge is obligated to inform the civil party, without any 
condition, every six months in cases of crimes against persons or crimes against 
property accompanied by attacks against persons.2252 The victim should be 
notified of decisions on renvoi, indictment, and decisions against which the civil 
party can exercise a remedy.2253 However, the civil party can no longer be 
informed of the release motions from the suspect placed in provisional 
detention.2254 The civil party has to be informed at any time that the individual 
under instruction is subject to a judicial control accompanied of the prohibition 
to receive, meet or be in relation with the victim in any manner.2255  
Fourth, (s)he has the right to be informed of the time and place of the 
trial.2256 Fifth, the public prosecutor is obligated to summon all those constituted 
civil parties during the pre-trial stage to appear in court.2257 Sixth, as a party to 
the proceedings, the civil party may appeal any investigating judge’s decision 
provided that this interferes with his/her civil interests,2258 as  detailed later.2259 
However, the civil party cannot appeal against orders concerning custody or 
conditions of bail.2260 In addition to the rights explicitly provided in the CPP, the 
civil party can submit his/her own evidence, which has been favored in case law 
as civil parties are authorized to submit evidence obtained disloyally, even in an 
illicit manner.2261 The Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation accepts its 
admissibility demanding only that the evidence can lead to a contradictory 
discussion.2262   
During the instruction or judicial investigation stage, civil parties’ 
control is materialized via the possibility to control the duration of the 
instruction as (s)he can ask the investigating judge to adjourn information, 
 
2251 Ibid., article 89-1. 
2252 Ibid., article 90-1. 
2253 Ibid., article 183.  
2254 The previous article 148-2 of the CPP was derogated by law n° 93-1013, 24 August 1993. See 
Pignoux (2008) 288, footnote 200. 
2255 CPP, article 138-1. 
2256 Ibid., article 391. 
2257 Ibid., article 420. 
2258 Ibid., articles 81, 82, 87 and 186.  
2259 See infra Chapter IV 6.1.3.  
2260 CPP, article 186. 
2261 Pignoux (2008) 294. 
2262 Crim., 30 March 1999, Bull. crim. n° 59; Procédures, 1999, com. n° 215, note J. Buisson; D., 
2000, pp. 391-394, note T. Garé; Crim., 19 January 1999, Bull. crim. n° 9; J.C.P., 1999, II, 10156, 
note D. Rebut; Dr. Pénal, 1999, com. n° 24, note C. Marsat. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 294.   
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either by sending it or via introducing it through the indictment before the 
judgment jurisdiction.2263 In addition to appealing the investigating judge’s 
decisions, detailed later, the civil party can raise nullities.2264 With regard to the 
civil party’s role during the hearings before the investigating judge, (s)he can 
oppose the publicity of the debates before the Chamber de l’instruction 
concerning provisional detention, or to proceed to a control hearing of the whole 
proceedings.2265 The civil party or his/her lawyer can oppose the publicity if, inter 
alia, this is of a nature to hinder the specific investigations needed by the 
instruction or affects the dignity of the person.2266 The civil party has an exclusive 
right to dispose of the publicity at any time and (s)he is equally entitled to ask 
that the judgment hearing be closed.2267   
The civil party can ask a lawyer to be appointed during the beginning of 
the proceedings.2268 This also can take place before the investigating judge when 
this is informed by the victims that they want to become civil parties and request 
the appointment of a lawyer.2269 The civil party’s lawyer has the right to be 
present during his/her client’s hearings or confrontations unless the civil party 
has explicitly renounced it.2270 The consultation of the dossier takes place 
between the end of the instruction and the hearing date.2271 The assistance of a 
lawyer is crucial since civil parties without lawyers cannot directly access the 
dossier as determined by the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation,2272 
which has been found by the ECtHR to be in conformity with article 6 (1) of the 
ECHR.2273 In addition to access to the dossier, the civil party’s lawyer can be 
present during visits to places, the hearing of a witness or another civil party or 
an interrogation of the person under judicial examination.2274 Nevertheless, the 
investigating iudge can oppose the presence of the lawyer via a motivated 
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2263 CPP, articles 89-1 and 175-1. 
2264 Ibid., articles 170 and 173.  
2265 See respectively Ibid., articles 199 and 221-3. 
2266 Ibid., article 706-73.  
2267 Pignoux (2008) 298. 
2268 CPP, article 40-4. 
2269 Ibid., article 80-3. 
2270 Ibid., article 114. 
2271 Ibid., article 197. 
2272 See, e.g., Crim., 12 June 1996, Bull. crim. n° 248; R.S.C., 1996, p. 878, obs. J.-P Dintilhac (the 
exclusion comprises consulting the dossier or delivering copies of a piece of the dossier). Cited by 
Pignoux (2008) 290. 
2273 ECtHR, Menet v. France, App. No. 39553/02, Judgment, 14 June 2005, paras. 43-53. 
2274 CPP, article 82-2. 
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decision.2275 It should be finally added that in Slimani  v. France, the ECtHR 
determined that the dead victim’s relatives should be involved in the 
investigation without necessarily being civil parties.2276 
 
3.2. The ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL 
As already mentioned, victims lack the status of victim participants or civil 
parties at these courts. Accordingly, victims as such do not have a proper 
participatory standing in the pre-trial proceedings.2277 A manner to ‘participate’ 
and knock on the door at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL so that these courts 
pay attention to special interests of victims, has been by directly contacting the 
Office of the Prosecutor, which has been done by, for example, some human 
rights NGOs (via letters).2278 For instance, the Coalition for Women’s Human 
Rights in Conflict Situations requested Prosecutor’s attention for sexual violence 
crimes in Slobodan Milošević and Muvunyi at the ICTY and the ICTR 
respectively.2279   
In Milošević, Prosecutor Del Ponte informed the Coalition that charges 
of sexual violence, not originally included in the Croatia and Kosovo 
indictments, have been incorporated, and in the later Bosnia indictment, 
Milošević was also charged with sexual violence crimes.2280 In Muvunyi, the 
Coalition asked the Prosecutor to reconsider his decision to withdraw the rape 
charges, which was denied by the Prosecutor due to potential witnesses’ refusal 
to testify.2281 However, the Prosecution’s motion to drop rape charges was 
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2275 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
2276 ECtHR, Slimani v. France, 27 July 2004, para. 47. See also Ochoa (2013) 123-124. 
2277 It may be noticed that during the investigation, like any other criminal forum, the Prosecution 
has to gather information and, hence, the Prosecutor ‘can summon and question […] victims and 
witnesses and record their statements, collect evidence and conduct on-site investigations to decide 
whether to indict individuals’. ICTY RPE, rule 39 (i). See also ICTR RPE, rule 39 (i); SCSL RPE, 
rule 39 (i). Therefore, surviving victims or family members of victims killed constitute an 
important source of information as witnesses.    
2278 See Brouwer (2005) 298-301.
2279 As for Milošević, see Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, Letter to 
Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor, Regarding the Urgent Need to Include Charges of Sexual Violence in 
the Indictment against Milošević, 14 August 2001. As for Muvunyi, see Coalition for Women’s 
Human Rights in Conflict Situations, Letter to Prosecutor Hassan Jallow, 8 February 2005. Letters 
referred to by Brouwer (2005) 299.    
2280 Milošević (IT-01-50-I), Indictment (Croatia), 8 October 2001; Milošević et al. (IT-99-37-PT), 
Second Amended Indictment (Kosovo), 29 October 2001; Milošević (IT-01-51-I), Indictment 
(Bosnia), 22 November 2001. 
2281 Letter from Dr. Alex Obote-Odora, Special Assistant to the Prosecutor, to Ms. Brunet, 11 
February 2005. Letter referred to by Brouwer (2005) 299. 
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rejected by the Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor had to continue with those 
charges.2282 Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess the impact of the Coalition’s 
correspondence.2283 Be that as it may, approaching the Prosecutor may constitute 
a way for victims, without being witnesses, to (indirectly) ‘participate’ in the pre-
trial stage.     
 
3.3. The ICC  
3.3.1. Preliminary Considerations 
Victims cannot initiate ICC proceedings.2284 However, similar to other 
individuals and organizations, victims can in a limited manner be complainants, 
i.e., under article 15 of the ICC Statute victims may submit communications to 
the Prosecutor concerning potential situations and cases under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, which has been characterized by the ICC as the first instance when 
victims can participate.2285 The Prosecutor is obligated to evaluate all materials 
received.2286 After a preliminary examination thereof, the Prosecutor shall decide 
whether to authorize the beginning of an investigation or seek authorization 
from the Pre-Trial Chamber to commence an investigation and then 
prosecution. As mentioned earlier, besides victim participation sensu stricto, i.e., 
upon being granted the status of victim participant under article 68 (3), the ICC 
Statute explicitly provides for two other forms of victim’s participation. The first 
of these forms is when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu as 
laid down in article 15 (3) of the ICC Statute: 
 
If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for 
authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material 
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2282 Muvunyi (ICTR-2000-55A-PT), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Indictment, Trial Chamber, 23 February 2005, paras. 28-31 and 34. 
2283 Brouwer (2005) 301.   
2284 It may be added that the fact that victims cannot trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction, unlike the 
situation in national criminal proceedings, does not mean to renounce the ICC’s jurisdiction but it 
constitutes a reasonable margin for states’ action so that these can adapt and amend their internal 
law and also to update their judicial apparatus and Public Ministries’ techniques. See Elizabeth 
Salmón Gárate and Giovanna García, ‘El Procedimiento Ante la Corte Penal Internacional’ (2005) 
3 Ius Inter Gentes 16, 20-21.   
2285 ICC, Report of the Court to the Assembly of States Parties on the Strategy in Relation to 
Victims, No. ICC-ASP/8/45, 18-26 November 2009, pp. 2 and 4; Office of the Prosecutor, Policy 
Paper on Victims’ Participation under Article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, April 2010, p. 8.  
2286 ICC Statute, article 53 (1).  
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collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
 
When the Prosecutor is seeking authorization of an investigation and 
once the victims known to the Prosecutor or to the VWU have been notified by 
the Prosecutor,2287 victims may make representations by writing to the 
competent Pre-Trial Chamber, which possesses the discretion to ask any 
additional information from the victims who made representations and may also 
consider it necessary to have a hearing so as to hear their views and concerns.2288 
Although article 15 (3) does not include the condition according to which the 
victims’ personal interests must be affected unlike article 68 (3),2289 Pre-Trial 
Chamber I considered that the victims’ personal interests are affected in general 
during the investigation,2290 as examined later. In the Kenya situation, the first 
investigation initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu, Pre-Trial Chamber II 
adopted some measures oriented to give a limited participation bearing in mind 
the need to guarantee swift proceedings.2291 Also, Pre-Trial Chamber II 
considered article 15 together with article 53 (initiation of an investigation) and 
in conducting the admissibility assessment, i.e., complementarity and gravity, it 
considered victims’ representations to back up its findings.2292 Therefore, the 
impact of the crimes on and the harm caused to victims and their families was 
considered as a factor when examining the gravity threshold.2293 Moreover, the 
victims’ representations led Pre-Trial Chamber II to broaden the temporal scope 
of investigation beyond the Prosecutor’s original request.2294 In the Ivory Coast 
situation, the second investigation initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu, 
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2287 ICC RPE, rules 50 (1), (4) and 92 (2). 
2288 Ibid., rules 50 (3) and (4).  
2289 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEn-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 62. 
2290 Ibid., para. 63. 
2291 Pre-Trial Chamber I asked the VPRS to: i) identify community leaders of the affected groups to 
act on behalf of victims who may want to make representations, i.e., collective representation; ii) 
receive victims’ representations, collective or individual; iii) examine whether the conditions under 
rule 85 have been met; and iv) summarize victims’ representations into a consolidated report with 
the original representations annexed thereto. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-
4), Order to the Victims Participation and Reparations Section Concerning Victims’ 
Representations Pursuant to Article 15 (3) of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 10 
December 2009, paras. 5-9.   
2292 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-19), Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 March 2010, paras. 62, 186 (footnote 273) and 196.  
2293 Ibid., para. 62. 
2294 Ibid., paras. 203-207. 
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victims’ representations were also requested by Pre-Trial Chamber III under 
article 15 (3) and provided accordingly.2295 It should be mentioned that although 
to participate under article 15 (3) no application for formal victim participant 
status is required, the VPRS (following Pre-Trial Chambers’ requests) conducts 
assessments of whether the requirements under rule 85 (definition of victims) 
are met.2296   
The second form, under the ICC Statute, whereby victims without 
holding the formal victim participant status can participate during pre-trial 
consists in submission of observations on the question of jurisdiction and 
admissibility according to article 19 (3). This is examined later.2297    
Lastly, but equally important, it should be mentioned that when 
discussing victims’ modalities of participation/procedural rights across the 
different procedural stages, some of them are already established under the ICC 
RPE. Thus, victims who have been granted the victim participant status can 
make opening and closing statements;2298 victims’ legal representatives may 
attend and participate in the proceedings according to the terms set by the 
competent Chamber;2299 victims’ legal representatives may question witnesses, 
experts and the accused upon Chamber’s leave and subject to the Chamber’s 
control;2300 and victims’ right to notification.2301 In addition to these specific 
provisions, each Chamber possesses discretion to determine how the ‘views and 
concerns’ of the victims are to be presented, including the exact scope and 
conditions of any intervention,2302 according to article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, 
as will be seen in this and the subsequent subchapters.            
 
3.3.2. Victims’ Participation During the Investigation Stage of a Situation  
3.3.2.1. Presentation  
With regard to the victim participant status and participation sensu stricto, 
article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute is unclear about whether victim participants’ 
 
2295 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (ICC-02/11-14), Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Côte d'Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 3 October 2011, para. 8.  
2296 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-17-Corr-Red), Public Redacted Version Of 
Corrigendum to the Report on Victims' Representations (ICC-01/09-17-Conf-Exp-Corr) and 
annexes 1 and 5, VPRS, 29 March 2010, para. 23. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1315.  
2297 See infra Chapter IV 3.3.3.1.  
2298 ICC RPE, rule 89 (1).  
2299 Ibid., rule 91 (2). 
2300 Ibid., rule 91 (3).  
2301 Ibid., rule 92.  
2302 Catani (2012) 910. 
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legal status is applicable in the investigation stage of a situation,2303 i.e., before the 
Prosecutor accuses someone. A situation is specific in pre-trial proceedings as 
the Prosecutor collects, examines evidence and manages the attendance and 
questioning of suspects, victims and witnesses to decide whether to prosecute.2304 
Pre-Trial Chamber I in its seminal decision on victims’ participation in the DRC 
Situation extended victims’ right to participate during the investigation stage, 
which has as remarked by Schabas promoted ‘a procedural model derived from 
the continental legal system whereby victims participate actively as parties in the 
criminal trial’.2305 Pre-Trial Chamber I reached its decision based upon three 
arguments.    
First, as for a terminological argument, the Chamber concluded that the 
term ‘proceedings’ does not necessarily exclude the investigation stage of a 
situation, and ‘on the contrary, a number of provisions include the stage of 
investigation of a situation within the meaning of the term “la procédure”’.2306 
Second, as for a contextual argument, the Chamber found that even though 
article 68 (3) is placed in the ‘Trial’ section of the ICC Statute, it does not specify 
a stage of proceedings for victim’s participation, i.e., there is no explicit exclusion 
of the investigation stage from the scope of application of article 68 (3) on 
victim’s participation.2307 Third, as for a teleological argument, the ICC found the 
application of article 68 (3) to the investigation phase to be consistent with the 
object and purpose of the participation regime for victims set by the ICC Statute 
drafters, especially considering ‘the context of the growing emphasis placed on 
the role of victims by the international body of human rights law and by 
international humanitarian law’.2308 The IACtHR and the ECtHR case law was 
mentioned to support the Chamber’s conclusion of permitting victims’ 
participation before a suspect is named, as part of the victim’s right to participate 
 
2303 ‘Situations’ are ‘generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some cases personal 
parameters, such as the situation in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1 July 
2002’. Situation in DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 65. Each situation 
generates individual cases.   
2304 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (3rd edn., Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 249. 
2305 Schabas (2010) 827. 
2306 Situation in DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 38. 
2307 Two additional considerations were: i) the existence of an explicit reference to investigation 
under article 68 (1) as for protection of victims and witnesses; and ii) that rule 92 (Notification to 
victims and their legal representatives) cannot limit victim’s participation to the stages mentioned 
explicitly. See Situation in DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, paras. 45 and 47-49.      
2308 Ibid., para. 50. 
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in the fight against impunity.2309 It should be, however, mentioned that these 
cases were not actually relevant to the victims’ right to participate during the 
investigation in a direct manner. Thus, ECtHR cases, cited by Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, establish that the victim has a right to have the conduct of criminal 
proceedings within a reasonable time where victims were in the first place 
permitted to join criminal proceedings via civil claims.2310   
Concerning the relation between victim’s participation during the 
investigation stage of a situation and the obligation not ‘to be prejudicial or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial’ under 
article 68 (3), it was concluded that victim’s participation at this stage ‘does not 
per se jeopardize the appearance of integrity and objectivity of the investigation, 
nor is it inherently inconsistent with basic considerations of efficiency and 
security’.2311 Furthermore, Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded that victims’ personal 
interests are ‘affected in general at the investigation stage, since the participation 
at this stage can serve to clarify the facts, to punish perpetrators of crimes and to 
request reparations for the harm suffered’.2312 It was envisaged that the 
modalities of victims’ participation during the investigation phase would include 
several proceedings relating to preservation of evidence, protective measures and 
investigations in general.2313 Since there is no explicit reference to victims’ 
participation during the investigation stage of a situation in the ICC Statute and 
RPE, Pre-Trial Chamber I determined that victims may: i) present their views 
and concerns; ii) file documents; iii) access to public documents; and iv) request 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to order specific measures.2314  
 
3.3.2.2. Legal Discussion  
Whether the decision adopted by Pre-Trial Chamber I was and to what extent 
appropriate is examined as follows. As a matter of principle, this decision serves 
restorative justice and was praised by victims’ advocates as a landmark 
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2309 Ibid., paras. 51-53. 
2310 Cases cited included ECtHR, Perez v. France, Appl. No. 47287/99, Judgment, 12 February 2004; 
ECtHR, Acquaviva v. France, Appl. No. 19248/91, Judgment, 21 November 1995. As for the 
IACtHR cases, unlike the national jurisdictions which provide cases for the IACtHR’s docket, the 
ICC does not permit victims to persist on or to begin prosecutions if the Prosecutor declines to do 
so. Indeed, the ICC Statute drafters did not contemplate the possibility of private prosecutions for 
victims. For further discussion on this point see McGonigle Leyh (2011) 269-270. 
2311 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 57. 
2312 Ibid., para. 63. See also Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-111-Corr), 14 December 2007, 
paras 11 and 14.  
2313 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, paras. 71, 73 and 74.  
2314 Ibid., para. 42.        
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decision.2315 Victims’ personal interests may be affected as early as during the 
investigation and, hence, their participation during it seems to be coherent with 
a restorative goal.2316 Victims’ role at the investigation stage of a situation may 
have a very important impact on the heart of the ICC’s substantive jurisdiction. 
Moreover, victims’ interests as such should not be the sole factor to be 
considered by the ICC when deciding on their admission during this early stage. 
Victims’ active participation is important to guarantee the viability of a further 
process. Their voices influence whether there is a reasonable basis for 
investigation and a sufficient basis for prosecuting individual(s) for specific 
crimes. As said, the ICC recognized that victims’ participation during the 
investigation can serve to clarify the facts, to sanction offenders and to claim 
reparations.2317 Victims’ participation also enhances the legitimacy of criminal 
justice.2318 This is coherent with a restorative justice paradigm which focuses on 
social dimensions of the crime, i.e., not only harm inflicted to victims or 
perpetrators but also interpersonal relationships and the community.2319 
Therefore, victims’ participation at this stage is in principle justified. However, 
some criticism, which is similar to the Prosecution grounds when this appealed 
the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision, is examined as follows.2320  
First, the creation of unrealistic expectations about victims’ role at the 
investigation stage of a situation is inconsistent with a restorative justice 
approach. Indeed, for example, the first six victims granted participation during 
the DRC situation had very limited participation later on. Moreover, once the 
proceedings reached the pre-trial stage of the case in Lubanga, the six victims 
failed to meet the criteria required to obtain victim participant status in the case 
since their harms were not linked to the charges against Lubanga.2321 Indeed, 
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2315 See, e.g., Statement of Mr. Antoine Bernard, International Federation for Human Rights, 
Second Public Hearing of the Office of the Prosecutor, Session 2: NGOs and Other Experts, The 
Hague, 26 September 2006.    
2316 American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office (2007) 42.  
2317 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 63. 
2318 Doak (2008) 117.  
2319 Zehr (1990) 184. 
2320 See Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-103), Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-
Trial Chamber I’s ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, 
VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, and VPRS6’, 23 January 2006, paras. 10, 13-22. See also Situation 
in Uganda (ICC-02/04-103), Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on 
Victims’ Application for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 
and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, 20 August 2007, paras. 13-14. See also American University 
Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office (2007) 44-49; Vasiliev (2009) 646-648.  
2321 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-172-tEN), 29 June 2006.  
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Pre-Trial Chamber I did not seem to regard the extension of article 68 (3) to the 
investigation as necessarily serving a restorative function as it in a later decision 
described the system of participation provided in its seminal decision as ‘very 
limited’.2322 Also, without having been afforded the status of victims under article 
68 (3), victims can still submit written observations when the Prosecutor seeks 
authorization for a proprio motu investigation (article 15 (3)), and also to submit 
observations in jurisdiction and admissibility hearings (article 19 (3)). 
Additionally, all victims who communicate with the ICC are entitled to notice 
concerning the Prosecutor’s decisions not to proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution.2323 Hence, victims would not in principle seem to lose a meaningful 
participatory right if the ICC does not extend the application of article 68 (3) to 
the investigation stage of a situation. Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chambers’ 
original position proved to be problematic as even though victims would obtain 
the victim participant status, they would subsequently be denied participatory 
rights during particular proceedings leading to victims’ disappointment about 
the participatory system.2324  
Second, the application of article 68 (3) to the investigation stage of a 
situation may raise some tension with the ICC’s responsibility to guarantee 
efficient and fair proceedings. The ICC’s practice has so far shown that the ICC 
lacks efficiency responding victims’ requests to participate. Lengthy waiting 
periods have been present across different situations at the ICC. This increases 
the risk of frustrating victims’ expectations and may eventually lead to a sort of 
‘secondary victimization’, which was precisely sought to be prevented via the 
ICC participation model.2325 In addition, the mere consideration of potentially 
thousands of applications imposes a very heavy burden on the ICC’s scarce 
resources. The resulting backlog experienced by the ICC,2326 due to a growing 
number of victims applying for participation plus some serious practical trouble 
already faced by the ICC when trying to handle its policy of victims’ 
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2322 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-135), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to 
Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of 17 January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 31 
March 2006, para. 47.   
2323 ICC Statute, article 53; ICC RPE, rule 92 (2). 
2324 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 273. 
2325 Vasiliev (2008) 647.  
2326 For example, just by January 2008, more than 150 victims had been applied for participation in 
the situation in the DRC, with waiting period towards the initial decision above 15 months. See 
American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, Interlocutory 
Appellate Review of Early Decisions by the International Criminal Court (2008) 4, 41, 42.     
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participation during the investigation stage of a situation are, hence, factors not 
to be disregarded.  
Third, such participation could potentially jeopardize the Prosecutor’s 
independence and his/her duty to establish the truth.2327 At the same time, it 
should be recalled that during the investigation there is yet no suspect or accused 
to defend his/her rights and victims’ participation may eventually affect the 
rights of future suspects or accused.   
It has also been proposed to de-link victims’ participation during this 
stage from article 68 (3) on the ground that victims would have a better 
understanding of their rights during an investigation and would be aware of the 
potential to increase those rights over time once suspects are arrested and, hence, 
decrease the high risk of getting frustrated, present in the scheme for their 
participation in the investigation under article 68 (3).2328 Making it clear that 
victims mainly just need to communicate with the ICC at this stage has been 
claimed to notably ‘ease the burden of the current victim participation scheme 
on the Chambers and the parties’.2329    
Bearing in mind these and similar difficulties and criticism, the regime 
of victim participation during the investigation stage has been revisited. It should 
first be mentioned that Pre-Trial Chambers deciding the situations in Uganda, 
the DRC and Darfur followed the first decision on victims’ participation in the 
DRC situation, concluding that victims hold a general right to participate in the 
investigations.2330 However, the Appeals Chamber in 2008 decided, two years 
after the first decision on victims’ participation in the DRC situation, to grant the 
Prosecutor’s motion to appeal the decisions on the DRC and Darfur situations 
agreeing partially with him. Those Pre-Trial Chamber decisions concluded that 
victim participants could present their views and concerns and file documents 
regardless of the conduct of specific judicial proceedings within the 
investigation. The Appeals Chamber reversed these decisions by considering 
that:  
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2327 ICC Statute, article 54 (1) (a). See also Jérôme De Hemptinne and Francesco Rindi, ‘ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber Allows Victims to Participate in the Investigation Phase of the Proceedings’ (2006) 
2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 342, 347. 
2328 American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office (2007) 49.  
2329 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
2330 Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-101), 10 August 2007; Situation in the DRC (ICC-02/04-423), 
Décision sur les Demandes de Participation à la Procédure Deposées dans le Cadre de l’Enquête en 
Republique Démocratique du Congo par a/0004/06 et al., Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 December 2007, 
paras. 4 and 5; Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-111-Corr), 14 December 2007, pp. 3-5, 22-
23, paras. 45-47.  
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The article of the Statute that confers power upon a victim to participate in any 
proceedings is article 68 (3) [...] participation can take place only within the 
context of judicial proceedings. Article 68 (3) of the Statute correlates victim 
participation to ‘proceedings’, a term denoting a judicial cause pending before a 
Chamber. In contrast, an investigation is not a judicial proceeding but an 
inquiry conducted by the Prosecutor into the commission of a crime with a view 
to bringing to justice those deemed responsible.2331    
 
Since article 42 (1) of the ICC Statute vests the Prosecutor with the 
authority for the conduct of investigations, the Appeals Chamber concluded that 
a victim’s general right to participate in the  investigation ‘would necessarily 
contravene the Statute by reading into it a power outside its ambit and remit’.2332 
In any case, the Appeals Chamber left clear that victims are not precluded from 
seeking participation in any judicial proceedings, proceedings affecting 
investigations included, as far as ‘their personal interests are affected by the 
issues arising for resolution’.2333 Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Kenya situation 
adopted the Appeals Chamber’s approach as the applicants were asked to link 
their requests to participate with an issue constitutive of the subject-matter of the 
judicial proceedings.2334 Also, following the Appeals Chamber’s guidance, Pre-
Trial Chamber I issued a decision establishing a new framework for victims in 
the DRC situation and, thus, it ruled that they could participate at the 
investigation stage of a situation, only within the context of judicial 
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2331 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-556), Judgment on Victim Participation in the Investigation 
Stage of the Proceedings in the Appeal of the OPCD against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 
7 December 2007 and in the Appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, Appeals Chamber, 19 December 2008, para. 45. See also 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/03-177), Judgment on Victim Participation in the 
Investigation Stage of the Proceedings in the Appeal of the OPCD against the Decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of 3 December 2007 and in the Appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 6 December 2007, Appeals Chamber, 2 February 2009, para. 
45.     
2332 Situation in DRC (ICC-01/04-556), 19 December 2008, para. 52. 
2333 Ibid., para. 56. 
2334 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-24), Decision on Victims’ Participation in 
Proceedings Related to the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 3 November 
2010, para. 16. 



proceedings.2335 The same went true in later decisions in the Libya and Uganda 
situations.2336  
The Pre-Trial Chambers noticed that the ICC Statute and RPE envisage 
various judicial proceedings at the situation including those connected to: i) 
review by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed 
with an investigation or prosecution (article 53); ii) preservation of evidence or 
the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses (article 57 (3) (c)); and iii) 
preservation of evidence in the context of a unique investigative opportunity 
(article 56 (3)).2337 Accordingly, victims can participate in such judicial 
proceedings provided that they demonstrate that their interests are affected.2338 It 
was also noted that, under rule 93, the Chamber may seek the views of victims or 
their legal representatives on any issue and, hence, victims may also participate 
in judicial proceedings by presenting their views at the investigation stage of a 
situation.2339 
Thus, these Pre-Trial Chambers adopted the casuistic approach when 
determining article 68 (3) applications. This approach adopted by the Appeals 
Chamber and implemented by Pre-Trial Chambers I and II is found here as a 
better option concerning the investigation stage of a situation based on two 
reasons.2340 First, as for the ICC Statute legal regime, under the previous 
approach, the consideration of a whole stage of the proceedings, i.e., the 
investigation stage of a situation, in application of article 68 (3) and considering 
under this approach that personal interests are affected by a whole stage would 
arguably deprive the effects of the ‘personal interests’ provision. Second, as for 
victims, the previous approach was grounded on a somehow contradictory basis 
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2335 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-593), Decision on Victims’ Participation in Proceedings 
Relating to the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 April 
2011, para. 9.    
2336 Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-191), 9 March 2012, para 10; Situation in Libya (ICC-01/11-
18), Decision on Victim's Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation in Libya, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 24 January 2012, p. 4.    
2337 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-593), 11 April 2011, para 10; Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya (ICC-01/09-24), 3 November 2010, para. 12; Situation in Libya (ICC-01/11-18), 24 January 
2012, p. 3; Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-191), 9 March 2012, para. 12.  
2338 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-593), 11 April 2011, para 10; Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya (ICC-01/09-24), 3 November 2010, para. 12; Situation in Libya (ICC-01/11-18), 24 January 
2012, p. 3; Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-191), 9 March 2012, para. 12.  
2339 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-593), 11 April 2011, para 10; Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya (ICC-01/09-24), 3 November 2010, para. 12; Situation in Libya (ICC-01/11-18), 24 January 
2012, p. 3; Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-191), 9 March 2012, para. 12.  
2340 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 273. 
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since although victims were granted a general participatory right to participate in 
the investigation, they could later be deprived of participatory rights in particular 
proceedings. Such an outcome could raise questions about the real practical 
benefits of a victim’s general right to participate in the entire investigation as 
well as some frustration and disappointment among victim participants.2341 In 
conclusion, victims’ participation in the investigation stage of a situation is 
considered as advisable but limited to judicial proceedings within this stage and 
not as a general right for the entire stage. 
           
3.3.3. Victims’ Participation During the Pre-Trial Stage of a Case 
3.3.3.1. Modalities of Participation/Procedural Rights 
Once a suspect is singled out upon the expedition of an arrest warrant or a 
summons to appear,2342 the pre-trial stage of a case begins. The ICC in its arrest 
warrants issued has not referred to the victims being heard concerning the 
Prosecutor’s applications for the arrest warrants. Indeed, as the arrest warrants 
are normally issued under seal, victims’ participation in related hearings is 
unlikely. Therefore, victims have been excluded from participation in arrest 
warrant proceedings.2343 This can lead to some negative outcomes for victims as 
evidenced in Lubanga where victims were frustrated when they knew of the 
narrow charges brought against Lubanga in the arrest warrant, about which they 
lacked any opportunity to influence directly.2344 Concerning the initial 
appearance of the suspect(s), Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge) in Ruto et al. 
denied the participation of victim applicants as they can only exercise their rights 
under article 68 (3) once granted victim participant status and, even then, their 
participation would not have been appropriate at this specific moment of the 
proceedings because this would go beyond the scope and purpose of initial 
appearance as defined by the ICC Statute and RPE, which consists in informing 
the suspects of the charges and their rights under the ICC Statute.2345     
 
2341 See also Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2342 ICC Statute, article 58 (Issuance by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant of arrest or a summons 
to appear). 
2343 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-43), Decision on a Request for Leave to Appeal, 
Pre-Trial Chamber III, 11 February 2011, paras. 9 and 13. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 
1320. 
2344 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 274. 
2345 Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-14), Decision on the Motion by Legal Representative of Victim 
Applicants to Participate in Initial Appearance Proceedings, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 
30 March 2011, para. 6. See also ICC Statute, article 60 (1) and ICC RPE, rule 121 (1).   


As for modalities of victims’ participation during the pre-trial stage of a 
case, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) in its seminal decision in Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui adopted a systematic approach, consisting of a clear 
determination of the set of procedural rights for victims granted the right to 
participate in order to make their participation meaningful and not merely 
symbolic.2346 For participation in the pre-trial stage of a case, in particular and 
including the confirmation of charges, the specific procedural rights for victim 
participation were divided into six groups,2347 which based on the principle of 
proportionality,2348  
 
[…] can be limited by the Chamber propio motu, or at the request of the parties, 
the Registry or any other participant, if it is shown that the relevant limitation is 
necessary to safeguard another competing interest protected by the Statute and 
the Rules-such as national security, the physical or psychological well-being of 
victims and witnesses, or the Prosecution’s investigations.2349 
        
The analysis of and references to the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision in 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui on those six groups of procedural rights follow as 
complemented by later developments.2350 The first group of procedural rights 
consists in the access, before and during the confirmation hearing, to the case 
record, including to the evidence filed by the Prosecutor and defence under rule 
121.2351 Nevertheless, this right is limited to the format, for example, un-redacted 
versions, redacted versions or summaries, ‘in which the evidence is made 
available to the party which has not proposed it’.2352 Although this right includes 
access to all filings and decisions in the case record regardless of their 
classification as public, it does not include the access to ‘ex parte’ filings and 
decisions.2353 Access to public and closed hearings, ex parte transcripts excepted, 
is also included.2354 In any case, only the non-anonymous victims’ legal 
representatives are granted access to the confidential part of the case record and 
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2346 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras. 49 and 51.  
2347 Ibid., para. 127. In addition, it should be mentioned that in order for victims to participate, they 
and their legal representatives need to be notified of the respective decisions and proceedings. See 
ICC Rule 92.    
2348 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 148. 
2349 Ibid., para. 147.  
2350 In general, see also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 282-291; Khan and Dixon (2009) 1146-1152.  
2351 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 127. 
2352 Ibid., para. 132. 
2353 Ibid., paras. 127 and 128. 
2354 Ibid., para. 130.   
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to attend closed session hearings but are prohibited from transmitting to their 
clients copies of any document or evidence in the confidential part of the case 
record and closed session hearing transcript.2355 It was also determined that non-
anonymous victims shall not have access to the confidential part of the case 
record nor attend closed session hearings.2356 The right to be notified in the same 
manner as the Prosecution and defence of all ex parte decisions and documents 
in the case record is included;2357 however, as for anonymous victims, it was 
stated that they would only receive notification of public documents in the case 
record and public hearing sessions in order not to violate the principle of 
prohibition of anonymous accusations.2358  
Nevertheless, in Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Single Judge) found that 
both anonymous and non-anonymous victims could have access to all public 
decisions, transcripts, documents and evidence in the case record but excepted 
those ex parte or confidential.2359 As for this set of procedural rights, non-
anonymous victims’ rights were affected in Bemba since they would no longer 
have access to confidential filings and closed hearings unlike victims in Lubanga 
and Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui. However, in Ruto et al., Pre-Trial Chamber II 
(Single Judge), based on previous case law, allowed victims’ access to 
confidential decisions, fillings and evidence but determined on a case-by-case 
basis,2360 as access to all confidential material disclosed:  
 
[…] would in principle violate the exceptional nature of a request to access 
confidential material pursuant to article 68(3) of the Statute. Such requests 
should be made on the basis of specifically identified material and not with a 
view to obtaining all material on which either party intends to rely on for the 
 
2355 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-537), Decision on Limitations of Set of 
Procedural Rights for Non-Anonymous Victims, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 30 May 
2008, p. 12.  
2356 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
2357 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 129. 
2358 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-462), Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims 
a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 22 
September 2006, pp. 7 and 8.    
2359 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), 12 December 2008, paras. 103-105.  
2360 Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-340), Second Decision on the ‘Request by the Victims’ 
Representative to Access to Confidential Materials’, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 23 
September 2011, paras. 9-17. See also Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-249), 5 August 2011, para. 93.   
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purposes of the confirmation of charges hearing regardless of its pertinence to 
any issue at stake.2361  
 
In any case, making or not the distinction between anonymous and non-
anonymous victim participants, the outcome reached by the Pre-Trial Chambers 
as for anonymous victim participants is for practical effects the same, i.e., they 
cannot have access to confidential filings and close hearings.   
The second group of rights includes the rights to make submissions on 
admissibility and probative value of the evidence on which the Prosecution and 
the defence intend to rely at the confirmation of charges hearing and examine 
such evidence at this hearing.2362 In Bemba, it was found that victims’ legal 
representatives, without distinguishing between anonymous and non-
anonymous victims, may make succinct submissions to specific issues of law and 
fact provided that victims prove that their interests are affected by the issue 
under examination and that it is considered as appropriate by the Chamber.2363 
As referred to,2364 such finding is based on the approach adopted by Pre-Trial 
Chamber III (Single Judge) in Bemba, differing from the approach adopted by 
Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui and Lubanga, 
according to which ‘no differentiation is made between victims whose identity is 
known to the Defence and those for whom anonymity has been granted by the 
Chamber’ as ‘a differentiation in participatory rights should not be to the 
detriment of those requesting protective measures’.2365 Accordingly, unlike 
previous decisions, anonymous victims would hold the right to make submission 
on law and fact. In turn, in Ruto et al., Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge) 
established the possibility for anonymous victims to make submissions on the 
evidential foundation of the parties since it does not per se prejudice the 
accused’s right but decided case-by-case considering victims’ personal interests, 
the scope of the right, and fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings.2366    
The third group of procedural rights concerns examination of witnesses, 
which is applicable to non-anonymous victims who have the right to examine, 
during the confirmation hearing, any witness called by the Prosecutor or 
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2361 Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-337), Decision on the ‘Request by the Victims’ Representative for 
Access to Confidential Materials’, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 21 September 2011, para. 
10.    
2362 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 134. 
2363 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), 12 December 2008, para. 110. 
2364 See supra Chapter III 2.3.2.2.  
2365 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), 12 December 2008, para. 99. 
2366 Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-249), 5 August 2011, para. 126. 
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defence.2367 In application of the principle of prohibiting anonymous 
accusations, anonymous victim participants are deprived of this right.2368 It was 
also stated that victims should examine witnesses after the Prosecution but 
before the defence and within the time allocated by the Chamber, but victims are 
not required to file the list of questions intended to be posed prior to the 
examination of witnesses.2369 Also, in Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber I found 
that, in application of the principle of prohibiting anonymous witnesses, 
anonymous victim participants would not be entitled to examine witnesses.2370 
However, in Ruto et al., this option was left open to a case-by-case determination 
considering the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph.2371  
The fourth group of procedural rights consists in the right to attend all 
public and closed hearings leading up to and during the confirmation of charges 
hearing; however, it is not possible to attend ex parte hearings.2372 In Bemba, the 
participation was limited to attendance at public hearings.2373 Nevertheless, in 
Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) concluded that in case of holding 
parts of confirmation hearing or any other hearing in camera or ex parte, ‘it 
retains the option to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether to authorise, 
proprio motu or upon a motivated request, the Common Legal Representative to 
attend those sessions’ and also the representative ‘shall be given access to the 
transcripts of such hearings to which he/she has been authorised to attend’.2374    
The fifth group includes the rights to participate via oral motions, 
responses and submissions in all hearings to which victim participants hold the 
right to attend and in relation to all matters at which their participation has not 
been excluded by the ICC Statute and RPE, e.g., matters relating to inter-play 
disclosure or any discussion of the evidence aimed at extending the factual basis 
of the Prosecution Charging Document.2375 Although Pre-Trial Chamber I in the 
first ICC confirmation of charges hearing in Lubanga established that victims’ 
representatives during the confirmation of charges hearing could make opening 
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2367 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 137. See also 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 283. 
2368 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras, 136 and 137. 
2369 Ibid., para. 138. 
2370 Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09-136), Decision on Victims’ Modalities of Participation at the 
Pre-trial Stage of the Case, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 October 2009, paras. 23-24.   
2371 Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-249), 5 August 2011, para. 126 
2372 Ibid., para. 140.  
2373 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), 12 December 2008, para. 101. 
2374 Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-138), 4 June 2012, para. 50. 
2375 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 141; Gbagbo (ICC-
02/11-01/11-138), 4 June 2012, paras. 51-52. 
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and closing statements and also request leave to intervene during public sessions, 
they were not able to add any point of fact or any evidence or pose questions 
directly to witnesses.2376 In their opening and closing statements, victims’ legal 
representatives also may, inter alia, address any point of law, which includes the 
legal characterization of the liability modes used to charge the suspect.2377 Even 
though the victim’s right to participate does not permit him/her the right to 
extend the factual basis contained in the Prosecution Charging Document, 
victims may try to extend the legal characterization of the facts contained in the 
Prosecution Charging Document to the point where the Prosecution may be 
asked by the Pre-Trial Chamber to consider amending the Charging Document 
to establish a different crime if the evidence indicates so.2378  
In Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Single Judge) decided that also 
anonymous victim participants would be allowed to make opening and closing 
statements and make succinct oral submissions on issues of law and fact 
provided that they prove that their interests are affected by the examined issue 
and if considered appropriate by the Chamber.2379 In Banda and Jerbo, although 
the parties suggested that victims’ participation could be limited to written 
submissions,2380 the Pre-Trial Chamber established that victims would be able to 
make oral submissions during the hearings.2381 These, however, were completed 
in one day by choice of victims’ legal representatives via very brief statements 
corresponding to the parties’ approach.    
The sixth and last group of procedural rights includes the right to file 
written motions, responses and replies under regulation 24 of the Regulations of 
the Court on all matters not excluded to the victims’ representatives by the ICC 
Statute and RPE.2382 Thus, it is included to make submissions on evidentiary and 
legal issues to be discussed at the confirmation of charges hearing and to raise 
objections or make observations on the proper conduct of the proceedings prior 
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2376 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-462), 22 September 2006, pp. 6 and 7.  
2377 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-678), Decision on the Schedule and Conduct of the Confirmation 
Hearing, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge), 7 November 2006, p. 7. 
2378 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras 122-123. 
2379 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), 12 December 2008, paras. 102, 108.  
2380 Banda and Jerbo (ICC-02/05-03/09-80), Joint Submission by the Office of the Prosecutor and 
the Defense as to Agreed Facts and Submissions Regarding Modalities for the Conduct of the 
Confirmation Hearing, 19 October 2010, para 11. 
2381 Banda and Jerbo (ICC-01/05-03/09-13), Decision on Issues Related to the Hearing on the 
Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 November 2010.  
2382 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 142; Gbagbo (ICC-
02/11-01/11-138), 4 June 2012, paras. 59-60. 
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to the confirmation hearing according to rule 122 (3).2383 Nevertheless, the right 
to make challenges to, or to raise issues relating to, ICC’s jurisdiction or a case 
admissibility, under article 19 (2) and (3) and rule 122 (2), was excluded.2384 Be 
that as it may, as previously referred to, victims in general, i.e., without the need 
to hold the official/formal status of victim participants, are authorized to 
participate in challenges to jurisdiction of the ICC or the admissibility of a case 
under article 19 (3) as also evidenced in ICC practice, where victims have been 
allowed to file observations in proceedings of challenges to jurisdiction or 
admissibility.2385 Article 19 (3) states that:  
 
The Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of 
jurisdiction or admissibility. In proceedings with respect to jurisdiction or 
admissibility, those who have referred the situation under article 13, as well as 
victims, may also submit observations to the Court.  
 
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber seems to have interpreted victims’ 
participation not only limited to article 19 (3) but in general to any proceedings 
under article 19.2386 Pre-Trial Chamber I in Lubanga had interpreted the 
defendant’s application for release as a challenge under article 19 (2) and 
informed the victims and the DRC and invited them to file observations.2387 The 
ICC RPE extend the obligation of notification to a Prosecutor application for 
review of inadmissibility,2388 which may constitute a sort of revision or appeal of 
a decision under article 19 (2) out of a State challenge.2389 This may be considered 
to be a confirmation of the legitimacy of Appeal Chamber’s broader 
approach.2390 Notification has to be provided to victims who have already 
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2383 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para 143. 
2384 Ibid., para. 144. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 284. 
2385 See, e.g., Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1060), Observations of the Victims on 
the Objection to Jurisdiction raised by the Defence for Germain Katanga in its Motion of 10 
February 2009, Legal Representatives of the Victims, 16 April 2009; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
349-tEN), Observations of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 Regarding the Challenge to 
Jurisdiction Raised by the Defence in the Application of 23 May 2006, 24 August 2006. 
2386 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-772), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court Pursuant to Article 
19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2006, para. 6.  
2387 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-206), Decision Inviting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
the Victims in the Case to Comment on the Proceedings Pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 24 July 2006, pp. 3-4.    
2388 ICC RPE, rule 62. 
2389 Schabas (2010) 370. 
2390 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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communicated with the ICC under rule 59 (1) (b). As whether the obligation to 
notify established by rule 59 is applicable to the arrest warrant phase, the 
Appeals Chamber determined that when an arrest warrant was issued under seal 
and ex parte, no notification obligation exists.2391  
 
3.3.3.2. Related Legal Issues and Evaluation 
Concerning investigative powers, even though the ICC allowed victim 
participants to challenge evidence presented at the confirmation of charges 
hearing, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui 
pointed out that the Prosecution is the organ primarily in charge of conduction 
of investigation of the situations and cases arising from them and, hence, 
granting investigative powers, independent from those of the Prosecutor, to 
victims participants would not be consistent with the ICC Statute and RPE.2392 
Accordingly, when victim participants find it necessary to undertake certain 
investigative steps, they must request the Prosecution to undertake those 
steps.2393 Additionally, it was found that:  
 
[…] those granted the procedural status of victim at the pre-trial stage of a case 
(i) must confine their participation to the discussion of the evidence on which 
the Prosecution and the Defence [...] intend to rely at the confirmation hearing; 
and (ii) do not have the right to introduce additional evidence.2394   
 
Moreover, the introduction of additional evidence by victim 
participants, not intended to be relied by either the Prosecution or the defence, 
i.e., not part of the case record, would: 
 
[…] (i) distort the limited scope, as well as the object and purpose, of the 
confirmation hearing as defined by article 61 of the Statute and rules 121 and 
122 of the Rules, and (ii) inevitably delay the commencement of a confirmation 
hearing that, pursuant to article 61 (1) of the Statute must be held within a 
reasonable period of time after the suspect’s surrender or voluntary appearance 
before the Court.2395      
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2391 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01-04-169-US-Exp), Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against 
the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for 
Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’, Appeals Chamber, 13 July 2006, paras. 30-31.  
2392 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras. 82 and 83.  
2393 Ibid., para. 83.  
2394 Ibid., para. 17. 
2395 Ibid., para. 101.  
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Furthermore, it was highlighted that the introduction of additional 
evidence by victim participants, which is not intended to be relied on by the 
parties would infringe upon the defence’s rights.2396 Finally, article 69 (3) of the 
ICC Statute was found to be inapplicable during the pre-trial proceedings.2397 
Therefore, Pre-Trial Chamber I considered itself unable to authorizing victim 
participants to introduce additional evidence and, hence, the Trial Chamber’s 
approach, seen later, was not applicable at the pre-trial stage of a case.2398 Pre-
Trial Chamber I also determined that since the ICC Statute and RPE do not 
involve victim participants in pre-trial disclosure, these lack disclosure rights and 
obligations.2399 Having said so, a disclosure mechanism to allow victim 
participants to have access to materials in Prosecution’s possession, was put in 
place by Trial Chamber I in Lubanga starting after the post-confirmation of 
charges leading up to the trial, i.e., still during pre-trial.2400 This and other 
disclosure issues concerning victim participants are discussed in the sub-chapter 
on trial due to their close relationship with specific disclosure matters during 
trial, evidentiary issues during trial, and the involvement of the ICC Trial 
Chambers.        
As for the difference between anonymous and non-anonymous victim 
participants in Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, it has been said that it 
had little practical impact since neither case grouped victims under common 
legal representatives based on their anonymity.2401 Accordingly, legal 
representatives concurrently represent both categories of victim participants, 
which impedes the defence counsel to challenge the participatory rights 
exercised in representation of anonymous victims as they can also be legitimately 
raised in representation of non-anonymous victims.2402 
The ICC legal instruments do not require explicitly that victim 
participants have to be represented by a legal counsel. Pre-Trial Chamber II in 
Kony et al. stated that victims could directly participate, i.e., without legal 
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2396 Ibid., para. 103. 
2397 Ibid., para. 110. Article 69 (3) reads as follows: ‘The parties may submit evidence relevant to the 
case, in accordance with article 64. The Court shall have the authority to request the submission of 
all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth’. 
2398 Ibid., paras. 112-113.  
2399 Ibid., para. 114. 
2400 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1368), Decision on the legal representative's request for 
clarification of the Trial Chamber's 18 January 2008 "Decision on victims' participation", Trial 
Chamber I, 2 June 2008, paras. 29, 31 and 35; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008.   
2401 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 286.  
2402 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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representatives, in, for example, opening and closing statements.2403 
Nevertheless, as practice has shown, victims normally participate via a legal 
representative to fully exercise their participatory rights. According to rule 90 
(1), ‘A victim shall be free to choose a legal representative’. However, bearing in 
mind the large number of victim participants during the investigation and the 
pre-trial stage of a case and in order to ensure a meaningful participation of 
victims and the fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings,2404 the Chamber 
may request the appointment of a common legal representative(s) for victim 
participants, according to rule 90 (2), and paying attention to, inter alia, the 
victims’ views under article 68 (3),2405 and the presence of victims’ distinct 
interests.2406 Thus, a Pre-Trial Chamber ‘retains the option [...] to request the 
victims or particular group of victims to choose a common legal representative 
or representative “where there are a number of victims” and “for the purposes of 
ensuring the effectiveness of the proceedings” (rule 90, sub-rule 2)’.2407  
Moreover, according to rule 90 (3), if victims cannot choose a common 
legal representative, the Chamber may ask the Registrar to choose one.2408 
Therefore, a lawyer from the OPCV can be appointed as a common legal 
representative, which can be revisited taking into account the views expressed by 
the victims.2409 Rule 90 (4) requires that ‘The Chamber and the Registry shall take 
all reasonable steps to ensure that in the selection of common legal 
representatives, the distinct interests of the victims […] are represented and that 
any conflict of interest is avoided’, which is a necessary guarantee to include 
victims participants’ interests in the decision-making process.  
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2403 Kony et al. (ICC-02/04-01/05-134), Decision on legal representation, appointment of counsel 
for the defence, protective measures and time-limit for submission of observations on applications 
for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to 
a/0127/06, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 1 February 2007, para. 4.   
2404 See, e.g., Kony et al. (ICC-02/04-01/05-252), Decision on Victims’ Applications for 
Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to 
a/0127/06, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 10 August 2007, paras 80 and 162; Ruto et al. 
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2405 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-322), Fifth Decision on Victims’ Issues Concerning Common Legal 
Representation of Victims, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Single Judge), 16 December 2008, para. 9.  
2406 Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), 5 August 2011, para. 65. 
2407 Kony et al. (ICC-02/04-01/05-134), 1 February 2007, para. 6. 
2408 ICC RPE, rule 90 (3) (‘If the victims are unable to choose a common legal representative or 
representatives within a time limit that the Chamber may decide, the Chamber may request the 
Registrar to choose one or more common legal representatives’.). 
2409 Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-138), 4 June 2012, paras. 44 and 45. 
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It should be noticed that whereas in earlier ICC cases appointed 
common legal representation was organized at different stages of the cases,2410 in 
more recent cases,2411 appointed common legal representation has been 
implemented from the outset to remove potential adverse effects that might 
happen when an appointed common representative substitutes the victim 
participants’ original nominee.2412 At the pre-trial stage of a case, inter alia, harm 
suffered by the victims, i.e., the specific crime allegedly suffered by the victims, 
has been considered concerning questions of common legal representation.2413     
Concerning victims’ participation on the conditional release of a suspect, 
rule 119 (3) requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to ‘seek the views of victims who 
communicated with the Court in that case and whom the Chamber considers 
could be at risk as a result of a release or conditions imposed’. Although rule 119 
(3) does not require to hold the victim participant status, victims’ personal 
interests have to be affected as only victims who have already communicated 
with the ICC and who would be at risk as a consequence of the release or the 
condition imposed will be admitted.2414 In Lubanga, three individuals holding 
victim participant status filed their observations.2415   
As for appeals of the suspect’s conditional release and those holding the 
victim participant status, even though article 82 (1) (b) provides for that either 
party may appeal a decision granting or denying the release of a person 
investigated or prosecuted, i.e., victim participants are not mentioned, in the 
pre-trial detention appeal of Lubanga the Appeals Chamber’s majority 
concluded that victim participants would be allowed to participate in these sorts 
of appeals.2416 However, for victims to participate, they must apply for leave to 
participate in the appeal,2417 i.e., it is not an automatic right, as victims have to 
specify how their personal interests are affected and why it would be appropriate 
for the Appeals Chamber to allow the presentation of their views and 
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2410 See, e.g., Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, and Bemba.   
2411 See, e.g., Ruto et al., Muthaura and Kenyatta, and Gbagbo.  
2412 See, for further details, Emily Haslam and Rod Edmunds, ‘Common Legal Representation at 
the International Criminal Court: More Symbolic than Real?’ (2012) 12 International Criminal 
Law Review 871, 880.    
2413 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-322), 16 December 2008, paras 9 and 10. See also Haslam and 
Edmunds (2012) 885.     
2414 Safferling (2012) 313. 
2415 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-530-tEN), Observations of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and 
a/003/06 in Respect of the Application for Release Filed by the Defence, 9 October 2006.  
2416 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), 13 June 2007, para. 23. 
2417 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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concerns.2418 In his dissent, Judge Song, however, concluded that victims do not 
need to apply as he considered that this right is given to all participants to the 
proceedings that gave rise to the appeal.2419 Actually, as said, rule 119 requires the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to seek victims’ views on this specific matter. Although the 
Pre-Trial and Appeals Chamber would most likely have decided for the 
continuation of the detention of Lubanga, even absent victims’ views, victims’ 
participation had at least symbolic importance.2420 Moreover, victims by 
definition have first-hand knowledge of their security and safety situation, which 
justifies expressing themselves without the need of being ‘represented’ by the 
Prosecutor. Furthermore, victims’ participation may have at least partially 
influenced the Appeals Chamber’s decision. Victim participants’ status during 
appeals proceedings is examined in further detail later.2421         
As seen, victim participation during the pre-trial stage of a case has 
resulted more active and significant for victims than during the investigation 
stage of a situation. A point that should be given extra attention is that victims 
generally speaking have tried to do much more than just present the harms 
suffered or clarify facts.2422 Accordingly, victim participants have very frequently 
commented on the suspect’s guilt and sometimes tried to induce evidence 
oriented to establish the existence of substantial grounds to believe that the 
accused was responsible for the charges presented against him.2423  
Some of the observations concerning victims’ participation in an 
investigation stage of a situation might mutatis mutandi be also raised in the 
context of the pre-trial stage of a case. Nonetheless, the main difference is that 
since in the pre-trial stage of a case by definition a suspect is already singled out, 
upon the expedition of an arrest warrant or a summons to appear, (s)he can 
already defend his/her rights and, accordingly, the right to due process is not as 
jeopardized as during investigation. It is important, however, to analyze, for 
example, Pre-Trial Chamber I’s considerations in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui 
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Demande de Mise en Liberté Provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Appeals Chamber, 13 
February 2007, paras. 1, 2 and 38-40. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 277.   
2419 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-824), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Décision sur la Demande de Mise en Liberté 
Provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song Regarding 
the Participation of Victims, Appeals Chamber, 13 February 2007, paras. 3 and 4.  
2420 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 277.   
2421 See infra Chapter IV 6.3.  
2422 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 291.  
2423 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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concerning victims’ participation at the pre-trial stage of a case. Victims were 
found to have a right to participate in the determination of issues affecting the 
guilt or innocence of an accused because they have an interest in ‘the truth’2424 
which, for example, corresponds to the confirmation of charges, but the 
Chamber did not allow victim participants to introduce evidence on the 
accused’s guilt as the Pre-Trial Chamber explicitly said that ‘we cannot allow a 
second Prosecutor in this process’.2425 Hence, the Chamber tried to leave it clear 
that the role for victims is being participants and not parties.2426 The object and 
purpose of the confirmation of charges hearing, which is not a ‘mini-trial’ or a 
‘trial before the trial’, was also considered.2427  
This is coherent with the logic underlying the ICC Statute and RPE 
which is arguably to achieve a balance between the importance of victim 
participants to voice their views and concerns, similar but not identical to a civil 
party, and the avoidance of an excessive number thereof or of those participating 
being granted with quite broad rights.2428 Victims’ participation during the pre-
trial stage of a case hence needs to be guided by this necessary equilibrium. 
 
3.4. The ECCC and the STL  
3.4.1. Participation During Investigation/Pre-Trial in General  
3.4.1.1. The ECCC 
At the ECCC, as previously mentioned, victims can assume the role of 
complainants during the preliminary investigations conducted by the Co-
Prosecutors when they have to determine whether there is enough evidence to 
potentially support a conviction and to identify potential suspects.2429 Hence, at 
this stage, victims’ complaints are first used. Thus, for example, victims’ general 
statements about what they suffered from 1975 to 1979 may lead the Co-
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2424 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras. 36, 45 (iii).  
2425 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Transcripts, 15 July 2008, at 70. Cited by 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 284-285, footnotes 357 and 358.   
2426 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 285. 
2427 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 100. It was also added 
that: ‘[...] according to article 61 (7) of the Statute, at the confirmation hearing the Pre-Trial 
Chamber must determine “whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged.” Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
is not a finder of truth in relation to the guilt or innocence of the person against whom a warrant 
of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued’. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-
474), 13 May 2008, para. 109. 
2428 See Christopher Hall, ‘The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 773, 783. 
2429 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 50 (1). 
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Prosecutors to consider incidents or look at villages not previously taken into 
account.2430 Bearing in mind that the Co-Prosecutors only look for general 
information during this stage, the requirement of victims’ specific statements is 
not as strong as when it comes to civil party applicants. This lower threshold 
during the investigation generates an incentive for victims to come forward 
instead of relying exclusively on the Co-Prosecutors, who ‘cannot possibly 
investigate all the crimes of the Khmer Rouge’s top leadership’.2431 Even though 
complaints may include significant details, complaints that are acceptable may 
include statements of the sort of ‘a massacre happened in my village, the Court 
should come look here’.2432 In any case, victim-complainants can neither initiate 
prosecutions nor force the Co-Prosecutors or Co-Investigating Judges to 
undertake an investigation if the Co-Prosecutors decide not to adopt action 
concerning a complaint unlike the situation existent under the Cambodian Code 
of Criminal Procedure.2433   
Once the ECCC Co-Prosecutors conclude that there is enough evidence 
to charge an individual with a crime, they prepare an ‘Introductory Submission’, 
which outlines the crimes with which an individual is charged,2434 and actually 
constitutes the procedural moment that introduces the distinction between 
victims and civil parties.2435 Whereas any victim who suffered a crime under the 
Khmer Rouge regime can submit complaints to the Co-Prosecutors who use 
such information in conducting their investigations,2436 only victims who 
suffered crimes listed in the introductory submission may apply to be joined as 
civil parties before the Co-Investigating Judges as previously examined.2437 Thus, 
victims from that moment can participate as civil parties during pre-trial 
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2430 Ibid., rule 49 (2). 
2431 Bair (2009) 521. 
2432 ECCC, Pratice Direction on Victim Participation, Practice Direction 02/2007/Rev. 1 (amended 
on 27 October 2008), article 2 (3).   
2433 Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure (2007), articles 138-142.  
2434 ECCC, Internal Rules, rule 53 (1). This provision additionally establishes that introductory 
submissions can also be sent against unknown persons and that the judicial investigation is opened 
by sending an introductory submission to the Co-Investigating Judges.  
2435 Bair (2009) 521.   
2436 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 49. 
2437 See, in particular, Nuon Chea (Case 002), Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional 
Detention Appeals, Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 March 2008, para. 36 (‘The Pre-Trial Chamber find that 
the text of Internal Rule 23(1)(a) [current rule 23 bis 1] is clear in its wording that Civil Parties can 
participate in all criminal proceedings […] Civil Parties have active rights to participate starting 
from the investigative phase of the procedure’.).  
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proceedings, i.e., during judicial investigations led by the Co-Investigating 
Judges.2438   
In cases 003 and 004, since judicial investigations have for a long time 
been going on without charges and without public information, victims were 
unable yet to successfully apply to become civil parties and, therefore, have not 
been able to effectively participate in judicial investigations.2439 Concerning case 
004, the Co-Investigating Judges justified its secretive approach due to the 
existence of serious doubts concerning the suspects as the most responsible and, 
thus, it would be ‘inappropriate to encourage civil party applications […] as this 
could raise expectations which might not be met later on’.2440 Although formal 
charges have not been yet laid in Cases 003 and 004, some civil parties have been 
already admitted to cases 003 and 004.2441 Their lawyers alongside those of civil 
party applicants and pending civil party applicants have been accredited and 
recognized.2442   
 
3.4.1.2. The STL  
With regard to the STL, it should first be mentioned that unlike the Lebanese 
Code of Criminal Procedure that grants victims the civil party status and permit 
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2438 Although there is a Pre-Trial Chamber at the ECCC, its mandate mainly consists in settling 
disputes between the Co-Prosecutors and Co-Investigating Judges, and also hearing appeals 
against Co-Investigating Judges’ decisions. See ECCC Internal Rules, internal rules 73 and 74. 
2439 Case 003, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the Appeal Against Order on the 
Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant Robert Hamill, Pre-Trial Chamber, Opinion of Judges 
Lahuis and Downing, 24 October 2011, para. 5; Case 004, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
Regarding the Appeal Against Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant Robert Hamill, 
Pre-Trial Chamber 02, Opinion of Judges Lahuis and Downing, 14 February 2012, para. 5. See also 
Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1322-1323.  
2440 Co-Investigating Judges, Press Release, Statement by Co-Investigating Judges Regarding Civil 
Parties in Case 004, 8 August 2011. Available at: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/statement-co-
investigating-judges-regarding-civil-parties-case-004 (last visit on 20 October 2012).  
2441 Case 003, Lawyer’s Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File 
No. 003, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 26 February 2013, para. 15; Case 004, Lawyer’s 
Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File No. 004, Office of the 
Co-Investigating Judges, 1 April 2013, para. 14. See also Case 003, Order on the Reconsideration of 
the Admissibility of the Civil Party Application of Robert Hamill, Co-Investigating Judges, 24 
February 2012, paras. 36-39; Case 003, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the 
Appeal Against Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant, Pre-Trial Chamber, 13 
February 2013.   
2442 Case 003, Lawyer’s Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File 
No. 003, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 26 February 2013, para. 15; Case 004, Lawyer’s 
Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File No. 004, Office of the 
Co-Investigating Judges, 1 April 2013, para. 14.  
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them to initiate criminal proceedings, STL RPE rule 86 (A) does not authorize 
victims to be granted the victim participant status and participate as such before 
the confirmation of an indictment, i.e., only after completing the investigation 
(or at least after the majority of the investigations has been finished).2443 
Although victim participant status is not available during investigation, victims 
(in general) may at most transmit the Prosecutor information that (s)he 
considers useful to determine the truth and the Prosecutor is free to decide how 
this information may be used.2444     
The limitation of victim participation to only after confirmation of the 
indictment corresponds, as the former President of the STL, Antonio Cassese, 
pointed out, to the aims of ‘(i) avoiding confusion that might somehow hamper 
the actions of the Prosecutor, and (ii) preventing possible delays in the 
proceedings’.2445 More specifically, that the Prosecutor when initiating 
proceedings must take into account other factors in addition to the victims’ 
interests, the risk of ‘fabricated requests’ aimed to infiltrate the Prosecutor’s 
investigation, and the fact that the Prosecutor is not an investigating judge who 
gathers evidence and leads the investigation have been invoked to justify the 
exclusion of victim participation during investigation.2446 In addition, the 
situation experienced by some victims at the ICC who were denied participation 
at the confirmation of charges after having been granted the victim participant 
status during the investigation, and the fact that during the investigation, no 
individual has not been yet identified as an accused or suspect and, hence, 
cannot defend his/her fundamental rights are also considered as sound 
arguments to exclude victim participation from investigation.2447  
Although these arguments are sound, the complete exclusion of victim 
participation from the investigation can be criticized. First, this introduced 
change is a step backwards in comparison with the existent ICC legal regime. 
More importantly, a half-way solution such as limiting the victim participation 
to specific judicial instances during the investigation stage, as the ICC did by 
revisiting its own practice and, hence, no longer assuming a general participatory 
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2443 STL President (2010), para 20. See also STL President (2012), para. 20; Brouwer and Heikkilä 
(2013) 1318. It should be noticed that the Prosecutor when conducting his/her investigation may 
‘summon and question […] victims and witnesses and record their statements’. STL RPE, rule 61 
(i).    
2444 STL Chambers, Information Guide on Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, December 2010b, para. 23. 
2445 STL President (2010), para 20. See also STL President (2012), para. 20. 
2446 Hemptinne (2010) 173. 
2447 See Ibid., 174. 
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right applicable to the whole investigation, could have been considered by the 
STL RPE drafters instead of forbidding completely victim participation. Second, 
unlike the ICC and the ECCC, the number of victim participants at the STL is 
comparatively low and, therefore, concerns on delays at the STL are in principle 
not as justified as in the other two courts. Third, victims’ status is already limited 
because of the impossibility of not claiming reparations before the STL. Hence, 
the decision of excluding victim participation completely from another 
procedural scenario, i.e., investigation, weakens victim status at the STL even 
more. Furthermore, as evidenced by the practice of the ICC, victims are affected 
by the Prosecutor’s actions during investigation and hearing victims’ voice to 
express their personal interests during investigation would constitute an extra 
guarantee of fairness and justice. This guarantee is especially relevant in the 
context of the STL which operates under the suspicion that its actions may be 
dictated by political considerations.2448                
 
3.4.2. Modalities of Participation/Procedural Rights 
3.4.2.1. The ECCC 
With regard to the ECCC, it should first be mentioned that Pre-Trial Chamber 
Judges have been reluctant to acknowledge civil parties as equal parties to the 
defence and the Prosecution.2449 Be that as it may, based on the ECCC Internal 
Rules as well as case law of the Co-Investigating Judges and Pre-Trial Chamber, 
it is possible to identify six main categories of civil parties’ rights during pre-trial 
proceedings.2450 First, after victims are granted the civil party status, they have 
the right to consult and examine the dossier.2451 Such right is of pivotal 
importance as the civil party and the other parties have to familiarize themselves 
with the contents and materials of the dossier since there is no disclosure system 
at the ECCC, which reflects the civil law influence. 
Second, under internal rule 58 (4), the Co-Investigating Judges can call 
the civil parties to confront the charged person. Civil parties’ lawyers may ask 
questions to the charged person and if the Co-Investigating Judges refuse to 
permit a question, this refusal ‘shall be noted in the written record of the 
interview’ according to internal rule 58 (5). The symbolic and substantial 
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2448 Ibid., 173. 
2449 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 185.  
2450 With regard to these procedural rights, in general, see Ibid., 185-192. 
2451 ECCC Internal Rules, rules 55 (11) and 59 (1). See also Case 003, Lawyer’s Recognition 
Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File No. 003, Co-Investigating Judges, 
26 February 2013, para. 13; Case 004, Lawyer’s Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party 
Applications on Case File No. 004, Co-Investigating Judges, 1 April 2013, para. 12.   


importance for the civil parties when confronting the charged person should be 
pointed out. In Duch, for example, confrontation interviews occurred and were 
subsequently referred to in the Closing Order.2452   
Third, civil parties have the right to request the Co-Investigating Judges 
to carry out specific investigations on their behalf.2453 Since neither civil parties 
nor the defence has the right to have their own investigations, they have to rely 
on those conducted by the Co-Investigating Judges, which are in turned 
determined by Co-Prosecutors’ submissions. Even though civil parties may ask 
specific judicial investigations, they still need to be related to the Co-Prosecutors’ 
investigations, e.g., requests about to open investigations on alleged attacks on 
cultural property in Nuon Chea et al. were denied as they were not included in 
the Co-Prosecutors’ Introductory Submission.2454 Indeed, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
has made it clear that although civil parties hold a right to ask certain 
investigative actions, the Co-Prosecutors are the only responsible ‘to expand an 
investigation beyond the scope of initial and existing supplementary 
submissions’.2455 All in all, civil parties certainly may influence what crimes 
should be included in the Closing Order.2456 Co-Investigating Judges may be 
requested by a civil party to ‘interview him or her, question witnesses, go to a 
site, order expertise or collect other evidence on his or her behalf’.2457 
Investigative requests from civil parties’ co-lawyers have included incidents of 
enforced disappearance of persons, forced marriage and forced sexual relations, 
and attacks against cultural property.2458 In any case, civil parties have to be 
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2452 Kaing Guek Eav (Case 001), Closing Order, Co-Investigating Judges, 12 August 2008, footnotes 
63, 175, 177, 200, 226, 370 and 371. Cited by McGonigle Leyh (2011) 188, footnote 116. This 
confrontation took place after the Co-Investigative Judges arranged for re-enactments at S-21, with 
the presence of Duch, his lawyers and some surviving victims. 
2453 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 59 (5). See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 185. 
2454 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Order on Civil Parties’ Co-Lawyers’ 7th Request for Investigative 
Actions Concerning the Charge of Attack Against Culture, Co-Investigating Judges, 15 March 
2010, para. 3.  
2455 Ieng Thirith et al. (Case 002), 27 April 2010, paras. 17-18. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 
1322.  
2456 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 67 (1) (‘The Co-Investigating Judges shall conclude the investigation 
by issuing a Closing Order, either indicting a Charged Person and sending him or her to trial, or 
dismissing the case. The Co-Investigating Judges are not bound by the Co-Prosecutors’ 
submissions’.).   
2457 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 59 (5). 
2458 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Co-Lawyers of Civil Parties’ Investigative Request Concerning the 
Crimes of Enforced Disappearance, 30 June 2009; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Second Request for 
Investigative Actions Concerning Forced Marriages and Forced Sexual Relations, 15 July 2009; 
Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Co-Lawyers for the Civil Parties’ Fourth Investigative Request 
	

informed of the Co-Investigating Judges’ closing order and receive a copy 
thereof.2459    
Although civil parties’ requests had some relative success,2460 applying 
internal rule 59 (5), the Co-Investigating Judges and the Pre-Trial Chamber on 
appeal have rejected many of them due to, inter alia, previous interviews of 
individuals by investigators and concerns about delay in proceedings.2461 A high 
potential for delays is explained by the fact that, under internal rule 74 (4), any 
request to question witnesses, collect evidence, or order expertise felt by the civil 
party as necessary is subject to appeal, even when such evidence might not 
necessarily aid the Prosecution’s goals.2462 It is important to mention that, unlike 
victim-complainants, when interviewed by the Co-Investigating Judges, the civil 
parties are entitled to have a counsel present during those meetings.2463  
Fourth, civil parties can request and propose witnesses during pre-trial, 
e.g., when the Co-Investigating Judges consult an expert to aid in the 
investigation, a civil party holds the right to request that additional experts be 
consulted if the first expert opinion was not favorable.2464 Although this is an 
important right as proposing witnesses may be connected to issues of particular 
relevance for the civil parties,2465 those witnesses may not necessarily fit in the 
Prosecutor’s case, lead to confusion and, hence, be rejected by the Court as 
examined during the subchapter on trial.  
Fifth, civil parties may attend and participate in the pre-trial proceedings 
via written and oral interventions. However, civil parties’ right to participate is 
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Concerning Forced Marriages and Sexually Related Crimes, 4 December 2009; Nuon Chea et al. 
(Case 002), Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties’ 7th Investigative Request Concerning the Charge of 
Attack Against Culture, 8 February 2010.            
2459 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 67. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1322. 
2460 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Order on Civil Request for Investigative Action Concerning 
Enforced Disappearance, Co-Investigating Judges, 21 December 2009, para. 12.  
2461 Ieng Thirith (Case 002), Public Decision on Appeal of Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties Against 
Order on Civil Parties’ Request for Investigative Actions Concerning All Properties Owned by the 
Charged Persons, Pre-Trial Chamber 4, August 2010; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on 
Appeal of Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties Against Order Rejecting Request to Interview Persons 
Named in the Forced Marriages and Enforced Disappearances Request for Investigative Action, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, 21 July 2010; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Order Concerning 
Requests for Investigate Actions, Co-Investigating Judges, 4 June 2008. See also McGonigle Leyh 
(2011) 187.   
2462 Bair (2009) 527; McGonigle Leyh (2011) 187. 
2463 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 55 (5) (a). 
2464 Ibid., rules 31 (10) and 74 (4) (e). 
2465 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 207. 
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not applicable to all the hearings during pre-trial proceedings.2466 Thus, for 
instance, internal rule 63 (1) (a) establishes that during a provisional detention 
hearing ‘the Co-Investigating Judges shall hear the Co-Prosecutors, the Charged 
Person and his or her Lawyers’. Nevertheless, the possibility for civil parties to 
participate in an appeal related to a provisional detention was discussed by Pre-
Trial Chamber concerning Nuon Chea (Case 002) as follows. On 4 February 
2008, the first civil parties debuted at the courtroom, being given thirty minutes 
each during which they presented submissions to the Pre-Trial Chamber as for 
the Nuon Chea’s appeal against provisional detention. Notwithstanding 
objections from Noun Chea’s lawyers, who sustained that civil parties’ 
participation was not provided by the Internal Rules and would infringe the 
accused’s right to a fair hearing as they had not been allowed to participate at the 
hearing before the Co-Investigating Judges, the Chamber permitted the civil 
parties to address it.2467 Even one civil party did so directly. This was Theary 
Seng, who did not fit the typical victim archetype insofar she is an American 
lawyer and a civil society leader in Cambodia and, moreover, not only made an 
emotional presentation but also failed to stick to the issue under discussion, even 
publicizing a book published by her NGO.2468  
Even though civil parties are unable to participate in the adversarial 
hearings on provisional detention, Pre-Trial Chamber in March 2008 
determined that victims/civil parties could participate in appeals against 
provisional detention.2469 It was found that the text of internal rule 23 (1) (a) was 
clear that victims can participate in all criminal proceedings, expect for those in 
which they are explicitly barred. The Chamber indeed concluded that victims 
hold ‘active rights’ to participate starting from the investigate phase of the 
procedure.2470 The Chamber mentioned that it wished to avoid a prescriptive 
procedure similar to the one adopted by the ICC,2471 and instead preferred 
flexibility so as to protect the rights of civil parties and of the charged persons. In 
any case, more notably, the Chamber stated that ‘the inclusion of Civil Parties in 
proceedings is in recognition of the state pursuit of national reconciliation’,2472 
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2466 See Ibid., 188.
2467 Ibid., Loc. cit; Bair (2009) 544-545. 
2468 See Mohan (2009) 752; McGonigle Leyh (2011) 188. 
2469 Nuon Chea (Case 002), Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals, 
Pre-Trial Chamber , 20 March 2008.  
2470 Ibid., para. 36.   
2471 Ibid., para. 43. 
2472 Nuon Chea (Case 002), Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 March 2008, para. 38 


which underscores the ECCC’s fundamental purpose and in accordance with 
international practice, in particular that of the ICC.2473 Accordingly, this decision 
can be considered as a landmark as victims’ right to participate not only as 
participants but as parties was emphasized.  
In Case 002, civil parties, before the provisional detention appeals of 
another charged person, Khieu Samphan, were informed that only the civil 
parties’ lawyers would be allowed to make oral submissions, in accordance with 
internal rule 77 (4) that provides that only lawyers for the parties may consult 
the case file up to the date of the pre-trial appeal hearing and those civil parties 
who lack legal representation will not be able to access the case file.2474 
Nevertheless, one civil party addressed directly the ECCC and, after parties’ 
agreement, she was permitted to make certain brief remarks but her comments 
went beyond the issues at the Chamber.2475  
In the detention appeal of Ieng Thirith (Case 002), the Pre-Trial 
Chamber once again established that only civil parties’ lawyers would be 
permitted to make oral observations in order to ensure the expeditiousness of 
the proceedings and to avoid unwarranted disruptions.2476 Additionally, the 
Chamber based its decision on internal rules that refer to civil parties’ 
participation via their lawyers.2477 The Chamber added that the defence should 
be made aware of the contents of the oral submissions of the civil parties prior to 
the hearing.2478 In spite of the Chamber’s decisions on restricting oral 
submissions to civil parties’ lawyers, Theary Seng asked to speak during the Ieng 
Thirith hearing.2479 Seng had dismissed her lawyer and, thus, was not represented 
by legal counsel.2480 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s majority ruled that the 
civil party was not allowed to address the Chamber in person citing internal rule 
77 (10).2481 Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that a previous version of 
internal rule 23 (7) invoked by the Chamber provided no indication that a civil 
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2473 Ibid., para. 40. 
2474 Nuon Chea (Case 002), Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 March 2008, para. 3. See also Khan and Dixon (2009) 1154-1155.  
2475 See Khan and Dixon (2009) 1155; Bair (2009) 548. 
2476 Ieng Thirith (Case 002), Directions on Civil Party Oral Submissions During the Hearing of the 
Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order, Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 May 2008. 
2477 Ibid, para. 3 (referring to ECCC internal rules 23 (7), 77 (4) and 77 (10)). 
2478 Ibid., para. 4. 
2479 Ieng Sary (Case 002), Decision on the Civil Party’s Request to Address the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber, 1 July 2008, para. 2.  
2480 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2481 Ibid., para. 3. 
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party must be represented by counsel, as noted in a dissenting opinion,2482 which 
was praised by Seng as ‘obviously and legally correct’.2483 Additionally, it may be 
considered that most victims are not lawyers and, hence, they have never been 
given a voice in shaping civil party’s participation. Seng requested 
reconsideration of the decision but this was also denied.2484  
The issue then was dealt with as the unrepresented victims’ right to 
address the ECCC personally. Concerning the provisional detention appeals, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber determined that ‘procedural rights can be limited if this is 
necessary to safeguard other competing interests, applying the principle of 
proportionality’ and noted that the ICC has sometimes granted broader rights to 
victim participants’ legal representatives than to victim participants 
themselves.2485 Nevertheless, since unrepresented civil parties may be unable to 
afford a legal representative, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided that legitimately 
unrepresented civil parties may be allowed to address the ECCC in person 
provided that they make this request at least 10 days prior to the hearing.2486 At 
this point, it should be mentioned that civil parties’ status during appeals 
proceedings is discussed in further detail later.2487 
In March 2009, revisions were introduced to the Internal Rules to 
consolidate Pre-Trial Chamber’s early decisions on the role of the civil parties’ 
lawyers and civil parties. The revisions applicable to the pre-trial and trial stages 
established that when civil parties are represented by a lawyer ‘it is the lawyer 
and not the civil parties themselves who must make legal submissions before the 
Court’.2488 The Internal Rules state that in order to participate in the proceedings 
and from the closing order issuance onwards, civil parties ‘shall at all times be 
represented by a Civil Party Lawyer’.2489 By the closing order, the Co-
Investigating Judges put end to the judicial investigation and can either dismiss 
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2482 Ieng Sary (Case 002), Decision on the Civil Party’s Request to Address the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber, Dissenting opinion of Judge Rowan Downing, 1 July 2008, para. 7.  
For further discussion on this point see Mohan (2009) 752-758.  
2483 See Theary Seng’s personal web site, available at: http://www.thearyseng.com/eccc-civil-party 
(last visit on 20 October 2012).    
2484 See Ieng Sary (Case 002), Decision on Application for Reconsideration of Civil Party’s Right to 
Address the Pre-Trial Chamber in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber, 28 August 2008.  
2485 Ieng Sary (Case 002), Direction on Unrepresented Civil Parties’ Rights to Address the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber, 29 August 2008, para. 8.  
2486 Ibid., para. 10. 
2487 See infra Chapter IV 6.4.1.1 and 6.4.2.1.   
2488 ECCC, Fifth Plenary Session of Judicial Officers, Closing Press Statement, 6 March 2009.  
2489 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 ter (1). 
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the case or send it to trial.2490 A disposition which is no longer present in the 
Internal Rules consisted in an explicit reference to a civil party’s right to be 
represented, during pre-trial, by counsel and to freely choose any lawyer 
registered with the Cambodian Bar Association.2491  
In practical terms, civil parties may only address the ECCC ‘through the 
mouth of a lawyer, rather than with their own voices’.2492 However, such a 
change is seemingly and in balance positive in order to guarantee expeditious 
proceedings. This consideration acquires especial relevance bearing in mind the 
important increase in the number of civil parties. Their direct participation, i.e., 
without legal representatives, would be detrimental to the pace of the 
proceedings leading to a delay of them. Although this and other changes on civil 
parties’ participation have been criticized as going against the ‘very spirit of civil 
party’ participation,2493 it is in principle agreed here with the ECCC Internal 
Rules Committee’s justification whereby the civil parties’ rights are not limited 
but it is instead the way whereby those rights are exercised that is modified.2494 
Furthermore, by noting that the parties hold different positions in criminal 
proceedings and ‘that these positions even vary in the different stages of the 
proceedings’, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that civil parties’ modalities of 
participation do not need to be the same as those of the other parties.2495 
Consequently, civil parties were not provided the same amount of time to make 
oral submissions in the Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Ieng 
Sary.2496 Regardless of the causes behind the ECCC’s reasons to change its 
attitude towards the victims,2497 at least some of these restrictions to avoid too a 
 
2490 Ibid., rule 67.  
2491 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 ter 2 (a) (Rev. 5).    
2492 Bair (2009) 550. 
2493 Mohan (2009) 755. 
2494 ECCC, Fifth Plenary Session of Judicial Officers, Closing Press Statement, 6 March 2009.  
2495 Ieng Sary (Case 002), Decision on Preliminary Matters Raised by the Lawyers for the Civil 
Parties in Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order, Pre-Trial Chamber, 1 July 
2008, para 4. See also Ieng Sary (Case 002), Direction on Unrepresented Civil Parties’ Rights to 
Address the Pre-Trial Chamber in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber, 29 August 2008, para. 5.  
2496 See Khan and Dixon (2009) 1156. 
2497 Some commentators have attributed this change in attitude to the ECCC’s disinclination to 
hear from Theary Seng rather than to a (correct) reading of the ECCC Rules. See Mohan (2009) 
754; Sarah Thomas, ‘Civil Party’s Repeated Attempts to Address Bench and Poor Management of 
Proceedings Force Worrying Precedent for Victim Participation Before the ECCC’, 3 July 2008, 
available at: 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Cambodia_08_07_03_Civil_ (last visit on 20 October 
2012).      
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broad and unpredictable participation of civil parties, notably illustrated by 
Theary Seng, may be considered as necessary.  
Keeping a delicate balance between civil parties’ participation and other 
important considerations such as expeditiousness, efficiency, and fairness of the 
proceedings, arguably justify at least some of these safeguards. Indeed, as 
determined by the Pre-Trial Chamber ‘preserving the balance between the 
procedural rights of the parties was an important and ongoing process’.2498  
Sixth, civil parties have the right to support the prosecution.2499 This 
right, as previously seen, is one of the two purposes to join the ECCC 
proceedings as civil parties but does not transform the civil party in an 
additional Prosecutor, as later discussed under the analysis of civil parties’ 
participation in trial.2500 
Concerning legal representation, according to the ECCC Internal Rules, 
during the pre-trial stage, ‘Civil Parties participate individually’,2501 and they hold 
the right to be represented by lawyers of their own choice. Moreover, civil parties 
‘may form groups and choose to be represented by a common lawyer’; however, 
the Co-Investigating Judges or the Chamber can also take the decision to group 
civil parties and organize them under common representation if the interests of 
justice so require.2502 When selecting common lawyers, the Co-Investigating 
Judges or the Chambers and the VSS ‘shall take all reasonable steps to ensure 
that […]  the distinct interests of each of the Civil Parties are represented and 
that any conflict of interest is avoided’. In Nuon Chea et al., the ECCC forcibly 
grouped unrepresented civil parties due to the large number of civil parties, and, 
for example, the provinces of origin was the criterion employed to group non-
represented civil parties.2503 Other civil parties grouped themselves on the 
grounds of their geographical origin, harm inflicted and ethnic origin.2504 
ECCC’s grouping criteria are similar to the ICC’s practice, which is examined 
later.2505 
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2498 Ieng Sary (Case 002), Decision on Application for Reconsideration of Civil Party’s Right to 
Address the Pre-Trial Chamber in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber, 28 August 2008, para. 5. 
2499 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (1) (a). See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal 
Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 488 (vii).      
2500 See infra Chapter IV 4.4.1.1.  
2501 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (3). 
2502 Ibid., rule 23 ter (3). 
2503 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Order on the Organization of Civil Party Representation under 
Rule 23ter of the Rules, Co-Investigating Judges, 2 August 2010.  
2504 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 218. 
2505 See infra Chapter IV 4.3.2.1. 
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Victims can also group themselves together under a Victims Association, 
which works as a sort of an umbrella organization for a numerous group of 
victims under common legal representation.2506 This did not take place in Duch 
during pre-trial and trial. In Nuon Chea et al., an Association of Khmer Rouge 
Victims, the Association of Victims of Democratic Kampuchea, ‘Ksem Ksan’, in 
Cambodia represents a large a number of victims.2507 Indeed, civil party group 3 
in Duch presented a memorial proposal on behalf of this association during the 
appeals proceedings as seen later.2508 Although victims associations are not 
themselves civil parties to the proceedings, lawyers of the association represent 
civil parties who are members of the victims associations.2509 In Cases 003 and 
004, lawyers for admitted civil parties, alongside civil party applicants and other 
pending civil party applicants, have already been accredited and recognized.2510   
 
3.4.2.2. The STL 
With regard to the STL, the Pre-Trial Judge in Ayyash et al. for first time 
discussed modalities of victims’ participation in pre-trial proceedings, i.e., in the 
STL context ‘the phase of proceedings following the confirmation of an 
indictment and preceding the transmission of the case file to the Trial Chamber 
pursuant to Rule 95 […]’.2511  
First, concerning the participation at meetings, status conferences and 
hearings, the Pre-Trial Judge, in application of STL RPE, rules 89 (C), 91 (D) (E) 
and 94 (A), determined that the legal representative of victim participants may 
attend and participate in meetings, status conferences and hearings when the 
victim participants’ interests are affected by an issue considered in the respective 
 
2506 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quarter (1) (‘A group of Victims may also choose to organise 
their Civil Party action by becoming members of a Victims’ Association […]’.). See also Practice 
Direction on Victim Participation, article 5.9. Victims Association, as defined under the glossary of 
the ECCC Internal Rules, is ‘an association made up solely of victims of crimes coming within the 
jurisdiction of the ECCC, which is validly registered in the country in which it is carrying on 
activities at the time of its intervention before the ECCC, and has been validly authorised to take 
action on behalf of its members’. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 218; Brouwer and Heikkilä 
(2013) 1311.  
2507 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 218. 
2508 See infra Chapter V 4.4.2.2.   
2509 ECCC Internal Rules, internal rule 23 quarter.  
2510 Case 003, Lawyer’s Recognition Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File 
No. 003, Co-Investigating Judges, 26 February 2013, para. 15; Case 004, Lawyer’s Recognition 
Decision Concerning All Civil Party Applications on Case File No. 004, Co-Investigating Judges, 
01 April 2013, para. 14. 
2511 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 18 May 2012, para. 3 


event.2512 Nevertheless, the legal representative cannot attend meetings, status 
conferences and hearings where the Pre-Trial Judge has decided so.2513 Nor may 
the legal representative’s attendance extend to the full event, ‘and may be limited 
to those agenda items of concern to the [victim participants]’.2514  
Second, the legal representative must have access to the full transcript of 
public status conferences and hearings and be provided with the portions of the 
transcripts, status conferences and hearings held in camera or ex parte attended 
by the legal representative.2515 The same regime was found to be applicable as for 
access to minutes.2516  
Third, concerning filings of written motions, briefs and related 
documents, the Pre-Trial Judge acknowledged that whereas the STL RPE 
establish some instances where victim participants are required to submit 
written filings, they are silent on whether victim participants can do so on their 
own initiative.2517 However, the Judge concluded that to make it effective victims’ 
entitlement to participate, the legal representative may file, in addition to 
responses and replies,2518 ‘motions or briefs on any issues that affects the victims’ 
personal interests’, which was found to be consistent with other jurisdictions, in 
particular the ICC.2519  
It should be mentioned that the legal representative for victim 
participants filed his observations on the defence motions challenging the 
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2512 Ibid., paras. 23-26. Rule 89 (c) states that ‘the Pre-Trial Judge may, proprio motu where 
appropriate, hear the Parties, without the accused or the victims participating in the proceedings 
being present. The Pre-Trial Judge may hear the Parties and the victims participating in the 
proceedings in chambers, in which case minutes of the meeting shall be taken by a representative 
of the Registry’. In turn, rule 91 (D) and (E) provides for that ‘The Pre- Trial Judge shall order the 
Parties to meet to discuss issues related to the preparation of the case. He may invite victims 
participating in the proceedings to attend. Such meetings shall be held inter partes or, if the Pre-
Trial Judge so decides at the request of a Party, ex parte’. Finally, in accordance to rule 94 (A), the 
Pre-Trial Judge shall ‘convene a status conference within a reasonable period after the initial 
appearance of the accused and not more than eight weeks after it and, thereafter, within eight 
weeks from the previous one unless otherwise ordered to: (i) organize exchanges between the 
Parties so as to ensure expeditious preparation for trial; and (ii) review the status of the case and 
allow the Parties the opportunity to raise issues in relation thereto, including the mental and 
physical condition of the accused’.    
2513 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 18 May 2012, para. 27. 
2514 Ibid., para. 28 
2515 Ibid., para. 29. 
2516 Ibid., para. 30. 
2517 Ibid., para. 31. 
2518 See The Practice Directive on Filing of Documents before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
STL/PD/2010/01/Rev.1, 23 April 2012; STL RPE, rule 87 (B).   
2519 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 18 May 2012, para. 31. 
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jurisdiction and legality of the STL and argued, during the on-going pre-trial 
stage, for the legality of the STL constitution before the Trial Chamber,2520 which 
after holding a hearing to allow the parties and the legal representative to 
develop their arguments, to respond to the opposing submissions, and to answer 
questions from the bench,2521 dismissed the defence motions.2522 Although 
probably the STL would have reached the same conclusion even without victim 
participants’ observations, these are of at least highly symbolic importance as 
victims were able to present their views about the very legality of the STL 
constitution during the pre-trial stage. Another example is constituted by 
observations of the victim participants’ legal representative concerning the 
defence’s motion for stay of proceedings in Ayyash et al.2523 
Fourth, concerning access to documents and filings, the Pre-Trial Judge 
interpreted rule 87 (A), which reads as follows:  
 
Unless the Pre-Trial Judge or the Trial Chamber, proprio motu or at the request 
of either Party, determines any appropriate restriction in the interests of justice, 
a victim participating in the proceedings is entitled to receive documents filed 
by the Parties, in so far as they have been disclosed by one Party to the other as 
well as the file, excluding any confidential and ex parte material, handed over by 
the Pre-Trial Judge to the Trial Chamber before commencement of trial 
pursuant to Rule 95. 
 
The Pre-Trial Judge found three unclear aspects in this provision. First, 
concerning the meaning of ‘disclosed’ whereas the English version of the STL 
RPE entitles victim participants to receive documents filed by the parties 
provided that they have been ‘disclosed by one Party to the other’, the French 
version establishes that ‘dans la mesure où lesdits documents ont été 
 
2520 Even though Ayyash et al. at the time of the decision was still in pre-trial phase, the Trial 
Chamber decided on the defence challenges posed since according to rule 90 (A) (i) preliminary 
motions on challenge of jurisdiction shall be disposed by the Trial Chamber.   
2521 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), Decision on the Defence Challenges to the Jurisdiction and 
Legality of the Tribunal, Trial Chamber, 27 July 2012, para. 4. See also Ayyash et al. (STL-11-
01/PT/TC), Observations of Legal Representative for Victims on Illegality Motions, Legal 
Representative for Victims, 6 June 2012. Even though Ayyash et al. at the time of the decision was 
still in pre-trial phase, the Trial Chamber decided on the defence challenges posed since according 
to rule 90 (A) (i) preliminary motions on challenge of jurisdiction shall be disposed by the Trial 
Chamber.     
2522 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 27 July 2012, para. 2 and p. 31. 
2523 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Observations of the Legal Representative of Victims on the 
“Sabra Defence Motion for Stay of Proceedings Due to Lebanon’s Failure to Cooperate with the 
Defence”, Legal Representative of Victims, 17 October 2013.  
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communiqués’.2524 The Judge in interpreting other STL RPE provisions 
understood that the phrase ‘disclosed by one Party to the other’ to mean 
‘communicated to or provided by’ one party to another.2525 Thus, ‘“Disclosure by 
one Party to the other” in Rule 87(A) of the Rule does not mean “disclosure” in 
the technical sense’.2526 Second, concerning the legal representative’s access to 
documents, the Judge noticed that although rule 87 (A) is clear in precluding 
victim participants from accessing confidential and ex parte material which 
includes the more sensitive category of under seal and ex parte with limited 
distribution materials, what remained to be determined was whether that rule 
grants the legal representative’s access to documents classified as 
‘confidential’.2527 The Pre-Trial Judge concluded that the legal representatives 
should be granted access to all documents filed confidentially subject to certain 
conditions in order to ‘ensure and promote the effective and efficient 
participation of victims in the proceedings’.2528 These conditions are that the 
security of individuals and organizations will not adversely be affected,2529 and 
that ‘the access to confidential documents is limited to the Legal Representative 
and cannot be extended to include his clients’.2530 In principle, hence, (s)he 
cannot provide received confidential materials to the victim participants unless 
(s)he has received first the consent of the party who provided the material and, 
when there is no consent, the Pre-Trial Judge can be asked to decide on a case-
by-case basis.2531 The Pre-Trial Judge also noticed that further ‘conditions of 
strict confidentiality’ may be applicable when the legal representative seeks to 
transmit materials to dual status victim participant-victim witness.2532 Third, 
concerning the meaning of ‘receive’ under rule 87 (A), the Pre-Trial Judge 
preferred the English version over the French version, which is reminiscent of 
‘inspection’ as otherwise ‘the legal representative’s ability effectively to be able to 
represent the views and concerns of the victims and exercise his mandate’ would 
be weakened and, hence, the legal representative is entitled to receive the 
materials in question.2533 
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2524 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 18 May 2012, para. 43.     
2525 Ibid., paras. 44-46 (referring to rules 110 and 122, especially rules 110 (A), 112 (A), 112 bis and 
113).  
2526 Ibid., para. 46. 
2527 Ibid., para. 49. 
2528 Ibid., para. 50. 
2529 Ibid., para. 55. 
2530 Ibid., para. 57. 
2531 Ibid., para. 57. 
2532 Ibid., para. 62. 
2533 Ibid., para. 54. 
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Fifth, concerning the legal representative’s access to disclosure materials, 
the Pre-Trial Judge noted that there is no provision in the STL RPE that 
explicitly entitles the victim participants’ legal representatives to receive 
disclosure materials provided by one party to another.2534 He also referred to his 
previous finding, under rule 87 (A), according to which the legal representative 
is not entitled to receive disclosure materials but only public and confidential 
documents filed by the parties.2535 Under the analysis of the legal representative’s 
access to disclosure materials, Pre-Trial Judge followed three categories: i) 
supporting materials; ii) remaining disclosure materials; and iii) disclosure 
materials and anonymous victim participants. 
Concerning supporting materials, according to rule 87 (A), victim 
participants have access to the file transmitted by the Pre-Trial Judge to the Trial 
Chamber before the beginning of the trial, in application of rule 95 (A) (ii). The 
case file contains, according to rule 95 (A) (ii), inter alia ‘any evidentiary 
material received by [the Pre-Trial Judge]’, which in turn includes the material 
submitted for confirmation by the Prosecutor in support of his indictment.2536 
Based on the above-mentioned and rule 87 (A), the Pre-Trial Judge concluded 
that legal representatives are entitled to receive indictment supporting materials, 
subject to any restriction that the Pre-Trial Judge or the Trial Chamber may 
determine in the interests of justice, at such times as they are transmitted to the 
Trial Chamber in accordance with rule 95 (A) (ii).2537 Although the Judge noticed 
that article 87 (A) is a novel provision, he added that the extent that victims 
participants (ICC) or civil parties (ECCC) have access to evidence, varies 
depending on the RPE and how they are interpreted.2538 Nevertheless, with 
special reference to the ICC, the Judge concluded that access to evidentiary 
material is ‘generally treated as prerogative of the parties. Therefore, the victim’s 
right of access to evidence tends to be narrowly interpreted’.2539 The Pre-Trial 
Judge added that the automatic access ensures victims’ effective participation 
and serves the celerity of the proceedings as avoids inter partes litigation of the 
question, which has been present at the other courts.2540 In any case, the Judge 
also stated that conditions as for the security of individuals and organizations are 
applicable to the legal representative’s access to the supporting materials and the 
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2534 Ibid., para. 70. 
2535 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2536 Ibid., para. 71. 
2537 Ibid., para. 72. 
2538 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2539 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2540 Ibid., para. 73. 
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legal representative is bound by the same confidentiality obligations in his 
communications with the victim participants and/or with third parties that are 
applicable to confidential filings.2541 As for the modalities of legal representative’s 
access to confidential documents, the Pre-Trial Judge considered that, in order 
for the victim participants to produce documents required by rule 91 (H), i.e., 
the list of witnesses they would like the Trial Chamber to call at trial and the list 
of exhibits they would like the Trial Chamber to admit into evidence,2542 and to 
elaborate arguments on the facts of the case, the legal representative has to be in 
a position to prepare the case and, hence, (s)he ‘needs to receive the relevant 
supporting materials before the case file is handed over to the Trial Chamber, 
and not at the time of transmission’.2543  
As for the remaining disclosure materials, the Pre-Trial Judge also 
acknowledged the legal representative’s need to access to such materials in the 
same format as made available to the party to which they were disclosed so that 
victims’ participation be effective and subject to the same conditions and 
restrictions applicable to other disclosure materials.2544  
Concerning disclosure materials and anonymous victim participants, the 
Pre-Trial Judge concluded that even if victims are allowed to participate 
anonymously, they have to do it like the rest of victim participants via the same 
common legal representative, who ‘is in principle precluded from providing such 
materials’ to them.2545  
In addition to the five broad categories of modalities of 
participation/procedural rights just examined, some comments follow 
concerning legal representation of victim participants. It is first necessary to 
mention that according to rule 86 (C) (ii) ‘A victim participating in the 
proceedings may only do so through a legal representative unless the Pre-Trial 
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2541 Ibid., paras. 73-75. 
2542 These filings are part of the case file, according to rule 95 (A) (i) and, as part of the Pre-Trial 
Judge’s obligations in application of rule 95 (A) (vii), (s)he has to include in the case file: ‘a detailed 
report setting out: (a) the arguments of the Parties and the victim participating in the proceedings 
on the facts and the applicable law; […] (c) the probative material produced by each Party and by 
the victims participating in the proceedings’. Ibid., para, 76. 
2543 Ibid., para. 77. 
2544 Ibid., para. 79. 
2545 Ibid., para. 80. It is important to mention that the Pre-Trial Judge concluded that the same 
regime applicable to victim participants shall apply, mutatis mutandi, to the VPU’s access to 
documents and disclosure of materials. However, the Pre-Trial Judge concluded that the VPU does 
not need to have automatic access to all confidential filings to perform this function, being 
sufficient that the VPU be provided with a list of all the documents filed by the parties. See Ibid., 
paras. 89-95.     
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Judge authorises otherwise’. Participation via legal representatives has been 
applied in Ayyash et al.2546 Additionally, in application of rule 86 (C), victim 
participants in the proceedings are presumed to be treated as a single group, 
which is the case in Ayyash et al,2547 unless valid reasons according to rule 86 (D) 
(i) justifies not doing so.2548 If this is the case, the Pre-Trial Judge shall divide 
victim participants into groups with common legal representation, taking into 
account, inter alia ‘(i) any conflicting interests that may hinder common 
representation; (ii) any shared or similar interests that may facilitate common 
representation […]’.2549 This decision may not be appealed.2550 Victim 
participants authorized in a second and a third decisions in Ayyash et al. to 
participate in proceedings were asked to form part of the group of victims 
already constituted.2551 The provision on designation of one legal representative 
to act on behalf of multiple victims constitutes a mechanism envisioned by the 
STL RPE drafters to avoid the ‘flooding’ of the STL.2552 It should be mentioned 
that matters concerning the designation by the Registrar of one legal 
representative, i.e., one lead legal representative for the victim participants, who 
is responsible for all aspects of his/her clients’ participation at the STL,2553 and 
who can be assisted by one or more co-legal representatives, is fleshed out under 
the Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation,2554 including a remedy against 
such designation decided by the Pre-Trial Judge, in consultation with the 
Presiding Judge of the Chamber if applicable.2555 In Ayyash et al., the Registrar 
designated one lead legal representative and two co-legal representatives for the 
victim participants.2556     
Although according to VPU’s observations some victims allegedly 
expressed their desire not to be associated with other victims’ certain political 
interests, the Pre-Trial Judge in Ayyash et al., appropriately noticed that, if any, 
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2546 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, para. 112; Ayyash (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 3 
September 2012, para. 14.     
2547 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, para. 127.  
2548 Ibid., paras. 119 and 120.  
2549 STL RPE, rule 86 (D). 
2550 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
2551 See, respectively, Ayyash (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 3 September 2012, para. 16; Ayyash (STL-11-
01/PT/PTJ), 28 November 2012, p. 5.       
2552 STL President (2010) para. 19; STL President (2012) para. 19.   
2553 STL Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation, article 24. 
2554 Ibid., articles 16-17. 
2555 Ibid., articles 22 and 23. 
2556 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), Designation of Victims’ Legal Representatives, Registrar, 16 
May 2012, p. 7.  


such interests should not influence the decision on whether victim participants 
should be divided into groups.2557 This is coherent since rule 86 (D) provides 
legal criteria upon which that decision should be exclusively taken.2558 Indeed, to 
arrive to the decision in question not only victim participants’ interests have to 
be considered but also broader interests such as the accused’s right to a fair and 
expeditious trial, which is part of the Pre-Trial Judge’s obligations.2559   
As for the decision to release a provisionally detained suspect, the STL 
RPE only refer to the Prosecutor and defence concerning appeals of a decision 
on this issue.2560 Indeed, victims’ exact role in appeals is not determined as rule 
87 (D) only establishes that they ‘may participate in a manner deemed 
appropriate by the Appeals Chamber’. Accordingly, the STL should determine 
via judicial interpretation whether victim participants can participate during the 
appeals proceedings on releasing a provisionally detained person. In any case, for 
example, Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on whether victim participants should be 
divided into groups is explicitly not subject to appeals according to rule 86 
(D).2561 Victim participants’ status during appeals proceedings is examined in 
further detail later.2562  
 
3.5. Comparative Conclusions 
At the ICC and the ECCC, victims without the need of holding the victim 
participant or civil party status, can report crimes as complainants, which is also 
similar to the situation existent in the discussed national systems. At the ICTY 
and the ICTR, some victims’ ‘participation’ during the investigation has taken 
place when, via NGOs letters, approached the Prosecutor. Unlike national 
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2557 Ayyash (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, para. 124. 
2558 Ibid, Loc. cit. 
2559 See Ibid., para. 120; and STL RPE, rule 86 (D) (iii). 
2560 STL RPE, rule 102 (C).  
2561 It should be added that the Pre-Trial Judge can exceptionally gather evidence at: i) the request 
of victim participant if this demonstrates on balance of probabilities that (s)he is not in a position 
to collect evidence, and the Pre-trial Judge considers that doing so is in the interests of justice (STL 
RPE, rule 92 (A)); or ii) where the victim participant is unable to collect ‘an important piece of 
evidence’ and the Pre-Trial Judge considers that it is indispensable to the fair administration of 
justice, the equality of arms and the search for truth (STL RPE, rule 92 (C)). In any case, evidence 
collected in this manner still needs to be introduced by the victim participant and also (s)he 
remains free from doing so. This constitutes a major difference from evidence collected by the 
French Juge d’instruction (Investigating Judge), which normally becomes available to a trial court 
without any victim’s initiative. See STL President (2010), para. 12 (xi); STL President (2012), para. 
12 (xi).    
2562 See infra Chapter IV 6.4.1.2 and 6.4.2.2.  
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systems, victims cannot initiate prosecutions at the ECCC, the ICC and the STL 
(and also at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL). However, at the national level, 
the so-called private prosecutions have proven to be mainly of symbolic value 
and of very limited application. Under the ICC Statute, victims without holding 
the official victim participant status, i.e., without being granted the formal victim 
participant status upon application, can participate in some specific proceedings, 
i.e., making representations in Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigations and 
submitting observations on challenges to jurisdiction of the ICC or admissibility 
of the case.  
Unlike the STL, victims at the ICC can participate as victim participants 
sensu stricto, as early as the investigation stage of a situation based on a 
terminological, contextual and teleological interpretation of the ICC Statute 
developed by the ICC’s case law. Such approach can in principle be considered as 
advisable due to existence of victim participants’ interests during the 
investigation, which in a more general level reinforces the victim participants’ 
status and is coherent with a restorative-oriented justice paradigm. However, 
paying attention to understandable concerns regarding the efficiency and 
fairness of the proceedings, problems with Prosecutor’s independence as well as 
creation of unrealistic expectations for victim participants, the Appeals Chamber 
decided to revisit victims’ participation during the investigation stage of a 
situation. The outcome, which has been implemented by the Pre-Trial 
Chambers, has reached a satisfactory half-way solution since victim participants 
can still participate during the investigation but only within the context of 
judicial proceedings and not, unlike the previous approach adopted by the Pre-
Trial Chambers, as a matter of a general right during the investigation seen as a 
whole stage. At the pre-trial stage of a case, victims can normally participate in 
the respective proceedings, including confirmation of charges hearing, but 
victims participate neither in arrest warrant proceedings as they are normally 
issued under seal nor in the initial appearance of the suspect.  
With regard to the STL and in order to handle similar concerns about 
victims’ participation during the investigation, the STL RPE drafters decided to 
explicitly exclude it, i.e., victims can only participate once there is confirmation 
of an indictment. However, this decision can be criticized as extreme since it 
weakens the victims’ status. A half-way solution similar to the one adopted by 
the ICC would have been better especially considering the lower number of 
victim participants at the STL compared to the ICC or the ECCC and the fact the 
victim participants cannot claim reparations directly at the STL.  
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At the ECCC (similar to the STL as for victim participants), victims do 
not have an official role during the preliminary investigations conducted by the 
Co-Prosecutors, i.e., victims cannot participate as civil parties. During 
preliminary investigations, victims can only have the more limited status of 
victim complainants. At the ECCC, victims can participate as civil parties during 
judicial investigations conducted by the Co-Investigating Judges. These features 
at the ECCC are similar to the French inquisitorial system.  
As for modalities of victim participation/procedural rights for victim 
participants during pre-trial proceedings of a case, these present mutatis 
mutandi similarities at the ICC and the STL. The differences are mainly related 
to the fact that while victim participants can participate during the confirmation 
of charges at the ICC and, thus, the discussed rights apply mainly up to and 
during the confirmation of charges hearing, victims at the STL can only 
participate after confirmation of the indictment and, thus, the examined rights 
apply from that moment onwards. The victim participants’ modalities of 
participation/procedural rights are, in a lesser degree, similar to those available 
to civil parties at the ECCC, where victims as civil parties hold additional 
procedural rights. It should be noticed that although in the Anglo-American 
adversarial systems, victims cannot be civil parties (ECCC, French system) or 
victim participants (in the sense of the ICC and the STL), they can exercise some 
procedural rights such as attend specific hearings and even being heard in 
specific proceedings, e.g., plea bargains, release of the accused, have their 
interests considered in prosecutorial decisions and being informed thereof, 
which may be considered as stronger than victims’ avenues of ‘participation’ at 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL.  
Following the scheme adopted by the ICC for victims’ participation 
during the pre-trial stage of a case (in particular during confirmation of charges), 
it is possible to identify six main categories of modalities of 
participation/procedural rights at the ICC. First, access to the case record, 
evidence of the Prosecutor and defence included but access to ex parte 
information is excluded. Second, making submissions on admissibility and 
probative value of the evidence on which the Prosecution and the defence intend 
to rely during the confirmation of charges hearing and examine it. Third, 
examination of any witness called by the Prosecution or defence at the 
confirmation of charges hearing. Fourth, attendance at public and closed 
hearings leading up to and during the confirmation of charges, excepted the ex 
parte hearings. Fifth, participation through oral motions, responses and 
submissions in all hearings to which victim participants have the right to attend 
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and in matters not excluded by the ICC legal instruments. Sixth, filing of written 
motions, responses and replies on matters not excluded by the ICC legal 
instruments. It should be noticed that disclosure issues concerning victim 
participants after the confirmation of charges leading up to the beginning of the 
trial and during trial are discussed in the next sub-chapter on trial.   
ICC Pre-Trial Chambers have adopted different approaches on whether 
anonymous victim participants and non-anonymous victim participants should 
be granted similar rights. Where such distinction existed, anonymous victim 
participants’ procedural rights have been limited mainly due to the prohibition 
of anonymous accusations. In any case, anonymous victim participants cannot 
access confidential filings and close hearings. However, the differentiation 
between ones and the others, at the practical level, is not of a big impact as 
lawyers concurrently represent both kinds of victim participants. On another 
note, victim participants lack investigative powers, independent from the 
Prosecutor, and thus they have to request the Prosecutor to undertake certain 
investigative steps if needed. Although victim participants can challenge 
evidence filed by the parties during the confirmation of charges hearing, they 
cannot introduce evidence additional to that presented by the parties during pre-
trial, which is coherent with their status of victim participants and not civil 
parties (ECCC). Finally, under the ICC RPE, the Pre-Trial Chamber can seek 
views of victims (regardless of holding the victim participant status) as for the 
conditional release of a suspect. The ICC Appeals Chamber, as for those holding 
the victim participant status, has determined that they can participate in pre-trial 
detention appeals but not as a matter of automatic right.   
As for the ECCC, it is possible to identify the following main categories 
of civil parties’ rights during pre-trial proceedings, i.e., during the ECCC judicial 
investigation. First, as a party, the right to consult and examine the dossier. 
Second, the Co-Investigating Judges can call civil parties in order to confront the 
charged person, who can be questioned by civil parties’ lawyers. Third, unlike 
the ICC and the STL, civil parties have the right to request the Co-Investigating 
Judges to conduct specific investigations on behalf of the civil parties but these 
investigations still have to be related to the Co-Prosecutors’ investigations. Civil 
parties may request the Co-Investigating Judges to interview them, question 
witnesses, go to a site, order expertise or collect evidence on the civil party’s 
behalf. Fourth, civil parties may request and propose witnesses. Fifth, civil 
parties may attend and participate in the pre-trial proceedings via written and 
oral interventions. Nevertheless, they cannot participate in all hearings. Even 
though civil parties cannot participate during pre-trial hearings on provisional 
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detention, the Pre-Trial Chamber allowed such participation in appeals against 
provisional detention and even one of the civil parties participated directly. 
However, via amendment of the Internal Rules, civil parties who are represented 
can only participate via their legal representatives to avoid disruptions similar to 
those experienced during the detention appeals in Case 002 and considering that 
parties have different positions in criminal proceedings which even change 
through stages. Sixth, right to support the prosecution. With the exception of 
participation in provisional detention appeals, the other rights of civil parties at 
the ECCC are similar to the ones granted to civil parties during the preparing 
instruction stage in the French inquisitorial system.  
As for the STL, it is possible (following its Pre-Trial Judge’s first 
decision) to identify the following main groups of modalities of victims’ 
participation, via their legal representatives, during pre-trial proceedings. First, 
right to attend and participate in meetings, conferences and hearings where 
victim participants’ interests are affected. Second, right to receive public 
transcripts and minutes, and also transcripts/portions of status 
conferences/hearings and minutes of hearings in camera or ex parte 
corresponding to the duration for which the representative was present. Third, 
filing of responses, replies, motions and briefs on any issue affecting victims’ 
personal interests. Fourth, access to documents and files, except confidential and 
ex parte material. However, for victims’ legal representatives, it is possible to 
have access to confidential material but under security measures and if the 
representatives do not share the accessed information with their clients. Fifth, 
access to materials ‘disclosed’ by one party to the other, and the right to access 
the case file transmitted by the Pre-Trial Judge to the Trial Chamber before the 
beginning of the trial, except for confidential (or under seal) and ex parte 
documents. The access to disclosure materials has to be conducted under 
security conditions. The same regime of disclosure materials is applicable to 
anonymous victim participants as, alongside non-anonymous victim 
participants, have the same common legal representatives. In addition to the 
discussed modalities of participation, it should be observed that concerning 
participation on appeals of a suspect’s release, the STL RPE only refer to the 
parties and, hence, it remains to be seen whether the STL will allow victim 
participation on this issue like the ICC and the ECCC did.   
Concerning victims’ legal representation, whereas the STL RPE explicitly 
require that victims participate through a legal representative unless otherwise 
determined, the ICC RPE do not contain such explicit provision although in 
practice victims’ participation at the ICC is mostly conducted via legal 
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representatives. As for the ECCC, the Internal Rules only request the civil parties 
to be represented to participate from the closing order, which puts end to the 
judicial investigation and gets the case ready for trial, onwards. In the French 
system, intermediation exists when civil parties can have access to the dossier but 
via their lawyers. Under the ICC and the STL instruments, victim participants 
have in practice grouped themselves/been grouped together and, thus, 
participated via common legal representatives. Although the ECCC Internal 
Rules refer to civil parties’ individual representation, it is provided the possibility 
to group civil parties under common legal representation, which has actually 
been the ECCC’s practice. Victim participants or civil parties can constitute 
groups with common representation or the respective Chambers/Judges can do 
it because of interests of justice and effectiveness. When the ICC, the ECCC and 
the STL appoint common legal representatives, the interests of victim 
participants or civil parties need to be considered according to the instruments 
of those courts. At the ECCC and the ICC, when civil parties and victim 
participants respectively have been grouped or have grouped themselves criteria 
such as geographical, ethnic origin and harm have been considered.  
 
4. Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings   
This subchapter examines in detail the modalities of participation/procedural 
rights of victim participants (ICC, STL) and civil parties (ECCC) in trial 
proceedings. Especial attention is drawn to how the practice of the ICC and the 
practice of the ECCC (no trial has started yet at the STL at the moment of 
writing this thesis) has expanded or restricted the victims’ scope of participation. 
The most relevant legal issues arising out of the complex participation regime of 
victim participants/civil parties are considered in a systematic manner, taking 
into account its impact on the efficiency of the proceedings, accused’s right to a 
fair and impartial trial and the benefits for the victims themselves. As for the 
ICTY, the ICTR and the STL the practice of amicus curiae briefs is examined as a 
sort of ‘participation’. It should be mentioned that, for methodological purposes, 
even concerning the ECCC where the trial is not divided into trial and 
sentencing stages, victims’ participation during trial and sentencing are 
discussed separately.  
 
4.1. National Systems  
4.1.1. English Adversarial System 
To begin with, it should be remembered that victims still lack standing in the 
criminal proceedings during trial in England and Wales. In spite of recent 
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initiatives to place the victim in a better position in the criminal proceedings, 
victims’ status has not changed. The current situation of victims in trial 
proceedings and attempts to strengthen their status but without bringing about a 
substantial change are captured in the Criminal Justice System Consultation 
Paper ‘Hearing the Relatives of Murder and Manslaughter’.2563 Even though it 
was suggested the introduction of victims’ advocates (qualified lawyers or lay 
people) in murder and manslaughter cases, it was explicitly clarified that:  
 
[…] it is not proposed that a victim’s advocate would participate in the trial as a 
party to it, for example, he or she would not examine or cross-examine 
witnesses, or make submissions or speeches which addressed the issue of guilt 
or innocence.2564  
 
The English criminal system does not grant a specific procedural role to 
the victim either as victim participants or not to mention as a civil party. 
Accordingly, during the trial proceedings, the victim is not considered as such 
and, hence, victims have very little room to voice all the information they might 
wish to express during the trial stage. Therefore, the role of victims during trial is 
limited to that of witnesses.   
Concerning witness’s participation during trial, as previously 
discussed,2565 the manner how the principle of orality has been implemented into 
the English adversarial system does not pay due attention to the contemporary 
understanding of how victims are affected by serious crimes or how witnesses 
recollect and may be persuaded to recount what they remember to have 
happened to them.2566 Moreover, although issues concerning crimes against 
victims are examined during trial, victims are reduced to mere passive spectators 
or, in the best case scenario, called in by the prosecution but limited to provide 
evidence in their role as witnesses, which does not enable them to effectively 
voice their views and concerns or exercise procedural rights. This severe 
limitation at the trial stage particularly waters down the overall status of the 
victim as, during trial, the criminal responsibility of the accused is precisely at 
stake. Moreover, when victims participate as witnesses, the prosecution does not 
act as their legal representatives, which is explicitly stated in the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors ‘the prosecution service does not act for victims or their families in 
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2563 Criminal Justice System//United Kingdom Home Office, Hearing the Relatives of Murder and 
Manslaughter Victims. Consultation Paper, September 2005.  
2564 Ibid., 14. 
2565 See supra Chapter III 2.1.1.  
2566 Shapland and Hall (2010) 175. 
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the same way as solicitors act for their clients, and prosecutors must form an 
overall view of the public interest’.2567  
Furthermore, the lack of victim representation in England and Wales, 
may be considered as a notorious sign of how weak victims’ situation in trial is 
even when compared to other adversarial systems such as the American and 
Irish ones.2568 Thus, although there have been some proposals to introduce some 
formal representation for victims, those have been rejected. Reasons for such 
rejections consisted in that introducing substantial changes to the procedures 
was not justified by their limited effect on the judge’s duty to prevent oppressive 
or unnecessary questioning,2569 and this kind of victim’s participation does not fit 
into the two partisan adversarial proceedings and ‘care must be taken, in 
particular when there is an issue as to guilt, not to treat him [the accused], in a 
way that appears to prejudge the resolution of that issue’.2570  
All in all, the Consultation Paper ‘Hearing the Relatives of Murder and 
Manslaughter Victims’, already referred to, proposed a scheme for victims to 
assist relatives of homicide victims. Not only did this document foresee that 
advocates would assist the victim at the sentencing stage, but it was also 
envisioned that representatives would give advice and support to the relative up 
to and during the trial so that they are maintained informed and more engaged 
in the process.2571 Besides, the important caveat that the victim’s advocate would 
not participate as a party, as already mentioned; however, when the Consultation 
Paper was piloted ‘such a reform, at the trial stage essentially provides a 
translation service, rather than making the trial itself comprehensible to lay 
people’.2572 In any case, victims have to be notified of the date of all criminal 
court hearings, which includes to ‘set down for consideration of an amendment 
to the sentence originally passed, and any subsequent amendments to that date 
[...]’.2573 It should be mentioned that the role of amicus curiae,2574 in England, 
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2567 The Code for Crown Prosecutors (2010), 4.19. 
2568 See Doak (2008) 141-143. 
2569 Criminal Law Revision Committee (1984) Sexual Offences (Cmnd 1923) 2.100.   
2570 Robin Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (Cmnd 9376) (HSMO 2002), 
Chapter 11, para. 74. 
2571 Doak (2008) 146. 
2572 Shapland and Hall (2010) 174. 
2573 Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, section 6.4. 
2574 It should be born in mind that an amicus curiae, or a friend of the court, is a established 
institution of domestic common law courts and, its traditional role has been understood as ‘A 
friend of the court. A term applied to a bystander, who without having an interest in the cause, of 
his own knowledge makes suggestion on a point of law or of fact for the information of the 
presiding judge’. Benjamin Abbot, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English 
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continues to be of a provider of impartial information to the court.2575 Hence, a 
potential avenue to have the victims’ interests represented at least indirectly 
during trial is closed.       
Finally, under the EU Framework Decision on Victims, it was, inter alia, 
established that ‘Each Member State shall safeguard the possibility for victims to 
be heard during proceedings and to supply evidence’ and the right to receive 
information.2576 The EU Directive on Victims contains similar provisions 
although these are more detailed, including: i) right to be heard, i.e., victims may 
be heard and may provide evidence;2577 ii) right to receive information about 
their case;2578 iii) right to understand and to be understood;2579 and iv) right to 
interpretation and translation.2580  
 
4.1.2. American Adversarial System  
In the American system, victims lack the status of civil parties or the official 
status of victim participants. Accordingly, victims are not entitled to make any 
sort of statement to the jury or, in general, to participate in any manner during 
trial and, victims can only address the jury if the Prosecutor decides to call 
him/her as witness and ask questions.2581 Although numerous victims’ rights 
statutes provide victims a right to be heard, none of them provides victims the 
right to be heard at trial; however, those instruments ‘give victims the right to be 
heard at other points in the process-bail hearings, plea bargain hearings, 
sentencings, and parole hearings’.2582  
In the United States, some individual states have introduced the victims’ 
right to have their legal representative present although (s)he is not involved. 
Other states have even allowed victims to hire their own lawyers to represent 
them in different criminal proceedings, mainly during parole hearings, plea 
bargain and sentencing, and some others have gone further by enabling victims’ 
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Jurisprudence (Little, Brown & Co, Boston 1879). Cited by Sarah Williams and Hannah Woolaver, 
‘The Role of the Amicus curiae before International Criminal Tribunals’ (2006) 6 International 
Criminal Law Review 151, 151.   
2575 Allen v. Sir Albert McAlpine & Sons Litd. [1968] 2 Q.B. 229, 266 (‘the role of the amicus curiae 
[is] to help the court by expounding the law impartially’.).  
2576 EU Framework Decision on Victims, articles 3-5.  
2577 EU Directive on Victims, article 10. 
2578 Ibid., article 6. 
2579 Ibid., article 3. 
2580 Ibid., article 7.  
2581 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 495. 
2582 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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lawyers to intervene in rape and sexual assault trials,2583 as well by allowing 
representations from victims’ lawyers when the accused claims illegal or 
improper conduct from the victim as part of his/her defence.2584 Additionally, it 
has been speculated that the real participation by victims’ lawyers in the states is 
indeed more often than widely thought or officially provided for in state 
statutes.2585      
As for the right to attend trial, victims when assuming their role of 
witnesses are traditionally excluded from court proceedings to avoid the risk that 
a witness’s testimony is influenced or contaminated by just observing and/or 
listening to other witnesses’ testimonies previously given. The Federal Rules of 
Evidence (Rule 615) re-state this general rule but including four exceptions, one 
of which is when ‘a person [is] authorized by statute to be present’.2586 Due to 
criticism from advocates of victims’ rights, most states and the federal 
government have enacted legislation laying down victims’ unqualified rights for 
victims to attend trials (including the CVRA),2587 or qualified rights when there 
are possible adverse effects on criminal defendants.2588 Moreover, the Ninth 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Mikhel v. D. Ct. concluded that the 
CVRA: 
 
[...] abrogated Rule 615, at least with respect to crime victims. A mere possibility 
that a victim-witness may alter his or her testimony as a result of hearing others 
testify is therefore insufficient to justify excluding him or her from trial. Rather, 
a district court must find by clear and convincing evidence that it is highly likely 
not merely possible, that the victim-witness will alter his or her testimony.2589      
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2583 See the cases of the states of Wisconsin, West Virginia and New Hampshire. See Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victims’ Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the Defendant’ in N.Y.U. 
Annual Survey of American Law (1989) 135, 146. Cited by Doak (2008) 141.  
2584 See Doak (2008) 142, footnote 157 (citing the South Carolina Statute, § 16-3-1510. S 3 F(2) (‘A 
victim or witness has the right to retain counsel in court to represent him in cases involving the 
victim’s reputation’.)).  
2585 See Ibid., Loc. cit. (citing American law literature).  
2586 US Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 615 (d).  
2587 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a) (3) (‘A crime victims has the following rights: […] The right not to be 
excluded from any […] public court proceeding unless the court, after receiving clear and 
convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the 
victim heard other testimony at that proceeding’); Alaska Const., art. I, § 24; and Arkansas Rule 
Evid. 616.  
2588 Kansas  Constitution, article 15, § 15; LA. Evid., article 615; and Mich. Comp. Laws § 780.761 
(1998).  
2589 In re Mikhel v. D. Ct. 453 F.3d 1137, 1139-1140 (9th Cir. 2006). See also United States v. 
Johnson, 362 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1056 (N.D. Iowa 2006).    
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Indeed, it has been concluded that a defendant does not have ‘a 
constitutional right to exclude witnesses from the courtroom’.2590 Concerning the 
victim’s right to sit at counsel table (prosecution side), whereas there is no 
modern federal case on the propriety of allowing a victim who is not also a case 
agent to sit at counsel table, this issue is left to the state court’s discretion.2591 
Indeed, in some states, the prosecutor has to represent that the victim’s presence 
at counsel table will assist him/her in the prosecution.2592 Moreover, under 
Alabama law, victims are entitled to sit at counsel table, independently from 
victims’ assistance to the prosecutor.2593 A person, i.e., a victim’s advocate, friend 
or relative, is allowed to accompany the victim when this attends or testify in the 
courtroom.2594 In general, victims’ rights legislation enables victims to, inter alia, 
be notified of criminal or juvenile proceedings, be present and heard at 
important hearings; however, the right to be notified and present at trial does 
not incorporate the right to be heard during the guilt phase of the criminal 
proceedings.2595 Lastly, but equally important, since the amicus curiae is 
currently perceived as a partisan advocate rather than as a neutral informer in 
the United States,2596 amicus curiae briefs enable to at least partially fill a gap to 
represent interests beyond the two traditional parties, i.e., victims’ interests.             
 
4.1.3. French Inquisitorial System  
As a preliminary point, it should be mentioned that who intervenes, his/her role 
and powers may differ based on whether the crime is: i) a contravention (petty 
offence), judged at first instance by the tribunal de police; ii) a délit 
(misdemeanor), judged at first instance by the tribunal correctionnel; iii) or a 
crime (felony), judged at first instance by the cour d’assises.2597 Without entering 
into details of each of those three jurisdictions, which would go beyond the scope 
of this thesis, modalities of participation/procedural rights of civil parties during 
trial are presented here in general.2598 Accordingly, during trial, the civil party 
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2590 United States v. Edwards, 526, F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 2008). 
2591 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 492.  
2592 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2593 Alabama Code, § 15-14-53. 
2594 See, e.g., Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated, § 16-10-401.   
2595 See, e.g., Utah Code Annotated, § 77-37-3; § 77-38-3 &-4; § 77-38-2(5); § 77-38-3; § 77-38-4(1) 
& (2). See also State v. Harrison, 24 P.3d 936 (Utah 2001).  
2596 Supreme Court Rules, rule 37. See also Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 
(1954); Samuel Krislov, ‘The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy’ in (1963) 72 Yale 
Law Journal 694-721. 
2597 Dervieux (2002) 230-231, 244. 
2598 For details on this see Ibid., 244-248. 
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holds the right to bring his/her claim for reparation, which is examined in the 
next chapter. The other aspects of the civil parties’ modalities of participation are 
examined herein as follows.    
First, concerning the right to pose questions, the civil party’s lawyer 
before the cour d’assises and the tribunal correctionnel can pose questions 
directly to the accused, his/her clients, witnesses and everyone called to the 
court, without the need for doing so via the president.2599 The same power is 
applicable with regard to expert witnesses.2600 However, if the civil party as such 
wishes to pose questions, (s)he has to do it via the president,2601 which may be 
considered as an obstacle for the victim who desires to be involved in a direct 
and explanatory dialogue with the perpetrator.2602 Accordingly, the civil party 
should be informed prior to the hearing in order to avoid any inconvenience 
when (s)he participates.        
Second, at the tribunal correctionnel, the victim can directly summon the 
accused or constitute himself/herself as a partie civile at the hearing, (s)he then 
produces his/her evidence at the hearing and the rules which exclude evidence 
obtained irregularly are not applicable to him/her.2603 The Cour de Cassation has 
actually stated that criminal judges should not be allowed to disregard evidence 
produced by the private parties, which includes civil parties, for the only reason 
that it may have been obtained illegally or unfairly as their task is merely to 
evaluate its probative value.2604 This is due to the fact that actions taken by the 
civil party do not constitute part of the instruction and, thus, are exempted from 
the rules on nullities, letting alone the fact that the court can only act on 
evidence debated in adversarial proceedings.2605 The civil party is examined 
together with the prosecutor as they begin the proceedings, and especially 
bearing in mind that they share the common duty to prove the facts that may 
establish the accused’s guilt.2606 Accordingly, the civil party has to bring evidence 
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2599 CPP, article 312 (before the Cour d’Assises); article 442-1 (before the Tribunal Correctionel).  
2600 Ibid., article 168. 
2601 See the same articles cited in the two previous footnotes.  
2602 Pignoux (2008) 301.  
2603 Dervieux (2002) 247. 
2604 Cass. Crim., 6 April 1994, Bull. crim. n° 136; Cass. Crim., 30 March 1999, Bull. crim. n° 59. 
Cited by Dervieux (2002) 263. 
2605 CPP, article 427-2. See also Dervieux (2002) 263. 
2606 Emmanuel Ntoko, The Civil Party in Criminal Trials: A Comparative Study-Guide to the 
Criminal Procedure Harmonization in Cameroon (1995) Master of Law Thesis, McGill University 
94. Available at: 
http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=22701&local_base=GEN01-
MCG02 (last visit on 20 October 2012).    
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to prove the existence of the facts that are material for his/her case, i.e., to get the 
accused found guilty so that (s)he can be granted the respective reparations. 
However, as examined in further detail later,2607 the civil party may still be 
granted reparations, for example, at state funds and courts, even if the defendant 
is acquitted.    
Third, the civil party may speak each time before the prosecutor is given 
the floor.2608 Although the civil party may replicate, the accused or his/her lawyer 
is the last to speak.2609 During the trial, witnesses called by the prosecutor, the 
civil party and the defence counsel are heard separately, one after the other, and 
testify orally. As already mentioned,2610 unlike the others, civil parties are not 
obligated to take an oath.2611 The civil party may testify on events, or on the 
character and the morals of the accused.2612 After his/her testimony is completed, 
questions may be posed to him/her by the presiding judge motu proprio or 
requested by one of the parties.2613    
Fourth, the civil party may bring his/her own lawyer.2614  
Fifth, the civil party may ask the court to visit the place of crime in order 
to find the truth and the civil party and his/her lawyer is called to assist.2615  
Sixth, the civil party may deposit records (conclusions).2616  
Seventh, the president of the cour d’assises may order the audio-
recording of the hearings and, upon request of the civil party, the audiovisual 
recording of the hearing and deposition, eventually employed in the appeals.2617 
As previously discussed,2618 civil parties’ right to ask closed hearings is very large 
in scope, which may conflict with the accused’s right to  a public trial.    
Eighth, civil parties have to be informed by all means of the date of 
hearing, especially in cases of proceedings in real time.2619 The civil party is 
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2607 See infra Chapter V 2.1.3. 
2608 CPP, article 460. 
2609 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2610 See supra Chapter III 2.1.3. 
2611 CPP, articles 103 and 452. 
2612 Ibid., articles 331, 335, 444 to 452 and 536. 
2613 Ibid., articles 312, 332, 454 and 536.  
2614 Ibid., article 424. 
2615 Ibid., article 456. 
2616 Ibid., article 459. 
2617 Cario (2010) 9. 
2618 See supra Chapter III 3.1.3.  
2619 CPP, article 393-1. Information concerning the date and location of a hearing should be given 
to the victim who reported the crime. See Ibid., article 391.    
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summoned to court,2620 and this summons includes the date and place of trial. 
Nevertheless, in practice, victims are only informed systematically if they are 
civil parties.2621 Therefore, an important number of victims do not notice, unless 
they become civil parties, that they will be granted almost no right, which 
includes the right to be informed. Although informing the victim of the 
proceedings and of possible assistance is in practice normally passed on to the 
victim’s lawyer, every victim should be provided with information on the general 
procedural rules and on the proceedings in court.2622  
Ninth, civil parties who do not speak fluent French have the right to an 
interpreter.2623 Also, a civil party who is deaf has the right to a sign language 
interpreter to help him/her, or communicate with him/her by writing if (s)he can 
read and write, or employ any other mechanical means to make it possible to 
communicate with him/her.2624    
Tenth, when there is a jury, its members have to swear that they shall not 
betray the victims’ interests.2625  
It is pertinent to note that the ECtHR in Perez v. France stated that 
article 6 (1) of the ECHR is applicable to civil parties who participate in trials.2626 
As examined,2627 unlike previous case law, it was determined that a civil party 
holds the right to a fair trial even when such victim has not brought a claim for 
financial reparation.2628 The applicability of article 6 (1), as correctly concluded 
by the ECtHR, is under the condition of ‘whether, from the moment when the 
applicant is joined as a civil party until the conclusion of those criminal 
proceedings, the civil component remains closely connected with the criminal 
component’.2629  
As seen, the procedural rights granted to victims as laid down in the CPP 
are in principle quite strong during trial, which corresponds to their status as 
civil parties. However, the real impact of those procedural rights has to do more 
with allowing victims to express freely their views and concerns although it may 
be felt that they are not particularly relevant under purely strict legal 
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2620 Ibid., article 420. 
2621 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 328. 
2622 Ibid., 329 (referring to Ministry of Justice, La Politique Pénale D’Aide Aux Victimes, Circular, 
13 July 1998).   
2623 CPP, article 407 (before the Tribunal Correctionnel); article 344 (before the Cour D’Assises).  
2624 Ibid., article 408 (délits); article 345 (crimes).  
2625 Ibid., article 304. 
2626 Perez v. France, Application No. 47287/99, Judgment, 12 February 2004, paras. 62-63. 
2627 See supra Chapter IV 2.1.3.   
2628 Perez v. France, Application No. 47287/99, Judgment, 12 February 2004, paras. 64-65. 
2629 Ibid., para. 70.  
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considerations.2630 Even if listening to victims is facultative for the judges, it is 
necessary for them to take the time to listen to the victims so that these, as civil 
parties, can express their suffering and try to get rid of it.2631  
 
4.2. The ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL 
4.2.1. General Considerations 
To begin with, it should be left clear herein that victims lack an official status as 
victim participants or as civil parties during trial at the ICTY, the ICTR and the 
SCSL. However, amicus curiae briefs may provide and have actually provided 
indirect avenues for victims to express some of their views and concerns. Rule 74 
(‘Amicus Curiae’) common to the RPE of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL 
reads as follows ‘A Chamber may, if it considers it desirable for the proper 
determination of the case, invite or grant leave to any State, organization or 
person to appear before it and make submissions on an issue specified by the 
Chamber’. 
Accordingly, amicus curiae submissions, to some extent, constitute some 
manner of victim’s ‘participation’ due to the fact that victims and their 
representatives may appear as amici at the respective tribunals.2632 However, even 
though the ICTY former Prosecutor Del Ponte supported the idea of victim 
participation indicating that she would ‘discuss with the judges the idea of 
allowing victims to present themselves through a lawyer in an Amicus Curiae 
procedure’,2633 the victim participant status as such during trial is inexistent at 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL. Having said so, rule 74 provides broad 
discretion to a Chamber to permit any individual or group to appear as an amici 
and can work under either invitation or spontaneous application.2634    
Taking into account the ICTR’s case law, it is possible to identify four 
rules on the admissibility of amicus curiae, namely, i) the relief sought must fall 
within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and not within that of the Prosecution or the 
defence; ii) the brief must deal with an issue which is relevant to the case at hand; 
iii) when the amicus curiae deals with legal and non-factual arguments, the 
amicus curiae applications will be granted much more readily; and iv) amicus 
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2630 Circulaire Du Cabinet du Garde des Sceaux, 20 May 2005, Présentation des Dispositifs Relatifs 
à l’Accueil des Victimes dans le Cadre du Procès Pénal, B. O Min. Just., 2005, No. 98. Cited by 
Pignoux (2008) 302, footnote 253.    
2631 Pignoux (2008) 302.  
2632 Brouwer (2005) 291; Heikkilä (2004) 155; Morris and Scharf (1995) 167.  
2633 Diplomatie Judiciaire, Compensating Victims With Guilty Money, Interview with Carla del 
Ponte, The Hague, 9 June 2000. Cited by Brouwer (2005) 293. 
2634 Williams and Woolaver (2006) 155.  
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curiae briefs must not be employed simply to advertise the views or causes of the 
applicants.2635 
 
4.2.2. Amicus Curiae Briefs Practice  
Amicus curiae briefs have been, for example, filed by women’s organizations and 
individuals to the Trial Chambers of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL to back 
up sexual violence victims. Thus, for instance, the Coalition for Women’s 
Human Rights in Conflict Situations, applied to file amicus curiae briefs to the 
competent ICTR Trial Chamber in Akayesu and Ntagerura et al. on a similar 
matter. In spite of such similarity, the amicus curiae briefs submitted had 
different outcomes. Thus, in Ntagerura et al., the Trial Chamber rejected the 
Coalition’s brief and stated that granting the amicus curiae would equal ‘to 
transgressing upon the independence of the Prosecutor and impugning the 
integrity of the Tribunal as an arbiter of international law’.2636 In contrast, 
although the competent ICTR Trial Chamber never decided on the amicus 
curiae brief submitted in Akayesu, it has been considered that it importantly 
contributed to the Trial Chamber’s decision on the need that subsequent 
investigations into sexual violence would have to be conducted by the 
Prosecutor.2637 Moreover, based on such further investigation, the Prosecutor 
found additional evidence of sexual violence to which the accused was linked 
and, thus, the Prosecutor amended the indictment to include charges of sexual 
crimes.2638 These different results in one and the other case may be explained by 
particular procedural circumstances. Thus, while in Akayesu the Prosecutor 
mainly underpinned the amicus curiae and requested to amend the indictment 
to incorporate sexual violence charges, the Prosecutor in Ntagerura et al. 
opposed the amicus curiae and did not request an amendment.2639  
In Bagosora et al., Belgium applied for leave to submit an amicus curiae 
brief on behalf of the Belgians who were prejudiced by the massacres in Rwanda 
 
2635 See Ibid., 170-172 (referring to ICTR’s jurisprudence) and also references to ICTR’s case law 
under the following subsection. 
2636 Ntagerura et al. (ICTR-99-46-T), Decision on the Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief 
According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Filed on Behalf of the NGO 
Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, Trial Chamber, 24 May 2001, para. 
22.  
2637 Brouwer (2005) 295. 
2638 Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, para. 417. 
2639 Ntagerura et al. (ICTR-99-46), Prosecutor’s Response to Application for Leave to File an 
Amicus Brief, 8 May 2001; Ntagerura et al. (ICTR-99-46), Prosecutor’s Response to a Request for 
Reconsideration of the Decision of the Application to File and Amicus Curiae Brief by Coalition 
for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, 7 September 2001.    
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to argue their right to ‘appear before the Tribunal as plaintiffs and not as mere 
witnesses’,2640 which was found inadmissible by the ICTR as the determination of 
penalties only follows after the establishment of the guilt, and it remarked that 
the only parties to the trial are the defence and the Prosecution.2641 Likewise, the 
Rwandan Government in Bagosora et al. applied to appear as amicus curiae at 
the ICTR to argue, inter alia, for the restitution of stolen property to their 
rightful owners and call additional witnesses,2642 which was rejected by the ICTR 
sustaining that there was no allegation of unlawfully taken property in the 
indictment and restitution claims were premature before determination of 
guilt.2643     
At the ICTY, for instance, the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in 
Conflicts and the Centre for Civil and Human Rights (Notre Dame Law School) 
submitted two amicus curiae briefs in Furundžija, challenging the Trial 
Chamber’s decision to re-open the case as well as to make a rape witness 
available for cross-examination on any medical, psychiatric or psychological 
treatment or counseling that she had been given.2644 Even though the amicus 
curiae briefs were submitted just prior to the re-opening of the case and 
admitted,2645 the Trial Chamber did not take into account the merits of the briefs 
since it was considered to have been filed too late.2646 Therefore, the Trial 
Chamber set a controversial precedent in detriment of sexual violence victims’ 
rights and interests on privacy, equality, security and protection without even 
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2640 Bagosora (ICTR-96-7-T), Decision on the Amicus Curiae Application by the Government of 
the Kingdom of Belgium, Trial Chamber, 6 June 1998, p. 2; Bagosora (ICTR-96-7-T), Amicus 
Curiae: Letter from Geert Muylle to Mr. Agwu Ukiwe Okali, 10 February 1998, para. 3. 
2641 Bagosora et al. (ICTR-96-7-T), 6 June 1998, pp. 2-4.  
2642 Bagosora et al. (ICTR-96-7-T), Request to Appear before the Tribunal and to Testify as Amicus 
Curiae in the Case of Théoneste Bagosora and others, Rwandan Government, 20 April 1998.   
2643 Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-T), Decision on Amicus Curiae Request by the Rwandan 
Government, Trial Chamber, 13 October 2004.    
2644 Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, 
Amicus Curiae Brief Respecting the Decision and Order of the Tribunal of 16 July 1998 Requesting 
that the Tribunal Reconsider its Decision Having Regard to the Rights of Witness ‘A’ to Equality, 
Privacy and Security of the Person and to Representation by Counsel, 5 November 1998; 
Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame Law School, Amicus 
Curiae Brief on Protective Measures for Victims or Witnesses of Sexual Violence and Other 
Traumatic Event, 6 November 1998. See also Brouwer (2005) 297.    
2645 Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Order Granting Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief, Trial Chamber, 
10 November 1998; Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Corrigendum to Order Granting Leave to File 
Amicus Curiae Brief, 11 November 1998.       
2646 See Brouwer (2005) 298. 
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having examined the merits of the amicus curiae briefs filed.2647 However, the 
Coalition’s amicus curiae briefs produced effects as the Prosecution and defence 
filed responses to the briefs, and the Prosecution, in turn, in responding them, 
filed motions seeking to protect the rights of the rape witness in question.2648 
Accordingly, although the amicus curiae submissions were not acknowledged 
explicitly, they certainly impacted on the Trial Chamber’s decisions. In Tadić, 
several individuals and organizations, including the International Women’s 
Human Rights Law Clinic of the City University New York Law School, the 
Women Refugees Project of the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Programme 
and the Centre for Constitutional Rights jointly filed an amicus curiae brief, 
addressing the need to balance requirements for protective measures against the 
accused’s right to a fair trial, and it was found admissible.2649                                      
The SCSL was more active than the ICTY and the ICTR in inviting 
amicus curiae submissions from international organizations and leading 
academics rather than just accepting unsolicited briefs.2650 When there is such 
invitation, there is no need to apply for leave and the court neither gives reasons 
for its request nor demonstrates how the briefs can assist the determination of 
the case.2651 Moreover, whereas in the ICTY and the ICTR decisions, it is difficult 
to find references to amicus curiae submissions in the judgments, when it comes 
to the SCSL, submissions are summarized at the beginning of the judgments in 
addition to those of the Prosecution and the defence.2652 Thus, for example, in 
Norman the majority relied on a conclusion in the amicus curiae submitted by 
the University of Toronto International Human Rights Clinic to conclude that 
‘citizens of Sierra Leone, and even less, persons in leadership roles, cannot 
possibly argue that they did not know that recruiting children was a criminal act 
in violation of international humanitarian law’.2653   
At the other international and hybrid criminal courts, where victims can 
intervene not only as witnesses but also as victim participants (ICC, STL) or civil 
parties (ECCC) and where can additionally claim and be granted reparations 
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2647 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2648 Furundžija(IT-95-17/1-T), 10 December 1998, para. 37.  
2649 Tadić (IT-94-1), 10 August 1995. 
2650 Williams and Woolaver (2006) 175. 
2651 SCSL Practice Direction on Filing Amicus Curiae Applications Pursuant to Rule 74 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 20 October 2004, article 1 (2).  
2652 Williams and Woolaver (2006) 179. 
2653 Norman (SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E)), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of 
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Appeals Chamber, 31 May 2004, para. 52 (citing Toronto 
International Human Rights Clinic brief, para. 69).  
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(ICC, ECCC), amicus curiae briefs are also admitted as provided in their 
respective rules of procedure and evidence.2654 Thus, for example, in its first 
decision setting the principles and procedures applicable to reparations, the ICC 
Trial Chamber I in Lubanga considered written observations submitted by, for 
instance, the International Centre for Transitional Justice, Women’s Initiative 
for Gender Justice and certain NGOs, which had previously and successfully 
applied for leave to intervene.2655  
The fact that victims holding the official status of participants were able 
to voice their own views and concerns via their own submissions and considered 
by Trial Chamber I when drafting principles and procedures for reparations, 
may lead to consider amicus curiae advocating for victims’ interests not as 
necessary as at the international and hybrid criminal courts where victims’ status 
is primarily limited to that of witness. In other occasions, amicus curiae have 
been rejected by the ICC. For example, the ICC Appeals Chamber in Lubanga 
did not consider that receiving observations from Child Soldiers International is 
‘desirable for the proper determination of the case […]’.2656 It should be noticed 
that, unlike the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL, at the ICC and the 
ECCC, amicus curiae briefs can be presented at any stage of proceedings, i.e., not 
only during trial.2657   
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2654 ICC RPE, rule 103 (‘Amicus Curiae and other forms of submission 1. At any stage of the 
proceedings, a Chamber may, if it considers desirable for the proper determination of the case, 
invite or grant leave to a State, organization, or person to submit, in writing or orally, any 
observation on any issue that the Chamber deems appropriate […]’); ECCC Internal Rules, rule 33 
(‘Amicus Curiae Briefs’ 1. At any stage of the proceedings, the Co-Investigating Judges or the 
Chambers may, if they consider it desirable for the proper adjudication of the case, invite or grant 
leave to an organization or a person to submit an amicus curiae brief in writing concerning any 
issue. The Co-Investigating Judges, and the Chambers concerned shall determine what time limits, 
if any, shall apply to the filing of such briefs […]’); STL RPE, rule 131 (‘Third Parties and Amicus 
Curiae (A) The Trial Chamber may decide, after hearing the Parties, that it would assist the proper 
determination of the case to invite or grant leave to a State, organization, or person to make 
written submissions on any issue, or to allow a State, organization, or person to appear before it as 
amicus curiae […]’.).      
2655 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 14; Lubanga ((ICC-01/04-01/06-2870), 
Decision Granting Leave to Make Representations in the Reparations Proceedings, Trial Chamber 
I, 20 April 2012. 
2656 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3044), Decision the Application by Child Soldiers International for 
Leave to Submit Observations Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Appeals Chamber, 16 August 2013, para. 9.   
2657 Thus, for example, the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice tried to file an amicus brief in 
Lubanga, but the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected it and instead it was invited to re-file its request to 
present its observations in the record corresponding to the situation in the DRC.   
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Be that as it may, at international and hybrid criminal courts where 
victims’ participation does not exist, i.e., the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, the 
amicus curiae briefs have been and may be used to indirectly submit victims’ 
views and concerns; however, this is limited by important factors such as the 
respective chamber’s discretion to invite or admit the respective briefs or 
whether/when the competent Chamber considers that those submissions may be 
useful for its judicial functions. Moreover, as seen, in practice individual victims 
as such are not those who mainly submit amicus curiae but normally civil society 
organizations such as NGOs or law schools use this mechanism.  
       
4.3. The ICC   
4.3.1. Modalities of Participation/Procedural Rights 
4.3.1.1. Presentation  
There is consensus that article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, which constitutes the 
legal ground for victims’ participation sensu stricto before the ICC, applies to the 
trial stage of a case due to, inter alia, the location of that article under provisions 
of the ICC Statute relevant to the trial, i.e., Part 6 (Trial). The modalities of 
participation at the trial stage, however, had to be better detailed by the Trial 
Chambers. Trial Chamber I thus ruling in a seminal decision in Lubanga, in 
addition to some modalities explicitly provided in the ICC RPE, included other 
modalities which have been considered controversial as they were thought 
originally as only available to the two parties before the ICC, i.e., the defence and 
the Prosecution. The second category corresponds to the modality of 
participation consisting in that victims may be allowed to introduce or produce 
evidence;2658 the right to challenge admissibility or relevance of parties’ 
evidence;2659 victims may be allowed to attend and to participate in closed and ex 
parte hearings;2660 witnesses may be called by the Chamber upon victims’ 
suggestion;2661 and the right to file ex parte or confidential written 
submissions.2662 On the other hand, modalities of victims’ participation explicitly 
provided in the ICC RPE include the right to make opening and closing 
statements;2663 victims’ legal representatives right to attend and participate in the 
proceedings (hearings included) following the terms set by the Chamber, 
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2658 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 108. 
2659 Ibid., para. 109.  
2660 Ibid., para. 113. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 292.      
2661 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, paras. 45-48. 
2662 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 114, 118.   
2663 ICC RPE, rule 89 (1). 
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including the right to file written observations or submissions;2664 the right to 
access to documents and notification;2665 and the right to examine witnesses, 
experts and the accused with prior leave of the Chamber and subject to the 
Chamber’s control.2666 The analysis of victims’ modalities of 
participation/procedural rights during trial and how different Chambers have 
shaped them follows.    
 
4.3.1.2. Legal Discussion  
First, concerning the right to notification, under the ICC RPE, victims or their 
legal representatives have to be notified of submissions and proceedings in the 
respective case by the Chambers via the Registry.2667  
Second, concerning the right to access documents, even though victims 
can access public fillings, Trial Chamber I in principle limited such right to 
public filings unless victims’ legal representatives showed that confidential filings 
held material that was relevant for their clients’ personal interests and as long as 
protective measures were not breached.2668 In turn, other Chambers have plainly 
stated that the legal representatives’ access does not include ex parte filings and, 
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2664 Ibid., rule 91 (2) (‘A legal representative of a victim shall be entitled to attend and participate in 
the proceedings in accordance with the terms of the ruling of the Chamber and any modification 
thereof given under rules 89 and 90. This shall include participation in hearings unless, in the 
circumstances of the case, the Chamber concerned is of the view that the representative’s 
intervention should be confined to written observations or submissions. The Prosecutor and the 
defence shall be allowed to reply to any oral or written observation by the legal representative for 
victims’.).  
2665 ICC RPE, rule 131 (2) (‘Subject to any restrictions concerning confidentiality and the 
protection of national security information, the record may be consulted by the Prosecutor, the 
defence, the representatives of States when they participate in the proceedings, and the victims or 
their legal representatives participating in the proceedings pursuant to rules 89 to 91’); ICC RPE, 
rule 92 (Notification to victims and their legal representatives).  See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 105-106, 111.     
2666 ICC RPE, Rule 91 (3) (a) (‘When a legal representative attends and participates in accordance 
with this rule, and wishes to question a witness, including questioning under rules 67 and 68, an 
expert or the accused, the legal representative must make application to the Chamber. The 
Chamber may require the legal representative to provide a written note of the questions and in that 
case the questions shall be communicated to the Prosecutor and, if appropriate, the defence, who 
shall be allowed to make observations within a time limit set by the Chamber’.). See also Lubanga 
(ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 108.    
2667 ICC RPE, rule 92 (5) and (6). 
2668 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 106. 


hence, their access is limited to public and confidential filings.2669 Indeed, 
although Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui allowed victims’ legal 
representatives to access confidential materials, this was not extended to their 
clients, i.e., the victims themselves.2670 However, Trial Chamber V, in the Kenyan 
cases, following Trial Chamber III’s approach in Bemba,2671 foresees the 
possibility to allow victims’ access to confidential materials upon Chamber’s 
prior approval.2672  
In its judgment in Lubanga, Trial Chamber I confirmed victims’ right to 
access the case file (rule 131 (2)); however, it limited this access to only public 
filings as a matter of principle.2673 Protection of sensitive information arguably 
justifies this decision. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that victims 
present personal interests in the proceedings and, hence, they are in a different 
standing than that of the public at large. Indeed, Trial Chamber I implicitly 
noticed this difference when it stated that:  
 
In principle, victims have the right to access and receive notification of all public 
findings and those confidential filings which concern them (as identified by the 
parties), insofar as this does not breach any protective measures that are in 
place.2674  
 
As mentioned in the quoted excerpt, what constitutes a matter of 
concern for the victims is left up to the parties’ decision, which may be put into 
question at least sometimes.2675 Another option, which presents the advantage of 
guaranteeing victims’ status, consists in providing them with general access to 
confidential filings, ex parte filings excluded.2676 Also, provision of a full, non-
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2669 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG), Decision on the Modalities of 
Victim Participation at Trial, Trial Chamber II, 22 January 2010, para. 121; Bemba (ICC-01/05-
01/08-807), 30 June 2010, para. 47. 
2670 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG), 22 January 2010, paras. 121-123. 
2671 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 12 July 2010, para. 47.
2672 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 68; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 67. 
2673 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 14 vi). See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 
2008, paras. 105-107.  
2674 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842),  Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 14 vi). See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 
2008, paras. 105-107. 
2675 Ambos (2012) 119. 
2676 See, in this regard, the approach employed by Pre-Trial Chamber I (Single Judge) for pre-trial 
proceedings: Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras. 105-112.  
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redacted version of the case record enabling victim participants to identify 
themselves the filings regarded as of concern for them, would constitute a sound 
alternative.2677 In Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, victims’ legal representative 
suggested that the system adopted by Trial Chamber I in Lubanga, i.e., setting up 
an automatic disclosure system for victims,2678 be applied by Trial Chamber II.2679 
However, Trial Chamber II rejected such proposal, stating that it would consider 
on a case-by-case basis whether victims’ access to the documents exchanged 
under rule 77 (Inspection of material in possession or control of the Prosecutor) 
is necessary in order to guarantee their effective participation according to article 
68 (3) of the ICC Statute.2680        
Third, victims are allowed to attend and participate in public 
hearings.2681 In Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui and also in Bemba, the Trial 
Chambers have interpreted this right as including attendance at and 
participation in all closed sessions, ex parte hearings excluded.2682  Trial Chamber 
I in Lubanga established that upon its discretion it may allow victims to attend 
and participate in closed and (exceptionally) in ex parte hearings.2683 In any case, 
this Chamber in practice allowed victims’ attendance at almost all public as well 
as closed sessions.2684 In turn, Trial Chamber V in the Kenyan cases has 
determined that participation in ex parte hearings, via the OPCV on behalf of the 
 
2677 Ambos (2012) 119. 
2678 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1368), Decision on the legal representative's request for 
clarification of the Trial Chamber's 18 January 2008 ‘Decision on victims' participation’, Trial 
Chamber I, 2 June 2008, para. 31; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008. 
2679 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2837), Requête Conjointe Visant la 
communication d’un Rapport Relatif au Témoin DRC-D02-P-0176 et Visant les Modalités de 
Communication aux Représentants Légaux des Documents Transmis entre les Parties sous 
Couvert de la Règle 77 du Règlement de Procédure et de Preuve, 15 April 2011. 
2680 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Transcripts, 21 April 2011, p. 4, lines 16-25; p. 
5, lines 1-11. 
2681 ICC RPE, rule 91 (2).  
2682 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/1788-tENG), 22 January 2010, para. 71. Even 
though this matter was addressed directly in Bemba, Trial Chamber III has adopted the approach 
undertaken in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui. See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 292, footnote 417.   
2683 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 113. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 
292.  
2684 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2340), Decision on the Defense Observations Regarding the Right 
of the Legal Representatives of Victims to Question Defense Witnesses and on the Notion of 
Personal Interest –and- Decision on the Defense Application to Exclude Certain Representatives of 
Victims from the Chamber During the Non-Public Evidence of Various Defense Witnesses, Trial 
Chamber I, 11 March 2010, para. 39. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 292.    
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victim participants’ common legal representative, shall be established by it on a 
case-by-case basis.2685  
Fourth, concerning the right to orally participate, victims’ participation 
includes the ability to speak at the various hearings, including opening and 
closing statements, at trial.2686 During the opening statements, victims’ legal 
representatives have pointed out different victims’ rights and/or interests.2687 
These have included reparations or protection,2688 victims’ dignity and security 
seriously affected by violence,2689 harm inflicted on victims,2690 repeated 
victimization,2691 victims’ right to truth and justice and the cathartic and 
restorative value of including victims in the criminal proceedings,2692 and right to 
an expeditious criminal process and protection from intimidation and 
harassment.2693 Although most victims’ legal representatives do not talk directly 
about accused’s criminal liability, some introduced comments on it and, thus, 
were similar to those brought by the Prosecutor.2694          
Fifth, in addition to oral participation, victims can also file written 
motions,2695 which include ex parte filings.2696 Comments on admissibility issues 
 
2685 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 71; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 70.  
2686 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 117; Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-
02/12-3-tEng), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II, 18 December 
2012, para. 27; ICC RPE, rule 89 (1).   
2687 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 293-294. 
2688 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 26 January 2009, pp. 59, 67; Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Transcripts, 24 November 2009, p. 46, footnote 430. Cited by McGonigle 
Leyh (2011) 294. See also Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Transcripts, 10 September 2013, p. 39, 
line 17. 
2689 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Transcripts, 10 September 2013, p. 38, lines 2-10.  
2690 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 26 January 2009, pp. 45, 47, 49, and 52-54; Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Transcripts, 24 November 2009, p. 40, footnote 429. Cited 
by McGonigle Leyh (2011) 294. See also Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Transcripts, 10 
September 2013, p. 41, lines 13-20.     
2691 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Transcripts, 10 September 2013, p. 38, lines 24-25.  
2692 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 26 January 2009, pp. 37-41 and 47-48; Bemba (ICC-
01/05-01/08), Transcripts, 22 November 2010, pp. 40-41. Cited by McGonigle Leyh (2011) 293, 
footnote 428.   
2693 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Transcripts, 10 September 2013, p. 39, lines 15-17.  
2694 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 26 January 2009, p. 55; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), 
Transcripts, 22 November 2010, p. 43. Cited by McGonigle Leyh (2011) 294, footnote 431.   
2695 ICC RPE, rule 91 (2). See, inter alia, Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tEng), Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II, 18 December 2012, para. 27.  
2696 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 114, 118; Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807), 30 June 2010; 
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and relevance of the evidence and other procedural matters have been 
considered as part of these submissions.2697 If the intervention of the victims’ 
legal representative does not involve the respective victims’ personal interests, 
such participation is not allowed.2698         
Sixth, in the seminal decision by Trial Chamber I in Lubanga,2699 upheld 
by Appeals Chamber,2700 and followed by other Trial Chambers,2701 it was found 
that the right to introduce or produce evidence and make submissions on 
matters of admissibility or relevance of evidence is not reserved to parties and, in 
appropriate circumstances determined by the Chamber, victims’ legal 
representatives may be allowed to produce evidence and challenge evidence. 
Therefore, victims can be allowed to lead evidence pertaining to the accused’s 
guilt or innocence and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence 
brought by the parties to the proceedings;2702 and, potentially, as Schabas 
suggests, ‘perhaps [evidence brought] by other victims’.2703 As stated by Trial 
Chamber I in the first ICC Judgment in Lubanga:  
 
Victims may request the Chamber to use its broad powers to call all the material 
it considers relevant for the determination of the truth, in order that the 
evidence identified by victims concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused 
is introduced (to the extent appropriate). Victims may tender evidence.2704 
    
Judge Pikis dissented from the Appeals Chamber’s majority judgment, 
which upheld the Trial Chamber I’s decision on this point, by arguing that under 
the ICC Statute and RPE, victims cannot adduce evidence on the accused 
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Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1107), Decision on Common Legal Representative for Victims’ 
Request to Participate in Hearings and Examine Witnesses, Trial Chamber V(A), 20 November 
2013, para. 18.     
2697 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 109. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 
293. 
2698 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG), 22 January 2010, para. 58; Ruto 
and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 72; Muthaura and Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-
02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 71.    
2699 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 108-109. 
2700 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, paras. 86-105 and 109. 
2701 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG), 22 January 2010, para. 46; Bemba 
(ICC-01/05-01/08-807), 30 June 2010, paras. 30-32; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 
October 2012, para. 77; Muthaura and Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 76.  
2702 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 93. 
2703 Schabas (2010) 833. 
2704 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 14 vii). 
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person’s guilt or innocence or challenge the admissibility or relevance of the 
evidence,2705 and thus stated that:  
 
The Statute does not permit the participation of anyone in the proof or disproof 
of the charges other than the Prosecutor and the accused. Exclusive 
responsibility is cast on the Prosecution for the investigation of a case, the 
collection of evidence, the arrest of the person, the substantiation of the charges 
at the confirmation hearing, and their proof at the trial.2706    
  
Judge Kirsh also dissented, along the same lines. He additionally referred 
to article 69 (3) of the ICC Statute to sustain that this disposition is unambiguous 
in providing for that evidence at trial is presented by the parties and not by any 
other participant such as the victims.2707 Article 69 (3) reads as follows ‘The 
parties may submit evidence relevant to the case, in accordance with article 64. 
The Court shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that 
it considers necessary for the determination of the truth’. The first part of this 
provision would support Judge Kirsh’s dissent, in addition to article 66 (2) of the 
ICC Statute which states that ‘The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of 
the accused’. As established by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga, the right to 
present and challenge evidence on the accused’s guilt or innocence ‘during trial 
proceedings lies primarily with the parties, namely, the Prosecution and the 
defence’.2708 However, Trial Chamber I in Lubanga, as confirmed by the Appeals 
Chamber, found that victims also have the possibility to lead and challenge 
evidence during trial proceedings if it will assist the Chamber in the 
determination of the truth and, if in this sense, the ICC has ‘requested’ the 
evidence.2709 It was highlighted by the Appeals Chamber that:  
  
[…] if victims were generally and under all circumstances precluded from 
tendering evidence relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused and from 
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2705 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432-Anx), Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and The 
Defense against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Appeals 
Chamber, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pikis, 23 July 2008, paras. 4-5.  
2706 Ibid., para. 6. 
2707 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432-Anx), Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and The 
Defense against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Appeals 
Chamber, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Philippe Kirsch, 23 July 2008, para. 21. 
2708 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 93. 
2709 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 108; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
1432), 11 July 2008, paras. 95-96.     
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challenging the admissibility or relevance of evidence, their right to participate 
in the trial would potentially become ineffectual.2710  
 
Additionally, the Appeals Chamber endorsed the procedure laid down 
by Trial Chamber I in Lubanga to enable victims to exercise this modality of 
participation/procedural right and which included the following safeguards: i) 
victims’ discrete application, ii) notice to the parties, iii) demonstration of 
personal interests affected by the specific proceedings, iv) compliance with 
disclosure obligations and protection orders, v) Chamber’s determination of 
appropriateness, and vi) consistency with the accused’s rights and a fair trial.2711 
Indeed, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that:  
 
[…] the Trial Chamber did not create an unfettered right for victims to lead or 
challenge evidence, instead victims are required to demonstrate why their 
interests are affected by the evidence or issue, upon which the Chamber will 
decide, on a case-by-case basis whether or not to allow such participation.2712  
 
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui 
concluded that although victims ‘do not have the right to present evidence 
during the trial’,2713 they may be allowed to do so subject to some conditions, 
namely, i) their personal interests are affected by the evidence; ii) this evidence is 
relevant to the issue of the case; iii) the Trial Chamber requests evidence 
submission as necessary for the determination of the truth; and iv) the evidence 
has to be submitted in a manner that does not affect the accused person’s right to 
a fair trial.2714 Furthermore, as Trial Chamber III in Bemba correctly added, 
victims are not parties and, hence, are not vested with a self-standing right to 
present evidence.2715 It should be mentioned that this modality of participation, 
i.e., presenting evidence, has also been applied in more recent ICC’s case law.2716  
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2713 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2288), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga 
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2715 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2138), 22 February 2012, paras. 13-14. 
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As discussed later in this same subsection, due to the absence of an 
explicit disclosure obligation on victims under the ICC Statute/RPE, in case of 
submission of evidence by victims, it corresponds to the Chamber the adoption 
of measures to guarantee the accused’s rights,2717 although victims have to meet 
certain ‘disclosure obligations’ when tendering evidence. This last point includes 
especially the need for parties to receive evidence with enough time to enable 
them to be prepared for the trial.2718        
Seventh, in accordance with rule 91 (3) of the ICC RPE, legal 
representatives of victims may question witnesses, including expert witnesses, 
and the accused, with Chamber’s leave when their personal interests are engaged 
by the evidence under consideration.2719 Questioning concerning the issue of 
reparations is examined in the next chapter.2720 As for questions on other 
matters, victims’ legal representatives have to submit discrete written 
applications in advance, which are notified to the Chamber and the Prosecutor, 
at least seven days before the appearance of the witness in court and the 
proposed questions and how these are related to the victim participants’ interests 
must be included in the applications.2721 In case that victim participants’ legal 
representatives request questions additional to those previously included in their 
applications, following examination-in-chief, the Trial Chamber may decide to 
put it to the witness, if ‘necessary for the ascertainment of the truth or to clarify 
the testimony of witnesses’.2722 The Chamber will pay attention to the accused’s 
rights, witnesses’ interests, the need for an impartial, fair and expeditious trial as 
well as the need to guarantee victims’ participation according to article 68 (3).2723 
Not only have the Chambers considered the time of the intervention and 
the question’s overall effect when assessing the accused’s rights, but also they 
have taken into account that, in case the Chamber considers it inappropriate for 
the representative to formulate a specific question, the Chamber can also put it 
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2717 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 100. 
2718 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2288), 22 January 2010, para. 107.  
2719 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, para. 108. See also, Bemba (ICC-01/05-
01/08-807), 30 June 2010, paras. 33 and 36. 
2720 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.2.  
2721 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 12 July 2010, para. 102 h); Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-
1023), Decision on Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings, Trial Chamber III, 19 
November 2010, para. 18; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 28 January 2009, p. 15, line 2 
to p. 17, line 13; Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 
87.      
2722 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 89. 
2723 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 317. 
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itself.2724 Submitting questions in advance has enabled the Trial Chambers to 
prevent repetitive questions, and, hence, do not admit questions regarded as 
unnecessary or excessively leading.2725 In any case, the Chambers have shown 
flexibility as they have permitted victims’ legal representatives to pose 
spontaneous and unexpected questions.2726  
Concerning the scope of questioning, although Trial Chambers have 
stated that questions should be limited to clarify or complement evidence 
previously brought by the witness,2727 they have also permitted victim 
participants’ representatives to pose questions beyond issues discussed in 
examination-in-chief provided that they are neither repetitive nor duplicative 
and circumscribed to issues in dispute between the parties or holding relevance 
for the victims’ interests.2728 Questions have to be conducted neutrally and 
leading and closed questions should be avoided unless specifically authorized by 
the respective Trial Chamber.2729 Whereas the defence in Lubanga would just 
occasionally question the questioning scope, the defence in Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui did so in an often manner.2730 
Concerning questioning witnesses about the accused’s guilt, it should 
first be noticed that in Lubanga and Bemba victims have frequently led evidence 
on the accused’s guilt and, hence, overlapped with the Prosecutor’s mandate, 
which differs from the situation in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui where even the 
victims were aware of their narrow role.2731 Trial Chambers have followed 
different approaches when interpreting the relation between victims’ evidence 
and the ICC’s purpose of determining the truth.2732 Trial Chambers in Lubanga 
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1665), 20 November 2009, paras. 90-91.  
2726 See, e.g., Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 89; 
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-1023), 19 November 2010, para. 19.   
2727 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2127), Decision on the Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the 
Legal Representatives of Victims, Trial Chamber I, 16 September 2009, para. 26; Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 90; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-
1023), 19 November 2010, para. 20.   
2728 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 108-111; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2127), 16 September 2009, para. 26; Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 
November 2009, paras. 82-91; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 12 July 2010, paras. 30-40.  
2729 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2127), 16 September 2009, paras. 27-30; Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 91; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 
12 July 2010, paras. 38-40.   
2730 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 319 (citing transcripts). 
2731 Ibid., 320 (citing transcripts). 
2732 Ibid., 298. 
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and Bemba, in adopting a broad interpretation of participation scope, have 
frequently permitted the legal representatives of the victim participants to 
question witnesses about the accused’s guilt, connecting this right with helping 
the ICC in the determination of truth.2733 Accordingly, victim participants’ legal 
representatives not only have questioned Prosecution witnesses on matters 
related to the crimes context, victims’ suffering or reparations, but they also have 
frequently tried to determine the accused’s guilt in a similar fashion than the 
Prosecutor.2734 This last point in practical terms means that there are two 
accusers although this modality of victims’ participation should in principle be 
objective and impartial as connects at least in theory with the idea of assisting the 
ICC to determine the truth. On the other hand, Trial Chamber II in Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui adopted a more limited participatory approach to the relation 
between victims’ evidence and the notion of assisting the ICC in the 
establishment of the truth as:  
 
The Chamber is of the view that the only legitimate interest the victims may 
invoke when seeking to establish the facts which are the subject of the 
proceedings is that of contributing to the determination of the truth by helping 
the Chamber to establish what exactly happened.2735   
            
Accordingly, Trial Chamber II exceptionally let victims question 
witnesses on the accused’s guilt and it actually often reminded legal 
representatives to stay within the representation framework of their clients’ 
interests.2736 It explicitly established that questioning by victim participants’ legal 
representatives must mainly aim the ‘ascertainment of the truth’ and that victims 
‘are not parties to the trial’ and have no role to support the Prosecutor.2737 Thus, 
Trial Chamber II pointed out that the representatives neither reinforce nor 
supplement the Prosecutor,2738 even warning representatives not to pose 
questions which would provide some kind of assistance to the Prosecution 
directly or indirectly.2739 Although this approach prevents the accused from 
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2736 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Transcripts, 22 March 2010, p. 4; Transcripts, 
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McGonigle Leyh (2011) 300, footnote 467. 
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being faced by two accusers, it somehow neglects the bias that victims have when 
participating. However, in balance, this approach seems to better ensure the 
accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial. In any case, as determined by Trial 
Chamber V in Ruto and Sang and Muthaura and Kenyatta, the victim 
participants’ legal representative when questioning the witness or the accused 
‘may not formulate any new allegations against the accused’.2740  
Eighth, victim participants may be allowed to testify as witness,2741 as 
previously discussed.2742 Nevertheless, this is subject to certain conditions set by 
the Chambers and which pay particular attention to the accused’s rights, namely: 
i) the presentation of evidence needs to be consistent with the accused’s right to 
a fair and impartial trial, including the right to an expeditious trial, according to 
article 67 (1) (c), and the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his 
defence according to article 67 (1) (b);2743 ii) the Chamber will only permit 
victims’ legal representatives to call the witnesses provided that they are not 
transformed in auxiliary prosecutors;2744 iii) victims’ testimony needs to be 
considered to make a genuine contribution to the ascertainment of the truth;2745 
and iv) victims are not allowed to testify anonymously.2746 Additionally, when 
evaluating which victims are best placed to provide evidence by personally 
appearing at the ICC, Trial Chambers have considered the following factors: i) 
whether the proposed testimony would be repetitive of the Prosecutor’s case or 
of evidence already tendered by the parties; ii) whether the topics of the victims’ 
proposed testimony are sufficiently closely related to the issues to be examined 
when the Chamber assesses the charges against the accused; iii) whether the 
proposed testimony is typical of a larger group of victim participants, who 
possess experiences similar to the victim who desires to testify, or whether the 
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2740 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 75; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 74. See also Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-847), 
9 August 2013, para. 20. 
2741 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2288), 16 July 2010, para. 110; Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras 132-134; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1379), 5 June 
2008. 
2742 See supra Chapter III 2.3.2.  
2743 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2288), 16 July 2010, para. 114; Bemba (ICC-
01/05-08), 22 February 2012, para. 23.   
2744 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 22. 
2745 Bemba (ICC-01/05-08-2138), 22 February 2012, para. 23; Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-
01/04-01/07-2288), 16 July 2010, para. 114; Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 
20 November 2009, para. 20. 
2746 Bemba (ICC-01/05-08-2138), 22 February 2012, para. 23; Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-
01/04-01/07-1665) 20 November 2009, para. 22. See for further discussion supra Chapter II 4.2.2. 
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victim is uniquely apt to provide evidence on a particular matter; and iv) 
whether the testimony will likely bring new substantial information which is 
relevant to Chamber’s examination on issues related to the charges.2747  
As previously discussed,2748 when victims give evidence, they have to give 
it under oath, which is directly related to their status as witnesses, and thus the 
defence is allowed to cross-examine him/her, which constitutes a safeguard and 
makes the respective victim liable to prosecution in case of giving false testimony 
in accordance with article 70 (1) (a) of the ICC Statute.2749 As victims’ 
intervention as witnesses is conditional upon victims’ real contribution to the 
search for the truth in the ICC’s fact finding process, Trial Chamber in Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui concluded that:  
 
[...] if there are potential doubts as to the reliability of a victim’s testimony, the 
Chamber may decide not to authorise the victim to testify under oath. This 
decision is entirely independent of the Chamber’s discretion under article 69 of 
the Statute to determine the relevance and admissibility of the evidence the 
victim may give during his or her testimony.2750  
   
Ninth, concerning disclosure rights, although this in application of rules 
77 and 78 only concerns the Prosecution and the defence and in principle takes 
place before trial,2751 Trial Chamber I in Lubanga set a mechanism through 
which victim participants may be provided with any materials within the 
Prosecution’s possession and which are relevant to victims’ personal interests.2752 
First, the victims’ legal representative needs to identify the personal interest and, 
second, the nature of the information, including information of a particular 
event at a specific time or location, that may be within the Prosecutor’s control is 
material for the preparation of victims’ participation.2753 Victims’ legal 
representatives and the Prosecutor should deal with the provision of this 
material inter se and, only when there is disagreement, filings should be made.2754 
To receive relevant material, the legal representative has to set out in a document 
for the Prosecutor how material under Prosecution’s possession is relevant to an 
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2747 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 30; Bemba 
(ICC-01/05-08-2138), 22 February 2012, para. 24. 
2748 See supra Chapter III 2.3.  
2749 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 89.  
2750 Ibid., para. 91. 
2751 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 308; Schabas (2010) 833.  
2752 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1368), 2 June 2008, paras. 30-31  
2753 Ibid., para. 31. 
2754 Ibid., para. 34. 
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individual victim’s personal interests, which is followed by Prosecution’s 
identification and provision of materials under his/her possession and relevant 
to the victim’s personal interests.2755 Upon receiving the requested documents, 
victims have to file a discrete application before the Chamber specifying how 
their personal interests are affected at a given phase of the trial in order to 
participate.2756  
Nevertheless, under highly restricted circumstances, the Prosecution can 
agree not to disclose certain material, which includes documents or information 
(s)he has received on a confidential basis only for the purpose of generating new 
evidence.2757  
As previously stated, Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui 
rejected the automatic system of disclosure implemented by Trial Chamber I and 
considered instead a case-by-case analysis.2758        
Concerning disclosure to the defence, Trial Chamber I in Lubanga 
considered that:  
 
[…] the disclosure regime established by the Rome Statute framework is 
imposed on the prosecution alone: in other words, no positive obligation is 
imposed on the other organs of the Court, the defence or the participants to 
disclose exculpatory material to the defence under Article 67 (2) of the Statute, 
Rule 77 or Rule 76 of the Rules.2759 
 
Therefore, concerning dual status victim participants-witnesses, the 
Prosecutor has to disclose their statements, application forms included, to the 
defence although (s)he first has to notify victims’ representative so that any 
objections to the disclosure can be raised.2760 In any case, it should be left clear, as 
stated in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, that victim participants ‘cannot be part of 
the disclosure process [...] and thus they have neither disclosure rights nor 
disclosure obligations’.2761 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber in Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui stated that there is no general obligation on victims to disclose to 
the accused the evidence, incriminating or exculpatory, which is in their 
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2755 Ibid., para. 35. 
2756 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2757 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1401), 13 June 2008, para. 71.  
2758 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Transcripts, 21 April 2011, p. 4, lines 16-25; p. 
5, lines 1-11. 
2759 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1637), 21 January 2009, para. 10. 
2760 Ibid., paras. 12-13. 
2761 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, para. 114.  
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possession.2762 Furthermore, when a victim’s application for participation 
suggests the possession of potentially exculpatory information, the Prosecutor 
has the responsibility to investigate such information, and this can be then 
disclosed to the defence.2763 The Appeals Chamber also established that in certain 
instances the Trial Chamber can request disclosure when, for example, there is 
available information which would contribute to the establishment of the 
truth.2764  
Disclosure obligations may apply to victim participants who are given 
the right to lead evidence at trial according to the Appeals Chamber, and it is for 
a Trial Chamber to decide on the modalities for the proper disclosure of any 
evidence it has allowed victims to present.2765 Although neither the ICC Statute 
nor the RPE establish any disclosure obligations on victims, Trial Chamber I in 
Lubanga determined that victims have to meet ‘their disclosure obligations’.2766 
In any case, as Schabas observes, given the silence on the ICC Statute and RPE 
on evidence by victim participants’ representatives, ‘regulation of disclosure in 
such cases is a matter to be determined by the judges on a case-by-case basis’.2767      
Tenth, victim participants’ legal representatives can call their clients as 
witnesses to testify directly at the Trial Chamber,2768 as illustrated by the fact that 
three victim participants, called upon request of their legal representatives, 
testified in Lubanga, as detailed in the previous chapter.2769 In addition to their 
clients, victim participants’ legal representatives may identify persons who they 
would like to provide evidence relevant to their clients’ personal interests and, 
then, the Chamber may determine to call the witness on its own motion (under 
articles 64 (6) (b), (d) and 69 (3)) and may authorize the legal representative to 
formulate questions before or after the Chamber does.2770 For example, in 
Lubanga, victims’ legal representatives successfully proposed two expert 
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2762 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2288), 16 July 2010, paras. 71, 72 and 75.  
2763 Ibid., para. 81. 
2764 Ibid., para. 71. 
2765 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, paras. 100 and 104. 
2766 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 14 vii). See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, 
para. 104. 
2767 Schabas (2010) 833. 
2768 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, paras. 45.  
2769 See supra Chapter III 2.3.2.2. 
2770 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, paras. 45-48.  
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witnesses on the use of names in the DRC.2771 Therefore, the victim participants’ 
right to call witnesses is not unfettered.2772 In Bemba, the Chamber noted that the 
parties and (victim) participants do not ‘own’ the witnesses as they are ‘witnesses 
of the Court’, and also stressed the ‘obligation not to try to influence the 
witness’s decision in any way when seeking content’.2773 
Lastly, but equally important, as previously examined,2774 anonymous 
victim participants have been allowed to participate during trial but, based on 
the accused’s right to a fair trial, whether they need to identify themselves 
depends on the scope and nature of the respective modality of 
participation/procedural right as explicitly indicated by Trial Chamber I in 
Lubanga: 
 
[…] Trial Chamber rejects the submissions of the parties that anonymous 
victims should never be permitted to participate in the proceedings [leading up 
to and during the trial] […].  
While the safety and security of victims is a central responsibility of the Court, 
their participation in the proceedings cannot be allowed to undermine the 
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. The greater the extent and the significance 
of the proposed participation, the more likely it will be that the Chamber will 
require the victim to identify himself or herself. 2775  
 
Accordingly, mutatis mutandi similar to victim participants’ modalities 
of participation in pre-trial,2776 in principle the participation regime in trial for 
anonymous victim participants is more restricted than that for their non-
anonymous peers. However, both kinds of victims are represented by the same 
common legal representatives, reducing the impact of the anonymous/non-
anonymous victim participant distinction in practice.           
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2771 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1896), Observations Conjointes des Représentants Légaux des 
Victimes sur les Questions a Poser au(x) Experts Concernant l’attribution et les Composantes du 
nom en République Démocratique du Congo, Legal Representatives of the Victims, 25 May 2009. 
2772 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 315.  
2773 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-2293), Decision on the “Prosecution Motion on Procedure for 
Contacting Defence Witnesses and to Compel Disclosure”, Trial Chamber III, 4 September 2012, 
paras. 16 and 23.    
2774 See supra Chapter III 4.3.2.2. 
2775 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras 130-131. See also Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 
2012, para. 14 xi).  
2776 See supra Chapter IV 3.3.3.1.  
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4.3.2. Related Legal Issues 
4.3.2.1. Legal Representation 
With regard to legal representation, although the ICC Statute and RPE do not 
require that victim participants have to be represented,2777 the full exercise of 
victims’ procedural rights, as experience has shown, requires them to be legally 
represented.2778 In any case, Trial Chambers, excepted Trial Chamber III,2779 have 
not permitted individuals who are still applying to become victim participants to 
be represented.2780 In the trial in Lubanga, common legal representatives 
appeared in court for the 129 victim participants, who were divided into two 
groups represented by two teams of external counsel.2781 Additionally, the OPCV 
was allowed to continue representing four dual status victim participants-victim 
witnesses,2782 as explicitly laid down in the ICC Regulations of the Court.2783  
Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether and to what extent victims’ 
legal representation by the OPCV may be the best option insofar as not only 
does the OPCV have as a principal task the assistance of and support the victims 
and their legal representatives,2784 but also taking into account its limited 
resources. The latter may compromise the supportive role that the OCPV is 
mainly trusted with.2785 Be that as it may, victims via their legal representatives in 
Lubanga made opening statements,2786 examined witnesses,2787 requested leave to 
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2777 ICC Statute, article 68 (3) (‘Such views and concerns [those of victim participants] may be 
presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate 
[…]’); ICC RPE, rules 89-93. See, in particular, ICC RPE rule 90 (1) (‘A victim shall be free to 
choose a legal representative’.).  
2778 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 326. 
2779 Individuals who were applying to participate as victims were permitted to be represented by the 
OPCV and participate while waiting their status determination. See Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-
1023), 19 November 2010, paras. 22-23. 
2780 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 327. 
2781 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 20. 
2782 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 22 January 2009, p. 12, line 23 to p. 13, line 12; 
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber 
I, 14 March 2012, para. 20.  
2783 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 80 (2).  
2784 Ibid., regulation 81. 
2785 Ambos (2012) 119. 
2786 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 26 January 2009, p. 36 line 5 et seq. 
2787 Trial Chamber I allowed the legal representatives to question 25 witnesses (the 4 Chamber 
witnesses, 14 Prosecution witnesses and 7 defence witnesses). See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, footnote 
62.  
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introduce evidence,2788 and were permitted to make written and oral 
submissions.2789  
In cases of larger numbers of victim participants, a Chamber (in this 
context a Trial Chamber), under rule 90 (2), ‘may, for the purposes of ensuring 
the effectiveness of the proceedings, request the victims or particular groups of 
victims, if necessary with the assistance of the Registry, to choose a common 
legal representative or representatives’. According to rule 90 (3), should victims 
be unable to choose a common legal representative(s), ‘the Chamber may ask the 
Registrar to choose one or more common legal representatives’. In turn, rule 90 
(4) establishes that ‘The Chamber and the Registry shall take all reasonable steps 
to ensure that in the selection of common legal representatives, the distinct 
interests of the victims […] are represented and that any conflict of interest is 
avoided’. This is a necessary guarantee to include victims participants’ interests 
in the decision-making process and, as indicated under Regulation of the Court 
79 (2), considering ‘the need to respect local traditions and to assist specific 
group of victims’. Additionally, as determined in Banda and Jerbo, if the 
common legal representative receives conflicting instructions from one or more 
groups of victims, (s)he has to represent both positions fairly and equally unless 
the conflicting instructions are irreconcilable, i.e., there is a conflict of interest, 
and, in this case, the Chamber shall be informed to adopt appropriate 
measures.2790  
In Lubanga, victim participants (around 120) had been allowed to 
choose their own common counsels/legal teams (a total of eight plus four victim 
participants represented by the OPCV); however, common legal representatives 
were later appointed and represented victim participants who were divided in 
two groups by Trial Chamber I.2791 The above-referred four dual status victim 
participants-witnesses continued being represented by the OPCV.2792 Due to the 
existence of a larger number of victim participants (more than 300) and of an 
increasing number of legal representatives in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Trial 
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2788 Trial Chamber I authorized victims’ legal representatives to submit 13 items of evidence. See 
Ibid., footnote 63. 
2789 Ibid., para. 20.   
2790 Banda and Jerbo (ICC-02/05-03/09-337), Decision on Common Legal Representation, Trial 
Chamber IV, 25 May 2012, para. 42. 
2791 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 22 January 2009, p. 12, lines 23-25, and p. 13, lines 1-
12; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 20.    
2792 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 22 January 2009, p. 13, lines 3-4; Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 
2012, para. 20.     
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Chamber II decided to split the victim participants, who had been represented by 
more than 10 legal teams, into two groups.2793 While the first and larger group 
consisted of all victims with the exception of ex child soldiers, the second one 
was made up of child soldiers. The division based on the harm inflicted enabled 
the legal representative to come up with more targeted questions.2794  
In Bemba, Trial Chamber III decided that just two common legal 
representatives would represent over 1000 individuals admitted as victim 
participants, who were divided thus into two groups.2795 Trial Chamber III also 
decided that the OPCV, which represented victims during the confirmation of 
charges, not to represent victims any more but only when called by the Chamber 
for particular matters.2796 In any case, Trial Chamber III did not group victim 
participants based on their harm but on the geographical location of the crimes. 
This approach may be criticized as this classification not necessarily represents 
victims’ best interests, in particular those who suffered sexual violence crimes,2797 
which was particularly endemic in the Central African Republic (CAR). The 
timely organization of victims’ common representation is also fundamental to 
guarantee both the ‘expeditiousness of the proceedings and the effectiveness of 
victim participation in the case’ as emphasized by Trial Chamber IV in Banda 
and Jerbo.2798 It should also be noticed that, unlike previous cases, in Banda and 
Jerbo, it was decided to create no more than a single group of victims for 
representation purposes.2799 Although this corresponds to efficiency arguments, 
whether presumed homogeneity of victim participants’ interests is really in place 
should be examined on case-by case basis.  
Moreover, in occasions, collective participation of group victims under 
common legal representation has been resisted by victims since, after being 
represented by a legal counsel of their choosing, were later designated by the 
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2793 Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07-1328), 22 July 2009, p. 13.  
2794 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 328. 
2795 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-1005), 10 November 2009, para. 34. 
2796 Ibid., para. 29.    
2797 See, e.g., Statement by the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice on the Opening of the ICC 
Trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, 22 November 2010. 
Referred to in McGonigle Leyh (2011) 328.  
2798 Banda and Jerbo (ICC-02/05-03/09-138), Order Instructing the Registry to Start Consultations 
on the Organization of Common Legal Representatives, Trial Chamber IV, 21 April 2011, para. 5. 
See also American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, Ensuring 
Effective and Efficient Representation of Victims at the International Criminal Court (2011) 43.    
2799 Banda and Jerbo (ICC-02/05-03/09-337), Decision on Common Legal Representation, Trial 
Chamber IV, 25 May 2012. 
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Judges a new counsel with little to no consultation in the selection process.2800 
This has to be criticized as goes in detriment of the victim participants’ status. 
Furthermore, the fact that due to the high number of victims and also the 
location thereof, i.e., far away from the ICC’s premises in The Hague, victims 
generally do not attend the hearings in person. Such situation may raise the 
question of whether victims’ participation via this kind of legal representation is 
purely symbolic and, if so, how meaningful the participatory regime is really for 
victims. Accordingly, to counterbalance these limitations and challenges, legal 
representatives should stay in permanent contact with and receive regular 
instructions from victims represented by them. Therefore, a potential cause for 
secondary victimization can be avoided.  
Trial Chamber V has designed, for its two Kenyan-related cases and 
concerning victim participants who do not wish to appear in person, a new 
victim participation procedure based on common legal representation, which 
includes both an appointed common legal representative, i.e., common legal 
representative, and the OPCV acting on the common legal representative’s 
behalf.2801 Thus, whereas the common legal representative is primarily 
responsible for being the contact point for victims represented by him/her, to 
formulate their views and concerns and to appear on their behalf at critical 
junctures of the trial, the OPCV’s main responsibility consists in acting as the 
interface between the common legal representative and the Chamber in day-to-
day proceedings in the court-room.2802 Concerning the modalities of victim 
participation through the common legal representative under this scheme, the 
Chamber listed: i) access to the record, documents and fillings, including 
confidential material (subject, in the last case, to Chamber’s previous 
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2800 Banda and Jerbo (ICC-02/05-03/09-228), Request of Victims a/1646/10 and a/1647/10 for the 
Trial Chamber to Review the Registry’s ‘Notification of Appointment of Common Legal 
Representatives of Victims’ in Accordance with Regulation 79(3), 30 September 2010; Ruto et al. 
(ICC-01/09-01/11-330), Decision on the ‘Motion from Victims a/0041/10, a/0045/10, a/0051/10 
and a/0056/10 requesting the Pre-Trial Chamber to Reconsider the Appointment of Common 
Legal Representative Sureta Chana for All Victims’. Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 9 
September 2011. See also Brianne McGonigle Leyh, ‘Victim-Oriented Measures at International 
Criminal Institutions: Participation and its Pitfalls’ (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review, 
375, 404-405.   
2801 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 41; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 40.   
2802 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, paras. 42-43; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, paras. 41-42.  
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approval);2803 ii) filing of responses to documents;2804 iii) oral submissions at 
critical junctures, such as opening and closing statements;2805 and iv) 
presentation of evidence.2806 However, the following modalities of participation 
have been said to be conducted by the OPCV (on behalf of the common legal 
representative): i) attendance at and participation in public hearings, closed and 
private sessions and, participation in ex parte hearings (determined on case-by-
case basis);2807 and ii) questioning of a witness, an expert or the accused (when 
allowed by the Chamber) although exceptionally the Chamber may authorize the 
common legal representative to appear in person.2808  
This division of tasks aims that victims benefit from the OPCV’s 
experience and with the OPCV’s involvement to ensure that confidential 
information is handled safely and securely.2809 However, this task division may be 
partially criticized as the legal representatives should be the ones to exercise 
victims’ modalities of participation/procedural rights as basic as attendance at 
hearings since they, unlike the OPCV, are in direct contact with victims. 
Moreover, the OPCV’s action in some participation modalities, in contexts 
where victims will have a common legal representative, introduces extra 
intermediation between victims and the Chamber, which may make victims’ 
participation more symbolic. Furthermore, the OPCV in practice acts as ‘a 
representative of a representative’, i.e., representative of the common legal 
representative of victim participants in day-to-day proceedings, i.e., in general. 
Regardless of the potential benefits from this mechanism, it may arguably be 
considered as too a ‘creative’ and broad interpretation of the ICC instruments. 
Although the OPCV has in conformity with the Regulations of the Court been 
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2803 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, paras. 64-69; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, paras 63-68. 
2804 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 72 (in application of regulation 
24 (2) of the Regulations of the Court which reads as follows ‘Victims or their legal representatives 
may file a response to any document when they are permitted to participate in the proceedings in 
accordance with article 68, paragraph 3, and rule 89, sub-rule 1, subject to any order of the 
Chamber’); Muthaura and Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 71.  
2805 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 73; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 72. 
2806 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 77; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 76.  
2807 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, paras. 70-71; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, paras 69-70. 
2808 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, paras. 74-76; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, paras 73-75. 
2809 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 43; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 42.  
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appointed as legal representative for some victim participants in other cases 
(mainly during pre-trial),2810 the Trial Chamber V’s scheme whereby the OPCV 
can be appointed as a representative of the common legal representative also 
appointed by the Trial Chamber is neither explicitly stated under the Regulations 
of the Court nor corresponds to the ICC’s practice.2811    
A related observation, concerning victims who wish to present their 
views and concerns individually, is that the Chamber may ask the common legal 
representative to select a specified number of applications, from which the 
Chamber will select those eligible for personal appearance.2812 The preliminary 
unilateral selection by the common legal representative is unprecedented in the 
ICC’s practice and may lead to an exponential increase in the number of victims 
participating personally. Finally, the two categories of victims, i.e., those who 
apply to participate individually and the others who ‘register’ to participate 
through common legal representation, previously mentioned,2813 are not in the 
same standing as when assessing the common legal representative’s submissions 
or requests ‘the Chamber will be mindful of the fact that the represented victims 
have not been subject to an individual assessment by the Court’. Thus, it is 
created a distinction not foreseen in the ICC instruments or previous ICC 
practice. These considerations, among others, raise serious doubts concerning 
the consistency of the Trial Chamber V’s procedures for victim participants with 
the ICC instruments and practical benefits in the respective trials.2814                           
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2810 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 80 (2) (‘The Chamber may appoint counsel from the 
Office of Public Counsel for victims’.). As for ICC’s practice, see American University Washington 
College of Law (2011) 44-47; and Haslam and Edmunds (2012) 877-889.    
2811 In addition to regulation 80 (2) of the Regulations of the Court, cited under the previous 
footnote, see also regulation 81 (4) which establishes that ‘The Office of Public Counsel for victims 
shall provide support and assistance to the legal representative for victims and to victims, 
including, where appropriate: (a) Legal research and advice; and (b) Appearing before a Chamber 
in respect of specific issues [emphasis added]’. As for ICC’s practice, see American University 
Washington College of Law (2011) 44-47; and Haslam and Edmunds (2012) 877-889.       
2812 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 57; Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 2012, para. 56.  
2813 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.2.1.   
2814 It should be added that Kituo, a Kenyan NGO, submitted its observations via amicus curiae on 
issues relating to the implementation of the new system regarding victims’ participation. See ICC 
Victims’ Rights Working Group, ICC Victims’ Rights Legal Update (December 2012-January 
2013), p. 4. In turn, discussions at the ICC on division of responsibilities between the OPCV and 
the common legal representative followed. See Ibid., p. 4.  
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4.3.2.2. Other Legal Issues 
In addition, there are two other legal issues, namely, adding charges and 
withdrawal of the victim participant status by the Trial Chamber. Concerning 
the possibility to add new charges against the accused by the victim participants, 
the trial in Lubanga proved to be of special relevance. As already mentioned,2815 
due to the fact that the Prosecutor only included charges on conscription, 
enlistment and use of child soldiers, victims’ legal representatives requested the 
Trial Chamber to add the legal characterization of sexual slavery as a crime 
against humanity and war crime as well as of cruel and/or inhuman treatment as 
a war crime to the facts of the case, in application of Regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court.2816 Regulation 55 (1) states that the Chamber can 
change the legal characterization of facts to fit new charges provided that these 
do not exceed ‘the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any 
amendments to the charges’.2817 In particular, regulation 55 (2) lays down that 
the Trial Chamber can change the legal characterization of the facts at any time 
during the trial proceedings and regulation 55 (3) states that the defence shall 
have adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence as well as, if necessary, to 
examine or re-examine witnesses.   
Although the Trial Chamber considered that it would examine the legal 
re-characterization of the facts,2818 it later added that the facts coming to light 
during the trial still need to be linked with the facts identified in the charging 
document.2819 Be that as it may, the Appeals Chamber overruled the Trial 
Chamber’s findings as the former concluded that the latter erred in law which 
had led the Trial Chamber to incorporate additional facts and circumstances not 
included in the charging document,2820 and, hence, ‘Regulation 55 (2) and (3) of 
the Regulations of the Court may not be used to exceed the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges or any amendment thereto’.2821 Finally, 
the Trial Chamber rejected the request of victims’ legal representatives 
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2815 See supra Chapter IV 3.3.3.2.  
2816 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1891), Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims 
for the Implementation of the Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, The 
Legal Representatives of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 et al., 22 May 2009, p. 23. 
2817 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 55 (1).  
2818 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2049), 14 July 2009, paras. 27-35.   
2819 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2093), Clarification and Further Guidance to Parties and 
Participants in Relation to the ‘Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the 
Legal Characterization of the Facts may be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55 
(2)’, Trial Chamber I, 27 August 2009, para. 11. 
2820 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2205), 8 December 2009, para. 112. 
2821 Ibid., para. 1.  
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considering that the decision on the confirmation of charges did not incorporate 
any fact relating to the crime of sexual slavery and that the facts included in the 
decision linked to possible acts of inhuman or cruel treatment were insufficient 
to determine the elements of those crimes.2822 However, this demonstrates that 
victims may express their viewpoints about charges against the defendant.            
Even though most of the aspects about the dual status victim 
participants-victim witnesses in Lubanga who were stripped off of their official 
victim participant status were already examined,2823 it is necessary herein to 
highlight two points. First, as examined, the Trial Chamber amended its 
previous decision granting the six Prosecution witnesses the status of victim 
participants due to their unreliable testimonies. The Chamber adopted this 
decision considering that victim participant status had been given on a prima 
facie assessment of the information provided in the applications. The Chamber, 
in general, determined that:  
 
[…] if the Chamber, on investigation, concludes that its original prima facie 
evaluation was incorrect, it should amend any earlier order as to participation, 
to the extent necessary. It would be unsustainable to allow victims to continue 
participating if a more detailed understanding of the evidence has demonstrated 
they no longer meet the relevant criteria.2824    
  
Concerning the three victim participants who were called as witnesses 
upon request of the victim participants’ legal representatives, they got their 
status removed due to internal inconsistencies in their testimonies and lack of 
credibility due to the real possibility of stolen identities.2825 As previously 
concluded, whereas concerning the Trial Chamber I’s decision to withdraw the 
Prosecution witnesses’ victim participant status was excessive, concerning the 
other three victim participants the decision was justified due to the likelihood of 
stolen identities.        
Second, this overall situation could have been avoided if VPRS staff (and 
not intermediaries) in the field would have assisted applicants to fill in their 
forms and/or transmission of less redacted application forms to the parties so 
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2822 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2223), Decision on the Legal Representatives’ Joint Submissions 
Concerning the Appeals Chamber’s Decision on 8 December 2009 on Regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court, Trial Chamber I, 8 January 2010, paras. 28-38. 
2823 See supra Chapter III 2.3.2.2.   
2824 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 484.  
2825 Ibid., para. 502. 
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that these could have presented the respective observations. Preventing 
participation of individuals who are not even real victims is important to, inter 
alia, avoid evidence against the accused and, thus, preserve his/her right to a fair 
trial.    
With regard to the withdrawal of the victim participant status of two 
victim participants by Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui,2826 as 
previously examined,2827 this decision was sound due to the particular case 
circumstances, namely, serious credibility doubts brought by their own legal 
representative and not clarified by those two individuals.  
Related to Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, two additional brief observations 
concerning victims’ participation during trial follow. First, although the charges 
against Ngudjolo were severed, victims allowed to participate in the initial 
proceedings, i.e., in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, were ‘authorised to continue 
participating in both of the severed proceedings’,2828 i.e., in both Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui. Second, following up the severance of the charges, Trial Chamber 
II in the judgment rendered in Ngudjolo acquitted the accused.2829 Trial Chamber 
tried to show sensitivity to the victims by pointing out, in its judgment, that the 
acquittal was not due to a doubt about the suffering of the population in 
question but due to uncertainty about Ngudjolo’s role.2830 However, his acquittal 
understandably brought about a lot of disappointment among the victims and 
has been criticized by the human rights NGOs community.2831     
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2826 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-3064), 7 July 2011, paras. 48-49.  
2827 See supra Chapter III 2.3.2.2. 
2828 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-3319), Decision on the Implementation of 
Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges the Accused Persons, Trial 
Chamber II, 21 November 2012, para. 64. See also Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3363), Judgment on 
the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 
2012 Entitled “Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court 
and Severing the Charges the Accused Persons”, Appeals Chamber, 27 March 2013.  
2829 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber II, p. 197.  
2830 Ibid., paras. 338, 503 and 516. 
2831 See Olivia Bueno, ’Reactions to the Ngudjolo Decision: Divisions among Iturian Communities’, 
2 January 2013. Available at:  
http://www.katangatrial.org/2013/01/reactions-to-the-ngudjolo-decision-divisions-among-iturian-
communities/ (last visit on 25 October 2013); Africa Legal Aid, ‘Raising the Bar-ICC Acquits 
Matheiu Ngudjolo Chui’, 6 January 2013. Available at:  
http://www.africalegalaid.com/IManager/MailingWeb/9088/HVlXyL2VcBII/129684/3435217 (last 
visit on 25 October 2013).   
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4.3.3. Evaluation of Victims’ Participation Regime         
Even though the Trial Chambers have followed the approach adopted by the 
Appeals Chamber, which confirmed to an important extent the findings by Trial 
Chamber I in its landmark decision on victims’ participation, it is herein 
examined whether and to what extent this approach, i.e., victims’ broad 
participation regime during trial, may be considered lege ferenda as appropriate. 
For this purpose, the analysis herein pays attention to the efficiency of the ICC, 
the rights of the accused and also considerations about victims.     
With regard to efficiency, it is clear that the expansion of victims’ rights 
already participating at the ICC is inversely proportional not only to the 
speediness of the proceedings but also to including more victims under a not 
excessively broad participatory regime for victims. Should victims’ participation 
slow down proceedings, a lower number of trials will be held and this might lead 
to the paradoxical outcome of holding back the ICC’s main objective, which is 
the fight against impunity. Moreover, as pointed out by ICC Judge Van den 
Wyngaert, victims take up an important proportion of time during trials.2832 It is 
therefore legitimate to question how spending ICC’s scarce human and 
monetary resources in a narrow number of victims with quite broad 
participation rights while leaving out meaningful participation of potentially a 
(much) higher number of victims is coherent with a restorative justice-oriented 
approach.2833 Reforms increasing participation rights of victims during the trial 
and other stages must hence be balanced against key stakeholders, for example, 
non-participating victims, in the international criminal justice system.2834 Equal 
access to justice for victims and its impact on reconciliation should accordingly 
be considered, also bearing in mind that victims of uncharged crimes will not be 
able to participate.      
Concerning the tension between the rights of the accused and broad 
participation of victims, article 68 (3) clearly establishes that victims may present 
their views and concerns ‘in a manner not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused’. Moreover, this provision does not require an actual 
conflict and, accordingly, it may be argued that the existence of a mere risk is 
sufficient.2835 The right to a fair trial may be considered as the most affected in 
the context of quite a broad participatory status of victims. It should be borne in 
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2832 Van den Wyngaert (2011) 494. 
2833 See American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, Victim 
Participation at the Case Stage of Proceedings (2008) 50-51.  
2834 Charles Trumbull, ‘The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings’ 
(2008) 29 Michigan Journal of International Law 777, 822.  
2835 Zappalà (2010) 143.  
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mind that whilst victims enjoy several rights under international law, not 
necessarily all of them fully implemented at the ICC, they cannot claim an 
identical content of rights that are granted, under the ICC Statute, to the 
accused, in particular the right to a fair trial, since ‘it is precisely this cluster of 
rights which embody the notion of a fair trial’.2836 That and others rights of the 
accused including the right to an expeditious trial, i.e., ‘To be tried without 
undue delay’,2837 or the presumption of innocence,2838 are directly or at least 
indirectly affected by excessively broad victim participation. In particular, 
permitting victim participants to submit and challenge evidence could in 
practice mean for the accused to face more than one accuser, i.e., to transform 
victim participants in de facto auxiliary or parallel prosecutors. A necessary and 
fine balance is required; however, this, as acknowledged by ICC Judge Van den 
Wyngaert, is not an easy task as ‘victims are not neutral and forcing them to act 
as if they were risks alienating them from the proceedings’.2839          
With regard to benefits that a broad participation regime supposedly 
reports to victim participants, attention should be drawn to some counter-
arguments. First, some empirical studies have concluded that not necessarily 
victims who actively participate in criminal proceedings meet their expectations 
or even they may fall in disillusionment.2840 Additionally, other studies suggest 
that victims may obtain positive experiences even in criminal justice systems 
when they hold a more passive role.2841 Therefore, treating victims before the 
ICC as if they were (quasi) civil parties should not be automatically taken as a 
better guarantee for their satisfaction and as a better manifestation of restorative-
oriented justice approach. Second, besides the right to reparations, it has been 
said that one of the most important victims’ rights in (international) criminal 
courts is the right to receive information,2842 and the fact of being notified has 
made victims feel that they have an opportunity to express their views and 
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2836 Ibid., 149. 
2837 ICC Statute, article 67 (1) (c). 
2838 See Ibid., article 66.  
2839 Van den Wyngaert (2011) 488. 
2840 See Mina Rauschenbach and Damien Scalia ‘Victims and International Criminal Justice: A 
Vexed Question?’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 441, 444-447; Andrew Sanders, 
Carolyn Hoyle, Rod Morgan and Ed Cape, ‘Victim Impact Statements: Don’t Work, Can’t Work’ 
(2001) Criminal Law Review 437-458.     
2841 See, e.g., Edna Erez, ‘Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentence: Integrating Restorative 
Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceedings’ (2004) 40 Criminal 
Law Bulletin 483; Dean Kilpatrick, David Beatty and Susan Smith Howley, The Rights of Crime 
Victims-Does Legal Protection Make a Difference? (USA National Institute of Justice 1998).        
2842 American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office (2008) 39.  
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concerns. This is connected with the notion whereby victims tend to be more 
satisfied with the criminal justice system provided that they feel that their voices 
have been heard and also when they have been treated with respect to avoid 
secondary victimization.   
The above-mentioned point does not necessarily mean that they seek ‘a 
role in the adjudication of their cases’.2843 In other words, the decision by Trial 
Chamber I to grant participation rights beyond what the ICC legal framework 
establishes and in potential detriment of the rights of the accused and the ICC’s 
efficiency does not seem in principle to be justified by a need to strengthen 
victims’ status in accordance with a restorative-oriented justice approach. It is 
considered, hence, that it may not have been completely necessary to go much 
further than the victim participants’ rights (explicitly) granted by the ICC Statute 
and RPE in what may have been a well-intentioned but misunderstood 
application of a restorative- oriented justice approach.  
Having said so, the broad modalities of participation as interpreted by 
the ICC Chambers, especially leading and challenging evidence, can be justified 
by invoking the right to truth, i.e., surviving victims’ right and/or the right of the 
next of kin to know the truth about crimes. As previously discussed,2844 this right 
is recognized in international human rights law and by the ICC itself,2845 and is 
coherent with restorative-oriented justice and the holistic transitional justice 
approaches.2846 Moreover, the ICC Trial Chambers, when expanding the victim 
participants’ modalities of participation/procedural rights and in particular those 
modalities/rights not explicitly contained under the ICC legal instruments 
and/or modalities/rights regarded as more ‘contentious’, have grounded their 
decision precisely on the assistance that victim participants can provide to the 
ICC’s role to determine the truth in trials. Considering that victims are those 
who first-hand experienced and have knowledge of the specific circumstances of 
the case, a strengthened participation regime may result in a helpful assistance to 
Judges by providing insiders’ details and, thus, victims also contribute to the 
ICC’s most important aim, i.e., the fight against impunity in the context of the 
most serious international crimes.     
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2843 Strang and Sherman (2003) 24.  
2844 See supra Chapter II 2.4.3. 
2845 See respectively UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 22 (b); IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. 
Peru, Merits, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Series C No. 75, paras. 47-49; ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, 
Appl. No. 25781/94, Judgment, 10 May 2001, para. 156; and Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, (ICC-
01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras. 34-36.     
2846 See respectively Dermot Groom, ‘The Right to Truth in the Fight Against Impunity’ (2011) 29 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 175, 187, 189 (2011); and ICTJ (2009) 1.  
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What is also pivotal, as has seemingly been so far the ICC Chambers’ 
practice is that, for example, before granting a request to leading and challenging 
evidence, limitations under articles 68 (3) and 69 (3) must be taken into account 
as well as the need for a fair and expeditious trial with total respect for the 
accused’s rights, which includes the right to have adequate time and facilities for 
defence preparation.2847 Be that as it may, approaches that provide better chances 
to fully guarantee the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial such as the one 
adopted by Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, presented when 
discussing the modalities of participation/procedural rights, that consisted in 
tendering and challenging evidence, questioning witnesses about the accused’s 
guilt, and victim participants’ attendance at/participation in ex parte hearings, 
should in principle be preferred over the more pro-victim oriented approach 
adopted especially by Trial Chamber I in Lubanga. This could arguably decrease 
the risk at breaching accused’s rights and increase the likelihood of conducting a 
trial in an efficient manner.  
 
4.4. The ECCC and the STL 
4.4.1. Modalities of Participation/Procedural Rights 
4.4.1.1. The ECCC  
With regard to the ECCC, a large number of the modalities of 
participation/procedural rights to which civil parties are entitled during trial are 
stated in the ECCC Internal Rules. This is beneficial for the parties as they know 
those modalities/rights in advance, which contributes to legal certainty, and also 
allowed the Trial Chamber not to spend a big deal of resources and time on 
crafting the modalities of participation/procedural rights. Civil parties in general 
hold the right to participate in trial proceedings as indicated in rule 23 (1) (a) 
‘The purpose of Civil Party action before the ECCC is to a) Participate in 
criminal proceedings [i.e., trial proceedings included]; and b) Seek collective and 
moral reparations’ and identified by the Supreme Court Chamber in Duch.2848 As 
pointed out in the Trial and the Supreme Court Chambers judgments:  
 
Civil Party participation before the ECCC includes both a right for victims to 
participate as parties in the criminal trial of an Accused in support of the 
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2847 See Katanga and Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-01/07-2288), 16 July 2010, paras. 43-48. 
2848 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 488 (ix). 
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Prosecution and to pursue a related civil action for collective and moral 
reparations against an Accused […].2849   
 
Victims’ status as reparations claimants is in detailed examined in the 
next chapter. In any case, the precise scope of some of the civil parties’ 
modalities of participation/procedural rights has been sharpened by the ECCC’s 
case law. Civil parties’ modalities of participation/procedural rights are 
examined as follows.   
First, civil parties have the right to be represented by lawyers according 
to a previous version of the ECCC Internal Rules.2850 This was later amended and 
actually transformed in a sort of requirement as ‘From the issuance of the 
Closing Order onwards, in order to participate in proceedings, Civil Parties shall 
at all times be represented by a Civil Party lawyer’.2851 Accordingly, civil parties’ 
participation/procedural rights during trial are exercised via their legal counsels. 
Moreover, civil parties have the right to be questioned in presence of their 
lawyers.2852 In Duch, there were a total of 93 civil parties who participated in the 
trial proceedings, organized themselves into four groups and each represented 
by their own counsels.2853 22 civil parties were heard before the Chamber during 
the course of trial.2854 The number of civil parties participating in the proceedings 
was low in comparison to Nuon Chea et al. and, thus, there was no need for 
forced grouping of civil parties. However, the trial proceedings in Duch 
presented difficulties to handle the representation of civil parties.  
Estimating a much higher number of civil parties in Nuon Chea et al., 
the ECCC Internal Rules were modified to provide for that:   
 
Civil Parties at the trial stage and beyond shall comprise a single, consolidated 
group, whose interests are represented by the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers as 
described in IR [Internal Rules] 12 ter. The Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers are 
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2849 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 660; 
Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 
2012, para. 639.  
2850 ECCC Internal Rules, rules 23 (7) and 83 (1) (Rev. 3). See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch 
(Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 488 (ii).  
2851 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 ter 1. 
2852 See Ibid., rule 23 (4).  
2853 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 637.  
2854 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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supported by the Civil Party Lawyers described in IR 12 ter (3). Civil Party Lead 
Co-Lawyers shall file a single claim for collective and moral reparations.2855 
 
Thus, as referred to by Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea et al., under this 
amended provision applicable to this case, and sub-sequent cases:  
 
[…] Civil Parties no longer participate individually on the basis of their 
particular harm suffered, but instead comprise a consolidated group whose 
collective interests are represented by the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers during 
the trial stage and beyond.2856  
 
It must be mentioned that the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers are selected 
by the ECCC,2857 which is in principle detrimental of civil parties’ right to freely 
choice their legal representatives.  
The idea of balancing different converging interests at trial is captured 
under internal rule 12 ter (1) ‘The Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers shall ensure the 
effective organization of Civil Party representation during the trial stage and 
beyond, whilst balancing the rights of all parties and the need for an expeditious 
trial within the unique ECCC context’.2858 In turn, internal rule 12 ter (3), 
referred to in internal rule 23 (3), reads as follows:  
 
The Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers shall first and foremost seek the views of the 
Civil Party lawyers and endeavour to reach consensus in order to coordinate 
representation of Civil Parties at trial. Internal procedures shall be developed by 
the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers, in consultation with Civil Party Lawyers, for 
this purpose.2859   
 
The requirement explicitly stating that civil parties’ lead co-lawyers shall 
seek the views from the civil parties’ lawyers to coordinate the representation of 
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2855 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (3) (Rev. 6). The current version of this rule has maintained the 
quoted text.  
2856 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Severance Order Pursuant to Internal Rule 89ter, E/124, 22 
September 2011, para. 8.  
2857 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 12 ter 4. 
2858 See also Ibid., rule 23 ter (2). (‘The Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers derive their powers from these 
IRs. They shall be obliged to promote justice and the fair and effective conduct of proceedings’.). 
2859 See also Ibid., rule 12 ter (5) (‘The core functions of the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers shall 
include: a. Representing the interests of the consolidated group of Civil Parties, as outlined in IR 
[Internal Rule] 23(1) and (2); and b. Ultimate responsibility to the court for the overall advocacy, 
strategy and in-court presentation of the interests of the consolidated group of Civil Parties during 
the trial stage and beyond’.).     
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civil parties is necessary in order not to weaken the autonomous status of victims 
as civil parties during trial. Additionally, the presence of lead co-lawyers in 
principle offers better chances for avoiding repetitions and unwarranted delays 
during trial since those legal counsels hold the responsibility to make filings and 
submissions representing the civil parties. Having said so, the referred 
compulsory coordination triggers two important disadvantages, which concern 
civil parties’ right to be represented by lawyers selected by them and the ever-
present difference in civil parties’ interests. Concerning the latter, it should be 
borne in mind that not only is each individual’s story separate and different from 
each other but also, as identified in a empirical-legal study on the civil parties at 
the ECCC, ‘even victims who have suffered a similar plight in the same site 
subscribe to very different values, and have very different identities, views and 
desires for vindication’.2860 Therefore, the amended/new rules present the 
drawback that individual civil parties’ ability to communicate with the 
Chambers, even via their own lawyers, is in principle substantially reduced, 
especially in cases with a large number of victims.2861  
Unlike the ICC RPE, the ECCC Internal Rules ‘do not explicitly address 
victims’ fears that their individual interests will be subjugated in the interest of 
the common consolidated group during trial’.2862 Indeed internal rule 12 ter (6) 
only refers to the consolidated group’s interests:  
 
The Civil Party Lawyers shall endeavour to support the Civil Party Lead Co-
Lawyers in the representation of the interests of the consolidated group. Such 
support may include oral and written submissions, examination of their clients 
and witnesses and other procedural actions. 
  
In Duch, it was not necessary to forced grouping due to the number of 
civil parties (93) participating in trial and, thus, each civil party chose his/her 
own legal team based on advice from the VSS or Cambodian NGOs.2863 In 
application of the amended ECCC Internal Rules, all civil parties in Nuon Chea 
et al., are under a single, consolidated group represented by lead co-lawyers who 
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2860 Mohan (2009) 762. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 218.   
2861 Susana SáCouto, ‘Victims Participation at the International Criminal Court and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: A Feminist Project?’ (2012) 18 Michigan 
Journal of Gender and Law 297, 327. 
2862 Alain Werner and Daniella Rudy, ‘Civil Party Representation at the ECCC: Sounding the 
Retreat in International Criminal Law?’ (2010) 8 Northwestern University Journal of International 
Human Rights Law 301, 305.    
2863 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 217.  
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are supported by civil parties’ lawyers. Concerning civil parties’ lawyers, civil 
parties ‘may form groups and choose to be represented by a common lawyer’; 
however, the Trial Chamber can also take the decision to group civil parties and 
organize them under common representation if the interests of justice so 
require.2864 When selecting common lawyers, the Trial Chamber and the VSS 
‘shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that […]  the distinct interests of each of 
the Civil Parties are represented and that any conflict of interest is avoided’. 
Second, the civil party is entitled to exercise the right of audience.2865 
According to internal rule 91 (1), the Trial Chamber ‘shall hear civil parties’, i.e., 
the right of audience.2866  In Duch, civil parties were seated in the witness box and 
the accused was sitting no more than two meters from the civil parties, i.e., civil 
parties by turning slightly to their right could look directly at the accused.2867 In 
Nuon Chea et al., the Supreme Court Chamber concluded that when the Trial 
Chamber decided to sever this case without having invited the parties’ 
submissions (civil parties’ submissions included) violated the parties’ right to be 
heard.2868 It also noticed a violation of the right to be heard of the civil parties’ 
lead co-lawyers following the Trial Chamber’s acknowledgment of the lead co-
lawyers’ request for reconsideration of the severance order within its decision on 
reconsideration but without having specifically addressed their particular 
arguments.2869 These points were addressed by the Trial Chamber through 
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2864 ECCC Internal rules, rule 23 ter (3). Nevertheless, these powers have not been used fully in 
practice. See Christoph Sperfeldt, ‘From the Margins of Internationalized Criminal Justice. Lessons 
Learned at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2013) 11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1111, 1119.  
2865 ECCC Internal Rules, rules 88 (1) (‘The Greffier of the Chamber shall call the Accused, Civil 
Parties, witnesses and experts and verify their identity. Each party shall sit at their designated place 
in the courtroom’), and 91 (1) (‘The Chamber shall hear the Civil Parties, witnesses and experts in 
the order it considers useful’.). See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, 
Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 488 (xiv).   
2866 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 488 (xiv). 
2867 See Eric Stover, Mychelle Balthazard and Alexa Koeing, ‘Confronting Duch: Civil Party 
Participation in Case 001 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of the Cambodia’ (2011) 93 
International Review of the Red Cross 503, 526. 
2868 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on the Co-Prosecutors’ Immediate Appeal of the Trial 
Chamber’s Decision Concerning the Scope of Case 002/01, Supreme Court Chamber, 8 February 
2013, para. 44. 
2869 Ibid., footnote 10. 
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hearings on the issue of severance,2870 which is found herein as a necessary step 
to fully respect the civil party’s right of audience.   
  Third, related to the previous right, civil parties can provide unsworn 
testimony during trial proceedings.2871 In Duch, 22 civil parties provided 
evidence before the Trial Chamber.2872 As previously discussed,2873 it is important 
to recall herein that victims once became civil parties, in application of the 
Internal Rules,2874 considered by the Trial Chamber in Duch, were no longer 
questioned as witnesses and, hence, were exempted from the requirement to 
testify under an oath or affirmation.2875 Thus, for example, following requests by 
the civil parties to be heard at trial, the Trial Chamber agreed to hear 7 civil 
parties, allegedly former S-21 detainees during the trial section corresponding to 
the functioning of the S-21 detention centre.2876 Other 15 civil parties were heard 
later on,2877 making up a total of 22 civil parties heard. Direct victims, i.e., 
survivors of the S-21 detention centre, were first heard and then indirect victims, 
who had the opportunity to tell their stories and express their sorrow for the loss 
of their next of kin.2878 Civil parties expressed, when interviewed, that their 
motivations were their desire to achieve justice not only for themselves but also 
for their families and dead relatives.2879 Civil parties ‘grounded their need to 
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2870 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Severance of Case 002 Following Supreme Court 
Chamber Decision of 8 February 2013, Trial Chamber, 26 April 2013, paras. 41-47.  
2871 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras. 52-54. 
2872 Ibid., para. 54. See also, Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Direction on the Scheduling of 
the Trial, Trial Chamber. 20 March 2009.   
2873 See supra Chapter III 2.4.2.1.  
2874 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (4). See also ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (3) (a) (Rev. 5); ECCC 
Internal Rules, rule 23 (6) (Rev. 3).  
2875 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 54. 
2876 Ibid., Loc. cit. See also, Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision Concerning the 
Scheduling of the Hearing of Civil Parties During the Substantive Hearing, E57, Trial Chamber, 30 
April 2009. It should be mentioned that although 28 civil parties initially requested to be heard, 
this number was later reduced to 22 after 6 civil parties declined or were unavailable to be heard by 
the Trial Chamber. 
2877 These 15 civil parties were heard between 17 and 24 August 2009. See Kaing Guek Eav alias 
Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, Annex I: Procedural History, para. 12. 
See also, Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 06 July 2009, 11-12 August 2009, 18 
August 2009, 20 August 2009 and 24 August 2009, Comprising Documents E1/43, E1/61, E1/64, 
E1/66 and E1/67; Transcripts, 17-20 August 2009 and 24 August 2009, Comprising Documents 
E1/63 to E/67.   
2878 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 215.  
2879 Stover Balthazard and Koeing (2011) 520. See also Phuong Pham et al., ‘Victim Participation 
and the Trial of Duch at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2011) 3 Journal 
of Human Rights Practice 264, 275.    
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testify in personal and intrinsic terms rather than in feeling a responsibility to 
perform a universal good for all Cambodians or all humanity, although such 
sentiments were not completely absent’.2880  
As a consequence of problems such as lack of understanding and 
problems of recollection of what happened three decades ago, some statements 
contradicted some of those previously given and also civil parties exceeded their 
time; however, the Trial Chamber showed flexibility as civil parties’ testimonies 
were allowed to continue beyond the time originally allocated.2881 Some civil 
parties could tell their stories in a narrative form; however, the Trial Chamber 
continuously interrupted them to answer questions.2882 Moreover, the defense 
questioned aggressively the civil parties sometimes, which made the civil parties’ 
lawyers request the Judges to remind the defense to show more respect.2883    
During the trial in Duch, it became clear that the civil parties needed 
better preparation. Indeed, several civil parties’ lawyers had not expected their 
clients to be examined and cross-examined like witnesses, and therefore were not 
prepared for the scrutiny.2884 Having said so, in interviews of the civil parties who 
participated in Duch, the vast majority of them said that the actual experience of 
testifying largely exceeded their expectations to the point that testifying 
constituted the most important part of their participation as civil parties.2885   
In Nuon Chea et al., the Trial Chamber has always distinguished between 
testimony on the facts at issue, which is restricted to the Case 002/01 scope, i.e., 
corresponding to the first mini-trial/trial within Nuon Chea et al., as explained 
later,2886 subject to adversarial argument, and ‘general statements of suffering, 
which the Civil Party can freely make at the conclusion of their testimony’.2887 
Thus, the Chamber directed the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers to structure the 
questioning of civil parties in a form that distinguishes between testimony on 
facts and statements pertaining to suffering,2888 assist civil parties in the 
preparation of their statements of suffering to discourage new allegations against 
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2880 Stover Balthazard and Koeing (2011) 520.  
2881 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 215.  
2882 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 1 July 2009, pp. 22-24. Cited by McGonigle 
Leyh (2011) 215, footnote 294.  
2883 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 13 July 2009, p. 62. Cited by McGonigle 
Leyh (2011) 216, footnote 301.  
2884 Stover, Balthazard and Koeing (2011) 524.  
2885 Ibid., 535, 536. See also Pham et al. (2013) 284 (‘[…] those who provided testimony also viewed 
that experience positively’.).  
2886 See infra Chapter IV 4.4.2.1. 
2887 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 2 May 2013, para. 14. 
2888 Ibid., p. 10. 
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the accused, and to ensure that their statements of suffering are limited to the 
purpose for which they are intended.2889 Should a civil party’s statement of 
suffering introduce new factual allegations, especially if considered inculpatory 
to the accused, an opportunity for adversarial challenge is given to the defence 
‘and may warrant the recall of the Civil Party for further examination’.2890  
In the first trial within Nuon Chea et al., 31 civil parties provided 
testimony concerning: i) historical background; ii) communication and 
administrative structures; and iii) population movements and the Tuol Po Chrey 
execution site; besides the impact on civil parties.2891 Thus, civil parties testified 
about, inter alia, medical experiments and forced marriage,2892 extremely harsh 
living conditions,2893 imprisonment,2894 and torture.2895 Their lawyers have 
commented on evidence introduced, orally responded to defence’s objections 
and voiced their general support for the Prosecution.2896 In the first trial within 
Nuon Chea et al., civil parties have put themselves to examination before the 
Trial Chamber and, as noticed by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, ‘have 
provided detailed, vivid and often startling testimonies on the crimes committed 
in Democratic Kampuchea and their impact on the population’.2897  
            Fourth, civil parties have the right to support the prosecution, as laid 
down explicitly under internal rule 23 (1) (a), which establishes that ‘The 
purpose of Civil Party action before the ECCC is to: […] Participate in criminal 
proceedings against those responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ECCC by supporting the prosecution […]’. This right was also noted by the 
Supreme Court Chamber in Duch.2898   
With regard to the exercise of this right, the defence lawyer during the 
trial in Duch sustained that questioning of witnesses by civil parties should be 
limited to aspects relevant for reparations and harm suffered as existent in many 
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2889 Ibid., paras. 17 and 18.  
2890 Ibid., para. 19. 
2891 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Civil Parties Closing Brief to Case 002/01 With Confidential 
Annexes 1-4, Civil Parties’ Lead Co-Lawyers, 26 September 2013, para. 7, footnote 4. 
2892 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 23 August 2012 (testimony of civil party Em Oeun). 
2893 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 10 January 2012 (testimonies of Roman Yun and 
Klan Fit). 
2894 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 7 December 2011 (testimony of Roman Yun).  
2895 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 4 June 2013 (testimony of Seng Sivutha); Nuon Chea 
et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 30 May 2013 (testimony of Yin Roum Doul).  
2896 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 19 January 2012. 
2897 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 26 September 2013, para. 7. 
2898 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 488 (vii).     
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national systems, including the French system, as the civil parties cannot become 
second prosecutors.2899 Thus, in Duch, a defence counsel quoting some French 
procedural textbooks argued that the civil parties’ role is limited to defend their 
own positions and interests in connection with their own suffering and to the 
damage inflicted on them but not putting them in charge of prosecution.2900 
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber rejected this argumentation and based on rule 
23 (1) stated that ‘The Chamber allows the questionings of the civil parties’ 
lawyers in order to support the alleged prosecution’,2901 but subject to some 
limits, as discussed later in this same sub-section. Accordingly, the civil party’s 
procedural right to/modality of participation of tendering evidentiary material to 
help in the determination of the accused’s guilt was confirmed and, therefore, 
the civil party’s status was in this particular point enhanced. However, as the 
Trial Chamber left clear in Duch, the civil party’s right to support the 
prosecution does not transform him/her in additional Prosecutors: 
 
The Chamber considers that the Accused’s right to a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings includes the right to face one prosecuting authority only. 
Accordingly, and while, the Civil Parties have the right to support or assist the 
Prosecution, their role within the trial must not, in effect, transform them into 
additional prosecutors. 
Each party has a distinct role, in keeping with their particular interests and 
responsibilities at trial.2902   
 
Although the civil parties’ interests mainly concern the pursuit of 
reparations, criminal conviction is a pre-requisite thereof.2903 Accordingly, civil 
parties have an interest in the trial establishing the elements of the crime which, 
if proven, constitute the basis of their civil claims and, hence, civil parties have 
the right to support the prosecution to establish accused’s criminal liability.2904 
Additionally, since the overall goal is to determine the truth, all parties may 
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2899 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 22 June 2009, p. 92. Referred to by 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 194, footnote 154.         
2900 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 22 June 2009, pp. 94-96. Referred to by 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 194, footnote 155.     
2901 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 22 June 2009, p. 98, lines 11 and 12. 
2902 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint Request for a 
Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions 
Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character, Trial 
Chamber,  9 October 2009, paras. 26 and 27. 
2903 Ibid., para. 33. 
2904 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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assist on this.2905 In the particular case of the civil parties, who hold a 
fundamental interest in obtaining reparations, establishing the truth is limited to 
facts or evidence relevant to establish accused’s criminal liability,2906 and thus 
they have the right to assist the Prosecution, who has to prove the accused’s guilt, 
in establishing the truth.2907  
Civil parties’ lawyers in Duch in several times opposed the Prosecution 
directly or put forward their own theory of the case resulting in delays of the 
proceedings, and about that the defence lawyer argued that civil parties’ lawyers 
were acting as substitute Prosecutors and, hence, jeopardizing the equality of 
arms.2908 The Trial Chamber concluded that even though civil parties hold the 
right to assist or support the Co-Prosecutors, they are not granted with ‘a general 
right of equal participation with the Co-Prosecutor’.2909     
In Nuon Chea et al., civil parties’ support of the Prosecution has been 
given when, for example, the Co-Prosecutors’ motions requesting the Trial 
Chamber to consider joint criminal enterprise (JCE-III, the so-called extended 
form of joint criminal enterprise) as an alternative mode of liability,2910 were 
supported by a brief filed by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers.2911 The Trial 
Chamber rejected the Co-Prosecutors’ motions as JCE III was considered neither 
to be part of customary international law nor to be a general principle of law at 
the time when the crimes took place (1975-1979),2912 following ECCC’s previous 
jurisprudence.2913 Nevertheless, this example illustrates the importance and scope 
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2905 Ibid., para. 34. 
2906 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
2907 Ibid., para. 41. 
2908 Stover, Balthazard and Koeing (2011) 523; Khmer Rouge Trial Monitor, Reports No. 7 (week 
ending 31 May 2009), No. 9 (week ending 21 June 2009), and No. 21 (week ending 21 September 
2009). 
2909 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2009, para. 25. 
2910 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Co-Prosecutors' Request for the Trial Chamber to Consider JCE 
III as an Alternative Mode of Liability, Co-Prosecutors, 17 June 2011. 
2911 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Brief in Support of the Co-Prosecutors' Request for the Trial 
Chamber to Consider Joint Criminal Enterprise III as an Alternative Mode of Liability, Civil 
Parties’ Lead Co-Lawyers, 22 July 2011. 
2912 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise, Trial 
Chamber, 12 September 2011, paras. 23-35.  
2913 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges 
Order On Joint Criminal Enterprise, Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 May 2010, paras. 78-82. See also Duch 
(Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras. 511-513 (finding that JCE-I and JCE-II 
were already part of customary international law when the crimes were committed (1975-1979). 
The judgment in Duch did not rule on the applicability of JCE III, which was inapplicable in that 
case). 
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of this civil parties’ modality of participation/procedural right, which goes to the 
very core of the legal issues at stake in trial, i.e., the determination of what mode 
of liability should be used to attribute criminal responsibility to the accused. Be 
that as it may be, this civil parties’ modality of participation/procedural right 
and, in general, concerning their participation during trial should exclude 
interventions not connected with the charges against the accused or when they 
do not (meaningfully) contribute to the determination of the truth.            
Fifth, in close connection with the civil parties’ support of the 
Prosecution, civil parties may question the accused,2914 and witnesses.2915 
Concerning questioning of the accused: 
 
The Co-Prosecutors and all the other parties and their lawyers shall also have 
the right to question the Accused. All questions shall be asked with the 
permission of the President. Except for questions asked by the Co-Prosecutors 
and the lawyers, all questions shall be asked through the President of the 
Chamber and in the order as determined by him.2916 
 
The Trial Chamber has set some necessary guidelines to exercise the civil 
parties’  right to questioning, paying particular attention to the situation of the 
accused and the efficient conduct of the trial proceedings:  
 
[...] first, try to avoid repetitive questions which has already been raised and 
asked by the Co-Prosecutors. There is no need to recall the questions by other 
parties which were already posed.   
The second point is try to avoid a very long-winded question, otherwise the 
accused will be confused […]. 
Third, try to avoid questions which are not related to the current fact that is 
being before the Chamber […].2917                              
 
It should be mentioned that even though civil parties have a right to be 
heard by the Chambers,2918 under internal rule 91 (2):  
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2914 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 90 (2). See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal 
Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 488 (xiii). 
2915 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 91 (2). 
2916 Ibid., rule 90 (2).  
2917 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 22 June 2009, p. 98, lines 13-16, 18-19, 21-
22.  
2918 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 91 (1) (‘The Chamber shall hear the Civil Parties [...]’.). 
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The Judges may ask any questions and the Co-Prosecutors and all the other 
parties [civil parties included] and their lawyers shall also be allowed to ask 
questions with the permission of the President. Except for questions asked by 
the Judges, the Co-Prosecutors and the lawyers, all questions shall be asked 
through the President of the Chamber. 
 
In Duch, the questioning was sometimes emotional, especially when the 
civil parties looked for answers concerning their next of kin,2919 which can be 
related to civil parties’ quest for justice.2920 Additionally, civil parties posed 
questions which were clearly not connected to the matters and, thus, the 
Chamber requested to ask relevant questions.2921 Furthermore, repetitive 
questions were often, thus delaying the proceedings and affecting the accused’s 
right to an expeditious trial. Indeed, few weeks after the trial began in Duch, 
allowing each party (every civil party group included) to pose unlimited 
questions to both witnesses and the accused was remarkably lengthening the 
duration of the proceedings.2922   
All this situation was faced by the Trial Chamber in Duch by setting new 
time limits, i.e., whereas the civil parties in total were granted as much time as 
the defense, the Co-Prosecutors were granted a slightly lower amount of time 
although they carry the burden of proof.2923 In some other occasions, the defence 
was given slightly more time than that allocated to the Prosecution and civil 
parties together but never as much as the two combined.2924 Even though the 
speed of the trial proceedings saw a significant increase, the adherence to the 
time limits impacted the trial significantly as, e.g., giving a civil party team 10 
minutes to question a victim-witness alongside important translation issues led 
to civil party lawyers’ inability to conduct a full examination of witnesses.2925 This 
arguably corresponded to the Trial Chamber’s restrictive interpretation of the 
scope of civil parties’ procedural rights.2926 Actually, the limits to time for 
questions did not provide a meaningful reduction of repetitive questioning of 
civil parties vis-à-vis the Co-Prosecutors and also civil parties vis-à-vis civil 
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2919 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 208. 
2920 Stover Balthazard and Koeing (2011) 519-521.  
2921 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 29 June 2009, pp. 88-90. Cited by 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 209, footnote 245.   
2922 See Werner and Rudy (2010) 304.    
2923 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 209-210.  
2924 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
2925 Ibid., 211. 
2926 See Stover Balthazard and Koeing (2011) 523.   
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parties.2927 The lawyers of civil parties could question expert witnesses, and also 
contest expert witnesses’ assertions.2928 Although civil parties’ lawyers 
questioning normally reinforced the Co-Prosecutors’ argumentation, there were 
some few incidents which actually undermine its strength.2929 Thus, as previously 
said, civil parties several times pushed their own theory of the case or even 
opposed the Co-Prosecutors.2930 The Trial Chamber in Duch permitted the civil 
party to ask some questions to Duch via the President of the Chamber, allowing 
some exchange, which constituted quite a remarkable trial highlight.2931         
In Nuon Chea et al., the civil parties’ lawyers have conducted 
questioning of, for example, a witness whose testimony focused on 
communication under the Khmer Rouge regime;2932 an expert witness’s 
testimony on one of the co-accused’s (Ieng Thirith) fitness to stand trial;2933 a 
witness testifying about disappearances;2934 Duch, in this case as a Prosecution 
witness, about the connection between the co-accused (Khmer Rouge leaders) 
and the crimes committed in the S-21 detention centre,2935 and a witness, a 
former soldier and investigator into the atrocities during the Khmer Rouge 
regime.2936  
Sixth, the civil party has the right to propose witnesses to be called by the 
Trial Chamber: 
 
[…] the Chamber shall consider the lists of potential witnesses and experts 
submitted by the parties in accordance with these IRs [Internal Rules]. Where 
the Chamber considers that the hearing of a proposed witness or expert would 
not be conducive to the good administration of justice, it shall reject the request 
that such person be summoned. 2937   
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2927 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 211.  
2928 Ibid., 211-212. 
2929 Ibid., 212.  
2930 Stover Balthazard and Koeing (2011) 523. 
2931 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 1 July 2009, testimony of Bou Meng; Kaing 
Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 13 July 2009, testimony of Nam Mon. Cited by 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 213, footnote 271. 
2932 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 4 September 2012, p. 24, line 23-p. 60, line 4.  
2933 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 30 August 2012 (testimony of Dr. Chak Tida). 
2934 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 30 July 2012 (testimony of witness Rochoem Ton).  
2935  Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 2 April 2012 (testimony of Duch); Nuon Chea et al. 
(Case 002), Transcripts, 3 April 2012, (testimony of Duch). 
2936 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 4 July 2013 (testimony of Sum Alatt).  
2937 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 80 bis (2). See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal 
Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 488 (x). 
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When the consolidated group of victims wishes to summon any 
witnesses not included on the Co-Prosecutors’ list, they shall submit an 
additional list.2938 Civil parties can also request the Trial Chamber to summon 
new witnesses during trial.2939 The risk concerning proposed witnesses is that 
they may not fit the Prosecutor’s case, leading to confusion, and thus the 
Chamber has to decide what proposed witnesses are called, i.e., the Chamber and 
not the parties call the proposed witnesses.2940 In Duch, the Trial Chamber was 
reluctant to entertain witnesses proposed by civil parties (including an expert 
witness on reparations options) and, thus, the Chamber out of the civil parties’ 
proposed witnesses was willing to accept two expert witnesses to testify about 
trauma but only one of these two expert witnesses testified.2941 In Nuon Chea et 
al., testimony of witnesses brought and examined by the civil parties’ lawyers has 
sometimes been strongly emotional.2942     
Seventh, the civil party holds the right to respond to preliminary 
objections.2943 These preliminary objections concern: i) the jurisdiction of the 
chamber; ii) any issue that requires termination of the Prosecution; and iii) 
nullity of procedural acts made after the indictment is filed.2944 For example, in 
Nuon Chea et al., opportunity was given to the civil parties to respond to the 
defence preliminary objections concerning statute of limitations on domestic 
crimes,2945 and a preliminary objection alleging the unconstitutional character of 
the ECCC Internal Rules.2946 In Nuon Chea et al., civil parties’ lead co-lawyers 
 
2938 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 80 (2). 
2939 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 87 (4).  
2940 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 207. 
2941 Ibid., 207-208.  
2942 See, e.g., Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 9 August 2012, testimony of witness Ong 
Thong Hoeung.   
2943 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 89 (2). See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal 
Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 488 (xii).  
2944 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 89 (1).  
2945 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Defence Preliminary Objections (Statute of 
Limitations on Domestic Courts), Trial Chamber, 22 September 2011, para. 4; Nuon Chea et. al. 
(Case 002), Agenda for Initial Hearing, Trial Chamber, 14 June 2011; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 
Transcripts, 29 June 2011 (Initial Hearing), E1/6.1, pp. 18.     
2946 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Nuon Chea’s Preliminary Objections Alleging the 
Unconstitutional Character of the ECCC Internal Rules, Trial Chamber, 8 August 2011, para. 4; 
Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Civil Parties' Joint Response to Defence Rule 89 Preliminary 
Objections, 7 March 2011, para. 32.   
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also requested (and were granted) an extension of time to respond one of the co-
accused’s preliminary objections.2947   
Eighth, the civil party can make written submissions.2948 For example, 
the civil parties’ co-lawyers in Duch presented rebuttal statements;2949 and civil 
parties filed submissions on forms of collective and moral reparations sought 
from the accused.2950 In Nuon Chea et al., for instance, civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers filed responses to accused’s objections to written statement 
admissibility.2951  
Ninth, the civil parties may examine the case file through their 
lawyers.2952        
Tenth, the civil party has the right to make closing statements.2953 Civil 
parties’ lead co-lawyers may make rebuttal statements;2954 however, in any case 
‘the accused and his or her lawyers shall always be entitled to make the final 
statement’.2955   
Eleventh, civil parties can tender written evidence. For example, in Nuon 
Chea et al., among all civil party applications, the lead co-lawyers specified which 
statements they sought to have placed into evidence in order to permit 
adversarial argument in relation to them.2956 In the first trial within Nuon Chea et 
 
2947 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers’ Request for Extension 
of Time, Trial Chamber, 9 June 2011, p. 2.  
2948 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 92. See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal 
Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 488 (xv).  
2949 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Written Record of Proceedings – 26 and 27 November 
2009, documents E1/81 and E1/82.  
2950 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Civil Parties' Co-Lawyers’ Joint Submission on 
Reparations, E159/3, 17 September 2009; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), CPG3 –Mémoire 
Additionnel Concernant la Réparation, E159/3/1, 17 September 2009.  
2951 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Lead Co-Lawyers’ Consolidated Response to Defense Objections 
on the Admissibility of Written Statements in Lieu of Oral Testimony, E277/2, Civil Party Lead 
Co-Lawyers, 10 June 2013.     
2952 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 86. 
2953 Ibid., rule 94 (1) (a). See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, 
Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 488 (xvi).  
2954 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 94 (2). 
2955 Ibid., rule 94 (3). 
2956 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Trial Chamber Memorandum Entitled: Forthcoming Document 
Hearings and Response to Lead Co-Lawyers’ Memorandum Concerning the Trial Chamber’s 
Request to Identify Civil Party Applications for Use at Trial (E280/4) and KHIEU Samphan 
Defence Request to Revise Corroborative Evidence Lists (E223), Trial Chamber, 19 October 2012, 
para. 12. 
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al., i.e., case 002/01, 574 civil party documents were submitted to the Trial 
Chamber and admitted into evidence by it.2957     
Participation of civil parties at the ECCC concerning submissions on 
sentencing, appeals and reparations are examined later.              
 
4.4.1.2. The STL   
With regard to the STL, since at the time of writing this thesis, the trial in the 
first STL case, Ayyash et al., has not yet started, the analysis conducted herein is 
mainly of the STL RPE and, where applicable, of the STL Statute. In any case, the 
Trial Chamber in Ayyash et al. acknowledging that victims ‘are entitled to 
participate in the proceedings’,2958 added that:  
 
The manner in which they exercise that right and participate is not specified in 
the Rules or the Statute. The Trial Chamber will have to decide how the victims 
will be allowed to participate through their legal representative […] and his 
team. And we are very interested in hearing from [him] as to what his 
application will be, how he proposes, what he proposes we do, and when he’s 
going to file his application in respect of that […] [emphasis added].2959      
 
Accordingly, the victim participants’ legal representative filed their 
observations on victim participants’ modalities of participation at trial 
emphasizing that within the trial proceedings the fulfilment of the mandate of 
the victim participants’ legal representative ‘necessitates further and different 
modalities as well as a renewal of those permitted by the Pre-Trial Judge’.2960  
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2957 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 26 September 2013, para. 7. 
2958 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/T26), Transcripts, 29 October 2013, p.  26, lines 22-23. 
2959 Ibid., p.  26, lines lines 23-25; and p. 27, lines 1-4.  
2960 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), Observations of the Legal Representative of Victims on the 
Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, Legal Representative of Victims, 1 November 2013, 
para. 14. Victim participants’ legal representative requested the following modalities of 
participation/procedural rights during trial: ‘a) participate at meetings, status conferences and 
hearings other than the trial proceedings during the trial phase; b) file motions and briefs and 
make oral submissions to the Trial Chamber in relation to any issue that affects the victims’ 
personal interests; c) have access to public and confidential documents and filings; d) have access 
to the case file and other disclosure materials; e) make opening and closing statements; f) call 
witnesses and tender other evidence on the basis of a systematic approach of the Trial Chamber; g) 
question witnesses on the basis of a systematic approach of the Trial Chamber; h) proof witnesses 
(whether called by the LRV [legal representative of victims] or the parties) on the basis of a 
systematic approach by the Trial Chamber’. See Ibid., para. 58.   
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The modalities of participation/procedural rights that victim 
participants can exercise via their representatives during the trial proceedings 
can be grouped under the following categories.  
First, victim participants may be allowed to make opening,2961 as well as 
closing statements.2962 Indeed, the Trial Chamber in a pre-trial conference in 
Ayyash et al. has already authorized the victim participants’ legal representative 
to make an opening statement on behalf of the victim participants during the 
first trial hearing and that a small number of victim participants are present in 
the courtroom during the opening statements.2963  
Second, victim participants may be allowed by the Trial Chamber, after 
hearing the parties, to tender evidence.2964 Victim participants’ legal 
representative in Ayyash et al. submitted that, under rules 87 (b) and 146 (b), a 
systematic approach rather than a casuistic approach should be followed to 
tender evidence to ensure fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings.2965 
Otherwise, it was added, it would be required ‘an individual decision on each 
proposed […] evidence to be tendered’.2966 It should be remembered that the 
ICC Trial Chambers, endorsed by the ICC Appeals Chamber, have mainly 
followed a casuistic approach as previously examined.2967   
Third, victim participants may request the Trial Chamber, after hearing 
the parties, to call witnesses.2968 The victim participants’ legal representative has 
also requested the application of a systematic approach to call witnesses in 
Ayyash et al.2969 Concerning this victim participants’ procedural right, it should 
be noticed that while under the English original version of rule 87 (B) victim 
participants were authorized by the Chambers to call witnesses, under the 
French version the Trial Chamber calls witnesses on behalf of victims 
participating in the proceedings. The STL Judges considered the latter being the 
correct procedure and, accordingly, the English version of rule 87 (B) has been 
corrected to reflect the French one.2970   
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2961 STL RPE, rule 143. 
2962 Ibid., rule 147 (A). 
2963 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/T26), Transcripts, 29 October 2013, p. 31, lines 6-10. See also 
Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 1 November 2013, para. 53.     
2964 STL RPE, rule 87 (B). 
2965 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 1 November 2013, para. 37. 
2966 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
2967 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.2.2 and 2.5.  
2968 STL RPE, rules 87 (B), 146 (A), and 146 (B) (ii). 
2969 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 1 November 2013, paras. 32-37. 
2970 STL Office of the President (February 2012) 24. 
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It should be reminded that, at the end of the pre-trial proceedings, the 
Trial Chamber should receive from the Pre-Trial Judge, a case file including the 
following documents:   
 
(i) all the filings of the Parties and of the victims participating in the 
proceedings;  
(ii) any evidentiary material received by him [Pre-Trial Judge];  
(iii) transcripts of status conferences;  
(iv) minutes of meetings […];  
(v) all the orders and decisions he [Pre-Trial Judge] has made;  
(vi) correspondence with relevant entities;  
(vii) a detailed report setting out: (a) the arguments of the Parties and the 
victims participating in the proceedings on the facts and the applicable law; (b) 
the points of agreement and disagreement; (c) the probative material produced 
by each Party and by the victims participating in the proceedings; (d) a 
summary of his decisions and orders; (e) suggestions as to the number and 
relevance of both the witnesses to be called by the Prosecutor and the witnesses 
that the victims participating in the proceedings intend to request the Trial 
Chamber to call […].2971   
 
This procedural feature makes the STL Trial Chamber have better 
chances than the ICC to examine whether the witnesses called by victim 
participants are necessary for the determination of the truth and whether the 
questions asked by the victim participants’ legal representatives to a witness are 
relevant. In Ayyash et al., the Trial Chamber was officially seized of the case 
when it received the Pre-Trial Judge’s case file and his report.2972 The STL Trial 
Chamber Judges are in a better standing than their ICC peers to avoid a parallel 
prosecution from the victim participants, which is a scenario no few times 
criticized by those who object victim participants’ broad procedural rights.2973  
Accordingly, since the STL Trial Chamber Judges have access to the 
above-detailed information in the case-file, and because of their intervening 
powers,2974 they can identify the more appropriate instances during trial 
 
2971 STL RPE, rule 95 (A).  
2972 This took place the 28 October 2013. See Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/T26), Transcripts, 29 
October 2013, p. 3, lines 6-8.  
2973 See Hemptinne (2010) 175-176. 
2974 STL RPE, rule 150 (G) (‘Upon an objection raised by a Party, the Chamber may exercise 
control over the mode and order of questioning witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (i) 
make the questioning and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth; and (ii) avoid 
needless consumption of time and resources’.).  
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proceedings to prevent victim participants from leading or challenging evidence 
which may be repetitive or lack relevance in establishing the truth. Moreover, 
under the STL Statute and RPE, the Prosecutor not only carries the burden of 
proof but (s)he is also in charge of the investigation, evaluation of evidence in 
connection with the charges in the indictment and submission of evidence in 
court.2975 Hence, it may be argued that only when the Prosecutor does not call 
witnesses or pose questions necessary for the determination of the truth, victims 
may on exceptional grounds be allowed to intervene.2976 This will, however, have 
to be determined in the STL’s practice. Lastly, but equally important, under the 
STL RPE, when victims are granted the right to call evidence by the Trial 
Chamber, the Chamber shall decide the corresponding disclosure obligations to 
be imposed.2977                  
Fourth, victim participants may be allowed to examine or cross-examine 
witnesses, under the control of the Trial Chamber, and after hearing the 
parties.2978 It should be mentioned that, the expression ‘after hearing the Parties’, 
contained in the respective rule has been removed in both the English and 
French versions of the rule in order to avoid any ambiguity concerning the fact 
that it is the Chamber, and not victim participants, who hears the parties.2979 In 
Ayyash et al., the victim participants’ legal representative has submitted that a 
systematic permission to question witnesses should be given.2980  
Fifth, victim participants may be allowed to pose questions to the 
accused via the Trial Chamber, whose Judges ‘at the request of […] a legal 
representative of a victim participating in the proceedings, may ask specific 
questions to the accused at any stage of the proceedings [trial stage included]’.2981 
Accordingly, the questioning of the accused can only be conducted by the Trial 
Chamber at the victim participants’ legal request. Thus, unlike the examination 
of experts and witnesses, victim participants’ legal representatives cannot 
question the accused directly. This provision constitutes a necessary judicial 
safeguard. Otherwise, victim participants’ legal representatives directly 
questioning the accused would severely jeopardize the accused’s right to remain 
silent, which is explicitly provided for under rule 144 (B) of the STL RPE. For the 
sake of an efficient and fair trial, victim participants’ legal representatives at trial 
 
2975 STL Statute, article 11 and 18 (1); STL RPE, rules 55 and 68.  
2976 Hemptinne (2010) 176. 
2977 STL RPE, rule 112 bis.  
2978 Ibid., rule 87 (B).  
2979 STL Office of the President (February 2012) 24. 
2980 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 1 November 2013, paras. 38-44. 
2981 STL RPE, rule 144 (B). 
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must be highly qualified lawyers who satisfy the same requirements as those 
asked for the defence counsel,2982 and who may receive logistical and legal 
assistance from the VPU.2983    
Sixth, victim participants may be allowed to file motions and briefs.2984  
Seventh, victim participants shall be informed about any procedural 
developments in a case, which includes the pronouncement of the judgment.2985 
Like in other procedural stages, ‘The Registrar shall provide victims participating 
in the proceedings or their legal representatives information about procedural 
developments in the case’.2986 Indeed, the right of notification is of pivotal 
importance in order to put in motion the other victim participants’ modalities of 
participation during trial.  
Eighth, victim participants shall receive all documents filed by the 
parties (excluding any confidential and ex parte material) during trial,2987 and 
have access to the case file handed over by the Pre-Trial Judge to the Chamber, 
unless the Trial Chamber establishes ‘any appropriate restrictions in the interests 
of justice’.2988 These restrictions may be set to, for example, guarantee the 
protection of sensitive and confidential information affecting the security of a 
State or an international organization.2989 In Ayyash et al., the victim 
participants’ legal representative has submitted that access to confidential 
documents during the trial, access to the case file and access rights to other 
disclosure materials should be given and under conditions similar to those 
imposed during the pre-trial stage.2990 The conditions during pre-trial were 
previously examined. 2991  
Ninth, only victims who have been granted the official status of victim 
participants have the right to legal representation before the STL according to 
the Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation,2992 document through which the 
Registrar:  
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2982 Ibid., rule 51 (C) (i). 
2983 Ibid., rule 51 (C) (iii). 
2984 Ibid., rule 87 (B). See also Ayyash et. al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 1 November 2013, paras. 19-21.  
2985 STL RPE, rule 168 (A). 
2986 Ibid., rule 86 (F). 
2987 Ibid., rule 87 (A). See also STL Chambers (2010b), para. 25.  
2988 STL RPE, rule 87 (A). See also STL Chambers (2010b), para. 25.  
2989 See STL RPE, rules 117-119; Hemptinne (2010) 174.  
2990 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 1 November 2013, paras. 22-26. 
2991 See supra Chapter IV 3.4.2.2 and 3.5. 
2992 See Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation, article 6. This article is subject to article 18 
(Designation of duty legal representatives. (A)The Registrar may designate a duty legal 
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[...] seeks to  guarantee the rights afforded to victims under the Statute and the 
Rules by ensuring that their representation is efficient, effective, meets 
internationally recognized standards and is consistent with the provisions of the 
Statute, the Rules, the Joint Code of Conduct, the Code of Conduct for Victims’ 
Legal Representatives, the Directive and any other relevant instruments.2993  
 
This article implements what is established under rule 51 (G) which 
provides for that ‘The Registrar, after consulting the Victims’ Participation Unit, 
shall designate counsel to represent victims participating in the proceedings in 
accordance with the Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation’. As previously 
mentioned,2994 the Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation fleshes out, inter 
alia, aspects concerning the designation by the Registrar of the lead legal 
representative for victim participants,2995 who is responsible for all aspects of 
his/her clients’ participation at the STL,2996 as well as remedies against such 
designation.2997 Victim participants in the proceedings are presumed to be 
treated as a single group, unless valid reasons according to rule 86 (D) (i) justifies 
not doing so. If this is the case, victim participants shall be divided into groups 
with common legal representation, considering, inter alia ‘(i) any conflicting 
interests that may hinder common representation; (ii) any shared or similar 
interests that may facilitate common representation […]’.2998 This decision may 
not be appealed.2999 
Tenth, as previously discussed,3000 victim participants can testify, i.e., 
under rule 150 (D) victim participants ‘may be permitted to give evidence if a 
Chamber decides that the interests of justice so require’ and, thus, they may hold 
a dual status victim participant-victim witness.3001 
Eleventh, concerning disclosure rights, the STL RPE phrase them in 
reference to the two parties, i.e., the Prosecutor and the defence,3002 and 
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representative for the limited purpose of undertaking a specific appeal, review or response in the 
following circumstances […]’.).   
2993 Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation, article 5.  
2994 See supra Chapter IV 3.4.2.2. 
2995 Directive on Victims’ Legal Representation, articles 16-17. 
2996 Ibid., article 24. 
2997 Ibid., articles 22-23.   
2998 STL RPE, rule 86 (D). 
2999 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3000 See supra Chapter III 2.4.2.2.  
3001 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 18 May 2012, para. 60.  
3002 STL RPE, rules 110 and 112. 
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disclosure normally takes place before trial, as done in Ayyash et al.3003 It remains 
to be seen exactly what kind of disclosure proceedings/mechanism for victim 
participants the STL Trial Chamber may follow leading up to and during trial. 
Concerning disclosure obligations, unlike the ICC RPE, the STL RPE explicitly 
establish that when ‘the Trial Chamber grants a victim participating in the 
proceedings the right to call evidence, the Chamber shall decide on the 
corresponding disclosure obligations that shall be imposed’.3004 Unlike the ICC 
RPE, the STL RPE explicitly stated that victim participants have like the 
Prosecutor the obligation to disclose exculpatory material to the defence; 
however, via 2013 amendment they now in certain circumstances shall disclose 
such material to the Prosecutor.3005 It should be noticed that although these 
disclosure obligations are regulated under Part 5 of the STL RPE (‘Confirmation 
of Charges and Pre-Trial Proceedings’), they have been presented in this sub-
chapter due to the their close connection to evidentiary issues during trial and 
the involvement of the Trial Chamber. 
Twelfth, on behalf of the victim participants, their legal representative’s 
presence and participation during trial proceedings.3006 It remains to be seen 
whether the STL Trial Chamber will exceptionally allow it during ex parte 
hearings.  
In addition to the previously examined modalities of 
participation/procedural rights, it should be noted that the victim participants’ 
legal representative in Ayyash et al. requested that the victim participants ‘be 
given access to the courtroom subject to the control of the Trial Chamber during 
trial proceedings’.3007      
It should finally be remembered that the Appeals Chamber has 
completely banned anonymous victim participants during trial in Ayyash et 
al.,3008 which is criticized herein as previously examined.3009     
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3003 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 2 August 2013, para. 46. 
3004 STL RPE, rule 112 bis.   
3005 Ibid., rule 113 (B). See also STL (2013) 28 (‘This amendment adds a requirement that if the 
victims participating in the proceedings (VPP) have reason to believe that information, which they 
must disclose under Rule 113 (i.e., exculpatory material), falls under Rule 116 (for example, 
because it might endanger future prosecutions/investigations by the Prosecutor, or might endanger 
a victim or witness) or Rule 117 (because it might affect the security of a State), they must disclose 
that material to the Prosecutor. This is because the Prosecutor usually has a much better 
understanding of the issues at stake’.). 
3006 STL RPE, rules 143, 146 and 147. See also Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 1 November 2013, 
paras. 16-18.   
3007 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/TC), 1 November 2013, para. 59.  
3008 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, paras. 27, 28, 31 and 39. 
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4.4.2. Additional Related Legal Issues and Evaluation of Civil Party/Victim 
Participant Regime 
4.4.2.1. The ECCC  
As seen, civil party’s status during trial proceedings at the ECCC may be 
characterized as being particularly strong as illustrated by the variety of 
modalities of participation/procedural rights at his/her disposal, which includes 
the ability to lead evidence. Such a robust status, as suggested by the Supreme 
Court Chamber in Duch, may have an important impact on the issue of equality 
of arms.3010 In order to guarantee the accused’s rights and to preserve the 
efficiency and integrity of the trial, the ECCC Internal Rules have been amended 
several times as proceedings in Duch progressed, which led to limiting the civil 
parties’ modalities of participation. On the one hand, establishing time limits for 
questioning witnesses, denial of civil parties’ request to give opening statements 
in Duch (and also in Nuon Chea et al.) trial proceedings,3011 and denial of request 
to respond to the Co-Prosecution’s opening statement; and, on the other hand, 
for example, the designation of a single team of legal counsels representing civil 
parties’ collective interests, are examples of the measures adopted by the ECCC 
to achieve the above-mentioned objectives. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber in 
Duch throughout the trial proceedings adopted a restrictive interpretation about 
civil parties’ participation, which may be regarded as if it were unwilling to 
acknowledge the civil parties as actual parties.3012 However, as the Trial Chamber 
stated in Duch, restrictions to the scope of civil parties’ rights may be necessary 
as ‘features of more traditional Civil Party models, devised for less complex 
proceedings with fewer victims, required adaptation’.3013    
In spite of those procedural limitations to the exercise of the civil parties’ 
modalities of participation/procedural rights, most civil parties who participated 
in Duch have shown satisfaction with the trial proceedings. Accordingly, in 
addition to the satisfaction experienced by the civil parties when testifying as 
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3009 See supra Chapter IV 4.4.2.2. 
3010 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 489. 
3011 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on the Request of the Co-Lawyers for Civil 
Parties Group 2 to Make an Opening Statement During the Substantive Hearing, Trial Chamber, 
27 March 2009; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Scheduling order for opening statements and hearing 
on the substance in Case 002, Trial Chamber, 18 October 2011, p. 3. 
3012 Michelle Staggs Kelsall et al., Lessons Learned from the Duch Trial. A Comprehensive Review 
of the First Case before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Asian 
International Justice Initiative’s KRT Monitoring Group December 2009) 32; Stover, Balthazard 
and Koeing (2011) 523-524.  
3013 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2009, para. 12. 
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previously mentioned, victims have qualified their participation as civil parties as 
transformative for them and, in some cases, for their families and found the trial 
to have been fair.3014 Civil parties also highlighted that their motivation to bear 
witnesses in representation of their deceased relatives had been done during the 
trial and highlighted how the overall trial experience introduced them to other 
victims.3015 Moreover, even though some civil parties felt that their mission was 
not fulfilled when they failed to get Duch to admit having ordered the killing of a 
relative, they were still satisfied.3016  
It should be pointed out that victims’ final perceptions about the 
meaningfulness of their participation as civil parties may be different in Nuon 
Chea et al. vis-à-vis Duch. An important factor underlying this is the number of 
civil parties who participated in Duch, less than 100, as opposed to the much 
higher number of civil parties participating in Nuon Chea et al., a total of 3864 
civil parties. Accordingly, victims’ participation as civil parties in trial 
proceedings in the latter case ‘may be more formulaic and less individualized, 
and therefore less transformative’.3017 Other factors make a meaningful 
participation of victims as civil parties in Nuon Chea et al. during trial more 
difficult. Thus, whereas in Duch there was only one defendant, viewed as the 
most responsible by the civil parties that lost their loved ones, and who early 
expressed remorse for his crimes that were confined to two specific locations (S-
21 and S-24), in Nuon Chea et al. civil parties are facing aging senior former 
Khmer Rouge leaders, who refused to talk and with very little or lack of 
knowledge of the local circumstances where civil parties’ loved ones died and 
associated to several locations in Cambodia where crimes were perpetrated.3018    
In any case, it must be noticed here that, inter alia, arguably considering 
the high number of civil parties in Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), the Trial 
Chamber decided to ‘separate the proceedings in Case 002 into a number of 
discrete cases that incorporate particular factual allegations and legal issues’,3019 
in application of rule 89 ter adopted in 2011.3020 Although the initial severance of 
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3014 Stover, Balthazard and Koeing (2011) 533 and 535. 
3015 Ibid., 536. 
3016 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3017 Ibid., 543. 
3018 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3019 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/124, 22 September 2011 para. 4. 
3020 This rule was adopted by the ECCC Plenary on 23 February 2011 and reads as follows ‘When 
the interest of justice so requires, the Trial Chamber may at any stage order the separation of 
proceedings in relation to one or several accused and concerning part or the entirety of the charges 
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Nuon Chea et al. was annulled by the Supreme Court Chamber due to inter alia 
the Trial Chamber’s failure to hear the parties,3021 such initial severance and its 
scope were later confirmed by the Trial Chamber, after having heard the parties, 
following the Supreme Court Chamber’s decision.3022 The fact that the severance 
and the scope of the first trial, the so-called ‘Case 002/01’, within Nuon Chea et 
al., were confirmed after hearing the civil parties is herein found as a necessary 
step to enhance the civil parties’ right of audience, i.e., right to be heard, as 
previously stated.3023 By doing so, civil parties’ status during trial proceedings has 
hence been enhanced. 
It must be pointed out that the severance of the trial is limited to a 
determination of the subject-matter, i.e., the first trial within Nuon Chea et al. 
was focused on alleged crimes against humanity concerning the forced 
movement of the population from Phnom Penh in April 1975 and later from 
other regions (phases one and two), and alleged executions at Toul Po Chrey 
execution site; however, such severance does not involve the Trial Chamber’s 
personal jurisdiction in relation to any accused in Nuon Chea et al.3024 In other 
words, each of the co-accused, currently two of the original four,3025 is and will 
continue to be tried together. It is here agreed with this decision adopted by the 
Trial Chamber and the arguments given by it, which were as follows.  
First, limiting the scope of facts to be tried during the first trial/mini-trial 
in Nuon Chea et al. produces no impact on the nature of civil party’s 
participation during trial as civil parties ‘no longer participate individually […] 
but instead comprise a consolidated group’ represented by their co-lead 
lawyers,3026 and their reparations claims formulated on their behalf by their lead 
co-lawyers should take account of internal rule 23 quinquies (1) (a),3027 which is 
later discussed.3028  
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contained in an Indictment. The cases as separated shall be tried and adjudicated in such order as 
the Trial Chamber deems appropriate’.    
3021 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 8 February 2013, paras. 40-41, 44 and 58.    
3022 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 26 April 2013, para. 4. See also Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 
Decision on Immediate Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s Second Decision on Severance of Case 
002, Supreme Court Chamber, 23 July 2013, para. 13.     
3023 See supra Chapter IV 4.4.1.1. 
3024 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/124, 22 September 2011, para. 4. 
3025 Originally, there were four co-accused; however, former Khmer Rouge Minister Ieng Thirith 
was released from detention on 16 September 2012 due to dementia. In turn, the proceedings 
against Ieng Sary were terminated on 14 March 2013, following his death that day.  
3026 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/124, 22 September 2011, para. 8. 
3027 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3028 See infra Chapter V 3.4.2.1.  
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Second, separating the proceedings arguably enables the Chamber ‘to 
issue a verdict following a shortened trial, safeguarding the fundamental interest 
of victims in achieving meaningful and timely justice, and the right of all 
Accused in Case 002 to an expeditious trial’.3029 Moreover, the Trial Chamber 
considered inter alia the advanced age and physical frailty of many witnesses and 
civil parties to favour an expeditious conclusion of the trial proceedings in Case 
002/01 within Nuon Chea et al. to keep the initial severance of the 
proceedings.3030 The Trial Chamber also declined to add the S-21 detention 
center incidents to the scope of Case 002/01 as it may jeopardize the Chamber’s 
ability to reach a timely verdict in Case 002/01 and would still only encapsulate a 
fraction of the victimization that took place during the Democratic Kampuchea 
era.3031 Thus, the S-21 incidents will be considered in the second trial within 
Nuon Chea et al.     
Third, as consequence of the severance of the trial proceedings, the 
number of witnesses, experts and civil parties to be called was limited to ‘those 
whose proposed testimony is required for the first trial’.3032 Only exceptionally, a 
‘party may make an oral application before the Chamber for leave to question a 
witness or Civil Party on all matters relevant to Case 002, including those that 
may instead form the subject of future trials’.3033 Nevertheless, ‘the Chamber 
expects that only rarely will such applications be entertained’.3034 Accordingly, 
the level of civil parties’ participation, via their co-lead lawyers, participating in 
the first trial (750 civil parties) in Nuon Chea et al. was higher than if it were only 
one trial comprising nearly 4000 civil parties in this case.  
Moreover, to guarantee that the civil parties can timely participate, the 
Trial Chamber foresaw the need to provide information ‘regarding subsequent 
cases to be tried in the course of Case 002’.3035 This has been, inter alia, 
implemented via the VSS regional forums, organized to: i) update the civil 
parties in Nuon Chea et al., on the current work and progress of the ECCC cases; 
ii) to facilitate discussion between civil parties and their lawyers on the severance 
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3029 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/124, 22 September 2011, para. 8. 
3030 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 26 April 2013, paras. 133 and 134. 
3031 Ibid., paras. 137 and 147. 
3032 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/124, 22 September 2011, para. 8.  
3033 Nuon Chea at al. (Case 002), Trial Chamber Memorandum Entitled: Notice of Trial Chamber's 
Disposition of Remaining Pre-trial motions (E20, E132, E134, E135, E124/8, E124/9, E124110, 
E136 and E139) and Further Guidance to the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers, E/145, Trial Chamber, 
29 November 2011, p. 3.  
3034 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3035 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/124, 22 September 2011, p. 4.  
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order of Nuon Chea et al.; and iii) enable civil parties to be informed of, and also 
to exercise their rights.3036             
In the first trial within Nuon Chea et al., i.e., Case 002/01, the civil 
parties, represented by their lead co-lawyers, in their closing brief expressed 
some concern about whether all the factual allegations in the closing order will 
ultimately be examined and adjudicated due to the ECCC’s situation and the 
accused’s advanced age.3037 However, they manifested an overall speaking 
positive experience: 
 
[…] civil parties also want to emphasize that this trial […] has brought them 
within its boundaries a partial answer to their expectations. Debates, 
discussions, testimonies, the participation of victims in their quality as a party to 
the proceedings were all positive contributions to the ascertainment of the truth. 
Things were said, explanations were suggested, they will be a form of truth, 
albeit partial and imperfect.3038         
  
Civil parties’ co-lead lawyers also considered that their evidence has 
vitally contributed to prove the factual elements of the JCE and the crimes 
alleged and that it ‘lends important context to the manner in which the crimes 
were carried out and how these crimes have impacted individuals, families, and 
Cambodian society as a whole’.3039 Moreover, as Judge Lavergne commented in 
Nuon Chea et al., civil parties’ rights have special significance considering ‘not 
only the seriousness of the charges […] but also the civil parties’ very long wait 
for justice, a wait which makes these trials historic’.3040  
An important issue to be examined in further detail herein is the 
revocation of the civil parties’ status at the ECCC. As previously mentioned,3041 
the Trial Chamber in Duch as partially confirmed by the Supreme Court 
Chamber, revoked the status of some civil parties who participated in the trial 
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3036 VSS, Press Statement (August 2012). Available at:  
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/vss-hold-3rd-regional-forum-2012-200-civil-parties-case-002-
siem-reap (last visit on 31 December 2012).   
3037 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 26 September 2013, para. 421. 
3038 Ibid., para. 423. 
3039 Ibid., para. 417.
3040 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Decision on lead Co-lawyer’s ‘Urgent Request for the Trial 
Chamber to amend memorandum E62/3/10 (formerly E106)’ (E62/3/10/1), Trial Chamber 
Memorandum to Counsel for the Parties Regarding the Classification of Expert’s Reports, Trial 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jean-Marc Lavergne Concerning the Trial Chamber 
Decision in Memorandum E62/3/10/4, 23 August 2011, para. 10. 
3041 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.1.1. 


proceedings leading to disappointment and frustration among them. Thus, as for 
the eight direct victims, i.e., the survivors of the atrocities committed in 
detention centers S-21 and S-24, who were granted the status of civil parties, only 
four were considered by the Trial Chamber ‘to have substantiated this claim and 
hence, to have established that KAING Guek Eav is directly responsible for their 
harm suffered’.3042 With regard to the other four direct civil parties, although the 
Trial Chamber acknowledged their psychological harm, they did not satisfy the 
required standard that they were victims of crimes committed by Duch at S-21 
or S-24.3043  
Concerning indirect victims, i.e., civil parties who claimed to be the 
immediate family members of a victim of S-21 or S-24, extended family 
members of a victim of S-21 or S-24, and a deceased civil party’s successor, the 
Trial Chamber ended up stripping off the civil party status of 19 individuals as 
either they could not ‘establish that at least one of their family members was the 
immediate victim’ of crimes for which Duch was convicted to the required 
standard or could not provide ‘proof of kinship or special bonds of affection or 
dependency in relation to immediate victims of S-21 or S-24’.3044 In contrast, 
those victims who were ‘confirmed’ by the Trial Chamber in their status of civil 
parties were found to: 
 
[…] have proved the existence of immediate victims of S-21 or S-24 and either 
close kinship or particular bonds of affection or dependency in relation to these 
victims. They have further shown that the death of these victims caused 
demonstrable injury within the scope of Internal Rule 23(2) and that this harm 
was a direct consequence of the crimes for which KAING Guek EAV was 
convicted.3045  
 
The removal of the civil party status of those individuals was thus 
determined based on re-assessment, under a higher evidentiary standard, of the 
evidence that they brought to prove their status as civil parties. The fact that 
alleged victims who participated during the entire proceedings as civil parties to 
have their status revoked in the ‘last minute’, i.e., via the Trial judgment may be 
criticized on three grounds. First, based on an argument of efficiency, the Trial 
Chamber should not have waited until the very end of the trial, i.e., when it 
issued its judgment to conduct its own assessment of the civil party 
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3042 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 645. 
3043 Ibid., para. 647. 
3044 Ibid., paras. 648 and 649. 
3045 Ibid., paras. 650. 
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applications/interim recognition letters. Actually, unlike the removal of the 
victim participant status of three individuals via the ICC Trial Chamber I’s 
judgment in Lubanga where there were serious allegations that they stole 
identities, in Duch the reason was that the victims did not meet the evidentiary 
requirements to ‘retain’ their civil party status. This could have been easily 
settled down once and for all before going to the trial hearings, which has indeed 
been acknowledged by the Supreme Court Chamber in Duch when it stated that:    
 
[…] in accordance with legal certainty and economy of the proceedings, civil 
party applications should have been examined, as a rule, at the earliest 
opportunity and before the commencement of the trial hearing, so that 
unsuccessful applicants would have the opportunity to appeal or supplement 
their unsupported applications.3046 
  
Also, the Supreme Court Chamber, agreed with a minority opinion of 
Pre-Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea et al., which found that the ‘interim 
recognition letters’ are court decisions admitting civil parties with all procedural 
rights and obligations.3047 As already discussed,3048 although the Supreme Court 
Chamber did not find that the Trial Chamber acted outside the ECCC Internal 
Rules, it found the legal framework to be ‘patently obscure’.3049 This was 
exacerbated by multiple pronouncements at the juncture between investigation 
and trial as to civil party status ‘lacked a basis in actual scrutiny of the merits of 
civil party applications’.3050 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court 
Chamber considered that: 
 
After issuing these decisions [interim recognition letters] relevant judges should 
be considered functus officio, unless the law foresees review of the decision. 
Subsequent decisions on the same matter by the same body should be 
dependent on a change of circumstances in the case, new evidence, or the 
elevation of the requisite level of proof attaching to the case moving to the next 
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3046 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 490. 
3047 Ieng Thirith et al. (Case 002), Decision on Appeals Against Co-Investigating Judges’ Combined 
Orders D250/3/3 and 250/3/2 on Admissibility of Civil Party Applications, Opinion of Judges Prak 
Kimsan and Rowan Dowing in Respect of the Declared Inadmissibility of Admitted Civil Parties, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, 27 April 2010,  para. 1 (cited by Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal 
Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 491).    
3048 See supra Chapter III 2.4.1.1. 
3049 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 493.  
3050 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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phase of proceedings. The Supreme Court is mindful, however, that these 
conclusions do not explicitly result from the legal framework of the Internal 
Rules at the time, and therefore there is no basis to invalidate the orders 
subsequent to ‘interim recognition’.3051 
 
Accordingly, although the Supreme Court Chamber did not overrule the 
legal approach applied by the Trial Chamber in Duch, by allowing civil parties to 
introduce evidence to challenge the revocations of their civil party status, it 
reversed some of these revocations as examined later.3052 What should be 
mentioned here is that in reading internal rule 100 (3) and article 355 of the 2007 
Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure,3053 the Supreme Court Chamber 
concluded that the Trial Chamber in Duch ‘had a lawful basis in Cambodian 
criminal procedure to determine in its Judgment the merits of victims’ 
applications for civil party status’.3054 Moreover, the Supreme Court Chamber 
pointed out that the Trial Chamber actually provided notice in advance and an 
opportunity to the civil parties when the Trial Chamber signaled the lack of 
finality of its prima facie assessment at the initial hearing via Judge Lavergne’s 
words:   
 
I think it is perfectly clear to all the parties that we are not going to go to the 
merits of the applications, we are just trying to look at the apparent existence of 
harm. It is perfectly clear that during the substantive proceedings we shall 
examine each of the applications to be perfectly certain that the alleged harm 
did in fact occur.3055  
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3051 Ibid., para. 491. 
3052 See infra Chapter IV 6.4.1.1. 
3053 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 100 (1) (‘The Chamber shall make a decision on any Civil Party 
claims in the judgment. It shall rule on the admissibility and the substance of such claims against 
the Accused. Where appropriate, the Chamber may adjourn its decision on Civil Party claims to a 
new hearing’.). The reference is to version 3 of the Internal Rules as applied by the Trial Chamber 
in Duch. In turn, article 355 of the 2007 Code of Criminal Procedure of Cambodia reads as follows 
‘[i]n the criminal judgment, the court [of first instance] shall also decide upon civil remedies. The 
court shall determine the admissibility of the civil party application and also decide on the claims 
of the civil party against the accused and civil defendants’. 
3054 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 495. 
3055 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 17 February 2009, E1/3.1, p. 42, lines 5-10 
(cited by Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 497).  
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However, as the Supreme Court Chamber also acknowledged, the 
opportunity to make the respective submissions took place just shortly (only 
three months) before the end of the trial.3056 Therefore, why the Trial Chamber 
had to procrastinate the determination of whether or not the civil party status 
would be revoked may still be criticized.    
Second, that individuals were allowed to participate as civil parties, 
without really being such, during trial and, hence, inter alia, allowed to tender 
incriminatory evidence against the accused may be considered as seriously 
threatening the accused’s right to fair trial. Thus, individuals who should not 
have been granted the civil party status exercised the respective modalities of 
participation in detriment of the accused.  
Third, the removal of the civil party status certainly caused victims’ 
frustration and disappointment besides the fact that those civil parties invested a 
large amount of time by participating throughout the trial and just to the very 
end of the trial proceedings to find themselves with empty hands as their civil 
party status was revoked.3057  
Be that as it may, as said, the Supreme Chamber Court reversed in some 
cases the Trial Chamber’s decision to revoke civil party status, redressing to 
some extent some of the problems previously described. The analysis conducted 
by the Supreme Court Chamber is examined later when discussing victims’ 
participation during appeals.3058    
The above-mentioned problems can increase in Nuon Chea et al. 
considering the much higher number of civil parties participating during the 
respective ongoing trial proceedings. Only time will tell, once the Trial Chamber 
issues its judgment(s), whether and to what extent the civil parties currently 
participating in the proceedings in Nuon Chea et al. will get their status revoked.          
 
4.4.2.2. The STL 
With regard to the STL, bearing in mind that at the time of writing this thesis no 
trial has yet started, it is herein conducted a preliminary evaluation of the legal 
framework of victims’ participation and connected legal issues. According to 
article 17 of the STL Statute, victims’ participation, i.e., presentation of victims’ 
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3056 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 499 (referring to Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Direction on 
Proceedings relevant to Reparations and on the Filings of Final Written Submissions, Trial 
Chamber, 27 August 2009, paras. 1 and 5).  
3057 See also Pham et al. (2011) 284 (‘Among those who ultimately had their status denied, anger, 
helplessness, shame, and feelings of worthlessness prevailed’.). 
3058 See infra Chapter IV 6.4.1.1. 
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views and concerns, shall be conducted in ‘a manner that is not prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial’. To 
implement this general provision, as seen, the STL RPE drafters included specific 
provisions, which are particularly important during trial proceedings. First, the 
Trial Chamber possesses the discretion to authorize victim participants, the 
exercise of certain procedural rights such as calling witnesses, authorization to 
tender other evidence, examination and cross-examination of witnesses and 
filing of motions and briefs.3059 Second, victims are expected to participate in the 
proceedings only through legal representatives unless authorized otherwise.3060  
Third, victim participants may be divided in the proceedings into groups 
having common legal representation, taking into account conflicting interests 
that may hinder common representation, shared or similar interests that may 
facilitate common representation, and accused’s rights as well as a fair and 
expeditious trial.3061 Moreover, this ‘decision may not be appealed’.3062  
Fourth, that the Pre-Trial Judge is the responsible to decide whether 
victim participants may intervene directly and concerning the grouping of victim 
participants with common legal representatives may save time and other 
resources to the Trial Chamber Judges. This has been the situation in Ayyash et 
al. concerning, for example, the grouping of victim participants with common 
legal representation.3063  
Fifth, although the original version of rule 86 (C) explicitly contemplated 
the possibility that the Pre-Trial Judge could limit the number of victim 
participants called to voice their views and concerns has been deleted,3064 the 
Trial Chamber may arguably use its discretion to adopt a practice similar to this 
rule when giving the respective directions for trial hearings.        
These measures reflecting the active role of the judges, as an inquisitorial 
feature at the STL procedural structure,3065 are herein considered as 
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3059 STL RPE, rule 87 (B). 
3060 The original text of rule 86 (C) of the RPE reads as follows ‘Unless authorized by the Pre-Trial 
Judge or a Chamber, as appropriate, a victim participating in the proceedings shall do so through a 
legal representative’. The current text reads as follows ‘A victim participating in the proceedings 
may only do so through a legal representative unless the Pre-Trial Judge authorises otherwise’.  
3061 STL RPE, rule 86 (D). 
3062 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3063 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 8 May 2012, paras. 108-128; Ayyash et al. (STL-11-
01/PT/PTJ), 28 November 2012, paras. 10-12.    
3064 STL RPE, rule 86 (C) (‘[…] [the Pre-Trial Judge] may limit the number of victims entitled to 
express their views and concerns in proceedings’.). This specific provision was deleted during the 
Fourth Plenary of Judges (February 2012), which amended the STL RPE. 
3065 See supra Chapter II 3.4.2.  
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advisable/necessary to allow victim participation during the trial proceedings but 
without affecting the accused’s rights. On the other hand, victim participants’ 
legal representatives have access to the Pre-Trial Judge’s case-file and to the 
filings of the parties. This feature should lead to victim participants’ legal 
representatives to possess a clear understanding of the case in question 
(especially of the Prosecutor’s strategy), being capable of understanding the 
content of the written exchanges between the parties and their in-court debates, 
which should prevent delays in trial proceedings.3066 It is clear that mutatis 
mutandi, as discussed when examining modalities of participation during pre-
trial, victim participants’ legal representatives should not be provided access to 
ex parte and confidential material (evidence included) of the parties, which is 
actually stated explicitly under rule 87 (A), previously referred to. Also, as the 
Pre-Trial Judge in Ayyash et al. already noticed:  
 
[…] by virtue of being entitled to have access to the Ayyash et al. case file 
pursuant to Rule 87(A) of the Rules, Legal Representatives are ordinarily be 
entitled to receive the Indictment supporting materials, subject to any 
restriction that the PreTrial Judge or the Trial Chamber may determine in the 
interests of justice, at such time as they are transmitted to the Trial Chamber 
pursuant to Rule 95(A)(ii) of the Rules [emphasis added].3067 
 
In order to guarantee the speediness of the trial proceedings and 
preserve their integrity, it might be considered that victim participants are 
permitted to express their views and concerns only after the parties had 
completed their intervention. Not only would it speed up and simplify the trial 
proceedings but it would also allow the Trial Chamber Judges to have a better 
control over the intervention of victims.3068 Nevertheless, de lege lata such option 
does not seem to be coherent with the STL Statute and RPE.3069 Nor, de lege 
ferenda, postponing the victim participants’ intervention to the very end of the 
trial will be of their best interest as they would not be able to exercise in a proper 
manner some important procedural rights laid down in the STL instruments 
such as questioning the witnesses called by the parties to trial. Moreover, unlike 
the ICC and the ECCC, the relatively low number of victim participants expected 
at the STL trials does not really justify to split the trial proceedings into two 
stages. 
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3066 Hemptinne (2010) 177. 
3067 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/PTJ), 18 May 2012, para. 72. 
3068 Hemptinne (2010) 177.  
3069 See STL Statute, article 17; STL RPE, rule 146. See also Hemptinne (2010) 177.  
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Finally, it must be noted that certain modalities of victims’ 
participation/procedural rights such as calling witnesses and tendering other 
evidence are explicitly mentioned under the STL RPE unlike the ICC RPE. This 
has led to victim participants’ legal representatives and the Prosecutor at the ICC 
to consider that victims’ participation at the STL is broader than at the ICC.3070 
Nevertheless, as they also implicitly acknowledge,3071 such a preliminary 
conclusion is only as for the comparison between the ICC RPE and the STL RPE. 
As previously examined, the ICC’s case law has expanded the victim’s 
participation regime during trial. Therefore, when comparing the ICC’s case law 
and the STL RPE, it is concluded herein that the STL RPE drafters have clearly 
paid close attention to the ICC’s case law when drafting the provisions on the 
victims’ modalities of participation/procedural rights, especially during trial, and 
explicitly included victims’ modalities of participation/procedural rights not 
explicitly included in the ICC RPE but later developed in the ICC’s case law.     
 
4.5. Comparative Conclusions      
During trial, whereas victims can participate as victim participants at the ICC 
and the STL, they participate as civil parties at the ECCC. Victims’ modalities of 
participation/procedural rights at the ICC have been broadly sharpened by the 
ICC Chambers. On the other hand, the ECCC’s practice and amendments to its 
Internal Rules have sometimes taken the opposite direction to the ICC’s practice, 
i.e., setting limits or controls to some of the civil parties’ modalities of 
participation/procedural rights. These two opposing trends have led to an 
outcome where arguably the modalities of participation and/or procedural rights 
of victims as victim participants at the ICC have moved closer or are similar to 
those of the civil parties at ECCC. Whether the STL would adopt a broad and 
generous approach when crafting the modalities of participation/procedural 
rights of victim participants during trial, is yet to be seen. Although the STL 
Judges when drafting and/or amending the STL RPE have seemingly been 
influenced by the ICC’s practice/legal framework, they in some aspects have 
adopted a relatively conservative approach. Be that as it may, either as victim 
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3070 See Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-80-tENG), Observations on the Participation of 
Anonymous Victims in the Appellate Proceedings and on Maintaining Deceased Victims on the 
List of Victims Authorised to Participate, Legal Representatives of Victims, 3 June 2013, para. 26; 
Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-87), Prosecution’s Submissions Pursuant to the Appeals 
Chamber’s “Order on the Filing of Further Submissions on the Registrar's List of Participating 
Victims” dated 27 May 2013, Office of the Prosecutor, 10 June 2013, para. 13.    
3071 See Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-80-tENG), 3 June 2013, para. 26; Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-
01/04-02/12-87), 10 June 2013, para. 13.        
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participants at the ICC or the STL, or especially as civil parties at the ECCC, 
victims’ modalities of participation and/or procedural rights at those three 
judicial forums resemble, in a higher or lower scale, the modalities of 
participation and/or procedural rights that victims as civil parties are entitled to 
in the French inquisitorial system.  
Having said so, an important difference between victims’ participation as 
victim participants (ICC, STL) and as civil parties (ECCC) during trial (and also 
in other procedural stages) is that victim participants need to show how their 
personal interests are affected to be allowed to participate and, thus, exercise one 
or more of the procedural rights/modalities of participation to which they are 
entitled or allowed to put in motion, which is not required for civil parties. This 
is explained by the fact that, unlike civil parties, victim participants are not 
parties to the trial proceedings. Another difference is that, only as civil parties, 
victims have an explicit right to support the prosecution, according to the ECCC 
Internal Rules, which however does not turn them in additional or auxiliary 
Prosecutors. Nevertheless, the possibility for victim participants, under the ICC’s 
practice and the STL RPE, to be allowed to lead and challenge evidence on the 
accused’s guilt may be considered as an indirect manner to support the 
prosecution, which may affect the accused’s right to a fair trial. Be that as it may, 
and as already highlighted, the contents of victim participants’ modalities of 
participation/procedural rights are generally speaking similar to those of the civil 
parties.            
At the other end of the spectrum, at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, it 
is found that victims lack any formal status either as victim participants or as 
civil parties during trial proceedings and, hence, cannot be heard during trial, 
which resembles the situation existent in the common law adversarial systems of 
England and the United States. The submission of amicus curiae briefs has 
constituted an indirect manner for victims to draw the attention of the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the SCSL to issues of special relevance for victims and to have their 
views and concerns indirectly considered by the Trial Chambers. The outcomes 
of these submissions have been diverse as the Trial Chambers exert their 
discretion to invite or admit them. SCSL judgments arguably paid more 
attention to amicus curiae briefs than the ICTY and the ICTR have done. Also, 
inter alia, mainly civil society organizations and not victims as such are in 
practice those which file amicus curiae. Nevertheless, even when amicus curiae 
briefs have been declared inadmissible, they have managed to raise awareness 
about some specific issues of special interest for the victims and which were 
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originally disregarded, leading to a further investigation and (amendment of) 
indictments.  
However, victims’ status at trial at the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL 
remains precarious and limited to that of being witnesses. Even when compared 
to the American adversarial system, victims’ status during trial at those tribunals 
seems to have been left behind. Thus, besides amicus curiae briefs, some 
American states allow victims as witnesses to have legal representatives, who 
may be even permitted to intervene in sexual crimes cases, letting alone that 
some states grant a victim’s right to attend trial (also under the federal CVRA) 
and to sit at counsel table on the Prosecutor’s side. The efforts to provide some 
participatory rights at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL have been unsuccessful 
like those undertaken in England, where victims have neither a legal 
representation right nor the amicus curiae brief option to express their own 
views.   
With regard to the ICC, victim participants’ modalities of 
participation/procedural rights during trial, which are normally exercised via 
their respective legal representatives, can be summarized as follows. First, 
victims have the right to be notified of the case submissions and proceedings. 
Second, right to access public documents. Victims’ legal representatives and, 
with the exception of Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, also victims themselves have 
been allowed to access confidential filings if these concern their personal 
interests. However, victims or their legal representatives cannot access ex parte 
filings. Third, whereas victims’ right to attend /participate in public and closed 
hearings has been acknowledged by all Trial Chambers, Trial Chambers II and 
III (Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui and Bemba respectively) have excluded 
attendance at/participation in ex parte hearings but this may be exceptionally 
allowed according to Trial Chamber I (Lubanga) and Trial Chamber V (Kenyan 
cases). Fourth, right to participate orally, opening and closing statements 
included. Fifth, right to file written motions, ex parte filings included.  
Sixth, victim participants may be allowed to introduce evidence 
pertaining to the accused’s guilt or innocence and challenge the admissibility or 
relevance of evidence as construed by the ICC Trial and Appeals Chambers as 
this modality of participation/procedural right is understood not to be limited to 
the parties and evidence brought by victim participants can assist the Trial 
Chamber in its determination of the truth although the right to present and 
challenge evidence on the accused’s guilt or innocence lies primarily with the 
Prosecution and the defence. Moreover, victim participants’ presentation of 
evidence is not a self-standing or unfettered right insofar as, in a similar manner 
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than other victims’ modalities of participation/procedural rights during trial, 
victims have to demonstrate that their personal interests are affected and this 
should also be done with due respect for the accused’s right to fair trial. 
Additionally, the evidence has to be relevant to the issue of the case and the 
Chamber has to allow/request the evidence submission for truth determination. 
Seventh, victim participants may question witnesses and also the accused, when 
their personal interests are engaged by the evidence under consideration. Trial 
Chambers’ practice has introduced some controls such as submitting questions 
in advance to avoid irrelevant, repetitive and/or leading questions. Concerning 
questions about the accused’s guilt, Trial Chambers have followed different 
approaches. Thus, whereas Trial Chambers I and III (Lubanga and Bemba 
respectively) have normally permitted questions about the accused’s guilt in 
connection with the assistance to the ICC’s determination of the truth but 
somehow overlapping with the Prosecutor’s mandate, Trial Chamber II 
(Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui) has allowed it only on exceptional basis. In any 
case, when questioning, it may not be formulated any new allegations against the 
accused. 
Eighth, victim participants may be allowed to testify as witnesses under 
oath, which enables the defence to cross-examine them. When a dual status 
victim participant-victim witness testifies specific controls apply such as 
consistency with the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial, not transforming 
them in additional or auxiliary prosecutors, contribution to determination of the 
truth and not allowing anonymous testimony. Ninth, victims do not have in 
principle general disclosure rights or obligations. However, they may be 
provided with any material in the Prosecutor’s possession if relevant to victims’ 
personal interests and after passing through a specific mechanism or case-by-
case analysis for that end. Also, disclosure obligations may apply to victims who 
are permitted to present/lead evidence. Tenth, victim participants’ legal 
representatives may call their clients to testify and propose other persons to the 
Chamber to testify, e.g., expert witnesses. As an additional observation, it should 
be indicated that anonymous victims can participate but depending on the 
scope/nature of the proposed modality of participation, they can be requested to 
identify themselves. Nevertheless, in practice, anonymous/non-anonymous 
victim participants are represented by the same common legal representatives 
and, therefore, the impact of such distinction is reduced.     
A matter directly connected with victims’ participation during trial 
consisted in victim participants’ application to add new charges (legal re-
characterization of the facts) against the accused in Lubanga, which was finally 
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denied by the Appeals Chamber as facts and circumstances exceeding the crimes 
charged cannot be used. Another issue concerns legal representation. Unlike the 
ECCC and the STL legal instruments, the ICC Statute and RPE do not require 
victim participants to be represented. However, as evidenced in the ICC’s 
practice, reality has shown that such representation indeed becomes necessary. 
Due to the large number of victims, efficiency purposes and victims’ own benefit, 
they have been grouped under common legal representatives based on factors 
such as geographical origin or crimes. Victims’ distinct interests are considered 
when selecting common legal representatives, a situation similar to the ECCC 
and the STL, and necessary for victims’ status. Nevertheless, in appointing a 
common legal representative for a group of victims, sometimes the ICC has not 
sought due consultation from victims, weakening their status. For a meaningful 
participation and to avoid potential secondary victimization, representatives 
should remain in contact with and receive instructions from their clients. In any 
case, at the ICC, the ECCC and (expectedly) the STL, in application of their 
respective instruments, victims have been grouped together or grouped 
themselves, in one or more groups, under common legal representation, chosen 
by the respective court or victims. At the ICC trials, when victim participants 
have been grouped under common legal representation criteria such as 
geographical origin and harm have been considered. When common legal 
representatives are appointed, the ICC, the ECCC and the STL need to take into 
account the interests of victim participants or civil parties according to their 
instruments. Regardless of the potential benefits from the Trial Chamber V’s 
approach to appoint the OPCV as interface between the victims’ common legal 
representatives and the Chamber, it may be questioned as, based on too a 
‘creative’ interpretation of the ICC instruments, establishes an extra appointed 
intermediary/filter between victims and the Chamber in some important 
modalities of participation and considering that the common legal representative 
(not the OPCV) is the one who is in direct contact with the victims.           
As for the ECCC, most of civil parties’ modalities of participation or 
procedural rights are already detailed in the ECCC Internal Rules and, thus, 
unlike the ICC Trial Chambers, the ECCC Trial Chamber in Duch did not have 
to spend too much effort and time in crafting them. This is especially relevant 
concerning the most ‘controversial’ modalities of participation in the case of 
victim participants (ICC, STL), which were already stated under the ECCC 
Internal Rules and/or considered necessary for civil parties’ status as formal 
parties to the proceedings, supporting the prosecution and seeking reparations. 


Civil parties’ modalities of participation/procedural rights may be summarized 
as follows.  
First, right to be represented by lawyers and indeed civil parties’ 
participation has to be done via their legal counsels. In France, there is no such 
requirement. However, at the ECCC, common legal representation is indeed 
necessary considering the large number of civil parties, especially in Nuon Chea 
et al. and, in exercising such representation, attention must always be paid to the 
victims’ views and interests like under the ICC RPE and the STL RPE. 
Nevertheless, unlike the ICC RPE, the ECCC Internal Rules somehow deal with 
the representation of interests as those of a consolidated group rather than of 
individual civil parties, which may lead to victims’ depersonalization. Under the 
amended Internal Rules (being applied to Nuon Chea et al.), the consolidated 
group of civil parties are represented by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers who are 
in contact with and seek the views from civil parties’ lawyers. Although this legal 
representation mechanism is explicitly required in the Internal Rules (unlike the 
ICC Trial Chamber V’s above-mentioned proposal) and regardless of its 
(efficiency) benefits, it may in principle be questioned as introduces another 
intermediary/filter between the civil parties and the Chamber, especially 
considering that the lead co-lawyers have to be selected by the ECCC. Unlike 
victim participants (ICC, STL), civil parties are explicitly granted the right to be 
questioned in presence of their lawyers.  
Second, civil parties can be heard, i.e., exercise the right of audience. 
Third, civil parties can give unsworn testimony. Unlike the ICC and the STL, 
they do not need to take an oath, which is similar to the French system. 
However, civil parties can be cross-examined. In addition to testimony, civil 
parties can provide statements of suffering and, if these introduce new factual 
allegations (especially inculpatory), adversarial challenge and potential further 
examination of the civil party follow. Fourth, civil parties have the right to 
support the prosecution and, thus, tender evidence for the determination of the 
accused’s guilt in a similar manner than in the French system. Nonetheless, civil 
parties do not hold a general right of equal participation with the Co-
Prosecutors. Moreover, the right to support the prosecution does not transform 
the civil party in an additional or auxiliary Prosecutor as the accused must only 
face a Prosecuting authority. Thus, civil parties should not advance their own 
case theory. Be that as it may, civil parties’ right to support the prosecution in 
determining accused’s guilt is determined by their interest to obtain reparations 
and the general procedural goal to establish the truth.  
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Fifth, closely connected with the previous right, civil parties may 
question the accused and witnesses provided that their questions are connected 
to the matters and, hence, be relevant and not repetitive. Time limits were also 
set in Duch. Similar than in France, civil parties themselves can via the 
Chamber’s President question the accused. Sixth, civil parties hold the right to 
propose witnesses to be called by the Trial Chamber and ask this to summon 
new witnesses during trial. Seventh, civil parties have the right to respond to 
preliminary objections. Eighth, civil parties have the right to make written 
submissions. Ninth, civil parties have the right to access the case file via the civil 
party’s lawyer. Tenth, civil parties hold the right to make closing statements. 
Eleventh, civil parties can tender written evidence. These modalities of 
participation/procedural rights are generally speaking similar to those existent in 
the French inquisitorial system.      
At the STL, victim participants’ modalities of participation/procedural 
rights during trial laid down in its RPE are in general quite similar to those 
existent under the ICC’s legal framework and/or the ICC’s practice. Indeed, the 
STL RPE explicitly include victims’ modalities of participation/procedural rights 
during trial such as calling witnesses and tendering other evidence not explicitly 
included in the ICC RPE but developed in the ICC’s case law. At the STL, 
modalities of participation/procedural rights, which are exercised via victim 
participants’ legal counsels, may be summarized as follows. First, victims may be 
allowed to make opening and closing statements. Second, right to tender 
evidence upon the Chamber’s authorization. Third, victim participants can 
request the Trial Chamber to call witnesses. STL Trial Chamber Judges stand 
better chances than their ICC counterparts to control whether witnesses called 
by the victim participants are necessary to determine the truth and, thus, avoid 
parallel prosecutions since those Judges receive a case-file from the Pre-Trial 
Judge, containing relevant information. Fourth, victim participants may be 
allowed to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Fifth, victim participants’ 
lawyers can directly pose questions to witnesses but, unlike the ICC, questioning 
of the accused is conducted via the Trial Chamber, which better guarantees the 
accused’s right to remain silent. Sixth, victim participants have the right to file 
motions and briefs. Seventh, right to notification. Eighth, right to receive all 
documents filed by the parties, ex parte material is excluded like at the ICC. 
Victims can also access the case file handed over by the Pre-Trial Judge to the 
Trial Chamber. Ninth, right to legal representation. The STL can divide victim 
participants into groups with common legal representation. Tenth, victims can 
testify (dual status victim-participant-victim witness). Eleventh, although 
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disclosure rights under the STL RPE refer to parties and normally takes place 
before trial, when it comes to disclosure obligations, unlike the ICC RPE, the 
STL RPE explicitly foresee that these obligations are also applicable to victim 
participants. Twelfth, presence and participation during trial proceedings. It 
should be finally remembered that anonymous victim participants have totally 
been banned from trial by the STL Appeals Chamber in Ayyash et al., which is 
criticized herein as previously examined.3072   
With regard to the impact of victims’ participation on the first ICC cases 
trials, a general evaluation can be done considering three important factors: 
efficiency, accused’s rights and impact on the victims themselves. This is also 
mutatis mutandi applicable to the ECCC and the STL. Concerning efficiency, the 
broad participatory regime granted to victims participants is inversely 
proportional not only to trial speediness but also to the inclusion of other 
victims who may have joined the proceedings if the participatory regime of 
victim participants had not been largely expanded. Second, concerning the 
accused’s rights, victim participants’ broad participatory regime at the ICC has 
led to a tense and delicate situation with regard to the accused’s right to a fair 
and impartial trial, especially in participation modalities/rights such as tendering 
and challenging evidence on accused’s guilt, access to some confidential 
documents, calling witnesses, and questioning witnesses about the accused’s 
guilt as victims may be perceived as additional or auxiliary prosecutors. Third, 
concerning the situation of victims in themselves, as matter of principle not 
necessarily the broader their participation is in trial, the more benefits they have 
since ‘humble’ or ‘more passive-oriented’ modalities of participation such as 
notification already serve an important function.  
However, with hindsight benefit, the generous and broad participatory 
regime crafted by the ICC Trial and Appeal Chambers should be considered in 
balance as an acceptable cornerstone in strengthening the victims’ status in 
international criminal proceedings, in particular during trial. To justify the 
victims’ extended participatory regime, the ICC’s role to determine the truth, 
which is also a victim’s right, is, inter alia, a pivotal ground considering the ICC’s 
main objective to fight impunity. This approach is also coherent with a 
restorative-oriented justice approach. Moreover, in general, some initial excesses 
have been dealt with by the Chambers by setting conditions and specific 
proceedings especially to guarantee the integrity and efficiency of the trial as well 
as the accused’s rights. Nevertheless, in order to safeguard the efficiency of the 
proceedings as much as possible as well as other competing interests, not to 
 
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transform victim participants in parallel Prosecutors and even for the own sake 
of victims, approaches which may be considered more balanced (such as that 
employed in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui) should be in principle preferred.             
These challenges, which due to chronological reasons, first arose in the 
trial stage of the first ICC cases, are similar to those experienced at the ECCC in 
Duch and in the ongoing trials in Nuon Chea et al. Accordingly, in addressing 
them, via amendments to its rules and/or via its practice, the ECCC has 
sometimes restricted the civil parties’ rights/modalities of participation, by inter 
alia setting limits to questioning witnesses, denial of both opening statements 
and of responding Co-Prosecutor’s opening statements as well as designation of 
a single team of lawyers. These restrictions correspond to the legal complexity of 
the proceedings and the high number of civil parties as compared to the 
situation in national systems. Moreover, the Trial Chamber in Duch revoked the 
status of some of the civil parties due to a lack of evidence proving it, and in 
application of a higher evidentiary standard as confirmed by the Supreme Court 
Chamber. It should be remembered that the ICC also revoked the status of some 
of the victim participants due to their unreliable testimonies and/or alleged 
stolen identities (Lubanga) or serious credibility doubts (Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui).    
As identified by the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber, although by 
revoking civil party status the Trial Chamber in Duch did not breach the ECCC 
instruments, the moment when it did so, i.e., at the very end of the trial should 
be criticized. Victims’ frustration, anger, and disappointment by having their 
status revoked at the last minute as well as considerations on efficiency and 
accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial since individuals who got their status 
revoked were allowed to, inter alia, tender (incriminating) evidence during trial 
make it imperative to settle this issue even before the trial hearings start. In spite 
of this, most civil parties in Duch were satisfied with their participation and even 
qualified it as a transformative experience not only for themselves but also for 
their families. It remains to be seen how civil parties participating in Nuon Chea 
et al. will assess their experience once the trial stage ends. As a consequence of a 
much larger number of civil parties in Nuon Chea et al., civil parties’ 
participation may end up being less personalized and more formulaic. 
Nevertheless, considering the large number of civil parties (around 4000) in 
Nuon Chea et al., this case has been divided into trials/mini-trials, which is found 
convenient since: i) the nature of civil party’s participation is not affected; ii) 
increased efficiency and in respect of the accused’s rights; and iii) potential 
increase in civil party’s substantial participation. This is complemented with 
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information to civil parties about the progress of their cases. Additionally, civil 
parties’ experience in the first trial within Nuon Chea et al. has been overall 
speaking positive. The fact that the severance of the proceedings in Nuon Chea et 
al. was kept after having heard inter alia the civil parties enhances their status 
during trial.           
As for the STL, Judges have drafted and amended the STL RPE in such a 
way that it is expected that victims’ participation during the first trial yet to begin 
in Ayyash et al. will move smoothly without affecting the integrity and efficiency 
of the proceedings and guaranteeing the accused’s rights. The (much) lower 
number of victim participants at the STL in comparison with those at the ICC 
and the ECCC cannot be disregarded as an important factor contributing to a 
potentially positive outcome. Be that as it may, the STL RPE explicitly state that 
the Trial Chamber has the discretion to authorize victim participants to exercise 
certain rights/modalities of participation, which have proven to be particularly 
contentious at the ICC (and to some extent at the ECCC), such as calling 
witnesses, tender evidence, and examination and cross-examination of witnesses. 
Additionally, the STL RPE lay down as a rule that victims’ participation can only 
be done via their legal representatives. This is similar to the ECCC but different 
from the ICC RPE under which legal representation is worded as a right rather 
than something mandatory. However, the STL RPE put in written the ICC and 
the ECCC Trial Chambers’ practice, i.e., the rule is precisely that victims 
participate via lawyers. Also, similar to the ICC and the ECCC instruments and 
practice, the STL RPE provide for grouping victims under common 
representatives and paying attention to victims’ interests.   
 
5. Victims’ Participation in Sentencing Proceedings 
It should first be mentioned that while at the ECCC trial and sentence 
proceedings are merged, at the ICC the Chamber can decide to split them, which 
happened in Lubanga, and at the STL trial and sentence proceedings are divided. 
For methodological purposes, the status of victims either as victim participants 
(ICC, STL) or as civil parties (ECCC) concerning sentencing is presented herein 
in an independent manner. Concerning the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, the 
specific figure of victim impact statement (VIS) relevant to sentencing is 
examined. Due to the fact that VIS or similar concepts are present at the 
international level and also in the national jurisdictions presented (in particular 
the Anglo-American ones) is convenient at this point to provide a general 
operative notion thereof. According to the UN Handbook on Justice for Victims:  
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It […] provides the victim with an opportunity to inform the court of how the 
offence has affected him or her physically, mentally or otherwise […] provides 
the victim with an opportunity not only to relate what impact the offence has 
had on the victim but also what, in the victim’s view, should be done about the 
matter.3073 
 
5.1. National Systems 
5.1.1. English Adversarial System 
The Victim Personal Statement (VPS) scheme was introduced nationally in 
October 2001.3074 The purpose of the VPS is only to provide sentencers better 
understanding of the harm inflicted on the victims as a consequence of the 
crime.3075 Hence, victims are not allowed to provide any indication concerning 
the nature of the sentence that should be imposed, as emphasized by the Lord 
Chief Justice in a Practice Direction ‘opinions of the victim or the victim’s close 
relatives as to what the sentence should be are therefore not relevant, unlike the 
consequences of the offence on them’.3076 This limitation has been said to cause 
erratic take-up rates among victims, victims’ lower satisfaction and, thus, VPS as 
being considered as having only a purely expressive function.3077 Although VPS 
can have a cathartic effect as it constitutes an avenue whereby victims can 
communicate their feelings about the impact of the crime,3078 victims are not 
permitted to read the statements themselves in open court. In other words, they 
can only submit them in paper but they cannot appear in person to read their 
statements before the sentencer and, thus, lack a right of allocution.3079   
A pilot victim’s advocate scheme, including family impact statements, 
incorporated a more comprehensive victims’ participation scheme during 
sentencing as victims acquired a ‘right of allocution’ and were led through their 
statements by the advocate; however, similar to the VPS, such mechanism only 
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3073 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Handbook on Justice for 
Victims (1999) 39. 
3074 Doak (2008) 150. The VPS national scheme followed up the 1996 Victim’s Charter and pilot 
Victim Personal Statement (VPS) schemes in late 1990s. See Home Office, The Victim’s Charter: A 
Statement of Service Standards for Victims of Crime (1996).  
3075 Doak (2008) 150. 
3076 Practice Direction (Victim Personal Statements) [2002] 1 Cr App R (S) 482. Cited by Doak 
(2008) 151. See also R v Hobstaff [1993] 14 Cr App R (S) 606 and R v Perks The Times 11/5/00.    
3077 See Doak (2008) 152 (referring to Jenny Graham et al. Testaments of Harm: A Qualitative 
Evaluation of the Victim Personal Statements Scheme (National Centre for Social Research (Great 
Britain) 2004)).    
3078 Ibid., 151. 
3079 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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sought to provide the sentencer a more accurate picture of the impact of the 
crime and, potentially, some cathartic benefit for the victims and, hence, specific 
penal demands to the court were not allowed.3080 In any case, family members of 
homicide victims can read a family impact statement aloud to the court before 
sentencing via the nationwide introduction of the Crown Prosecution Service’s 
Victim Focus Scheme introduced in October 2007.3081     
At the regional level, the Recommendation (1985) 11, the EU 
Framework Decision on Victims and the EU Directive on Victims have not 
required a formal role for victims in the sentencing process. Victims’ rights in 
the sentencing stage was considered in McCourt v. United Kingdom, where the 
European Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR) found that it would be 
inappropriate to recognize any role for the victim’s family in setting the tariff 
period for the crime as they would not possess the required impartiality.3082 The 
ECtHR in T and V v. United Kingdom adopted the exceptional decision to allow 
the killed victim’s parents to intervene in the case filed by two juvenile 
delinquents and authorized the parents’ legal representatives to address the 
ECtHR in oral argument although it fell short of stating this requirement as for 
the domestic proceedings.3083 This approach is similar to the Practice Statement 
by Lord Woolf C.J. where he ‘would invite written representations from the 
detainees’ legal advisers and also from the Director of Public Prosecutions who 
may include representations on behalf of victims’ families’.3084 Even though this 
maintains the English approach of not permitting a direct submission of victim 
statements and demanding them to be sent through the prosecution, it clearly 
acknowledges the relevance of submissions by victims’ families.3085  
However, at the domestic level case relating to T and V v. United 
Kingdom, the Lord Chief Justice ‘invited, and received, representations from 
[Mr. Bulger] and his family as to the impact of his son’s death on them but had 
not invited them to give their views on what they thought was an appropriate 
[sentencing] tariff’.3086 These considerations are consistent with the Court of 
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3080 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3081 Ian Edwards, ‘The Evidential Quality of Victim Personal Statements and Family Impact 
Statements’ (2009) 13 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 293, 293. 
3082 ECtHR, McCourt v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 20433/92, Admissibility Decision, 2 December 
1992, para. 1. 
3083 ECtHR, T and V. v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 24794/94, Judgment, 16 December 1999, para. 
4. 
3084 Practice Statement (Life Sentences for Murder) [2000] 2 Cr App R 457. 
3085 Emmerson, Ashworth and MacDonald (2012) 830. 
3086 Per Rose L.J.. in R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Bulger, Times, 7 
March 2001.  
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Appeal’s approach, which has considered that the opinion of victims or 
surviving family members ‘about the appropriate level of sentence do not 
provide any sound basis for reassessing a sentence’.3087 Otherwise, cases 
presenting identical or quite similar characteristics would lead to different 
sentences depending on whether victims are merciful or obsessed with revenge. 
Therefore, the VPS allows victims to provide representations on the 
effects of the crime on the victim and his/her life and wellbeing but it does not 
admit opinions or demands on a specific sentence as currently reflected in the 
Practice Direction (Criminal Proceedings: Consolidation).3088 Representations on 
the length or type of sentence may conflict with impartiality of the trial (ECHR, 
article 6) as suggested in McCourt v. United Kingdom, or may mislead victims 
and their families as for the significance of their statements.3089 In any case, 
victims’ interests are only one factor to be taken into account when passing a 
sentence although private interests should not be considered strange to or 
conflicting with public proceedings.3090     
 
5.1.2. American Adversarial System                  
Virtually all states and the federal government permit victims to present 
information bearing on the appropriate sentence via VIS, which can be 
presented in writing to a probation officer elaborating a pre-sentence report for a 
judge or in open court to the sentencing judge and also to the accused.3091 Under 
the CVRA, victims have the right to ‘be reasonably heard at any public 
proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole 
proceeding’.3092 The Ninth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Kenna v. United 
States, after considering that the CVRA made victims full participants for 
sentencing purposes, found that victims’ participation is not limited to written 
statements but they can be heard ‘if they choose to speak’.3093 Thus, especially 
under the CVRA where the victim’s act of speaking constitutes an individual 
choice and holds greater latitude to express opinions independent or even 
 
3087 Nunn [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 136 at p. 140. See also, e.g., Perks [2001] 1 Cr App R (S) 19. 
3088 Practice Direction (Criminal Proceedings: Consolidation) [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2870. 
3089 Emmerson, Ashworth and MacDonald (2012) 832.  
3090 Doak (2008) 155. 
3091 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 567. As for state legislation see, e.g., Illinois Constitution, 
article 1, § 8.1; Nebraska Constitution, article 1, § 28.  
3092 18 U.S.C § 3771 (a)(4).    
3093 Kenna v. United States D. Ct. For C. Dist. Ca. 435 F.3d 1011, 1015-1016 (9th Cir. 2006).  
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contrary to those of the government.3094 Nevertheless, victims’ status as 
independent participants during sentencing under the CVRA does not 
transform them into parties to the proceedings.3095 Thus, in In re Kenna (Kenna 
II), the court rejected that the victim’s arguments whereby the right to be 
reasonably heard under the CVRA includes the right to litigate, as a party, the 
calculation of the accused’s sentence.3096      
VIS on victims’ personal characteristics and also the nature and the 
extent of harm out of the crime are generally admissible.3097 As for victims’ 
opinion on what is a proper sentence, its admissibility depends on whether the 
recommendation is for capital cases or not. Concerning capital cases, although 
the Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee overruled aspects of its previous broad 
prohibition on the presentation of VIS in Booth v. Maryland,3098 it did not 
consider VIS as admissible regarding the appropriate sentence to be imposed,3099 
as, for instance, also mentioned by Justice Scouter’s concurring opinion ‘This 
case presents no challenge to the Court’s holding in Booth v. Maryland that a 
sentencing authority should not receive a third category of information 
concerning a victim’s family members’ characterization of and opinions about 
[…] the appropriate sentence’.3100 Thus, even though Payne overruled Booth’s per 
se prohibition on victims’ statement regarding the victim and the impact of the 
crime on the victim’s family, it did not find victims’ sentencing opinions relevant 
and even considered them as potentially prejudicial due to impartiality 
concerns.3101  
However, concerning non-capital cases, the few courts deciding on the 
admissibility of VIS on sentence recommendation have decided that a victim can 
express an opinion regarding the accused’s sentence if this is provided for in 
law.3102 Indeed, in non-capital cases, VIS is constitutionally allowed either by 
state constitutional amendment or state statute in virtually all states.3103 VIS is 
 
3094 Mary Giannini, ‘Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, and 
the Crime Victims’ Rights Act’ (2008) 26 Yale Law and Policy Review 431, 445. 
3095 Ibid., 446. 
3096 In re Kenna, 453 F.3d 1136, 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (Kenna II).  
3097 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) at 827; United States v. Sampson 332 F. Supp. 2d 325, 
338 (D. Mass. 2004); Lynn v. Reinstein, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona 68 P.3d 
412 (Az. 2002).  
3098 Booth v. Maryland 482 U.S. 496 (1987).   
3099 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n. 2 (1991). 
3100 Ibid., 835 n. 1 (Souter, J., concurring). See also Ibid., 833 (O’ Connor, J. concurring).  
3101 Ibid., 827, 830 n. 2. 
3102 State v. Mattesan, 851 P.2d 336 (Idaho 1993); Randall v. State, 846 P.2d 278 (Nev. 1993). 
3103 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 597. 
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generally limited to victims of the charged crime.3104 Although a victim’s right to 
introduce a VIS cannot be delegated to a relative or friend, the court normally 
has discretion to hear and consider other witnesses as appropriate.3105 Some 
judges have passed sentences on defendants that focus on the victims, frequently 
at victims’ request.3106 
On another note, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for 
sentencing enhancements (aggravating factors) in various situations paying 
attention to the kind of victim or the effects on the victims. Accordingly, the 
guidelines provide additional punishment, estimated by increasing the level of a 
crime under some circumstances, among which the following are related to 
victims: vulnerable victim, restraint of victim, physical injury, extreme 
psychological injury, and extreme conduct.3107  
 
5.1.3. French Inquisitorial System       
The request of imposing a penalty is solely reserved to the prosecution, i.e., the 
state authority and, hence, civil parties’ opinions or wishes concerning the nature 
and the amount of the penalty are judicially inoperative.3108 Even though the 
victim lacks an active and direct role in choosing the sanction, (s)he can exercise 
an indirect influence and play a passive but at the same time real role as referred 
to under article 132-24 of the French Criminal Code which states that:  
 
The nature, amount and regime of penalties pronounced against the accused are 
set in such a manner to conciliate the effective protection of the society, 
sanction of the accused and the victims’ interests with the need to facilitate the 
insertion or re-insertion of the convicted and to prevent the commission of new 
crimes [emphasis added].3109   
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3104 Commonwealth v. Smithton, 631 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).    
3105 People v. Zikorus, 197 Cal.Rptr. 509 (Cal. App. 1983). 
3106 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 597.  
3107 See respectively: § 3A1.1, § 3A.1.3, § 3A1.3, § 5K2.3, and § 5K2.8.  
It should be added that both the CVRA and the majority of States allow victims’ input in parole 
hearing. See, as for the CVRA, 18 U.S.C § 3771 (a) (4). This is handled in quite similar manner as 
in court hearings. See Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 606. Some states admit victims’ input in 
pardon proceedings. See Ibid., 607. Lastly, but equally important, a type of victim-defendant 
confrontation is the requirement of attendance at a victim impact panel as condition of sentencing. 
See Ibid., 629.             
3108 See Pignoux (2008) 313. See also Serge Guinchard and Jacques Buisson, Procédure Pénale 
(Litec 2005) § 912.   
3109 ‘La nature, le quantum et le régime des peines prononcées sont fixés de manière à concilier la 
protection effective de la société, la sanction du condamné et les intérêts de la victime avec la 
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Accordingly, judges and, where applicable, jury members are requested 
to integrate the victim, i.e., the person who has suffered because of a crime, in 
their reflection about a suitable penalty. However, there is neither an obligation 
to justify the application of the penalty nor an obligation to explain to the 
victims how their interests have been integrated to the decision. This has led to 
an opaque scenario, which is compounded by difficulties found by the victim to 
access information on the reality of the penalty regarding his/her interest. Thus, 
the victim would be only a parameter to be considered by the judge.3110  
Nevertheless, according to article 81-1 of the CPP, the civil party can 
according to law request the investigating judge to proceed to ‘[…] any act which 
permits him/her to appreciate the nature and importance of the harm suffered 
by the victim or gather information about the victim’s personality’.3111 This 
provision was clarified by a circular which made it explicit that its purpose is to 
collect elements to enable the competent jurisdiction to better evaluate the 
seriousness of the crime with regard to harm inflicted to the victim as well as to 
make it easier for the victim to justify his/her compensation claim.3112 The acts 
established under article 81-1 can be conducted by a rogatory commission or by 
an expert in charge of assessing his/her harm.3113 Accordingly, the victim can via 
his/her harm, influence the choice of the penalty and, therefore, the French 
practice gets closer to VIS; however, this is not as explicit as in the case of 
common law jurisdictions.3114 In any case, the civil party may testify on the 
character and the morals of the accused.3115    
According to the French Criminal Code the same crime is sanctioned in 
a different manner based on the consequences over victims’ physical integrity, 
and victims’ need for compensation can also guide the judge to choose the 
penalty in order to preserve the capacity of the convicted to provide 
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nécessité de favoriser l'insertion ou la réinsertion du condamné et de prévenir la commission de 
nouvelles infractions’. 
3110 Stéphane Bernhard, ‘Le Rôle de la Victime dans le Prononcé et L’Exécution des Peines’ in 
Strickler (2009) 157, 160. 
3111 ‘[…] à tout acte lui permettant d'apprécier la nature et l'importance des préjudices subis par la 
victime ou de recueillir des renseignements sur la personnalité de celle-ci’. The above-quoted can 
also be exercised by the investigating judge on his/her own initiative or requested by the 
Prosecutor. 
3112 Circulaire 14 May 2001 JUS-D-01-30065 C/CRIM-01-07/F1 - 14.05.01, Présentation des 
Dispositions de la Loi du 15 Juin 2000 Renforçant la Protection de la Présomption D’Innocence et 
les Droits des Victimes Relatives aux Victims, 1.3.14.  
3113 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3114 Pignoux (2008) 316. 
3115 CPP, article 444. 
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compensation.3116 Moreover, paying attention to victims’ interests, when 
pronouncing sentences, can lead the judge to interdict the convicted from 
coming into contact with the victim.3117  
 
5.2. The ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL 
5.2.1. General Considerations 
Since victims lack the official status of victim participants, they do not have the 
right to submit VIS to the Trial Chamber themselves. Nor, are the Chambers 
required to admit VIS. Nevertheless, the ICTY and the ICTR have admitted VISs 
filed by the Prosecutor,3118 and regardless of the fact that submission of those 
statements to the Chamber was not originally provided for in the Statutes or the 
RPE of those tribunals. Currently, the legal ground thereof is contained in the 
ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE rule 92 bis and which reads as follows:  
 
(A) Trial Chamber may admit, in whole or in part, the evidence of a witness in 
the form of a written statement in lieu of oral testimony which goes to proof of a 
matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the 
indictment.  
(i) Factors in favour of admitting evidence in the form of a written statement 
include, but are not limited to, circumstances in which the evidence in question:  
[…]    
d) concerns the impact of crimes upon victims.  
 
It is pertinent to mention that rule 155 (A) (d) of the STL RPE contains a 
similar provision. On the other hand, under rule 92 bis of the SCSL RPE, there is 
no explicit reference to the impact of crimes upon victims as a factor when 
examining whether to admit witnesses’ written statements unlike the ICTY RPE 
 
3116 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3117 Criminal Code, articles 131-6, 14; 132-45, 13. 
It should be noticed that, unlike the sentencing stage as such where victim’s participation is 
limited, victims (either victims sensu lato or civil parties) during the post-sentence stage, i.e., in the 
application of the penalty, hold a particularly active role as, inter alia, they have the rights to 
present written observations and the civil party’s lawyer can participate in the contradictory debate 
by presenting his/her respective observations before the tribunal of application of penalties. See 
CPP, articles 712-6 and 712-7 respectively. Finally, it should be added that victims’ interests can be 
taken into account in the individualization of the imprisonment penalty, in particular a temporal 
or definitive cessation thereof. See CPP, article 720.        
3118 See, e.g., Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 October 1998; Tadić 
(IT-94-1-Tbis-R117), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 11 November 1999, para. 4; Todorović 
(IT-95-9/1), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 31 July 2001, para. 53.  
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and the ICTR RPE. Moreover, unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the SCSL was 
reluctant to admit VIS.3119   
  
5.2.2. Legal Issues 
A VIS is first and foremost given for sentencing purposes since it may impact the 
sentence to be imposed. These statements portray the degree of suffering and 
harm endured by victims, which is part of the seriousness of the crimes and, 
hence, an aggravating factor as identified in Krstić by the ICTY:    
 
[…] the Trial Chamber must assess the seriousness of the crimes in the light of 
their individual circumstances and consequences. This presupposes taking into 
account quantitatively the number of victims and qualitatively the suffering 
inflicted on the victims.  
[…] 
Appropriate consideration of those circumstances gives “a voice” to the 
suffering of the victims.3120  
 
The appropriate circumstances referred to in the previous excerpt 
included complete defenselessness of victims, physical and psychological 
suffering inflicted on them as well as terrifying and heinous methods employed 
to perpetrate the crimes.3121 Individual victims’ specific characteristics may also 
hold relevance, in particular when it comes to a victim who is particularly 
vulnerable, or a victim who is a child or a woman, which have been considered 
as an aggravating factor.3122 Other aggravating factors considered have been 
discriminatory motive, e.g., ethnic and religious discrimination,3123 particular or 
extreme cruelty,3124 and scale of the crime, including the number of victims.3125   
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3119 See, e.g., Brima et al. (SCSL-04-16-T), Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judgment, 19 July 2007, 
paras. 6-9. 
3120 Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, paras. 701 and 703.  
3121 Ibid., para. 703. 
3122 See, e.g., concerning the status of victims as women and children: Furundžija (IT-95-17/1), 
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, para. 283; Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23-T and IT-96-
23/1-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, paras. 864, 874 and 879; Kunarac et al. (IT-
96-23-A and IT-96-23/1-A), Appeals Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, paras. 352, 354 
and 355; Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 30 May 2012, para. 25. As 
for the vulnerability of victims see, e.g., Deronjić (IT-02-61), Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, 
Appeals Chamber, 20 July 2005, paras. 124, 126-128; Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), 30 May 2012, paras. 
25 and 75.    
3123 See, e.g., Blaškić (IT-95-14), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, para. 785; Taylor (SCSL-
03-01-T), 30 May 2012, para. 25.  
3124 See, e.g., Todorović (IT-95-9/1-S), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 31 July 2001, para. 65.  
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The effect of a VIS has explicitly been acknowledged and/or quoted in 
judgments. To illustrate this point, judgments on Mucić et al. and Bralo at the 
ICTY are analyzed here. In the first case, concerning sexual violence, the Trial 
Chamber stated that:  
 
[…] Ms. Antic testified as to the effect these crimes had on her, including 
feelings of misery, constant crying and the feeling that she had gone crazy. In a 
victim impact statement submitted by the Prosecution for the purposes of 
sentencing, she stated, “[t]he wounds that I carry from the rapes in Čelebići will 
never go away”.3126                
 
It should be mentioned that VISs of sexual violence survivors seem to be 
exceptional.3127 Moreover, even though the impact of sexual violence on the 
victims is sometimes emphasized by the Prosecutor when conducting 
examination, the Office of the Prosecutor has not apparently included such 
inquiry as part of its prosecutorial strategy to seek justice for rape victims.3128   
In Bralo, the Trial Chamber considered not only the way in which 
crimes were perpetrated but also ‘the submissions of the Prosecution on the 
impact of these crimes on his victims’.3129 Indeed, in this case, the defence 
explicitly reckoned:  
 
[…] the suffering of Bralo’s victims, both at the time of commission of his 
crimes, and in the months and years afterwards. The Defence has further agreed 
with the Prosecution that the victim impact statements provided to the Trial 
Chamber are both powerful and affecting.3130  
 
The Chamber took note of and examined the several statements, 
submitted by the Prosecutor, from survivors and whose relatives were killed, and 
actually the Chamber appreciated ‘the willingness of these victims to describe 
their ordeal and the consequences of the attack upon their lives since’.3131 
Therefore, the effect of VISs in establishing the sentence was explicitly 
acknowledged by the Chamber under the following wording:      
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3125 See, e.g., Kambanda ((ICTR-97-23-S), Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber, 4 September 
1998, para. 42; Blagojević (IT-02-60-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 17 January 2005, para. 485.  
3126 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, para. 1263. 
3127 Brouwer (2005) 286. 
3128 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3129 Bralo (IT-95-17-T), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 7 December 2005, para. 36. 
3130 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3131 Ibid., para. 37.  
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These statements paint a picture of shattered lives and livelihoods, and of 
tremendous ongoing pain and trauma. The Trial Chamber is therefore mindful 
of the suffering of these victims, and of all of the other Muslim residents of 
Ahmići and Nadioci who were persecuted or otherwise abused by Bralo in the 
course of the attacks on their villages. It observes that the consequences of the 
persecution, murders, rape, and other crimes committed by Bralo are profound 
and long-lasting and takes this into consideration in its determination of 
sentence.3132  
 
The ICTY Prosecutor has additionally called victim-witnesses to give 
testimony concerning the impact of the crimes on their lives as well as the 
accused’s character during the time when the offences in question took place.3133 
Indeed, the ICTY and the ICTR Prosecutors have frequently introduced VISs as 
an avenue to voice the suffering and harm endured and expressed by the victims 
in their own language. Therefore, although victims lack an official victim 
participant status, they can at least influence the Chambers when these are 
considering what sentence should be imposed. Be that as it may, once a crime is 
established, the negative effect on the victim is implicitly understood by the 
Chamber, as was indicated by the ICTR in Akayesu and Musema.3134 In the latter 
case, the Trial Chamber noticing that an important number of witnesses ‘in this 
case have seen or have experienced terrible atrocities’ and bearing in mind that 
recounting such painful experiences normally produces pain to the witness and 
affects his/her ability to recount those events before a court, it ‘considered the 
testimony of those witnesses in this light’.3135 Nevertheless, the above-referred 
implicit understanding is not equal to saying that the impact of the crime is 
always explicitly pointed out in the judgments or sentences of these tribunals, 
which is the situation when the effects of the crimes on the victims are not 
adequately addressed.3136   
Be that as it may, it has been held that the consequences of the crime 
upon the victims who are directly injured are ‘always’ a relevant consideration in 
sentence.3137 When such consequences on the victim are a constitutive part of the 
crime definition, ‘they may not be considered as an aggravating circumstance in 
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3132 Ibid., para. 40. 
3133 See, e.g., Nikolić (IT-94-2-S), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 18 December 2003, paras. 
41-43. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 145. 
3134 Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), 2 September 1998, paras. 142-144; Musema (ICTR-96-13-T), Trial 
Chamber, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, paras. 100-101.   
3135 Musema (ICTR-96-13-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para. 100. 
3136 See also, with special emphasis on sexual crimes, Brouwer (2005) 291.  
3137 See, e.g., Krnojelac (IT-97-25-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 15 March 2002, para. 512. 
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imposing sentence, but the extent of the long-term physical, psychological and 
emotional suffering of the immediate victims is relevant to the gravity of the 
offences’.3138  
It is important to notice that although the Statutes and the RPEs of these 
tribunals do not mention explicitly the effects of the crimes on victims, the ICTY 
RPE, the ICTR RPE and the SCSL RPE include an open-ended clause, which 
refers to ‘any aggravating circumstance’.3139 In addition, these tribunals when 
imposing sentences as part of the ‘gravity of the offence’ factor contained in their 
Statutes,3140 have considered the degree of suffering or impact of the crime on the 
immediate victim, effect on his/her relatives and the vulnerability and number of 
victims.3141 Effects of the crime on the victims’ relatives may be taken into 
account when establishing the appropriate punishment and that ‘even where no 
blood relationships have been established, a trier of fact would be right to 
presume that the accused knew that his victim did not live cut off from the world 
but had established bonds with others’.3142 Moreover, the ICTY in Mucić et al. 
determined that ‘The gravity of the offences of the kind charged has always been 
determined by the effect on the victims or, at the most, on persons associated 
with the crime and nearest relations’.3143 Evidence of the accused’s bad character, 
i.e., concerning similar conduct that did not lead to a conviction, has been 
considered as an aggravating factor.3144 Lastly, but equally important, an 
admission of guilt and a guilty plea have sometimes been considered as 
mitigating factor.3145 This seeks not only to save the court resources but also to 
avoid undue strain on witnesses and victims.3146         
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3138 Ibid., Loc. cit. See also, Blagojević (IT-02-60-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 17 January 2005, 
para. 845. On the effect of the crimes on the victims and their families as an aggravating factor see, 
e.g., Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), 30 May 2012, paras. 25, 70 and 74.  
3139 ICTY RPE, rule 101 (B) (i); ICTR RPE, rule 101 (A) (i); and SCSL RPE, rule 101 (B) (i). 
3140 ICTY Statute, article 24 (2); ICTR Statute, article 23 (2); SCSL Statute, article 19 (2).  
3141 See, e.g., Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), 30 May 2012, para. 20; Blaškić (IT-95-14-A), Appeal 
Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004, para. 683.     
3142 Krnojelac (IT-97-25-A), Appeal Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2003, para. 260.  
3143 Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), 16 November 1998, para. 1226. 
3144 Ndindabahizi (ICTR-01-71-A), Appeal Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 16 January 2007, para. 
141; Ndindabahizi (ICTR-01-71-I), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 15 July 2004, paras. 474, 508 (iii).         
3145 See, e.g., Erdemović (IT-96-22-S), Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, 5 March 1998, paras. 
16, 21; Kambanda ((ICTR-97-23-S), 4 September 1998, paras. 36, 48, 50 and 52; Blaškić (IT-95-14-
T), 3 March 2000, para. 777.  
3146 William Schabas, ‘Penalties’ in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (2002) 1497, 1506. 
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5.3. The ICC    
5.3.1. Preliminary Considerations 
According to article 76 (2) of the ICC Statute ‘the Trial Chamber may on its own 
motion and shall, at the request of the Prosecutor or the accused, hold a further 
hearing to hear any additional evidence or submissions relevant to the sentence’. 
In Lubanga, the defence requested Trial Chamber I to hold an additional hearing 
in the event of a conviction.3147 The Chamber decided that there would be a 
separate hearing if the accused is convicted,3148 and for reasons of efficiency and 
economy, it ordered that evidence relating to sentence could be admitted during 
the trial.3149 Indeed, under article 76 (1) of the ICC Statute, the Chamber when 
considering the appropriate sentence ‘shall take into account the evidence 
presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant to the 
sentence’. As it is known, Lubanga was convicted by Trial Chamber I and 
separate sentencing proceedings took place, where victim participants 
intervened.  
 
5.3.2. Victims’ Participation and Related Legal Issues 
5.3.2.1. Victims’ Participation  
In Lubanga, upon Trial Chamber I’s invitation,3150 victim participants’ legal 
representatives filed written submissions on the procedure to be adopted for 
sentencing and the principles to be applied by the Chamber when considering 
the appropriate sentence to be imposed.3151 By referring to rule 145 of the ICC 
RPE, the legal representatives of victims emphasized the extent of damage to 
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3147 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1250), Observations de la Défense sur l’interprétation et 
l’application de l’Article 76, 31 March 2008, para. 4.   
3148 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 25 November 2008, p. 39, lines 22-23.  
3149 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 25 November 2008, p. 39, line 11 to page 40, line 
4; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1140), 29 January 2008, para. 32; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2360), 
Decision on Judicial Questioning, Trial Chamber, 18 March 2010, para. 38.    
3150 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2844), Scheduling Order Concerning Timetable for Sentencing and 
Reparations, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 3.  
3151 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), Observations sur la fixation de la peine et les réparations de 
la part des victimes a/0001/06, a/0003/06, a/0007/06 a/00049/06, a/0149/07, a/0155/07, a/0156/07, 
a/0162/07, a/0149/08, a/0404/08, a/0405/08, a/0406/08, a/0407/08, a/0409/08 , a/0523/08, 
a/0610/08, a/0611/08, a/0053/09, a/0249/09, a/0292/09, a/0398/09, et a/1622/10, 18 April 2012; 
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2869), Observations du Groupe de Victimes V02 Concernant la 
Fixation de la Peine et des Réparations, 18 April 2012.   
	

victims and their families as a factor to be considered by the Trial Chamber 
when determining the sentence.3152     
Victim participants’ legal representatives filed submissions, a single 
filing for each of the two groups of victims,3153 on the relevant evidence 
introduced during trial, as well as their views on the kind of penalty to be 
imposed in the sentence against Lubanga, including specific aggravating and 
mitigating factors.3154 By referring to article 77 (applicable penalties) of the ICC 
Statute and rule 146 (imposition of fines), victims’ legal representatives not only 
regarded imprisonment but also confiscation and imposition of fines as the 
applicable penalties in this case.3155 By invoking rule 145 (2) (b) (ii) (iii) and (v), 
the legal representatives of victims emphasized the abuse of power or official 
capacity, the particular defenseless situation of the victims and the commission 
of the crimes with a discriminatory effect as aggravating sentencing 
circumstances.3156 On the other hand, victims’ legal representatives could not 
identify any mitigating circumstance, in particular, they noticed the lack of 
Lubanga’s apologies towards the victims and the absence of his intention to 
redress the harm inflicted on victims.3157 The V01 group of victims relied on the 
25 April report from the TFV, which determined that approximately 2900 
children under the age of 15 were enlisted, and submitted that this constituted 
considerable damage in the context of the case.3158        
Victim participants’ legal representatives filed their submissions on the 
defence’s request to introduce additional evidence, opposing it since they 
considered that admission of new evidence could substantially alter the subject 
matter of the sentencing hearing.3159 They also considered that submission of 
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3152 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), 18 April 2012, paras. 4-9; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2869), 
18 April 2012, paras. 6-8.   
3153 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2893), Order Fixing the Date for the Sentencing Hearing, Trial 
Chamber I, 24 April 2012, para. 5. 
3154 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2880), Observations sur la Peine pour le Groupe de Victimes V01, 
14 May 2012; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2882), Observations du Groupe de Victimes VO2 Sur 
des Éléments de Preuve Établissant des Circonstances Aggravantes ou des Circonstances 
Atténuantes des Faits Portés à la Charge de l’accusé Reconnu Coupable, 14 May 2012.  
3155 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2880), 14 May 2012, paras. 4-13.  
3156 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2882), 14 May 2012, para. 4. See also, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2880), 14 May 2012, paras. 15-16.   
3157 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2880), 14 May 2012, paras. 18-21; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2882), 14 May 2012, paras 9-10.  
3158 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2880), 14 May 2012, paras. 8-9. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2901), 10 July 2012, para. 46. 
3159 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2893), Réponse Des Représentants Légaux du Groupe de Victimes 
V01 à la Requête de la Défense ICC-01/04-01/06-2892 du 4 Juin 2012, 7 June 2012, para. 4. 
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new evidence may affect the victims’ interests and requested that they should be 
permitted to request leave to examine the relevant witnesses and, where 
applicable, to respond to any additional evidence introduced with the Chamber’s 
leave, including via additional written submissions.3160 Based on considerations 
of potential assistance to determine the aggravating and mitigating sentencing 
circumstances, Trial Chamber I allowed two defence witnesses’ testimonies and a 
document on the time spent by Lubanga in custody for imprisonment sentence 
deduction effects.3161   
In Lubanga, after two additional defence witnesses were heard, the 
Prosecutor and victim participants’ legal representatives made their oral 
submissions, which were followed by a Lubanga’s statement to the Chamber.3162 
Victim participants’ legal representatives are expected to endeavor not to repeat 
submissions made by the Prosecutor or, where applicable like in Lubanga, by the 
legal representatives of the other group of victim participants.3163 During the 
sentencing hearing, the Trial Chamber emphasized that although the legal 
representatives of the victims can ask questions to the defence’s witness, this 
shall be done guaranteeing that ‘there is neither the reality nor the appearance of 
there being two Prosecutors in this Court’.3164 Accordingly, questions posed by 
victim participants’ legal representatives are allowed provided that they are 
relevant to the victims’ concerns, they assist the Chamber to determine the truth, 
and their content and the manner of being framed do not trespass the above-
mentioned restriction of not having two Prosecutors.3165 One of the victims’ 
lawyers tried to ask a defence’s witness questions on his identity document;3166 
however, the Trial Chamber rejected doing so as this belongs to issues 
considered during the course of the trial leading to the judgment and not to the 
sentencing stage.3167  
The legal representative of the V01 group of victims challenged the 
language used by the defence which tried to present the crimes committed as not 
very serious.3168 The legal representative also highlighted that the sentence has to 
 
3160 Ibid., paras. 4-6. 
3161 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2895), Order on the defence request to present evidence during the 
sentencing hearing, Trial Chamber I, 11 June 2012, paras. 19-23. 
3162 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 13 June 2012.  
3163 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2893), 24 April 2012, para. 8.  
3164 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 13 June 2012, p. 18, lines 24-25.  
3165 Ibid., p. 18, line 25 and p. 19, lines 1-4. 
3166 Ibid., p. 30, lines 16-21. 
3167 Ibid., p. 30, lines 22-25. 
3168 Ibid., p. 37, lines 1-25.  
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reflect the gravity of the crimes taking into account the condition of the 
perpetrator,3169 and pointed out that Lubanga did not express regret for what 
happened to the victims.3170 In turn, the legal representative of the V02 group of 
victims emphasized that while it was difficult to identify mitigating sentencing 
factors,3171 it was possible to find several aggravating sentencing factors such as 
Lubanga’s personality and behavior, means employed to commit the crimes, 
harm done to the victims (both direct and indirect) and Lubanga’s degree of 
participation.3172                  
Under rule 143, the sentencing hearing can be postponed, in exceptional 
circumstances, by the Trial Chamber, on its own motion or at the request of the 
victim participants’ legal representatives, besides the Prosecutor and the 
defence.3173      
Although it has been suggested that a Chamber may authorize victims to 
make a sentencing recommendation (via an impact statement),3174 neither the 
ICC Statute nor the ICC RPE provides for explicitly this option. In Lubanga, 
none of the submissions on sentencing filed by victims’ legal representatives 
suggested a specific imprisonment term. Those submissions only dealt with 
considerations on what sentence should be the appropriate, i.e., imprisonment, 
confiscation and fine; however, concerning imprisonment they did not contain a 
recommendation on a specific imprisonment term and they limited themselves 
to discuss the aggravating and mitigating sentencing circumstances, especially as 
for the impact on the victims as previously examined. This is different from the 
Prosecution’s scope of action as he requested the Chamber to impose a 30-year 
imprisonment sentence on Lubanga.3175        
 
5.3.2.2. Related Legal Issues  
Victims’ interests go beyond the determination of criminal responsibility and 
may include the establishment of the punishment. The ICC concluded in 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui that the identification, prosecution and punishment 
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3169 Ibid., p. 39, lines 21-25. 
3170 Ibid., p. 40, lines 20-25. 
3171 Ibid., p. 41, lines 9-12. 
3172 Ibid., p. 41, line 12-p. 43, line 5.    
3173 It should be added that, under rule 144, wherever possible, sentence decisions should be 
rendered in presence of victim participants or their lawyers.  
3174 McGonigle Leyh (2011), p. 301. 
3175 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2868), Prosecution’s Submissions on the Procedures and Principles 
for Sentencing, 18 April 2012, para. 5. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), 10 July 2012, 
para. 95. 
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of those responsible are located ‘at the root of the well established right to justice 
for victims of serious violations of human rights, which international human 
rights bodies have differentiated from the victims’ right to reparations’.3176 It is 
here discussed whether the punishment of the perpetrators is really a key 
component of the victim-centered discourse.    
Victims’ participation at the sentencing stage is grounded in boosting 
levels of victims’ satisfaction, victims’ moral interest in seeing that punishment is 
effected, and reassurance to victims of having support and public recognition.3177 
Those who oppose victims’ participation during sentencing point out that it 
jeopardizes the due process rights of the accused and the public interest.3178 Even 
those advocating for victims’ greater access to the criminal process show some 
reservations concerning victims’ participation during sentencing.3179 Indeed, 
international law generally neither recommends nor prescribes victims’ direct 
participation at sentencing and, if this is the case, such participation is usually 
limited to reparations.3180 This is reasonable since the state obligation to punish 
constitutes an obligation of means.3181 Even though a victim-centered approach 
claims that societies punish serious crimes out of deference to the victims,3182 it 
acknowledges that a State meets its obligation to punish even when the trial 
results in acquittal provided that this was not ‘preordained to be ineffective’.3183   
It is sustained here that a balanced position according to which the 
victims’ interests, including the punishment of the perpetrator, should be 
considered when determining the sentence but only as one factor, which is 
indeed the position in the ICC Statute and RPE.3184 Determination of individual 
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3176 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-474), 13 May 2008, paras. 38-39.  
3177 Doak (2008) 152; Antonia Cretney and Gwynn Davis, Punishing Violence (Routledge 1996) 
178.   
3178 See Andrew Ashworth, ‘Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice’ (2002) 42 British 
Journal of Criminology 578, 585; Jane Morgan, Frans Winkel and Katherine Williams, ‘Protection 
of and Compensation for Victims of Crime’ in Christopher Harding, Phil Fennell, Nico Jorg and 
Bert Swart (eds.), Criminal Justice in Europe (Oxford University Press 1996) 301, 315.  
3179 Raquel Aldana-Pindell, ‘An Emerging Universality of Justiciable Victims’ Rights in the 
Criminal Process to Curtail Impunity for State-Sponsored Crimes (2004) 26 Human Rights 
Quarterly 605, 609.   
3180 Ibid., Loc. cit. See also UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, Principle 22 (f) (‘Judicial and 
administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations’ is included under satisfaction, a 
mode of reparations.). See for further details infra Chapter V.         
3181 Mendez (1997) 264.  
3182 Mendez (2001) 31.  
3183 Mendez (1997) 264.  
3184 ICC Statute, article 78 (1); ICC RPE, rule 145 (1) (c) (‘the extent of the damage caused, in 
particular the harm caused to the victims and their families’.). See also Schabas (2010) 902-906. 
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criminal responsibility should also be related to a more inclusive appraisal of 
community liability regarding sentencing purposes.3185 This does not mean to 
engage the ICC in truth-seeking as if it were a TRC but that the ICC exploits ‘the 
restorative potential of the trial when establishing accountability for 
international crimes’,3186 which may help to achieve healing and closure for 
victims and their respective communities by facilitating mediation in trial.3187   
The foregoing considerations should arguably guide ICC Judges’ 
discretion. The ICC Statute and RPE leave important room for flexibility to take 
into account the harm inflicted on victims when determining the sentence and, 
therefore, victims’ participation oriented to sentencing is appropriately allowed. 
Article 78 (1) of the ICC Statute mentions ‘gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person’ as illustrative factors when 
determining the sentence. Rule 145 (1) (c) of the ICC RPE adds a non-exhaustive 
list including ‘the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused to 
the victims and their families’. Nevertheless, this rule only obliges the ICC to 
‘give consideration’ to the harm caused to victims but does not introduce a 
victim’s right to file submissions to be necessarily considered in sentencing. 
Therefore, it would be advisable to amend the ICC RPE to ensure that 
viewpoints of victims be sought by the ICC.3188   
As previously referred to, besides imprisonment, the ICC may also 
impose fine and ‘forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or 
indirectly from that crime’.3189 This is discussed in detail later in the next 
chapter.3190 It is also discussed in the next chapter,3191 the possibility for victim 
participants to make representations on reparations at the sentencing hearing 
and, in particular, in any additional hearing, if one is held by the Trial 
Chamber.3192 
To complete this sub-section, it is now examined some findings 
contained in the first sentence decision by Trial Chamber I in Lubanga. Trial 
Chamber I considered the gravity of the crimes in the circumstances of this case, 
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3185 Ralph Henham, ‘Towards Restorative Sentencing in International Criminal Trials’ (2009) 9 
International Criminal Law Review 809, 814. 
3186 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3187 Ibid., 815. 
3188 Especially amendment to rule 93 of the ICC RPE (Views of victims or their legal 
representatives).   
3189 ICC Statute, article 77 (2) (a) and 77 (2) (b) respectively.  
3190 See infra Chapter V 2.3.2. 
3191 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.4.  
3192 See ICC Statute, article 76 (3); ICC RPE, rule 143. 
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with regard, among others, to the extent of the damaged caused and, in 
application of rule 145 (1) (c), in particular: 
 
[…] the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the 
unlawful behavior and the means employed to execute the crime; the degree of 
participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the circumstances of 
manner, time and location; and the age, education, social and economic 
condition of the convicted person.3193    
  
Although the Prosecution did not charge Lubanga with rape and other 
sexual violence crimes, the Trial Chamber examined them under rule 145 (1) (c) 
as a component of: i) the harm suffered by the victims; ii) the nature of the 
unlawful behavior; iii) the circumstances of manner in which the crime was 
committed; and, iv) under rule 145 (2) (b) (iv), this can also be considered as 
showing that the crime was perpetrated with particular cruelty.3194 However, due 
to the fact that the Prosecutor neither introduced relevant evidence during the 
sentencing stage nor referred to any relevant evidence brought during the trial, 
sexual violence was not considered part of the assessment of Lubanga’s 
culpability for sentencing purposes.3195 Trial Chamber I also rejected the fact that 
some child soldiers were under the age of 15 as an aggravating circumstance,3196 
which was submitted by the legal representatives of the V01 group of victims.3197 
Although the legal representatives of the V02 group of victims argued that there 
was a discriminatory intent as the female soldiers were sexually abused,3198 Trial 
Chamber I concluded that evidence was not provided to demonstrate that 
Lubanga deliberately discriminated against women in the commission of these 
crimes.3199  
Moreover, Trial Chamber I found no aggravating factor and, therefore, it 
considered that a whole life term would be inappropriate.3200 On the contrary, 
Lubanga’s persistent cooperation with the ICC during the proceedings was 
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3193 Cited in Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), 10 July 2012, para. 44. 
3194 Ibid., para. 67. 
3195 Ibid., para. 75. 
3196 Ibid., paras. 77-78. 
3197 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2880), 14 May 2012, paras. 15-16; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2882), 14 May 2012, paras. 6-9.  
3198 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2880), 14 May 2012, para. 10. 
3199 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), 10 July 2012, para. 81. 
3200 Ibid., para. 96. Trial Chamber I cited rule 145 (3), which states that life imprisonment sentence 
is ‘justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person, as evidenced by the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances’.     
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considered as mitigating.3201 Taking into account all these factors, and pursuant 
article 78 (3), the total period of imprisonment on the basis of the joint sentence 
was set to be 14 years.3202 
This sentence may be considered as lenient, which has indeed been the 
main criticism coming from some human rights NGOs, activists and victims.3203 
Victims have complained about the relative low number of years by stating, inter 
alia, that ‘We are many whose lives were ruined because of him. This penalty is 
not proportional to his capacity to cause trouble’, and ‘He [Lubanga] has done a 
lot of things in Ituri that everyone knows about, and today you condemn him to 
14 years [… ] that is to mock us’.3204 Even other members of the NGOs 
community fear Lubanga’s return.3205 It is here argued that victims’ 
disappointment, anger and frustration for the relatively lenient sentence has 
some ground. In particular, the Majority of the Chamber should have considered 
the damage inflicted to the victims and their families, especially as a consequence 
of the harsh punishments and sexual violence suffered by the victims of those 
crimes in accordance with rule 145 (1) (c), which was criticized by Judge Odio 
Benito in her dissent to the decision on sentence.3206 
Accordingly, the Chamber should have considered the ample evidence 
brought in trial connected with the conditions in which boys and girls were 
recruited and the harm suffered by them, particularly harsh treatment and sexual 
violence against very young children, as aggravating circumstances when 
determining the applicable sentence.3207 Therefore, factors such as ‘sexual 
violence’ and ‘punishment’, disregarded by the majority but admitted in the 
dissenting opinion,3208 should have been considered as aggravating factors to 
increase the sentence inasmuch as these factors led to serious and frequently 
irreparable harm to the victims and their families. In any case, the Prosecutor 
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3201 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), 10 July 2012, paras. 88-90 and 97. 
3202 Ibid., para. 99. See also para. 107.  
3203 See, e.g., Olivia Bueno, ‘14 Years: Too Much or Not Enough?’ Commentary Trial Reports, 16 
July 2012 in the Lubanga Trial at the International Criminal Court.  
Available at: http://www.lubangatrial.org/2012/07/16/14-years-too-much-or-not-enough/ (last 
visit on 20 October 2012).     
3204 See Ibid., Loc. cit. (quoting victims interviewed. Another victim was reported to have said that 
the ICC had shown ‘how limited it is, the ICC must correct this error. Thomas doesn’t deserve 14 
years in prison, he deserves 20, 25, 30, and even 50 years in prison’.).  
3205 See Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3206 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), Decision on Sentence pursuant Article 76 of the Statute, 
Trial Chamber I, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, 10 July 2012, para. 2. 
3207 See also Ibid., paras. 6 and 8. 
3208 See Ibid., para. 22. 
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filed its notice of appeal against the sentence decision and, thus, ‘For reasons that 
will be provided in its document in support of the appeal, request that the 
Appeals Chamber reverse and revise upward Thomas Lubanga’s 14-year 
sentence’.3209 The Prosecutor considered the sentence disproportionate to the 
crime, considering inter alia the harm caused to victims and their families,3210 
and requested the Appeals Chamber to vary the sentence upwards.3211 As it is 
known, both the judgment and sentence in Lubanga are currently under appeals.  
 
5.4. The ECCC and the STL             
5.4.1. General Considerations 
5.4.1.1. The ECCC 
With regard to the ECCC, as previously mentioned, the trial before the ECCC is 
not divided into trial and sentencing stages, and, therefore, all relevant testimony 
and material put before the Chamber, whether it refers to the question of guilt or 
any eventual innocence, is examined during trial.3212 The Trial Chamber in Duch 
concluded that civil parties’ lawyers cannot file submissions on sentencing as this 
corresponds exclusively to the Prosecutor’s mandate and, hence, civil parties 
were asked not to file submissions: i) on the sentence, ii) relevant to sentencing, 
and iii) on the assessment of factors underlying a decision on sentencing.3213 The 
Trial Chamber noted that the ECCC Internal Rules provide no legal basis for the 
civil parties to file submissions on sentencing.3214  
In any case, for example, in Nuon Chea et al., as previously referred 
to,3215 civil parties during trial have been allowed to express their suffering during 
the Democratic Kampuchea era in general, at least when this has not infringed 
the accused’s right to a fair trial.3216 These statements of suffering may be 
considered mutatis mutandi as serving a similar function than that of VIS 
although those are not specific sentencing submissions.  
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3209 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2933), Prosecution’s Notice of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s 
“Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute”, 3 October 2012, para. 4.  
3210 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2950), Prosecutor’s Document in Support of Appeal Against the 
“Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute” (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), Office of the 
Prosecutor, 3 December 2012, paras. 27-35.    
3211 Ibid., para. 96 (i).  
3212 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2009, para. 15. 
3213 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 27 August 2009, pp. 41-42. 
3214 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2009, para. 35. 
3215 Supra Chapter IV 4.4.1.1. 
3216 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 2 May 2013, para. 15. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1329-
1330.    
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Additionally, the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers in the first trial within 
Nuon Chea et al., i.e., Case 002/01, requested the Trial Chamber to sentence the 
accused ‘to a period of imprisonment commensurate with the gravity of their 
crimes and the measure of suffering and injury these crimes have caused civil 
parties and victims’.3217 
 
5.4.1.2. The STL 
 With regard to the STL, it should be first mentioned that the STL proceedings 
are divided into two stages: trial, to establish the accused’s guilt or innocence 
and, provided the accused is found guilty, the sentencing stage to establish the 
sentence.3218 Rule 87 (C) of the STL RPE explicitly provides for that victim 
participants may participate in the proceedings either via oral or written 
submissions as follows:  
 
At the sentencing stage, subject to the authorisation by the Trial Chamber, a 
victim participating in the proceedings may be heard by the Trial Chamber or 
file written submissions relating to the personal impact of the crimes on them.    
 
5.4.2. Legal Issues 
5.4.2.1. The ECCC  
In deciding not to admit civil parties’ submissions on sentencing, the Trial 
Chamber in Duch interpreted rule 23 (1) (a) which states that one of the civil 
parties’ purpose is to ‘Participate in proceedings […] by supporting the 
prosecution’ as having to be interpreted restrictively and, hence, it ‘does not 
confer a general right of equal participation with the Co-Prosecutors’.3219 
Although the fact that trial and sentencing proceedings before the ECCC are not 
divided leading to some ambiguity on the purpose of the evidence especially 
where facts relate simultaneously to conviction and sentence, civil parties were 
not permitted to evaluate all facts adduced during the criminal process.3220 Thus, 
the Trial Chamber determined that civil parties’ evaluation of such facts is 
restricted to assisting the Co-Prosecutors to establish the accused’s guilt or 
innocence and to the reparations proceedings.3221 However, ‘Where facts relate 
exclusively to sentencing, Civil Parties may not evaluate such factors or make 
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3217 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 26 September 2013, conclusive part i). 
3218 See STL RPE, rule 171. See also STL President (2010), para. 46; STL President (2012), para. 46. 
3219 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2009, para. 25. 
3220 Ibid., para. 36. 
3221 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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submissions in relation to them’.3222 It was therefore considered that civil parties 
have no role in relation to sentencing as this ‘is the sole preserve of the 
prosecution, in the public interest and in the interests of justice’.3223   
In connection with this issue, the Trial Chamber determined that civil 
parties are not allowed in general to question the accused concerning his 
character,3224 as well as experts and witnesses who testify exclusively on the 
character of the accused.3225 In reaching this conclusion, the Trial Chamber 
defined ‘character’ as including ‘the personality, temperament, integrity and 
reputation of a person’.3226 In principle, according to the Chamber, none of these 
features are relevant concerning the accused’s guilt or innocence.3227 They are 
relevant when determining aggravating or mitigating circumstances in relation 
to any eventual sentence and are not relevant to establish the accused’s guilt or 
innocence.3228  
The ban on civil parties to file submissions on sentencing and 
questioning related to the accused’s character is herein criticized. First, neither 
the ECCC Internal Rules nor the Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure 
contains an express limitation for civil parties as for sentencing. Second, the ban 
in question hinders civil parties’ ability to support the prosecution. Third, by 
prohibiting civil parties to question the character of the accused at the end of the 
trial, the Trial Chamber dilutes Cambodians’ capability to claim the trial as their 
own, which may make it more difficult for the ECCC to achieve its goal to 
promote national reconciliation.3229  
Fourth, excluding civil parties’ participation from sentencing 
considerations originated frustration and disillusionment among victims.3230 
Thus, victims as civil parties who were denied participation concerning 
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3222 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3223 Ibid., para. 42. 
3224 Ibid., para. 48. 
3225 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3226 Ibid., para. 45. 
3227 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3228 Ibid., para. 46. The Trial Chamber considered that the portion of the trial proceedings depicted 
in the Scheduling Order of 13 August 2009 as ‘Questioning the witness and expert on issues 
relating to the character of the accused’ relates only to issues of character of the accused.  
3229 See also David Sokol, ’Reduced Victim Participation: A Misstep by the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2011) 10 Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 167, 181-182.   
3230 See Michael Saliba, ‘Civil Parties Boycott Start of Character Witness Testimony while Experts 
Offer Psychological Assessment of Duch’, Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, 31 August 2009; 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 196.   
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sentencing got disappointed when the Trial Chamber condemned Duch to only 
35 years in prison.3231 To an important extent, the Supreme Court Chamber via 
its appeal judgment corrected this situation insofar as it held that the sentence of 
35 years of imprisonment by the Trial Chamber did not appropriately reflect the 
gravity of crimes and the individual circumstances of Duch.3232 The Supreme 
Court Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred in imposing an arbitrary 
and manifestly inadequate sentence, which prompted the Supreme Court 
Chamber to impose a sentence of life imprisonment against Duch.3233 In 
imposing this harsher sentence, the Supreme Court Chamber paid close 
attention to the ‘particularly heinous character’ of the crimes committed by 
Duch based on the verified number of victims killed, who totaled at least 12272, 
and also the systematic torture and deplorable conditions of the detention 
suffered by them.3234 Accordingly, in the understanding of the Supreme Court 
Chamber:  
 
The sufferings of victims and their families and relatives are not in the past, but 
are continuing and will continue throughout their lives. Although the 
punishment of KAING Guek Eav does not completely cure their suffering, the 
victims’ fair and reasonable expectations for justice deserve to be fulfilled. 
KAING Guek Eav’s crimes were an affront to all of humanity, and in particular 
to the Cambodian people, inflicting incurable pain.3235 
 
It should be noticed that, unlike the other international and hybrid 
criminal courts’ instruments, the ECCC Internal Rules do not contain an explicit 
enumeration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.    
Fifth, as determined by a dissent to a Decision on civil parties’ 
submissions on sentencing and directions concerning the accused’s character in 
Duch, legal proceedings are not only about answering the question ‘what did he 
or she do?’ but they also concern answering the question ‘why did he or she do 
that’, which is a legitimate concern for all parties, civil parties included.3236 
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3231 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 196; Pham et al. (2011) 280.   
3232 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 383. 
3233 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3234 Ibid., para. 376. 
3235 Ibid., para. 381. 
3236 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint Request for a 
Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions 
Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character, Trial 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lavergne, 9 October 2009, para. 28.  
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Accordingly, civil parties’ participation should have not been restricted to the 
mere determination of accused’s guilt or innocence but it should have also 
included participation as for sentencing. Moreover, it is quite difficult to 
differentiate between what should be taken into account for accused’s guilt or 
reparations and what should be considered to establish an appropriate 
punishment, which is particularly relevant when it comes to very serious crimes 
where, inter alia, the consequences for victims is a factor to be considered when 
imposing the punishment.3237 Furthermore, accused’s guilt is not determined in 
the abstract but it is connected to knowledge of the crimes and matters that go to 
knowledge of the defendant’s character.3238 Indeed, these matters which may be 
inculpatory or exculpatory generally are already included in the judicial 
investigation case file or dossier to which all parties (civil parties included) had 
the opportunity to contribute.3239 
Sixth, as put forward by the civil parties in Duch and acknowledged by 
the dissenting opinion previously referred to, domestic procedures permit civil 
parties to question all witnesses including those who testified on the defendant’s 
character.3240 Indeed, civil parties had already testified or questioned the accused 
and others concerning the accused’s character.3241 For example, a civil party told 
about a meeting with Duch that took place after the facts over which the ECCC 
has jurisdiction but relevant to the accused’s character.3242 This reveals 
contradiction in the prohibition later imposed by the Trial Chamber.     
 
5.4.2.2. The STL  
With regard to the STL, following a systematic reading of rule 87 (C) of its RPE, 
quoted previously,3243 it should be pointed out that the STL RPE clearly state that 
when the Trial Chamber finds the accused guilty, the Prosecutor and the defence 
are those who are entitled to submit ‘any relevant information that may assist the 
Trial Chamber in determining an appropriate sentence’.3244 Hence, only subject 
to authorization by the Trial Chamber, victim participants ‘may exercise all the 
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3237 Ibid., para. 27. 
3238 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3239 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3240 Ibid., para. 33. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 195.  
3241 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 195. 
3242 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 24 August 2009, p. 26. Referred to by 
McGonigle Leyh (2011) 19, footnote 160.  
3243 See supra Chapter IV 5.4.1.2. 
3244 STL RPE, rule 171 (A).  
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rights provided in Rule 87 (C)’.3245 Moreover, rule 87 (C) can be considered as 
having achieved an important balance.3246  
Accordingly, even though victim participants can be heard by the Judges 
so that these examine the seriousness of the crimes perpetrated based on the 
suffering inflicted on the victims, these are not allowed to file submissions or 
observations on the sentence to be imposed. Such a power has been limited to 
the Prosecutor, i.e., in his/her role as a public order guardian and who is 
expected to provide a recommendation for a proportional and just sentence 
based on the seriousness of the crime(s) in question as well as applicable 
mitigating and aggravating factors. Thus, by not allowing victim participants’ 
submissions or observations on a specific sentence to be imposed, it is expected 
to avoid any manifestation of revenge. Be that as it may, as highlighted by the 
former President of the STL, Antonio Cassese, under rule 87 (C), victims may 
play an important role in the sentencing stage in assisting the Judges to evaluate 
the personal impact of the crimes on them via written or even oral 
submissions.3247 Thus, as summarized in the STL Information Guide on Victims’ 
Participation, victim participation during the sentencing stage is limited, i.e., ‘a 
victim may only give details of the impact of the crime on him if authorized to 
do so by the Trial Chamber. He is therefore not entitled to comment on 
sentencing’.3248 Additionally, rule 171 (E) establishes that not only the sentence 
shall be pronounced in public but it also, wherever possible, in the presence of 
the accused and victim participants.   
It is important to mention that the STL RPE or Statute does not contain, 
as part of aggravating factors, an explicit reference to the harm or damage caused 
to the victims and their families. However, rule 172 (B) (i) of the STL RPE refers 
to an open-ended clause ‘any aggravating circumstance’. Accordingly, when the 
STL has to impose a sentence, harm or damage inflicted on the victims must 
arguably be considered as an aggravating factor in order to achieve a fair and 
proportional sentence. Moreover, under article 24 (2) of the STL Statute factors 
such as ‘the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person’ are mentioned for illustrative effects, letting alone that ‘gravity 
of the offence’ has been interpreted in international case law as including the 
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3245 Ibid., rule 171 (B). 
3246 Hemptinne (2010) 178.  
3247 STL President (2010), para. 17. See also STL President (2012), para. 17. 
3248 STL Chambers (2010b) para. 28. 
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degree of suffering or impact of the crime on the immediate victim, effect on 
his/her relatives and the vulnerability and number of victims.3249                          
 
5.5. Comparative Conclusions 
Although international law does not require a formal role for victims 
during/connected to sentencing proceedings, common law domestic practice 
examined (especially in the United States) and most of the international and 
hybrid criminal courts provide avenues in a higher or lower extent to permit at 
least some level of victims’ participation. Whereas at the ICC and the STL, 
victims participants can present oral and written submissions on sentence, at the 
ECCC civil parties have been precluded from doing so. At the ICTY and the 
ICTR, victims can via the Prosecutor submit written evidence concerning the 
impact of crimes on them. Even though victims lack a formal victim participant 
status at the ICTY and the ICTR, their VISs have sometimes been explicitly 
acknowledged by the respective Trial Chamber when determining sentence. VISs 
have accordingly influenced sentences rendered although sometimes, for 
example, in sexual crimes cases, this influence has been rather limited. However, 
a VIS is channeled through the Prosecution like in England (family impact 
statement excepted) and only consists in written submissions like in England 
(oral family impact statement excepted) but unlike the United States.       
At the ICC, victim participants’ lawyers can inter alia: i) file written 
submissions on the procedures, principles applicable to sentencing as well as 
views on the kind of penalty to be imposed in the sentence, the impact of the 
crimes on the victims, aggravating/mitigating factors, and relevant evidence 
introduced during trial; ii) file submissions on defence’s request to introduce 
additional evidence (witnesses included); iii) make oral submissions during the 
sentencing hearing; iv) ask questions to the defence’s witnesses provided that 
these are relevant to victims’ interest and contribute to the truth and without 
constituting or giving the appearance of being a second Prosecutor; and v) can 
ask the sentencing hearing to be postponed.  
In Lubanga, the victim participants’ lawyers did not propose a specific 
imprisonment term. This is similar to the practice existent in England (and in 
the United States concerning capital cases), which is justified by impartiality 
concerns and the Prosecutor’s scope of action. In the United States, although in 
non-capital cases sentence recommendation is admissible, victims do not have 
the right to litigate sentence calculation. In Lubanga, even though ICC Trial 
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3249 See case law referred to in previous sub-sections of this sub-chapter, especially under sub-
section 5.2.2.     
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Chamber I examined sexual violence crimes (not charged) to determine the 
sentence, it did not consider them as aggravating factors due to evidentiary and 
legal technicalities. This may explain why the sentence imposed on Lubanga was 
relatively lenient (14 years), which understandably caused disappointment 
among the victims. This sentence can be considered as disproportionately low 
considering the damage inflicted to the victims and their families, which was 
actually and extensively presented in trial connected to the conditions under 
which child soldiers were recruited and used in the hostilities.  
At the ECCC, in Duch, the situation for victims looked much more 
difficult since civil parties were not allowed to file submissions on sentencing, 
relevant to sentencing and on evaluation of factors underlying a decision on 
sentencing. Even though these limitations are similar to those existent in the 
French system where civil parties are excluded from sentencing, at least in 
France victims can testify on the accused’s character, which is prohibited by the 
ECCC for sentencing. This restrictive approach can be criticized under 
considerations such as: i) no explicit prohibition in the ECCC instruments; ii) 
hindering civil parties’ ability to support the prosecution; iii) disempowerment 
of civil parties and obstacles to achieve reconciliation; iv) frustration among 
victims; v) the importance of participation to build knowledge of not only what 
crimes were committed but also why the accused did so; and vi) the fact that 
indeed civil parties had already testified and questioned about the accused’s 
character during the trial in Duch. In any case, civil parties can present 
statements of suffering during trial.  
At the STL, victim participants subject to Trial Chamber’s authorization 
can participate in the sentencing proceedings via oral and written submissions 
on the personal impact of the crime on them but they cannot submit 
recommendations on sentence, i.e., their participation is limited.  
A feature common to all the examined international and hybrid criminal 
courts (and also present in the considered national systems) is that in their 
instruments and/or case law,3250 factors relating to the victims have been 
considered to examine the gravity of the crimes and as aggravating factors. These 
have included the harm caused to and impact of crimes inflicted on victims and 
their families; the vulnerability and particular condition of victims; the manner 
to commit the crime, including cruelty and discrimination against victims; and 
the number of victims. All these factors are arguably an important guarantee to 
reach a sentence which is both fair and proportional to seriousness of the crimes 
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3250 As mentioned, the ECCC Internal Rules do not contain an explicit list of aggravating 
sentencing factors but these have been considered in its case law. 
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and the harm caused to victims. Thus, for example, the ECCC Supreme Court 
Chamber imposed a life sentence on Duch, overruling the 35 year imprisonment 
sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber, since the former paid closer attention to 
aggravating factors that have victims as central reference. Such factors are also 
similar mutatis mutandi to those employed by the examined domestic 
jurisdictions when determining a sentence. As a matter of lege ferenda, the ICC 
RPE and the other international and hybrid criminal courts’ instruments may be 
modified so that it is made it explicit that those courts shall always consider the 
harm inflicted on the victims. This would arguably constitute a guarantee for 
victims’ submissions on this regard to be duly considered.  
 
6. Victims’ Participation in Appeals Proceedings  
In this subchapter, it is examined the victims’ participation regime during 
appeals proceedings. The appeals proceedings correspond not only to those 
related to a final judgment and sentence but also refer to interlocutory appeals, 
i.e., those appeals concerning issues before a case is finally decided.3251 The 
analysis is focused on the situation of victims at the ICC, the ECCC and the STL.  
 
6.1. National Systems 
6.1.1. English Adversarial System 
Since victims do not have an official status in criminal proceedings, they lack 
participatory rights during appeals proceedings. However, under the Code of 
Practice for Victims of Crime, there are specific obligations to inform. Thus, if a 
person convicted at the Magistrate’s Court appeals against his/her conviction or 
sentence to the Crown Court, the joint police/CPS Witness Care Units must 
inform all victims of the appeal after the joint Police/CPS Witness Care Units are 
notified that an appeal notice has been lodged.3252 The Witness Care Units must 
notify a prosecution witness regardless of the likelihood of the witness being 
called to provide evidence again and to inform them of the outcome of the 
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3251 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 303 (referring to Black’s Law Dictionary (7th edn, West Publishing 
Company 1999). An issue for interlocutory appeal can be identified by the fact that there is a topic 
requiring a decision for its resolution and is not merely disagreement over an issue. An issue for 
appeal must significantly affect, in a material manner, the fair and expeditious conduct of 
proceedings or the outcome of the trial. See, e.g., Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-168), Judgment 
on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Appeals Chamber, 13 July 2006, paras. 9-10.  
3252 The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, para. 6.13.  
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appeal.3253 In turn, the Prosecutors have to keep victims informed of the progress 
of any appeal and, together with the Witness Care Units, to explain the effect of 
the court’s judgment.3254 Moreover, witnesses and also any interested parties ‘are 
entitled to approach the Attorney General’ directly, establishing the reasons why 
they consider that the sentence should be reviewed.3255 Furthermore, the ECtHR 
concluded in Kelly and Others v. The United Kingdom that the lack of reasons in 
the Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute denied the families of the killed 
victims access to information and prevented them from challenging such 
decision.3256  
       
6.1.2. American Adversarial System 
The CVRA provides that when a victim is denied any of his/her enumerated 
rights (under the CVRA), (s)he ‘may petition the court of appeals for a writ of 
mandamus […] [which] the court […] shall take up and decide […] forthwith 
[…]’.3257 Moreover, the United States Congress endeavored to give victims a 
powerful new remedy that would fully protect victims through the incorporation 
of the ‘shall take up and decide’ language,3258 i.e., exonerating victims from the 
ordinary mandamus standards,3259 as also identified by some case law.3260 
However, it should be stressed that the CVRA only permits victims to obtain 
appellate review of violations of their rights under the Act.3261 Accordingly, 
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3253 The Witness Charter, Standards of Care for Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System (March 
2008), standard 31.  
3254 Implementing and complying with the Witness Charter - Operational Guidance for CPS Staff 
and Managers, standard 31. Available at:  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/witness_charter_cps_guidance/#Toc194480777 (last visit on 
20 October 2012). 
3255 The Witness Charter, Standards of Care for Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System (March 
2008), standard 31.  
3256 ECtHR, Kelly and Others v. United Kingdom, 4 August 2001, para. 117.  
3257 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d) (3). The 10th Federal Circuit Court in United States v. McVeigh considered 
the lack of standing of victims who were pursuing an appeal against a District Judge. This Judge 
had prohibited those victims that would testify at the sentencing phase from attending the trial. See 
United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997). This lack of standing was remedied by a 
statute specifically providing standing, e.g., the CVRA in the federal system. See Beloof, Cassell and 
Twist (2010) 691.     
3258 See, for further details, Kyl, Twist and Higgins (2005) 618-622. 
3259 Paul Cassell and Steven Joffee, ‘The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role in a System of Public 
Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act’ (2010) 105 Northwestern 
University Law Review Colloquy 164, 169.  
3260 In re W.R. Huff Management Co., 409 F.3d, 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005); Kenna v. United States, 
Dist. C. for C. Dist. CA. 435 F.3d.  1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006). 
3261 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d) (3).    
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unlike a Prosecutor, a victim who is just dissatisfied with the length of an 
imprisonment sentence against the convicted cannot seek mandamus review.3262 
Nevertheless, the victim is entitled to appeal a Judge’s restitution decision since 
an erroneous restitution decision deprives a victim of ‘the right to full and timely 
restitution as provided in law’.3263 Concerning restitution, the Sixth Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Perry rejected previous case law and 
instead permitted a crime victim to appeal a District Court releasing a lien in 
favor of victim securing a restitution.3264             
In Kenna v. U.S., the Ninth Federal District Court of Appeals, 
considered that the District Court committed an error of law by refusing the 
petitioner (victim) to allocute at the sentencing, and it thus issued the writ, 
ordering the District Court to resentence the convicted after allowing the victims 
to speak during the sentencing hearing.3265 In Doe v. United States, taking into 
account the legislative history of rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it was 
concluded that if rape victims are not permitted to appeal an erroneous 
evidentiary ruling made at a pre-trial hearing conducted pursuant to that rule, 
the purpose thereof would be frustrated.3266 Additionally, in United States v. 
Hunter, it was found no precedent for allowing a non-party, i.e., a victim, post-
judgment appeal that would reopen an accused’s sentence and affect his/her 
rights, unlike cases not disturbing a final judgment, i.e., interlocutory appeal,3267 
which was the situation in Doe v. United States.  
Concerning state case law, in, for instance, Landon v. State, it was 
recognized that the victim has a mandatory and self-enabling right to appeal.3268 
State appellate courts have vacated results, i.e., based on the use of remedy of 
voiding, and ordered judges to comply with and enforce victims’ rights.3269 At a 
reconsideration hearing, the victim can exercise his/her right to address the 
court and this will affirm or void the previous order or ruling.3270 However, in 
some states, victims lack standing to ensure rights which cannot be exercised in 
criminal cases insofar as there is no voiding or reconsideration remedy 
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3262 Cassell and Joffee (2010) 171.  
3263 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a) (6). See also Cassell and Joffee (2010) 171, footnote 50.      
3264 United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 524-527 (6th Cir. 2004).   
3265 Kenna v. United States, Dist. C. for C. Dist. CA. 435 F.3d. 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2006).  
3266 Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 1981 (4th Cir. 1981).  
3267 United States v. Hunter 548 F. 3d 1308, 1316  (10th Cir. 2008). 
3268 Landon v. State, 1999 WL 46543 (No. A-6479 Alaska App. 1999).   
3269 See, e.g., Ford v. State 829 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Melissa J. V. Superior 
Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 5, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).  
3270 Douglas Beloof, ‘The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review’ 
(2005) Brigham Young University Law Review 255, 302. 
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available.3271 Finally, it should be mentioned that only two states provide for 
appellate review of a trial court’s violation of victims’ rights.3272 Therefore, other 
state courts have denied victim appeals against a final judgment as they are not 
parties and, therefore, lack standing to appeal.3273          
 
6.1.3. French Inquisitorial System 
The victim as civil party can appeal most of the decisions concerning his/her 
civil interests, in each stage of the proceeding, i.e., prosecution, instruction and 
judgment.3274 Concerning appeals against investigating judges’ orders, the civil 
party has more limited rights of appeal before the chambre de l’instruction than 
the accused but (s)he may still appeal against certain orders.3275 The civil party 
may appeal any investigating judge’s order which conflicts his/her civil interests; 
however, the civil party cannot appeal against orders regarding custody or 
conditions of bail.3276   
The civil party has the right to appeal:3277 i) the investigating judge’s 
decision on competence;3278 ii) admissibility of civil party constitution;3279 iii) 
medical or psychological examination upon a preliminary decision by the 
presiding judge of the chambre de l’instruction, and direct access to the court is 
provided;3280 iv) use of expert testimony, with direct access to the court 
provided;3281 v) additional expert testimony, ‘second opinion’ and number of 
experts appointed upon a preliminary decision by the presiding judge of the 
chambre de l’instruction, and direct access to the court is provided;3282 vi) 
hearing, questioning, hearing of a witness or confrontation upon preliminary 
decision by the presiding judge of the chambre de l’instruction, and direct access 
to the court is provided;3283 vii) transport to the scene of the crime upon a 
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3271 See, for further details, ibid., 312, 319.  
3272 As of 2005, Utah and Maryland. See Ibid., 322 (citing Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings § 11-103 b ‘A victim of violent crime […] may file an application for leave to appeal 
[…] from an interlocutory or final order […]’.   
3273 See, e.g., People v. Gansz, 888 P.2d 256, 257 (Colorado 1995).  
3274 Cario (2010) 10. 
3275 CPP, articles 186 and 186-1. 
3276 Ibid., article 186, para. 2.  
3277 See, in general, Dervieux (2002) 273.  
3278 CPP, article 186, para. 3. 
3279 Ibid., articles 87 and 186. 
3280 Ibid., articles 81 and 186-1.   
3281 Ibid., articles 156 and 186-1. 
3282 Ibid., articles 167 and 186-1.  
3283 Ibid., articles 82-1 and 186-1. 
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preliminary decision by the presiding judge of the chambre de l’instruction, and 
direct access to the court is provided;3284 viii) production of exhibit upon a 
preliminary decision by the presiding judge of the chambre de l’instruction, and 
direct access to the court is provided;3285 and ix) ruling on procedure for 
instruction (when there is a withdrawal of case) with direct access to the court 
provided.3286  
Concerning any decision by the tribunal correctionnel, and convictions 
and acquittals given by the cour d’assises, they may be subject of an appeal on the 
merits;3287 however, a civil party can only appeal decisions that affect his/her civil 
interests,3288 i.e., the civil party can appeal only in relation to his/her civil 
claim,3289 as seen in further detail later.3290 Concerning appeals to the Supreme 
Court (Cour de Cassation), only the civil claim can be affected if the civil party 
appeals,3291 which is similar to ordinary appeals.3292 This is different from the 
accused’s appeal which can affect not only the verdict and sentence but also the 
claim by the civil party.3293 In case of sentence appeal proceedings, the civil party 
can address his/her observations to the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de 
Cassation before this designates a new Cour d’assises.3294 In any case, since the 
Cour de Cassation is not a judge on merits, it may only overrule a decision 
provided that there has been an error of law.3295  
Reconsideration of conviction can only be requested by the convicted 
person or his/her heirs if the convicted has died or by the Minister of Justice in 
specific cases.3296 
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3284 Ibid., articles 82-1 and 186-1. 
3285 Ibid., articles 82-1 and 186-1. 
3286 Ibid., articles 175-1 and 186. 
3287 Dervieux (2002) 274. 
3288 As for felonies, see CPP, article 380-2 (4). See also article 380-4 to 380-8. As for misdemeanors, 
see CPP, articles 497 and 498. See also Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 321.   
3289 Dervieux (2002) 275.  
3290 See infra Chapter V 3.1.3.   
3291 CPP, articles 567, 568 and 573.  
3292 Dervieux (2002) 275. 
3293 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3294 See Cario (2010) 10.  
3295 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3296 CPP, articles 622 and 623. As an additional point, it should be mentioned that the civil party’s 
lawyer can intervene in the adversarial debate that takes place at the Application of Penalties 
Chamber, Appeals Chamber, concerning an appeal against a judgment rendered by the Tribunal of 
Application of Penalties. See CPP, article 712-13.  
	

6.2. The ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL 
Victims cannot bring appeals against the final decision since, according to those 
tribunals’ Statutes, this is only limited to parties to the criminal proceedings ‘The 
Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the Trial 
Chambers or from the Prosecutor […]’.3297 Concerning review proceedings of 
the judgment, victims are not entitled to them either.3298 As for interlocutory 
decisions, victims lack locus standi to bring interlocutory appeals, which is 
reserved to the parties to the proceedings.3299 Indeed, in an appellate decision, a 
detained witness from the proceedings in Tadić sought leave to appeal an ICTY 
Trial Chamber’s decision but his request was denied as the Appeals Chamber 
held that he lacked standing to invoke rule 72 (B) as this only allows ‘either 
party’ to bring appeal and rule 2 of the ICTY RPE defines ‘party’ as ‘the 
Prosecutor or the accused’.3300 The Appeals Chamber read these provisions in a 
strict manner and concluded that a detained witness was not a ‘party’ and, hence, 
lacks standing to appeal.3301 It reached this conclusion as ‘any another ruling 
would open up the Tribunal’s appeals procedure to non-parties-witnesses, 
counsel, amicus curiae, even members of the public when might nurse a 
grievance against a Decision of the Trial Chamber’.3302  
Due to the lack of status as victim participants or civil parties, victims 
cannot participate during appeals proceedings. The only manner of 
‘participation’ at those tribunals is as witnesses. The analysis of the status of 
victims as witnesses is referred to that conducted in the previous chapter.  
 
6.3. The ICC  
6.3.1. Appeals Against Judgment (Verdict), Sentence and Reparations Orders  
A decision of acquittal or conviction, or a sentence, can only be appealed by the 
Prosecutor or by the convicted person or the Prosecutor on behalf of the 
convicted.3303 In other words, the right of appeal against a judgment and sentence 
is only reserved to parties. Hence, since victims are not parties but participants, 
they cannot appeal those decisions. Indeed, in Lubanga, while the defence filed 
its notices of appeals against both the condemnatory judgment and the 
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3297 ICTY Statute, article 25 (1); ICTR Statute, article 24 (1); SCSL Statute, article 20 (1).  
3298 ICTY Statute, article 26; ICTR Statute, article 25; SCSL Statute, article 21. 
3299 ICTY RPE, rule 72 (B), ICTR RPE, rule 72 (B), SCSL, rule 73 (A).  
3300 Tadić (IT-94-1), In the Case of Dragan Opacic Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal, 
Appeals Chamber, 3 June 1997.  
3301 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3302 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3303 ICC Statute, article 81 ; ICC RPE, rules 150 et seq.  
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sentence,3304 the Prosecutor did so against the sentence.3305 In any case, victims 
can participate as victim participants in the respective appeals proceedings 
triggered by one or the two parties. Thus, the Appeals Chamber in the ongoing 
appeals proceedings against Trial Chamber I’s conviction and sentencing 
decisions (proceedings triggered by the Prosecution and the defence) in Lubanga 
found that:  
 
The victims who participated in the trial proceedings in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and whose right to participate in the proceedings as 
victims was not withdrawn, may, through their legal representatives, participate 
in the present appeal proceedings for the purpose of presenting their views and 
concems in respect of their personal interests in the issues on appeal.3306 
 
The Appeals Chamber in the same decision added that:   
 
4. […] 120 victims who participated in the trial proceedings and whose right to 
participate in the proceedings was not withdrawn may participate in the appeal 
proceedings against the Conviction Decision, as their personal interests are 
affected by the appeal in the same way as during trial. For the same reason, the 
120 victims who participated in the sentencing proceedings may participate in 
the appeal proceedings against the Sentencing Decision. 
5. […] victims may participate in the present appeals in the following manner: 
the Legal Representatives of Victims V01 and V02 may present the victims’ 
views and concerns with respect to their personal interests in the issues on 
appeal by filing consolidated observations on the three Documents in Support 
of the Appeals. […] Should the need arise to specify the modalities of victims’ 
participation in the pending appeals further, the Appeals Chamber will give 
supplementary information […]. 3307  
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3304 See respectively, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2934), Acte d’appel de la Défense de M. Thomas 
Lubanga à l’encontre du «Jugement rendu en Application de l’article 74 du Statut» rendu par la 
Chambre de Première Instance I le 14 Mars 2012, 3 October 2012; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2935), Acte d'appel de la Défense de M. Thomas Lubanga à l'encontre de la «Décision relative à la 
peine, rendue en application de l’article 76 du Statut » rendue par la Chambre de première instance 
I le 10 juillet 2012, 3 October 2012.     
3305 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2933), 3 October 2012.  
3306 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2951), Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeals 
Against Trial Chamber I's Conviction and Sentencing Decisions, Appeals Chamber, 13 December 
2012, p. 3 (1).  
3307 Ibid., paras. 4 and 5.  
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In Ngudjolo Chui, the Appeals Chamber followed the same approach 
and determined that victim participants who participated in the trial proceedings 
and whose victim participant status has not been revoked may participate 
through their legal representatives for the purpose of presenting their views and 
concerns in respect of their personal interests in the issues on appeal, which was 
lodged by the Prosecutor against Trial Chamber II’s judgment that acquitted the 
accused.3308 In Ngudjolo Chui, the Appeals Chamber determined that, until 
further specification is given later, victims’ modalities of participation include 
victims filing observations on the document in support of the appeal and the 
response to the document in support of the appeal.3309  
In turn, the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga assessed the admissibility of 
29 applications for participation that had not been assessed by either Pre-Trial 
Chamber I or Trial Chamber I, and 3 applications that had been rejected by the 
Trial Chamber because they were incomplete at that time.3310 The Appeals 
Chamber granted the victim participant status to most of those victim 
applicants.3311 Moreover, for example, victim participants’ legal representatives in 
Lubanga have filed their observations concerning the appeals against the 
judgment and sentence brought by the defence and Prosecutor.3312 
With regard to reparations orders, victims via their legal representatives 
can appeal reparations orders as provided by article 82 (4) of the ICC Statute:  
 
A legal representative of the victims, the convicted person or a bona fide owner 
of property adversely affected by an order under article 75 [Reparations to 
victims] may appeal against the order for reparations, as provided in the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.3313  
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3308 Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-30), Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal 
Against Trial Chamber II’s ”Judgment Rendu en Application de l’Article 74 du Statut”, Appeals 
Chamber, 6 March 2013, p. 3. The Appeals Chamber also determined that: ‘[…] the legal 
representatives shall have access to all confidential documents in the appeal proceedings, with the 
exclusion of all those documents classified as ex parte’. Ibid., para. 7.     
3309 Ibid., para. 5; Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-140), 23 September 2013, para. 18.  
3310 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3045), Decision on 32 Applications to Participate in the 
Proceedings, Appeals Chamber, 27 August 2013, paras. 13-166.  
3311 Ibid., Loc. cit. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3052), Decision on a/2922/11’s Application 
to Participate in the Appeals Proceedings, Appeals Chamber, 3 October 2013.  
3312 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2976), Observations Consolidées de l’équipe VO2 de 
Représentants Légaux de Victimes, sur les Appels Interjetés par la Défense et le Procureur contre le 
Jugement et la Sentence Rendus en Vertu des Articles 74 et 76 du Statut de Rome, V02 Team of 
Legal Representatives of Victims, 7 February 2013.  
3313 See also ICC RPE, rules 149-158.  
	

Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber ‘may confirm, reverse or amend a 
reparation order made under article 75’.3314 The existence of this specific 
provision arguably confirms that victims have no general standing to appeal 
decisions by the ICC, excepted for the reparations order.3315 Although appeals 
concerning reparations orders are analyzed in further detail in the next 
chapter,3316 some general considerations are fleshed out herein.      
Concerning the Decision establishing the principles and procedures to 
be applied to reparations in Lubanga, adopted by Trial Chamber I,3317 V01 victim 
group’s legal representative and also V02 victim group’s legal representative 
together with the OPCV appealed it,3318 since they considered it to be a 
reparations order under article 82 (4).3319 However, the Trial Chamber 
considered that its decision was not a reparations order but only an interlocutory 
decision that could not be appealed by victims’ legal representatives:  
 
The Chamber repeats and emphasises that the Decision of 7 August 2012 does 
not constitute an “order for reparations” in the sense of Article 82(4), given 
reparations were not ordered in the Decision. Rather, the Decision establishes 
principles and procedures relating to reparations, pursuant to Article 75 (1). On 
this basis, Article 82(1)(d) is the correct legal basis for the defence request.3320  
   
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga, upon requesting and 
receiving observations from the victims’ legal representatives to in limine, inter 
 
3314 Ibid., rule 153 (1). 
3315 Schabas (2010) 949; Robert Roth and Marc Henzelin, ‘The Appeal Procedure of the ICC’ in 
Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (2002) 1535, 1542.  
3316 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.4.  
3317 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be 
Applied to Reparations, Trial Chamber I, 7 August 2012. 
3318 See, respectively, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2914), Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s Decision 
establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparation of 7 August 2012, V01 Team 
of Legal Representatives of Victims, 3 September 2012; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2909), Appeal 
against Trial Chamber I’s Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to 
reparation of 7 August 2012, Office of Public Counsel for Victims and V02 Team of Legal 
Representatives of Victims, 24 August 2012.  
3319 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2914), 3 September 2012, para. 5; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2907), Réponse conjointe à la « Requête de la Défense Sollicitant l’autorisation d’interjeter Appel 
de la «Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparation» Rendue le 
7 Août 2012”, Office of Public Counsel for Victims and V02 Team of Legal Representatives of 
Victims, 17 August 2012, paras. 12-15. 
3320 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2911), Decision on the Defence Request for Leave to Appeal the 
Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations, Trial Chamber 
I, 29 August 2012, para. 20.  
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alia, determine the nature of the decision in question, concluded that the Trial 
Chamber I’s reparations decision is actually a reparations order: 
 
[…] the Impugned Decision, as is apparent from its title consists of two parts. 
First, it establishes principles relating to reparations as referred to in article 75 
(1) of the Statute. Second, it sets out, in a comparatively short part, the 
“procedure” to be applied in relation to reparations. It is this latter part of the 
Impugned Decision that persuades the Appeals Chamber, for the reasons that 
follow, that the Impugned Decision should be deemed to be an order for 
reparations and recourse may therefore be had to article 82 (4) of the Statute.3321   
 
As examined later, reparations claimants appealed the reparations 
decision in question in Lubanga.3322 In any case, when a reparations decision is 
not considered a reparations order, victim participants can participate voicing 
their views and concerns in the respective interlocutory decision appeals 
proceedings triggered by one of the parties but not to appeal as such the 
respective interlocutory decision since victims’ legal representatives can only 
appeal a reparations order.3323   
Finally, rule 159 (3) of the ICC RPE lays down that notification of a 
decision on an application for revision, which is an exceptional remedy and 
applicable only to conviction or sentence,3324 ‘shall be sent to the applicant and, 
as far as possible, to all the parties who participated in the proceedings related to 
the initial decision’.3325 Although victims would in principle not need to be 
notified and/or able to participate in a revision hearing, it could be argued that 
the ICC may notify victims and seek their views and concerns,3326 which can be 
sustained under rule 86 and the travaux préparatoires of the ICC.3327  
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3321 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), Decision on the Admissibility of the Appeals Against Trial 
Chamber I’s “Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations” 
and Directions on the Further Conduct of Proceedings, Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2012, 
para. 51. 
3322 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.3 and Chapter V 3.3.1.4.    
3323 See also infra Chapter V 3.3.1.4.   
3324 See ICC, article 84 (1) (establishing the grounds for revision, namely, new evidence discovered, 
decisive evidence resulted to be forged or falsified, or serious misconduct or breach of function 
from Judges who participated in the conviction or confirmation of charges).  
3325 See also ICC RPE, rule 161 (Determination on revision).  
3326 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 306-307.  
3327 ICC RPE, rule 86 (‘A Chamber in making any direction or order […] shall take into account 
the needs of all victims and witnesses’.). As for travaux préparatoires, the French delegation 
proposed that all participants from the trial should be able to participate although this was later 
modified leading to the current text. See Proposal submitted by France, 
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6.3.2. Appeals Against Other Decisions (Interlocutory Appeals)   
It must be first mentioned that only parties, i.e., the Prosecutor and the defence, 
can appeal interlocutory decisions.3328 Even though victim participants cannot 
appeal interlocutory decisions as such, they can still voice their views and 
concerns during interlocutory appeals proceedings. Victims who wish to 
participate in an interlocutory appeal need to file their application as soon as 
possible and, in any situation, before the date of filing of the responses to the 
document in support of the appeal.3329 To participate, a victim must demonstrate 
that his/her personal interests are affected by the issues on appeal and the 
Appeals Chamber has to establish that such participation is appropriate.3330 
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber is not automatically bound by previous 
determinations of the other Chambers concerning the appropriateness of 
participation.3331   
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber evaluates each application under 
article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute and, therefore, considers whether the victim 
participants meet the following requirements: i) whether the individuals seeking 
participation are victims in the respective case; ii) whether they have personal 
interests affected by the issues on appeal; iii) whether their participation is 
appropriate; and iv) that the manner of participation is not prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the accused’s rights.3332 This same determination is applicable 
in interlocutory appeals that arise in the investigation stage of a situation.3333 
Those applicants who have not been granted the victim participant status will be 
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PCNICC/1999/WRGPE/DP.13 (19 July 1999). See also Gilbert Bitti and Silvia Fernández de 
Gurmendi, ‘Revision of Conviction or Sentence’ in Lee (2001) 596, 600-602.      
3328 ICC Statute, article 82. It should be mentioned that the decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
authorizing the Prosecutor to take specific investigate steps without having secured the State’s 
cooperation can also be appealed by the State concerned. See ICC Statute, article 82 (2).   
3329 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1335), Decision in Limine, on Victim Participation in the Appeals 
of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision Entitled ‘Decision on 
Victims’ Participation’, Appeals Chamber, 16 May 2008, para 12.  
3330 Ibid., para. 35.  
3331 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3332 Ibid., para 36. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-824), 13 February 2007, para. 43; Katanga  
(ICC-01/04-01/07-3346), Decision on the Application of Victims to Participate in the Appeal 
Against Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of 
the Court, Appeals Chamber, 17 January 2013, para. 6.   
3333 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-503), Decision on Victim Participation in the Appeal of the 
Office of Public Counsel for the Defence against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 24 December 
2007, Appeals Chamber, 30 June 2008, para. 89.   
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denied the right to participate in appeals proceedings, i.e., the Appeals Chamber 
does not conduct rule 85 assessments.3334 
Under article 82 (1) (b) of the ICC Statute, either party, i.e., Prosecutor 
and defence, can appeal a decision that grants or denies the release of an 
individual investigated or prosecuted. Victims who wish to participate in this 
type of appeal must file an application seeking leave to participate, i.e., victims 
do not hold an automatic right to participate but they need to show how their 
personal interests are affected, and also why it is appropriate for the Appeals 
Chamber to allow victims’ views and concerns to be presented.3335 For further 
analysis of victims’ participation in this sort of appeals, see also discussion 
previously conducted.3336     
Under article 82 (1) (d) of the ICC Statute:  
 
Either party may appeal any of the following decisions […] 
A decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and 
expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for 
which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate 
resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings 
[emphasis added]. 
 
As seen, there is only reference to parties, not participants. The same 
goes true with rule 155 (Appeals that require leave of the Court), which in 
referring to article 82 (1) (d) only mentions parties. However, under regulation 
65 (Appeals under rule 155) of the Regulations of the Court, victim participants 
are granted the right to file responses for leave to appeal and substantive appeals 
as well as a limited right to be heard when the competent Chamber ordered an 
immediate hearing on an application seeking leave to appeal.3337 The ICC Statute 
and RPE permit arguing for a broad victim participatory regime; however, it may 
be sustained that the drafters intentionally wished to restrict the access to 
interlocutory appeals,3338 as they may cause delay and, hence, negatively impact 
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3334 Ibid., para. 93. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1335), 16 May 2008, para. 40 (‘The Appeals 
Chamber will not embark on determining the status of these victims as ordinarily, for 
interlocutory appeals it would not itself make first hand determinations with respect to the status 
of victims’.).  
3335 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), 13 June 2007, para 23. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
824), 13 February 2007, paras. 1 and 38. See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 305.     
3336 See supra Chapter IV 3.3.3.2.  
3337 Regulations of the Court, regulation 65 (3). See also regulation 65 (1). 
3338 Helen Brady, ‘Appeal’ in Lee (2001b) 575, 595.    
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on the accused’s rights.3339 Indeed, the ICC instruments, as seen, are not totally 
clear whether victim participants have the automatic right to participate in 
interlocutory appeals. Even though victims cannot appeal and present arguments 
against the accused to the Chamber according to the ICC instruments,3340 
whether they can share their views and concerns with the Appeals Chamber in 
cases when a request for leave to appeal is given to one party was considered less 
clear.3341  
Be that as it may, the Appeals Chamber found that its decision whereby 
victims need to file an application seeking leave to participate in appeals under 
article 82 (1) (b), is also applicable to article 82 (1) (d) appeals.3342 Actually, for 
the purpose of appeals under rule 155, the Appeals Chamber does not interpret 
the reference to ‘participant’ within regulation 65 (5) to mean that victims can 
automatically participate in appeals proceedings under article 82 (1) (d).3343 
Nevertheless, the ICC has also noted that a party’s request for leave to appeal 
under article 82 (1) (d) of the Statute constitutes the only remedy of a general 
nature by which victim participants can voice their concerns regarding a 
Chamber’s decision.3344 
Victims who wish to participate in an article 82 (1) (d) appeal must file 
an application seeking leave to participate in such appeal. Besides demonstrating 
that: i) the impugned decision involves an issue that would significantly affect 
the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial; 
and that ii) the impugned decision requires an immediate resolution by the 
Appeals Chamber so as to materially advance proceedings; according to the 
Appeals Chamber, the application ought to include a statement explaining how 
the victim’s personal interests are affected and why it is appropriate for the 
Appeals Chamber to allow the presentation of their views and concerns during 
this stage of the proceedings and why the presentation of those views and 
concerns would not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
defence.3345    
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3339 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 304.  
3340 See Jorda and Hemptinne (2002) 1406.  
3341 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3342 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1335), 16 May 2008, para. 13. 
3343 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-503), 30 June 2008, para. 34.  
3344 Kony et al. (ICC-02/04-01/05-219), Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for Leave to Appeal 
the Decision Denying the “Application to Lift Redactions from Applications for Victims’ 
Participation to be Provided to the OTP”’, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), 9 March 2007, p. 3.   
3345 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-481), Order of the Appeals Chamber on the Date of Filing of 
Applications for Participation and on the Time of the Filing of the Responses Thereto by the 
OPCD and the Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, 29 February 2008, pp. 2-3. See also Situation in 
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In his separate opinions in Appeals Chamber’s decisions, Judge Song has 
sustained that if victims participated in pre-trial or trial proceedings leading to 
an appeal, their participation on the appeals proceedings is pertinent.3346 Judge 
Van den Wyngaert has followed a similar approach and has additionally argued 
that victim participants hold the right to file submissions under regulation 65 (5) 
as they participated in proceedings which originated the appeal.3347 Therefore, 
according to both Judges, victims would not need to apply to participate in the 
interlocutory appeal.3348  
Be that as it may, the Appeals Chamber has stressed the need to ensure 
fair and expeditious proceedings by limiting the observations submitted by 
victim participants in interlocutory appeals and, thus, requiring that those 
submissions be specifically relevant to the issues that arise in the appeal and 
affect their personal interests.3349 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber has asked the 
victim participants’ legal representatives to file consolidated briefs paying 
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Darfur (ICC-02/05-129), Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the OPCV’s Request for 
Clarification and Order of the Appeals Chamber on the Date of Filing of Applications for 
Participation and on the Time of the Filing of the Responses Thereto by the OPCD and the 
Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, 29 February 2008, p. 3.  
3346 See, e.g., Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-2124), Decision on the Participation of 
Victims in the Appeal of Mr. Katanga against the ‘Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial’, Appeals Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Song, 24 May 2010, p. 8; 
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1335), Decision in Limine, on Victim Participation in the Appeals of 
the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision Entitled ‘Decision on Victims’ 
Participation’, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Song, 16 May 2008, paras. 3-7; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-824), Dissenting Opinion by Judge Song, 13 February 2007, paras. 2-8. 
3347 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2205), Judgment on the Appeals of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 Entitled ‘Decision Giving 
Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterization of the Facts may be Subject to 
Change in Accordance with Regulation 55 (2) of the Regulations of the Court’, Appeals Chamber, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Song and Judge Van Der Wyngaert, 8 December 2009, p. 43. 
3348 Additionally, although it was suggested that victim participants should be allowed to appeal a 
decision on protective measures (under a flexible interpretation of article 82 (1) (d)), the same 
author acknowledged very important pragmatic problems due to the high volume of victims at the 
ICC. Brady (2001b) 596.  
3349 See, e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1452), Decision on the Participation of Victims in the 
Appeal, Appeals Chamber, 6 August 2008, para. 12; Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-138), 
Decision on Victim Participation in the Appeal of the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense 
against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 3 December 2007 and in the Appeals of the Prosecutor 
and the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 6 
December 2007, Appeals Chamber, 18 June 2008, paras. 60 and 62. 
	

attention to the similarity, number and complexities of issues in an interlocutory 
appeal.3350  
On another note, the version in English of the ICC RPE refers to 
notifying a ‘party’ or ‘parties’ in the proceedings giving rise to the appeal.3351 
However, based on considerations of fairness, the versions in French and 
Spanish which refer to ‘all those who participated in the proceedings’, and 
consistency with rule 92 (Notification to victims and their legal representatives), 
victim participants should be notified.3352 Finally, it is relevant to notice that the 
ICC Statute and RPE do not provide victims with a possibility to challenge the 
Trial Chamber’s decision to withdraw their victim participant status.3353 Also, 
those who are applying to participate as victim participants cannot appeal a 
decision rejecting such application.3354 Nevertheless, those applicants may submit 
a new application under rule 89 (2) as previously seen.3355 In turn, victim 
participants may ask for the review of certain administrative decisions, e.g., 
should victims be dissatisfied with the registrar’s choice of common legal 
representative, they may request the Chamber to review the decision.3356 
Nonetheless, when a Judge or a Chamber appoints a common legal 
representative, such review option is not applicable.3357  
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3350 Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC-01/04-503), 30 June 2008, paras. 101-102. 
3351 ICC RPE, rules 151, 155 and 156. 
3352 See also Brady (2001b) 595.  
3353 In Lubanga, the OPCV requested Trial Chamber I to reconsider its decision to withdraw the 
status of four victim participants, but the Chamber rejected it in limine. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2846), Order Refusing a Request for Reconsideration, Trial Chamber, 27 March 2012.   
3354 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-418), Decision on the Requests of the OPCV, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I (Single Judge), 10 December 2007, para. 16. 
3355 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.2.1. 
3356 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 79 (3).  
3357 Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-330), 9 September 2011, paras. 13-15. See also Brouwer and 
Heikkilä (2013) 1331. In addition, it should be mentioned that ‘According to the Appeals 
Chamber’s jurisprudence on the participation of victims in appeals under articles 19(6) and 
82(1)(a) of the Statute, victims who made observations according to article 19(3) of the Statute and 
rule 59(3) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the proceedings before the Pre-Trial or Trial 
Chamber may submit observations before the Appeals Chamber’. Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-236 
OA2), Direction on the Submissions of the Observations, Appeals Chamber, 31 August 2012, para. 
3.   
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6.4. The ECCC and the STL 
6.4.1. Appeals Against Judgment, Sentence and Reparation Orders  
6.4.1.1. The ECCC 
With regard to the ECCC, the Supreme Court Chamber has jurisdiction over 
appeals against the three kinds of decisions enumerated in the heading of this 
sub-section as well as over other decisions provided that they were issued by the 
Trial Chamber.3358 In the next sub-section, special attention is drawn to appeals 
against interlocutory decisions by Co-Investigating Judges, which fall under the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s jurisdiction. Under internal rule 104 (1), the Supreme 
Court Chamber can admit appeals against a Trial Chamber’s judgment or a 
decision based on the following grounds:  
 
a) an error on a question of law invalidating the judgment or decision; or  
b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 
[…] 
For these purposes, the Supreme Court Chamber may itself examine evidence 
and call new evidence to determine the issue.   
 
According to the current text of internal rule 105 (1): 
  
An appeal against the Trial Chamber judgment may be filed by […] c) The Civil 
Parties may appeal the decision on reparations. Where the Co-Prosecutors have 
appealed, the Civil Parties may appeal the verdict. They [civil parties] may not 
appeal the sentence.   
 
In application of internal rule 105 (1), the Co-Prosecutors in Duch filed 
an appeal against the sentence, referring to it as ‘plainly unjust’ and ‘manifestly 
inadequate’.3359 Civil parties, unable to appeal the sentence, and in application of 
a previous version of this rule,3360 had two appealable issues, namely the 
revocation of their civil party status and the reparations order. Although it was 
not completely clear what proceedings should be applicable to appeals on civil 
party status determination,3361 the Supreme Court Chamber decided to consider 
them as appeals against the judgment.3362 Civil party groups 1, 2 and 3 filed 
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3358 See ECCC Internal Rules, section F ‘Appeals from the Trial Chamber’, rules 104 et seq.  
3359 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Co-Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Judgment of the 
Trial Chamber in the Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias ‘Duch’, 13 October 2010, paras. 5 and 8. 
3360 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 105 (1) (c) (Rev. 3); ECCC Internal Rules, rule 105 (1) (c) (Rev. 6).  
3361 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 203. 
3362 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision on Characterization of Group 1 – Civil Party 
Co-Lawyers’ Immediate Appeal of Civil Party Status Determination in the Trial Judgment, 
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appeals and one of the lawyers of civil party group 4 joined the group 2’s 
filing.3363 Whereas group 1 solely filed an appeal against the rejection of the civil 
party status of their clients,3364 groups 2 and 3 appealed not only the revocation 
of the civil party status of their clients but also the reparations order.3365 
Examination of the Supreme Court Chamber’s relevant findings follows, in 
particular, those concerning revocation of the civil party status.   
As mentioned previously,3366 the Supreme Court Chamber considered 
that any prejudice inflicted on the civil parties appealing the revocation of their 
status ‘has been cured by the opportunity they have had on appeal to submit 
additional evidence to satisfy the Supreme Court Chamber that they qualify as 
civil parties under the Internal Rules’.3367 The Supreme Court Chamber evaluated 
civil party applications under the standard of appellate review, on factual 
matters, for example, its task consisted in determining whether the Trial 
Chamber’s application of the ‘more likely than not to be true’ standard of proof 
for applications of civil parties used when ordering the reparations in the 
judgment was unreasonable.3368 The Supreme Court Chamber considered 
whether the appellants’ statements ‘contain the necessary degree of particularity 
and authenticity to make it credible in the circumstances of the case’.3369 The 
Supreme Court Chamber lent high credibility to civil parties’ statements, due to 
their lack of individual financial interest, provided that they were consistent and 
complete; however, it referred to the Trial Chamber’s credibility evaluation when 
the civil party had been directly heard.3370 Additionally, the Supreme Court 
Chamber examined the civil party appellants’ statements connected with official 
and private (unofficial) documents included in the case file and also those 
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Supreme Court Chamber, 30 September 2010, p. 4. See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 
Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 511. 
3363 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 208.   
3364 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Group 1-Civil Parties’ Co-Lawyers’ Immediate Appeal 
of Civil Party Status Determinations from the Final Judgment, Civil Party Group 1, 14 September 
2010. 
3365 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal against Rejection of Civil Party Applicants in 
the Judgment, Civil Party Group 2, F13, 2 November 2010; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 
Appeal of the Co-Lawyers for the Group 3 Civil Parties against the Judgment of 26 July 2010, Civil 
Party Group 3, 5 October 2010 (Filed in English on 10 November 2010).          
3366 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.1.1.  
3367 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 534.  
3368 Ibid., para. 536. 
3369 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3370 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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submitted by the parties during the appeal hearing.3371 In individually applying 
these criteria to the situation of each civil party who got and appealed the 
revocation of their status, the Supreme Court Chamber reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s decision to revoke civil party status in the case of 10 out of 23 civil 
party appellants.3372        
Concerning appeals against the reparations order contained in the 
judgment in Duch, consideration on substantive issues are examined in detail in 
the next chapter.3373 However, it should be mentioned herein that in their 
submissions, civil party group 2 articulated extensive submissions on 
reparations, requesting in its notice of appeal and on its appeal on reparations 
that the Supreme Court Chamber overturns the Trial Chamber’s rejection of its 
nine reparations requests and, hence, grant those claims fully.3374 Civil party 
group 3 also requested to be granted the appellant’s original claims for 
reparations before the Trial Chamber and refused in the Trial judgment.3375 
Broadly speaking, those civil party groups claimed that: i) the ECCC is 
empowered to grant reparations measures requiring assistance of Cambodia to 
be implemented; ii) Duch’s indigence should not prevent the ECCC from issuing 
reparations orders; and iii) the Trial Chamber committed an error of law by 
grouping the reparations requests and disposing of them without explicitly 
explaining which request is addressed under each group.3376 As said, analysis of 
legal issues under these grounds is conducted in detail in the next chapter.   
It is important to mention that the Supreme Court Chamber found its 
powers to be exercised within the limits of the issues appealed.3377 Therefore, civil 
parties alleging an error of law have to identify the alleged error, present 
arguments supporting such allegation and explain how the error invalidates the 
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3371 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3372 See Ibid., paras. 537-629.  
3373 See infra Chapter V 3.4.2.2 and 4.4.2.1. 
3374 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Notice of Appeal of Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties 
(Group 2) on the Reparation Order, Civil Party Group 2, E188/14, 6 September 2010, para. 9; 
Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal against Judgment on Reparations by Co-Lawyers 
for Civil Parties – Group 2, Civil Party Group 2, F13, 2 November 2010, paras. 8 and 130. 
3375 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Notice of Appeal by the Co-Lawyers for Civil Party 
Group 3, E188/4, 20 August 2010, paras. 26-27; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal of 
the Co-Lawyers for the Group 3 Civil Parties against the Judgment of 26 July 2010, F9, 5 October 
2010, paras. 107-108.  
3376 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, paras. 634-637. 
3377 Ibid., para. 15.  
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trial judgment in application of internal rule 105 (3).3378 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court Chamber also added that:  
 
[…] the burden of proof on appeal is not absolute with regard to errors of law. 
Even if the party’s arguments [civil party’s arguments] are insufficient to 
support the contention of an error of law, the Supreme Court Chamber may 
find other reasons and come to the same conclusion, holding that there is an 
error of law.3379   
 
Be that as it may, a party, civil party included, which wishes to appeal a 
judgment must file a notice of appeal establishing the grounds.3380 Subsequently, 
the appellant has to file an appeal brief setting out the arguments and authorities 
in support of each of the appeal grounds, specifically referring to the page and 
paragraph numbers of the Trial Chamber’s decision.3381  
Concerning appeals against Trial Chamber’s appealable decisions, both 
judgment and (where applicable) other decisions, i.e., interlocutory decisions, it 
is pertinent to make some additional precisions. First, the Trial Chamber’s 
Greffier needs to immediately notify all other parties and their lawyers in case of 
the filing of an appeal or an immediate appeal.3382 Second, the civil parties ‘shall 
be represented by the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers’.3383 Third, civil parties’ 
lawyers may examine the case file at any time before the appeals hearing and 
they ‘may submit any pleadings for the appeal to the Greffier of the Chamber as 
provided in the Practice Direction on filing of documents’.3384 Fourth, parties, 
civil parties included, cannot raise matters of fact or law during an appeal 
hearing ‘not previously set out in their submissions on appeal’.3385 Fifth, civil 
parties on appeal cannot introduce new claims which were not submitted to the 
Trial Chamber.3386 Sixth, civil parties ‘may submit a request to the Chamber for 
additional evidence provided it was unavailable at trial and could have been a 
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3378 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3379 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3380 ECCC Internal Rule, rule 105 (3) (this provision also states that ‘The notice shall, in respect of 
each ground of appeal, specify the alleged errors of law invalidating the decision and alleged errors 
of fact which occasioned a miscarriage of justice’.).    
3381 Ibid., rule 105 (4). 
3382 Ibid., rule 106 (1). 
3383 Ibid., rule 106 (3). 
3384 Ibid., rule 108 (6). 
3385 Ibid., rule 109 (6).  
3386 Ibid., rule 110 (5).  
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decisive factor in reaching a decision at trial’.3387 In the appeals proceedings in 
Duch, some civil parties’ requests for additional evidence were accepted.3388 
Civil parties participated via submissions directly related to the 
conviction during appeals proceedings in Duch. Thus, for example, Civil Parties 
Group 3 filed submissions responding to alleged errors on personal jurisdiction, 
which was ground 1 of the defence appeal.3389 Finally, the extraordinary remedy 
of revision of a condemnatory final judgment, is only reserved to the accused or 
the Co-Prosecutors on his/her behalf.3390 Therefore, there is no reference to civil 
parties and, at least explicitly, no reference to some civil parties’ participation.  
 
6.4.1.2. The STL 
With regard to the STL, according to article 17 of its Statute ‘Where the personal 
interests of the victims are affected, the Special Tribunal shall permit their views 
and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings 
determined to be appropriate by the Pre-Trial Judge or the Chamber […]’. Rule 
87 (D) develops this provision by laying down that ‘At the appeal stage, subject 
to the authorisation of the Appeals Chamber, after hearing the Parties, a victim 
participating in proceedings may participate in a manner deemed appropriate by 
the Appeals Chamber’. Accordingly, both the STL Statute and RPE recognize the 
possibility for victims to have some participation in the appeals stage. This 
includes participation during proceedings relating to appeal of the judgment 
(verdict) and sentence (the STL lacks the power to order a reparations order) as 
well as during interlocutory appeals.  
What has to be left clear in this subsection is that victim participants 
cannot appeal the Trial Chamber’s judgment (verdict) or the sentence as rule 177 
(B) only mentions ‘a party’, i.e., the Prosecutor and the defence, as holders of this 
specific right.3391 This limitation was explicitly stressed by the former President 
of the STL, Antonio Cassese.3392 Be that as it may, according to the STL RPE, the 
appeal judgment must not only be pronounced in public but also ‘on a date of 
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3387 Ibid., rule 108. 
3388 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Decision to File Additional Evidence Admitted by Oral 
Decision of the Chamber during the Appeal Hearing, Supreme Court Chamber, 1 April 2011.  
3389 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 25. 
3390 After the accused’s death, his/her relatives or a person authorized in writing can exercise this 
remedy. See ECCC Internal Rules, rule 112.  
3391 STL RPE, rule 177 (B) (‘Following a Judgement of conviction pursuant to Rule 168, a Party 
seeking to appeal either the Judgement or the sentence shall be permitted to file a notice of appeal 
following the pronouncement of the sentence pursuant to Rule 171’.). 
3392 STL President (2010), para. 17. See also STL President (2012), para. 17. 
		

which notice shall have been given to the Parties and to the victims participating 
in the proceedings, and at which they shall be entitled to be present’.3393 Finally, 
as for a request for review of a final judgment, there is only mention to parties, 
not victim participants.3394 Nor is there explicitly contemplated victims’ 
participation.  
 
6.4.2. Appeals Against Other Decisions (Interlocutory Appeals) 
6.4.2.1. The ECCC   
Under internal rule 74 (4) civil parties may appeal against some orders issued by 
the Co-Investigating Judges before the Pre-Trial Chamber, which are the 
following:  
 
a) refusing requests for investigative action allowed under these Rules;  
b) declaring a Civil Party application inadmissible;  
c) refusing requests for the restitution of seised property;  
d) refusing requests for expert reports allowed under these IRs;  
e) refusing requests for further expert investigation allowed under these IRs;  
f) a Dismissal Order where the Co-Prosecutors have appealed;  
g) refusing an application to seise the Chamber for annulment of investigative 
action; or  
h) relating to protective measures.      
 
Civil parties (unlike the Co-Prosecutors and the accused) are not allowed 
to appeal against Co-Investigating Judges’ orders or decisions confirming the 
ECCC’s jurisdiction.3395 As for appeals proceedings before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, it may ‘after considering the views of the parties, decide to determine 
an appeal or application on the basis of written submissions of the parties 
only’.3396 Civil parties have not been granted permission to speak in person.3397  
Concerning inadmissibility of civil party applications since originally the 
Trial Chamber was also competent to determine their admissibility, the 
respective appeals could also take place at the Supreme Court Chamber as 
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3393 STL RPE, rule 188 (D).  
3394 Ibid., rule 190.  
3395 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 74. 
3396 Ibid., rule 77 (3). 
3397 See Brianne McGonigle Leyh, ‘Two for the Price of One: Attempts by the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to Combine Retributive and Restorative Justice Principles’ 
(2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 127, 143; Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1332.    
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occurred in Duch.3398 Currently, the respective appeals take place before the Pre-
Trial Chamber.3399 For example, in Nuon Chea et al., civil parties’ co-lawyers filed 
appeals for those civil party applicants who had been found inadmissible and 
these appeals were filed within the time limits established by the Internal Rules 
or under the specific directions of the Pre-Trial Chamber.3400 Civil parties’ co-
lawyers requested the Pre-Trial Chamber to overturn the impugned orders with 
respect to the applicants and admit them as civil parties.3401 The co-lawyers 
alleged errors in law: i) on lack of specific reason for rejecting civil party 
applications; ii) application of the wrong criteria in the determination on the 
causal link; and iii) restrictive application of the term ‘injury’.3402 The co-lawyers 
also claimed lack of due diligence by the Co-Investigating Judges.3403 The Pre-
Trial Chamber ‘Considering the totality and significance of the errors […]’ 
decided to ‘judge the rejected Civil Party applications before it afresh, taking into 
account […] any supplementary material filed by the Appellants’.3404 An 
important number of victims, whose civil party applications were rejected by the 
Co-Investigating Judges, got civil party status granted by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
overruling the previous decision accordingly.3405 Under internal rule 77 bis, 
appeals ‘regarding the admissibility of Civil Party applications […] shall be 
considered expeditiously on the basis of written submissions alone’. On another 
note, as discussed in detail, although civil parties cannot participate in the 
adversarial hearings on provisional detention, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that 
civil parties’ lawyers could participate in appeals against provisional 
detention.3406   
For immediate appeal before the Supreme Court Chamber against a 
Trial Chamber’s decision, besides error of law and error of fact, a ground may be 
based on a discernible error in the exercise of the Trial Chamber’s discretion 
resulting in prejudice to the appellant,3407 and the Supreme Court Chamber ‘may 
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3398 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 511.  
3399 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3400 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, para. 20.     
3401 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3402 Ibid. paras. 37-50.  
3403 Ibid., paras 51-54. 
3404 Ibid., para. 55. As for rejected appeals against inadmissibility of a civil party application, see, 
e.g., Case 003, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the Appeal Against Order on 
the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicant, Pre-Trial Chamber, 28 February 2012.  
3405 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, pp. 51-55.  
3406 See supra Chapter IV 3.4.2.1.  
3407 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 104 (1). 
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itself examine evidence and call new evidence to determine the issue.3408 The 
following Trial Chamber’s decisions are subject to immediate appeal:  
 
a) decisions which have the effect of terminating the proceedings;  
b) decisions on detention and bail under Rule 82;  
c) decisions on protective measures under Rule 29(4)(c); and  
d) decisions on interference with the administration of justice under Rule 
35(6).3409  
 
As the Supreme Court Chamber clarified in Duch ‘immediate appeals’ 
under the provision quoted applies to decisions made by the Trial Chamber 
during trial proceedings as opposed to the concept of ‘against the judgment’ 
which applies to decisions contained in the Trial Chamber’s judgment.3410 
Indeed, internal rule 104 establishes that ‘Other decisions may be appealed only 
at the same time as an appeal against the judgment on the merits’. A party, civil 
party included, wishing to appeal a Trial Chamber’s decision, where immediate 
appeal is available ‘shall file an immediate appeal setting out the grounds of 
appeal and arguments in support thereof’.3411 Moreover, although the Supreme 
Court Chamber’s hearing shall be conducted in public, it ‘may decide to 
determine immediate appeals on the basis of written submissions only [i.e., civil 
parties’ written submissions]’.3412 
 
6.4.2.2. The STL  
The STL Appeals Chamber in Ayyash et al. determined that there is a narrow 
right to an interlocutory appeal of the victim participants ‘in strictly confined 
circumstances and only after obtaining certification’,3413 and this right is not 
automatic.3414 It is herein agreed on this Appeals Chamber’s finding, which is 
based on the following arguments. First, there is certain ambiguity in the STL 
RPE, in particular, rule 126 (Motions Requiring Certification) as whereas rule 
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3408 Ibid., rule 104, last paragraph. 
3409 Ibid., rule 104 (4). 
3410 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Supreme Court Chamber, 30 September 2010, para. 3. 
3411 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 105 (2) (this provision also lays down that ‘In respect of each ground 
of appeal it shall: a) specify an alleged error on a question of law and demonstrate how it 
invalidates the decision; or b) specify a discernible error in the exercise of the Trial Chamber’s 
discretion which results in prejudice to the appellant; or c) specify an alleged error of fact and 
demonstrate how it occasioned a miscarriage of justice’.). 
3412 Ibid., rule 109 (1).  
3413 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, para. 9. 
3414 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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126 (A) refers to ‘all motions’, which may presumably include motions filed not 
only by the parties but also by the victim participants’ legal representatives if 
authorized to do so, rules 126 (B) and (E) refer to ‘a Party’ that may appeal.3415 
Although rule 126 is based on the nearly identical rule 73 of the ICTY RPE, the 
key difference is that at the STL victims can participate in the proceedings unlike 
the situation at the ICTY.3416 Second, the RPE do not contain any general 
provision that would exclude a victim participant’s right to lodge interlocutory 
appeals: 
 
On the contrary, Rule 86 (C) grants an appeal as of right to any unsuccessful 
applicant for the status of VPP [victim participant] against the decision of the 
Pre-Trial Judge denying them that status. Moreover, Rule 86 (D) specifically 
prohibits appeals against decisions relating to the grouping of victims in the 
proceedings. Argumentun e contrario, if the drafters of the Rules had believed 
that VPPs did not have a general right to file interlocutory appeals, the express 
prohibition of Rule 86 (D) in relation to one specific matter would not have 
been necessary. In sum, the Rules do not contain any general prohibition of 
interlocutory appeals by VPPs but do permit appeals by persons seeking to 
participate as VPPs.3417   
 
Third, based both on a reading and application of article 17 of the STL 
Statute (Rights of victims) as this is applicable to all stages of the proceedings 
and that victim participants’ legal representative are allowed to file motions or 
briefs on an issue that affects the victim participants’ personal interests, it should 
be allowed to appeal a decision on victim participants provided that the 
certification threshold under rule 126 is met.3418  
The STL Appeals Chamber has determined a narrow right to appeal 
interlocutory decisions for victim participants, limited to very specific situations 
that fundamentally affect their personal interests:  
 
[…] for the purposes of whether VPPs [victim participants] have standing to 
seek appellate review of interlocutory first instance decisions, we hold that such 
personal interests must necessarily be limited to situations where the VPPs’ own 
interests as participants in the proceedings are fundamentally concerned. We 
can discern three such specific situations: 
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3416 See Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3417 Ibid., para. 13. 
3418 Ibid., para. 14. 
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• Decisions on applications for status as a VPP (a right to appeal is already 
provided for under Rule 86 (C). 
• Decisions on the modalities of victims’ participation in the proceedings 
(such as decisions concerning access of the LRV [legal representative of 
victim participants] to documents and decisions on whether victims may 
call evidence and make submissions). 
• Decisions on protective measures for VPPs and the variation of such 
measures.3419   
 
Some extra observations follow. First, victim participants also have the 
right to appeal certain disclosure decisions.3420 Second, Pre-Trial Judge’s decision 
on ‘whether to divide victims participating in the proceedings into groups having 
common legal representation’ cannot be appealed according to rule 86 (D) of the 
STL RPE. Third, an unsuccessful applicant of victim participant status may 
appeal the decision denying his/her application and, under a 2013 amendment to 
the STL RPE, this appeals is no longer subject to the requirement of being an 
issue significantly affecting the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings 
or the trial outcome.3421 As determined by the Plenary of Judges amending the 
STL RPE ‘Rule 86(C) is amended to simply give an unsuccessful applicant for 
victim participation status the possibility to appeal this decision as of right’.3422 
Fourth, the STL Appeals Chamber considered not to be bound by the ICC’s case 
law under which, as previously seen, victim participants have not been permitted 
to trigger interlocutory appeals.3423  
Concerning interlocutory decisions other than the previously ones 
detailed, victim participants cannot appeal them. Therefore, in general, 
concerning appeals against Pre-Trial Judge’s decisions, the STL RPE only refer to 
parties, i.e., the Prosecution and defence, but not to victim participants. For 
example, regarding decisions on preliminary motions subject to interlocutory 
appeal,3424 rule 90 (D) provides for that ‘If certification is given, a Party shall 
appeal to the Appeals Chamber within ten days of the filing of the decision to 
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3419 Ibid., para. 15.  
3420 STL RPE, rules 116 (D), (E).  
3421 Ibid., rule 86 (c) (i). See also Ibid., rule 126 (C).  
3422 STL (2013) 20. 
3423 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, para. 17. 
3424 STL RPE, rule 90 (B) (‘Decisions on preliminary motions are without interlocutory appeal save: 
(i) in the case of motions challenging jurisdiction; (ii) in other cases where certification has been 
granted upon the basis that the decision involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair 
and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which an 
immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings’.).  
		

certify’. Likewise, according to rule 176 bis (B) (Preliminary Questions), before 
the Appeals Chamber renders its interlocutory decision on any question raised 
by the Pre-Trial Judge under rule 68 (G),3425 the Appeals Chamber ‘shall hear the 
Prosecutor and the Head of Defence Office in public session’. In any case, victim 
participants can participate during interlocutory appeals proceedings. However, 
neither the STL Statute nor the RPE refers to an automatic right for victim 
participants to participate on appeals proceedings.  
Be that as it may, the STL’s initial practice shows that victim 
participants’ legal representatives have been allowed to submit their 
observations, both written and oral, in interlocutory appeal proceedings. To 
illustrate how victims’ participations works, it is herein examined their 
participation in the interlocutory appeal proceedings triggered by the defence 
against the Trial Chamber’s decision on the defence’s challenges to the 
jurisdiction and legality of the STL in Ayyash et al. Considering the participation 
of the victims’ lead legal representative in the proceedings on and pursuant to 
article 17 of the STL Statute and rule 87 of the STL RPE, the Appeals Chamber 
determined that ‘[…] we may be assisted by his observations on behalf of the 
participating victims in this appeal’.3426 Following up this invitation, the victims’ 
lead legal representative submitted two observations, one of which consisted in 
that ‘is in the victims’ interest that the legality of this Tribunal be thoroughly 
addressed and established’.3427 During the appeal hearing on this matter, upon 
the Chamber’s invitation, the lead legal representative of victims was given five 
minutes,3428 in which he highlighted victims’ interest in ‘having access to a forum 
which can preserve their rights and which is properly and legally established […] 
the essence and the kernel of our observations is that this Tribunal is properly 
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3425 ‘The Pre-Trial Judge may submit to the Appeals Chamber any preliminary question, on the 
interpretation of the Agreement, Statute and Rules regarding the applicable law, that he deems 
necessary in order to examine and rule on the indictment’. 
3426 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01), Scheduling Order on Interlocutory Appeals, Appeals Chamber, 27 
August 2012, para. 3. 
3427 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01), Observations of the Legal Representative of Victims on the 
Interlocutory Appeal Briefs and Responses to the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Defence 
Challenges to the Jurisdiction and Legality of the Tribunal, Legal Representative of Victims, 19 
September 2012, para. 2 (1). 
3428 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01), Transcripts, 1 October 2012, p. 148, lines 9-11.  
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and legally established’.3429 It should be noticed that the Appeals Chamber 
dismissed the defence’s appeals.3430  
Since rule 87 (D) of the STL RPE does not determine exactly the 
modalities of participation during appeals (both appeals of verdict/sentence and 
of interlocutory decisions), it has been suggested that victim participants may be 
authorized to exercise all functions entrusted to them during trial proceedings 
or, if the Appeals Chamber decides so, they should have more limited 
functions.3431 As examined, it seems to be that the Appeals Chamber’s initial 
practice concerning interlocutory appeals has primarily adopted the second 
option. It remains to be seen what approach the Appeals Chamber will follow 
once the first appeal proceedings against verdict/sentence take place in the 
future. In any case, the kind of victims’ participation during appeals, including 
interlocutory appeals, depends on the nature of the appeals proceedings, i.e., 
they may be conducted via written exchanges of briefs or orally when additional 
evidence is submitted and witnesses heard.3432  
 
6.5. Comparative Conclusions 
Victim participants (ICC and STL) can neither appeal the trial judgment 
(verdict) nor the sentence delivered by the Trial Chamber. At the ECCC, 
although civil parties can appeal against the trial judgment (verdict) when the 
Co-Prosecutors have appealed it, civil parties cannot appeal the sentence. These 
limitations are also present in the domestic systems examined and at the ICTY, 
the ICTR and the SCSL. However, victim participants (via their legal 
representatives) at the ICC and civil parties at the ECCC can appeal final orders 
on reparations issued by the respective Trial Chambers, which is similar to the 
French system. Such possibility to appeal a final reparations order corresponds 
to victims’ specific and clear interests common to victim participants and civil 
parties to obtain reparations. Victims’ legal representatives in Lubanga appealed 
the ICC decision on reparations as this was considered to be a reparations order. 
At the ICC, if a reparations decision is not considered a reparations order, 
victims can not appeal it but can still participate as victim participants in the 
respective interlocutory appeals proceedings triggered by one of the parties.3433 
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3429 Ibid., p. 148, lines 15-18.  
3430 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR90.1), Decision on the Defence Appeals against the Trial 
Chamber’s ‘Decision on the Defence Challenges to the Jurisdiction and Legality of the Tribunal’, 
Appeals Chamber, 24 October 2012, p. 25.  
3431 Hemptinne (2010) 175.  
3432 See STL RPE, rule 186. See also Hemptinne (2010) 175.  
3433 See also infra Chapter V 3.3.1.4.  
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At the ICC, victim participants can also participate via, e.g., filing of 
observations, during the appeals against a conviction/sentence concerning their 
personal interests in the issues on appeal, e.g., in Lubanga and Ngudjolo Chui.     
At the ECCC, in Duch civil parties’ lawyers appealed the revocation of 
their clients’ civil status as well as reparation orders both contained in the Trial 
Chamber judgment. They submitted additional evidence and statements and, as 
for the first claim, the Appeals Chamber reversed the revocation of civil party 
status in approximately 40% of the cases. As for appeals against Trial Chamber’s 
decisions, civil parties in hearings cannot raise new matters of fact or law or new 
claims not contained in their written submissions but they may request to 
introduce additional evidence. In Duch, civil parties filed submissions directly 
related to conviction during the appeals. As for the STL, both its Statute and RPE 
lay down that victim participants may participate in appeals proceedings but 
subject to Appeals Chamber’s authorization and in a manner considered 
appropriate by it. At all the examined international and hybrid criminal courts, 
revision/review of a judgment or sentence is not available to victim participants 
or civil parties, similar to the French system; however, as argued when it comes 
to the ICC, they may be notified thereof. 
With regard to participation in appeals against other decisions 
(interlocutory decisions), although two ICC Appeals Chamber Judges have 
argued that victims who participated in pre-trial or trial proceedings leading to 
an appeal should have automatic participation in the respective appeal 
proceedings, the ICC Appeal Chamber’s case law has sustained that there is no 
automatic right to participate in them. Accordingly, victim participants who 
wish to participate in interlocutory appeals have to apply for participation and 
they have to demonstrate that they are case victims, that their personal interests 
are affected by issues on appeal, the appropriateness of their participation at this 
stage of the proceedings, and that their manner of participation is not prejudicial 
to or inconsistent with the accused’s rights, alongside the adoption of safeguards 
and some restrictive approach. At the ICC, appeal of revocation of victim 
participant status is not foreseen. As for the ECCC, similar to the French system, 
civil parties have the right to appeal some interlocutory decisions which are 
mentioned in its Internal Rules and rendered either by the Co-Investigating 
Judge (before the Pre-Trial Chamber), e.g., inadmissibility of civil party 
applications, or by the Trial Chamber (before the Supreme Court Chamber). 
Accordingly, civil parties can participate via written submissions (mainly) and 
oral submissions. As for the STL, unlike the ICC’s case law, the Appeals 
Chamber has recognized a narrow right of the victim participants to appeal 
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certain interlocutory decisions that fundamentally affect their personal interests, 
namely, decisions on applications for status as a victim participant (already 
established under the STL RPE), decisions on modalities of participation of 
victim participants, and decisions on protective measures for victim participants 
and variations on protective measures. Also, under the STL RPE, certain 
disclosure decisions can be appealed by victim participants. However, the 
decision to divide victims in groups under common representation cannot be 
appealed at the STL. As for other interlocutory decisions, victim participants 
cannot appeal them at the STL. In any case, they can participate in interlocutory 
appeals although there is no victim participants’ automatic participation in 
them. In any case, the STL Appeals Chamber’s emerging practice has allowed 
written and oral submissions/observations from victim participants’ lawyers.  
The civil party’s explicit right to appeal some interlocutory decisions at 
the ECCC, i.e., not only participation during interlocutory appeals but also the 
right to appeal as such, in contrast to the victim participants’ situation at the ICC 
and the STL, where they can participate in interlocutory appeals but lack the 
right to appeal per se (ICC) or their right to appeal is limited to specific decisions 
fundamentally affecting victim participants’ personal interests and not as an 
automatic right (STL), is arguably the most important difference in status 
between civil parties and victims participants during these appeals. In other 
words, victims at the ICC and the STL (with the exception of the specific 
decisions above-mentioned) can only participate once appeals requests had been 
filed by a party, i.e., the Prosecution and the defence. This situation arguably 
corresponds to the distinction in status between victim as civil party (a ‘party’ to 
the proceedings) and victim as victim participant (a ‘participant’ in the 
proceedings).  
Having said so, the modalities of victim participation at the appeals stage 
in the ICC, the ECCC and the STL resemble those of the French civil party and 
also mutatis mutandi the American system. In the latter, victims’ status at the 
appeals stage has been particularly strengthened especially in comparison with 
the English system to the point that, under the American system, victims hold 
the right to appeal certain interlocutory decisions that affect their rights, chiefly 
under the CVRA. A feature common to the ICC, the ECCC and the STL is that 
participation of victim participants or civil parties in appeals have to be 
conducted via their legal representatives.    
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7. Chapter Conclusions   
1. The formal status of victims as victim participants or as civil parties only exists 
at the ICC, the STL (victim participants) and the ECCC (civil parties). Victim 
participants at the ICC and the STL intervene to present their own views and 
concerns. The civil party action at the ECCC, like in the French system, has the 
dual purpose of participating in the proceedings by supporting the prosecution 
and seeking reparations, i.e., participate as civil parties in criminal proceedings 
and pursue a related civil action for reparations. Indeed, victims’ status as civil 
parties at the ECCC is a clear example of the French system’s influence (via 
Cambodian law). At the ICC and the STL, unlike the ECCC, victims cannot be 
civil parties, i.e., full parties, and whereas victim participants’ modalities of 
participation and participation timing are subject to the ICC or the STL 
competent chamber’s authorization, at the ECCC victims who have been 
admitted as civil parties do not need to receive a chamber’s prior authorization 
to participate. This is related to the difference in status between victims as 
participants and as civil parties. However, victim participants’ modalities of 
participation/procedural rights put in practice victim participants at the ICC and 
the STL in a status generally speaking similar to that of the civil parties at the 
ECCC and the French system. Under the ICC Statute, victims who do not hold 
the official victim participant status, i.e., without having been granted the formal 
victim participant status upon application, can participate via 
observations/submissions as for Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigation and 
proceedings concerning the question of the ICC’s jurisdiction and admissibility 
of a case. At the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, victims do not hold the status of 
victim participants or civil parties as their status is limited to be witnesses; 
however, there are some very limited instances where victims may have some 
level of indirect ‘participation’. This situation is similar to the Anglo-American 
systems, i.e., although victims are not civil parties (unlike the ECCC or the 
French system) or participants (unlike the ICC and the STL) but first and 
foremost witnesses, they can participate in some limited and specific manners 
and procedural stages, primarily during sentencing and some appeals. Indeed, 
their participation (in the United States, in particular) may be considered as 
stronger than the very limited avenues of ‘participation’ at the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL.    
2. The ICC, the ECCC and the STL have applied a flexible prima facie 
standard when examining the admissibility of applications to become and 
participate as victim participants or civil parties. This standard is necessary to 
handle the numerous applications received by these courts. Nevertheless, as they 
			

can later be reviewed by the respective Trial Chambers, the 
withdrawal/revocation of the victim participant/civil party status has led/may 
lead to understandable disappointment and frustration among victims. To avoid 
this undesired effect, some more careful admissibility assessment of the 
applications and also not to procrastinate the ‘confirmation’ of the status of 
victim participants or civil parties until the trial judgment are advisable, 
alongside mechanisms to speed up the admissibility process such as collective 
applications, simplified application process, or admissibility deadlines set in 
earlier procedural stages but within the respective court’s legal framework, e.g., 
not replacing the judicially assessed application process with mere ‘registration’. 
3. As for the requirements to become and participate as victim 
participants or civil parties, generally speaking, they are to an important extent 
similar across the ICC, the ECCC and the STL. First, natural persons have to 
prove their identity although those courts have been flexible on identification 
documents. Second, crimes have to be those under the respective court’s 
jurisdiction. Third, there must be physical, material or mental personal harm. 
The direct victim’s harm may raise harm on others, i.e., indirect victims. In turn, 
indirect victims not only include relatives (there is a presumption on close 
relatives) but also extended family members based on the cultural context and 
even beyond that, e.g., victims who were harmed by assisting the direct victims, 
preventing potential direct victims from being victimized or who witnessed 
violent crimes (ICC) or common law spouses, de facto adopters and friends 
(ECCC) if harm is proved. Under the case law of the ICC, the ECCC and the 
STL, deceased victims’ relatives have suffered personal harm and, thus, allowed 
to participate. Fourth, there must be a causal link between the crime and harm, 
which does not necessarily have to be direct at the ICC. In any case, the ICC, the 
ECCC and the STL have recognized direct and indirect victims. Concerning 
indirect victims, it is necessary to prove that their harm suffered comes as a 
result of the harm caused to the direct victim. The fact that victims of victims 
(e.g., victims of crimes committed by child soldiers) have been excluded in 
Lubanga at the ICC makes it necessary for the Prosecutors to carefully decide 
what crimes to prosecute not to exclude victims. When it comes to case stage at 
the ICC, the ECCC and the STL, the causal link must be between the harm and 
the (confirmed) crime charged, i.e., not any crime under the court’s jurisdiction. 
Fifth, whereas at the ICC and the STL, victims have to demonstrate that their 
personal interests are affected to be allowed to participate, at the ECCC civil 
parties do not need to do so, i.e., difference between participants and parties. 
Whereas the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers have considered personal interests on 
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procedural stage basis, the ICC Trial Chambers, Appeals Chamber, and Pre-Trial 
Chambers (during investigation) have mainly done so on specific procedural 
issue basis. The latter approach may in principle be criticized as it is quite time-
consuming (except when applied in investigations) although it matches better 
the personal interest and fair trial requirements. At the ICC, although personal 
interests include not only reparations, protection and truth but also arguably to 
see the accused punished, this cannot intersect with the Prosecutorial function. 
4. Victims, in general, can report crimes as complainants before the ICC 
and the ECCC, which is similar to the national systems examined. However, 
unlike national systems, victims cannot initiate prosecutions at the international 
and hybrid criminal courts. In any case, national ‘private prosecutions’ are quite 
limited and symbolic. At the ICC, victims, without being officially victim 
participants, can participate in some specific proceedings, i.e., via 
representations in Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigations and observations in 
challenges to jurisdiction/admissibility. At the ICTY and the ICTR, as a form of 
‘participation’ during investigation, victims have approached the Prosecutor via 
NGO letters. As for victim participation sensu stricto, i.e., based on article 68 (3) 
of the ICC Statute, the ICC has reached a balanced halfway solution by allowing 
victims to participate during investigation but only corresponding to judicial 
proceedings and, hence, it has been conciliated the need for fairness and 
efficiency and appropriate victim participation at this early stage. The complete 
exclusion of victim participants from investigation at the STL is herein criticized, 
especially considering the comparatively lower volume of victims. At the ECCC 
(similar to the STL as for victim participants), victims cannot participate as civil 
parties during preliminary investigations conducted by the Co-Prosecutors. 
During preliminary investigations, victims can only be complainants at the 
ECCC. At the ECCC, victims can participate as civil parties during judicial 
investigations conducted by the Co-Investigating Judges. These ECCC features 
are similar to the French system. 
5. Modalities of participation/procedural rights during the pre-trial stage 
of a case at the ICC and the STL are mutatis mutandi similar. However, while the 
discussed rights are mainly applicable up to and during the confirmation of 
charges hearing (ICC), the examined rights only apply after the confirmation of 
the indictment at the STL as victim participants can only participate after it. 
First, at the ICC, access to the case-record (ex parte materials excluded), 
confidential information access is allowed for non-anonymous victim 
participants, and there is no disclosure rights. At the STL, common lawyers of 
victim participants (anonymous or not) can access: the case-file except for 
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confidential (or under seal) and ex parte documents; ‘disclosed’ materials by one 
party to the other under restrictions; and confidential information under certain 
conditions. Second, attendance at hearings, excepted those ex parte (ICC) or 
excluded by the Pre-Trial Judge (STL). Third, participation in hearings not 
excluded by the instruments (ICC) or by the Pre-Trial Judge (STL). Fourth, filing 
written motions not excluded by the respective instruments. At the ICC, two 
additional modalities are specifically applicable concerning/during the 
confirmation of charges hearing, i.e., submissions on admissibility and probative 
value of the evidence to be relied by the parties and its examination, and 
examination of any witness called by the parties. At the STL, access to portions 
of transcripts/minutes of in camera or ex parte hearings as for the time the 
representative was present was considered in pre-trial. In addition to these 
modalities/procedural rights, two considerations should be mentioned. First, 
under the ICC’s practice, although anonymous victim participants’ rights have 
been sometimes restricted, common legal representatives concurrently represent 
anonymous/non-anonymous victim participants, reducing this distinction 
impact. Similar observation is applicable mutatis mutandi to trial proceedings. 
Second, under the ICC’s case law, although victim participants can challenge 
evidence brought by the parties, they cannot introduce evidence additional to 
that filed by the parties and victims lack investigative powers. These limitations 
are related to their status as participants and, thus, different from the victims’ 
status as civil parties at the ECCC.      
6. As for ECCC civil parties, there are some similarities with the ICC and 
the STL victim participants but since victims are parties at the ECCC, the scope 
of their procedural rights during pre-trial proceedings is broader. Civil parties’ 
procedural rights at the ECCC during pre-trial, i.e., during the ECCC judicial 
investigation, which are similar to those existent in the French system are, inter 
alia, as follows. First, as a party, access to the dossier. Second, civil parties can 
confront and question the accused (via civil party’s lawyer). Third, unlike victim 
participants (ICC, STL), civil parties’ right to request the Co-Investigating Judges 
to conduct investigations on civil parties’ behalf but linked to Co-Prosecutors’ 
investigations. Fourth, right to request and propose witnesses. Fifth, civil parties 
may attend and participate in pre-trial proceedings via written and oral 
interventions. However, they cannot necessarily participate in all hearings, e.g., 
provisional detention hearings. Sixth, right to support the prosecution. In 
addition to these modalities/procedural rights, two considerations should be 
indicated. First, whereas under the case law of the ECCC and the ICC victims 
can participate in pre-trial detention appeals, at the STL this remains to be seen. 
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Second, in the practice of the ICC, the ECCC and the STL, victims have been 
normally grouped together and represented by common legal representatives. 
Such practice, based on the respective legal instruments, has proven to be 
necessary for the sake of efficiency and fairness due to the large number of 
victim participants and civil parties, especially and increasingly at the ICC and 
the ECCC.    
7. During trial proceedings, whereas the ICC’s case law has broadly and 
generously sharpened victims’ modalities of participation/procedural rights, at 
the ECCC civil parties’ procedural rights have been limited. The outcome is that 
the victim participants’ procedural rights/modalities of participation at the ICC 
have moved closer/are similar to those of the civil parties at the ECCC. The 
STL’s practice on victims’ participation remains to be seen. While the STL RPE 
generally speaking follow the ICC’s practice/legal framework, explicitly 
including some modalities of participation/procedural rights not explicitly 
included in the ICC RPE but developed in the ICC’s case law, a relatively 
conservative approach is in place in some aspects. In any case, victim 
participants (ICC, STL) have to show their affected personal interests to 
participate in trial (similar to the other stages) unlike civil parties at the ECCC. 
Moreover, civil parties, unlike victim participants, hold the explicit right, under 
the ECCC Internal Rules, to support the prosecution but without turning them 
in additional or auxiliary Prosecutors. However, under the ICC’s case law (and 
the STL RPE), the possibility for victim participants to be allowed to lead and 
challenge evidence on the accused’s guilt may be considered as an indirect 
manner to support the prosecution, which may compromise the accused’s right 
to a fair trial. At the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, the only chance to indirectly 
‘participate’ is via amicus curiae briefs, which has raised some awareness about 
issues that matter to victims despite limitations.      
8. Concerning modalities of participation/procedural rights of victim 
participants at the ICC and the STL during trial, they are in principle and 
generally speaking similar. Since no trial has started yet at the STL (at the 
moment of writing this thesis), the following enumeration is based on the ICC’s 
case law and/or the ICC and the STL instruments. First, right to notification. 
Second, access to documents but ex parte filings (ICC), and confidential and ex 
parte material (STL) are excluded. Third, attendance at and participation in 
public and closed hearings and, as for ex parte hearings, some ICC Trial 
Chambers have allowed it. Fourth, oral participation (opening and closing 
statements included). Fifth, filing of written motions and the ICC’s practice has 
allowed ex parte filings. Sixth, the ICC’s case law has permitted leading evidence 
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and challenge of evidence brought by the parties, and the STL RPE permit to 
tender evidence. As for the ICC’s case law, it has been particularly controversial 
that the Chambers have allowed victim participants to submit and challenge 
evidence on the accused’s guilt. Such modality has been and can be justified on 
the contribution to truth determination. In any case, parties are the primary 
actors on this matter and presentation of evidence is not a victim’s self-standing 
right (unlike in the case of civil parties), i.e., as determined in the ICC’s case law, 
it is subject to conditions such as personal interests affected, evidence relevant to 
the case, evidence allowed/requested by the Chamber for truth determination, 
and submission without affecting accused’s right to a fair trial. Seventh, 
questioning the witnesses and the accused, and questioning of the latter at the 
STL, unlike the ICC, can only be conducted via the Chamber. Some ICC 
Chambers have normally allowed questions on the accused’s guilt, but ICC Trial 
Chamber II has permitted them only exceptionally. Under the ICC’s case law, 
when questioning, it cannot be formulated any new allegations against the 
accused. Eighth, victims can testify under oath (dual victim participant-victim 
witness status). Nevertheless, the ICC’s practice has correctly established 
controls to avoid victims to become additional or auxiliary prosecutors and 
safeguards for the accused’s right to a fair trial, including prohibition of 
anonymous testimony. Ninth, despite of the silence of the ICC instruments on 
victims’ disclosure rights, the ICC’s practice has allowed them to be provided 
with material in Prosecution’s possession. Unlike the ICC RPE, the STL RPE 
explicitly foresee disclosure obligations for victim participants. Tenth, victim 
participants’ right to propose/call witnesses to testify under the ICC’s practice 
and the STL RPE. In addition to these modalities of participation, at the ICC, 
victim participants were able to apply for new charges in Lubanga although with 
an unsuccessful outcome. Also, whereas at the ICC anonymous victim 
participants are allowed with limited procedural rights during trial, they have 
been banned altogether by the STL Appeals Chamber, which is criticized herein, 
as discussed in the previous chapter.3434 
9. Civil parties’ procedural rights at the ECCC during trial are in general 
similar to those of victim participants (ICC, STL), but since they are parties, the 
scope of those rights is broader. These rights, which are similar to those existent 
in the French system, follow. First, right to legal representation and, unlike the 
ICC and the STL, the explicit right to be questioned in presence of their lawyer. 
Unlike the ICC RPE, the ECCC Internal Rules frame the representation as being 
of consolidated groups (via co-lead lawyers appointed by the ECCC) rather than 
 
3434 For further discussion on this point, see supra Chapter IV 4.5 and 5. 
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of individuals, which depersonalizes victims. Second, right to be heard, i.e., right 
of audience. Third, civil parties can provide testimony and, unlike the ICC and 
the STL, without an oath, i.e., unsworn testimony, but they may still be cross-
examined. Also, they can provide statements of suffering. Fourth, civil parties’ 
right to support the prosecution and, thus, provide evidence on the accused’s 
guilt (also seeking reparations and truth determination) but without holding a 
general right like that held by the Co-Prosecutors or without being transformed 
in an additional or auxiliary Prosecutor since the accused can only face one 
Prosecution authority. Civil parties should not advance their own case theory.  
Fifth, relevant and non-repetitive questioning of the accused and witnesses. 
Sixth, right to propose witnesses to be called by the Chamber. Seventh, right to 
respond preliminary objections. Eighth, right to file written submissions. Ninth, 
right to access the case file (via a lawyer). Tenth, right to make closing 
statements. Eleventh, right to tender written evidence.    
10. As for participation in proceedings related to sentencing, there is the 
paradoxical situation where the status of victim participants at the ICC and the 
STL is stronger than that of civil parties at the ECCC. Thus, whereas the former 
may file oral and written submissions, the latter have been precluded by the 
ECCC’s case law from filing submissions on sentencing, relevant to sentencing, 
and evaluation of factors on sentencing as well as they are prohibited from 
testifying on the accused’s character. These restrictions can be criticized as, inter 
alia, there is no explicit prohibition on the ECCC instruments, hinder civil 
parties’ support to the Prosecution, and due to the frustration generated among 
victims, especially considering that they had indeed already testified/questioned 
about the accused’s character (in Duch). Indeed, these restrictions are stronger 
than those existent in the French System. Moreover, even in the Anglo-
American systems, victims can directly participate during sentencing via 
VIS/VPS. In any case, civil parties at the ECCC can present statements of 
suffering during trial. At the ICC, in Lubanga, victims’ lawyers, inter alia, filed 
written and oral submissions on procedures and principles applicable to 
sentencing, including the kind of penalty to be imposed in the sentence, the 
impact of the crimes on the victims, and aggravating factors, as well as on 
relevant evidence submitted on trial. They also asked questions to the defence’s 
witnesses, with the caveat that they cannot become a second Prosecutor. 
However, they did not propose a specific imprisonment term, which is 
consistent with the Prosecutor’s scope of action and impartiality. Under the STL 
RPE, victims can only give details on the crime impact on them but not to 
comment on a specific sentence. At the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, victims 
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may indirectly participate via VIS filed by the Prosecution. Common to all the 
examined international and hybrid criminal courts (and also present in the 
reviewed national systems) is the consideration of victims, in particular, for 
example, harm inflicted, vulnerability, number thereof, to determine the gravity 
of the crime and as aggravating factors in the sentence. This consideration 
should be made mandatory.                                                                                                                                       
11. Victim participants (ICC, STL) cannot appeal the Trial Chamber 
judgment (verdict) and sentence although they may participate in the related 
appeals proceedings triggered by the parties. At the ECCC, civil parties may only 
appeal the trial judgment (verdict) when the Co-Prosecutors have appealed it; 
however, they cannot appeal a sentence. These limitations are similar to those 
existent in the considered national systems. Be that as it may, at the ICC and the 
ECCC, victim participants (via their legal representatives) and civil parties can 
appeal a reparations order according to explicit provisions under the respective 
courts’ instruments, similar to the French system. In Duch, civil parties appealed 
the reparations order, and revocation of their status both contained in the Trial 
Judgment. As for revocations of their status, the Supreme Court Chamber, based 
on additional evidence and statements submitted by the civil parties in appeals, 
overruled them in approximately 40% of the cases. Revision/review remedy is 
not available to victim participants/civil parties, like in the national systems 
examined. Concerning interlocutory appeals, the most important difference 
between victim participants and civil parties is that whereas victim participants 
cannot appeal a decision as such (ICC) or their right to appeal is limited to 
specific decisions fundamentally affecting victim participants’ personal interests, 
namely, decisions on applications for victim participants status, modalities of 
participation, protective measures and certain disclosure issues, and not as an 
automatic right (STL), civil parties as parties at the ECCC hold this right against 
some interlocutory decisions, similar to the French system and mutatis mutandi 
to some extent to the American system. In any case, victim participants can 
participate in interlocutory appeals proceedings, triggered by one or the two 
parties, via written and oral submissions. However, this right is not automatic, 
i.e., according to the ICC’s case law, victim participants need to demonstrate, 
inter alia, that their personal interests are affected during the appeals 
proceedings and that their participation is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with 
the accused’s rights. Decisions on revocation of victim participant status (ICC) 
or grouping victims under common representatives (STL) cannot be appealed.  
12. The impact of the participation of victim participants and civil 
parties on trial, and other procedural stages at the ICC, the ECCC and the STL, 
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can be evaluated considering three factors: efficiency, accused’s rights and 
victims themselves. First, the broader the victims’ participation regime is, the less 
efficient and slower the proceedings become. Also, victims who could have 
participated are excluded for the sake of fewer victim participants or civil parties 
with (too) broad procedural rights. Second, a broader participation regime 
generally remains in a tense relation with the accused’s right to a fair and 
impartial trial/proceedings, especially in the most controversial modalities, e.g., 
victim participants’ evidence on and witness questioning on the accused’s guilt at 
the ICC. Third, a more robust participation regime does not necessarily mean a 
higher level of victims’ satisfaction. Nevertheless, the victims’ participation 
regime as crafted by the ICC can be justified based on victims’ contribution to 
the truth and, more generally, to the first objective of the ICC, and of the other 
courts, which consists in the fight against impunity, as well as under a 
restorative-oriented justice approach. This is, however, only feasible if victims’ 
procedural rights as participants and, mutatis mutandi as civil parties, are subject 
to controls by the respective courts, which include to follow more balanced 
approaches, as those adopted by some of the ICC Chambers, to guarantee the 
other interests at stake and for the benefit of the victims themselves.  
13. The ECCC and the STL, bearing in mind the emerging challenges at 
the ICC and especially in the case of the ECCC facing its own problems with civil 
parties’ participation have adopted more cautious approaches to victims’ status. 
This has sometimes led to uncomfortable situations, e.g., stripping off civil 
parties of their status only at the end of the trial when a decision could have been 
taken earlier or by prohibiting civil parties’ participation on sentencing 
altogether, both at the ECCC. In the STL, the much lower number of victims 
compared to the ICC or the ECCC is an important factor to better handle the 
flux of participation and, accordingly, their complete exclusion from 
investigation was not justified. On the other hand, at the ECCC, the severance of 
Nuon Chea et al. in (mini)trials is a sound option to increase civil party’s 
participation and with regard to efficiency and the accused’s rights. That such 
severance was kept after having heard inter alia the civil parties enhances their 
status during trial. The fact that it has become practice of the ECCC and the ICC 
and, even mandatory under the ECCC Internal Rules (from the issuance of the 
closing order onwards), and the STL RPE, that victim participants and civil 
parties are represented by lawyers is indeed an answer to the exorbitant number 
of victim participants or civil parties intervening in the cases before these judicial 
forums and also to some problems when civil parties participated directly (e.g., 
incidents at provisional release appeals at the ECCC). Moreover, the imperative 
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need to handle such high numbers of victim participants/civil parties, especially 
at the ICC and the ECCC, has led to the scenario where in all cases before the 
ICC, the ECCC and the STL, under their respective instruments, victims 
constitute themselves or are grouped in one or more groups under common 
legal representatives who are chosen by the respective court or by the victims. 
Even though grouping victims is necessary, it is pivotal not to weaken the status 
of individual victims. Accordingly, when the ICC, the ECCC and the STL are in 
process of selecting/appointing a common legal representative for grouped 
victims, victims’ interests need to be considered and, in general, the legal 
representatives must stay in regular contact with and receive instructions from 
their clients. Otherwise, victims’ status as participants or civil parties, may 
become symbolic, depersonalized and even lead to secondary victimization. 
Also, some additional legal representation filters/intermediaries such as the 
appointment of the ICC OPCV to ‘represent’ an ICC appointed common legal 
representative or the requirement for ECCC appointed lead co-lawyers (from 
trial onwards) may be criticized as they may result in victims’ symbolic 
participation.  
14. It is necessary to reach a balanced participation regime of victims as 
participants or civil parties at the ICC, the ECCC and the STL, in particularly 
challenging contexts where the number of victim participants/civil parties is 
much higher than that in domestic cases. Such balanced participation regime has 
to take into account victims as such and integrate them within the big picture 
existent at those courts where other competing and legitimate interests need to 
be all reconciled. Therefore, provisions and/or practices that go to extremes of 
either being too generous/broad in scope or excluding victims altogether must be 
avoided as much as possible. Only in this manner, can the participatory 
dimension of the victims’ status as participants or civil parties be truly enhanced 
without jeopardizing other interests, all of which should in the end benefit 
victims themselves. This is also coherent with international human rights law 
sources, in particular case law, under which although certain participatory rights 
in criminal proceedings have been acknowledged for victims, these have been 
considered taking into account other legitimate interests.3435      
 
 
 
3435 See for further discussion on this point supra Chapter II 2.1.7 and 4, as well as sections on 
national systems in this chapter. 
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Chapter V. Victims’ Status as Reparations Claimants 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The present chapter examines the third dimension of the status of victims, i.e., 
victim status as reparations claimants, at international and hybrid criminal 
courts as presented in this thesis. In the context of state responsibility, the 
obligation to provide reparations, compensation included, as a consequence of a 
violation of an international obligation is a well-established international law 
principle,3436 and an international customary law rule.3437 Examples of how this 
obligation has been in practice implemented include human rights monitoring 
bodies, in particular the IACtHR and the ECtHR, which have provided 
reparations, based on their constitutive instruments,3438 in among others, cases of 
serious human rights violations. In addition, the Convention against Torture 
lays down an obligation to repair violations of the prohibition against torture.3439 
Indeed, (international) human rights law is the primary area where individuals 
can exercise their right to claim and receive reparations. Although under 
international humanitarian law States have been reluctant to recognize explicitly 
and generally a right for victims of international humanitarian law violations,3440 
the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
 
3436 See, e.g., Permanent Court of International Justice, Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), 
Ser A, No 17, 13 September 1928, p. 29; International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001.  
3437 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian 
Rules, rule 150 (‘A State responsible for violations of international humanitarian law is required to 
make full reparation for the loss or injury caused’.). 
3438 ACHR, article 63 (1); ECHR, article 41. For further analysis on these provisions, see, e.g., Jo M., 
Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2nd edn., 
Cambridge University Press 2013) 188-250; Juan Pablo Pérez León Acevedo, ‘Las Reparaciones en 
el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional Humanitario y 
Derecho Penal Internacional’ (2008) 23 American University International Law Review 7.    
3439 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, article 14 (‘1. 
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress 
and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his 
dependants shall be entitled to compensation. 2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the 
victim or other persons to compensation which may exist under national law’.). 
3440 Liesbeth Zegveld, ’Victims’ Reparations Claims and International Criminal Courts’ (2010) 8 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 79, 83. 
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and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UN Basic Principles 
and Guidelines), have recognized that victims’ right to remedies includes 
‘adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered’,3441 and 
‘Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm 
suffered’.3442 These principles, as noticed by Bassiouni,3443 are based on 
international and national practice. Therefore, victims’ right to reparations is 
well-established under international law.  
International instruments and practice have generally applied the 
reparations right in the state-individual relation.3444 However, the emergence of 
international criminal law and, in particular, as implemented by international 
and hybrid criminal courts, makes it possible for an individual to claim 
reparations from another individual at international criminal justice forums. 
This is related to the principle whereby individuals found guilty are obligated to 
provide reparations (including compensation) for the harm inflicted on 
victims.3445 As found in the study on customary international humanitarian law 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross, recent national and 
international practice favors obtaining reparations from individuals claimed by 
victims, both before (international) criminal courts and national civil courts.3446     
Even though the existence of reparations proceedings and modalities at 
international and hybrid criminal courts have specific, even sui generis, 
characteristics, human rights courts’ jurisprudence on reparations as well as the 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines have been closely taken into account by the 
emerging case law of the ICC and the ECCC. The ICC and the ECCC are the 
only judicial forums among the international and hybrid criminal courts 
considered in this thesis where victims can claim reparations and benefit from 
them.3447  It is necessary to remember that reparations orders can only be made 
 
3441 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 11 (b).  
3442 Ibid., principle 15. 
3443 Bassiouni (2006) 265-275. 
3444 E.g., the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines mainly refers to State obligations. For a discussion 
on state implementation of reparations for violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, see Elizabeth Salmón Gárate, El Derecho Internacional Humanitario y su 
Relación con el Derecho Interno de los Estados (Palestra 2007a) 263-271.     
3445 Zegveld (2010) 85.  
3446 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Vol. I (ICRC/Cambridge University Press 2005) 554-555. 
3447 Some references to victims as reparations claimants at the hybrid criminal courts in the Balkan 
region, which have not been considered in this thesis, are mentioned later for illustrative purposes. 
Under the extinct UNTAET Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, a hybrid criminal 
court not considered in this thesis, section 49.1 of its Regulation 2000/30 established the option for 
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against convicted persons at the ICC and the ECCC,3448 i.e., not against States. In 
turn, the implementation of reparations orders against the convicted may be 
conducted by the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) (ICC) or potentially 
implemented with external funds involving state/non-state cooperation and the 
Victims Support Section (VSS) (ECCC) as detailed later.3449 The importance of 
the ICC and the ECCC reparations regimes for the success of the respective 
courts has been stressed both by the courts themselves,3450 and by victims acting 
as reparations claimants before them.3451 Since the ICC and the ECCC are the 
only courts among the international and hybrid criminal courts considered in 
this thesis at which victims’ status as reparations claimants can be exercised, the 
analysis in this chapter is mainly focused on those two courts.   
Having said so, the situation at the other international and hybrid 
criminal courts considered in this thesis, i.e., the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and 
the STL, is also examined. The three national systems considered in the previous 
chapters are also taken into account in this chapter for 
complementary/referential and comparative purposes.    
With regard to the chapter structure, it consists of five subchapters 
(including this introduction and chapter conclusions). The second subchapter, 
‘General Framework’, includes two independent sections, for the ICC and the 
ECCC. Each of them starts with preliminary considerations about the case-based 
reparations regimes existent at the ICC and the ECCC. This is followed by a 
much more detailed analysis of categories of reparations claimants and 
beneficiaries, which includes inter alia considerations on direct and indirect 
victims, the causal link between crimes and harm to be redressed, civil parties as 
reparations claimants (ECCC), relation between victim participant status and 
victims as reparations claimants (ICC). Finally, it is included an analysis of the 
resources for implementing reparations, i.e., financial penalties and others, 
especially those from the ICC TFV. 
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victims to bring civil action before civil courts. Under, section 49.2, it was provided for that these 
panels could order a compensation order for victims; however, in practice apparently no order was 
rendered. See Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1362; Bassiouni (2006) 242, footnote 202.    
3448 ICC Statute, article 75 (2); ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quinquies (1).   
3449 See infra Chapter IV 2.3.3, 2.4.3, 4.3.2, and 4.4.2.   
3450 See e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr), Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 
Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case 
against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 24 February 2006, para. 136. (‘[…] the success of the Court is, 
to some extent, linked to the success of its reparation system’.).   
3451 See, e.g., Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Initial Specification of the Substance of the Awards that 
the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers Intend to Seek – Hearing of 19 October 2011, Civil Party Lead 
Co-Lawyers, E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 99.  
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The third subchapter, ‘Victims and Reparations Proceedings’, mainly 
discusses the proceedings whereby victims can claim and later obtain reparations 
at the ICC and the ECCC, in their respective independent subchapter sections. 
Thus, these proceedings are examined following the sequential succession of 
procedural stages that victims need to pass through to claim and obtain 
reparations. Accordingly, it is discussed initial proceedings to bring/file 
reparations claims, participation/intervention during trial and appeals 
proceedings, putting particular emphasis on proceedings specifically relating to 
reparations requests and hearings. Victims’ situation at the TFV is also 
examined.  
The fourth subchapter, ‘Modalities of Reparations and other Legal 
Issues’, when it comes to the independent subchapter sections on the ICC and 
the ECCC, consist of two subsections. Under the first one, ‘Individual/Collective 
Reparations and Reparations Standard/Burden of Proof’ (ICC) and ‘Collective 
and Moral Reparations and Reparations Standard/Burden of Proof’ (ECCC), the 
notions of individual and collective reparations as designed at the ICC and the 
ECCC are extensively discussed. This is followed by some analysis of reparations 
standard and burden of proof. The second subsection, ‘Modalities of 
Reparations’, examines which modalities of reparations, i.e., restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition,3452 
may be available at the ICC and the ECCC, alongside the challenges to 
implement them.  
Subchapters two, three and four start with references to the three 
national systems considered and the other international and hybrid criminal 
courts examined in this thesis. Comparative conclusions are included within 
each subchapter. Finally, comprehensive chapter conclusions are provided in the 
last subchapter.  
 
2. General Framework  
In this subchapter, after some general points on the three considered national 
systems, and the situation at the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL, the 
analysis is focused on the ICC and the ECCC as the only judicial forums, among 
the examined international and hybrid criminal courts, where victims can claim 
and benefit from reparations. Accordingly, in the respective independent 
subchapter sections on the ICC and the ECCC, a general presentation of the ICC 
and the ECCC case-based reparations regimes is given. Then, the discussion 
concerns the categories of reparations claimants and beneficiaries. Finally, it is 
 
3452 See UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principles 19-23.  
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examined the resources to support reparations. Comparative conclusions 
complete this subchapter.    
  
2.1. National Systems  
2.1.1. English Adversarial System  
Concerning compensation from the offender, victims can obtain it either via 
compensation orders, which are criminal sanctions or penalties,3453 (criminal 
proceedings) or civil actions.3454 Regardless of whether a perpetrator is convicted 
in criminal courts, a victim is entitled to begin civil proceedings against him/her 
to recover losses.3455 However, although compensation orders are made on the 
principle that victims should be compensated by any harm, the compensation 
order beneficiary is technically speaking not a reparations claimant.3456 Victims 
cannot file a civil claim in criminal proceedings.3457 In England and Wales, courts 
can order the defendant to pay compensation as part of a sentence for ‘any 
personal injury, loss or damage resulting from the offender’ since 1973.3458 
Although it was originally introduced as an ancillary penalty, courts are 
empowered to award compensation orders as penalties in their own right since 
1982.3459 The rule is that compensation orders are awarded in conjunction with 
other penalties; however, a compensation order can be made instead of or in 
addition to any other penal sanction.3460   
Compensation orders, are currently regulated under section 130 (4) of 
the Powers of Criminal Conducts (Sentencing) Act 2000 which provides for that 
compensation ‘shall be of such amount as the court considers appropriate, 
having regard to any evidence and to any representation that are made by or on 
behalf of the accused or the prosecutor’. Compensation is given priority over 
fines, i.e., when an offender lacks sufficient means to pay both, the court should 
 
3453 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 258. See also that compensation orders are regulated under Part VI 
(‘Financial Penalties and Orders’) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.    
3454 Doak (2008) 231. 
3455 Chris Lewis and Tom Ellis, Victim Protection in the United Kingdom: Policies, Practice and 
the Law (2006) 7. Available at:  
http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/icjs/staff/documentation/filetodownload,63887,en.p
df  (last visit on 30 November 2012).   
3456 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 258. 
3457 Ibid., 1073.  
3458 This was originally included in Criminal Justice Act (1972). The power is currently included in 
the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 130.  
3459 Criminal Justice Act (1982), section 67. 
3460 Doak (2008) 232.  
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impose a compensation order instead of a fine.3461 Moreover, the court is 
obligated to contemplate issuing a compensation order and when does not do it, 
it has to state reasons.3462 Courts can also order, against the convicted, 
deprivation of offender’s property, etc. used to commit the crime and 
restitution,3463 as well as confiscation.3464   
Compensation orders are limited by important factors.3465 First, they 
have to reflect the perpetrator’s capability of paying, unlike civil damages. 
Second, the victim lacks standing to influence the decision and needs to rely on 
the prosecutor to ask that an order be made and, indeed, there is some evidence 
of prosecution’s failure to pass on appropriate information as demanded by the 
courts to facilitate the process. Third, compensation orders have a maximum 
amount limit (£5,000),3466 the amount awarded is normally small and 
compensation orders are made inconsistently. On the other hand, unlike state 
compensation schemes, compensation orders are not limited to violent crimes, 
i.e., an order may be made in cases involving death, injury, loss or damage.3467 
Moreover, pursuing compensation via criminal courts has been found to 
enhance the victims’ opportunities to obtain some tangible compensation as 
opposed to a retributive justice model which leaves them with empty hands,3468 
and indeed has been considered as a relatively successful experience.3469   
Since compensation order is a penalty, it can only be ordered provided 
that the accused is convicted.3470 In any case, the victim can sue the offender for 
damages in a civil court even when the criminal court has acquitted him/her,3471 
although a criminal conviction normally increases the likelihood of success in 
civil action.3472 However, civil actions are very rare due to, inter alia, the fact that 
 
3461 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 130 (2). Concerning imposition of 
fines imposed on the accused see Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 127-
129.     
3462 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 130 (12). 
3463 See respectively Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, sections 143-145 and 
sections 148-149.  
3464 See Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 6.  
3465 See Doak (2008) 233. 
3466 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 131 (1).  
3467 Doak (2008) 233. 
3468 Ibid., 235.  
3469 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 1099. 
3470 Ibid., 258. 
3471 Doak (2008) 231. 
3472 Ibid., 232. 
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the burden lies on the victim and civil actions are seldom financially worthy.3473 
This situation may explain why Recommendation (1985)11 and the UN Victims’ 
Declaration seem to prefer the scenario where victims can obtain compensation 
via criminal proceedings.3474 The same went true under the EU Framework 
Decision on Victims,3475 and is also the case now under the EU Directive on 
Victims, which states in its article 16 (Right to decision on compensation from 
the offender in the course of criminal proceedings) that: 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that, in the course of criminal proceedings, 
victims are entitled to obtain a decision on compensation by the offender, 
within a reasonable time, except where national law provides for such a decision 
to be made in other legal proceedings.  
2. Member States shall promote measures to encourage offenders to provide 
adequate compensation to victims. 
 
Additionally, similar to the EU Framework Decision on Victims,3476 the 
EU Directive on Victims provides for the victims’ right to return of property 
seized in criminal proceedings.3477 As compensation from the offender may 
become very difficult as (s)he is not identified or even when identified there are 
many obstacles for doing so,3478 an alternative for victims is compensation from 
the State, the so-called Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme administered by 
the Criminal Injury Compensation Authority (CICA).3479 Indeed, the European 
 
3473 Ibid., 231. 
3474 See respectively Recommendation (1985)11, guidelines 10 and 11; UN Victims’ Declaration, 
principle 9.  
3475 EU Framework Decision on Victims, article 9. Right to compensation in the course of criminal 
proceedings (‘1. Each Member State shall ensure that victims of criminal acts are entitled to obtain 
a decision within reasonable time limits on compensation by the offender in the course of criminal 
proceedings, except where, in certain cases, national law provides for compensation to be awarded 
in another manner. 2. Each Member State shall take appropriate measures to encourage the 
offender to provide adequate compensation to victims’.).  
3476 Ibid., article 9 (3) (‘Unless urgently required for the purpose of criminal proceedings, 
recoverable property belonging to victims which is seized in the course of criminal proceedings 
shall be returned to them without delay’.).  
3477 EU Directive on Victims, article 15. Right to the return of property (‘Member States shall 
ensure that, following a decision by a competent authority, recoverable property which is seized in 
the course of criminal proceedings is returned to victims without delay, unless required for the 
purposes of criminal proceedings. The conditions or procedural rules under which such property 
is returned to the victims shall be determined by national law’.). 
3478 Doak (2008) 227.  
3479 Martin Partington, Introduction to the English Legal System (Oxford University Press 2012) 
140. 
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Union Council Directive Relating to Compensation to Crime Victims (EU 
Council Directive on Compensation) states the existence of national schemes of 
compensation:  
 
All Member States shall ensure that their national rules provide for the existence 
of a scheme on compensation to victims of violent intentional crimes 
committed in their respective territories, which guarantees fair and appropriate 
compensation to victims.3480  
 
However, the CICA scheme (like the Directive) is restricted to victims 
injured as result of violent criminal acts, which has been criticized as seemingly 
introducing a distinction ‘between deserving and undeserving victims’.3481 The 
compensation provided by the State limited to serious crimes is also a feature 
shared with the European Convention on Compensation for Violent Crime 
Victims, which additionally establishes that compensation has to be awarded via 
state schemes even when the perpetrator cannot be prosecuted or punished.3482 
In any case, compensation for victims of the London Bombings in July 2005 and 
the immediate relatives of those who were killed was available from the CICA.3483 
It should be noticed that, as consequence of amendments in the Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victims Act (2004), courts when making a compensation 
order may require sums obtained from the offender to be used by the 
Compensation Injuries Fund when there has been given an award from the 
Fund.3484   
Like in other domestic systems, the existence of, inter alia, state 
immunities can preclude victims from receiving damages on civil claims 
proceedings, as determined by the ECtHR in Al Adsani v. United Kingdom, a 
case concerning allegations of torture.3485 It must be also said that the law of torts 
is not examined as it exceeds the scope of this thesis. However, some very general 
and brief references to tort/civil litigation are included in the sections 
 
3480 Council Directive 2004/80/EC Relating to Compensation to Crime Victims, 29 April 2004, 
article 12 (2). 
Concerning the access to compensation, in cross-border situations, article 2 of the Directive lays 
down that ‘Compensation shall be paid by the competent authority of the Member State on whose 
territory the crime was committed’.   
3481 Doak (2008) 228. See also Partington (2012) 140.   
3482 See European Convention on Compensation for Violent Crime Victims, articles 2-3 and 5-6. 
3483 Lewis and Ellis (2006) 15.  
3484 Partington (2012) 141.  
3485 ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 35763/97, 21 November 2001, para. 66.    
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corresponding to the English and American systems. In any case, it can be 
mentioned here that:  
 
The paradigm of tort consists of an act or omission by the defendant which 
causes damage to the claimant. The damage must be caused by the fault of the 
defendant and must be a kind of harm recognised as attracting legal liability.  
This model can be represented: act (or omission) + causation + protected 
interest + damage = liability.3486   
 
Under the law of torts, a irrecoverable consequential loss for the 
claimant is one that is ‘too remote’ or ‘not proximately caused’ by the 
defendant’s wrong, i.e., a ‘remoteness’ test or ‘proximate cause’ is the test 
used.3487 Finally, it should be noted that, under the Human Rights Act (1998), a 
person claiming that a public authority has acted or proposes to act in a way 
incompatible with the ECHR may bring free-standing proceedings under the Act 
at a competent tribunal or court or may rely on the ECHR in any other legal 
proceedings being brought, provided that (s)he would be a ‘victim’ of the 
unlawful act for purposes of article 34 of the ECHR.3488 In any case, damages 
‘may be awarded only by a court which has power to award damages, or to order 
the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings’.3489 Accordingly, damages 
may not be awarded by a criminal court.3490       
 
2.1.2. American Adversarial System 
To begin with, victims are not technically speaking reparations claimants in 
criminal proceedings although they can benefit of restitution orders. Thus, 
offenders are normally ordered by the competent court to pay restitution to 
his/her victims.3491 The Federal CVRA states that a crime victim has ‘The right to 
full and timely restitution as provided in law’.3492 The restitution award is 
generally governed by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) of 
 
3486 John Cooke, The Law of Tort (8th edn. Pearson 2007) 4. This basic pattern has of course some 
variations such as torts which do not require fault known as torts of strict liability. See Ibid. Loc. 
cit.  
3487 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press 2007) 152.  
3488 See Human Rights Act (1998), sections 7 (1) (a), 7 (1) (b), 7 (3) and 7 (7). As for case law of the 
UK Supreme Court, see, e.g., G (AP) (Appellant) v Scottish Ministers and another (Respondents) 
(Scotland) [2013] UKSC 79.       
3489 Human Rights Act (1998), section 8 (2).  
3490 Emmerson, Ashworth and MacDonald (2012) 203.    
3491 Human Rights Watch (2008) 30.  
3492 18 USC § 3 771 (a) (6).  
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1996,3493 and the earlier Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) (1982).3494 
Under the MVRA, a court is required to enter a restitution order for each 
defendant without regard to the defendant’s economic circumstances in every 
case that involves a conviction for certain listed crimes.3495 While under 
previously discretionary statutes, restitution was discretionary with the court, the 
CVRA makes restitution a victim’s right and, hence, discretion on this issue does 
not exist anymore.3496 However, as established in In re W.R. Huff Asset 
Management Co., LLC, the CVRA does not provide any (restitution) right 
against an individual who has not been convicted.3497 Nevertheless, it was also 
found that neither the government nor the sentencing court is prevented by the 
CVRA from effecting reasonable settlement or restitution measures directed 
against non-convicted defendants.3498  
The term ‘crime victim’ under the CVRA has been interpreted in case 
law as ‘a person must be directly harmed as a result of the offense and the harm 
must be proximate to the crime’ and it has also been established that ‘proximate 
cause’ emphasizes ‘the continuity of the sequence that “produces an event and 
refers to a cause of which the law will take notice”’.3499 Thus, ‘the harm must 
“proximately” result from the crime’.3500 Besides CVRA’s victim definition, 
previously examined in further detail,3501 it is relevant to notice the definition of 
‘victim’ for restitution effects under the MVRA, which reads as follows:  
 
[…] a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of 
an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an 
offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal 
activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. In the case of a victim who is 
under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal 
guardian of the victim or representative of the victim’s estate, another family 
member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, may assume 
the victim’s rights under this section.   
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3493 18 USC § 3 663A (a) (2). 
3494 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580.  
3495 See for further details Kyl, Twist and Higgins (2005) 610.   
3496 Ibid., 611.  
3497 In re W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., LLC, 409 F.3d 555, 558–64 (2d Cir. 2005).  
3498 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3499 United States v. Hunter, 2008 WL 53125 (D. Utah 2008).   
3500 In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1225 (10th Cir. 2008) (Judge Tymkovich concurring).  
3501 See supra Chapter IV 2.1.2.  
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This provision was, for instance, interpreted in United States v. Bedonie, 
which stressed the proximate cause standard (‘proximately harmed’) and that 
those persons who ‘may assume the victim’s rights’ when the victim is deceased 
do not become the victim as they are considered mere representatives of the 
victim under the statute.3502 In United States v. Johnson, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals concluded that a District Court, under the MVRA, was required to 
order restitution even when the victim did not accept the restitution as the 
purpose underlying the MVRA did not only consist in the compensation of 
victims but also the punishment of offenders. In this particular case, as the 
victim refused the money, the court directed that the perpetrator pay restitution 
to the Federal Crime Victims Fund.3503 Similar to most states, federal legislation 
prohibits monetary damages for violations.3504    
In almost all states, the court that imposes a criminal sentence can order 
a convicted to make restitution to the victim and, in some states, victims even 
hold a constitutional right to restitution.3505 However, many offenders lack funds 
to afford the restitution ordered by the court. On the other hand, all but two 
states permit victims to enforce restitution orders via a civil judgment. In turn, 
state systems of crime victim compensation seek to supplement or act instead of 
restitution that cannot or will not be provided directly by offenders.3506 This is 
organized in most states via state compensation funds.3507 Many states have 
passed laws prohibiting defendants from profiting from their crimes.3508 
However, the United States Supreme Court found the New York statute 
transferring any profits to crime victims unconstitutional.3509 As restitution 
obligations are part of a criminal judgment, it has been suggested the penal 
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3502 United States v. Bedonie 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004).   
3503 United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2004).   
3504 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 730. 
3505 Ibid., 607. As for constitutions, under which there is a right to restitution see, for example, 
Illinois Constitution, article I, § 8.1 (‘Crime victims, as defined by law shall have the following 
rights as provided by law: (10) The right to restitution’); South Carolina Constitution, article I, § 
24; Michigan Constitution, article I, § 24 (1).   
3506 Human Rights Watch (2008) 30, 31. 
3507 Ibid., 31.  
3508 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 618. 
3509 Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991). Since then, courts 
have struggled to establish the constitutionality of state laws so as to comply with the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision. Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 618.     
		

nature of restitution.3510 A restitution order can be converted into a civil 
judgment in most states and under federal statutes.3511    
As for civil jurisdiction, a class action, which consists in a civil lawsuit of 
a large group of victims with similar legal claims, may be brought collectively in 
federal or state courts.3512 Thus, a large unnamed group of plaintiffs is 
represented by a smaller, named group of plaintiffs, or even one single plaintiff 
and the link between the named plaintiffs and those unmanned consists in a 
shared legal grievance.3513 The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),3514 provides a legal 
basis for United States Federal Courts to hear civil claims against persons 
allegedly responsible for serious human rights abuses.3515 Starting with the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, it has been 
held that conduct which violates the ‘law of nations’ under the ATCA includes 
human rights abuses prohibited by customary international law.3516 The United 
States Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, cited with approval Filartiga 
and other cases which have permitted claims for violations of ‘specific, universal 
and obligatory’ international norms.3517 This litigation has also been exercised by 
class action suit, due to the large number of victims, for example, in Kadić v. 
Karadžić, where it was found that the ACTA ratione materiae scope may cover 
international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.3518  
Lastly, but equally important, the United States Government has granted 
compensation for specific groups of victims, e.g., the ‘September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund of 2001’ or the Office of Redress Administration (1988) for 
Japanese-Americans interned during the Second World War.3519 Based on 
 
3510 Thompson v. Hewitt, 311 B.R. 415 (E.D. Penn. 2004).  
3511 Beloof, Cassell and Twist (2010) 617.    
3512 As for federal law, see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23. 
3513 Zegveld (2010) 97. 
3514 28 USC § 1350. The other acts are: Torture Victim Protection Act (T 28 USC § 1350 note), the 
Anti-Terrorism Act (18 USC § 2333); and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (28 USC § 1330 
et seq.).   
3515 REDRESS, Enforcing Reparations: Enforcement of Awards for Victims of Torture and Other 
International Crimes (May 2006) 60.  
3516 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980) 
3517 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).   
3518 Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F. 3d 232, 242-243 (2nd Cir.. 1995). See also Ilaria Bottigliero, Redress for 
Victims of Crimes Under International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 57-62.   
3519 See, for further details, respectively Samuel Issacharoff and Anna Morawiec Mansfield, 
‘Compensation for the Victims of September 11’ in Greiff (2006) 284-320; Erik Yamamoto and 
Liann Ebesugawa, ‘Report on Redress: The Japanese American Internment’ in Greiff (2006) 257-
283.      
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agreements adopted by the United States with Germany and Austria, Germany 
and Austria set up funds to award compensation to victims of the Second World 
War crimes.3520 
 
2.1.3. French Inquisitorial System 
To obtain reparations from the offender, victims can present their requests 
before the civil judge or the criminal judge according to article 4 of the CPP ‘The 
civil action for reparation of damage caused by the infraction foreseen in article 
2 can be exercised before a civil jurisdiction separated from the public action’.3521 
The rule is that the selection of a civil court is irrevocable, i.e., according to 
article 5 of the CPP, the victim who has brought his/her action before the 
competent civil court may not bring it before the criminal court. However, under 
articles 4 and 5 of the CPP, when the public prosecutor has referred the case to a 
criminal court (the criminal action then puts the civil action on hold), the victim 
may join his/her action to the public action provided that the competent court 
has not yet judged the case.3522 Thus, the civil case must be adjourned until the 
criminal court reaches a decision,3523 and the civil judge cannot reach a decision 
contrary to the criminal court’s decision.3524     
One of the two objectives for civil party constitution is to obtain 
reparation for the damage inflicted, i.e., the civil action before a criminal 
court.3525 As discussed,3526 the object of civil action before criminal jurisdiction is 
to obtain reparation for damages. Although the civil party constitution and the 
civil action as such should not be confused, there is doctrinal consensus 
concerning the dual repressive and reparative finality of civil party’s constitution 
and participation.3527 As examined,3528 a claim for reparations is not required for 
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3520 See Henckaerts and Doswald Beck (2005) 543.   
3521 CPP, article 4 (‘L'action civile en réparation du dommage causé par l'infraction prévue par 
l'article 2 peut être exercée devant une juridiction civile, séparément de l'action publique’.). See also 
Yann-Matthias Dazin, ‘La Situation Française, à L’Épreuve Des Droits Allemand et Suisse’ in 
Strickler (2009) 177, 189.   
3522 CPP, articles 4 and 5. See also Dervieux (2002) 227.   
3523 CPP, article 4.  
3524 In application of respectively the principles le criminel tient le civil en état, and the precedency 
of criminal proceedings over civil litigation. See Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 319. However, 
although the principle le criminel tient le civil en état remains in place, it has been restricted by 
amendments to article 4-1. See Yves Strickler, ‘Post-Face’ in Strickler (2009) 263, 266.      
3525 Dervieux (2002) 227.   
3526 See supra Chapter IV 2.1.3. 
3527 See supra Chapter IV 2.1.3. 
3528 See supra Chapter IV 2.1.3.  
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civil party constitution. Be that as it may, the admissibility of the civil action does 
not automatically imply that damages will be awarded to the victim.3529    
In general, a natural person brings a civil action before a criminal court 
in order to obtain compensation for personal, direct harm caused to him/her.3530 
Article 2 of the CPP explicitly states that the civil action aims at repairing ‘the 
damage suffered because of a felony, a misdemeanor or a petty offence [and it] is 
open to all those who have personally suffered damage directly caused by the 
offence’.3531 Accordingly, there is a required direct causal link between the crime 
and the damage inflicted. This provision is complemented by article 85 of the 
CPP whereby any individual who claims to have suffered harm out of a felony or 
a misdemeanor may request to become civil party by filling a complaint with the 
competent investigating judge. As a general rule, compensation of the victim by 
a criminal court presupposes the conviction of the accused.3532 Also, the Criminal 
Chamber of the Cour de Cassation has stated that a criminal court lacks 
competence over a civil action, i.e., reparations for damages, already decided on 
merits concerning the public (criminal) action.3533 
According to the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, not only 
direct victims can become civil parties and, hence, to claim reparations but also 
their next of kin as they suffer a direct and personal harm out of a crime and 
even they can become civil parties and, therefore, become reparations claimants 
regardless of whether the direct victim is alive.3534 Next of kin’s personal harm 
has hence been understood as their own harm, different from the harm inflicted 
to the direct victim, i.e., the next of kin suffers a direct and personal harm out of 
the harm inflicted on the direct victim.3535 Losses and injuries may be of a 
material, moral or both nature, and the victim’s right may be transferred to 
his/her heirs, assignees, creditors and also third parties.3536 However, the Cour de 
Cassation has been more restrictive as the admissibility of heirs’ civil action at 
criminal courts, and thus their chances to obtain reparations in criminal 
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3529 Dervieux (2002) 237. 
3530 Ibid., 226.  
3531 ‘L'action civile en réparation du dommage causé par un crime, un délit ou une contravention 
appartient à tous ceux qui ont personnellement souffert du dommage directement causé par 
l'infraction’.  
3532 Dervieux (2002) 227.  
3533 Crim., 9 September 2008, Arrêt n°4701(07-87.207).         
3534 Crim., 9 February 1989, arrêt Latil-Janet, D., 1989, somm. comm.., p. 389, note J. Pradel; Crim., 
23 May 1991, Bull. crim. n° 220; D., 1992, somm. comm.., p. 95, note J.Pradel; Crim., 11 July 1994, 
Bull. crim. n° 269; J.C.P., 1995, II, 22441, note F. Eudier. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 250-251.    
3535 Pignoux (2008) 250-251.  
3536 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 319.  
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proceedings, has been subject to the requirements of having the action started by 
the direct (immediate) victim or the Public Ministry.3537  
Concerning crimes (felonies), cour d’assises, which has jurisdiction over 
them,3538 rules on any civil party’s claims for damages against the accused.3539 
Even in acquittal or when there is exemption of penalty, the court may endorse 
the civil party’s claim for compensation for the damage caused by the accused’s 
fault provided that it is clear that the accused has committed a civil wrong and, 
therefore, the damage comes from the matters of which (s)he was accused based 
on the CPP,3540 and on jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de 
Cassation.3541 Restitution of articles may be ordered by the court on its own 
motion.3542 Individuals convicted of the same felony are jointly responsible for 
restitution and compensation for damages, and the court may determine that if 
one of the co-accused is surrounded by insolvent co-principals or accomplices, 
(s)he is jointly liable to pay the fines imposed.3543 In cases of individuals found 
guilty of genocide or crimes against humanity, the Criminal Code provides for 
forfeiture of some or of all of their assets.3544  
There is a penalty named ‘sanction-reparation’,3545 which consists in ‘the 
obligation for the convicted, within the deadline and according to the modalities 
established by the jurisdiction, the compensation of prejudice of the victim’.3546 
This can be pronounced instead or in addition to the imprisonment penalty or 
fine, and, based on the provision text, the sanction-reparation may be susceptible 
to benefit victims who have not been constituted civil parties.3547 The acquittal by 
the tribunal correctionnel or the tribunal de police (misdemeanors and 
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3537 Crim., 27 April 2004, J.C.P., 2004, II, 10175, note L. Boré, J. De Salve de Bruneton; R.S.C., 2004, 
pp. 804-905, obs. D-N. Commaret. See also Ass. Plén. 9 may 2008, 2 arrêts (rulings), J.C.P., 2008, 
II, 10124, note J-Y. Maréchal. Cited by Pignoux (2008) 252.     
3538 Dervieux (2002) 231.  
3539 CPP, article 371. 
3540 Ibid., article 372. 
3541 Crim., 14 January 1981, Bull. crim. n° 24. Cited by Dervieux (2002) 227.   
3542 CPP, article 373. The court can also order the perpetrator to pay the civil party the sums it 
establishes to compensate the costs spent by the civil party and not paid by the State. See Ibid., 
article 375.    
3543 Ibid., article 375-2. 
3544 Criminal Code, article 231-1, 221-9, 3° and 131-21. 
3545 Pignoux (2008) 158. 
3546 Criminal Code, article 131-8-1 (‘La sanction-réparation consiste dans l'obligation pour le 
condamné de procéder, dans le délai et selon les modalités fixés par la juridiction, à 
l'indemnisation du préjudice de la victime’.). 
3547 Pignoux (2008) 158.  
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contraventions respectively3548) of an individual accused of an offence that does 
not require evidence of intention does not constitute obstacle to the court 
awarding damages.3549 France’s Law of Armed Conflict Manual restates article 
1382 of the Civil Code on civil liability and provides that ‘this implies that 
someone who has not been held criminally liable must nevertheless provide 
reparation for the damage caused’.3550 
Lastly, but equally important, in addition to the civil action exercised 
either before a civil or criminal jurisdiction, public structures, i.e., state 
compensation schemes, such as the Commission d’indemnisation des victimes 
d’infractions (CIVI),3551 presided by a judge,3552 and the fonds de garantie multiply 
reparations avenues for victims.3553 Thus, victims of terrorist acts, individuals 
whose lives have been threatened or physically damaged, those sexually attacked 
and certain victims of theft, fraud or breach of trust can obtain full 
compensation for the damage resulting from these offences from the State.3554 
Damages are allocated by a committee with the characteristics of a civil court 
and they are paid out of a guarantee fund subrogated in the victim’s right to get 
reimbursement of the compensation paid from the convicted person.3555 If the 
CIVI compensates the victim, it is subrogated into the victim’s right to claim 
damages from the offender.3556 In practice, state compensation schemes have 
been said to be much more effective than individual victims’ actions.3557 
According to the Civil Chamber of the Cour de Cassation, the avenue of 
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3548 Dervieux (2002) 230-231.  
3549 CPP, article 470-1, para. 1. Additionally, article 4-1 of the CPP states that where negligence in 
the criminal sense (faute pénale intentionnelle) is not proved, it does not preclude a civil court from 
granting damages under article 1383 of the Civil Code. See Dervieux (2002) 227.  
3550 Law of Armed Conflict Manual (2001) 422. Article 1382 of the Civil Code states that ‘Any act of 
man, which causes damages to another, shall oblige the person by whose fault it occurred to repair 
it’ (‘Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute 
duquel il est arrive, à le réparer’.). In addition, Article 1383 provides that ‘One shall be liable not 
only by reason of one’s acts, but also by reason of one’s imprudence or negligence’ (‘Chacun est 
responsable du dommage qu'il a causé non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa négligence 
ou par son imprudence’.).  
3551 Compensation Commission for Crime Victims.  
3552 The so-called ’Juge Délégué aux Victimes (JUVEDI). See Cario (2010) 13-14.   
3553 Dazin (2009) 190.  
3554 CPP, 706-3 et seq. See also Dervieux (2002) 227. 
3555 CPP, 706-3 et seq. See also Dervieux (2002) 227. 
3556 CPP, 706-11. 
3557 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 315. 
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compensation examined in this paragraph is autonomous and subject to its own 
rules.3558 
 
2.2. The ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL  
2.2.1. Absence of Reparations Claimant Status 
The ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL do not have the mandate to issue 
reparations orders against the convicted person in favor of victims of the crimes 
upon which the offenders are found guilty. Therefore, at the ICTY, the ICTR, the 
SCSL, and the STL, victims lack the status of reparations claimants although they 
may benefit as witnesses of some limited rehabilitative measures as detailed 
later.3559   
Even at the STL where, as seen, victims can apply for and be granted the 
victim participant status, victims do not possess the reparations claimant status. 
This feature was emphasized by the former President of the STL, Antonio 
Cassese, when, by comparing the situation of victim participants before the STL 
with that of civil parties, illustratively concluded that ‘the main raison d'être of 
“parties civiles”, namely their participation in criminal proceedings for the 
purpose of seeking compensation is removed’.3560 The victim participant status 
thus shaped was determined by the Secretary-General’s Report on the 
establishment of the STL where it was stated that ‘the participation of victims as 
“parties civiles” [is] absent’, i.e., victim participants at the STL cannot claim 
reparations before the STL.3561 Accordingly, the STL trial proceedings aim at 
determining the accused’s responsibility but not the determination of 
compensation, one modality of reparations, in favor of victim participants.3562 
The fact that at the STL proceedings lack of victims’ status as reparations 
claimants co-exists with the victims’ status as victim participants (previously 
examined) evidences the possibility that these two dimensions of victims’ status, 
i.e., as reparations claimants and as participants, are autonomous although they 
are normally closely interconnected, which is the case of the ICC and especially 
at the ECCC as for civil parties. This also shows the several options when 
engineering the dimensions that victims’ status may consist of at international 
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3558 Cour de Cassation, Second Civil Chamber, 25 May 1987. Cited by Association des Paralysées 
de France- Conseil Technique National, Les Victimes d’Infractions Pénales, Circulaire No. 130 (19 
November 2008) 13.  
3559 See infra Chapter V 4.2.1. 
3560 STL President (2010), para 15. See also STL President (2012), para. 15. 
3561 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
S/2006/893, 15 November 2006, para. 32.   
3562 STL President (2010), para. 16; STL President (2012), para. 16.    
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and hybrid criminal courts, as expressed by the Secretary-General on the 
establishment of the STL ‘The statute also protects the rights of victims whose 
personal interests are affected and, while not recognizing them as “parties 
civiles”, it permits their views and concerns to be presented and considered at all 
stages of the proceedings’.3563 
Although victims lack the status as reparations claimants before these 
tribunals, another feature common to them is that their legal instruments only 
envisage a system where victims may claim compensation at the national level 
based on a condemnatory judgment from these tribunals, i.e., delegation to 
national courts.3564 The relevant proceedings are discussed in detail later.3565 
What should be criticized here is that those provisions assume the existence of 
financial resources available for compensation at the domestic level, existence of 
national legislation and that there is a competent domestic body to grant 
compensation.3566 Problems on applying these proceedings are evidenced by the 
fact that, as far as it is known, no national domestic compensation claim has 
been grounded on a judgment from these tribunals. Indeed, the title of rule 106 
of the ICTY ‘Compensation to Victims’ (and the respective equivalent provisions 
in the other courts) is misleading.3567 Thus, even though it may imply that the 
ICTY (and the other courts) can give compensation to victims, in reality they 
neither hold the authority to decide on the amount to be awarded nor to direct 
States to grant compensation.3568 In any case, as detailed later,3569 under article 25 
(1) of the STL Statute ‘The Special Tribunal may identify victims who have 
suffered harm as a result of the commission of crimes by an accused convicted 
by the Tribunal’. For identifying purposes that may later lead to compensation 
claims in a national court, as remarked by Cassese, victim participation at the 
STL ‘may prove of enormous value’.3570 Due to the fact that the STL has not 
started its first trial at the time of writing this thesis, this option remains to be 
seen.  
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3563 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
S/2006/893, 15 November 2006, para. 31.   
3564 See ICTY RPE, rule 106; ICTR RPE, rule 106; SCSL RPE, rule 105; and STL Statute, article 25. 
3565 See infra Chapter V 3.2.1.  
3566 Heikkilä (2004) 175-176.  
3567 Susanne Malmström, ‘Restitution of Property and Compensation to Victims’ in Richard May et 
al. (eds.), Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 
(Kluwer Law International 2001) 373, 380. 
3568 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3569 See infra Chapter V 3.2.1. 
3570 STL President (2010), para. 16. See also STL President (2012), para. 16.   
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It should be noticed that victims who have not been identified by the 
STL may also use the condemnatory judgment to seek compensation at the 
national level.3571 This is explicitly stated in rule 86 (G), which reads as follows:   
 
Any person identified in a final judgment as a victim, or otherwise considering 
himself or herself victim, who has suffered harm as a result of the commission 
of crimes by an accused convicted by the Tribunal may request from the 
Registrar a certified copy of the judgment for the purpose of exercising his or 
her rights under national or other relevant law, as provided by Article 25 of the 
Statute. 
 
Moreover, the STL Appeals Chamber has explicitly stated that the victim 
participant status ‘is not a condition-precedent of a victim’s ability to seek 
compensation in a national court under Article 25 and Rule 86 (G)’.3572 The 
Appeals Chamber has also concluded that the extent to which a domestic court 
can rely on determination on victim participant status in a STL’s final judgment 
is properly a matter for that court.3573 Therefore, as determined by the STL 
Appeals Chamber: 
 
Under Article 25 of the Statute and Rule 86 (G) of the Rules, persons who have 
suffered harm as the result of the commission of crimes by an accused convicted 
by the Tribunal may bring an action in a national criminal court in order to 
obtain compensation, if they are identified as victims in the final judgment, or 
otherwise consider themselves to be victims. Article 25 (1) gives the Tribunal 
the specific power to identify victims who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of crimes by an accused convicted by the Tribunal.3574    
 
As discussed later,3575 and referred to at the beginning of this subsection, 
some limited rehabilitative measures have been provided at these tribunals. In 
particular, a ‘Support Programme for Witnesses and Potential Witnesses’ (2000-
2002) set up by the ICTR’s Gender Issues and Assistance to Victims Unit, 
involved some (limited) rehabilitative measures, such as physical rehabilitation 
or psychological counseling, at the ICTR (operated by NGOs and financed by 
the ICTR’s Voluntary Trust Fund) but only for witnesses or potential 
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3571 STL Chambers (2010b) para. 20. 
3572 Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR126.3), 10 April 2013, para. 34.  
3573 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3574 Ibid., para. 33.  
3575 See infra Chapter V 4.2.1.  
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witnesses.3576 This program, once cancelled, was followed by the setting up of a 
medical unit for witnesses, primarily in the context of medical HIV/AIDS 
treatment in sexual crimes cases.3577 In other words, some rehabilitation was 
provided to victims but based on their status as witnesses rather than on a 
reparations claimant status, which is inexistent at these tribunals. Besides so, 
victims at these tribunals may receive some witness allowances,3578 but they are 
once again given on their status as witnesses and not as properly speaking 
reparations claimant. Moreover, such allowances are negligible considering the 
costs of the crimes caused to the victims.3579            
At the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL according to articles 24 (3), 23 (3) 
and 19 (3) of their Statutes respectively, in addition to imprisonment, the 
respective Trial Chamber as a penalty ‘may order the return of any property and 
proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their 
rightful owners’. The wording used in the case of the SCSL is slightly different, 
being the most important difference that restitution can also be made to Sierra 
Leone ‘the Trial Chamber may order the forfeiture of the property proceeds and 
any assets acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct, and their return to their 
rightful owner or to the State of Sierra Leone’. This penalty is further developed 
under the RPE of these tribunals, which is examined later.3580 What needs to be 
stated here is that victims have no standing to request restitution before the 
Chamber as this request corresponds to the Prosecutor or can be taken by the 
Chamber on its own motion.3581 Accordingly, victims lack the status of 
reparations claimant in these proceedings. The most accessible and direct 
manner whereby victims may receive restitution of property is seemingly via a 
Trial Chamber’s order on the identification of the rightful owner,3582 on the 
balance of probabilities.3583 Indeed, potential beneficiaries are not limited to 
those victims who testified. However, similar to the delegation to national 
proceedings concerning compensation, as far as it is known, there has not been a 
Chamber’s order to restitute property or proceeds to the rightful owner.3584 
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3576 Brouwer (2005) 401 
3577 Ibid., 403.  
3578 See, e.g., ICTY, Directive on Allowances for Witnesses and Expert Witnesses, Doc. IT/200, 5 
December 2001, articles 7-14. 
3579 Heikkilä (2004) 179. 
3580 See infra Chapter V 3.2.1 and 4.2.1.   
3581 ICTY RPE, rule 98 ter (B); ICTR RPE, rule 88 (B); and SCSL RPE, rule 88 (B).  
3582 Brouwer (2005) 396.  
3583 ICTY RPE, rule 105 (D); ICTR RPE, rule 105 (D).  
3584 See OSCE-ODIHR/ICTY/UNICRI, International Criminal Law and Practice Training 
Materials: Sentencing (2011b) 12; Khan and Dixon (2009) 1379; Guénael Mettraux, International 
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Therefore, this mechanism has also remained dead letter. In any case, restitution 
(as a penalty) is subject to the accused’s conviction and, hence, can only be given 
after a judgment of conviction as determined by the ICTR when it rejected 
amicus curiae on restitution of property and/or compensation filed by the 
Belgian and Rwanda Governments,3585 and by the NGO African Concern.3586 The 
ICTR considered that the amicus curiae were filed too early in the process and/or 
victims cannot appear as plaintiffs.3587 For example, when the ICTR rejected the 
Belgian Government’s request that Belgian victims appear before the ICTR not 
as witnesses but as plaintiffs.3588 Lastly, but equally important, under the STL 
RPE, only imprisonment may be imposed on the convicted.3589        
Finally, the instruments of these courts establish that only victims who 
have suffered injury or harm as a result of a crime based upon which the accused 
has been convicted, or someone claiming on behalf of a victim, may claim 
compensation from the convicted in a domestic court or other body. Therefore, 
victims of crimes not addressed by the courts are excluded from the provisions 
of the courts.3590 However, the reference to the causal link is general, i.e., no 
direct causal link is explicitly required as the wording of the respective 
provisions are that ‘the accused guilty of a crime which has caused injury to a 
victim’ (ICTY, ICTR and SCSL RPE),3591 and ‘victims who have suffered harm as 
a result of the commission of crimes by an accused convicted by the Tribunal’ 
(STL Statute).3592 
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Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2005) 358 (‘The practical difficulties 
involved in such a process […] appear to have deterred all Trial Chambers from any attempt to 
apply that provision [return/restitution of property] […] despite the fact that several Chambers 
have had ample opportunity to do so’.).  
3585 See respectively Bagosora (ICTR-96-7-T), 6 June 1998 (dealing with restitution and 
compensation); Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-T), 13 October 2004, para. 6 (dealing with 
restitution). See also Brouwer (2005) 397.  
3586 Musema (ICTR-96-13-T), Decision on an Application by African Concern to Leave to Appear 
as Amicus Curiae, Trial Chamber, 17 March 1999 (restitution); Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-T), 
Decision on Amicus Curiae Request by African Concern, Trial Chamber, 23 March 2004 
(restitution).    
3587 Brouwer (2005) 397. See also supra Chapter IV 4.2.2.  
3588 Bagosora (ICTR-96-7-T), 6 June 1998 (restitution and compensation).   
3589 STL RPE, rule 172.   
3590 Brouwer (2005) 398.  
3591 ICTY RPE, rule 106 (A); ICTR RPE, rule 106 (A); SCSL RPE, rule 105 (A).   
3592 STL Statute, article 25 (1).  
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2.2.2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo   
Bearing in mind both the legal and factual limitations in these courts, a logic 
question was to think over about the need to reform the system in place at these 
judicial institutions so that victims may become compensation claimants before 
them. These initiatives were particularly debated at the ICTY and the ICTR. 
Nonetheless, they were unsuccessful as examined herein.  
Former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and the ICTR, Carla del Ponte, 
several times tried to enhance the indirect system of compensation, and also 
victims’ participation at the ICTY and the ICTR.3593 At the ICTY, after being 
requested by del Ponte,3594 the tribunal commissioned the Rules Committee to 
further study this issue and the ICTY Judges agreed with the conclusions on the 
Committee’s Report, which established that victims of crimes within the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction ‘have a legal right to seek compensation for their injuries’.3595 
Nevertheless, the problem once again was to determine at which forum and how 
to implement this right. The Committee’s Report proposed that the ICTY’s 
President recommend to both the Secretary General and Security Council a 
claims commission as a suitable mechanism to compensate victims of the crimes 
in the former Yugoslavia.3596 However, the Rules Committee was reluctant to any 
amendment to the ICTY’s Statute and RPE to introduce a compensation 
mechanism within the tribunal as the Committee considered it as a very difficult 
approach based on the following grounds: i) increase in the Chamber’s workload 
and further exacerbation of the length of the proceedings, affecting the accused’s 
right to a fair and expeditious trial; ii) difficult implementation; iii) going 
contrary to the ICTY’s main objective, i.e., prosecuting those individuals 
responsible for the crimes in the Former Yugoslavia; iv) funding problems for 
the compensation scheme, in particular considering that many of the accused 
have few resources.3597  
The ICTY Judges finally upheld the Committee’s recommendations and 
communicated them to the UN Secretary-General who in turn submitted the 
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3593 See, inter alia, ICTY, Eighth Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/56/352-S/2001/865, 17 
September 2001, para. 49.  
3594 ICTY, Press Release, The 22nd Plenary Session of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, JL/P.I.S./518-e, The Hague, 17 July 2000.  
3595 ICTY Rules Committee, Victims’ Compensation and Participation (2000), Section IV. See also 
ICTY, Eighth Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/56/352-S/2001/865, 17 September 2001, 
para. 49.  
3596 ICTY Rules Committee, Victims’ Compensation and Participation (2000), Section IV.  
3597 Ibid., Loc. cit. See also Brouwer (2005) 407. 
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recommendations to the Security Council.3598 Hence, the ICTY’s mandate was 
not extended to include the payment of compensation to victims of crimes 
perpetrated by those convicted by it. Even though the ICTY Judges 
acknowledged the existence of a right to compensation for victims under 
international law,3599 they considered that the implementation of a compensation 
system in the ICTY would have had a major negative impact on the workload of 
the different organs of the tribunal and on the lengths of trials besides financial 
difficulties and potential inequity among victims.3600 Therefore, they 
recommended the setting of mechanisms outside the ICTY such as an 
international claims commission.3601   
In turn, at the ICTR, the Judges initially welcomed Prosecutor del 
Ponte’s suggestion on compensation for victims; however, they introduced the 
caveat that amendments to the Statute would be necessary and thus changes to 
the RPE would not be sufficient.3602 Also, the ICTR established that it was not 
responsible for providing compensation for victims.3603 Thus, like at the ICTY, 
the ICTR Judges put forward the setting up of other mechanisms such as: i) a 
UN specialized agency to manage a compensation scheme or trust fund; ii) a 
similar scheme administered by an agency or governmental entity; or iii) an 
arrangement operating in tandem with options (i) and (ii) which would allow 
the ICTR to exercise a limited power to order payments from a trust fund to 
victims appearing before it as witnesses.3604 Moreover, the ICTR Judges 
concluded that a compensation system managed by the tribunal would ‘severely 
hamper the everyday work of the Tribunal and would be highly destructive to 
the principal mandate of the Tribunal’.3605 Nevertheless, the ICTR Judges 
suggested that, alongside those other mechanisms, the tribunal should be given a 
limited power to decide on the payment of compensation to victims who were 
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3598 ICTY, Letter dated 12 October 2000 from the President of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/1063, Annex, 3 November 
2000.    
3599 Ibid., para. 22. 
3600 Ibid., paras. 33-41.     
3601 Ibid., paras. 42-48.   
3602 See ICTY Rules Committee, Victims’ Compensation and Participation (2000), Sections I and 
IIII. See also Brouwer (2005) 406.  
3603 ICTR, Seventh Annual Report of the ICTR, UN Doc. A/57/163-S/2002/733, 2 July 2002, paras. 
90-91. 
3604 ICTR, Letter dated 14 December 2000 from the President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/1198, Annex, 15 
December 2000, para. 4.   
3605 Ibid., para. 15. 
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witnesses at the tribunal from a trust fund but (once again) on the condition to 
amend the ICTR Statute accordingly.3606       
Del Ponte addressing the UN Security Council, pointed out the 
deficiencies in the participation and compensation for victims and, in particular, 
the fact that the system in place at the ICTY and the ICTR fell short of providing 
justice to the populations of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.3607 Moreover, 
she suggested the option to employ frozen assets in the accused’s personal 
accounts to benefit victims.3608 Notwithstanding these attempts to incorporate a 
compensation mechanism, the ICTY and the ICTR Judges were not persuaded 
by these initiatives and, hence, there is no direct compensation mechanism at the 
ICTY or the ICTR.      
Later, although a former President of the ICTR, Judge Pillay, in a speech 
to the UN General Assembly strongly urged the UN Member States to 
compensate victims, she did not suggest implementing a mechanism at the ICTR 
to do so.3609 This restrictive view would also later be endorsed by another former 
President of the ICTR, Judge Møse, who said that the ICTR is not tasked or 
responsible for processing and assessing compensation claims.3610 In turn, Judge 
Claude Jorda, a former President of the ICTY, had considered that a truth 
commission/compensation fund could give reparations to victims since 
reparations ‘is not a priority for the International Tribunal [ICTY]’.3611 
Those restrictive views adopted by the ICTY and the ICTR Judges can be 
criticized. Although the fears of delayed trials if a compensation mechanism 
would have been introduced may be considered as realistic,3612 national 
jurisdictions have demonstrated that it is possible to transcend the 
differentiation between retributive punishment and reparations ordered by the 
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3606 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3607 ICTY, Press Release, Address to the Security Council by Carla del Ponte, Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to the UN Security 
Council, JL/P.I.S./542-e, The Hague, 24 November 2000.  
3608 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3609 ICTR, Office of the President, Statement by the President of the ICTR to the United Nations 
General Assembly by Judge Navannethem Pillay, President, 28 October 2002; ICTR, Office of the 
President, Statement by the President of the ICTR to the United Nations Security Council by Judge 
Navanethem Pillay, 29 October 2002.  
3610 ICTR, Address by Judge Erik Møse, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda to the United Nations General Assembly, 9 October 2003.   
3611 ICTY, The ICTY and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Doc. Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, 17 May 2001.  
3612 See Zegveld (2010) 94-96. 
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court.3613 Moreover, as appropriately remarked by Van Boven, receiving 
reparations during criminal proceedings reports important advantages such as: i) 
the public defendant is not only aware of the commission of his/her crime but 
also of the harm inflicted by him/her on victims; ii) reparations modalities and 
punitive measures are connected; and iii) it helps speed up the process of 
receiving civil damages.3614          
With regard to the SCSL, reparations were not seemingly discussed 
during the process of establishing the SCSL nor was it apparently considered that 
the SCSL could play a role on this regard.3615 
 
2.3. The ICC  
2.3.1. Preliminary Considerations  
The ICC Statute contains the first reparations regime in the history of 
international and hybrid criminal courts. This regime has its legal ground on 
article 75 (Reparations to victims), alongside other dispositions such as article 79 
(establishing a TFV), as complemented by the respective ICC RPE Rules. Thus, 
the first three paragraphs of article 75 read as follows: 
 
1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in 
its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in 
exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss 
and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is 
acting. 
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying 
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court may order that 
the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in 
article 79.  
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3613 Brouwer (2005) 407 (Citing Marc Groenhuijsen, ‘Victims’ Rights and Restorative Justice: 
Piecemeal Reform of the Criminal Justice or a Change of Paradigm? in Hendrik Kaptein and 
Marijke Malsch (eds.), Crime Victims and Justice: Essays on Principles and Practice (Ashgate 
2004) 63, 73); Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 1057-1101.  
3614 Theo Van Boven, ‘The Perspective of the Victim’ in Yael Danieli, Elsa Stamatopoulou, Clarence  
Dias (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Baywood 1999) 13, 21. Cited by Brouwer 
(2005) 407.    
3615 See William Schabas, ‘Reparations Practices in Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’ in Koen de Feyter et al. (eds.), Out of the Ashes. Reparations for Victims of Gross 
and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Intersentia 2005) 289, 295.     
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3. Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall take 
account of presentations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, 
other interested persons or interested States. 
  
Article 75 was developed relatively late in the negotiating process,3616 and 
after some initial opposition,3617 there was a gradual realization of the need for 
recognizing in the ICC Statute that the victims not only have an interest in the 
prosecution of the offenders but also an interest in restorative justice via 
restitution, compensation or other forms of reparation.3618 Accordingly, there 
was a very strong support at the Rome Conference for allowing the ICC to award 
reparations,3619 explained as an effort at rectifying the situation at the ICTY and 
the ICTR.3620 Under article 75 (1) ‘The Court shall establish principles relating to 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation […]’.3621 In Lubanga, Trial Chamber I has for first time established 
these principles,3622 and also the approach to be taken to their implementation in 
its ‘Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to 
Reparations’ (hereinafter ‘reparations decision’). Although this decision is 
limited to the circumstances of the case, i.e., not intended to affect the victims’ 
rights to reparations in other cases,3623 it constitutes a landmark decision in 
sharpening the status of victims as reparations claimants at the ICC and, hence, 
is considered extensively in this chapter. It should also be noticed, as previously 
mentioned,3624 and discussed later,3625 that the Appeals Chamber has considered 
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3616 See Peter Lewis and Håkan Friman, ‘Reparations to Victims’ in Lee (2001) 474, 475. 
3617 See Christopher Muttukumaru, ‘Reparation to Victim’ in Roy S. Lee (ed.). The International 
Criminal Court. The Making of the Rome Statute. Issues, Negotiations, Results (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 262, 263-264.   
3618 See Ibid., 264.  
3619 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.2, paras. 37 (European Union, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus, Iceland, Norway), 58 (Sweden); UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/SR6, paras 10 (Belgium), 69 (Luxemburg), 113 (Rwanda); UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/SR.7, para. 56 (Malawi).    
3620 UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/SR.2, para. 74 (France).  
3621 See also ICC Assembly of States Parties, Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.5, Victims and Affected 
Communities, Reparations and Trust Fund for Victims, 27 November 2013, para. 6; ICC, Report 
of the Bureau on Victims and Affected Communities and the Trust Fund for Victims, Including 
Reparations and Intermediaries-Annex: Draft Resolution on Victims and Affected Communities, 
Reparations and Trust Fund for Victims, ICC-ASP/12/38, 15 October 2013, para. 6.  
3622 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 176. 
3623 Ibid., para. 181.  
3624 See supra Chapter IV 6.3.1. 
3625 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.3.  
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that the nature of the reparations decision is that of a reparations order, mainly 
due to the inclusion of procedural steps on reparations implementation, via the 
TFV, which can be only undertaken once a reparations order has been issued.3626        
Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision stressed that the reparations 
system set up under the ICC Statute and RPE goes beyond the notion of punitive 
justice as it recognizes ‘the need to provide effective remedies for victims’.3627 
Indeed, the ICC reparations scheme is a key feature and, as established by the 
ICC itself, the ICC’s very own success is, to some extent, connected with its 
reparations system.3628 According to the ICC Statute,3629 reparations orders may 
only be made against the convicted person.3630 Therefore, ICC reparations orders 
cannot be issued against States. Not only do reparations oblige those responsible 
to repair the harm caused to the victims but they also provide justice to the 
victims by mitigating the consequences of crimes, relieving the suffering caused 
by crimes, and assist in promoting reconciliation.3631 As applicable law, Trial 
Chamber I, in accordance with article 21 of the ICC Statute (Applicable Law) 
considered not only the ICC instruments but also the right to reparations under 
international human rights law instruments and, in particular, the jurisprudence 
of regional human rights bodies. It is necessary to mention, as Trial Chamber I 
did,3632 that according to article 75 (6) ‘Nothing in this article shall be interpreted 
as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law’, which 
has been interpreted as a message to other courts, at which ICC reparations 
mechanisms might be raised in opposition to other claims.3633 In other words, it 
should in principle be possible for victims to claim reparations, for example, 
both before the ICC (based on criminal responsibility) and a regional human 
rights court (based on international state responsibility). This is also coherent 
with article 25 (4) of the ICC Statute ‘No provision in this Statute relating to 
individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under 
international law’.  
Even though the ICC reparations orders are issued against the convicted 
person, reparations at the ICC are not intended to be punitive in character as 
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3626 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, paras. 51, 53, 55 and 64.  
3627 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 177. 
3628 Ibid., para. 178; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1-US-Exp-Corr), 24 February 2006, para. 150.   
3629 ICC Statute, article 75 (2).  
3630 See also Dwertmann (2010) 68-71; Zegveld (2010) 86 footnote 28. 
3631 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 179. 
3632 Ibid., para. 257.    
3633 Schabas (2010) 883. See also David Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 75 - Reparations to Victims’ in 
Triffterer (2008b) 1399, 1410-1411.   
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article 75 is found in Part 6 of the ICC Statute (‘The Trial’) rather than in Part 7 
(‘Penalties’). Indeed, article 77 (‘Applicable Penalties’) does not refer to 
reparations, as also seen in the travaux préparatoires.3634 As examined later,3635 
although the ICC under its Statute and RPE may order that money and property 
collected through fines under article 77 (2) be transferred to the TFV and, finally, 
provide compensation to the victims, the punitive role of the penalty and the 
restorative role of reparations remain distinct and complementary.3636 Therefore, 
at the ICC, reparations do not pursue to punish the perpetrator but to redress 
the harm inflicted on the victims.3637  
It should be finally added, concerning enforcement of reparations 
orders, that State Parties to the ICC Statute ‘shall give effect to a decision under 
this article as if the provisions of article 109 [Enforcement of fines and forfeiture 
measures] were applicable to this article’.3638 
 
2.3.2. Reparations Claimants  
2.3.2.1. Categories of Reparations Claimants and Beneficiaries: Preliminary 
Observation 
A necessary preliminary observation consists in the use of the expressions 
‘claimants’ and ‘beneficiaries’. At the ICC, victims as reparations claimants will 
logically be reparations beneficiaries if their reparations claims are successful. 
Victims as reparations claimants can request that the reparations benefit also 
goes to inter alia their families as seen later.3639 As discussed in the next 
subsection, victims’ status as reparations claimants (and subsequently 
reparations beneficiaries) exists regardless of whether victims hold the official 
victim participant status. Concerning victims who could not initially claim 
reparations, the ICC may exceptionally initiate reparations proceedings,3640 and, 
thus, victims may be granted reparations without having initially made a request 
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3634 See Proposal by France and the United Kingdom, Committee of the Whole, Rome Conference, 
26 June 1998, A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.28; Report of the Working Group on Penalties, 
Committee of the Whole, Rome Conference, 4 July 1998, A/CONF.183/C.1/WGP/L.14.  
3635 See infra Chapter V 2.3.3.1.  
3636 Conor McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court 
(Cambridge University Press 2012a) 78. See also Conor McCarthy, ‘Victim Redress and 
International Criminal Justice. Competing Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of Justice?’ (2012b) 10 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 351, 361-362.  
3637 McCarthy (2009) 257.  
3638 ICC Statute, article 75 (5). 
3639 See infra Chapter 3.3.1.1. 
3640 ICC RPE, rule 95 (1).  
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at the ICC, which thus proceeds on ‘behalf’ of the victims, as seen later.3641 In any 
case, even when the ICC exceptionally intervenes, reparations beneficiaries have 
first to be identified by it and/or by the TFV and, thus, victims will then have the 
opportunity to claim reparations, following proceedings, as detailed later.3642   
Herein, it should be posed the question concerning the situation of those 
victims, i.e., potential beneficiaries, who could not be identified and could not 
claim reparations and/or for whom no reparations claimant requested 
reparations. These victims will not benefit from individual reparations, in 
particular compensation. Thus, for example, the IACtHR has not ordered 
compensation when it was not possible to individualize victims.3643 When it 
comes to collective reparations, it is argued that victims of the crime(s) based 
upon which the accused was convicted and who could not claim reparations, for 
whom no reparations claimant requested reparations, and/or who could not be 
identified may at least indirectly benefit from some forms of collective symbolic 
reparations such as the delivery of the condemnatory judgment, public apologies 
or construction of a memorial, and from some collective rehabilitative measures 
such as provision of some services for whole victimized communities.   
The previous considerations about a potentially broader scope of 
collective reparations beneficiaries stem from, inter alia, three reasons. First, 
Trial Chamber I has drawn some distinction between the victims, which include 
direct and indirect victims and legal entities, and the beneficiaries of the 
collective reparations programmes, as identified by the TFV.3644 Therefore, it was 
stated that: 
 
[…] reparations will not be limited to those who participated in the trial and 
those who have applied for reparations, but they may benefit other individuals 
residing in the communities where the collective reparation programmes will be 
developed. However, these latter beneficiaries will not be granted victim 
[participant] status.3645  
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3641 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.1. 
3642 See infra Chapter V 3.3.  
3643 IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment of 19 
November 2004, Series C No. 116, para. 62. 
3644 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, paras. 283 and 288; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2911), Decision on the Defence Request for Leave to Appeal the Decision Establishing the 
Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations, Trial Chamber I, 29 August 2012, para. 
29.  
3645 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2911), 29 August 2012, para. 29. 
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The TFV has also followed this approach as, referring to community-
oriented collective reparations, it has considered that collective reparations ‘[…] 
also must and will have to include broader communities in order to remedy the 
damage that affected the communities and society as a whole’.3646  
Second, the reparations application form allows the reparations 
claimants to choose where the benefit should go, which includes the victim’s 
community, as detailed later.3647 It should be noticed that, in Lubanga, the V02 
group of victims represented by their lawyers submitted in their observations, as 
part of the reparations decision, that collective reparations should include 
victims’ community.3648 The V01 group of victims, represented by their lawyers, 
in turn suggested the construction of a memorial for children who died in 
combat.3649  
Third, Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision considered symbolic 
collective reparations modalities and, as rehabilitation, inclusion of child 
soldiers’ communities in steps taken to rehabilitate and integrate child soldiers as 
those programs are implemented in the respective communities.3650 Individual 
and collective reparations as well as modalities of reparations are also discussed 
later.3651   
What must be left clear here is that when the expression ‘reparations 
claimants and beneficiaries’ is used, it refers first and foremost to those victims 
who after claiming reparations may benefit and/or request to benefit others such 
as their families and/or communities from reparations. The above-mentioned 
does not deny, as previously detailed, that in some forms of collective 
reparations, the scope of reparations beneficiaries may be broader than the 
universe of reparations claimants. In any case, the case-based reparations regime 
at the ICC, as detailed in the next subsection, is linked to the harm caused on 
victims for crimes based upon which the accused was convicted.  
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3646 The TFV also added that ‘For these types of collective reparations, which necessarily include 
broader and larger communities/groups, the beneficiaries do not need to establish the 
requirements of Rule 85. […] The convicted person can be held liable only for those reparations, 
which are for victims in the meaning of Rule 85. Others might and should benefit in order to 
address the collective harm but the convicted person cannot be held liable for these reparations 
awards’. Ibid., paras. 147 and 149.  
3647 See infra Chapter V 3.3.  
3648 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2869), 18 April 2012, paras. 19 and 20. 
3649 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), 18 April 2012, para. 19.  
3650 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, paras. 236-240.   
3651 See infra Chapter V 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.  
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2.3.2.2. Categories of Reparations Claimants and Beneficiaries  
In application of rule 85 of the ICC RPE, which defines victims and previously 
examined,3652 Trial Chamber I in its reparation decision found that:  
 
Beneficiaries of reparations   
Pursuant to Rule 85 of the Rules, reparations may be granted to direct and 
indirect victims, including the family members of direct victims […]; anyone 
who attempted to prevent the commission of one or more of the crimes under 
consideration; and those who suffered personal harm as a result of these 
offences, regardless of whether they participated in the trial proceedings.3653   
     
This paragraph captures the broad scope of potential claimants and 
beneficiaries of reparations. Some observations follow. First, as seen, the 
definition of victims, under rule 85, used by the ICC when examining the 
admissibility application to become and participate as victim participants, has 
also been used in order to determine the scope of claimants and beneficiaries of 
reparations. It is herein considered that such application is in principle correct as 
rule 85 explicitly stipulates that definition ‘For the Purposes of the Statute and 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, and both the definition of victims under 
rule 85 and rules on reparations are located under the same section of the ICC 
RPE, i.e., Section III (Victims and Witnesses). Therefore, the definition of 
victims, previously examined, has a general scope and is applicable to the 
different dimensions of the victims’ status, in particular, victims as participants 
and victims as reparations claimants. Additionally, when interpreting the ICC 
Statute, should one consider, inter alia, the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, 
an international instrument containing numerous provisions on reparations, as 
the ICC Chambers have done.3654 In particular, the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines contain a definition of victims that mutatis mutandi is similar to that 
under the ICC Statute and which reads as follows:  
 
[…] victims are persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, 
including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or 
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions 
that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in 
accordance with domestic law, the term “victim” also includes the immediate 
 
3652 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.   
3653 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 194. 
3654 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 90-92; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
1432), 11 July 2008, paras. 33-35.      
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family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm 
in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization 3655  
 
Second, concerning what constitutes harm for reparations purposes, 
although article 75 refers to ‘damage, loss or injury’, it does not provide further 
details on the type of harm that may be claimed for reparations. The UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines definition of victims just quoted, alongside relevant 
case law of the IACtHR and the ECtHR, permit to identify, inter alia, 
physical/mental injury,3656 emotional suffering,3657 and economic loss.3658 As 
previously examined,3659 these categories have been considered by the ICC 
Chambers concerning victims’ status as victim participants. Moreover, Trial 
Chamber I, by relying on the above-mentioned sources, has identified similar 
categories of harm in its reparations decision when determining compensable 
damages, as detailed later.3660 Furthermore, similar categories of harm are listed 
in the current combined participation and reparation standard application 
form,3661 and were considered by the OPCV in its observations on the road to the 
reparations decision.3662 As also previously examined,3663 harm can be direct and 
indirect, i.e., harm ‘attach to both direct and indirect victims’ as determined by 
the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga.3664 Some extra considerations about direct and 
indirect victims for reparations purposes follow.   
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3655 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, Principle 8.  
3656 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 8. As for case law, see, e.g., IACtHR, Case of 
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment of 29 July 1988, paras. 156, 175 and 187; 
ECtHR, Y.F. v. Turkey, Appl. No. 24209/94, Judgment, 22 July 2003, para. 33;  
3657 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 8. As for case law, see, e.g., IACtHR, Case of 
Aloebotoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993, para. 20; ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, 
Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment, 18 December 1996, para. 113.    
3658 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 8. As for case law, see, e.g., IACtHR, Case of El 
Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of 14 September 1996, paras. 28-63; ECtHR, Ayder and Others v. 
Turkey, Appl. No. 23656/94, Judgment, 8 January 2004, paras. 10, 141 et seq.;  
3659 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.2.2. 
3660 See infra Chapter V. 4.3.2.1. 
3661 Application Form for Individuals. Request for Participation in Proceedings and Reparations at 
the ICC For Individual Victims. Available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/48A75CF0-
E38E-48A7-A9E0-026ADD32553D/0/SAFIndividualEng.pdf  (last visit on 30 November 2012). 
See Part C, question 30 (‘Describe physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, harm to 
reputation, economic loss and / or damage to property or any other kind of harm’.).   
3662 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), Observations on Issues Concerning Reparations, OPCV, 18 
April 2012, paras. 36-37; 47-60, 62-71.      
3663 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.2.2.  
3664 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 32.  
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Third, concerning the inclusion of ‘indirect victim’, i.e., victims who 
suffered harm as a result of the harm suffered by direct victims,3665 to be included 
in the reparations scheme, Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision also 
followed the ICC’s case law on admissibility of victim participant applications. 
Thus, the ICC has to determine whether there was a close personal relationship 
between the direct and the indirect victim, e.g., child soldiers-parents.3666 
Moreover, in its reparations decision, Trial Chamber I appropriately reckoned 
that since the concept of ‘family’ has many cultural variations, the ICC should 
pay attention to applicable social and family structures,3667 which is similar to the 
IACtHR’s jurisprudence on reparations.3668 As noticed by Schabas, the ICC law 
‘will not be applied identically everywhere in the world, but rather may display a 
degree of cultural relativism’.3669 Furthermore, Trial Chamber I by referring to 
the IACtHR’s case law concluded that the ICC should consider the widely 
accepted presumption whereby an individual is succeeded by his/her spouse and 
children.3670 Relying on its previous case law and the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines, Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision established that indirect 
victims may also include individuals who ‘suffered harm when helping or 
intervening on behalf of direct victims’.3671 Reparations, pursuant to rule 85 (b), 
can also be granted to legal entities such as non-governmental, charitable and 
non-profit organizations, public schools and institutions that benefit members of 
the community.3672     
Concerning ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ victims in the specific context of 
reparations, three additional provisions should be examined. Article 79 (1) refers 
to establishment of the TFV ‘for the benefit of victims of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such victims’. In turn, article 75 
(2) lays down that the ‘ICC may make an order directly against a convicted 
person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of victims [emphasis 
added]’. Based on the preparatory works, it is possible to conclude that the 
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3665 See for further discussion supra Chapter IV 2.3.2.2.  
3666 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 195 (referring to Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432), 8 April 2009, para. 32).  
3667 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3668 See, e.g., IACtHR, Case of Aloebotoe et al. v. Suriname, 10 September 1993, paras. 58-59, 62. 
3669 Schabas (2010) 912. 
3670 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 195 (referring to IACtHR, Case of 
Aloebotoe et al. v. Suriname, 10 September 1993, para. 62; IACtHR, Case of Godínez-Cruz v. 
Honduras. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 21 July 1989. Series C No. 8, para. 13).    
3671 Ibid., Loc. cit., para. 196 (Referring to Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1813), 8 April 2009, para. 13; 
and UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 8).   
3672 Ibid., para. 197.  
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wording ‘in respect’ was used to extend the scope of application to include 
indirect victims such as direct victims’ families and successors.3673 Articles 79 (1) 
and 75 (2) have been complemented by Regulation 46 of the TFV Regulations 
which establishes that:  
 
Resources collected through awards for reparations may only benefit victims as 
defined in rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and, where natural 
persons are concerned, their families, affected directly or indirectly by the 
crimes committed by the convicted person.  
 
Thus, read systematically, those three provisions lead to a balanced 
outcome where, on the one hand, reparations claimants and beneficiaries 
include not only direct victims, but also indirect victims such as family members 
and successors, and, on the other hand, to receive reparations the harm has to be 
causally linked to the crimes for which the accused was convicted.3674 This 
interpretation is also consistent with the categories of direct and indirect victims, 
as reparations beneficiaries, identified in the reparations decision by Trial 
Chamber I in Lubanga and previously examined.3675 The required causal link 
between harm and crime for reparations purposes is explained as follows.  
Fourth, concerning causation for claiming and being granted 
reparations, i.e., the causal link between the crimes for which the accused is 
convicted and the harm inflicted on the victims, rule 85 (a) does not provide a 
‘direct’ legal causation standard as it only lays down that ‘victims’ are those who 
have suffered harm ‘as a result’ of the commission of a crime within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.3676 Indeed, the Appeals Chamber has noticed that this ‘does not 
necessarily imply the existence of direct harm’.3677 In Lubanga, the convicted was 
solely charged with and was found criminally responsible only for the war crimes 
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3673 UN. Doc. A/CONF. 183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.7, p. 5 (1998). See also Donat-Cattin (2008b) 
1403; Dwertmann (2010) 112.   
3674 For further discussion, see Dwertmann (2010) 111-114.  
3675 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, paras. 194 and 195. In Muthaura et al., Judge 
Ekaterina Trendafilova considered family members and successors as reparations beneficiaries but 
not as victims themselves under rule 85. See Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11-267), 26 August 
2011, paras. 53-55. Judge Trendafilova’s interpretation, adopted tangentially in her decision on 
victims’ participation during pre-trial, is at odds both with the reparations decision later adopted 
in Lubanga, and other ICC case law on victims’ participation, based on which, Trial Chamber I in 
its reparations decision identified family members and successors as indirect victims under rule 85 
for reparations purposes.      
3676 McCarthy (2012a) 150.  
3677 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 35. 
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of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them 
to participate actively in hostilities. Nevertheless, Trial Chamber I in its 
judgment in Lubanga stated that it would later consider whether factual 
allegations of sexual violence (sexual slavery included) in the context of child 
soldiers’ active participation in hostilities should be taken into account for 
sentencing and reparations purposes although sexual violence as such was not 
charged by the Prosecutor and, therefore, sexual violence evidence was not 
considered for determination of the accused’s criminal liability.3678 In its sentence 
decision, Trial Chamber I mentioned that whether the link between Lubanga 
and sexual violence, in the context of the charges, is relevant as a factor to the 
issue of reparations would be assessed in a separate decision.3679  
In its reparations decision, Trial Chamber I has considered in a closer 
look the situation of victims of sexual violence.3680 Unlike the IACtHR or the UN 
Compensation Commission, which have respectively applied the ‘immediate 
effects’ and ‘directness’ standards,3681 Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision 
considered that reparations should not be limited to ‘direct harm’ or ‘the 
immediate effects’ of the crimes, and instead applied a proximate cause 
standard.3682 This test is, as previously seen, used in common law jurisdictions.3683 
The ‘proximate cause’ standard consists in the existence of a ‘but/for’ 
relationship between the crime and the harm, i.e., the crimes for which the 
accused, e.g., Lubanga, was convicted were the proximate cause of the harm for 
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3678  Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, paras. 630, 631 and 896. The Trial Chamber also stated that ‘Regardless 
of whether sexual violence may properly be included within the scope of “using [children under 
the age of 15] to participate actively in hostilities” as a matter of law, because facts relating to sexual 
violence were not included in the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, it would be 
impermissible for the Chamber to base its Decision pursuant to Article 74(2) on the evidence 
introduced during the trial that is relevant to this issue’. Ibid., para. 630.   
3679 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), 10 July 2012, paras. 75-76. 
3680 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, paras. 207-209. 
3681 As for the IACtHR see IACtHR, Case of Aloebotoe et al. v. Suriname, 10 September 1993, para. 
48. See also Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Cambridge University Press 2003) 237. As for the UN Compensation Commission, see 
Norbert Wuhler, ‘Causation and Directness of Loss as Elements of Compensability before the 
United Nations Compensation Commission’ in Richard Lillich (ed.), The United Nations 
Compensation Commission (Transnational Publisher 1995) 207, 230-231. 
3682 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 249. 
3683 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2005) 
51.   
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which reparations are sought.3684 Trial Chamber I in a subsequent decision added 
that:  
 
[…] the [reparations decision] permits awards to victims of sexual and gender-
based violence, provided that the facts have been established to the relevant 
standards and the crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 
15 or using them to participate actively in the hostilities are the proximate cause 
of the sexual violence.3685 
 
However, the language employed by Trial Chamber I is not completely 
clear when it refers to ‘permits awards to victims of sexual violence and gender 
based violence’, which read together with the Chamber’s generic references to 
victims of sexual violence,3686 may lead to some confusion, i.e., the 
misassumption of the adoption of an ‘extended’ notion of indirect victim for 
reparations purposes, e.g., including victims of crimes committed by child 
soldiers,3687 or victims of sexual crimes as such committed by Lubanga’s forces. 
Nevertheless, putting aside some lack of clarity with the used language, the Trial 
Chamber has, as exemplified in the quoted paragraph, only referred to the 
crimes for which the accused was convicted to delimit the ICC case-based 
reparations regime.   
Connected with the above-mentioned, Trial Chamber I, upon defense’s 
application, for the sake of a fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings to 
identify the correct criteria on the link between the harm suffered and the crime 
committed, and ‘the scope of the harm that can be considered in this 
connection’, has found this to be an appealable issue and, therefore, the Appeals 
Chamber will have the last word on it.3688 The Appeals Chamber is expected to 
determine whether the ‘proximate cause’ standard is the right test to be 
employed and, then, apply the chosen standard to the facts of this case. Be that as 
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3684 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 250.  
3685 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2911), 29 August 2012, para. 32. 
3686 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, paras. 207-209.   
3687 See Valentina Spiga (2010) 193. It has been suggested that potentially victims who suffered 
harm as a result of the child soldiers’ actions, e.g., women and girls raped as a consequence of the 
forced initiation rites of new recruits, may be reparations claimants and beneficiaries. See Carla 
Ferstman and Mariana Goetz, ‘Reparations before the International Criminal Court: The Early 
Jurisprudence on Victim Participation and its Impact on Future Reparations Proceedings’ in Carla 
Ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan Stephens (eds.), Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the Making (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 313, 331.      
3688 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2911), 29 August 2012, para. 33. 
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it may, regardless of the standard employed, it is difficult to ‘determine whether 
a particular loss falls within the classification’,3689 and its exact dimension will 
only be clarified in the ICC’s jurisprudence.   
Some important considerations on causation are herein presented. To 
begin with, reparations claimants and beneficiaries under the ICC case-based 
reparations regime are limited to victims, both direct and indirect (as previously 
defined), of crimes for which the accused was found guilty, as laid down by the 
ICC Statute, article 75 (2) ‘The Court may make an order directly against a 
convicted person specifying appropriate reparations […]’,3690 and Regulation 46 
of the TFV Regulations, previously quoted. Therefore, under the ICC case-based 
reparations regime, the ‘damage, loss and injury’ which form the basis of a claim 
for reparations have to be caused by the crimes(s) for which the offender was 
convicted.3691 The Appeals Chamber, in paraphrasing the reparations decision by 
the Trial Chamber in Lubanga, has established that the ‘decision [reparations 
decision] is intrinsically linked to his conviction [Lubanga’s conviction], with the 
Trial Chamber finding that reparations should be awarded for the crimes for 
which Mr Lubanga was convicted in the case brought against him’.3692 Indeed, 
the Appeals Chamber has considered victims, for reparations purposes, those 
‘who claim to have suffered harm as a result of the crimes in relation to which 
the accused was convicted and who request reparations’.3693    
The application of the ‘proximate cause’ standard adopted by the ICC 
Trial Chamber might broaden the harm to be considered for reparations 
purposes and, potentially, the scope of reparations claimants and beneficiaries. 
When material damages are claimed, these must not be too remote from the 
wrongful conduct.3694 However, whereas civil law jurisdictions tend to deal with 
this issue in terms of ‘equivalent or adequate causal connections’, common law 
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3689 Wuhler (1995) 232. 
3690 See also American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, The 
Case-Based Reparations Scheme at the International Criminal Court (2010) 40.  
3691 See, e.g., Ibid., 37; Dwertmann (2010) 92; Linda Keller, ‘Seeking Justice at the International 
Criminal Court: Victims’ Reparations’ (2007) 29 Thomas Jefferson Law Review 189, 203. See also 
ICC Assembly of States Parties, Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.5, 27 November 2013, para. 9.    
3692 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 66.  
3693 Ibid., para. 69. Accordingly, a Prosecutor’s suggestion, in a 2010 policy paper, whereby 
reparations claims may include harm stemming from crimes other than those based on which the 
accused was charged and ultimately convicted is not consistent with the ICC case-based 
reparations regime. See ICC OTP, Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation under Article 68 (3) of 
the ICC Statute, April 2010, p. 9.     
3694 Shelton (2005) 51 (commenting on reparations in the law of state responsibility). 
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jurisdictions pay attention to the ‘proximate or natural consequences of acts’.3695 
Thus, in application of the ‘proximate cause’, material damages claimed must 
not be too remote from the wrongful conduct in order to identify compensable 
claims.3696 Accordingly, proximate cause is ‘generally considered to be a relative 
term meaning ‘near’ or ‘not remote’ and also to include concepts of foreseability 
and temporal proximity’.3697 In simple words, under this standard, victims may 
only need to prove their presence in a particular location in a particular time to 
justify their claim that their harm was caused by the offender’s acts identified by 
the relevant judgment.3698  
In both domestic and international norms, proof of both ‘factual’ and 
‘legal causation is required.3699 When it comes to factual causation, the 
‘proximate cause’ or ‘but for’ standard might be considered as not completely 
appropriate in the context of crimes under international law (unlike other areas 
of international law).3700 However, rather than selecting a single ‘test’ for factual 
causation, the ICC should ‘account a range of factors which assist in assessing 
the extent of an individual’s contribution to the harm caused by the crime of 
which he or she has been convicted’.3701  
As for ‘legal causation’, a standard along the lines of ‘proximate cause’ 
may in principle be accepted,3702 since, unlike rule 85 (b) which states that only 
organizations suffering ‘direct’ harm may be considered victims, rule 85 (a) 
(natural persons) does not specify such standard. Thus, the Appeals Chamber 
noticed that subparagraphs (a) and (b) of rule 85 imply different causal 
relationships between the crime and the harm sustained by the victim.3703 
However, the ‘proximate cause’ standard should be applied in a restrictive 
manner as much as possible since by definition the ICC case-based reparations 
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3695 Ibid., Loc. cit..  
3696 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
3697 Arthur Rovine and Grant Hanessian, ‘Toward a Foreseeability Approach to Causation 
Questions at the United Nations Compensation Commission in Lillich (1995) 235, 243.  
3698 American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office (2010) 40. 
3699 Rovine and Hanessian (1995) 241. See also American University Washington College of Law, 
War Crimes Research Office (2010) 40, footnote 129.  
3700 McCarthy (2012a) 155.  
3701 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3702 See also American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office (2010) 
39-40. 
3703 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 30 (stating that ‘The type of “harm” 
referred to relates to organizations or institutions rather than natural persons. It is therefore 
different from the type of harm set out in rule 85 (a) of the Rules, which is harm to natural 
persons’.). 
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regime, in particular the harm to be repaired, has to be linked to crimes upon 
which the accused was found criminally responsible. In other words, for 
example, victims of sexual violence committed by Lubanga’s armed forces, 
especially in incidents that were remote from or not near to the specific incidents 
and crimes for which Lubanga was convicted, should not be considered as 
reparations claimants and beneficiaries as they are outside the crimes attributed 
via conviction to Lubanga. As previously examined,3704 this is also consistent 
with the exclusion of the civilian victims of crimes committed by child soldiers 
from the category of indirect victims by Trial Chamber I in Lubanga, applying 
Appeals Chamber’s case law,3705 since the nexus to the crimes charged was 
deemed to be too remote: 
 
52. [...] Indirect victims, therefore, are restricted to those whose harm is linked 
to the harm of the affected children when the confirmed offences were 
committed, not those whose harm is linked to any subsequent conduct by the 
children, criminal or otherwise. Although a factual overlap may exist between 
the use of the child actively to participate in hostilities and an attack by the child 
on another, the person attacked by a child soldier is not an indirect victim for 
these purposes because his or her loss is not linked to the harm inflicted on the 
child when the offence was committed.  
53. This is not to undermine the possibility that individuals in these 
circumstances may well be victims of other crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.3706  
  
Whether the ‘proximate cause’ standard will remain in the ICC’s 
practice, it is yet to be seen. If it does, besides the previous considerations, it is 
important to bear in mind that due to the high number of potential reparations 
claimants in the ICC cases, the ICC should adopt a (relatively) strict threshold 
criterion/interpretation.3707 Thus, the causation standard should be kept 
practicable and simple, within the broader need for considering as reparations 
claimants those victims who were sufficiently affected by the crime(s) in 
question.3708 This is connected with the fact that the harm claimed is to an 
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3704 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.2.2.  
3705 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 62. 
3706 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1813), 8 April 2009, paras 52 and 53. 
3707 Marc Henzelin, Veijo Heiskanen and Guénael Mettraux, ‘Reparations to Victims before the 
International Criminal Court: Lessons from International Mass Claims Processes’ (2006) 17 
Criminal Law Forum 317, 325.  
3708 Dwertmann (2010) 95-96.  
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important extent linked to evidentiary issues. Accordingly, claims based on harm 
too remote or speculative should be excluded.3709                  
As the Trial Chamber itself in its reparations decision mentioned the 
‘damage, loss and injury’ which constitutes the basis of a reparations claim ‘must 
have resulted from the crimes’ upon which the accused was convicted,3710 which 
was noticed by the Appeals Chamber.3711 In application of the ‘proximate cause’ 
standard, although reparations should not be limited to ‘direct harm or 
immediate effects’,3712 it is necessary to adopt the above-mentioned precautions 
not to denaturalize the case-based reparations regime and also to avoid a highly 
exponential increase in reparations claimants and beneficiaries who can make 
the system of reparations at the ICC to become inefficient. Thus, the legal 
representatives of the V01 group of victims in Lubanga pointed out that only a 
minority of their clients considered that other victims of the Lubanga’s Union of 
Congolese Patriots, such as victims of the crimes committed by child soldiers, 
should receive reparations due to concerns to reduction in available resources.3713 
After all, victims who are not eligible to receive reparations under the ICC case-
based reparations regime can still be supported by the TFV, via reparation-like 
modalities, when the TFV exercises its assistance mandate as seen later.3714 
Indeed, in the OPCV’s submission,3715 and in the TFV’s submissions leading to 
Trial Chamber I’s reparations decision, it was only referred to victims of crimes 
for which Lubanga was found guilty as beneficiaries of reparations.3716     
It is necessary to leave it clear that the previous analysis and 
considerations do not mean to neglect sexual violence endured by direct and 
indirect victims in Lubanga. Indeed, as examined in the next subsection, and 
based on the reparations decision, it is expected that specific reparations 
measures are tailored and implemented to address the harm that direct victims 
(child soldiers) and indirect victims may have suffered due to sexual violence. 
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3709 American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office (2010) 38. 
3710 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 247. 
3711 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 66 (‘The Impugned Decision is 
intrinsically linked to his conviction, with the Trial Chamber finding that reparations should be 
awarded for the crimes for which Mr Lubanga was convicted in the case brought against him’.).  
3712 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 249. 
3713 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), 18 April 2012, para. 26. Legal representatives of the V02 
group of victims suggested that child soldiers, their parents and communities should be able to 
apply for reparations. See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2869), 18 April 2012, paras. 31 and 34.    
3714 See infra Chapter V 3.3.2.3.  
3715  Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 18 April 2012, paras. 33-35. 
3716 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), Observations on Reparations in Response to the Scheduling 
Order of 14 March 2012, TFV. 25 April 2012, para. 22. 
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This is arguably the case of an important number of child soldiers (particularly 
girls), who need to receive specific reparations measures to redress the particular 
dimension of their harm caused by sexual violence. This point is connected to 
what a witness expert in Lubanga’s trial, the former UN Special Representative 
for Children and Armed Conflict, Mrs. Coomaraswamy, said by appropriately 
pointing out that the use for sexual exploitation of boys and girls by armed forces 
or groups constitutes an ‘essential support function’.3717 Thus, for reparations 
effects, it is also herein agreed with Judge Odio-Benito’s Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion to the Trial Judgment, where she concluded that: 
 
Sexual violence committed against children in the armed groups causes 
irreparable harm and is a direct and inherent consequence to their involvement 
with the armed group […] It must be clarified, however, that […] crimes of 
sexual violence are distinct and separate crimes that could have been evaluated 
separately by this Chamber if the Prosecutor would have been presented charges 
against these criminal conducts.3718    
 
Accordingly, for reparations purposes, sexual violence or enslavement 
may produce harm directly caused by the war crime of enlisting, conscripting, 
and the use of children under the age of 15 in support of the combatants.3719 This 
consideration is also related to the finding by Trial Chamber I in its judgment in 
Lubanga where although the Chamber excluded sexual violence as a general 
category within the concept of using children to participate actively in hostilities, 
it mentioned that its ‘determination of whether a particular activity constitutes 
“active participation” can only be made on a case-by-case basis’.3720 The TFV has 
also established that ‘[…] victims who suffered harm from sexualized violence 
occurring during their enlistment, conscription, or use to participate actively in 
 
3717 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para.  630, footnote 1811 (referring to Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
1229-AnxA), Written Submissions of the United Nations Special Representative of the 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, 18 March 2008, paras 23 
and 24-26). 
3718 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judge Odio-Benito’s Separate and Dissenting Opinion, 14 
March 2012, para.  20.  
3719 See also Ibid., para. 21.  
3720 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para.  628.  
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hostilities as children under the age of 15 are entitled to reparations addressing 
this specific harm’.3721 
Fifth, the ICC Statute does not require the participation of victims in 
pre-trial or trial proceedings in order to be able to claim reparations.3722 This is 
clearly illustrated in Lubanga where only 129 individual victims out of a clearly 
much bigger universe of potential reparations claimants and beneficiaries 
participated. As determined by Trial Chamber I in Lubanga, victims who may 
obtain reparations ‘will not necessarily participate in the proceedings, either in 
person or through their legal representatives’.3723 Although details on the 
reparations request proceedings are examined later,3724 what should be 
mentioned here is that under Section III (Victims and Witnesses) of the RPE, 
there are two separate sub-sections (3 and 4) dealing with respectively 
participation of victims in the proceedings, i.e., victim participant status; and 
reparations to the victims, i.e., victims as reparations claimants. The autonomous 
dimensions of victims’ status at the ICC, i.e., victims as participants to voice their 
own views and concerns in the proceedings at the ICC, and victims as 
reparations claimants lead to the important consequence whereby victims can 
claim reparations without having necessarily participated as victim participants 
in the ICC pre-trial or trial proceedings. In other words, to claim and benefit 
from reparations, victims must have suffered some personal harm linked to the 
crimes upon which the accused was convicted, but they do not need to have 
participated as victim participants in the pre-trial or trial proceedings. This 
feature of the ICC case-based reparations regime has been noticed by the 
Appeals Chamber in Lubanga,3725 as examined later,3726 as well as by the Trial 
Chamber and the TFV.3727 
Moreover, as discussed later,3728 the exact scope of beneficiaries of 
reparations, i.e., total identification of eligible individual beneficiaries, in 
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3721 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3009), 8 April 2013, para. 158. See also Luke Moffett, ‘Reparative 
Complementarity: Ensuring an Effective Remedy for Victims in the Reparation Regime of the 
International Criminal Court’ (2013) 12 The International Journal of Human Rights 368, 375.   
3722 Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11-267), 26 August 2011, para. 52. See also McGonigle Leyh 
(2011) 239; Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1359.   
3723 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2858), Decision on the OPCV’s Request to Participate in the 
Reparations Proceedings, Trial Chamber I, 5 April 2012, para. 10.  
3724 See infra Chapter V 3.3.  
3725 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 69. 
3726 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.4.  
3727 See respectively Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2911), 29 August 2012, para. 29; Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-3009), 8 April 2013, para. 148.   
3728 See infra Chapter V 3.3.2.1.  
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Lubanga is yet to be determined via the implementation of TFV’s reparations 
plan under the ICC Trial Chamber’s monitoring and oversight. Not restricting 
the universe of potential claimants and beneficiaries of reparations to only those 
who are/were victim participants also correspond to minimum considerations of 
non-discrimination as ‘it would be inappropriate to limit reparations to the 
relatively small group of victims that participated in the trial and those who 
applied for reparations’.3729 Considering all factors such as on-going armed 
violence, remoteness and intimidation that may have been prevented victims 
from participation during trial, this is also a realistic approach. Accordingly, 
victims, as defined in rule 85, have to be given equal access to any information 
relating to their right to reparations and the ICC’s assistance,3730 which is also 
coherent with the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines.3731 The autonomous 
dimension of victims as reparations claimants is also reflected in specific 
proceedings to do so, under the ICC RPE and which do not require victims’ 
previous participation in the proceedings as victim participants, as examined in 
detail later.3732  Concerning dual status victim participants-victim witnesses who 
lost their victim participant status due to problems with their testimonies in 
Lubanga, they may still claim and benefit from reparations if the respective 
causal link is proved, as noticed by the Appeals Chamber,3733 and discussed 
later.3734     
Sixth, as analyzed in the previous chapter, victims who participate in the 
pre-trial and trial proceedings present several interests to do so, including an 
interest in receiving reparations as identified by Pre-Trial Chambers,3735 Trial 
Chambers,3736 and the Appeals Chamber.3737 Moreover, victims do not only want 
to participate in the proceedings but also want to be identified as victims and 
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3729 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 187. 
3730 Ibid., para. 188. 
3731 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principles 11, 12 and 24.  
3732 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.     
3733 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 70. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, 14 March 2012, para. 35. 
3734 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.4. 
3735 See, e.g., Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 63; Abu 
Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09-121), 25 September 2009, para. 3. 
3736 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 97-98; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-
01/11-460), 3 October 2012, para. 2; Muthaura and Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-498), 3 October 
2012, para. 2.   
3737 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), 13 June 2007, para. 28; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 
July 2008. 
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claim and receive reparations (compensation included) for the harm inflicted.3738 
Accordingly, there is consensus that victims’ personal interests to receive 
reparations claimed by those who were granted the victim participant status and 
as such participated in the proceedings are judicially recognizable and justiciable 
personal interests.3739 Therefore, the universe of victims as reparations claimants 
and beneficiaries includes victim participants who precisely had, as an important 
personal interest for participation, to obtain reparations. In any case, like other 
victims, victims who hold the official victim participant status need to 
specifically apply for reparations, following proceedings detailed later,3740 to be 
reparations claimants at the ICC. 
Seventh, victims hold the right to be awarded reparations at the ICC, 
based on the conviction of the accused, i.e., determination of his/her criminal 
responsibility. Accordingly, victims may receive reparations based on their 
claims for adequate and proportional reparations for the damage inflicted. 
Moreover, even scholars who have been critical of a broad status of victims as 
participants have pointed out that concerning reparations ‘might victims be 
considered as proper parties to judicial proceedings against the convicted person 
and could possess all relevant procedural rights’.3741 During the pre-trial/trial 
proceedings before conviction, victim participants who participate in those 
proceedings, to inter alia later receive reparations, remain participants since 
during those stages, as determined by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga, there 
are only two formal parties, ‘namely the Prosecutor and the Defence’.3742 
However, as seen later,3743 during the reparations phase proceedings, i.e., after 
conviction, victims as reparations claimants may be considered as parties, as 
suggested by Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision,3744 and also by the 
Appeals Chamber.3745       
Eighth, as appropriately highlighted by a former ICC Judge, Claude 
Jorda,3746 victim’s right to reparation is potential as the ICC has the sole 
discretion to decide whether a victim can receive reparation, award him/her 
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3738 Van den Wyngaert (2011) 475, 486. 
3739 As for discussion on the concept of judicially recognizable personal interests see, e.g., Vasiliev 
(2009) 664-668.   
3740 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.  
3741 Zappalà (2010) 154. 
3742 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 93.  
3743 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.3. 
3744 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 267.  
3745 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 67.  
3746 Jorda and Hemptinne (2002) 1407.  
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reparation on individual or collective basis, bearing in mind the scope and extent 
of any damage, loss and injury. The ICC can act not only based on victim’s 
application but also, exceptionally, on its own initiative as laid down under 
article 75 (1) of the ICC Statute:  
 
[…] in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in 
exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss 
and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which is 
acting. 
 
As detailed later,3747 this motu proprio power permits the competent ICC 
Chamber to make up for victims’ initial absence of request for reparations due 
to, inter alia, cultural or geographical remoteness, his/her lack of information, 
and/or pressures over him/her,3748 and victims may end up becoming reparations 
claimants and beneficiaries.   
                        
2.3.2.3. Related Legal Issues           
Some of the other principles considered by Trial Chamber I in its reparations 
decision, related and applicable to victims as claimants and beneficiaries of 
reparations are briefly presented here. Following up its previous case law on 
victim participation,3749 Trial Chamber I concluded that victims may use official 
or unofficial documents, any other means of demonstrating their identities 
accepted by the Chamber, or even, absent documentation, a statement signed by 
two credible witnesses establishing the applicant’s identity and describing the 
relationship between the victim and any individual action on his/her behalf.3750   
In matters concerning reparations, the ICC has to take into account the 
needs of all victims, particularly children, the elderly, disabled individuals and 
the victims of sexual or gender violence, according to article 68 of the ICC 
Statute and rule 86 of the ICC RPE,3751 Victims of the respective crimes, as 
defined in rule 85 of the ICC Rules, have to enjoy equal access to information on 
their right to reparations as well as assistance from the ICC, as an important 
component of their right to a fair and equal treatment via the proceedings,3752 
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3747 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.1.   
3748 Jorda and Hemptinne (2002) 1407. 
3749 See, e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 88-89.    
3750 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 198.  
3751 Ibid., para. 189. 
3752 Ibid., para. 188.  
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which is also coherent with the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines.3753 
Moreover, the ICC has to treat the victims with humanity, respecting their 
dignity and human rights and implement appropriate measures to ensure their 
safety,3754 physical and psychological well being and privacy, in accordance with 
rules 87 and 88 of the ICC RPE.3755  
Pursuant article 21 (3) of the ICC Statute, reparations have to be granted 
to victims without any discriminatory ground.3756 This is coherent with 
international human rights law at which, as Salmón Gárate observes, victims’ 
status is not subject to discriminatory restrictions.3757 Indeed, the IACtHR’s case 
law on serious human rights violations has ordered reparations in favor of 
individuals accused of or convicted of terrorism.3758 Be that as it may, Trial 
Chamber I in its reparations decision acknowledged that priority may need to be 
given to some victims who are particularly vulnerable and/or who may require 
urgent assistance such as:  
 
[…] victims of sexual or gender-based violence, individuals who require 
immediate medical care (especially when plastic surgery or treatment for HIV is 
necessary), as well as severely traumatized children, for instance following the 
loss of family members. The Court may adopt, therefore, measures that 
constitute affirmative action in order to guarantee equal, effective and safe 
access to reparations for particularly vulnerable victims.3759 
 
Moreover, as previously said,3760 although decisions by other national or 
international bodies do not affect victims’ right to receive reparations under 
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3753 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principles 11, 12 and 24.  
3754 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 190. See also UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines, principle 10.  
3755 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 190.  
3756 Ibid., para. 191. See also UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 25.   
3757 Salmón Gárate (2007b) 30, 31 and 35.  
3758 See, e.g., IACtHR, Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment of 25 November 2006, Series C No. 160; IACtHR, Case of Bámaca-Velásquez v. 
Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 22 February 2002, Series C No. 91; IACtHR, Case 
of Neira-Alegría et al. v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 19 September 1996, Series C 
No. 29.  
3759 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 200. See also Nairobi Declaration on 
Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation (Nairobi Declaration) 2007, para. 7; 
Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination against Women (1979), article 4.   
3760 See supra Chapter V 2.3.1.  
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article 75, the ICC may consider any award or benefits granted to victims so as to 
ensure that reparations are not applied discriminatorily or unfairly.3761  
The ICC has emphasized the accessibility and consultation with victims 
of the crimes who, together with their families and communities, should be 
capable of effectively and substantively participating and being assisted in the 
reparations process.3762 Accordingly, the consultation with victims should 
include aspects such as the beneficiaries’ identity, their priorities and the 
obstacles faced by them in their efforts to secure reparations.3763 A gender-
inclusive approach has to be undertaken.3764 Moreover, concerning victims of 
sexual violence, the ICC should prepare and implement reparations awards 
suitable for sexual and gender-based violence victims.3765 Thus, the ICC’s 
approach should enable girls and women in the affected communities to 
participate in a meaningful manner in the design and implementation of 
reparations orders and, therefore, fully participate in the reparations 
programs.3766  
Concerning child victims, in accordance with article 68 (1) of the ICC 
Statute and rule 86 of the ICC RPE, the ICC has to consider the age-related harm 
and, therefore, any differential impact on boys and girls.3767 Moreover, as for 
children beneficiaries of reparations, the principle of the ‘best interests of the 
child’ embedded in the Convention on the Rights of the Child,3768 should inter 
alia guide the decisions by the ICC.3769 Furthermore, reparations proceedings, 
orders and programs that benefit child soldiers should guarantee the 
development of the victims’ personalities, help them obtain rehabilitation and 
reintegrate them into society.3770 Child victims’ views are to be taken into 
account when adopting decisions on individual or collective basis, considering 
the circumstances, age and level of maturity.3771 Information provided to child 
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3761 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 201. 
3762 Ibid., para. 203.  
3763 Ibid., para. 206. 
3764 Ibid., para. 202. See also Nairobi Declaration, principle 2.   
3765 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 207. 
3766 Ibid., paras. 208-209. See also Nairobi Declaration, principle 1-D.  
3767 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 210.  See also Paris Principles and 
Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles) 
February 2007, principle 4.0. Concerning the related issue of the children as a vulnerable group, see 
Salmón Gárate (2010a) 17-24.     
3768 Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 3.  
3769 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 210.    
3770 Ibid., paras. 213 and 216. See also Paris Principles 7.0, 7.46-7.49.   
3771 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 215. 
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victims should be delivered in a comprehensible manner for them and those 
representing them.3772                    
 
2.3.3. Resources for Implementing Reparations  
2.3.3.1. Penalties     
According to article 75 (2), the ICC may make a case-based reparations order 
‘directly against a convicted person’. Thus, it is necessary to examine the 
complementarity between some of the penalties, those of an economic nature, 
imposed on the convicted and their use as resources to finance a reparations 
order in favor of victims. As previously said,3773 besides imprisonment, article 77 
(2) lays down that the ICC may impose on the convicted person:    
 
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence;  
(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly 
from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. 
      
Also, article 79 (2) of the ICC Statute provides for that ‘The Court may 
order money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture to be 
transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund’.   
With regard to fines, under rule 146 (1), the ICC, when determining 
whether or not to impose a fine as well as when fixing the amount, should 
evaluate ‘whether imprisonment is a sufficient penalty’, giving ‘due 
consideration to the financial capacity of the convicted person, including any 
orders for forfeiture’ and orders for reparations. The ICC also has to take into 
account ‘whether and to what degree the crime was motivated by personal 
financial gain’. Fines must be set at an ‘appropriate level’.3774 In addition to the 
factors previously established, the ICC has to pay attention to ‘the damage and 
injuries caused as well as the proportionate gains derived from the crime by the 
perpetrator’.3775      
With regard to forfeiture, at any hearing considering a forfeiture order, 
the competent Chamber shall hear evidence on the identification and location of 
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3772 Ibid., para. 214.  
3773 See supra Chapter V 2.3.1. 
3774 ICC RPE, rule 146 (2). 
3775 Ibid., rule 146 (2) (also adding that ’[….] Under no circumstances may the total amount exceed 
75 per cent of the value of the convicted person’s identifiable assets, liquid or realizable, and 
property, after deduction of an appropriate amount that would satisfy the financial needs of the 
convicted person and his or her dependants’.).   
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specific proceeds, property or assets derived directly or indirectly from the 
crime.3776 The Chamber must notify any bona fide third party who appears to 
have an interest in relevant proceeds, property, or assets and that party is entitled 
to intervene and submit evidence.3777 The ICC has to be satisfied that the specific 
proceeds, property, or assets were derived directly or indirectly from the 
crime.3778   
In Lubanga, the V01 group of victims submitted that a fine should be 
imposed under article 79 (2) of the ICC Statute to benefit the TFV and added 
that rule 146 enables the ICC to consider the financial circumstances of the 
convicted person.3779 Additionally, the V01 group of victims sought for a Trial 
Chamber’s order whereby any confiscated assets are paid to the TFV according 
to article 79 (2).3780 Nevertheless, in applying article 77 (2) and rule 146 (1), Trial 
Chamber I considered ‘it inappropriate to impose a fine in addition to the prison 
term, given the financial situation of Mr Lubanga. Despite extensive enquiries by 
the Court, no relevant funds have been identified’.3781  
As previously mentioned, it is important to remind that under the ICC 
the reparative regime and punitive measures are, although complementary, 
distinct. When fine or forfeiture is ordered as a penalty, its purpose is to divest 
the perpetrator of material benefits obtained via the crime. On the other hand, if 
fine or forfeiture is used as a part of a reparations order, its subsequent role is to 
compensate the victim for the harm inflicted.3782 Accordingly, even though the 
ICC may in application of article 79 (2) order that money and property collected 
via fines under article 77 (2) have to be transferred to the TFV and thus used to 
compensate the victims, this does not modify ‘the distinctly punitive rationale 
underpinning the imposition of the fine or forfeiture in the first instance’.3783 The 
non-punitive character of reparations for serious international human rights 
violations that may be constitutive of international crimes, has also been 
identified by the IACtHR’s case law, which has established that international law 
does not provide damages meant to deter or serve as an example,3784 but seeks to 
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3776 Ibid., rule 147 (1). 
3777 Ibid., rule 147 (2), (3). 
3778 Ibid., rule 147 (4).  
3779 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2880), 14 May 2012, paras. 8-10.  
3780 Ibid., para. 11. 
3781 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2901), 10 July 2012, para. 106.  
3782 McCarthy (2012a) 78.  
3783 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3784 IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 21 
July 1989, Series C No. 7, para. 38; IACtHR, Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras. Reparations and 
Costs. Judgment of 21 July 1989. Series C No. 8, para. 36. 
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provide reparations for the damages caused.3785 Be that as it may, the relation 
between reparations and financial penalties at the ICC may be considered as two 
sides of the same coin, i.e., whereas reparations seek to redress the harm caused 
to the victims, fines and forfeitures concern the side of the offender and may be 
used to enforce reparations awards given directly or through the TFV.3786 Thus, 
financial penalties may have a dual effect and/or role.3787 Moreover, the outcomes 
of reparations, in particular compensation and restitution, can take shapes 
identical to financial penalties,3788 although still different in nature.    
The imposition of fines or forfeiture may provide some benefits. First, 
the burden of punishment on the convicted is lessened and a forward-looking, 
constructive sentence is in place.3789 Second, these penalties present psychological 
advantages over retributive penalties as those relieve the offender’s feeling of 
guilt and alienation.3790 Thus, there is a restorative effect ‘not only to the victim 
but also to the offender, increasing their sense of self-esteem and aiding 
reintegration’.3791 This is consistent with the restorative justice paradigm which 
also closely takes into account the offender’s situation.3792 Nevertheless, there are 
certain limitations to implement economic penalties. First, they can be used only 
if and when the offender is identified and convicted.3793 Second, most offenders, 
e.g., Lubanga, lack the means to pay economic penalties and these must reflect 
the offender’s capacity to pay.3794 Third, even if the convicted is able and willing 
to pay, it only serves to cover specific material losses to victims, regarded as 
‘worthy’.3795 Fourth, an imposed payment will be insufficient or may even be 
counterproductive to originate a real attitude change in the offender.3796  
It is submitted herein that the ICC Statute/RPE to some extent keep a 
balance with regard to the above-mentioned competing arguments. First, 
imposition of fines complements but does not replace imprisonment. The 
 
3785 IACtHR, Case of Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment of 15 March 
1989, Series C No. 6, para. 136.  
3786 Dwertmann (2010) 260 
3787 Claus Kreb and Göran Sluiter, ‘Fines and Forfeiture Orders’ in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (2002) 
1823, 1832.  
3788 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3789 Zedner (2009) 189.      
3790 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3791 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3792 Ibid., Loc. cit; Zehr (1990) 185 (‘Wounds of the offender important’.). 
3793 Doak (2008) 231 (comenting on compensation  orders as a penalty).  
3794 Ibid., 231, 233 (comenting on compensation orders as a penalty). 
3795 Ibid., 235 (comenting on compensation orders as a penalty). 
3796 Zedner (2009) 190.  
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seriousness of the crimes makes fines unsuitable as the only punishment.3797 
Nevertheless, a convicted person’s efforts to compensate victims are a mitigating 
circumstance in sentencing.3798 Second, the ICC RPE provide guidance to impose 
fines so that these are neither arbitrary nor disproportional.3799 Third, should 
collection of fines and/or forfeiture be unsuccessful, victims’ status as reparations 
(including compensation) claimants at the ICC can still be implemented due to 
the existence of the TFV and certain non-monetary reparations such as apologies 
by the offender. Indeed, although Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision 
highlighted that the convicted person has been declared indigent and no assets 
or property have been identified to be used for reparations purposes, the 
Chamber considered that Lubanga was only able to contribute to non-monetary 
reparations (symbolic reparations) such as public or private apology to the 
victims, as a satisfaction, provided that these are given with his agreement.3800 
This modality of reparations, alongside others, is examined in further detail 
later.3801 Arguably, inter alia, in connection with non-monetary reparations, what 
should be mentioned now is that the Trial Chamber concluded that the fact that 
assets belonging to Lubanga have not been identified does not leave him 
unaffected by the reparations process as the overall aim of the ICC reparations 
system goes ‘beyond the notion of punitive justice in order to provide effective 
remedies to the victims’.3802       
Lastly, but equally important, under article 93 (1) (k) of the ICC Statute 
and as part of their obligation to cooperate with the ICC, States Parties to the 
ICC Statute shall provide assistance to the ICC in ‘the identification, tracing, 
freezing or seizure of proceeds, property, assets and instrumentalities of crimes 
 
3797 ‘Discussion Turns to Range and Definition of Penalties in Draft Statute in Preparatory 
Committee on International Criminal Court’, Press Release L/285, 22 August 1996 (Sweden, Japan, 
Switzerland).  
3798 ICC RPE, rule 145 (2) (a) (ii).  
3799 Ibid., rule 146 (‘1. In determining whether to order a fine [and in fixing the amount], the Court 
shall determine whether imprisonment is a sufficient penalty. The Court shall give due 
consideration to the financial capacity of the convicted person, including any orders for forfeiture 
[…] and […] any orders for reparation […] The Court shall take into account [among others] 
whether and to what degree the crime was motivated by personal financial gain. 2. A fine imposed 
[…] shall be set at an appropriate level [taking into account inter alia] the damage and injuries 
caused as well as the proportionate gains derived from the crime by the perpetrator […] The total 
amount [cannot] exceed 75 per cent of the value of the convicted person’s […] after deduction of 
an appropriate amount that would satisfy the financial needs of the convicted person and his or 
her dependants’.).  
3800 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 269.  
3801 See infra Chapter V 4.3.2.2.  
3802 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2911), 29 August 2012, para. 23.  
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for the purpose of eventual forfeiture’. In securing effective reparations, the 
identification and freezing of any asset of the convicted person is pivotal.3803 
Therefore, State Parties ought to timely and effectively assist the ICC as early as 
possible in the proceedings as identified by the Assembly of ICC State Parties.3804 
The ICC has ordered ‘protective measures’ to secure funds for reparations for 
‘the ultimate benefit of the victims’, under article 57 (3) (e) of the ICC Statute,3805 
and thus prevent that those funds are placed outside the ICC’s reach, which is 
technologically feasible as determined in Lubanga by Pre-Trial Chamber I.3806 In 
Bemba, an important quantity of property and assets, including bank accounts, 
real estate and aircrafts were either seized or frozen.3807 Additionally, it should be 
noticed that, under rule 221 of the ICC RPE, the ICC Presidency has, as 
appropriate, to consult with, among others, victims in order to decide on 
disposition or allocation of property or assets belonging to the sentenced person 
and it shall in all cases prioritize enforcement of measures on reparations.     
        
2.3.3.2. General Remarks on the TFV and Reparations Through it   
To begin with, some general remarks on the TFV are provided herein. The TFV 
is a unique feature at the ICC and set up for the benefit of victims of crimes 
under the ICC’s jurisdiction as laid down in article 79 (1) of the ICC Statute ‘A 
Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of States Parties for 
the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the 
families of such victims’. The concept of a Trust Fund, which received strong 
support in the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the ICC,3808 
constitutes in Schabas’s words ‘one manifestation of the enhanced role for 
 
3803 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 277.  
3804 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.5, 27 November 2013, para. 10;  
ICC Assembly of State Parties, Resolution ICC-ASP/10/Res.3, Reparations, 20 December 2011, 
para. 3.  
3805 ICC Statute, article 57 (3) (e) (‘Where a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued under 
article 58, and having due regard to the strength of the evidence and the rights of the parties 
concerned, as provided for in this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, seek the 
cooperation of States pursuant to article 93, paragraph 1 (k), to take protective measures for the 
purpose of forfeiture, in particular for the ultimate benefit of victims’.). 
See also ICC RPE, rule 99. Cooperation and protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture 
under articles 57, paragraph 3 (e), and 75, paragraph 4.  
3806 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr ), 24 February 2006, para. 137.   
3807 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-8), Décision et Demande en Vue d’obtenir l’identification, la 
Localisation, le Gel et la Saisie des Biens et Avoirs Adressées a la République Portugaise, Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, 27 May 2008. 
3808 See Mark Jennings, ‘Article 79. Trust Fund’ in Triffterer (2008) 1439, 1439.  
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victims in the general philosophy of the Court’.3809 The TFV was established by 
decision of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC Statute at its first session in 
September 2002,3810 its Board of Directors was elected in September 2003, during 
the second session of the Assembly of States Parties.3811 The Assembly also 
adopted regulations setting up the Trust Fund Secretary and those measures 
were in place by 2006 and, in early 2007, the TFV began its operations.3812   
The phrase ‘benefit of victims’ contained in article 79 (1) has been 
interpreted by the Assembly of States Parties as consisting of two components, 
reparations and material support.3813 Accordingly, and generally speaking, the 
TFV’s mandate is twofold and reflects its relationship with the ICC. A first 
mandate is to ensure the existence of sufficient available funds in case the ICC 
orders reparations in accordance with article 75 (2) of the ICC Statute,3814 which 
provides for that ‘Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for 
reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in article 79’. This has 
been the case in Lubanga, as detailed by the Appeals Chamber.3815 This first 
mandate is referred to by the TFV as ‘reparations mandate’ and linked to a 
specific ICC case.3816 Thus, under this mandate, the TFV implements reparations 
awards to victims ordered by the Court against the convicted in accordance with 
ICC’s specified criteria.3817 The TFV’s second function, i.e., the general assistance 
function,3818 has also been called non-judicial or humanitarian.3819 The difference 
 
3809 Schabas (2010) 909.  
3810 Establishment of a Fund for the Benefit of Victims of Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the 
Court, and of the families of such Victims, Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.6, 9 September 2002, 
Adopted Pursuant to Rule 89, Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of State Parties, ICC-ASP/1/3, 
pp. 160-179.    
3811 Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Second Session, New York, 8-12 September 2003, ICC-ASP/2/10, paras. 40-43.  
3812 See Schabas (2010) 911. 
3813 See Regulations of the TFV, regulation 50 (a) (i). 
3814 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-492), Decision on the Notification of the Board of Directors 
of the Trust Fund for Victims in accordance with Regulation 50 of the Regulations of the Trust 
Fund, p. 7 (Apr. 11, 2008).    
3815 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 55.  
3816 Report to the Assembly of States Parties on the Activities and Projects of the Board of Directors 
of the Trust Fund for Victims for the Period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, ICC-ASP/10/14, 7 August 
2012, paras. 3-8. 
3817 See also Zegveld (2010) 88-89. 
3818 Report to the Assembly of States Parties on the Activities and Projects of the Board of Directors 
of the Trust Fund for Victims for the Period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, ICC-ASP/10/14, 7 August 
2012, paras. 9 et seq. 
3819 Zegveld (2010) 88. 
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is that whereas in the first function, the TFV can by using resources deposited 
with it implement ICC-ordered reparations awards against a convicted person, 
when directed by the ICC to do so; the second function allows the TFV using 
voluntary contributions to provide general assistance, i.e., technically speaking 
not reparations, to all victims of the situations before the ICC.3820 Details 
concerning these two mandates of the TFV and how victims’ status is exercised 
are discussed later on.3821 
Article 79 (2) of the ICC Statute establishes that ‘The Court may order 
money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture to be transferred, 
by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund’. In addition, as established by the 
Assembly of State Parties, besides the sources of income listed in article 79 (2), 
the TFV can also be funded with voluntary contributions from governments, 
organizations, individuals, corporations, and other entities, according to the 
‘relevant criteria adopted by the Assembly of States Parties’, via ‘Resources 
collected through awards for reparations if ordered by the Court pursuant to rule 
98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, and ‘Such resources, other than 
assessed contributions, as the Assembly of States Parties may decide to allocate 
to the Trust Fund’.3822     
With regard to the concept of ‘reparations through the Trust Fund’, as 
laid down in article 75 (2) of the ICC Statute, Trial Chamber I in its reparations 
decision applied the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, concerning 
interpretation of treaties,3823 and thus the Chamber gave ‘the word “through” its 
ordinary meaning, namely “by means of”’.3824 Accordingly, Trial Chamber I 
understood that when article 75 (2) of the ICC Statute establishes that a 
reparations award may be made ‘through’ the TFV, the ICC can draw on the 
TFV’s logistical and financial resources in implementing the award.3825 
Additionally, the Chamber considered that when the convicted person lacks 
assets, as seen in Lubanga, the reparations award is not limited to the funds and 
 
3820 See, e.g., TFV, The Two Roles of the TFV. Reparations and General Assistance, available at: 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/two-roles-tfv (last visit on 30 November 2012).  
3821 See infra Chapter V 3.3.2.  
3822 Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.6, 9 September 2002, para. 2. 
3823 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31 (1) (‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose’.).  
3824 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 270 (citing the Oxford English 
Dictionary).   
3825 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
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assets seized and deposited with the TFV, but such award ‘can, at least 
potentially, be supported by the Trust Fund’s own resources’.3826  
As found by Trial Chamber I,3827 this interpretation can be in principle 
considered consistent with rule 98 (5) of the RPE and regulation 56 of the TFV 
Regulations. Rule 98 (5) establishes that the Trust Fund ‘may use “other 
resources” for the benefit of victims [emphasis added by the Chamber]’.3828 In 
turn, regulation 56 of the TFV Regulations sets an obligation on the TFV’s Board 
of Directors to complement the resources collected from the convicted with ‘the 
other resources of the Trust Fund’, and the Board, without prejudice of its 
activities ‘[…] shall make all reasonable endeavours to manage the Fund taking 
into consideration the need to provide adequate resources to complement 
payments for awards under rule 98, sub-rules 3 and 4 [of the ICC RPE]’. 
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that, under regulation 56, the ‘need to provide 
adequate resources’ includes the need to fund reparation awards.3829 When the 
ICC orders reparations against an indigent convicted, e.g., Lubanga, the ICC 
‘may draw upon “other resources” that the TFV has made reasonable efforts to 
set aside’. This conclusion can also be reached by considering the equally 
authentic French version.3830     
The ICC Trial Chamber I’s interpretation is also consistent with a 
previous decision by Pre-Trial Chamber I, which established that:  
 
[...] pursuant to articles 75(2), 79(2) of the Statute and rule 98 of the Rules, the 
Court may order that an award for reparations be made through the Trust 
Fund; that the Court order concerning awards for reparations may be executed 
with (i) funds collected through fines and forfeiture as provided for in article 
79(2) of the Statute, or (ii) other resources as provided for in rule 98(5) of the 
Rules which is subject to the provisions of article 79 of the Statute; and that 
therefore, the responsibility of the Trust Fund is first and foremost to ensure that 
sufficient funds are available in the eventuality of a Court reparation order 
pursuant to article 75 of the Statute [emphasis added].3831    
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3826 Ibid., para. 271. 
3827 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3828 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3829 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3830 Regulations of the TFV, regulation 56 (French version) (‘Le Conseil de direction détermine s'il 
faut compléter le produit de l'exécution des ordonnances de réparation par d'«autres ressources du 
Fonds» et en informe la Cour’.). 
3831 Situation in the DRC (ICC-01/04-492), 11 April 2008, page 7. For a critical view of this 
decision, see Tom Dannenbaum, ‘The International Criminal Court, Article 79, and Transitional 
Justice: The Case for an Independent Trust Fund for Victims’ (2010) 28 Wisconsin Law Journal 
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Thus, Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded that even though the TFV is in 
principle and formally free to use its ‘other sources’, such freedom is limited by 
the TFV’s obligation to guarantee an adequate reserve to provide/pay 
reparations under article 75 of the ICC Statute. Such interpretation seems to be 
consistent with the interpretation by Cherif Bassiouni who sustains that article 
75 (2) grants the ICC the authority to order reparations out of the TFV.3832 
Therefore, based on the interpretations given by Pre-Trial Chamber I and Trial 
Chamber I, it is possible to conclude that, under regulation 65, the TFV has to 
complement the funding of a reparations award, but within the limitations of 
resources available to the TFV and without affecting its assistance mandate, as 
also determined by Trial Chamber I.3833 The Board of Directors of the TFV 
approved in March 2013 the increase of the Fund’s reparation reserve from € 1.2 
million to € 1.8 million.3834 
ICC RPE on the TFV’s involvement on implementing individual and 
collective reparations awards and related findings in the reparations decision in 
Lubanga, are analyzed later.3835 What should be mentioned herein is that rule 98 
(1) states that ‘Individual awards for reparations shall be made directly against a 
convicted person’. However, according to rule 98 (2), if the ICC orders that the 
award for reparations against a convicted person be deposited with the TFV at a 
time when making the order is ‘impossible or impracticable to make individual 
awards directly to each victim’, such award ‘shall be separated from other 
resources of the Trust Fund and shall be forwarded to each victim as soon as 
possible’. Rule 98 (3) deals in turn with a collective reparations award against the 
convicted through the TFV. Thus, although reparations awards are ordered by 
the Chamber against the accused, their implementation can be conducted 
through the TFV, e.g., in Lubanga, as detailed later.3836 
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234, 297 (concluding that Pre-Trial Chamber I was wrong to limit the TFV’s independence by 
asserting the TFV’s responsibility to maintain a balance enough to supplement insufficiently 
resourced reparations awards ordered by the ICC under article 75).      
3832 Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, 
Analysis, and Integrated Text of the Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Vol. 1(Brill 2005) 177.  
3833 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 273. 
3834 Report to the Assembly of States Parties on the Activities and Projects of the Board of Directors 
of the Trust Fund for Victims for the Period 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, ICC-ASP/12/14, 31 July 
2013, p. 1.  
3835 See infra Chapter V 3.3.2.1, 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.   
3836 See infra Chapter V 3.3.2.1, 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.  
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2.4. The ECCC  
2.4.1. Preliminary Considerations  
Even though the right to claim reparations was not included in the ECCC Law, it 
is incorporated in the ECCC Internal Rules. Moreover, most Cambodians agree 
on the necessity of some form of reparations for Khmer Rouge victims.3837 
Although the civil party’s right to claim reparations is also recognized under 
Cambodian Law,3838 there are differences between the ECCC reparations regime 
and that existent under national law. The scope of civil action at the national 
level is significantly wider.3839 Following the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber’s 
appeal judgment in Duch,3840 those differences can be summarized as follows.  
First, whereas civil parties at the ECCC may direct their reparations 
claims only against the accused,3841 the civil parties in Cambodian domestic 
proceedings may claim compensation for injury against a broader group of liable 
persons (not limited to perpetrators).3842 Second, whereas the ECCC Internal 
Rules confine reparations to moral and collective awards,3843 i.e., individual 
awards and compensation are excluded,3844 the Cambodian domestic system 
allows a wider set of classic civil law remedies including damages proportional to 
the injury suffered, return of lost property and restoration of damaged or 
destroyed property to its original state.3845 However, some of the measures 
identified under the ECCC Internal Rules are not yet available under the 2007 
Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure,3846 as examined later.3847 Third, unlike 
 
3837 In a 2008 survey conducted in a universe of 1000 Cambodian nationals, whereas 88% 
considered that reparations should be given to victims, 68% opined that they should be granted to 
the community as a whole. In turn, 53% considered that reparations should be provided in a 
modality that affects Cambodians’ daily lives such as social services (20%), infrastructure 
development (15%), economic development programs (12%), housing and land (5%), and 
provision of livestock, food and agricultural tools. See Phuong Pham et al., So We will Never 
Forget: A Population-based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Human Rights Center, University of 
California January 2009) 43-44.    
3838 See 2007 Code of Criminal Procedure, articles 2 and 14.  
3839 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 643. 
3840 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3841 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quinquies (3). See also ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (11) (Rev. 3).   
3842 2007 Code of Criminal Procedure, article 21. 
3843 ECCC Internal Rules, rules 23 (1), 23 bis (1) and 23 quinquies (1).  
3844 Ibid., rule 23 quinquies (1). 
3845 2007 Code of Criminal Procedure, article 14. 
3846 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 643. For further details see infra Chapter V 4.4.2. 
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the Cambodian national system,3848 civil actions at the ECCC are not limited by 
statute of limitations.3849 Fourth, unlike the ECCC,3850 it is possible to bring the 
civil action before civil courts at the Cambodian domestic system.3851  
Based on the previous considerations, although the ECCC Internal Rules 
reparations regime comes from analogous forms of redress included in the 2007 
Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure, rules on civil parties at the ECCC have 
to be differentiated and ‘cannot readily be drawn by way of analogy to those in 
domestic law’,3852 including in Cambodia.3853 Such observation is of particular 
relevance concerning civil compensation regime from which the Internal Rules 
significantly depart as highlighted by the Supreme Court Chamber.3854 These 
departures from national law were considered necessary by the Trial Chamber 
due to not only the large number of civil parties anticipated at the ECCC but also 
because of the difficulties of quantifying the total extent of losses suffered by an 
indeterminate class of victims.3855 In addition, due to the need for prosecuting 
crimes, which was unviable in Cambodia for many years, reparations provided 
by the ECCC are intended to be symbolic rather than compensatory.3856 
Furthermore, the eligibility has to be decided on an equal basis and not under 
civil compensation formulae.3857 Lastly, but equally important, it should be 
noticed that the ECCC is the first forum for victims of the Khmer Rouge to apply 
for reparations as a national reparations program has not been implemented.3858 
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3847 See infra Chapter V 4.4.2.  
3848 2007 Code of Criminal Procedure, article 26. 
3849 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 643.  
3850 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3851 2007 Code of Criminal Procedure, article 22.  
3852 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 644.  
3853 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 661.  
3854 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 644.  
3855 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 661, 
footnote 1144. See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court 
Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 644.    
3856 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 661, 
footnote 1144. See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court 
Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 644.     
3857 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 644.      
3858 See Hao Duy Phan, ’Reparations to Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations: The Case of 
Cambodia’ (2009) 4 East Asia Law Review 277-298.   
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2.4.2. Reparations Claimants    
2.4.2.1. Civil Parties as Reparations Claimants  
The Trial Chamber in Duch has found that civil parties’ interests ‘are principally 
the pursuit of reparations’ provided that there is criminal conviction.3859 As 
previously mentioned,3860 under the ECCC Internal Rules, victims are entitled to 
reparations, which are their primary interest, alongside support of the 
Prosecutor, in order to join and participate as civil parties in the criminal 
proceedings before the ECCC. As noted by the Supreme Court Chamber and the 
Trial Chamber in Duch, civil participation before the ECCC includes ‘both the 
right for victims to participate in the criminal trial of an accused, and to pursue a 
related civil action for collective and moral reparations’.3861 Moreover, at the 
ECCC, only victims who have been granted the status of civil parties may claim 
reparations. As already seen,3862 one of the purposes of the civil party action 
before the ECCC is to ‘Seek collective and moral reparations, as provided in Rule 
23 quinquies’.3863   
Having said so, similar to the situation at the ICC, some modalities of 
collective reparations may potentially and at least indirectly be enjoyed by 
victims who could not apply to become civil parties and, thus, were not 
reparations claimants at the ECCC. The Supreme Court Chamber in its appeal 
judgment in Duch, when discussing the term ‘collective’ reparations, concluded 
that:  
 
In the ECCC context it excludes individual awards, whether or not of a financial 
nature. It also seems to favour those measures that benefit as many victims as 
possible. The present case is concerned with mass crimes, which, by their very 
nature, directly and indirectly affected, albeit to varying degrees, a large number 
of victims. Granting measures which are capable of being enjoyed by a restricted 
group of victims only, however much they might be deserved, would entail 
excluding other individuals such as those: who were not aware of the proceedings 
or of the opportunity to participate as civil parties; were not in a financial, 
physical, psychological or logistic position to join the proceedings; did not possess 
sufficient evidence to meet the required threshold of admissibility of their 
application; or did not wish to be engaged for other reasons […] the present case 
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3859 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2009, para. 33.  
3860 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.2.1.   
3861  Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 639; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 
July 2010, para. 660. 
3862 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.2.1. 
3863 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (1) (a).  
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numbers fewer than one hundred civil parties, while the crimes involved more 
than 12,000 victims. Moreover, an unspecified number of victims could not, and 
will likely never fully, be identified. In the present circumstances, the Supreme 
Court Chamber is of the view that the most inclusive measures of reparation 
should be privileged [emphasis added].3864  
 
Similar approach has been put forward by the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers in Nuon Chea et al. when discussing the implementation of collective 
reparations projects and, thus, ‘In addition to civil parties, it could also benefit 
victims in a broader sense as awarding collective and moral reparations to civil 
parties implies that they can benefit many victims’.3865 Indeed, some of the 
modalities of collective and moral reparations asked by the civil parties in Case 
002/01 within Nuon Chea et al. can benefit a larger group than just civil parties, 
e.g., those modalities related to the categories of remembrance and 
memorialization and documentation and education,3866 and also, as 
rehabilitation, testimonial therapy of civil parties read aloud in public 
ceremonies with the participation of community members, survivors and 
relatives.3867 These and other modalities are discussed in detail later.3868 In Duch, 
the proposal for a memorial, the S-21 Detention Centre Victims’ Memorial, was 
presented by Civil party group 3 on behalf of the Association of Victims of 
Democratic Kampuchea, ‘Ksem Ksan’.3869 This association, which includes most 
victims in this case but consisted of 486 victims (at the time of Supreme Court 
Chamber’s appeal judgment in Duch) as opposed to the 94 civil parties in Duch, 
was included in the list of associations recognized by the Victims Support 
Section (VSS) of the ECCC.3870 However, as previously seen,3871 these victims 
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3864 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 659.  
3865 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 84.  
3866 See, inter alia, Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers’ Response to the Trial 
Chamber’s Memorandum E218/7/2 Concerning Reparations Projects for Civil Parties in Case 
002/01, With Confidential Annexes, Civil Parties’ Lead Co-Lawyers, 23 August 2013, paras. 3-7 
and 9-12.  
3867 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Lead Co-Lawyers’ Indication to the Trial Chamber of the Priority 
Projects for Implementation as Reparations (Internal Rule 80BIS(4)) With Strictly Confidential 
Annexes, Civil Parties’ Lead Co-Lawyers, 12 February 2013, para. 16. 
3868 See infra Chapter V 4.4.2.2. 
3869 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 690.  
3870 See Ibid., para. 690, footnote 1399.  
3871 See supra Chapter IV 3.4.2.1.  
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associations are not themselves civil parties and are different from class 
actions.3872  
Discussion on collective and moral reparations and modalities of 
reparations is conducted later.3873 Be that as it may, reparations claimants who 
trigger the reparations proceedings and who may later benefit from reparations 
have to meet the respective causal link between harm inflicted and crimes upon 
which the accused is convicted, as discussed later. What should be mentioned 
now is that internal rule 23 quinquies conditions the granting of reparations to 
only cases where the ‘Accused is convicted’, as occurred in Duch. Thus, as 
identified by the Supreme Court Chamber in its appeal judgment in Duch, 
victims’ participation in criminal proceedings as civil parties before the ECCC is 
‘inextricably linked with the civil action’,3874 i.e., seeking collective and moral 
reparations. With regard to the civil party’s civil action, the status of a civil party 
is only attached to ‘the fact of deriving a civil claim from the criminal act 
charged’.3875 Nor is there any formal limitation on the claimant inasmuch as the 
focus is on assessing the proof in support of the claim.3876 According, to internal 
rule 23 (1) quinquies, ‘If an Accused is convicted, the Chambers may award only 
collective and moral reparations to Civil Parties […]’.   
Thus, in Duch, the Trial Chamber in its judgment, once determined the 
accused’s criminal responsibility for specific crimes and convicted him 
accordingly, then moved on to ‘consider whether he can also be found 
responsible for the particular harm alleged by two categories of Civil Parties’.3877 
In Nuon Chea et al., the Pre-Trial Chamber stressed that a ‘Civil Party has a 
right, as a member of a collective “class” to request moral reparations’ and such a 
right flows from joining the proceedings, which is not an issue to be balanced 
against the accused’s position.3878 The proceedings applicable to civil parties as 
reparations claimants as well as the specific modalities of reparations are 
discussed in detail later.3879   
What should be left clear herein is that, unlike the TFV existing at the 
ICC, there is no similar trust fund existent at the ECCC, which would have 
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3872 Zegveld (2010) 97. 
3873 See infra Chapter V 4.4.1.1 and 4.4.2.  
3874 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 411.  
3875 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3876 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3877 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 644. 
3878 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, para. 99. 
3879 See infra Chapter V 3.4 and 4.4.2.  
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provided a solid option to implement reparations claims before the ECCC. 
Victims who are granted the civil party status have to attach claims to the 
criminal proceedings before the ECCC, i.e., exercise their civil action in the 
criminal proceedings. Although in theory not necessarily all civil parties might 
seek reparations,3880 victims who wish to claim reparations before the ECCC have 
to as a sine qua non condition to join as civil parties first. Relating to this point, 
the Trial Chamber in Duch compared the system in place at the ECCC with that 
set up at the ICC:  
 
Under the scheme established by the ICC’s Rome Statute, however, there is no 
necessary connection between victim participation in criminal proceedings and 
their participation in relation to reparations: a civil action is not a prerequisite 
for victim participation in criminal proceedings before the ICC.3881  
 
It should be additionally reminded that according to internal rule 23 bis 
(5):   
 
At any time during the pre-trial stage, a Civil Party may expressly waive the 
right to request reparation, and abandon a Civil Party action. The waiver of the 
right or abandonment of the action shall not stop or suspend the criminal 
prosecution.  
 
This may be regarded as an example of the possibility to consider 
victims’ status as reparations claimants as intrinsically conditioned to the 
constitution as civil party but not identical to it.    
Internal rule 23 (2) explicitly lays down that ‘The right to take civil 
action may be exercised without any distinction based on criteria such a current 
residence or nationality’. This rule is particularly important as implements in a 
specific setting the principle of non-discrimination. By making it explicit that the 
reparations regime under the ECCC is led by the principle of non-
discrimination, the ECCC Internal Rules drafters have at least on paper reached 
a standard which is coherent with the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines.3882        
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3880 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 175. 
3881 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2009, para. 38.  
3882 UN Principles and Guidelines, principle 12 (‘[victims] shall have equal access to an effective 
judicial remedy […]), principle 25 (‘[these principles should be applied] without any 
discrimination of any kind or on any ground, without exception’.). 
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As also examined,3883 to be admissible as a civil party and, therefore, be 
able to claim reparations before the ECCC, the civil parties according to internal 
rule 23 bis (1) need to:  
              
a) be clearly identified; and  
b) demonstrate as a direct consequence of at least one of the crimes alleged 
against the Charged Person, that he or she has in fact suffered physical, material 
or psychological injury upon which a claim of collective and moral reparation 
might be based. 
  
As seen, harm or injury relevant for reparations may be of a ‘physical, 
material or psychological’ nature, as previously defined.3884 Furthermore, this 
rule requires that the injury has to be ‘a direct consequence of at least one of the 
crimes alleged against the Charged Person’ and, thus, concerning causation, the 
perpetrator’s liability is limited to ‘direct losses’.3885 In interpreting this provision, 
the Supreme Court Chamber in its appeal judgment in Duch: i) concluded that it 
is necessary a causal link between the prohibited conduct giving rise to 
reparations and the form of reparations sought;3886 and ii) interpreted this causal 
link at the ECCC as follows:     
 
[...] the causality that needs to be demonstrated for the purpose of admissibility 
of civil party applications concerns the presence of an injury suffered as a direct 
consequence of the crime. The presence of the injury is conducive to the right to 
seek reparation. Accordingly, once the Trial Chamber satisfied itself with the 
presence of injury and the civil party status of the applicant, eligibility for 
reparation is established.3887 
 
In any case, as determined by the Trial Chamber, responsibility is not 
limited to persons against whom crimes were perpetrated ‘but may also be the 
direct cause of injury to a larger group of victims’.3888 The implications for civil 
parties as reparations claimants, under rule 23 bis (b) are examined in detail in 
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3883 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.2.1.  
3884 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.2.1.   
3885 American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office (2010) 38-39. 
3886 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 699 (citing jurisprudence on reparations from the IACtHR and the ECtHR. 
The Supreme Court Chamber added that although the causal link is not entirely precise, it is 
relatively easy to interpret).   
3887 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
3888 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 642. 
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the next subsection. It should be mentioned that since legal entities (in addition 
to natural persons) can become civil parties, they can also claim reparations at 
the ECCC.3889  
  
2.4.2.2. Categories of Civil Parties as Reparations Claimants   
The definition/requirements for civil party constitution and, therefore, the 
possibility to claim reparations before the ECCC is not a formal reference to a 
specific class of individuals but instead a substantive criterion of an actual injury 
that results as a direct consequence of the crime, as correctly identified by the 
Supreme Court Chamber in its appeal judgment in Duch.3890 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Supreme Court Chamber recalled that (previous) internal rule 23 
(2) (Rev. 3) (current internal rule 23 bis (1) (b) (Rev. 8)) reflects  article 13 of the 
2007 Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure, which in turn closely resembles 
article 2 of the French CPP.3891  
The injury resulting from the crime charged is the defining and at the 
same time limiting criterion for the admissibility of the civil party application 
before the ECCC,3892 and hence for claiming and receiving reparations if the 
accused is convicted. In any case, to be granted reparations, the harm inflicted 
on victims must be directly linked to the crime(s) for which the accused was 
convicted, as noticed by the Trial Chamber in Duch ‘to pursue a related civil 
action for collective and moral reparations against an Accused for harm that is 
directly attributable to the crimes for which the Accused is convicted’.3893  
Based on the existence of an injury thus considered, the following 
question consists in determining whether this includes persons other than direct 
victims. In other words, the question is whether not only a direct victim but also 
an indirect victim can be admitted as civil party,3894 and thus to claim reparations 
before the ECCC. As previously examined in detail and concluded,3895 ECCC’s 
case law has found that not only direct but also indirect victims can be civil 
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3889 ECCC, Practice Direction 02/2007/Rev.1, article 3 (2) (a).   
3890 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 411. 
3891 Ibid., para. 409 (citing article 13 of the 2007 Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure which 
states that ‘In order for [a] Civil Party action to be admissible, the injury must be: a) Physical, 
material or psychological; and b) The direct consequence of the offence, personal and have actually 
come into being’.).   
3892 Ibid., para. 415.  
3893 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 660 
3894 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 417.  
3895 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.2.1, 2.5 and 7.  
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parties. Accordingly, not only direct victims but also indirect victims, constituted 
as civil parties, can claim reparations at the ECCC and receive them if the 
accused is convicted. Thus, as determined by the Supreme Court Chamber as for 
admissibility of civil party applications during the reparations stage, it can be 
concluded that the requirement of injury as a direct consequence of the offence 
(as stated in internal rule 23 bis (1) (b)) does not limit the admissibility of civil 
parties, and therefore their status as reparations claimants, to direct victims and, 
thus, indirect victims can be included.3896  
The Supreme Court Chamber has found that indirect victims are those 
who ‘actually suffered psychological injury, for example, as a result of the injury, 
whether temporary or permanent, of their loved ones’.3897 This conclusion is 
consistent with the IACtHR’s case law on reparations.3898 The Supreme Court 
Chamber found that psychological injury is the result of uncertainty or fear 
about the direct victim’s fate, knowledge of their suffering or the loss of sense of 
safety and moral integrity.3899 In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber relied on 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the ECtHR dealing with the provision of 
reparations for damages in serious human rights violations cases.3900 Moreover, 
in grave or prolonged cases, psychological injury may lead to physical injury by 
causing several ailments.3901 Vulnerable groups such as infants, children, the old 
and sick may have suffered psychological and physical injury as their caregivers 
were taken away from them.3902 The Supreme Court Chamber found that 
material injury may have been caused on individuals for whom the direct victims 
was providing when victimization stroke, or would have, in all probability, 
 
3896 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 418. 
3897 Ibid., para. 417. 
3898 See, e.g., IACtHR, Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment of 27 August 1998, Series C No. 39, para. 50; IACtHR, Case of Bulacio v. Argentina, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 98; 
IACtHR, Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru. Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 27 November 1998, 
Series C No. 42, paras. 138, 140 and 142-143.    
3899 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 417.  
3900 As for IACtHR’s case law, see IACtHR, Case of the “White Van" (Paniagua-Morales et al.) v. 
Guatemala, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 25 May 2001, Series C No. 76, para. 66; IACtHR, 
Case of the Caracazo v. Venezuela, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 29 August 2002, Series C 
No. 95, para. 97 (b). As for the ECtHR, see ECtHR, Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94, 
Judgment, 8 July 1999, para. 98.    
3901 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 417.  
3902 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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provided for in the future, which is the case of the relationship between parents 
and children.3903 This is consistent with the IACtHR’s jurisprudence,3904 and the 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines.3905  
The Supreme Court Chamber also added that material injury may be 
occasioned by or be a material damage to the family’s patrimony.3906 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Chamber relied once more on the IACtHR’s jurisprudence 
on reparations.3907 Furthermore, material injury may eventually have its source 
in a contractual or statute-based claim against the direct victim that the crime in 
question prevented from being satisfied.3908  
Accordingly, victims who pursue a civil action as civil parties are 
reparations claimants and, therefore, may benefit from reparations at the ECCC. 
In turn, civil parties as reparations claimants include not only direct victims but 
can also include indirect victims who ‘personally suffered injury as a direct result 
of the crime committed against the direct victim’.3909 Moreover, as previously 
examined, indirect victims are not limited to a specific class of individuals, e.g., 
families, but may also include common law spouses, distant relatives, friends, de 
facto adopters and adopters and adoptees, or other beneficiaries if that injury on 
them is demonstrated.3910 This broad scope of reparations claimants and 
beneficiaries is similar to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence on reparations.3911   
Under this logic, the Supreme Court Chamber found that persons who 
do not present injury are not considered indirect victims even if they were 
immediate family members.3912 Concerning this particular finding, it should be 
first borne in mind that, for example, jurisprudence on reparations from the 
IACtHR and the ECtHR, when it comes to immediate family members, has 
applied a rebuttable presumption according to which they have suffered injury 
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3903 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3904 See, e.g., IACtHR, Case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 
10 September 1993, paras. 48, 67 and 71.    
3905 UN Principles and Guidelines, principle 8.   
3906 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 417.  
3907 Ibid., para. 417, footnote 880 (referring to IACtHR, Case of the Caracazo v. Venezuela. 
Judgment of 29 August 2002, paras. 80-88).  
3908 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 417.  
3909 Ibid., para. 418.  
3910 Ibid., para. 418.  
3911 See Burgorgue-Larsen and Úbeda (2011) 110-117, 225-228.  
3912 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 418. 
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and accordingly shall be granted reparations.3913 Hence, in principle, this 
Supreme Court Chamber’s particular finding, with regard to immediate family 
members, can be questioned as may affect the chances of some individuals to 
become civil parties and, therefore, their right to claim reparations before the 
ECCC. Indeed, this may be considered as a factor that underlies the fact that in 
Duch only around 40% of the victims who got their civil party status revoked by 
the Trial Chamber were restituted with it by the Supreme Court Chamber in 
appeals, as previously seen.3914  
However, as the Supreme Court Chamber established, it should be borne 
in mind the difference in scope and standards between the regional human 
rights courts’ jurisprudence on reparations, in particular that developed by the 
IACtHR and the ECtHR, and heavily relied on by the ECCC’s jurisprudence, and 
the admission of victims as civil parties and consequently their claims for 
reparations before the ECCC.3915 In particular, causality relevant to the 
proceedings under regional human rights instruments is different from that 
before the ECCC and, hence, whereas the first is rights-focused, the latter is 
injury-focused.3916 As a result, the margin of discretion in deciding the 
admissibility of victims and claims for reparations before regional human rights 
courts is normally larger than in criminal proceedings due to, inter alia, 
necessary fair trial considerations in the latter.3917 Thus, the standard of and 
burden of proof as well as the scope of reparations beneficiaries are more relaxed 
before the regional human rights courts as compared to the criminal proceedings 
at the ECCC since ‘legal precepts of regional human rights mechanisms do not 
necessarily provide guidance for civil actions in criminal cases’.3918  
Bearing in mind these standards, the Supreme Court Chamber examined 
in further detail the legal presumptions applied by the IACtHR’s jurisprudence 
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3913 With regard to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence, see, e.g., IACtHR, Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. 
Argentina, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 27 August 1998, paras 63-64; IACtHR, Case of 
Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment of 7 June 2003, Series C No. 99, paras. 58-59; IACtHR, Case of the Caracazo v. 
Venezuela, Judgment of 29 August 2002, para. 91. With regard to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, 
which has used a notion of victim generally speaking more restrictive, see, e.g., ECtHR, Yasa v. 
Turkey, App. No. 22495/93, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 61-66; ECtHR, Velikova v. 
Bulgaria, App. No. 41488/98, Judgment, 18 May 1999, p. 12.              
3914 See supra Chapter IV 4.4.2.1.   
3915 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, paras. 431-432. 
3916 Ibid., para. 433. 
3917 Ibid., para. 434. 
3918 Ibid., para. 435. 
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on reparations.3919 As correctly stated by the Chamber,3920 the IACtHR’s has 
applied a presumption iuris tantum (a legal rebuttable presumption) about the 
existence of mental and moral harm with regard to mothers, fathers, daughters 
and sons, husbands and wives, and permanent companions in cases of serious 
human rights violations such as forced disappearance of persons,3921 extrajudicial 
executions,3922 and massacres.3923 In this context, the State in question has to 
disprove victims’ claim.3924 Thus, when there is state’s opposition, the IACtHR 
proceeded to examine the legal representatives’ evidence and it has asked that at 
least testimonial evidence be provided.3925 Based on this closer examination of 
the IACtHR’s jurisprudence on reparations, and also considering the difference 
in nature between the regional human rights courts and a criminal court such as 
the ECCC, it is possible to agree with the Supreme Court Chamber when this 
concludes that:  
 
[…] the jurisprudence under the ACHR serves to demonstrate that while there 
is a standard practice of applying presumptions regarding the scope of the 
notion of victim, the concrete inferences are not treated as law but as factual 
statements drawn in consideration of the circumstances of the case. These 
presumptions may be of assistance for the ECCC inasmuch as they attest to the 
universality of certain probabilities in given circumstances. The ECCC, 
however, exercises its own discretion in formulating presumptions in the factual 
context of the cases before it.3926                  
        
Be that as it may, indirect victims’ rights, including the possibility to 
claim reparations once constituted as civil parties, are independent from those of 
 
3919 Ibid., paras. 439-443. 
3920 Ibid., para. 440. 
3921 IACtHR, Case of Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of 24 January 1998, para. 114; IACtHR, Case of 
Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 22 September 2006, Series 
C No. 153, paras. 96-97; IACtHR, Case of Heliodoro-Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of 12 August 2008, Series C No. 186, paras. 174-175.  
3922 IACtHR, Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment of 29 November 2006, para. 218.    
3923 IACtHR, Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 1 July 2006, Series C No. 148, paras. 96-97; IACtHR, Case of 
the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 15 September 
2005, Series C No. 134, para. 146.    
3924 See Pasqualucci (2003) 236-237.   
3925 IACtHR, Case of Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 3 
April 2009. Series C No. 196, paras. 130-139.    
3926 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 444.  
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the direct victims, i.e., indirect victims can be granted civil party status and claim 
compensations even ‘where the direct victim is alive and does not pursue the 
civil party action him or herself’.3927 Moreover, as for the two avenues whereby 
victims can join as civil parties and claim reparations under the 2007 Cambodian 
Code of Criminal Procedure: i) as indirect victim, i.e., having suffered personal 
injury as a result of the injury to his or her family members (iure proprio) or ii) 
as a successor (iure hereditaris),3928 the Supreme Court Chamber clarified that a 
early decision by the Trial Chamber ‘to limit the scope of eligible successors to 
circumstances where the direct victim had personally filed a civil party 
application before his or her death has no basis in applicable law’.3929   
Finally, as previously discussed in detail,3930 the ECCC’s case law has 
considered the Cambodian cultural context to consider the nature of familial 
relationships, in particular extended family members,3931 to grant civil parties 
status and, therefore, opening up a possibility for indirect victims as civil parties 
to claim for reparations. In this aspect, there is a similarity with the IACtHR’s 
case law on reparations.3932                
 
2.4.3. Resources for Implementing Reparations  
2.4.3.1. From the Convicted     
As pointed out by the Supreme Court Chamber in its appeal judgment in Duch, 
unlike the reparations system existent under Cambodian law where civil parties 
may claim compensation for injury against a broader group of liable persons, 
including, but not limited to, perpetrators, the civil action can only be directed 
against the accused before the ECCC.3933 However, unlike the version of the 
ECCC Internal Rules considered by the Chamber in Duch,3934 which laid down 
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3927 Ibid., para. 418. 
3928 Ibid, para. 419 (referring to articles 13 and 16 of the 2007 Cambodian Code of Criminal 
Procedure and citing article 16 which states that ‘in case of death of the victim, a civil action may 
be started or continued by his successors’.).  
3929 Ibid., para. 421. 
3930 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.2.1.  
3931 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 643. 
3932 IACtHR, Case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 10 
September 1993, paras. 54-66 (especially para. 62).    
3933 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 643 (citing internal rule 23.11 (Rev.3 ) which stated that ‘Subject to Article 39 
of the ECCC Law, the Chambers may award only collective and moral reparations to Civil Parties. 
These shall be awarded against and be borne by convicted persons’.).  
3934 See Ibid., para. 11, footnote 22 (‘Unless otherwise indicated, as here, all references in this 
Appeal Judgment to the ECCC Internal Rules (“Internal Rule(s)”) are to Revision 3’.). 
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that the reparations award ‘shall […] be borne by the convicted person’,3935 the 
current version also contemplates the alternative option of external funding to 
implement a specific reparations project,3936 as discussed in the next subsection. 
In any case, what should be left clear here is that civil actions in ECCC 
proceedings can only be brought against the accused and, therefore, the civil 
parties lack standing to file a claim against another civil defendant.3937 This 
feature has not been changed by the revisions of the Internal Rules.3938    
The Trial Chamber in its judgment in Duch highlighted, as key features 
of civil party participation, ‘awards are directed against and borne exclusively by 
the Accused following a determination of responsibility for the harm established 
by Civil Parties as resulting from the criminal offending’.3939     
However, as established in the ECCC Law ‘All penalties shall be limited 
to imprisonment’.3940  Nevertheless, the same ECCC Law provides for that:  
 
[…] In addition to imprisonment, the Extraordinary Chamber of the trial court 
may order the confiscation of personal property, money, and real property 
acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct.  
The confiscated property shall be returned to the State.3941  
 
Although under the ECCC Internal Rules the Chambers ‘may award 
only collective and moral reparations to Civil Parties’ and ‘These benefits shall 
not take the form of monetary payments to Civil Parties’,3942 property confiscated 
from the accused can eventually be used to finance and implement some of the 
non-monetary reparations claimed by the civil parties. Internal Rules 23 
quinquies (3) establishes that ‘In deciding the modes of implementation of the 
awards, the Chamber may, in respect of each award, either: a) order that the 
costs of the award shall be borne by the convicted person’. In interpreting this 
provision, alongside the Chamber’s power to ‘award only collective and moral 
 
3935 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (11) (Rev.3) (the full text read ‘These [reparations] shall be 
awarded against and be borne by convicted persons’.). See also ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 
quinquies (1).  
3936 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quinquies 3 (b).   
3937 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 656. 
3938 Ibid., para. 656, footnote 1312.   
3939 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 661. 
3940 ECCC Law, article 38. 
3941 Ibid., article 39. 
3942 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (1).  
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reparations to Civil Parties,3943 Pre-Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea et al. noticed 
that civil party’s only right that may directly affect the accused’s right in case of 
conviction is to ‘seek in a “single submission” “in relation to each award, the 
single specific mode of implementation” of the award which may include an 
“order that the costs of the award shall be borne by the convicted person’.3944 The 
Chamber introduced the necessary precision that this particular issue is not 
related to the cost of the award but to civil party’s right to claim moral 
reparations and, hence, does not affect the accused’s position.3945   
In Duch, the Trial Chamber identified no personal property, money or 
real property acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct by the accused and, 
therefore, no asset which could form the subject of confiscation under article 39 
(new) of the ECCC Law.3946 Based on this quite precarious situation, at the time 
the Trial Chamber delivered its judgment concluded that when the accused 
seems to be indigent, which is Duch’s case, there was not a mechanism allowing 
the ECCC to substitute or supplement awards made against them with funds 
provided by national authorities or other third parties. Thus, the overwhelming 
losses suffered by the civil parties in Duch were compounded by the unlikelihood 
of recovery from the convicted, who was found to be indigent.3947           
Whether Duch’s indigence affects the ECCC’s power to award 
reparations to be borne by him was an issue discussed by the Supreme Court 
Chamber in Duch, as part of the appeals filed by the civil parties’ lawyers.3948 The 
Supreme Court Chamber began its analysis by referring to Cambodian Law. By 
doing this exercise, the Chamber found that the situation of indigence of an 
obligor, i.e., the accused, ‘does not exclude the possibility that his/her obligations 
are nevertheless ultimately performed through the intervention of third 
parties’.3949 Having said so, the Chamber moved on to consider the sui generis 
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3943 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3944 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 24 June 2011, para. 99. 
3945 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3946 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Inquiry into Income and Assets of the Accused, 
Trial Chamber, 15 October 2009; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial 
Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 634. 
3947 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 26 July 2010, para. 666. 
3948 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, paras. 666-668.  
3949 Ibid., para. 666 (referring to the fact that civil action under the 2007 Cambodian Code of 
Criminal Procedure presupposes that even when concerning an indigent civil defendant, (s)he may 
receive income in the future or third parties may pay instead of him/her; and citing, among others, 
article 434 (1) of the Civil Code of Cambodia, which explicitly foresees that ‘an obligation may be 
performed by a third party as well as by the obligor’.).   
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and dual private/public character of the ECCC reparations regime and, 
therefore, the Chamber reckoned that a reparations award that, in all probability, 
can never be enforced (de facto fictious), ‘would belie the objective of effective 
reparation and would be confusing and frustrating for the victims’.3950 The 
Chamber correctly stated that whereas in a civil action seeking a title of 
execution against an indigent accused is based on a choice and private interest of 
the plaintiff, in proceedings that include elements of reparations, ‘the 
effectiveness requirement mandates that there be a tangible availability of 
funds’.3951 Thus, reparations claims programs envisage reparations to be funded 
by the State, companies or specific funds (e.g., the TFV in the ICC).3952                 
The Supreme Court Chamber in Duch came to terms with the lack of 
externally subsidized funding mechanism whereby a reparations award issued 
against an indigent convicted could be given effect and, hence, agreed with the 
Trial Chamber’s implicit finding according to which the reparations award 
should be limited to what can realistically be implemented taking into account 
the convicted’s actual financial situation.3953 The modalities of reparations 
claimed by the civil parties and how the Trial Chamber and Supreme Court 
Chamber addressed them taking into consideration, inter alia, this important 
limiting financial factor are analyzed later on.3954 What should be mentioned 
here is that since the possibilities (in purely abstract terms) whereby Duch can 
enrich himself or a third party would come forward to give means sufficient to 
fund the reparations on Duch’s behalf rather than on his/her/its own name are 
so remote, those chances can practically be excluded and cannot be a basis for 
ordering reparations.3955 On the contrary, the Supreme Court Chamber adopted 
an approach that, although limited by the notorious constraints under the 
ECCC’s previous reparations implementation regime, is realistic as is ‘tailored to 
what is in practical terms attainable is appropriate in the ECCC reparations 
framework’.3956              
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3950 Ibid., para. 667. 
3951 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3952 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3953 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 668 (referring to Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial 
Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras. 664, 666).  
3954 See infra Chapter V 4.4.2.  
3955 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 668. 
3956 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
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2.4.3.2. External Funding 
Previous versions of the ECCC Internal Rules (applied in Duch) only laid down 
that the collective and moral reparations to civil parties ‘shall be awarded against, 
and be borne by convicted persons’.3957 Although reparations orders are issued 
against the convicted and, therefore, depend on the conviction,3958 not only the 
convicted can bear the reparations award according to the amended Internal 
Rules, as established in the current version of internal rule 23 quinquies:  
 
3. In deciding the modes of implementation of the awards, the Chamber may, in 
respect of each award, either:  
a) order that the costs of the award shall be borne by the convicted person; or  
b) recognize that a specific project appropriately gives effect to the award sought 
by the Lead Co-Lawyers and may be implemented. Such project shall have been 
designed or identified in cooperation with the Victims Support Section and 
have secured sufficient external funding. 
 
In Nuon Chea et al., where this provision is being applied, the Trial 
Chamber considered that the implementation regime of reparations was 
amended due to the uncertainties of recovery of victims’ reparations through the 
‘traditional civil party claim’.3959 Thus, rule 23 quinquies (3) (b) introduces ‘a new 
and independent avenue for reparations’ and initiatives under this provision do 
not result in enforceable claims against the accused.3960 Accordingly, the 
underlying idea:  
 
[…] was to ensure that tangible, externally funded awards acknowledging the 
suffering of Civil Parties could be realized soon after a verdict becomes final. 
This presupposes the development of awards (technically through program 
management) in parallel with the ongoing trial. Given that the Victims Support 
Section already deals with non-judicial measures, allocation of project 
development in relation to Rule 23quinquies (3)(b) to this section was the 
obvious choice.3961   
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3957 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (11) (Rev. 3); ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quinquies (1) (Rev. 5).  
3958 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quinquies (1).  
3959 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Trial Chamber Memorandum Entitled: Initial Specification of the 
Substance of Reparations Awards Sought by the Civil Party Lead-Co-Lawyers Pursuant to Internal 
Rule 23quinquies (3), E125, Trial Chamber, 23 September 2011, p. 2. 
3960 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3961 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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Moreover, a program manager, tasked with the development of these 
awards, was installed in the VSS to design the awards identified by the civil 
parties’ lead co-lawyers as well as to ensure their funding and readiness for 
implementation at the verdict stage.3962 The process of consultation and the 
modalities of reparations and their implementation presented so far in 
reparations projects in Nuon Chea et al. are discussed later.3963 What should be 
highlighted here, concerning financing of the implementation of the collective 
and moral reparations in this case is the so-called ‘Project to establish a trust 
fund and for collective and moral reparations’, presented by the civil parties’ lead 
co-lawyers as follows: 
 
[...] We wish to point here that what we are proposing is the establishment of an 
independent non-governmental, quasi-administrative body, outside the ECCC 
framework. Its purpose would be to implement reparation awards ordered by 
the Court and to allocate funds to that effect. 
[...] it must be demonstrated to the Chamber that funding for the projects has 
been secured. It is therefore justified to envisage the establishment of a trust 
fund or a funding organ. This would enable donors who are prepared to fund a 
reparation project to willingly entrust funds to an independent organisation for 
use in implementing a variety of projects.3964 
  
The civil parties’ lead co-lawyers mindful of a previous observation 
raised by the Trial Chamber, which consisted in that a trust fund cannot be 
established as an organ of the ECCC as this is outside the ECCC legal 
framework,3965 added that: 
 
There are many types of trust funds. The first example is the fund established by 
the International Criminal Court. The Chamber could argue that the fund was 
established through the Rome Statute at the same time as the ICC as an organ 
thereof. Such is not the case here. However, there is no impediment to 
establishing such a fund here in another form, provided that it guarantees use of 
the funds collected.3966 
 
This clarification by the lead co-lawyers indeed is similar to the Supreme 
Court Chamber’s in Duch observation according to which a workable solution, 
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3962 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3963 See infra Chapter V 3.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.  
3964 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, paras. 41 and 81.  
3965 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125, 23 September 2011, p. 3. 
3966 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 82.  



applicable under the amended regime in Nuon Chea et al., may be the setting up 
of an externally-subsidized trust fund, whose administrative structure would be 
tasked with the implementation of measures asked.3967 In any case, as the 
Chamber correctly stressed, monetary payments are excluded although the 
proposed projects are to be financed either by the convicted person or by 
external donors.3968 However, due to the alleged indigence of the co-accused in 
Nuon Chea et al. (like in Duch), financing by those convicted is not a realistic 
option. It is important to notice that although civil parties could not benefit of 
the amended regime in Duch, most of them have also been admitted as civil 
parties in Nuon Chea et al.3969 Accordingly, as encouraged by the Supreme Court 
Chamber,3970 these civil parties can benefit from the new regime to implement 
their reparations claims in Nuon Chea et al. Indeed, in Nuon Chea et al., the 
current fundraising strategy includes the establishment of the Victims 
Foundation of Cambodia ‘as a potential mechanism for channeling and 
administering funds for reparations projects’.3971    
Thus, the VSS may to some extent step in and, if there are external 
funds, to make the implementation of reparations awards a reality as provided in 
the current version of internal rule 23 quinquies. Internal rule 12 bis (2) 
complements this provision by stating that:  
 
The Victims Support Section shall, in co-operation with the Lead Co-Lawyers, 
and, where appropriate, in liaison with governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, endeavour to identify, design and later implement projects 
envisaged by Rule 23quinquies (3)(b).  
 
As established in its web-site, part of the VSS’s mission consists in 
coordinating the process of seeking reparations for victims via legal and non-
judicial measures and programs addressing victims’ broader interests both 
during the ECCC proceedings and beyond.3972 To implement its mandate, the 
VSS:   
 
3967 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 704, footnote 1430.  
3968 Ibid., para. 668, footnote 1343.  
3969 Ibid., para. 704, footnote 1430. 
3970 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3971 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Lead Co-Lawyers’ Indication to the Trial Chamber of the Priority 
Projects for Implementation as Reparations (Internal Rule 80BIS(4)) With Strictly Confidential 
Annexes, Civil Parties’ Lead Co-Lawyers, 12 February 2013, para. 34.  
3972 VSS's Mission Statement, available at: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support/vss-structure 
(last visit on 30 November 2012).     
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[….] seeks to design, propose, and seek alternate financial sources for 
development and implementation of non-judicial measures and programs 
addressing the broader interests of victims. These programs may when 
appropriate be developed and implemented in collaboration with government 
and non-govermental organization external to the ECCC.3973 
 
Corresponding to the first case within Nuon Chea et al., i.e., Case 002/01, 
the Trial Chamber requested from the lead co-lawyers, in consultation with the 
VSS, information regarding the status of the financing of the reparations projects 
to ensure that all measures sought pursuant to internal rule 23 quinquies (3) (b) 
might be realized with the support of donor assistance and external collaborators 
and within a meaningful time frame.3974 At the time of writing this thesis, the 
Trial Chamber requested the civil parties’ co-lead lawyers to file clarifications 
concerning funding for an important number of reparations projects and the 
final written submissions.3975 
Notwithstanding civil society groups expressed their approbation of the 
amendments introduced to the ECCC Internal Rules in 2010 whereby the VSS’s 
mandate was expanded,3976 problems with funding have raised fears about 
insufficient financial resources due to the ECCC’s budgetary problems.3977 This 
has led to NGOs doing work that should in principle be conducted by the ECCC, 
which in turn may originate the disadvantage of making the ECCC feel self-
satisfied as for funding for victims.3978  
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3973 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3974 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Trial Chamber Memorandum Entitled: Indication of Priority 
Projects for Implementation as Reparation (Internal Rule 80bis(4)), Trial Chamber, 3 December 
2012; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Trial Chamber Memorandum Entitled: Trial Chamber’s 
Response to the Lead Co-Lawyers’ Initial Specification of the Civil Party Priority Projects as 
Reparations Pursuant to Rule 80 bis(4), Trial Chamber, 1 August 2013, para. 2. 
3975 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Trial Chamber Memorandum Entitled: Trial Chamber’s 
Subsequent and Final Order on the Updated Specification of Civil Party Priority Projects Pursuant 
to Rule 81bis(4), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2013.   
3976 See, e.g., Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee, ‘New Directions for Victim 
Participation at the ECCC’, Press Release, 26 February 2010, p. 1 (‘In doing so, the Court 
recognizes the need to complement the criminal justice process with restorative elements of justice. 
The relevant provision is broad and allows therefore the Victim Support Section to design – by 
applying a consultative and inclusive approach – measures that are most appropriate for victims of 
the Khmer Rouge’.). Available at:  
http://www.chrac.org/eng/CHRAC%20Statement%20in%202010/02_26_2010_CHRAC%20Press
%20Release%20on%20Outcome%20of%207th%20ECCC%20Plenary%20in%20Eng.pdf (last visit 
on 30 November 2012). See also McGonigle Leyh (2011) 217.    
3977 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 217.  
3978 Ibid., 221.     
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In the particular case of using external funding to implement a 
reparations award project to be provided for the victims, according to the quoted 
rule 23 quinquies (3) (b) is subject not only to a specific designation or 
identification of a specific project in cooperation with the VSS, but also to the 
quite challenging task to guarantee sufficient external funding. The importance 
of external funding to implement reparations and how it operates within the 
ECCC framework is illustrated as follows. In Duch, the Supreme Court Chamber 
considered that due to convicted’s indigence, inter alia, the installations of 
memorials at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek and transformation of Prey Sar into a 
memorial site could not be granted.3979 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
Chamber noticed that an association, namely the Association of Victims of 
Democratic Kampuchea ‘Ksem Ksan’,3980 had started a fund-raising initiative, 
which may attract potential donors’ interests. However, considering that the 
edification of a memorial within the S-21 compound is a complex process and 
requires the participation and coordination of different entities and 
administrative bodies, the Chamber only ended up inviting and encouraging ‘the 
competent national and international entities to ‘facilitate the performance of 
any and all measures required to give it effect’.3981 Thus, due to the ECCC’s legal 
framework, the Chamber fell short of ordering or asking further actions to 
ensure the allocation of funds for this particular modality of reparations claimed 
by the civil parties. Only time will tell if the merely exhortative but not binding 
language produces any real impact.  
Lastly, but equally important, the Supreme Court Chamber in Duch 
stressed that the limited reparations available from the ECCC did not affect the 
victims’ right to seek and receive reparations that fully address their harm in 
proceedings that may be available in the future.3982 However, it also reckoned 
that unlike, for example, the situation in Rwanda where defendants were 
indigents, there is no ECCC legal instrument provision foreseeing that a 
reparations decision be transmitted to domestic courts or other competent 
bodies.3983 Moreover, awarded monetary reparations in favor of victims in 
Rwanda as damages in the proceedings against the convicted were ordered by 
domestic courts in application of national law.3984   
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3979 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 692.  
3980 Ibid., para. 690. 
3981 Ibid, para. 692. 
3982 Ibid., para. 668. 
3983 Ibid., para. 668, footnote 1344.  
3984 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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Although the matter of whether a civil action would be available at the 
Cambodian system,3985 the fact that the civil action can only be brought against 
the accused at the ECCC ‘precludes the use of legal framework of the 2007 Code 
of Criminal Procedure to sue the State before the ECCC’.3986 In addition, unlike 
the ICC proceedings,3987 the ECCC instruments do not contemplate a 
mechanism to invite State representations.   
 
2.5. Comparative Conclusions   
At the examined international and hybrid criminal courts, victims’ status as 
reparations claimants only exists at the ICC and the ECCC, i.e., victims can 
claim reparations in criminal proceedings at the ICC and the ECCC and, later, 
receive reparations for the harm inflicted caused by the accused’s crimes for 
which (s)he is convicted. Victims’ status as reparations claimants at the ICC and 
especially at the ECCC in general terms resemble to that existent in the French 
system. Reparations orders at the ICC and the ECCC may only be issued against 
the convicted but they can be implemented by the TFV (ICC) or, potentially, 
with external funds by the VSS in liaison with non-governmental organizations, 
e.g., an externally subsidized trust fund, and governmental organizations 
(ECCC).  
At the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL, victims lack the status of 
reparations claimants although they may benefit from some limited 
rehabilitative measures, such as medical assistance, but based on their status as 
witnesses at those courts. Even at the STL where victims can participate as victim 
participants, the possibility for them to claim reparations does not exist. What 
exists in these courts is a sort of ‘delegation’ to domestic courts where victims 
can claim compensation, i.e., victims may use a condemnatory judgment from 
these tribunals to claim compensation at the national level, but, as far as it is 
known, no domestic compensation claims have been granted based on a 
condemnatory judgment of the ICTY, the ICTR or the SCSL. The STL may 
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3985 Ibid., para. 656 (referring to articles 291 and 355 of  the 2007 Cambodian Code of Criminal 
Procedure that state that a civil defendant other than the accused becomes responsible in 
connection with the establishment of the accused’s criminal responsibility. As for the state 
obligation to grant reparations, it is independent of the determination of the accused’s criminal 
responsibility; however, there is no positive domestic regulation that would tie up state obligation 
to pay reparations upon the determination of a former state agent’s criminal responsibility. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court Chamber found that the use of the 2007 Code of Criminal 
Procedure provisions on a civil defendant is likely to be a moot question.).     
3986 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
3987 See ICC Statute, article 75 (3); ICC RPE, rules 94 (2) and 95 (1).  
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‘identify’ victims who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of crimes 
by an accused convicted by the STL and who later may bring compensation 
claims at national courts and, thus, for identification purposes victims’ 
participation as victim participants may be important. In any case, victims not 
identified by the STL can also use the condemnatory judgment to claim 
compensation at the national level. Victim participant status at the STL is not a 
pre-requisite to claim compensation at the national level. The ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL can order, as a penalty against the accused, restitution of property 
and proceeds to the rightful owners, which can include victims. However, as far 
as it is known, this provision has not been applied. Indeed, amicus curiae on 
restitution of property and/or compensation at the ICTR have been rejected. 
Although there have been some attempts at the ICTY and the ICTR to grant 
victim the status of reparations claimants, in particular concerning 
compensation, these initiatives have been unsuccessful. Reasons for this negative 
outcome have included, inter alia, that these tribunals’ judges considered these 
tribunals not to be suited for handling compensation claims, funding problems, 
and potential delays. Notwithstanding efficiency and financial concerns may be 
sound, it is herein criticized the exclusion of victims as reparations claimants 
from these courts, which have thus adopted a purely retributive approach on this 
regard.  
The lack of standing as reparations claimants before the ICTY, the ICTR, 
the SCSL and the STL is a feature also present in the Anglo-American systems, 
where the fact that victims can receive compensation via penalties imposed 
against the accused does not transform them in technically speaking 
compensation claimants. However, in the Anglo-American systems and also in 
the French one, victims have the option to claim reparations before civil courts 
via, for instance, in United States class actions and/or the ACTA. Indeed, the 
class actions as implemented in the United States may be considered as a 
general/indirect referent for international and hybrid criminal courts since in 
both contexts large numbers of reparations claimants are involved. Be that as it 
may, national systems provide avenues additional to criminal proceedings such 
as civil courts and state funds where victims can claim reparations, mainly 
compensation. Accordingly, on this regard, the scope of alternatives available in 
national systems is broader than the existent at the examined international and 
hybrid criminal courts.        
The ICC is the first court, among the international and hybrid criminal 
courts, at which victims can claim reparations. The ICC reparations regime 
recognizes the need to go beyond an exclusively punitive justice approach by 
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redressing the suffering inflicted on the victims and, thus, introduces a 
restorative justice approach element based on victims’ interest to receive 
reparations. At the ECCC, one of the two purposes for which victims become 
civil parties is to seek reparations, which is similar to the French system. 
Therefore, the civil party participation at the ECCC includes the right to seek 
reparations. However, the reparations regime at the ECCC in comparison to that 
in place at the Cambodian System (and also as for the French system) is in some 
aspects more limited as, inter alia, civil parties at the ECCC can only direct their 
reparations claims against the accused; reparations at the ECCC are only limited 
to moral and collective awards; and, unlike the ECCC, in Cambodia victims can 
bring the civil action before civil courts. 
Concerning the scope of reparations claimants and beneficiaries, the 
most important difference between the ICC and the ECCC is whether victims’ 
participation as victim participants in the proceedings (ICC) or civil party 
constitution (ECCC) is a requirement to claim reparations. On the one hand, at 
the ICC, victims do not need to be victim participants, i.e., are not required to 
participate as victim participants during pre-trial or trial to seek and receive 
reparations. This approach should be welcome as it does not restrict reparations 
to the few victims who participated in the trial but also considers the (much) 
larger universe of victims of crimes committed by the accused and upon which 
(s)he is convicted and who for reasons, most of the times beyond their control, 
could not or did not want to become victim participants. Accordingly, it is not 
only non-discriminatory but also realistic. Victims who participated as victim 
participants in the ICC criminal proceedings have, inter alia, the personal 
interest to obtain reparations. Be that as it may, for victims (including victim 
participants) to be reparations claimants and receive reparations accordingly, 
they need to request reparations via proceedings detailed later.3988 In any case, 
the ICC exceptional court-initiated reparations proceedings may benefit victims, 
i.e., eligible reparations beneficiaries, who could not initially apply for 
reparations if they can be identified by the ICC and/or the TFV and, thus, have 
the chance to later claim reparations.  
Principles applicable to victims as reparations claimants at the ICC 
include inter alia: i) consideration of all victims, in particular, children, elderly, 
disabled and sexual or gender violence victims, and related to it, reparations 
awards suitable for sexual violence and child victims; ii) reparations based on 
non-discriminatory grounds; and iii) accessibility, consultation with and 
participation from victims, families and communities.  
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3988 See infra Chapter V 3.3.1.  
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On the other hand, victims who want to claim and obtain reparations at 
the ECCC are first required to become civil parties, which may (considerably) 
reduce the universe of potential reparations claimants and beneficiaries. 
Although this situation is similar in the French system, i.e., constitution as civil 
parties to claim reparations at a criminal court, in France victims may 
alternatively exercise their civil action before civil courts, which is non-existent 
at the ECCC. In any case, at the ECCC, civil party is not determined by residence 
or nationality criteria. ECCC’s case law has determined that the accused’s 
responsibility for any harm for reparations purposes is established once the 
accused’s criminal responsibility is determined, i.e., once (s)he is convicted. In 
other words, granting reparations to civil parties at the ECCC depends on the 
accused’s conviction, which is also the rule in the French system but with the 
caveat that a French court may under certain conditions endorse the civil party’s 
claim for damages in case of acquittal.  
Therefore, whereas at the ICC victims’ status as reparations claimants 
may be exercised independently from the victim participant status, i.e., victims 
do not need to become (or remain) victim participants to claim reparations, at 
the ECCC civil party constitution is required for victims to claim reparations.  
However, victims’ status as reparations claimants and beneficiaries at the 
ICC and the ECCC presents several similarities. First, when it comes to some 
modalities of collective reparations, victims who claim reparations at the ICC or 
the ECCC will not necessarily be the only reparations beneficiaries as victims 
who could not claim reparations, could not be identified and/or for whom no 
one claimed reparations benefits at the ICC or who could not become civil 
parties to exercise the respective civil action at the ECCC may potentially and at 
least indirectly benefit from some symbolic and/or non-monetary collective 
reparations such as collective (rehabilitative) measures for comunities. Second, 
at the ICC and the ECCC case-based reparations regimes, the granting of 
reparations to victims depends on the accused’s conviction as the harm inflicted 
on the victim to be redressed has to be causally linked to the crime(s) upon 
which the accused was convicted. Third, the categories of reparations claimants 
and beneficiaries, i.e., direct and indirect victims, at the ICC and the ECCC are 
to an important extent similar. In shaping these categories, the ICC and the 
ECCC have mainly relied on jurisprudence on reparations from the IACtHR and 
the ECtHR, and the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines. Fourth, at the ICC 
victims as reparations claimants may be considered as parties concerning their 
reparations claims during the reparations phase proceedings, i.e., after 
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conviction, although there is no official civil party status at the ICC unlike the 
ECCC.  
At the ICC, in application of the definition of victims under the ICC 
RPE, used not only for victims’ status as victim participants but also as 
reparations claimants, and ICC’s case law (in particular the reparations decision 
in Lubanga), reparations for material, physical or psychological harm can be 
claimed by and granted to not only direct victims but also indirect victims, i.e., 
those who suffer harm as a result of the harm inflicted on direct victims. Indirect 
victims include family members of the direct victims, those who tried to prevent 
the commission of a crime and those harmed when helping or intervening on 
direct victims’ behalf. In further analyzing the notion of indirect victims to 
determine the scope of reparations beneficiaries, the Trial Chamber in its 
reparations decision has highlighted the importance of the cultural context when 
examining family structures, and also the presumption that an individual is 
succeeded by his/her spouse and children.    
Likewise, ECCC’s case law has concluded that not only direct victims but 
also indirect victims can be civil parties and, therefore, claim reparations for 
physical, material or psychological injury before the ECCC. The indirect victim 
category is not limited to family members but also may include, for example, 
common law spouses, distant relatives, (de facto) adopters, adoptees and friends. 
To examine familial relationships, the ECCC considered the Cambodian context. 
Nevertheless, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber concluded, as for immediate 
family members who do not present injury, that they are not considered indirect 
victims. Although this may in principle be criticized in the light of human rights 
courts’ reparations jurisprudence, the ECCC’s approach is sound as, inter alia, 
the margin of discretion and scope of reparations claimants and beneficiaries in 
the former (rights-focused) is broader than in the latter (injury-focused in 
criminal proceedings). Even in human rights courts’ reparations jurisprudence, 
the presumption of immediate relatives as indirect victims is not absolute but 
rebuttable. In any case, indirect victims at the ECCC can be granted civil party 
status and claim reparations regardless of whether the direct victim is alive, 
which is similar to the French system. However, unlike the French and 
Cambodian systems, the ECCC is not limited to the direct victim having first 
applied for civil party constitution when it comes to eligible successors.  
Concerning causation, i.e., the causal link between the crime for which 
the accused is convicted and the harm inflicted on victims for which they will be 
granted reparations, the ICC RPE do not provide a specific legal standard. The 
‘as a result’ of the commission of a crime phrasing (rule 85 (a)) has been 
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interpreted by the ICC as not limited to direct harm. In the reparations decision 
in Lubanga, Trial Chamber I has applied the ‘proximate cause’ standard, which 
consists in the existence of a ‘but/for’ relationship between the crime and the 
harm inflicted and, thus, not limited to ‘direct harm’ or ‘immediate effects’ of the 
crimes. This standard is also applied in the Anglo-American systems. At the 
ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL, compensation delegated to national 
systems does not require explicitly direct causation. However, inter alia, ICC 
Trial Chamber I’s not very clear language by referring to ‘victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence’ as seemingly within the scope of reparations in Lubanga, 
where the accused had not even been charged with sexual violence crimes as 
such, has led to an on-going appeal. In any case, putting aside that clarity of 
language problem, both the Trial and Appeals Chambers in Lubanga have only 
referred to victims (both direct and indirect as previously defined) of crimes for 
which the accused was convicted for reparations purposes. Regardless of whether 
the legal causation standard is confirmed by the ICC Appeals Chamber, the 
proximate cause standard can in principle be accepted as the legal causation 
standard as there is no reference to a ‘direct’ causation in the ICC RPE although 
when it comes to factual causation it may be difficult to apply, like any another 
single standard.  
In any case, it is concluded here that if the ‘proximate cause’ standard 
finally prevails, it should be applied in a restrictive manner, excluding as much as 
possible (too) remote or speculative harm from reparations, based on the 
following reasons. First, victims claiming reparations can only and by definition 
receive them in the ICC case-based reparations regime if those claimants are 
victims, both direct and indirect, of those crimes for which the accused was 
found guilty. Second, those victims who are not eligible to receive reparations 
under the ICC case-based reparations regime can still benefit from the TFV’s 
general assistance mandate. Third, a quite flexible application of the ‘proximate 
cause’ standard may likely lead to an exponential increase in reparations 
claimants and beneficiaries by including harm and/or victims too remote from 
the crimes that led to the accused’s conviction. Not only would it denaturalize 
the logics of the ICC case-based reparations regime, i.e., linked to crimes for 
which the accused was found criminally responsible, but also it in practical terms 
would most likely jeopardize the efficiency of the reparations regime set up in 
the ICC due to, inter alia, the limited resources available for reparations and 
potential delays in proceedings. The above-mentioned arguments are not 
incompatible with acknowledging that, for example, in Lubanga, the fact that 
those victims of crimes for which the accused was found guilty, i.e., enlisting, 
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conscripting or using children under the age of 15 to directly participate in the 
hostilities, suffered sexual violence or enslavement (especially girls) and, hence, 
have to receive reparations tailored to redress the particular dimension of their 
harm caused by sexual and gender-based violence and abuse, as identified by 
Trial Chamber I. Thus, in Lubanga, victims (direct and indirect) who were 
sexually abused as part of the ‘essential support function’ connected to the 
crimes for which Lubanga was convicted should also be redressed for that harm.  
With regard to causation, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber has 
considered the need for a causal link between the crime and the reparations 
sought and, in application of the ECCC Internal Rules, this causal link consists in 
an injury suffered as a ‘direct consequence’ of the crime, i.e., a direct causal link. 
The presence of injury thus established is conducive to the civil party’s right to 
seek reparation. Therefore, the harm to be redressed has to be directly 
attributable to the crimes for which the accused is convicted. In any case, 
reparations are not limited to persons against whom crimes were perpetrated 
(direct victims) but also include a larger group of victims (indirect victims) 
provided that criminal responsibility is the direct cause of the injury. The direct 
causal link at the ECCC is similar to the one existent in the French system.      
Concerning resources for implementing reparations, a first point to be 
remembered is that the ICC and the ECCC can issue a reparations order directly 
against the convicted person. At the ICC, financial penalties (punitive measures), 
i.e., fines and forfeiture, can be used to fund reparations in favor of victims. 
However, it should be borne in mind that reparations regime and punitive 
measures are although complementary distinct in nature. The ICC reparations 
regime is not of a punitive nature since reparations at the ICC do not seek to 
punish the perpetrator but address the harm caused to the victims. Reparations 
under the ICC are not penalties. This feature is different from the Anglo-
American systems where compensation orders (England) and restitution orders 
(United States) are penalties in nature although they may arguably have a dual 
effect (or even purpose), i.e., punitive and restorative, especially in the United 
States where ‘full and timely restitution’ (Federal CVRA) has been worded as a 
victim’s right. Indeed, reparations and penalties at the ICC may be considered as 
two sides of the same coin, i.e., interrelated, but different in nature. Even though 
funding reparations for victims out of the financial punitive measures imposed 
on the convicted present advantages for victims and even for the defendant, the 
most important limitative factor is the convicted’s lack of financial means, which 
is common at the international level as evidenced in Lubanga. Nevertheless, this 



important gap is compensated at the ICC via its TFV, whose first mandate 
concerns case-based reparations.  
Thus, the ICC can implement its case-based reparations orders against 
the convicted through the TFV and, hence, when the former needs funds (e.g., in 
case of convicted’s indigence) can use those collected by the TFV but without 
affecting the TFV’s second mandate, which is of general assistance. Accordingly, 
the TFV is a sui generis mechanism not only to complement funds when the ICC 
needs to provide case-based reparations but also to design and implement 
reparations plans, for example, in Lubanga, as seen later.3989 The TFV is mutatis 
mutandi similar to national practice examined where there are specific 
compensation funds as alternative avenues to provide reparations to victims. 
However, in the case of the TFV, its reparations mandate is intrinsically linked to 
the cases litigated before the ICC. 
When it comes to the ECCC, although there are not monetary 
reparations, financial resources are necessary to implement collective and moral 
reparations (with some exceptions such as apologies). The reparations order is 
addressed against the convicted and, under the previous implementation regime, 
it could only be borne by him/her, i.e., to assume the costs thereof. Nonetheless, 
as shown in Duch, due to convicted’s indigence, funds, for example, obtained via 
confiscation of the accused’s property, which may eventually be used to finance 
and implement non-monetary reparations, are normally not found. 
Nevertheless, the amended implementation regime of reparations at the ECCC, 
applicable to Nuon Chea et al., permits as an option that reparations initiatives 
identified by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers in cooperation with the VSS may 
be supported by external funding. Thus, it has been prepared a project to 
establish an externally subsidized trust fund to finance collective and moral 
reparations in this case. Most of the civil parties in Duch are also civil parties in 
Nuon Chea et al. and, thus, at least this time their collective and moral 
reparations claims can be externally financed. The projected trust fund will not 
be an ECCC’s organ, i.e., not like the TFV. In any case, the always challenging 
process of securing funds will determine whether reparations projects succeed.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that, mutatis mutandi similar to the 
French system, the ECCC Law contemplates confiscation of the accused’s 
property,3990 but unlike the French system, not fines. Moreover, in France, the so-
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3989 See infra Chapter V 3.3.2, 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.  
3990 As seen before, confiscated property ordered by the ECCC in principle returns to the State. See 
supra Chapter V 2.4.3.1. 
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called ‘sanction-reparation’ penalty can be ordered and may benefit victims who 
did not become civil parties.  
 
3. Victims and Reparations Proceedings  
In this subchapter, after some general points on the national systems considered 
and the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL, the analysis is focused on 
reparations proceedings and how victims participate/intervene in them to claim 
and receive reparations at the ICC and the ECCC. Thus, the analysis follows the 
sequence of procedural stages where victims can claim reparations from bringing 
their reparations requests, including trial and appeals, and putting emphasis on 
reparations phase proceedings such as reparations hearings, reparations orders 
and appeals against them. As for the ICC, victims’ situation at the TFV 
(reparations implementation phase) is also considered. The subchapter is 
completed with comparative conclusions.       
 
3.1. National Systems 
3.1.1. English Adversarial System 
As previously determined, victims are not technically speaking reparations 
claimants in criminal proceedings although they may benefit from compensation 
orders established as penalty against the accused by a criminal court. In other 
words, the court may make a compensation order of its own accord and the 
victim neither has to submit an application nor can file a civil claim. 3991 In any 
case, the likelihood to receive compensation via criminal courts contrasts with a 
purely retributive justice approach that offers nothing on this regard.3992 Indeed, 
compensation orders have been considered relatively successful since they are 
better enforced and made more often than mechanisms to compensate victims in 
civil law jurisdictions (adhesion model).3993 However, in an absolute sense, the 
frequency and amount of awards via compensation orders remain very 
modest.3994 Indeed, an important number of victims were led to believe that they 
were likely to receive compensation via criminal courts although they received 
nothing in spite of a legal requirement.3995 In any case, victims seem to be more 
concerned about whether the defendant made a personal contribution rather 
than the actual amount of compensation.3996 
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3991 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 258 and 1073.  
3992 Doak (2008) 235.  
3993 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 1099. 
3994 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
3995 Doak (2008) 235.  
3996 Ibid., 236.  
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It is herein briefly examined victims’ status as reparations claimants via 
civil actions as an alternative manner to obtain reparations from the offender. 
Although the majority of crimes against the person or property also constitute 
civil wrongs and, hence, victims have always been able to pursue offenders for 
damages via the civil justice system, civil actions are rare.3997 Reasons explaining 
this include: i) the burden of proof on victims as they, unlike in criminal 
proceedings, have to conduct investigations, gather evidence and prove the case 
before the civil court in a lengthy and time consuming process; and ii) civil 
actions are seldom financially worthy as civil actions are expensive and most 
perpetrators have very limited financial resources to afford large compensation 
payments.3998 Be that as it may, conviction in criminal proceedings can increase 
the likelihood to receive reparations in the civil jurisdiction; however, when 
criminal proceedings have taken place, victims will still need to testify again 
before the civil jurisdiction,3999 which may lead to secondary victimization. In 
any case, the victim can take the perpetrator to a civil or a county court and 
obtain judgment against him/her regardless of whether the case is proceeded in 
criminal courts.4000 Nonetheless, unlike criminal proceedings, the enforcement of 
the judgment is up to the victim and not the court, which increases the 
constraints for victims.4001 Civil judgment debts are pursued via the county and 
high courts and there are various means to enforce debts, including an 
Attachment of Earnings Order.4002  
Finally, eligible victims have the possibility to apply for reparations from 
the State via the CICA, which is inter alia obligated to provide explanations of its 
decisions, give information on the procedure and notify its decision to review its 
decision to the applicants.4003 Moreover, victims may appeal the award, first to a 
higher level within the CICA and, then, to the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Appeals Panel, where claimants inter alia have to receive information on 
procedure for appeals and on appeals decisions.4004 Victims should make their 
complaints in writing to the CICA and, where applicable, to the Appeals 
Panel.4005 However, there have been important criticisms against the state 
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3997 Ibid., 227.  
3998 Ibid., 231-232.  
3999 Ibid., 227. 
4000 Lewis and Ellis (2006) 9. 
4001 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4002 Ibid., 9-10.  
4003 See Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, section 13.  
4004 See Ibid., section 14.  
4005 Ibid., p. 20.  
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reparations regime such as: i) the requirement for applicants to have been living 
in England, Scotland or Wales when the injury was sustained; ii) the apparent 
distinction between ‘deserving’, i.e., victims free from blame, from ‘undeserving’ 
victims; iii) victims are denied compensation when they have criminal records; 
and iv) ambiguity on what is a violent offence, which is important as the scheme 
primarily targets some offences against the person, the so-called ‘core’ assault 
offences.4006 On the other hand, there is no requirement that the perpetrator is 
prosecuted or even identified as the applicant only has to show that (s)he has 
been inflicted a personal injury meriting a tariff excess scale in excess of £ 1000 
or that (s)he is a dependant or relative of the deceased victim.4007 Lastly, but 
equally important, it should be noted that the EU Council Directive on 
Compensation foresees, in cross-border situations, that the deciding authority 
may hear the applicant.4008  
 
3.1.2. American Adversarial System   
As previously said, victims are not technically speaking reparations claimants in 
criminal proceedings. However, there are some ‘indirect’ avenues whereby they 
may participate in the proceedings related to and leading to the imposition of 
restitution by a court, as a penalty, on the convicted and/or benefit from 
restitution thus established. Relatively recent cases under the CVRA are 
particularly useful to illustrate this point. Thus, in In re W. R. Huff Asset 
Management Co., LLC, a group of victims petitioned for a writ of mandamus to 
vacate the settlement agreement in a forfeiture action.4009 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in this case determined by denying the mandamus (in appeals) 
that nothing under the CVRA requires the government to seek victims’ approval 
before negotiating or entering into a settlement agreement since the CVRA only 
requires the competent court to hear the victims on a proposed settlement 
agreement.4010   
In In re Jane Doe, a victim claimed that, under the CVRA, she should 
receive restitution for harms suffered. By denying the petition, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner had to demonstrate a 
legal entitlement to restitution and that the CVRA itself does not provide that 
entitlement, but it states that a victim has a right to full and timely restitution ‘as 
 
4006 Doak (2008) 228-230.  
4007 Ibid., 228. 
4008 Council Directive on Compensation, article 9.  
4009 In re W. R. Huff Asset Management Co., LLC, 409 F.3D 555, 558-64 (2d Cir. 2005). 
4010 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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provided in law’.4011 Since the law applicable was the VWPA and the victim’s 
injuries did not flow ‘directly and proximately’ from the crime, there was no 
abuse to deny her motion seeking restitution under the CVRA.4012 In U.S. v. BP 
Products of North America, Inc., victims filed a motion requesting rejection of a 
plea agreement as they claimed violation by the government of the CVRA 
obligations as the government did not answer letters questioning restitution 
calculation sent by a victims’ lawyer.4013 However, the court concluded that the 
victims were given notice of their CVRA rights and the hearing on the proposed 
plea agreement and sentence would be deferred in order to allow victims to fully 
exercise their rights, attend, be heard, and, thus, the represented victims took 
advantage of the rights afforded.4014 Finally, in U.S. v. Sacane, a group of victims 
required more detailed financial disclosures from the defendant in advance of a 
restitution hearing as they claimed the need for receiving information to enforce 
their right to ‘full and timely restitution’ under the CVRA.4015 However, the court 
denied the motion by concluding that other courts have determined that victims 
lack a right to information contained in a presentence report.4016  
Considering the importance acquired for compensation on cases 
involving serious human rights violations under the ATCA, it is herein briefly 
examined this civil litigation mechanism. Under the ATCA, federal District 
Courts can exercise jurisdiction to give a tort remedy to aliens who have been 
victims of violations of the law of the nations, including serious human rights 
violations such as torture. Conditions are that: i) the claimant must be an alien; 
ii) the suit must be a civil action for a tort only; and iii) the tort must be 
committed in violation of the laws of nations or a treaty of the United States.4017  
However, there are important difficulties.4018 First, plaintiffs are required 
to first exhaust remedies available at the country where the offences were 
perpetrated.4019 Second, the court needs to have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, i.e., the defendant has to bring himself within the court’s jurisdiction. 
Third, limitations from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which prohibits 
United States courts’ jurisdiction over a foreign state official without previous 
 
4011 In re Jane Doe, No. 07-1705 (4th Cir. Aug. 9. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished).  
4012 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4013 United States v. BP Products of North America, Inc., No. H-07-434 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008).  
4014 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4015 United States v. Sacane, Crim. No. 3:05cr325(AHN) (D. Conn. Mar 28, 2007).  
4016 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4017 See 28 USC § 1350. 
4018 See Bottigliero (2004) 53-65. 
4019 See also Torture Victim Protection Act, T 28 USC § 1350 (2) (b).  
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consent of the respective State.4020 Nevertheless, in Kadić v. Karadžić, it was 
considered that the former Bosnian Serb President did not have immunity from 
service of process,4021 which also led to another case against a Rwandan who was 
a political leader at the time of the Rwandan genocide.4022 Fourth, the financial 
judgment is recoverable only when the defendant’s assets are subject to the 
court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, although United States courts have awarded very 
high compensation and punitive damages against defendants, these have been 
‘nominal victories’ as victims have not been successful to enforce them.4023 
Having said so, considering the high number of victims, the ATCA has provided 
a good avenue for numerous victims via class actions to at least obtain ‘symbolic’ 
victories.  
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
(2004) confirmed the 1980 federal court’s decision in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala to 
allow foreign victims of serious human rights abuses to sue for damages in 
United States courts under the ATCA,4024 reaffirming thus a sort of civil 
universal jurisdiction.4025 The United States Torture Victim Protection Act 
provides for civil actions for damages against individuals that committed torture 
and extrajudicial killing in favor of the torture victim or the primary victim’s 
legal representative as well as any individual who may be a claimant for wrongful 
death respectively.4026 Concerning the class action proceedings, the group has to 
be approved or certified by the judge before the respective action can proceed, 
the unnamed plaintiffs are not obligated to be part of the class as they may opt 
out once informed of the lawsuit and, although non-members of the class are 
logically not benefited with the award, they can individually litigate their own 
claims.4027     
It is important to mention that in class action cases such as Re Holocaust 
Victims’ Assets and Re Agent Orange, the respective courts appointed a Special 
Master to conduct factual and statistical research analysis to determine 
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4020 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC § 1330 et seq., 1602-11.  
4021 Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F. 3d 232, 246-248 (2nd Cir. 1995).   
4022 Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94, Civ. 3627 (JSM), 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. 9 April 
1996).  
4023 See Bottigliero (2004) 63-65.  
4024 Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004)  
4025 See Naomi Norberg, ‘The US Supreme Court Affirms the Filartiga Paradigm’ (2006) 4 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 387, 395.  
4026 Torture Victim Protection Act, T 28 USC § 1350 (2) (a) (1) and (2). 
4027 See for further details Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23. See also Zegveld (2010) 97. 
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implementation issues.4028 Part of the task performed by the Special Master 
involved extensive consultations with victims and their representatives,4029 and, 
even, in, for instance, Re Holocaust Victims’ Assets the District Court conducted 
its own process of consultation and a further hearing was led by it to consider 
whether the proposed plan was equitable and fair according to the comments or 
objections from victims and their heirs or representatives.4030 Lastly, but equally 
important, the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund has been considered 
with reservations as a reparations program since the fund is limited to provision 
of compensation in contrast to standard reparations programs closely related to 
social reintegration of victims.4031 As for the Office of Redress Administration for 
Japanese-Americans interned during the Second World War, it was established 
that the acceptance of reparations payments barred the beneficiaries from 
claiming other reparations against the government.4032  
             
3.1.3. French Inquisitorial System  
The proceedings concerning victims’ participation as reparations claimants in 
criminal proceedings in France correspond to those of the civil parties, already 
examined. Accordingly, it is here made a general re-account of the main stages of 
intervention offered to civil parties with some additional points relevant to their 
claims for reparations in criminal proceedings. The first necessary procedural 
step for victims of felonies and misdemeanors to claim reparations before 
criminal jurisdictions is their constitution as civil parties.4033 The civil party 
petition may be filed during any moment of the judicial investigation with the 
competent investigating judge.4034 In case of a challenge, by the district 
prosecutor or by a party,4035 or when the civil party petition is found inadmissible 
by the investigating judge in a reasoned order and after having sent the case file 
to the public prosecutor,4036 the civil party may appeal it.4037 The investigating 
judge makes an order recoding the filing of the complaint.4038           
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4028 See Re Holocaust Victims’ Assets, Final Order and Judgment, 9 August 2000, 96 Civ. 4849 
(ERK) (MDG); Re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1396.   
4029 See Memorandum and Orden of Korman, C.J., 22 November 2000, United States District Court 
EDNY Case No. CV 96-4849 (ERK)(MDG) (Consolidated with CV 96-5161 and CV 97-461).   
4030 McCarthy (2012a) 247-248.   
4031 See Issacharoff and Morawiec Mansfield (2006) 310. 
4032 See Yamamoto and Ebesugawa (2006) 275. 
4033 See CPP, articles 2 and 85. As for délits (misdemeanors) at the tribunal correctionnel, see also 
Ibid., article 418. 
4034 Ibid., article 87. 
4035 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
4036 Ibid., articles 86 and 87. 
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With regard to crimes (felonies), which fall under the jurisdiction of the 
cour d’assises, civil parties are heard and, once the court has decided on the 
public prosecution, it decides on the claims for damages brought by the civil 
party against the accused. It is possible for the court to appoint one of its 
members to hear the (civil) parties, examine evidence and produce a report at a 
hearing where the (civil) parties may also present their observations.4039 Even 
when the accused is acquitted or exempted from penalty, the civil party can still 
apply for compensation damage caused by the accused’s fault provided this 
derives from matters for which (s)he was accused.4040 Convicted co-accused are 
jointly liable for damage compensation.4041 As for délits (misdemeanors) at the 
tribunal correctionnel, civil party constitution can take place at the hearing itself, 
(s)he can support his/her petition for damages corresponding to the harm 
suffered, and the petition can be filed either before the hearing or in the course 
of it.4042 With the public prosecutor’s agreement, the restitution or reparations 
claim may be also drawn up by the victims, during the police investigation, with 
a judicial police officer.4043 The court rules on the admissibility of the civil party 
petition,4044 the civil party may always be represented by a lawyer,4045 and the civil 
party who having lawfully summoned does not appear or is not represented at 
the hearing, is considered as having waived his/her petition.4046 Civil party’s 
withdrawal does not preclude a civil action at a competent court.4047     
As for appeals before the cour d’assises (felonies), the civil party can 
appeal on merits provided that this regards his/her civil interests,4048 and the 
execution of the decision reached in the criminal proceedings is suspended 
during the appeals.4049 When the cour d’assises is not seized of appeal against the 
prosecution’s outcome, any appeal lodged by one party against the decision in 
the civil action is brought before the appeal division of the tribunal 
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4037 Ibid., article 87.  
4038 Ibid., article 88.  
4039 Ibid., article 371.  
4040 Ibid., article 372.  
4041 Ibid., article 375-2. 
4042 Ibid., articles 418 and 419.  
4043 Ibid., article 420-1.  
4044 Ibid., article 423.  
4045 Ibid., article 424. In this case, the judgment made is adversarial in relation to the civil party.   
4046 Ibid., article 425.  
4047 Ibid., article 426.  
4048 Ibid., article 380-2. 
4049 Ibid., article 380-4. 
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correctionnel.4050 Although the civil party is not allowed to introduce any new 
claims via appeal, (s)he may ask for increased damages in relation to any harm 
suffered since the first judgment.4051 Even though when no appeal has been filed 
against the ruling on the civil action, the civil party may exercise the rights 
granted to the civil party before the court seized of the appeal.4052 The accused’s 
position cannot be worsened by the court trying a civil action when only the civil 
party brought the appeal.4053 During the appeal, the execution of the judgment 
on civil action is suspended.4054 The enforcement of the provisional payment of 
the damages, obtained via a civil action, may be suspended.4055 Concerning 
appeals against misdemeanors, the civil party holds the right to appeal on merits, 
only in respect of his/her civil claims.4056 Even though the civil party cannot put 
forward any additional claim during appeals, (s)he may apply for an increase in 
the award of damages relating to harm occurring after the first instance 
decision.4057 The court can order suspension of any interim payment of the 
compensation granted on civil action.4058     
Concerning proceedings applicable to the CIVI, victims who have 
suffered harm caused by an offence may obtain full compensation for the 
damage coming from offences against the person if some requirements are 
met.4059 Compensation is given by a commission (the CIVI), which is of a civil 
court nature, set up with a first instance court’s jurisdiction.4060 Although the 
indemnity application must be filed within three years from the date of the 
offence, this is extended when criminal proceedings have been initiated up to 
one year after the final decision is taken.4061 When a criminal prosecution is 
started, the commission’s decision may be made before the Prosecution’s 
outcome. The CIVI may stay the implementation of its admissibility ruling until 
 
4050 Ibid., article 380-5. 
4051 Ibid., article 380-6. 
4052 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4053 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4054 Ibid., article 380-7. 
4055 Ibid., article 380-8.  
4056 Ibid., article 497 (3).  
4057 Ibid., article 515.  
4058 Ibid., article 515-1.  
4059 These are: i) need for an offence and that offence is not excluded from the CIVI’s material 
scope of application; ii) the action caused death, permanent incapacity or total incapacity to work 
for more than one month; and iii) (in principle) French nationality, although open to other 
nationals under certain conditions. See CPP, article 706-3. 
4060 Ibid., article 706-4.  
4061 Ibid., article 706-5.  
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the final criminal court’s decision if the victim requests so.4062 The hearing and 
decision take place in chambers.4063 If the criminal court rules on a civil claim 
grating a higher compensation than the indemnity by the CIVI, the victim may 
apply for further compensation within one year after the civil claim decision 
becomes final.4064 
On the other hand, the Fonds de Garantie des Victimes des Actes de 
Terrorisme et d’autres Infractions (FGTI),4065 is subrogated to the victim’s right to 
obtain compensation for the damage caused by the offence from the responsible 
and it can do via, for example, filing a civil party petition at the criminal court, 
which may even begin during appeals.4066 If the victims or his/her beneficiaries 
file a civil party petition at a criminal court or when starting an action against the 
responsible for the damage, they shall state (whatever the stage of the 
proceedings) whether they have applied to the CIVI and, if applicable, whether 
the CIVI has given them an indemnity.4067 If not, the nullity of the judgment 
concerning their civil action may be petitioned.4068 It is important to mention 
that, regarding terrorist offences, the FGTI (unlike other offences before the 
CIVI where this intervenes as a payer), intervenes directly as the only direct 
interlocutor and the only possible remedy for the victims of terrorism who are 
outside the CIVI’s scope of application; however, the victim can accept, discuss 
or refuse the compensation offer.4069        
 
3.2. The ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL  
3.2.1. Proceedings Foreseen in the Courts’ Instruments    
At the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL, victims cannot claim reparations 
and there is a ‘delegation’ to domestic courts where victims may apply for 
compensation. This scheme was foreseen as early as in the Security Council 
Resolution adopting the ICTY Statute, which states that ‘the work of the 
International Tribunal shall be carried out without prejudice to the right of the 
victims to seek, through appropriate means, compensation for damages incurred 
as a result of violations of international humanitarian law’.4070 This was 
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4062 Ibid., article 706-7.  
4063 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4064 Ibid., article 706-8.  
4065 Guaranty Funds for Victims of Terrorism and other Crimes.  
4066 CPP, article 706-11.  
4067 Ibid., article 706-12.  
4068 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4069 See Association des Paralysées de France- Conseil Technique National (2008) 27-28.  
4070 UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), para. 7.  

	

implemented via common rule 106 (Compensation to Victims) of the ICTY RPE 
and the ICTR RPE and rule 105 (Compensation to Victims) of the SCSL RPE, 
which present identical texts:  
 
(A) The Registrar shall transmit to the competent authorities of the States 
concerned the judgement finding the accused guilty of a crime which has caused 
injury to a victim. 
(B) Pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or persons claiming 
through the victim may bring an action in a national court or other competent 
body to obtain compensation. 
(C) For the purposes of a claim made under paragraph (B) the judgment of the 
Tribunal shall be final and binding as to the criminal responsibility of the 
convicted person for such injury. 
 
Former President of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, describing the 
background to the adoption of the rule said that ‘This is a sort of hint to the 
victim: please go to the national court and try to get some sort of vindication of 
your rights’.4071 At the STL, the language employed is similar. However, there are 
two important differences. First, the respective provision is contained in the STL 
Statute, not in its RPE.4072 Second, unlike the RPE of the other courts, article 25 
(1) of the STL Statute explicitly provides for that the STL ‘may identify victims 
who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of crimes by an accused 
convicted by the Tribunal’. Concerning the rest of article 25, as said, it is 
basically the same than the equivalent provisions of the other courts’ RPE. 
As seen, the provisions quoted foresee that victims who suffered injury 
for a crime under the jurisdiction of the respective court and based upon which 
the accused was found guilty have to exercise their status as reparations 
claimants at other judicial forums, i.e., either a national or other competent 
body.4073 This sort of ‘delegation’ may be criticized as there is an assumption of 
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4071 Cited in Albrecht Randelzhofer and Christian Tomuschat (eds.), State Responsibility and the 
Individual, Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1999) 48 (Cassese also indicated that ‘We decided to adopt provisions in Rule 106 of 
our Rules of procedure whereby the Tribunal has the right to transmit the judgement to the 
relevant national authorities deciding that somebody, say, has been raped or has been the victim of 
physical atrocities, and then we also go on to say that under the national legislation the victim, or 
person claiming through the victim, may bring action in a national court’.).      
4072 STL Statute, article 25 (Compensation to Victims).  
4073 See Heikkilä (2004) 175; Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf, The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Vol. 1 (Transnational Publishers 1998) 596-597.    
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not only the existence of financial resources available but also of national bodies 
to grant reparations, in particular compensation.  
Such assumption is unfounded and the very functionality of these 
provisions can be called into question as confirmed by the fact that as far as it is 
known no domestic compensation claim award has been given based on a 
judgment of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL. Rule 106 of the ICTY RPE and 
its equivalent provisions do not preclude collective claims and also are equally 
applicable for persons claiming through the victim although without establishing 
if the person has to be related or may represent, for example, an organization. 
However, since the claim has to be brought before a national court, the issue of 
who is entitled to claim compensation depends on the respective national 
laws.4074 Thus, the applicable national law may only permit standing for the 
direct victim but not for family members of other indirect victims. Moreover, the 
RPE do not oblige the respective State to grant compensation and the 
compensation scope depends on the respective domestic jurisdiction.4075 
Nevertheless, the respective provisions are not limited in their application to the 
respective States, e.g., the application of rule 105 of the ICTR RPE is not limited 
to Rwandan domestic courts. Thus, in theory, compensation claims may be 
brought in any national jurisdiction. Although the respective provisions establish 
that the judgment of the respective court ‘shall be final and binding’, it is 
doubtful the real impact of the judgment as, in certain national jurisdictions, a 
judgment is not enforceable unless the judgment has been previously 
transformed into a domestic decision and, hence, the court’s judgment in 
question has limited value.4076 Finally, although the respective rules require that 
the crime causes injury to the victims, they do not specify what kind of injury is 
required.          
The fact that, as far as it is known, no compensation has been granted in 
a domestic court based on a judgment from the ICTY and the ICTR led to 
discussions within the ICTY and the ICTR about whether to implement a system 
of compensation at these tribunals as previously examined.   
It remains to be seen whether the STL situation will be different. The 
explicit provision of singling out victims, under article 25 (1) of the STL Statute, 
may make the difference when it comes to the STL since, as previously quoted, it 
provides that ‘The Special Tribunal may identify victims who have suffered harm 
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4074 See Malmström (2003) 382. 
4075 See Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4076 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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as a result of the commission of crimes by an accused convicted by the Tribunal’. 
The rest of article 25 reads as follows:  
 
2. The Registrar shall transmit to the competent authorities of the State 
concerned the judgement finding the accused guilty of a crime that has caused 
harm to a victim.   
3. Based on the decision of the Special Tribunal and pursuant to the relevant 
national legislation, a victim or persons claiming through the victim, whether or 
not such victim had been identified as such by the Tribunal under paragraph 1 
of this article, may bring an action in a national court or other competent body 
to obtain compensation. 
 4. For the purposes of a claim made under paragraph 3 of this article, the 
judgement of the Special Tribunal shall be final and binding as to the criminal 
responsibility of the convicted person. 
 
Therefore, using the STL’s identification, victims can later file an action 
for compensation at a national court and, as appropriately pointed out by 
Cassese, ‘for the purpose of such “identification”, the participation of victims in 
the criminal proceedings before the Tribunal may prove of enormous value’.4077 
Moreover, in order to contribute to this process, the STL will give a person 
identified as a victim in a final judgment rendered by the Tribunal with regard to 
a convicted person, with a certified copy of the judgment.4078 It is expected that 
this measure will allow or at least expedite the actions for him/her to exercise 
his/her rights to compensation under national or other applicable law.4079 
However, even though article 25 (4) stipulates that for the purposes of 
reparations claims, the STL’s judgment shall be final and binding concerning the 
accused’s criminal responsibility, there is no guarantee that judicial authorities of 
domestic jurisdictions other than the Lebanese courts would necessarily consider 
themselves to be legally obligated by the STL provisions.4080 Nevertheless, the 
STL provisions should open up Lebanese Courts to victims to file compensation 
claims. In any case, victims who have not been identified by the STL can also use 
a condemnatory judgment to claim compensation in domestic courts or other 
institutions.4081 This has been implemented in rule 86 (G):  
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4077 STL President (2010), para. 16. See also STL President (2012), para. 16.   
4078 STL President (2010), para. 16; STL President (2012), para. 16. 
4079 STL President (2010), para. 16; STL President (2012), para. 16.  
4080 See Aptel (2007) 1120.  
4081 STL Chambers (2010b), para. 20. 
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Any person identified in a final judgment as a victim, or otherwise considering 
himself or herself victim, who has suffered harm as a result of the commission 
of crimes by an accused convicted by the Tribunal may request from the 
Registrar a certified copy of the judgment for the purpose of exercising his or 
her rights under national or other relevant law, as provided by Article 25 of the 
Statute. 
            
It is noticed that compensation is the only modality of the reparations 
envisaged by the provisions of the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL to be 
provided at the domestic level. This should also be criticized as compensation is 
only one modality of the broader concept of reparations as examined in detail 
later.4082      
As for the restitution of property and proceeds, which cannot be claimed 
by victims but may be ordered by the Chamber as a penalty, the respective RPE 
of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL set requirements for restitution: i) accused’s 
conviction and unlawful taking of property; ii) the property taken is associated 
with ‘the crime’; and iii) the Prosecutor requested so or the Chamber delivered 
this order on its own motion.4083 If these requirements are met, a special hearing 
is convened to establish the matter of restitution of unlawfully taken property or 
the proceeds thereof.4084 For Chamber’s determination, it is necessary a sufficient 
level of investigation during pre-trial or trial, especially from the Prosecution.4085 
If the Trial Chamber cannot determine ownership, the competent domestic 
authorities are required to do so, based on which the Chamber will order the 
restitution of property or proceeds.4086 However, these proceedings may be 
difficult due to lack of ability or willingness from national authorities. In any 
case, the Registrar is responsible to transmit to the competent national 
authorities the orders for the restitution of property or proceeds and these bear 
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4082 See infra Chapter V 4.3.2.  
4083 See ICTY RPE, rule 98 ter (B) and ICTR RPE, rule 88 (B) (‘If the Trial Chamber finds the 
accused guilty of a crime and concludes from the evidence that unlawful taking of property by the 
accused was associated with it, it shall make a specific finding to that effect in its judgement. The 
Trial Chamber may order restitution as provided in Rule 105’.). See also SCSL RPE, rule 104.  
4084 See ICTY RPE, rule 105 (A); ICTR RPE, rule 105 (A) (‘After a judgement of conviction 
containing a specific finding as provided in Rule 98 ter (B) [or ICTR RPE, rule 88 (B)], the Trial 
Chamber shall, at the request of the Prosecutor, or may, proprio motu, hold a special hearing to 
determine the matter of the restitution of the property or the proceeds thereof, and may in the 
meantime order such provisional measures for the preservation and protection of the property or 
proceeds as it considers appropriate’.). See also SCSL RPE, rule 104 (A).  
4085 Brouwier (2005) 396; Bottigliero (2004) 200.   
4086 ICTY RPE, rule 105 (E); ICTR RPE, rule 105 (E). 
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responsibility for the enforcement of the restitution orders thus received.4087 
Nevertheless, as indicated,4088 as far as it is known, these tribunals have not 
issued a restitution order and, hence, these proceedings remain theoretical. It 
must be mentioned that the STL does not have the power to order restitution at 
all.  
With regard to some rehabilitative measures, as previously mentioned 
from 2000 to 2002, the ICTR initiated an assistance program in Rwanda for 
witnesses and potential witnesses, aimed to provide legal assistance, physical 
rehabilitation, reintegration and psychological assistance.4089 This program was 
carried out by Rwandan women’s NGOs. Avega, one of the NGOs which 
received money from the ICTR, stressed that money did not go to women who 
had testified at the ICTR but was spent on a general target group providing 
medical and psychological assistance to victims.4090 Hagukura, one of the 
associations that received ICTR money, used it to organize training sessions on 
the victims’ rights and on the ICTR procedures.4091 Other organization, Asoferwa 
built a peace village in Taba (Gitamara), which was clearly linked to the ICTR’s 
activities and more specifically to the notion that the ICTR wanted to provide 
some concrete assistance to women who had testified in Arusha.4092 Indeed, the 
first accused convicted by the ICTR was Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor of 
Taba, and many women from Taba testified against him for incidents of rape 
which were qualified as genocide.4093 However, at the UN level, the program was 
thought to be problematic, especially considering the narrow mandate of the 
ICTR, i.e., prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of international crimes 
committed in Rwanda in 1994, and which does not include social assistance 
programs, and, thus, the program was partially closed in 2002.4094 As detailed 
later,4095 a medical unit at the ICTR has been undertaking some rehabilitative 
measures but limited to witnesses.4096 Therefore, these measures are given to 
victims as witnesses and not as reparations claimants.   
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4087 ICTY RPE, rule 105 (G); ICTR RPE, rule 105 (G).  
4088 See supra Chapter V 2.2.1.  
4089 See Heidy Rombouts, Victim Organisations and the Politics of Reparation: A Case-Study on 
Rwanda (2004 Intersentia) 465; Brouwer (2005) 401.  
4090 See AVEGA, Rapport Annuel d’Activités (January-December 2000) 28, 67. Cited by Rombouts 
(2004) 466.   
4091 See Rombouts (2004) 466.    
4092 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4093 Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), 2 September 1998, paras. 507-508. 
4094 See Brouwer (2005) 402.  
4095 See infra Chapter V 4.2.1. 
4096 Brouwer (2005) 403. 




As for allowances available to victims and given to them in their witness 
status at these courts, basically the respective proceedings to get them consist in 
(at least potentially) being called, normally by the Prosecutor, as witness.         
  
3.2.2. External Mechanisms Related to the Crimes under the Courts’ 
Jurisdictions  
Relating to crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICTR, the ICTY, and the SCSL, 
some mechanisms outside these courts have been set up. Here, it is explored 
briefly some of those. In April 2005, the ‘Hotel Rwanda’ film team, in 
partnership with the UN Foundation set up the ‘International Fund for Rwanda’ 
to assist the survivors of the genocide perpetrated in Rwanda.4097 The fund was 
established to implement five projects: i) gender HIV/AID sensitive income 
generating project; ii) reintegration and sustainable livelihood initiatives for 
returnees and genocide survivors in Rwanda; iii) recruitment of new doctors and 
nurses; iv) the establishment of a film school at Kigali; and v) support to 
genocide orphans living in child headed households project.4098          
At domestic Rwandan jurisdiction, the 1996 Organic Law on the 
Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide, 
Crimes against Humanity Committed since 1 October 1990, provided that 
damages awarded to survivors who had not been identified should be deposited 
in a victims compensation fund, ‘whose creation and operation shall be 
determined by a separate law’.4099 Genocide survivors participated in around 2/3 
of all criminal cases at specialized chambers in ordinary courts as civil parties or 
civil claimants, and approximately 50 % of the survivors who filed compensation 
complaints against perpetrators were awarded compensation for material or 
moral damage.4100 In 2001, Organic Law 40/2000, which introduced the special 
Gacaca jurisdictions, tasked with all genocide related cases with the exception of 
those individual most responsible for genocide,4101 declared civil actions against 
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4097 See UN Press Release, United Nations Welcomes Establishment of International Fund for 
Rwanda, AFR/1133 IHA/1031, 4 April 2005.    
4098 The International Fund for Rwanda, available at: 
http://www.unrwanda.org/undp/hotel_rwa.htm (last visit on 30 November 2012).  
4099 Organic Law No. 08/96, 30 August 1996, article 32. 
4100 See REDRESS and African Rights, Access to Reparation for Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda, Background Note (17 August 2011) 4.  
4101 Ibid., 5.  
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the State inadmissible.4102 Be that as it may, none of the compensation awards 
rendered by national courts against individual perpetrators or the State has been 
enforced.4103 Although Rwanda has established the Fonds National pour 
l’Assistance aux Rescapés du Genocide (FARG),4104 it has not adopted a 
compensation law or set up a compensation fund.4105 The legislation which 
governed the (now extinct) Gacaca jurisdiction kept silence on the survivor’s 
right to claim damages, and relevant provisions of the Organic Law 40/2000 and 
subsequent legislation were repealed, and, since 2009, only FARG can bring a 
civil action against persons convicted as being the most responsible for 
genocide.4106 Successful litigation via civil universal jurisdiction leading to 
compensation has however been implemented.4107    
With regard to the hybrid criminal courts established in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia, which are not studied in this thesis, some very general 
observations follow. Concerning the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) War Crimes Panels in Kosovo (later overtaken by 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)), established by 
UNMIK in the aftermath of the Serb-led attack against Kosovar-Albanians, in 
1998-1999, victims can inter alia participate not only as witnesses but also as civil 
parties (referred to as ‘injured parties’) and, thus, ‘The injured party has the right 
to file a property claim in criminal proceedings in accordance’,4108 and the ‘The 
motion to realize a property claim in criminal proceedings may be filed by the 
person authorized to pursue that claim in civil litigation’.4109 However, the 
number of victims participating in the proceedings has been relatively low.4110 
On the other hand, at the War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and 
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4102 Organic Law No. 40/2000 Setting up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing Prosecutions for 
Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed between 
October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, article 91. 
4103 See REDRESS and African Rights (2011) 5. 
4104 National Funds for the Assistance of the Genocide Survivors. 
4105 REDRESS and African Rights (2011) 2. 
4106 See Organic Law No 69/2008 Relating to the Establishment of the Fund for the Support and 
Assistance to the Survivors of the Tutsi genocide and other Crimes against Humanity Committed 
between 1st October 1990 and 31st December 1994, and Determining its Organization, Powers and 
Functioning, 30 December 2008.  
4107 See REDRESS and African Rights (2011) 8. 
4108 Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2003/26, 6 July 2003, article 80 
(1).  
4109 Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, article 108 (1).   
4110 See McGonigle Leyh (2011) 158-159.  
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Herzegovina,4111 that tries cases concerning lower to mid-level perpetrators 
referred to it by the ICTY,4112 victims can not only be witnesses but also file civil 
property claims during the proceedings.4113 Thus, during a trial on the Srebrenica 
massacre, 800 injured parties submitted claims for damages and the Chamber 
referred them to pursue the property claims by taking civil action.4114 However, 
the War Crimes Chamber failed to grant compensation as it referred the injured 
parties (due to efficiency considerations) to pursue their property law claims by 
taking civil action and its referral was confirmed on appeals.4115 This failure has 
been one of the victims’ principal complaints.4116 Indeed, due to efficiency 
considerations, the Chamber has in many cases instructed the injured parties to 
initiate their civil actions outside the criminal proceedings.4117 When the accused 
has been acquitted of the charges, the Chamber referred the injured parties to 
take civil actions with their claims under property law.4118  
Concerning reparations mechanisms for, among others, victims of 
crimes related to the ICTY’s mandate, under chapter 2 of Annex 6 of the Dayton 
Accords, a Human Rights Chamber was set up, modeled on the ECtHR, with the 
power to determine responsibility for human rights violations, especially those of 
a severe, systematic or discriminatory nature, committed by any of the parties to 
the Dayton Accords, i.e., the State and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Republika Sprska, and upon this determination provide reparations to 
victims.4119 In turn, under article XI of the 1995 Agreement on Refugees and 
Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords, it was established the 
Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
 
 
4111 Established via an agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the High Representative for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. See for further details Cassese (2008) 331.  
4112 Pursuant rule 11 bis of the ICTY RPE.  
4113 Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, articles 193-204.  
4114 Milorad Trbić (X-KRŽ-07/386), Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, First Instance, 16 October 
2009, para. 873.  
4115 See OSCE-ODIHR/ICTY/UNICRI (2011a) 80.   
4116 See for further details Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Prosecuting War Crimes at Home: Lessons from 
the War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2012) 12 International 
Criminal Law Review 589, 613. 
4117 See OSCE-ODIHR/ICTY/UNICRI (2011a) 79. 
4118 See Ibid., Loc. cit.      
4119 See Carla Ferstman and Sheri Rosenberg, ‘Reparations in Dayton’s Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in 
Ferstman, Goetz and Stephens (2009) 483, 486-488.  
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The Commission shall receive and decide any claims for real property in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise 
transferred since April 1992, and where the claimant does not now enjoy 
possession of that property. Claims may be for return of the property or for just 
compensation in lieu of return.    
 
Finally, some sections of the UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60, 
concerning the Housing and Property Claims Commission, also provided 
restitution, in particular the restitution of property or compensation for any 
person, including refugees or displaced persons.4120 In particular, it was 
established that:  
 
Any person with a property right on 24 March 1999, who has lost possession of 
that property and has not voluntarily disposed of the property right, is entitled 
to an order from the Commission for repossession of the property. The 
Commission shall not receive claims for compensation for damage to or 
destruction of property.4121  
     
  With regard to Sierra Leone, as previously mentioned, reparations were 
not apparently discussed during the process of setting up the SCSL nor was it 
seemingly considered that the SCSL could play a role on that issue.4122 Thus, the 
above-mentioned constituted a strong reason for the Sierra Leonean TRC to 
handle the issue of reparations and, in turn, highlights the complementarity of 
the SCSL and the TRC, i.e., two transitional justice institutions with different 
mandates.4123 Accordingly, the Sierra Leonean TRC recommended setting up a 
reparations program ‘for those victims who were particularly vulnerable because 
of the human rights violations they had suffered and the harm that they 
continued to live with’.4124 Following the TRC’s recommendations, the Sierra 
Leonean Government via the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) 
established its reparations program in 2009, which ‘will largely focus on the 
 
4120 See UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60, section 2.2 (‘Any person whose property right was lost 
between 23 March 1989 and 24 March 1999 as a result of discrimination has a right to restitution 
in accordance with the present regulation. Restitution may take the form of restoration of the 
property right (hereafter “restitution in kind”) or compensation’.), and section 2.5 (‘Any refugee or 
displaced person with a right to property has a right to return to the property, or to dispose of it in 
accordance with the law, subject to the present regulation’.).   
4121 Ibid., section 2.6.  
4122 See Schabas (2005) 295.     
4123 See Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4124 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Report, Vol. II, 2004, p. 229, para. 
6.  
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rehabilitation of victims through the delivery of social service packages and 
symbolic measures which acknowledge the past, the harm done to victims, and 
empower them to rebuild their lives’.4125 More than 30000 victims have registered 
at the NaCSA for reparations purposes,4126 in five categories, namely, amputees, 
sexual assault, severely wounded, orphans and war widows.4127  
Concerning funding for the reparations program in Sierra Leone, the 
Victims’ Trust Fund was only launched in 2009 although it had already been 
foreseen in the Lomé Peace Agreement (1999): ‘The Government, with the 
support of the International Community, shall design and implement a 
programme for the rehabilitation of war victims. For this purpose, a special fund 
shall be set up’.4128 This fund was also referred to in the TRC Act (2000),4129 and 
recommended in the TRC’s Final Report.4130   
 
3.3. The ICC and its TFV  
3.3.1. Seeking Reparations at the ICC    
3.3.1.1. Reparations Requests 
Although the application process for reparations is individualized, i.e., each 
victim must file a reparations request form, a large number of victims ‘may have 
suffered harm collectively’.4131 Rule 94 (1) (Procedure upon request) lists the 
specific requirements and, in particular items, for victims who want to claim 
reparations and reads as follows:  
 
1. A victim’s request for reparations under article 75 shall be made in writing 
and filed with the Registrar. It shall contain the following particulars:  
(a) The identity and address of the claimant;  
 
4125 NaCSA (2009). Cited by Nina Sørheim, Sierra Leone Reparations Program. The Limits of Good 
Intentions. MA Thesis in the Practice and Theory of Human Rights (University of Oslo, Faculty of 
Law 2010) 22-23. Available at: 
 https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22868/NKSThesis_2010.pdf?sequence=1 (last 
visit on 30 November 2012). 
4126 See ICTJ/Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law, ‘Sierra Leone has demonstrated its ability 
to provide Reparations: Challenges Ahead’, Press Release (4 December 2009) 1. Available at: 
http://www.carl-sl.org/home/press-releases/376-ictj-and-carl-sl (last visit on 30 November 2012).  
4127 See Joseph Sesay, ‘The Reparations Programme: What Hopes for the Victims’ (3 October 2011). 
Available at: http://www.carl-sl.org/home/reports/512-the-reparations-programme-what-hopes-
for-the-victims (last visit on 30 November 2012).  
4128 Lomé Peace Agreement, article XXIX. Special Fund for War Victims. 
4129 TRC Act 2000, article 7 (6).  
4130 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Report, Vol. II, 2004, p. 267, para. 
220. 
4131 See Ferstman and Goetz (2009) 335.  
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(b) A description of the injury, loss or harm;  
(c) The location and date of the incident and, to the extent possible, the identity 
of the person or persons the victim believes to be responsible for the injury, loss 
or harm;  
(d) Where restitution of assets, property or other tangible items is sought, a 
description of them;  
(e) Claims for compensation;  
(f) Claims for rehabilitation and other forms of remedy;  
(g) To the extent possible, any relevant supporting documentation, including 
names and addresses of witnesses.  
   
Sub-rule 1 stipulates that the request has to be made ‘in writing’, which 
departs from the original draft that also considered requests being made ‘in 
electronic form’.4132 Nevertheless, alternative forms of communications to the 
ICC such as audio, video or other electronic forms are covered under general 
provisions in rule 102 and allowed under certain conditions, which are indeed 
necessary when, for example, the victim is disabled or illiterate. Items contained 
under sub-rules 1 (c) and 1 (g) proved to be controversial when drafted.4133 The 
original draft version of sub-rule 1 (c) required the reparations claimant to 
identify the person(s) responsible for the injury, loss or harm since, absent this 
identification, the ICC might have found it difficult to link a claim with an 
accused being prosecuted at the ICC.4134  
However, it was realized that many victims would be incapable of 
identifying the perpetrator of the attack or a specific defendant at the ICC,4135 
because of the large scale of crimes or of victims’ unfamiliarity with legal 
concepts of responsibility, e.g., command responsibility.4136 Therefore, sub-rule 1 
(c) includes the provision that the reparations claimant should identify the 
person(s) responsible ‘to the extent possible’. In turn, concerning sub-rule 1 (g), 
while for many delegates the requirement to provide any supporting 
documentation helping to validate the claim sounded absolutely reasonable, for 
others that requirement would prevent those without documentation, e.g., 
refugees, from making reparations claims.4137 Foreseeing this problem, it was 
added that documentation would be provided but only ‘to the extent possible’, 
 
4132 Lewis and Friman (2001) 480. See also PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(6)DP. 3 (13 March 2000).  
4133 Lewis and Friman (2001) 479.  
4134 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4135 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4136 Dwertmann (2010) 204.  
4137 Lewis and Friman (2001) 480.  
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clause cited by Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision.4138 In other words, the 
reparations request is still valid even when no documentation is provided, which 
avoids an automatic disqualification of victims lacking documents for their 
claims.4139 In any case, similar to the ICC’s case law on identification 
documentation for victim participant applicants, Trial Chamber I in its 
reparations decision has established that as for reparations proceedings, victims 
may use: 
 
[…] official or unofficial identification documents, or any other means of 
demonstrating their identities that are recognized by the Chamber. In the 
absence of acceptable documentation, the Court may accept a statement signed 
by two credible witnesses establishing the identity of the applicant and 
describing the relationship between the victim and any individual acting on his 
or her behalf.4140           
 
It is important to notice that victims who apply for admission to 
participate as victim participants in the pre-trial or trial proceedings have the 
option to additionally request reparations. In other words, they have to claim 
reparations if they wish to receive them in addition to their application to 
participate as victim participants. This is clear in the current combined 
participation and reparation standard application form,4141 which replaced and 
merged in one form the previous standard separate forms for participation and 
reparations requests. The combined form (like its predecessor) reflects the items 
requested under rule 94, and whose use is encouraged under the ICC 
instruments.4142 Part E (Reparations) of the combined form is particularly 
relevant for the analysis conducted here and consists of three questions. The first 
two read as follows: ‘33. Would the victim like to apply for reparations? i.e., does 
the victim want something to be done for what he / she suffered?’, and ‘34. If yes, 
what would the victim want?’.  
 
4138 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 252.  
4139 Lewis and Friman (2001) 480; Dwertmann (2010) 204-205.    
4140 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 198. 
4141 See also ICC RPE, rule 96 (Requests for reparations in accordance with rule 94) (‘1. For the 
application of rule 94, the Registrar shall develop a standard form for victims to present their 
requests for reparations and shall make it available to victims, groups of victims, or 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations which may assist in its dissemination, as 
widely as possible. This standard form shall be approved in accordance with regulation 23, 
subregulation. 2, and shall, to the extent possible, be used by victims’.).  
4142 See ICC Regulations of the Court, regulations 86 and 88; Regulations of the ICC Registry, 
regulation 105. See also Dwertmann (2010) 202-205.   
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The third question (question 35) allows the reparations claimant to 
propose where the benefit should go giving these cumulative options ‘victims, 
victim’s family, victim’s community and other’. This should be understood as 
part of the discretion from the victims as reparations claimants’ right to propose 
to the ICC whether to retain the reparation benefit for him/herself or diversify it 
to include other beneficiaries. This is connected with the categories of 
reparations claimants and beneficiaries previously referred to,4143 i.e., while in 
general reparations claimants will logically be reparations beneficiaries, when it 
comes to, especially, some forms of collective reparations the reparations 
beneficiaries universe may be broader than those who properly speaking claimed 
reparations. In any case, the scope of reparations claimants is limited by the 
notions of direct and indirect victims, as developed by the ICC’s jurisprudence, 
and by the fact that only victims, both direct and indirect (including family 
members and successors), of crimes upon which the accused was convicted 
should/can claim reparations as examined previously.4144 Be that as it may, as 
evidenced in the ICC’s practice, not all victims who applied for victim 
participant status to participate in the proceedings additionally applied for 
reparations.4145 It should also be mentioned that Part D ‘Participation in the 
Proceedings’ of the combined form consists of two questions: ‘31. Does the 
victim want to present his/her views and concerns in ICC proceedings?’ and ’32. 
If yes, why does the victim want to participate in the proceedings?’.  
In conclusion, victims who apply for participation have the option to 
claim reparations by filling in Part E of the combined form and, hence, become 
reparations claimants too. It should be additionally mentioned that although rule 
94 (1) only refers to ‘victims’, the standard application form allows another 
person to file it on victims’ behalf when the victim is a child, disabled or 
deceased, or the victim has consented to it.4146  
Concerning notification, rule 94 (2) states that:   
 
 
4143 See supra Chapter V 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2.  
4144 See supra Chapter V 2.3.2.2.  
4145 See, e.g., Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2838), Order on the Applications by Victims to 
Participate and for Reparations, Trial Chamber I, 27 January 2012, paras. 2 and 4 (stating, inter 
alia, that out of 27 new applications for participation in the trial proceedings, 25 also requested 
reparations); Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1308), Decision Inviting the Parties' Observations on 
Applications for Participation of  a/0001/06 et al., Trial Chamber I, 6 May 2008, paras. 5 and 6 
(mentioning that out of the 105 applicants, 6 applicants also submitted applications for 
reparations).   
4146 Application Form for Individuals. Request for Participation in Proceedings and Reparations at 
the ICC For Individual Victims, Part A, questions 13-21.  
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At commencement of the trial and subject to any protective measures, the Court 
shall ask the Registrar to provide notification of the request to the person or 
persons named in the request or identified in the charges and, to the extent 
possible, to any interested persons or any interested States. Those notified shall 
file with the Registry any representation made under article 75, paragraph 3.   
 
Although this is a simple provision about notification, notification of the 
claim has been described as a very important guide as to how the entire 
reparation scheme of reparations operates.4147 Concerning the moment when the 
ICC can receive reparations claims, when drafting the ICC RPE, while some 
States argued that the ICC should only encourage claims where there was a 
known defendant against whom reparations could potentially be claimed, others 
sustained that the ICC should encourage victims to put forward their claims at 
the earliest opportunity.4148 Then, the ICC would have to establish whether if the 
reparations claim could subsequently be linked to an identified person(s) 
prosecuted before the ICC.4149 The second proposal prevailed and the rule was 
drafted to encourage early claims.4150 Having said so, as suggested by some ICC’s 
practice,4151 victims’ requests for reparations should be better filed once charges 
are confirmed since the harm to be repaired is linked to (confirmed charged) 
crimes for which the accused may later be convicted and also in order to avoid 
further victimization if victims request reparations too early for crimes about 
which the respective charges would later be not even confirmed. With regard to 
the moment when the accused should be notified of the reparations claims, it 
was established that the appropriate point is at the beginning of the trial as at this 
stage the accused would know that the charges had been confirmed and that 
there were claims for reparations associated with that charge.4152 
The ICC, based on article 75 (1) of the ICC Statute, can determine the 
scope and extent of reparations on its own motion; however, it is also stipulated 
that the ICC should only act proprio motu in exceptional circumstances.4153 
When the Court raises the issue of reparations, rule 95 (Procedure on the motion 
of the Court) of the ICC RPE is applicable:  
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4147 Lewis and Friman (2001) 480.  
4148 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4149 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4150 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4151 See REDRESS, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Reparations Mandate (20 May 2011) 17.   
4152 Lewis and Friman (2001) 480.  
4153 ICC Statute, article 75 (1) (‘[…] in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its 
own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and 
injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is acting’.). 
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1. In cases where the Court intends to proceed on its own motion pursuant to 
article 75, paragraph 1, it shall ask the Registrar to provide notification of its 
intention to the person or persons against whom the Court is considering 
making a determination, and, to the extent possible, to victims, interested 
persons and interested States. Those notified shall file with the Registry any 
representation made under article 75, paragraph 3.  
2. If, as a result of notification under sub-rule 1:  
(a) A victim makes a request for reparations, that request will be determined as 
if it had been brought under rule 94;  
(b) A victim requests that the Court does not make an order for reparations, the 
Court shall not proceed to make an individual order in respect of that victim. 
 
Thus, the ICC has the power to exceptionally initiate reparations 
proceedings and victims may be granted reparations without having initially 
made a request at the ICC if victims can be identified and, therefore, given the 
opportunity to later claim reparations.4154 When reparations are ordered through 
the TFV and the ICC has not identified beneficiaries in its reparations order, the 
TFV Regulations establish that the TFV will use statistical and demographical 
data analysis to locate and determinate the individual beneficiaries.4155  
Conflicting views during the drafting of rule 95 (1) were conciliated 
under rule 95 (2). These views involved concerns about: i) victims who would 
not wish reparations as these would may be seen as benefiting from ‘blood 
money’; ii) the ICC should not be intervening in what was regarded as an 
essentially civil procedure, i.e., if the victims did not opt for exercising their right 
to claim reparations against the accused, the ICC should not step in; and iii) not 
affecting victims who decide to submit a late application for reparations in case 
the ICC decides to act motu proprio,4156 i.e., not affecting victims’ late decision to 
become reparations claimants. Accordingly, in application of sub-rule (2) (a), a 
victim who becomes aware that the ICC is acting on its own motion and 
subsequently submits a reparations claim, is not to be treated differently from a 
victim making a claim in the usual manner.4157  
In turn, sub-rule (2) (b) establishes that the ICC will not issue a 
reparations order to make an individual reparations order if the victim wishes so 
and, hence, delegates who were concerned about the ICC’s intervention in what 
 
4154 See Dwertmann (2010) 209.  
4155 TFV Regulations, regulations 60 and 61. Concerning the application of statistic and 
demographic data to determine eligible victims, see also, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2803), Trust 
Fund for Victims’ First Report on Reparations, 1 September 2011, paras. 264-265. 
4156 Lewis and Friman (2001) 481. 
4157 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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was regarded as an ‘essentially’ civil matter were convinced that this sub-rule 
dealt with their concerns.4158 Nevertheless, an individual victim, member of a 
group of victims, cannot prevent the ICC from ordering collective awards.4159 In 
any case, court-initiated reparations proceedings serve the important purpose of 
allowing the ICC Judges to make up for the absence of victims and, hence, 
protect the rights of victims who due to cultural, geographical remoteness and/or 
on-going conflict situations are unable to in principle file a reparations claims.4160 
Indeed, it might be sustained the existence of an obligation for the ICC to 
exceptionally begin reparations proceedings on behalf of the victims when they 
could not originally apply for reparations.4161  
With regard to the notification of the reparations proceedings, rule 96 
(Publication of reparation proceedings) is applicable.4162 During the drafting, 
there was a general recognition that special notification considerations are 
applicable to reparations and, hence, the general rule on notifications needed to 
be supplemented.4163 Behind it, there was a justified concern to guarantee that 
victims are encouraged to bring application for reparations, which is only 
feasible if victims are aware of the proceedings.4164 In addition to notification 
which aims to inform a specific person or people known to hold an interest in 
the reparations proceedings,4165 rule 96 also lays down publication proceedings 
which seek to raise awareness among those who potentially be interested in 
reparations proceedings.4166 Due to the particularly difficult conditions existent 
during or after the commission of serious crimes and the related problems of 
communication, seeking inter-governmental organizations’ assistance was 
considered necessary to communicate with potential reparations claimants,4167 
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4158 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4159 Dwertmann (2010) 209.  
4160 Ibid., 208. 
4161 Ibid., 210. 
4162 ‘1. Without prejudice to any other rules on notification of proceedings, the Registrar shall, 
insofar as practicable, notify the victims or their legal representatives and the person or persons 
concerned […]’. 
4163 Workshop 4 in the Report of the Paris Seminar, PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/INF/2 (6 July 1999) 
Rule C.  
4164 Lewis and Friman (2001) 482. 
4165 Dwertmann (2010) 215.  
4166 ICC RPE, rule 96 (‘1. [...]The Registrar shall also, having regard to any information provided by 
the Prosecutor, take all the necessary measures to give adequate publicity of the reparation 
proceedings before the Court, to the extent possible, to other victims, interested persons and 
interested States’.).       
4167 Lewis and Friman (2001) 482.  
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concerning both notification and publication proceedings.4168 Indeed, the 
Regulations of the Court establish the option to rely on NGOs for dissemination 
of reparations application forms and, hence, ease victims’ access to the 
reparations proceedings.4169 In any case, the obligation to notify the accused is 
even more extensive when the ICC decides to begin reparations proceedings 
proprio motu.4170 Although rule 95 does not detail which victims should be 
notified, it may be said, under a joint reading of rules 95 (2) and 94, that those 
are victims on whose behalf the ICC intends to begin reparations proceedings 
and if their identity is known to the ICC.4171  
Concerning deadlines to file the reparations request, although there is no 
specific provision in the ICC instruments, to benefit from direct reparations 
orders, applications seemingly have to be filed before the reparations hearing.4172 
In Lubanga, the OPCV suggested that, based on new reparations applications, 
the Trial Chamber would set up a deadline.4173  Nevertheless, when reparations 
are awarded ‘indirectly’, i.e., through the TFV, the TFV may impose the 
respective time limits for reparations applications.4174                          
 
3.3.1.2. Seeking Reparations before/during Trial  
This sub-section deals with the legal issues concerning seeking reparations 
before/during trial up to the condemnatory/absolutory judgment. Victims or 
their legal representatives may raise the issue of reparations as early as during the 
investigation stage.4175 Although some scholars and practitioners have based on 
practical reasons suggested a strict split of the trial and reparations proceedings, 
they also acknowledge that this approach is removed from the ICC RPE’s 
spirit.4176 Indeed, Regulation 56 (Evidence under article 75) of the Regulations of 
the Court establishes that ‘The Trial Chamber may hear the witnesses and 
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4168 ICC RPE, rule 96 (‘2. In taking the measures described in sub-rule 1, the Court may seek, in 
accordance with Part 9, the cooperation of relevant States Parties, and seek the assistance of 
intergovernmental organizations in order to give publicity, as widely as possible and by all possible 
means, to the reparation proceedings before the Court’.). 
4169 Regulations of the Court, regulation  86 (1).  
4170 Rule 95 (1) establishes that the person against whom the ICC is considering to issue a 
reparations order ’shall’ be notified by the Registry. See also Dwertmann (2010) 213. 
4171 Dwertmann (2010) 213. 
4172 Ibid., 111. 
4173 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), 18 April 2012, para. 15.  
4174 Dwertmann (2010) 211. 
4175 See, e.g., Situation in DRC ((ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr), 17 January 2006, para. 63. See also 
Dwertmann (2010) 195-196. 
4176 See, e.g., Jorda and Hemptinne (2002) 1414.  
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examine the evidence for the purposes of a decision on reparations in 
accordance with article 75, paragraph 2, at the same time as for the purposes of 
trial’. Case law in Lubanga and Bemba has fleshed out this principle as for: i) 
hearing evidence related to reparations in general; ii) specific questioning of 
witnesses in relation to reparations; and iii) testimony on reparations given by 
victim participants.4177   
Trial Chamber I in Lubanga presented its approach in the following 
terms:   
 
119. The Trial Chamber accepts the submission of the legal representatives of 
victims that the extent of participation by victims during trial will to a 
significant degree depend on the Chamber's decision as to whether or not 
evidence concerning reparations will, at least in part, be considered during the 
trial or as a separate procedure after the trial.  
120. […] Regulation 56 […] does not […] undermine the rights of the defence 
and the presumption of innocence. The objective of this provision is to enable 
the Chamber to consider evidence at different stages in the overall process with 
a view to ensuring the proceedings are expeditious and effective. This will 
enable the Chamber to avoid unnecessary hardship or unfairness to the 
witnesses by removing, where appropriate, the necessity of giving evidence 
twice. This will guarantee the preservation of evidence that may be unavailable 
to the Chamber at a later stage of the proceedings.  
121. […] the Chamber will be able, without difficulty, to separate the evidence 
that relates to the charges from the evidence that solely relates to reparations, 
and to ignore the latter until the reparations stage (if the accused is convicted). 
Should it emerge that evidence relating to reparations introduced during the 
trial may be admissible and relevant to the determination of the charges, 
consideration will need to be given in open court as to whether it is fair for the 
Chamber to take this into account when deciding on the accused's innocence or 
guilt. The Trial Chamber has borne in mind that it has a statutory obligation to 
request the submission of all evidence that is necessary for determining the 
truth under Article 69 (3) of the Statute, although this requirement must not 
displace the obligation of ensuring the accused receives a fair trial.  
122. The Chamber does not agree with the prosecution’s concept of a wholly 
"blended approach" because there will be some areas of evidence concerning 
reparations which it would be inappropriate, unfair or inefficient to consider as 
part of the trial process. The extent to which reparations issues are considered 
during the trial will follow fact-sensitive decisions involving careful scrutiny of 
the proposed areas of evidence and the implications of introducing this material 
at any particular stage. The Trial Chamber may allow such evidence to be given 
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4177 See also REDRESS (2011) 43.  
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during the trial if it is in the interests of individual witnesses or victims, or if it 
will assist with the efficient disposal of issues that may arise for determination. 
However, the Chamber emphasises that at all times it will ensure that this 
course does not involve any element of prejudgment on the issue of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence, and generally that it does not undermine the 
defendant's right to a fair trial.4178 
 
As seen, Trial Chamber I arguably reached a fine balance. On the one 
hand, its approach allows considering, at least in part, evidence relevant for 
reparations during trial proceedings and, thus, not only avoiding victims the 
problems of providing evidence twice on the same issue but also guaranteeing 
expeditious and effective proceedings. On the other hand, since trial proceedings 
first and foremost aim at establishing the accused’s criminal responsibility, the 
limits set by Trial Chamber I as for evidence on reparations are precisely 
determined by the respect for the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial as 
well as by considerations of efficiency and, thus, it rejected the Prosecutor’s 
wholly ‘blended approach’. Trial Chamber III in Bemba has followed Trial 
Chamber I’s approach.4179  
As for questioning of witnesses on reparations, Trial Chamber I in 
Lubanga, based on rule 140 (2) (b), found that parties could question witnesses 
on ‘other relevant matters’ including among others ‘reparation issues 
(properties, assets and harm suffered)’.4180 In Lubanga’s trial, Judge Odio-Benito 
was particularly active questioning witnesses on harm, which included harm as a 
result of sexual violence suffered by girl child soldiers.4181 Although the defense 
opposed this systematic practice, Trial Chamber I found that the case general 
evidence is not limited to the facts and circumstances under the charges and, 
under article 69 (3), it can request submission of all evidence deemed by it as 
necessary to determine the truth.4182 Victims who testify personally during trial 
may contribute with highly important evidence in, among other issues, 
reparations and, therefore, both victims and their legal representatives need to be 
aware of this possibility.  
If a legal representative of victims wants to pose a question to a witness 
on issues related to a potential order on reparations under article 75, as 
determined in Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui: i) (s)he has to make a written 
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4178 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 120-122. 
4179 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr), 12 July 2010, para. 28.  
4180 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1140), 29 January 2008, para. 32. 
4181 See also REDRESS (2011) 44. 
4182 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2360), 18 March 2010, paras. 36 and 39.  



application, which shall be notified to the parties and must include the questions 
to be posed (in accordance to rule 91 (3) (a)), an explanation of the precise 
purpose and scope of the questions to be posed, and any relevant documents to 
be used for the questioning; and ii) this application has to be filed early enough 
for the defence to submit observations, which is seven days before the witness’s 
appearance.4183 If the request is granted by the Chamber, it will do so under 
regulation 56 of the Regulations of the Court, which permits questioning on 
reparations during trial, as mentioned, and the Chamber will determine whether 
and to what extent rule 91 (4), which contains more flexible dispositions on 
questioning applicable during the reparations hearing,4184 may also apply to 
trial.4185  
Lastly, but equally important, as previously noticed,4186 during the 
opening statements, victims’ legal representatives have pointed out different 
victims’ rights and/or interests,4187 including reparations or protection,4188 and 
harm inflicted on victims.4189           
 
3.3.1.3. Victims and Reparations Phase Proceedings: Reparations Hearings, 
Reparations Orders and Other Legal Issues    
This sub-section and the following two sub-sections deal with the legal issues on 
seeking reparations during reparations phase proceedings, i.e., after conviction. 
The Appeals Chamber in Lubanga noticed that, under the statutory framework 
for reparations, reparations phase proceedings may be divided into two parts.4190 
First, the proceedings leading to the issuance of a reparations order, regulated in 
particular by articles 75 and 76 (3) of the ICC Statute and by rules 94, 95, 97 and 
143 of the RPE and, during this first part of the reparations phase proceedings, 
the Trial Chamber may inter alia establish principles relating to reparations to, 
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4183 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, paras. 84-85. See 
also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), 18 January 2008, paras. 108-111; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-
807-Corr), 12 July 2010, paras. 30-40.  
4184 For further discussion on rule 91 (4), see infra Chapter V 3.3.1.3.  
4185 Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07-1665), 20 November 2009, para. 86. 
4186 See supra Chapter V 4.3.1.2.   
4187 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 293-294. 
4188 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 26 January 2009, pp. 59, 67; Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Transcripts, 24 November 2009, p. 46; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), 
Transcripts, 10 September 2013, p. 39, line 17.   
4189 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Transcripts, 26 January 2009, pp. 45, 47, 49, and 52-54; Katanga 
and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Transcripts, 24 November 2009, p. 40; Ruto and Sang 
(ICC-01/09-01/11), Transcripts, 10 September 2013, p. 41, lines 13-22. 
4190 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 53. 
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or in respect of, victims.4191 Thus, the ‘first part of the reparations proceedings 
concludes with the issuance of an order for reparations under article 75 (2) of the 
Statute or a decision not to award reparations’.4192 The second part of the 
reparations phase proceedings, i.e., implementation phase, consists in the 
implementation of the reparations order, which the TFV may be tasked with 
carrying out.4193 This reparations implementation phase is examined later.4194   
Reparations phase proceedings as determined by the Trial Chamber in 
its reparations decision are part of ‘the overall trial process’,4195 and indeed article 
75 of the ICC Statute that deals with reparations is located under part 6 (Trial) of 
the Statute. During reparations phase proceedings, i.e., post-conviction 
reparations hearings leading to a reparations order, and appeals against a 
reparations order, victims can be considered parties as indicated by Trial 
Chamber in its reparations decision: 
 
As already indicated, the reparations phase is an integral part of the trial 
proceedings, but unlike the Article 74 [conviction/acquittal judgment] or the 
sentencing stages when the principal focus is on the defence and the 
prosecution, the Court is mainly concerned at this juncture with the victims, 
even though the prosecution and the defence are also parties to the reparations 
proceedings.4196  
 
These considerations justify why victims, when claiming reparations 
during the reparations phase proceedings, can be considered as ‘proper 
parties’,4197 although there is no official status of civil party at the ICC, and, in 
general, there are only two formal parties at the ICC (the Prosecutor and the 
defence) as established by the Appeals Chamber.4198  
As determined in Lubanga, and already mentioned, reparations phase 
proceedings are an integral part of the overall trial process.4199 Even though 
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4191 Ibid., para. 54. 
4192 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
4193 Ibid., para. 53.  
4194 See infra Chapter 3.3.2.1.  
4195 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 260.  
4196 Ibid., para. 267.  
4197 Zappala (2010) 154. See also Brady (2001b) 595; Mariana Pena and Gaelle Carayon, ‘Is the ICC 
Making the Most of Victim Participation’ (2013) 7 International Journal of Transitional Justice 
518, 525, foonote 43.  
4198 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), 11 July 2008, para. 93 
4199 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 260. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2911), 29 August 2012, para. 36.   
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article 75 of the ICC Statute states that the ICC may order reparations, it does 
not specify the body in charge of monitoring and supervising this part of the 
proceedings. Trial Chamber I, in application of articles 64 (2) and (3) (a),4200 
established that those tasks fall within the Judiciary’s responsibilities and 
functions.4201 However, the Chamber considered it unnecessary for it to remain 
seized throughout the reparations proceedings and, accordingly, ‘reparations in 
this case [Lubanga] will be dealt with principally by the TFV, monitored and 
overseen by a differently composed Chamber’.4202 As examined later, the 
Chamber thus constituted will be in a position to resolve any contested issues 
arising out of the TFV’s work and decisions.4203  
Concerning reparations orders, article 75 (3) stipulates that ‘Before 
making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall take into 
account of representations from or on behalf of the […] victims […]’. The use of 
the verb ‘may’ would in principle seem ‘to reduce the victims’ right of 
intervention into a mere faculty’ concerning reparations proceedings after 
conviction.4204 Similar wording is found in two other official language versions, 
i.e., French and Spanish.4205 The wording is obscure and it would have been 
better to have the victims’ right to be heard and present observations explicitly 
recognized.4206 Be that as it may, once victims’ representations take place, the 
ICC must take them into consideration.4207 Under the RPE, the ICC ‘shall’ 
require the Registrar to notify victims and is thus obligated to involve them.4208  
Article 76 (3) states that if a separate sentencing hearing takes place, 
which was the case in Lubanga, reparations could be examined at the same 
hearing or alternatively at a separate hearing ‘Where paragraph 2 applies 
[separate sentencing hearing], any representations under article 75 shall be heard 
during the further hearing referred to in paragraph 2 and, if necessary, during 
any additional hearing’. In general, it is expected that a reparations hearing takes 
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4200 Provisions dealing with the Trial Chamber’s functions and powers.    
4201 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 260.  
4202 Ibid., para. 261. 
4203 Ibid., para. 262. 
4204 Donat-Cattin (2008b) 1407. 
4205 See, respectively, ‘Avant de rendre une ordonnance en vertu du présent article, la Cour peut 
solliciter, et prend en considération, les observations [...] des victimes [...]’, and ‘La Corte, antes de 
tomar una decisión con arreglo a este artículo, podrá solicitar y tendrá en cuenta las observaciones 
formuladas por el condenado, las víctimas’.  
4206 Salvatore Zappala, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University 
Press 2003) 229. 
4207 Donat-Cattin (2008b) 1408. 
4208 ICC RPE, rules 94 (2) and 95 (3).  
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place before the competent Trial Chamber prior to the delivery of the 
reparations order by that Chamber. Indeed, rule 143 of the RPE refers to a 
reparations hearing in association with one on sentencing, which would suggest 
that it is required.4209 However, under the ICC Regulations of the Court, the Trial 
Chamber may hear witnesses and examine evidence concerning a reparations 
order at the same time than the trial,4210 which implies that there is no need for a 
separate hearing.4211 In any case, the Regulations ‘shall be read subject to the 
Statute and the Rules’.4212 
The Working Group at the Rome Conference added the reference to 
additional hearings contained in article 76 (3).4213 This article is complemented 
by the above-mentioned rule 143 (Additional hearings and matters related to 
sentence or reparations), which reads as follows:  
 
Pursuant to article 76, paragraphs 2 and 3, for the purpose of holding a further 
hearing on matters related to sentence and, if applicable, reparations, the 
Presiding Judge shall set the date of the further hearing. This hearing can be 
postponed, in exceptional circumstances, by the Trial Chamber, on its own 
motion or at the request of the Prosecutor, the defence or the legal 
representatives of the victims participating in the proceedings pursuant to rules 
89 to 91 and, in respect of reparations hearings, those victims who have made a 
request under rule 94. 
 
During the drafting of this rule, it was felt necessary to include within 
those who could apply for a postponement of a reparations hearing, victims who 
had requested reparations under rule 94.4214 In order to avoid that the explicit 
reference to victims seeking reparations may lead to assume that victim 
participants would be excluded from asking postponement, the latter were 
included explicitly.4215 In any case, legal representatives cannot as such initiate a 
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4209 Schabas (2010) 883. 
4210 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 56 (‘Evidence under Article 75. The Trial Chamber 
may hear the witnesses and examine the evidence for the purposes of a decision on reparations in 
accordance with article 75, paragraph 2, at the same time as for the purposes of trial’.).    
4211 Schabas (2010) 883. 
4212 ICC Regulations of the Court, regulation 1 (2). 
4213 Report of the Working Group on Procedural Matters, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/ Add.2 (4 July), p. 5. See also Schabas, ‘Article 76 – Sentencing’ in 
Triffterer (2008b) 1413, 1416.  
4214 See Lewis (2001) 552. 
4215 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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reparations hearing as they only have the power to postpone such hearing as 
seen.4216  
‘Representations’ whereby victims can present their views to the ICC can 
be written and oral.4217 While article 76 (2) and (3) require that they ‘shall be 
heard’ in the reparations hearing(s), the Regulations of the Court refer to 
representations as being written.4218  
It has been argued that the right to be heard prior to a reparations order 
(under article 75 (3)) might be qualified as a specification of the general right of 
participation (under article 68 (3)),4219 and thus the application of article 68 (3) 
would be excluded and victims would participate in the reparations phase 
proceedings only via representations and upon invitation of the ICC.4220 
Additionally, some ICC RPE differentiate between victim participants and 
victims as reparations claimants.4221   
However, it is sustained herein that victims as reparations claimants 
cannot only participate in reparations phase proceedings via ‘representations’ on 
notification following articles 75 (3) and rules 94 or 95, but they should also be 
allowed to participate as victim participants in reparations phase proceedings, 
i.e., to possess relevant procedural rights beyond mere submission of 
representations upon the ICC’s invitation, if they follow the respective 
application process, detailed in the previous chapter,4222 based on the following 
reasons.4223   
First, reparations phase proceedings ‘are an integral part of the overall 
trial process’, according to Trial Chamber I,4224 and ICC official documents,4225 
letting alone the systematic location of article 75 under part 6 (Trial) of the ICC 
Statute, as previously said. Thus, since article 68 (3) (legal ground for victim 
participant status) is applicable to ‘all stages of the proceedings determined to be 
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4216 See also Dwertmann (2010) 195. 
4217 Ibid., 218.  
4218 According to regulation 38, representations under article 75 shall not exceed the 100 page limit, 
unless otherwise permitted by the ICC.  
4219 Donat-Cattin, David, ‘Article 75’ in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article (Nomos/Baden Baden 
1999b) 965, 974. 
4220 Dwertmann (2010) 219. 
4221 See, e.g., ICC RPE, rule 143. 
4222 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.  
4223 See also Dwertmann (2010) 220-221. 
4224 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 260. 
4225 ICC (2006) 11.  
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appropriate by the Court’, which includes pre-trial, trial and appeals, article 68 
(3) is also applicable during reparations phase proceedings.4226 
Second, excluding the application of article 68 (3) from reparations 
phase proceedings would mean a considerable reduction of the victims’ 
participatory rights in reparations phase proceedings, which would go against 
the goals behind victims’ rights to participate and claim reparations.4227  
Third, under subsection 3 (Participation of victims in the proceedings) 
of section III (Victims and witnesses) of the ICC RPE, rule 91 (4) mentions 
victims’ participation in a hearing that is ‘limited to reparations under article 75’.  
Fourth, the purpose of article 75 (3) is arguably to give the ICC authority 
to persons who have not applied to participate on their own motion, i.e., as 
victim participants, but about whom the ICC is interested in hearing their views 
on reparations.4228 Actually, under article 75 (3) (read together with article 76), 
besides victims, other interested persons, including bona fide third parties, 
namely, owners of property which was previously owned by victims, and the 
convicted can be heard by the ICC on reparations.4229  
Fifth, although it has been suggested that, in post-conviction stages, the 
need to protect the convicted’s interests ought to prevail over victim’s search for 
justice,4230 it does not seem to be the case that the offender’s interests are more 
worthy of protection after establishment of his/her responsibility.4231 On the 
contrary, it is precisely during the reparations phase proceedings (post-
conviction) where victims may be particularly interested in an active 
participation and, thus, truly benefit of a clear manifestation of restorative 
justice. Thus, Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision established that ‘The 
Court is mainly concerned at this juncture [reparations phase proceedings] with 
the victims’.4232 Additionally, if when participating in proceedings (in general) at 
the ICC, victim participants have been considered as ‘potential parties’,4233 this 
qualification could be even more appropriate during reparations phase 
proceedings. 
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4227 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4228 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4229 See also Donat-Cattin (2008b) 1408.
4230 Donat-Cattin (1999b) 974; Donat-Cattin (2008b) 1407.     
4231 Dwertmann (2010) 220.  
4232 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 267.   
4233 Donat-Cattin (1999b) 974; Donat-Cattin (2008b) 1407.      
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Indeed, Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision suggested the 
application of the victim participant status during reparations phase 
proceedings:   
 
The Registry shall decide, in accordance with its powers under Article 43 (1) of 
the Statute, the most appropriate manner in which the current victims 
participating in the proceedings, along with the broader groups of victims who 
may ultimately benefit from a reparations plan, are to be represented in order to 
express their views and concerns [emphasis added].4234 
 
Concerning the ‘personal interest’ criterion to participate, this is met 
when victims request reparations under rule 94.4235 With regard to victims who 
did not apply for reparations, considering that victims status as victim 
participants is only based on article 68 (3) and, in turn, article 75 (3) and the 
applicable rules only foresee reparations for those who have applied for them, it 
should be assessed whether victim’s personal interest to participate might come 
from his/her intention to prevent a reparations order against the convicted.4236  
The considerations under the previous paragraphs are also related to the 
idea according to which victims, when claiming reparations, can be considered 
as ‘proper parties’ and, therefore, they ‘could possess all relevant procedural 
rights’.4237  
At this point, it must be noticed that the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga 
has considered that victims are parties to, and not victim participants in, the 
appeal proceedings against a reparations order.4238 This finding, as examined in 
the next sub-section, corresponds to an explicit right for reparations claimants to 
appeal a reparations order under article 82 (4) of the ICC Statute, i.e., the right to 
appeal a reparations order as parties.      
In practice, victims who have applied for reparations under rule 94, are 
expected to directly or via their legal representatives present their observations in 
the reparations hearing and these must be considered by the ICC.4239 
Additionally, according to rule 144 (1) ‘victims or the legal representatives of 
victims participating in the proceedings’ hold the right to be present, wherever 
possible, when the Trial Chamber delivers ‘Decisions […] concerning […] 
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4234 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 268.  
4235 Dwertmann (2010) 221. 
4236 Ibid., Loc. cit.   
4237 Zappala (2010) 154. See also Brady (2001b) 595.  
4238 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 67.  
4239 Dwertmann (2010) 221. 
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reparations […]’ and, under rule 144 (2) (a), copies of such decision shall be 
provided to ‘all those who participated in the proceedings, in a working language 
of the Court’. During the reparations hearing, rule 91 (4) of the ICC RPE 
provides a more generous scope of action for the legal representatives of victims 
than during other proceedings: 
 
For a hearing limited to reparations under article 75, the restrictions on 
questioning by the legal representative set forth in sub-rule 2 [i.e., to limit legal 
representative’s intervention to written submission] shall not apply. In that case, 
the legal representative may, with the permission of the Chamber concerned, 
question witnesses, experts and the person concerned.   
 
Accordingly, for example, there are in principle no limitations on the 
questioning of witnesses, experts and the convicted person; victims are also free 
to submit relevant supporting information;4240 and, unlike other stages, during 
reparations hearings the ICC cannot limit the legal representatives to only 
submit written submissions.4241 This is related to the fact that, in the reparations 
hearing, the key matter is by definition to establish the injury, harm or loss 
inflicted on the victims caused on the crimes upon which the accused was 
convicted. The analysis of the necessary standard of proof is conducted later.4242 
It is expected the participation and/or submission of (written) 
representations/observations from a larger number of victims than those who 
participated as victim participants in the trial, which may transform the ICC in a 
sort of a mini claims commission.4243 Indeed, an important number of victim 
participants in Lubanga had not originally filed reparations applications, which 
may in principle be understood as that they were not particularly interested in 
having a monetary interest. In any case, victims may personally participate 
(articles 75 (3), 76 (3)), or considering the large number of them, most likely via 
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4240 See ICC RPE, rule 94 (1) (g); McGonigle Leyh (2011) 302.  
4241 Dwertmann (2010) 222.  
4242 See infra Chapter V 4.3.1.2.  
4243 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 302. Indeed, the Prosecutor has favored a wider approach to allow 
victims’ participation and victims’ representations or on their behalf and other interested 
individuals ‘who suffered harm as a result of crimes other than those included in the charges 
selected for prosecution’. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation under 
Article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, April 2010, p. 9.    
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their legal representatives as provided for in the ICC Statute,4244 and thus ensure 
efficiency.  
Under rule 97 (2), the ICC may appoint experts for the reparations 
assessment on request of victims or their legal representatives and the ICC ‘shall’ 
invite victims or their legal representatives to make ‘observations’ on the experts’ 
reports on reparations, as appropriate:   
 
At the request of victims or their legal representatives, or at the request of the 
convicted person, or on its own motion, the Court may appoint appropriate 
experts to assist it in determining the scope, extent of any damage, loss and 
injury to, or in respect of victims and to suggest various options concerning the 
appropriate types and modalities of reparations. The Court shall invite, as 
appropriate, victims or their legal representatives, the convicted person as well as 
interested persons and interested States to make observations on the reports of 
the experts [emphasis added].   
 
Accordingly, victims’ status and role during reparations phase 
proceedings at the ICC is ‘potentially much stronger than the wording of Art. 75 
(3) suggests’.4245  
After Lubanga’s conviction, on the road to its reparations decision, Trial 
Chamber I in Lubanga invited parties and victim participants to file submissions 
on the principles to be applied by the Chamber with regard to reparations; and 
the procedure to be followed by it including, inter alia:  
 
[…] i) whether reparations should be awarded on a collective or an individual 
basis (see Rule 97 (1) of the Rules); ii) depending on whether there should be 
individual or collective reparations (or both), to whom are they to be directed; 
how harm is to be assessed; and the criteria to be applied to the awards; iii) 
whether it is possible or appropriate to make a reparations order against the 
convicted person pursuant to Article 75(2) of the Statute; iv) whether it would 
be appropriate to make an order for an award for reparations through the Trust 
Fund for Victims pursuant to Article 75(2) of the Statute; and v) whether the 
parties or participants seek to call expert evidence pursuant to Rule 97 of the 
Rules.4246      
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4244 ICC Statute, article 75 (3) (‘representations from or on behalf of [...] victims’.). See also rule 91 
providing for the possibility to present victims’ views via their legal representatives in reparations 
proceedings.   
4245 Dwertmann (2010) 222.   
4246 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2844), 14 March 2012, para. 8.  
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Moreover, it was also stated that if other individuals, including those 
notified of the reparations proceedings under rule 96 of the RPE, seek to file 
submissions, they were given the opportunity to apply in writing for leave to 
participate.4247 Thus, the Chamber granted leave to, for example, UNICEF, 
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, and other NGOs to make written 
representations.4248 Following the Trial Chamber’s invitation, the legal 
representatives of the V01 group of victims,4249 and those of the V02 group of 
victims,4250 filed written submissions accordingly. The TFV and the Registrar also 
filed their submissions.4251  
Upon Trial Chamber I’s instruction, the OPCV was appointed by the 
Registrar as the legal representative for any unrepresented reparations 
applicants. Trial Chamber I, considering that the expertise of the OPCV is 
useful, in particular to safeguard the rights of those potential beneficiaries for 
collective reparations,4252 noticed that the OPCV may: 
 
[…] a. act as the legal representatives of unrepresented applicants for 
reparations until their status is determined or until the Registrar arranges a legal 
representative to act on their behalf; and 
b. represent the interests of victims who have not submitted applications but 
who may benefit from an award for collective reparations pursuant to Rules 97 
and 98 of the Rules.4253 
 
The OPCV was thus provided with the applications for reparations so far 
received and given the mandate to receive any future applications from 
unrepresented victims as well as allowed to file submissions on behalf of those 
victims who had not ‘submitted applications but who may fall within the scope 
of an order for collective reparations’.4254 Moreover, the Trial Chamber 
instructed the OPCV to ‘file submissions on the principles to be applied by the 
Chamber with regard to reparations and the procedure to be followed by the 
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4247 Ibid., para. 9.  
4248 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2870), 20 April 2012, para. 22 (the other NGOs were the Fondation 
Congolaise pour la Promotion des Droits humains et la Paix and Avocats sans Frontières (along with 
the NGOs it represents)).  
4249 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), 18 April 2012, paras. 10-50. 
4250 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2869), 18 April 2012, paras. 11-44.  
4251 See respectively Lubanga ((ICC-01/04-01/06-2870), 20 April 2012; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2865), 18 April 2012.  
4252 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2858), 5 April 2012, para. 11. 
4253 Ibid., para. 12. 
4254 Ibid., para. 13.  
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Chamber on behalf of those victims who have not submitted applications but 
who may fall within the scope of an order for collective reparations [...]’.4255 
Accordingly, the OPCV filed submissions.4256 Submissions by legal 
representatives of the V01 and V02 groups of victims as well as those by the 
OPCV discussed, inter alia, individual and collective reparations as well as 
modalities of reparations including compensation, rehabilitation and restitution, 
which is examined later.4257  
Based on the contents of and discussion in the reparations decision in 
Lubanga, it can be concluded that although Trial Chamber I paid close attention 
to the submissions by the legal representatives of the groups of victims and the 
OPCV, it differed in some issues, which have been questioned by the victims’ 
legal representatives and the OPCV, as part of the appeals proceedings against 
the reparations decision, examined in the following subsection.   
In Lubanga, as previously seen,4258 the Trial Chamber considered that its 
first reparations decision did not constitute an ‘order for reparations’ in the 
sense of article 82 (4) as reparations were not ordered in the reparations decision 
and, instead, it ‘establishes principles and procedures relating to reparations, 
pursuant to Article 75 (1)’.4259 However, the Appeals Chamber considered it 
necessary to examine in limine, before addressing any other issue in the appeals, 
whether the appeals, not only those filed by the victims’ legal representatives but 
also by the defence, were admissible and who should make submissions or 
submit observations on the appeals.4260 In particular, the Appeals Chamber 
requested submissions from the victims’ legal representatives about whether they 
appear before the Appeals Chamber only on behalf of those individuals who 
have claimed reparations.4261 From the Prosecutor, defence, victims’ legal 
representatives and the TFV, Appeals Chamber requested observations (and the 
respective supporting documents):  
 
[…] addressing the admissibility of the appeals and the question of the making 
of observations on the appeals, including on the following issues:  
 
4255 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4256 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), 18 April 2012.   
4257 See infra Chapter V 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.   
4258 See supra Chapter IV 6.3.2.  
4259 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2911), 29 August 2012, para. 20.  
4260 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2923), Directions on the Conduct of the Appeals Proceedings, 
Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2012, p. 3.  
4261 Ibid., p. 4. 
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a) the nature of the "Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be 
applied to reparations” […] 
b) whether Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was not ordered to make any 
specific reparations, and claimants for reparations, including those whose right 
to participate in the proceedings was withdrawn by virtue of the Trial 
Chamber's "Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute" of 14 March 2012  
[…] as well as those victims who may be affected by an order for collective 
reparations, have the right to appeal it under article 82 (4) of the Statute.4262 
  
In answering the Appeals Chamber’s request for observations on the 
directions on the conduct of appeals proceedings, which established that this 
request was ‘without prejudice to the resolution of who has standing in these 
appeals’,4263 the legal representatives of the two groups of victims sustained that 
the reparations decision constitutes a reparations order due to their content and 
formulation and, thus, claimed to have the right to appeal it.4264 The OPCV,4265 
and the TFV argued along the same lines, in particular, the later sustained that 
since the decisions shall be determined considering their content and the context 
where they were issued, the reparations decision constitutes a reparations 
order,4266 and in particular, as for individual applications transmitted by the Trial 
Chamber to the TFV to be included in any of its reparations program.4267 
As previously noticed,4268 the Appeals Chamber ended up considering 
that the Trial Chamber I’s reparations decision in Lubanga constitutes a 
reparations order. Thus, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s 
finding on the nature of the reparations decision insofar as for the former the 
reparations decision in question is a reparations order. This finding was 
grounded mainly on two reasons. First, the Appeals Chamber noted that the 
reparations decision contained a part on ‘procedure’, whereby ‘[…] the Trial 
Chamber addressed aspects that relate, under the statutory scheme for 
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4262 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4263 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4264 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2931), Observations de l’équipe V02 de représentants légaux de 
victims, conformément aux directives ICC-01/04-01/06-2923, V02 team of legal representatives, 1 
October 2012, paras. 17-24; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2926), Observations sur les Appels à 
l’encontre de la ‘Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations’, 
V01 team of legal representatives of victims, 28 September 2012, paras. 10-21.     
4265 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2928), 1 October 2012, paras. 19-28. 
4266 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2927), Observations in Response to the Direction on the Conduct 
of Appeal Proceedings, TFV, 1 October 2012, paras. 12-27. 
4267 Ibid., para. 21.  
4268 See supra Chapter IV 6.3.1. 
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reparations, to the steps to be taken both before and after the issuance of an 
order for reparations’.4269 As for the first part of the reparations proceedings, the 
Appeals Chamber paid attention to the delegation of the Trial Chamber’s 
functions under rule 97 of the ICC RPE to the TFV, in particular the hearing of 
experts pursuant rule 97 (2).4270 As for the second part of the reparations 
proceedings, i.e., those adopted after the issuance of a reparations order, the 
Appeals Chamber noted that the reparations decision indeed includes steps on 
the implementation phase as the reparations decision: 
 
[…] requires the Trust Fund to determine the appropriate forms of reparations 
and to execute a five-step implementation plan, including by presenting 
proposals for collective reparations to a differently composed Trial Chamber for 
approval. The Trial Chamber further ruled that the assessment of harm and the 
identification of victims and beneficiaries were to be carried out by the Trust 
Fund, which was to update a newly constituted Chamber in relation to the 
implementation of the five-step plan on a regular basis.4271              
 
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber 
mandated the TFV ‘to take steps in relation to the implementation phase’ and 
that, under the reparations statutory scheme, ‘the TFV can only undertake 
activities in relation to implementation following the issuance of an order for 
reparations’.4272  
Second, the Appeals Chamber recalled the Trial Chamber’s reference to 
the role of a newly composed Trial Chamber as that of monitoring and oversight 
of the TFV,4273 which corresponds to the Trial Chamber’s role under the 
Regulations of the TFV during the reparations implementation phase.4274 Thus, 
the Appeals Chamber concluded that:  
 
[…] the practical effect of this is that the Impugned Decision represents the 
final judicial decision in respect of reparations, apart from such monitoring and 
oversight required of the Trial Chamber under the Regulations of the Trust 
Fund after an order for reparations has been issued, such as the “approval” of 
 
4269 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 57. 
4270 Ibid., para. 59 (referring to Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 265.).       
4271 Ibid., para. 60.  
4272 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4273 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, paras. 261 and 262. 
4274 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 62. 
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the draft implementation plan under regulations 57 or 69 of the Regulations of 
the Trust Fund.4275   
 
Based on the previous considerations, it may herein be agreed with the 
Appeals Chamber when this concludes that ‘without prejudice to any final 
decision on the merits, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Impugned 
Decision is deemed to be an order for reparations, which may be appealed 
pursuant to article 82 (4) of the Statute’.4276    
It may be noticed that, in Lubanga, a reparations hearing has not yet 
taken place. This may be related to the fact that originally the submissions 
leading to the reparations decision were asked and arguably filed in the 
understanding that the Trial Chamber would not yet deliver a reparations order 
at that stage, which was changed by the Appeals Chamber’s qualification of the 
reparations decision as a reparations order. In any case, since a newly constituted 
Trial Chamber will monitor and oversight the TFV’s reparations 
implementation plan, it is expected that reparations claimants will exercise other 
procedural rights in the reparations phase proceedings ahead. It should also be 
remembered, as mentioned previously,4277 that in Lubanga, both the conviction 
and the sentence have been appealed. 
 
3.3.1.4. Victims and Reparations Phase Proceedings: Appeals Against 
Reparations Orders  
As previously mentioned,4278 with regard to appeals of a reparations order, 
according to article 82 (4) of the ICC Statute ‘A legal representative of the 
victims, the convicted person or a bona fide owner of property adversely affected 
by an order under article 75 may appeal against the order for reparations, as 
provided in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’. This specific provision 
arguably confirms that victims have no general standing to appeal ICC’s 
decisions, excepted for the reparations order.4279 Concerning the question of 
which categories of victims have the right to appeal a reparations order, via their 
legal representative, under article 82 (4), which was asked by the Appeals 
Chamber in Lubanga,4280 it may in principle be argued that the term a ‘legal 
representative of the victims’ refers to both lawyers of victim participants (who 
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4275 Ibid., para. 63.  
4276 Ibid., para. 64.  
4277 See supra Chapter IV 6.3.1. 
4278 See supra Chapter IV 6.3.1. 
4279 Schabas (2010) 949; Roth and Henzelin (2002) 1542.  
4280 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2923), 17 September 2012, p. 4.  
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claimed reparations) and also legal representatives of reparations claimants who 
do not have the official status of victim participants based on three reasons. First, 
to claim reparations at the ICC, it is not necessary to hold the victim participant 
status. Second, some references existent in the ICC Statute and the RPE in which 
when the word ‘victims’ is used alone may imply victims in general, i.e., 
regardless of their victim participant status.4281 Third, the procedural stage when 
the appeal against a reparations order takes place, i.e., reparations phase. 
Therefore, it is herein agreed with the OPCV on that the legal representatives of 
reparations claimants without the victim participant status can appeal a 
reparations order.4282 Even the Prosecutor, who showed reluctance about 
reparations claimants that do not have a formal victim participant status or those 
who have yet to claim reparations, concerning participation as victim 
participants in interlocutory appeals proceedings, has acknowledged that victims 
who are reparations claimants have the right to appeal a reparations order.4283  
In this regard, it may be argued that since under article 75 victims hold a 
right to seek reparations, ‘As a claimant for reparations, such victims are clearly 
“parties” and have an explicit right under article 82, paragraph 4 to appeal an 
order for reparations’.4284 Indeed, when dealing with the procedure to bring an 
appeal, rule 150 of the RPE uses the word ‘parties’ to refer to those who may file 
an appeals against a conviction/acquittal judgment, sentence and reparations 
order,4285 although the civil party status does not exist in the ICC as previously 
said. In any case, the right to appeal a reparations order cannot be exercised 
directly and must be done via victims’ legal representatives. As seen, the legal 
representatives of the two groups of victims and the OPCV represent 
simultaneously several categories of victims, who have different status in 
Lubanga. Therefore, reparations claimants who lack the status of victim 
participants may directly benefit from any appeals against a reparations order 
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4281 See, among others, ICC Statute, article 15 (3) (‘Victims may make representations […]’.), 
article 19 (‘[…] victims, may also submit observations to the Court’.). As for the ICC RPE, see, 
among others, rule 92 (2) (‘In order to allow victims to apply for participation […]’.); rule 93 (‘[…] 
a Chamber may seek the views of other victims, as appropriate’.).   
4282 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2928), 1 October 2012, paras. 20-21.  
4283 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2930), 1 October 2012, para. 31. 
4284 Brady (2001b) 595. 
4285 ICC RPE, rule 150 (‘1. Subject to sub-rule 2, an appeal against a decision of conviction or 
acquittal under article 74, a sentence under article 76 or a reparation order under article 75 may be 
filed not later than 30 days from the date on which the party filing the appeal is notified of the 
decision, the sentence or the reparation order. 2. The Appeals Chamber may extend the time limit 
set out in sub-rule 1, for good cause, upon the application of the party seeking to file the appeal 
[emphasis added]’.).     
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due to the manner how victims have been grouped and represented in the ICC 
cases. The existence of common legal representation is also beneficial for the 
effectiveness of appeal proceedings considering the likely high number of 
reparations claimants.    
The previous considerations evidence once again that although the 
status of victims as reparations claimants and as victim participants are related 
and may even be cumulative, i.e., victims may hold a sort of ‘dual’ reparations 
claimant-victim participant status, these two dimensions of the victims’ status 
are autonomous from each other. Be that as it may, since legal representatives of 
victims (especially the OPCV) for reparations purposes may represent victim 
participants (both those who have claimed reparations and those who have yet to 
claim them) and also victims who are only reparations claimants, their actions 
and also the final outcome of reparations orders will benefit equally all victims 
who claimed reparations or will claim reparations.    
In Lubanga, after considering the reparations decision as a reparations 
order, the Appeals Chamber proceeded to determine the categories of victims 
who are holders of the right to appeal it. Since the reparations decision has been 
qualified as a reparations order, the legal representatives of victims and the 
OPCV are ‘entitled to bring an appeal’.4286 The Appeals Chamber explicitly 
considered that victims are parties to the appeals proceedings against a 
reparations order, under article 82 (4), and not victim participants:  
 
They are therefore parties to the proceedings and not, as is the case at other 
stages of the proceedings, participants who, under article 68 (3) of the Statute, 
may present their views and concerns where their personal interests are 
affected. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that the right to appeal lies 
with the victims, not with the legal representatives of victims. In this regard, 
article 82 (4) of the Statute provides that victims may only appeal with the 
assistance of a legal representative as is the case in these appeals.4287     
 
As previously noticed, this finding corresponds to the existence of an 
explicit right for reparations claimants to appeal a reparations order under 
article 82 (4) of the ICC Statute, i.e., their right to appeal a reparations order as 
parties.      
Concerning the categories of victims who can via their legal 
representatives appeal a reparations order, it should be noted that the Appeals 
Chamber in Lubanga when requesting observations for the direction on the 
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4286 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 67. 
4287 Ibid., Loc. cit. 



conduct of appeals and, in addressing the two groups of victims’ legal 
representatives and the OPCV, had focused on those who claimed reparations by 
explicitly asking ‘who they represent in the present proceedings and, in 
particular, whether they appear before the Appeals Chamber only on behalf of 
those individuals who have claimed reparations’.4288 When submitting their 
observations in response to the Appeals Chamber’s request, the V02 group of 
victims’ legal representatives explicitly indicated that, concerning the appeals in 
question, they represented not only those victim participants who requested 
reparations but also victim participants who have not done yet so and, even 
those who lost their status as victim participants but who still are reparations 
claimants.4289 Moreover, the OPCV established that it was representing victims 
who lost their status as victim participants but who are seeking reparations, 
reparations claimants, and victims who have not yet claimed reparations but 
who could be involved by a collective reparations award.4290 The OPCV’s answer 
was coherent with a previous instruction given by the Trial Chamber to 
represent those who have not submitted reparations applications yet but who 
can benefit from reparations,4291 as already mentioned. Even the Prosecutor 
established that those who lost their victim status can still claim reparations in 
the future if a proper determination is made.4292     
With regard to the categories of victims holding the right to appeal the 
reparations decision, understood as a reparations order, the Appeals Chamber in 
Lubanga has arrived to the following conclusions. First, victims under article 82 
(4) include not only those victims who participated in proceedings related to the 
accused person’s guilt or innocence or the sentence but also those victims who 
‘claimed to have suffered harm as a result of the crimes in relation to which the 
accused was convicted and who request reparations’.4293 The Appeals Chamber 
arrived to this conclusion by correctly recalling that a request for reparations 
(under rule 94 of the RPE) does not depend on holding the victim participant 
status or filing a victim participant application (under rule 89).4294  
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4288 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2923), 17 September 2012, p. 4. 
4289 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2931), 1 October 2012, para. 16. Concerning those victims who lost 
their victim participant status, the legal representatives referred to the three victim participants 
called as witnesses by the victim participants’ legal representatives during the trial in Lubanga.  
4290 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2928), 1 October 2012, para. 9.  
4291 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2858), 5 April 2012, para. 13.  
4292 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2930), 1 October 2012, para. 37.  
4293 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 69. 
4294 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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Second, the Appeals Chamber determined that those individuals whose 
request to participate as victim participants in relation to the accused’s guilt or 
innocence was rejected or whose right to participate was withdrawn by the Trial 
Chamber in its judgment in Lubanga have the right to claim reparations and 
appeal the reparations decision.4295 The Appeals Chamber came to this 
conclusion by establishing that ‘reparations proceedings are a distinct stage of 
the proceedings and it is conceivable that different evidentiary standards and 
procedural rules apply to the question of who is a victim for the purposes of 
those proceedings’.4296  
Third, the Appeals Chamber considered that victim participants who 
participated during the proceedings related to Lubanga’s guilt or innocence but 
who did not request reparations are likely affected by the impugned reparations 
decision as those victims were given by the Trial Chamber a role in the 
reparations proceedings, which the victims accepted by filing submissions.4297 
Thus, the Appeals Chamber found that: 
 
[…] it is possible that they are affected by the Impugned Decision, in particular 
because the Impugned decision was the result of reparations proceedings in 
which they participated and made submissions. In this regard, the Appeals 
Chamber has also taken note of the submissions of the Legal Representatives of 
Victims 02 explaining that not all individuals that they represent have applied 
for reparations, at least in part because the legal representatives have been 
unable to contact them in relation to submitting a request for reparations.4298  
 
Fourth, the Appeals Chamber determined that the OPCV is entitled to 
bring an appeal concerning individuals ‘in respect of whom it was appointed as a 
legal representative’.4299 However, the Appeals Chamber considered that 
unidentified individuals who have not submitted applications but who may 
benefit from a collective reparations award and represented by the OPCV 
‘cannot have a right to appeal because at this stage of the proceedings it is 
impossible to discern who would belong to this group as no concrete criteria 
exist’.4300 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber found inadmissible the appeal 
brought by the OPCV concerning legal action on behalf of those unidentified 
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4295 Ibid., para. 70.  
4296 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4297 Ibid., para. 71. 
4298 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4299 Ibid., para. 72. 
4300 Ibid., para. 72. 
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individuals; however, ‘This is without prejudice to the OPCV potentially being 
invited to make submissions on behalf of such individuals at a later stage in the 
proceedings’,4301 i.e., ‘on specific issues arising in these appeals proceedings’.4302       
It is herein agreed with the Appeals Chamber’s findings based on the 
analysis conducted in the beginning of this subsection, in particular the fact that 
those findings reflect the autonomous dimensions of victims’ status at the ICC, 
i.e., victims as victim participants and victims as reparations claimants. 
Therefore, although these two dimensions of the victims’ status may be 
interrelated, they can be exercised autonomously.          
Concerning the grounds of appeals in Lubanga, it should be mentioned 
that the groups of victims’ legal representatives have requested the Appeals 
Chamber to set aside the Trial Chamber’s decision since, they claimed, this 
decision, inter alia, dismissed the individual reparations applications without 
considering their merits.4303 The appellants also asked the Appeals Chamber to 
direct ‘Trial Chamber I to rule anew on the matter of reparations under article 75 
of the Rome Statute in light of the findings of the Appeals Chamber’.4304 The V01 
group of victims’ legal representatives sustained that the Trial Chamber erred in 
law by: i) dismissing the individual applications for reparations without 
entertaining them; ii) absolving the convicted person from any obligation as 
regards reparations; and iii) deciding that the defence and the Prosecutor remain 
parties to the reparations phase proceedings.4305  
In turn, the V02 group of victims’ legal representatives and the OPCV, 
the latter representing any unrepresented reparations applicant and those who 
have not submitted applications,4306 have sustained in their joint appeal against 
the reparations decision that the Trial Chamber erred in law by: i) dismissing the 
individual applications for reparations without considering them on their merits; 
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4301 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4302 Ibid., para. 76.  
4303 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2914), 3 September 2012, pp. 9-10 (the impugned decision was also 
appealed because it ‘[…] (ii) declines to order the convicted person to pay reparations; and (iii) – 
alternatively submitted – retains the Defence and the Prosecutor as parties in a process 
implemented by the Trust Fund for Victims’); Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2909), 24 August 2012, 
p. 11. (the impugned decision was also appealed because of ‘[…] (ii) the referral of the instant case 
to a newly constituted chamber; and (ii) the delegation by the Chamber of its own reparations 
responsibilities to the Trust Fund for Victims and the Registry’.). 
4304 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2914), 3 September 2012, p. 10; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2909), 
24 August 2012, p. 11.  
4305 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2914), 3 September 2012, paras. 11-27.   
4306 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2858), 5 April 2012, para. 12. See, for further details, supra Chapter 
V 3.3.1.3. 
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ii) referring the case to a newly constituted chamber at the reparations stage; and 
iii) deciding to delegate its own reparations responsibilities to two non-judicial 
entities, i.e., the TFV and the Registry.4307 Moreover, the OPCV and the V02 
group of victims’ legal representatives filed responses to the defence’s request for 
leave to appeal the reparations decision.4308  
It should be mentioned that so far the Appeals Chamber has established 
that although whether the referral of individual reparations applications from 
Trial Chamber I to the TFV was correct will be determined on the merits of 
appeals, those individuals are entitled to appeal the reparations decision.4309 The 
grounds of appeals will be in due time examined by the Appeals Chamber on the 
merits of appeals. In any case, in Lubanga, legal representatives of the V02 group 
of victims (jointly with the OPCV) and the legal representatives of the V01 
group of victims were authorized to submit their documents in support of their 
appeals within 60 days of notification (in application of regulation 59 of the 
Regulations of the Court),4310 and they filed their documents accordingly.4311 
They were also authorized to submit their responses to the supporting document 
to be filed by Lubanga in support of his appeal against the reparations 
decision,4312 and they filed their documents accordingly.4313 Victim participants’ 
legal representatives have also filed their responses to the defence’s arguments 
contained in its appeal against the reparations decision.4314   
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4307 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2909), 24 August 2012, paras. 17-26.  
4308 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2907), 17 August 2012.  
4309 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 70.  
4310 Ibid., p. 4 and para. 74. 
4311 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2970), Document in Support of the Appeal Against Trial Chamber 
I’s 7 August 2012 Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparation, 
Office of Public Counsel for Victims and V02 Team of Legal Representatives of Victims, 5 
February 2013; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2973), Document à l’appui de l’appel contre la « 
Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations » du 7 août 2012, 
V01 Team of Legal Representatives of Victims, 5 February 2013.  
4312 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, p. 4.  
4313 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3007), 7 April 2013; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3010), Joint 
Response to the "Mémoire de la Défense de M. Thomas Lubanga Relatif à l’appel à l’encontre de la 
'Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations', Rendue par la 
Chambre de Première Instance le 7 août 2012", Office of Public Counsel for Victims and V02 
Team of Legal Representatives of Victims, 8 April 2013.  
4314 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3010), Joint Response to the "Mémoire de la Défense de M. 
Thomas Lubanga relatif à l’appel à l’encontre de la 'Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations', rendue par la Chambre de première instance le 7 août 
2012", Office of Public Counsel for Victims and V02 Team of Legal Representatives of Victims, 8 
April 2013; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3007), Réponse au Mémoire de la Défense relatif à l’appel 
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It can also be mentioned that both the TFV and the V01 group of 
victims’ legal representatives,4315 agreed with the defence’s request for suspensive 
effects of the reparations decision.4316 Since Lubanga’s conviction has been 
appealed, as previously noticed,4317 and, in consideration that the case-based 
reparations regime depends on the (final) determination of Lubanga’s 
responsibility in appeals, the suspensive effect is the most logical approach. This 
indeed has been the approach adopted by the Appeals Chamber 
‘Notwithstanding the potential for delay, the Appeals Chamber finds that in the 
present circumstances, there is a clear need to suspend the enforcement of the 
Impugned Decision’.4318 Additionally, since the Appeals Chamber considered the 
reparations decision as a reparations order (appeal-related proceedings under 
article 82 (4) of the ICC Statute) and not an interlocutory decision, it declared 
inadmissible the appeal brought (under article 82 (1) (d)) by Lubanga.4319 Thus, 
the Appeals Chamber found that Lubanga is entitled to appeal the reparations 
decision under article 82 (4),4320 and found the respective appeal brought by him 
admissible.4321    
In application of the ICC RPE: i) the appeal against a reparations order 
has to be filed not later than 30 days from the date when victims claiming 
reparations, or their legal representatives, have been notified of the reparations 
order although the Appeals Chamber may extent this time limit for good cause 
claimed by the party which is seeking to file the appeal;4322 and ii) the Appeals 
Chamber may confirm, reverse or amend a reparations order.4323 In general, the 
appeals against a reparations order might concern, inter alia, the scope of 
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contre la « Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be applied to Reparations » du 7 
août 2012, V01 Team of Legal Representatives of Victims, 7 April 2013.  
4315 See respectively Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2926), Observations sur les Appels à l’encontre de 
la ‘Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations’, 28 
September 2012, para. 38; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2927), 1 October 2012, paras. 44-48. 
4316 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2917), Appeal of the Defence for Mr Thomas Lubanga against Trial 
Chamber I’s Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparation 
Rendered on 7 August 2012, 6 September 2012, paras. 12-15. 
4317 See supra Chapter IV 6.3.1.  
4318 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 84.  
4319 Ibid., p. 3.  
4320 Ibid., para. 66 (‘[…] at this stage and for the purposes of the admissibility of his appeal, it 
appears possible that Mr. Lubanga is adversely affected by the Impugned Decision’.).   
4321 Ibid., p. 3.  
4322 ICC RPE, rule 150 (1).  
4323 Ibid., rule 153 (1). 
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reparations beneficiaries, e.g., some individual(s) excluded, and reparations 
modalities.4324  
A point not explicitly clarified in the ICC instruments is whether 
victims’ legal representatives can appeal when a reparations order is not 
awarded. It may in principle be presumed that victims’ legal representatives can 
appeal against a decision refusing to render a reparations order.4325 This 
interpretation would be consistent with the object and purpose of the ICC’s 
instruments to grant victims the right to appeal a reparations order, which may 
be even considered as more urgent when no reparations order has been 
issued.4326 Nevertheless, silence on this matter may be interpreted as victims 
being able to only challenge the content of reparations orders but not to appeal 
the Trial Chamber’s refusal to issue this kind of order,4327 based on the following 
reasons.4328 First, the ICC Statute and RPE clearly establish which persons and 
institutions can appeal against which decisions and this is apparently done on an 
exhaustive manner. Second, the drafting history of rule 153 (Judgment on 
appeals against reparation orders) backs up the interpretation whereby there is a 
need for a reparations order since a proposal for a broader phrasing enabling the 
Appeals Chamber to order a new reparations hearing was refused.4329 In any case, 
it is expected that the ICC’s practice clarifies this issue in its future 
jurisprudence.4330    
In case that a reparations decision is not considered a reparations order, 
it may be said, based on, inter alia, the analysis of the victim participants’ status 
during interlocutory decision appeal proceedings (in general) previously 
conducted,4331 that in order to formally participate as victim participants in 
reparations decision appeals proceedings, i.e., interlocutory appeals proceedings, 
reparations claimants would first need to become victim participants. As argued 
by the OTP in Lubanga, in the context of the reparations decision (when this was 
 
4324 Dwertmann (2010) 263.  
4325 See Cristopher Staker, ‘Article 82’ in Triffterer (1999) 1029, 1032; Staker (2008) 1480; Jason 
Manning, ‘On Power, Participation and Authority: The International Criminal Court’s Initial 
Appellate Jurisprudence’ (2007) 38 Georgetown Journal of International Law 803, 813.   
4326 Dwertmann (2010) 262. 
4327 Adrian Hoel, ‘The Sentencing Provisions of the International Criminal Court: Common Law, 
Civil Law, or Both’ (2007) 33 Monash University Law Review 264, 286. 
4328 See Dwertmann (2010) 262-263.  
4329 See Brady (2001b) 587-588.  
4330 In Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber stated that ‘Whether the decision not to award reparations is 
appealable under article 82 (4) of the Statute does/not have to be, and is not, addressed in the 
present decision’. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, para. 54, footnote 165.  
4331 See supra Chapter IV 6.3.2.    
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not yet considered a reparations order), not only the interest in participating in 
the appeal has to be real (not merely hypothetical) but also a ‘recognized 
procedural status in the case’ would be needed.4332 This arguably corresponds to 
those already constituted as victim participants, i.e., those who already applied 
for and who were granted with the victim participant status.4333 Also, based on 
practical reasons, a lack of control would lead to a situation where any person 
possessing just a general interest, without victim participant status and, hence, 
lacking identified personal interest could participate in the appeal proceedings, 
which may flood the ICC.4334 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber does not first-
hand grant victim participant status in interlocutory appeals proceedings.4335 In 
turn, when the nature of the reparations decision was still pending of 
determination by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga, i.e., to determine whether it 
was a reparations order, the legal representatives of the V01 group of victims 
sustained that in case of not considering the reparations decision as a reparations 
order, victims (at least those who hold the victim participant status) should be 
entitled to participate in the respective interlocutory appeals proceedings 
triggered by the defence.4336     
However, even if reparations claimants do not hold the victim 
participant status, reparations claimants may in practice still be represented by 
legal representatives or the OPCV, who represent simultaneously victims with 
different (procedural) status, as noticed in this subsection and in the previous 
one. This corresponds to the fact that their interests to later benefit from 
reparations are at stake, which can be reflected in submissions/observations by 
legal representatives/OPCV, e.g., in Lubanga, that may end up simultaneously 
representing several categories of victims.    
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4332 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2930), Prosecution’s Submissions further to the Appeals 
Chamber’s ”Directions on the Conduct of the Appeal Proceedings”, Office of the Prosecutor, 1 
October 2012, para. 34.  
4333 See also Ibid., paras. 34 and 36. 
4334 Ibid., para. 34.  
4335 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1335), 16 May 2008, para. 40 (‘The Appeals Chamber will not 
embark on determining the status of these victims as ordinarily, for interlocutory appeals it would 
not itself make first hand determinations with respect to the status of victims’.).  
4336 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2926), 28 September 2012, para. 32. 
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3.3.2. Reparations Claimants and the TFV  
3.3.2.1. Reparations Claimants in the TFV’s Reparations Order 
Implementation Plan and Chamber’s Monitoring/Oversight  
Following the Appeals Chamber’s finding in Lubanga, the second part of the 
reparations phase proceedings: 
 
55. […] consists of the implementation phase, which is regulated primarily by 
article 75 (2) of the Statute and rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
If the Trial Chamber has ordered that reparations be made through the Trust 
Fund pursuant to rules 98 (3) and 98 (4) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, or that the award for reparations be deposited with the Trust Fund 
pursuant to rule 98 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Trust Fund 
plays an important role in this phase and the Regulations of the Trust Fund 
apply. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that, under the Regulations of 
the Trust Fund, an order for reparations has to be issued in order to seize the 
Trust Fund and allow it to undertake implementation activities in relation to 
reparations. This is stipulated in regulation 50 (b) of the Regulations of the 
Trust Fund [...]. 
56. The Appeals Chamber also notes that the Regulations of the Trust Fund 
[regulations 54, 55, 57, 58 and 69] contemplate oversight and a certain degree of 
intervention by the Trial Chamber during the implementation phase of 
reparations.4337    
 
In Lubanga, Trial Chamber I endorsed the five-step reparations 
implementation plan suggested by the TFV that has to be executed in 
conjunction with the Registry, the OPCV and the experts.4338 In this subsection, 
the emphasis of the analysis is put on the avenues whereby victims seeking 
reparations can intervene. Indeed, Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision 
has highlighted accessibility and consultation as important and necessary 
principles sustaining the ICC case-based reparations regime and including issues 
on ‘the identity of the beneficiaries, their priorities and the obstacles they have 
encountered in their attempts to secure reparations’.4339 In particular, concerning 
victims of sexual violence, the Chamber has found it necessary to ensure that 
they are able to fully participate in the reparations program,4340 and, as for child 
victims, that their views are taken into account considering their circumstances, 
 
4337 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, paras. 55-56. 
4338 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 282.  
4339 Ibid., para. 206. 
4340 Ibid., para. 208. 
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age and level of maturity.4341 These two are good examples of how to address the 
specific needs of reparations claimants who belong to vulnerable groups.         
The TFV’s five-step plan is examined as follows. First, it should be 
established which localities are to be considered in the reparations 
implementation proceedings and a focus should be given on the places referred 
to in the judgment and in particular where the crimes were committed; however, 
the reparations program is not restricted to those mentioned in the judgment.4342 
Second, there should be a process of consultation with victims and communities 
within the localities.4343 The importance of victims’ participation in the design 
and implementation of reparations programs is intrinsically related to ensure 
that reparations are timely, meaningful and achieve the desired impact.4344 As the 
TFV pointed out, victims’ heterogeneity, need for inclusiveness, their serious 
organizational and resources limitations, and security risks faced by them have 
to be taken into account.4345 As part of the participative process, an informative 
and outreach campaign could be launched, including consultation with victims 
on how they would define their reparations,4346 and, in particular, child soldiers 
who suffered violence, including that of a sexual or gender-based violence are 
expected to be given an informed choice to participate in the process.4347 Third, 
an assessment of harm ought to be carried out as part of this consultation phase 
by a team of experts, and including focus groups with former child soldiers, 
children, women and other vulnerable groups.4348  
Fourth, public debates should be held in each locality to explain the 
reparations principles and procedures, and also to address the victims’ 
expectations.4349 Following a community-based debate, explanation and 
discussion of the reparations principles with the victims and communities 
should be conducted, ensuring the full participation of former child soldiers and 
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4341 Ibid., para. 215. 
4342 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), Observations on Reparations in Response to the Scheduling 
Order of 14 March 2012, TFV, 25 April 2012, paras. 181-197. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2904), 7 August 2012, para. 282.    
4343 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, paras. 198-201; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2904), 7 August 2012, para. 282.  
4344 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, para. 198. 
4345 Ibid., para. 199. 
4346 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4347 Ibid., para. 200. 
4348 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, paras. 202-206. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 282.  
4349 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, paras. 207-214; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2904), 7 August 2012, para. 282.  
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other vulnerable groups such as child mothers, children and women.4350 Fifth, 
the collection of proposals for collective reparations to be developed in each 
locality, which subsequently have to be presented to the Chamber for its 
approval, constitutes the final step.4351 The TFV appropriately noticed that since 
a number of communities are multi-ethnic, the community consultation should 
be open to all members independently from their ethnic origin.4352 Proposals 
would indicate: i) type of reparations (individual or collective) desired by the 
victims; ii) type of measures required to implement the desired reparations; iii) 
an estimation of the costs and available resources; iv) applicable best standards 
practice and technical standards; and v) the links to the case and reasons why the 
proposed measures would be meaningful and address the harm suffered.4353 
Should victims request individual reparations, their names would be indicated 
confidentially.4354  
Trial Chamber I agreed with the TFV on the assessment of harm to be 
carried out by the latter during a consultative phase in different localities and the 
Chamber also expressed that, in the circumstances in Lubanga, the identification 
of victims and beneficiaries (regulations 60 to 65 of the TFV Regulations) ought 
to be made by the TFV.4355   
Based on the five-step implementation of the reparations plan, the 
Chamber established that the individual application reparation forms received 
by the Registry should be transmitted to the TFV and, hence, the Trial Chamber 
‘Decides not to examine the individual application forms for reparations and 
instructs the Registry to transmit to the TFV all the individual application forms 
received thus far’.4356 The Trial Chamber also added that in case the TFV 
considers it pertinent, victims who have applied for reparations could be 
included in any reparations program to be implemented by the TFV.4357 In its 
conclusions, the Chamber accordingly ‘decline[d] to issue specific orders to the 
TFV on the implementation of reparations that are to be funded using voluntary 
contributions’.4358 
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4350 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, paras. 207-208.  
4351 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, paras. 215-217; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2904), 7 August 2012, para. 282.  
4352 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, para. 216.  
4353 Ibid., para. 217. 
4354 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4355 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 283.  
4356 Ibid., para. 289 b. 
4357 Ibid., para. 284.  
4358 Ibid., para 289 d. 
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Legal representatives of victims have considered that the Trial Chamber 
by deciding not to entertain the individual applications for reparations before it, 
failed to comply with article 75 of the ICC Statute, depriving ‘the individual 
victims of the right to the due consideration and adjudication of their 
applications for reparations’,4359 and was also argued that the Chamber:  
 
[…] deprived de facto the victims who had submitted the applications of the full 
exercise of their right to reparations under article 75 of the Rome Statute, that is, 
the right to have their applications for reparations duly examined and decided 
upon.4360   
 
Although these claims will be examined by the Appeals Chamber on the 
merits of appeals, it is herein provided some considerations. It may be sustained 
herein that the Trial Chamber’s reparations decision has not deprived the 
victims from their status as reparations claimants and beneficiaries but what it 
has been done instead is to postpone the determination of potential reparations 
beneficiaries.  
Moreover, in principle, the decision adopted by the Trial Chamber may 
be regarded as more balanced considering that the total scope of potential 
reparations claimants and beneficiaries in Lubanga has yet to be determined 
following the painstaking five-step plan proposed by the TFV and endorsed by 
the Trial Chamber in its reparations decision. Therefore, granting individual 
reparations to the few victims who have managed to submit their reparations 
applications would not have been in the best interest of the ICC reparations 
system.4361 This is due to the fact that, prior to distributing the scarce resources 
available to redress victims’ harm in this case as well as in others which are 
similar, it is arguably necessary to know the total universe of reparations 
claimants and beneficiaries so that the resources for reparations do not end up 
just benefiting few victims. Had Trial Chamber I acted otherwise, it may have 
given rise to further tension with and among those victims who can come up 
later to claim reparations. However, what is criticized herein is the delay in Trial 
Chamber I’s delivery of reparations principles finally contained in its reparations 
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4359 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2914), 3 September 2012, para. 15.  
4360 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2909), 24 August 2012, para. 20. 
4361 As of 28 March 2012, the Registry had received only 85 individual applications for reparations 
(53 applications by women and 22 by men). See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2847), First Report on 
Applications for Reparations, Registry, 28 March 2012, para. 9. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2906), Transmission to the Trust Fund for Victims of Applications for Reparations, 
Registry, 16 August 2012.  
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decision. Due to the general nature of, at least, most of the reparations principles, 
these may have already been discussed and drafted (much) earlier than when 
they were in fact finally rendered,4362 and without jeopardizing the accused’s 
right to a fair trial. Procrastinating the drafting of reparations principles 
neglected the existence of an important number of victims who had applied for 
reparations at the ICC VPRS.4363 It also limited opportunities to progressively 
keep victims informed of how reparations may affect them and what to expect 
from reparative measures. 
Additionally, the V02 group of victims’ legal representatives and the 
OPCV also sustained that the Chamber erred in law: i) by referring the case to a 
newly constituted chamber at the reparations stage; and ii) by delegating its own 
reparations responsibilities to two non-judicial entities, i.e., the Registry and the 
TFV.4364 Although these appeals claims will be examined by the Appeals 
Chamber on the merits of appeals, it is herein provided some considerations. 
Concerning the first claim, it should be noticed that de lege lata the ICC Statute 
and RPE seem to imply that the Trial Chamber, which heard the case, and 
evidence relating to reparations, will also hear evidence and deliver its decision 
on reparations.4365 De lege ferenda, it should have been advisable that the same 
three Judges who constituted Trial Chamber I in Lubanga and who are already 
familiar with the case would be the same to decide on reparations. Concerning 
victims’ second claim, it is not fully accurate since reparations will principally be 
dealt with by the TFV, monitored and overseen by the newly constituted 
Chamber.4366 Regardless of what Trial Chamber will be the competent, ‘During 
the implementation process […] the Chamber will be in a position to resolve any 
contested issues arising out of the work and the decisions of the TFV’.4367 In 
other words, there is no de-linking of a Trial Chamber from the reparations 
proceedings but an advisable and even necessary reliance on the Registry and, 
especially, the TFV’s expertise on reparation issues: 
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4362 See similar critique in: REDRESS (2011) 24.   
4363 A total of 2031 victims’ applications for reparations, in the situations at the ICC, as of March 
2011. See Registry and Trust Fund for Victims, Fact Sheet, March 2011, 1.   
4364 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2909), 24 August 2012, paras. 21-26.  
4365 Whereas article 75 and  rules 94-98 (Reparation to victims) employ the word ‘Court’ as the 
entity in charge of conducting hearings and making decisions on reparation, article 76 and  rule 
143 (Additional hearings on matters related to sentence or reparation) and rule 144 (Delivery of 
decisions of the Trial Chamber) explicit refer to the Trial Chamber. See REDRESS (2011) 47, 
footnote 203.  
4366 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 261.  
4367 Ibid., para. 262. 
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The Chamber is of the view that the TFV is well placed to determine the 
appropriate forms of reparations and to implement them. It is able to collect any 
relevant information from the victims, and the Chamber notes the TFV is 
already conducting extensive activity in the DRC for the benefit of victims in the 
context of the general situation of which this case is a part.4368  
 
Accordingly, it is left intact the Chamber’s powers to monitor and 
oversight the TFV as part of the reparations proceedings. The advantage is that 
the Trial Chamber will benefit precisely from the reparations implementation 
plan proposed by the TFV. In any case, the Chamber’s monitoring and 
ultimately decision-making role on reparations was expressed as follows: 
 
The Chamber accordingly [….] remains seized of the reparations proceedings, 
in order to exercise any necessary monitoring and oversight functions in 
accordance with Article 64 (2) and (3) (a) of the Statute (including considering 
proposals for collective reparations that are to be developed in each locality, 
which are to be presented to the Chamber for its approval) […].4369 
 
In addition, it was strongly recommended that experts on certain areas 
were retained by the Chamber,4370 pursuant rule 97 (2) already examined. In 
Lubanga, the Trial Chamber accepted the TFV’s proposal that there should be a 
preliminary consultative stage involving the victims and the affected 
communities, conducted by a team of experts and supported by the Registry, the 
OPCV and any local partners.4371 The TFV has been appointed to select and 
monitor experts, who should include experts in the field of child soldiers, 
violence against girls and boys and gender issues.4372     
A closer look into the ICC legal instruments indicates that a delegation 
of decision-making as for reparations award to the TFV itself is a valid option.4373 
Article 75 (2) generally refers to ‘Where appropriate, the Court may order that 
the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund’. Indeed, when an 
ICC Chamber delegates decision-making power to the TFV, the former retains 
ultimate control as indicated in regulation 55 of the TFV Regulations which 
establishes that the TFV’s discretion ‘is subject to the order of the Court’. 
Regulation 57 of the TFV Regulations, in turn, stipulates that the TFV shall 
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4368 Ibid., para. 266.  
4369 Ibid., para. 289 c. 
4370 Ibid., para. 263. 
4371 Ibid., para. 264.  
4372 Ibid., para. 265.  
4373 See also McCarthy (2012a) 243.  
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submit to the relevant Chamber, ‘the draft implementation plan for approval and 
shall consult the relevant Chamber, as appropriate, on any questions that arise in 
connection with the implementation of the award’. Finally, under regulation 58, 
not only does the TFV have to provide updates to the Chamber on progress of 
the award implementation ‘in accordance with the Chamber’s order’ but also at 
the end of the implementation period, the TFV must ‘submit a final narrative 
and financial report to the relevant Chamber’.  
Be that as it may, consultation with victims constitutes quite an 
important element in the reparations implementation proceedings so as not to 
undermine their victims’ status as reparations claimants, as actually established 
under regulation 70 of the TFV Regulations ‘The Board of Directors [of TFV] 
may consult victims [...] and where natural persons are concerned, their families, 
as well as their legal representatives’. Notification of on-going reparations 
proceedings, under rule 96 of the ICC RPE, is also pivotal to reach out potential 
reparations claimants and beneficiaries. In verifying the eligibility of claimants 
and beneficiaries and bearing in mind that under article 75 (2), the ICC can 
make reparation awards only ‘to, or in respect of, victims’, Regulation 62 of the 
TFV Regulations lays down that ‘The Secretariat [of the TFV] shall verify that 
any persons who identify themselves to the Trust Fund are in fact members of 
the beneficiary group, in accordance with any principles set out in the order of 
the Court’.  
As detailed later,4374 the ICC can order individual or collective awards. 
What should be mentioned herein is that although both individual and collective 
reparations can be made through the TFV, when the ICC makes an individual 
reparation award, the TFV will not necessarily be involved as suggested under 
rule 98 (2):   
 
The Court may order that an award for reparations against a convicted person 
be deposited with the Trust Fund where at the time of making the order it is 
impossible or impracticable to make individual awards directly to each victim. 
The award for reparations thus deposited in the Trust Fund shall be separated 
from other resources of the Trust Fund and shall be forwarded to each victim as 
soon as possible. 
 
In case of individual reparations awards and as for beneficiaries in 
urgent situation, the TFV ‘may prioritize certain sub-groups of victims for 
verification and disbursement’.4375 Bearing in mind the likely high number of 
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4374 See infra Chapter V 4.3.1.1.  
4375 TFV Regulations, regulation 65.  
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reparations claimants being involved in the adjudicative process before the TFV, 
it has been suggested that, for reasons of economy and efficiency, the large 
majority of claims should be tackled by writing by the TFV, and based on 
experiences of mass claim institutions, they should be inquisitorial.4376  However, 
the TFV has indicated that its proposed implementation plan can be subject to a 
hearing of interested parties held by the Chamber.4377 Accordingly, an approach 
that ensures both efficiency of the proceedings and victims’ real participation as 
reparations claimants should be followed. If necessary, victims that are members 
of the community may be identified to express their views during the hearing 
and, thus, explain why reparations awards would help them redress the harm 
suffered as a result of the crimes perpetrated.4378 The TFV has also sustained that 
such hearing:  
 
[…] would be an opportunity for the Chamber to call for experts in order to 
debate the propositions issued from the community-based consultation. The 
Trust Fund could provide the Chamber with a list of experts in different fields 
after consulting with the proposed individuals. The Trust Fund respectfully 
encourages the Chamber to conduct a hearing in situ if the security, logistical 
and financial issues are manageable by the Court. Such a hearing in the 
situation would increase the transparency of the reparations process, and value 
of the reparation measures ordered by the Chamber.4379 
 
It is expected that the TFV will live up to victims’ expectations and be 
beneficial for the ICC, considering that the ICC Judges do not necessarily hold 
expertise on the complex issues surrounding reparations, the fact that the ICC 
Judges possess different legal backgrounds, and that the ICC faces large-scale 
crimes contexts.  
Finally, according to rule 98 (4), the ICC following consultations with 
interested States and the TFV may order that a reparations award be made 
through the TFV to an intergovernmental, international or national organization 
approved by the TFV, as discussed later.4380 According to the respective TFV 
Regulations,4381 it is fundamental that reparations awards implemented by 
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4376 McCarthy (2012a) 263.  
4377 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, para. 230. 
4378 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4379 Ibid., para. 231. 
4380 See infra Chapter V 4.3.1.1. 
4381 See TFV Regulations, regulations 73 (c) and 74. 
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intermediary organizations be monitored by the TFV to verify the appropriate 
implementation of the award.4382  
 
3.3.2.2. The Need for the ICC and its TFV in Case-Based Reparations 
Some (additional) considerations about the convenience of and even the need 
for the ICC’s case-based reparations regime and also the TFV’s involvement 
within it are discussed herein. First, where national systems that by definition 
have been unwilling or unable to provide access to criminal justice, which is 
common to countries where the ICC exercises jurisdiction based on the principle 
of complementarity, it is unlikely that such domestic systems will be willing or 
able to effectively implement the victims’ right to reparations.4383 The ICC as an 
international criminal court lacks the mandate to order a State to provide 
reparations to victims of crimes under its jurisdiction. Precisely, the role of the 
ICC in the field of reparations and, in particular, the mandate of the TFV may at 
least partially compensate this gap. This is also grounded in the fact that 
reparations ordered to States by regional human rights courts are conditional on 
the determination of international state responsibility, which normally takes 
place after quite complex formal requirements in lengthy and expensive 
proceedings. As victims of cases before the ICC and the TFV mostly live in 
poverty or even extreme poverty, they need to be given alternatives such as the 
ICC/TFV to seek and obtain reparations in a relatively flexible manner.   
Accordingly, the TFV assumes an integrative role, which may even be 
considered essential,4384 insofar as the ICC framework does not recognize any 
direct manifestation of state responsibility to grant reparations ‘on behalf’ of the 
convicted person in cases where (s)he acted in an official capacity as a state agent 
in committing the crime(s) but is unable to provide victims with reparations. In 
any case, the ICC and the TFV should complement domestic criminal justice 
systems and national reparations programs. In other words, when reparations 
are provided at the domestic level, the ICC and the TFV ought to consider those 
reparative measures before taking and/or implementing reparations plans and 
orders. Thus, for example, if a State only contemplates compensation as the 
exclusive form of reparations but neglects the other modalities of reparations 
such as rehabilitation or apologies, the ICC and the TFV should step in. It is 
therefore argued that the principle of complementarity, one of the ICC pillars, 
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4382 See McCarthy (2012a) 282.  
4383 Cattin (2008) 1401.  
4384 See Ibid., 1406.  
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should be understood as complementarity not only to fighting impunity but also 
to providing reparations for those who have been victimized.   
Second, in spite of the limitations and challenges faced by the ICC/TFV 
when implementing reparations orders and the fact that reparations for the most 
serious crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction will hardly, if ever, fully redress the 
harm inflicted, the benefits of the ICC/TFV’s involvement include the 
reaffirmation of the standing of victims as human rights holders. This has been 
put into practice in several ways, including the participation of victims before the 
ICC to seek reparations or their (expected) active participation when reparations 
programs are designed and implemented. This also has to do with the 
enhancement of the status of victims as reparations claimants as the TFV seeks 
to ‘contribute to recognizing victims, and in this manner, to strengthen their 
status as right bearing citizens’.4385 Thus, TFV Regulations provide that the Board 
of Directors when conducting its projects ‘may consult victims [as defined in 
Rule 85], their families, as well as their legal representatives’.4386 This 
consultation process strengthens the victims’ status.  
Third, the association of a trust fund with the ICC may also be grounded 
in the notion of external coherence, i.e., reparations programs bearing a close 
relationship with transitional mechanisms such as TRCs with mandates to 
determine at least some level of accountability or domestic criminal 
investigations and prosecutions. The association of the TFV with the ICC and, 
hence, its focus on ICC crimes may make that coherence more easily 
implemented.4387 It also reinforces the idea that a reparations program not 
accompanied by prosecutions may be perceived as asking victims to trade away 
their right to justice to receive support.4388  
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4385 Marieke Wierda and Pablo de Greiff, Reparations and the International Criminal Court: A 
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http://www.ictj.org/static/TJApproaches/Prosecutions/RepICCTrustFund.eng.pdf (last visit on 30 
November 2012). See also Pablo de Greiff, The Role of Reparations in Transitions to Democracy 
(2004) 6-7. Available at:  
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/4980.html/_res/id=sa_File1/49
80_Greiff_Reparations_and_Democracy.pdf  (last visit on 30 November 2012). 
4386 TFV Regulations, Regulation 49.  
4387 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations’ in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of 
Reparations (Oxford University Press 2006b) 451, 467. 
4388 Lisa Magarrell, Reparations in Theory and Practice (ICTJ 2007) 2. Available at: 
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3.3.2.3. Victims and the TFV’s General Assistance Mandate 
Although not provided in the ICC Statute, the TFV’s general assistance mandate, 
also called non-judicial or humanitarian, 4389 is laid down under rule 98 (5) which 
establishes that ‘other resources of the Trust Fund may be used for the benefit of 
victims subject to provisions of article 79 [i.e., for the benefit of victims of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and of their families]’.4390 Unlike the ICC’s 
case-based reparations scheme, the TFV’s general assistance mandate is not 
limited to provision of material support to ‘victims who appear before the Court 
or to the victims who participate in the proceedings’4391 or victims as reparations 
claimants and beneficiaries since all victims of crimes under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, which are investigated in the ICC’s situations, can potentially be 
assisted. The TFV hence has independent power to assist victims outside the 
case-based reparations scheme. The underlying notion is that reparations 
through individualized, case-by-case court proceedings fragments the universe 
of victims and, hence, decreases the aggregate reparatory effect of the awards.4392 
The TFV implements the need for redress not only for individual harm but also 
human and social relations destroyed violently in a mass criminality context, 
which goes beyond individual redress and court proceedings.4393   
The TFV’s autonomy to design and implement general assistance 
projects outside the case-based reparations scheme would suggest the 
importance of having set up a specialized international agency not associated 
with the ICC. Although the class of victims is clearly larger than in a case-based 
reparations scheme, it may still be questioned whether a completely independent 
agency would not be better as the TFV’s general assistance mandate is still 
limited to the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, investigated in the ICC’s 
situations, and, therefore, selective. It is, however, argued here that the 
association of a trust fund with the ICC is necessary to counterbalance some of 
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4389 See Zegveld (2010) 88. 
4390 ICC RPE, Rule 98 (5). See also TFV Regulations, regulation 47 (‘[…]“other resources of the 
Trust Fund” set out in of rule 98, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence refers to 
resources other than those collected from awards for reparations, fines and forfeitures’.); and 
regulation 48 (Other resources of the Trust Fund shall be used to benefit victims of crimes as 
defined in rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and, where natural persons are 
concerned, their families, who have suffered physical, psychological and/or material harm as a 
result of these crimes’.).   
4391 Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04), Notification of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for 
Victims in accordance with Regulation 50 of the Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, 25 
January 2008, para. 35. 
4392 Wierda and Greiff (2004) 5.    
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

the problems that the ICC may be generating for the victims of its country 
situations. As the ICC can try only a small minority of perpetrators and, thus, 
only acknowledge a few victims, this inequity may potentially exacerbate existing 
animosities. The TFV by engaging in projects outside the few ICC cases but 
relating to the crimes and country situations that triggered those cases can reach 
a much larger number of victims who will not be heard and/or claim reparations 
at the ICC and, hence, mitigate the ICC ‘side effect’ or ‘pathology’ of artificially 
and to some extent inadvertently creating categories of victims who were 
affected by crimes of the same gravity and in the same factual scenarios.4394 Since 
reparations under article 75 of the ICC Statute are granted only if the harm 
inflicted is causally linked to crimes upon which an accused is convicted by the 
ICC, in Lubanga, the limited charges filed by the OTP came under strong 
criticism from NGOs expressing disappointment and concern about a ‘negative 
impact on the right of victims to reparations’,4395 and the fact that ‘the lack of 
recognition of some of the most heinous and flagrant crimes denies victims their 
right to justice and reparation’.4396 The TFV’s general assistance mandate can at 
least partially fill some of these notorious gaps.      
Under its general assistance mandate, the TFV notified the ICC of its 
plans to conduct assessments of needs as part of specific projects to provide 
physical, psychological and material support to victims in two ICC country 
situations: Uganda and the DRC.4397 The TFV Board of Directors has estimated 
that those projects will benefit more than 380,000 victims,4398 and similar projects 
in the CAR were prepared,4399 and approved.4400 Those estimations should be 
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4394 Tom Dannenbaum, ‘The International Criminal Court, Article 79, and Transitional Justice: 
The Case for an Independent Trust Fund for Victims’ (2010) 28 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 234, 296. 
4395 Letter from Avocats Sans Frontiers et al. to Luis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, 
International Criminal Court (31 July 2006). 
4396 REDRESS, Press Statement, ICC trial will go ahead, but limited charges may alienate victims in 
Eastern Congo (29 January 2007). Available at:  
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Redress_LubangaMediaAdvisory_29jan07_eng.pdf (last visit 
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4397 In 2007, the TFV approved 18 projects for Uganda and 16 for the DRC. These were later 
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4398 TFV, Report to the Assembly of States Parties on the Activities and Projects of the Board of 
Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, ICC-ASP/7/13, 
3 September 2008, para. 22.  
4399 TFV, Report to the Assembly of States Parties on the projects and the activities of the Board of 
Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, ICC-
ASP/11/14, 7 August 2012, p. 1. 


taken carefully since, as Schabas observes, the notion of beneficiaries ‘is probably 
being used rather loosely’.4401 Having said so, the nature and scale of projects 
handled by the TFV show the great potential that initiatives such as the TFV 
have to bring restorative justice to a much larger number of victims in contexts 
involving thousands or millions of victims. The TFV has set out the following 
categories of programs:  
 
Physical rehabilitation, which includes reconstructive surgery, general surgery, 
bullet and bomb fragment removal, prosthetic and orthopedic devices, referrals 
to services such as fistula repair and HIV and AIDS screening, treatment, care 
and support;  
Psychosocial rehabilitation, which includes both individual and group-based 
trauma counseling, dance and drama groups to promote social cohesion and 
healing, community sensitization workshops and radio broadcasts on victims’ 
rights, information sessions and large-scale community meetings; and 
Material support in the form of safe shelter, vocational training, reintegration 
kits, microcredit support grants, and classes in accelerated literacy.4402 
 
The TFV has also set out the following categories of programs: 
 
Implementing special initiatives for children born out of rape and children who 
themselves have been victimized by sexual and gender-based crimes under the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, including access to basic services, education, and nutrition 
support, and intergenerational responses and stigma reduction programs;  
Building the capacity of implementing partners and victims used as a strategy to 
reinforce the sustainability of the interventions; and  
Engaging community dialogue and reconciliation to foster peace within and 
between the communities that create a suitable environment for prevention of 
crimes.4403  
    
The target beneficiaries/victims have been categorized in groups 
including: i) children and youth; ii) victims of physical trauma; iii) other victims 
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4400 Situation in the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-41), Decision on the “Notification by the 
Board of Directors in Accordance with Regulation 50 a) of the Regulations of the Trust Fund for 
Victims to Undertake Activities in the Central African Republic”, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 
October 2012.  
4401 Schabas (2010) 915. 
4402 TFV, Report to the Assembly of States Parties on the activities and projects of the Board of 
Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims for the period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010, 28 July 2010, 
ICC-ASP/9/2, 28 July 2010, para. 4.  
4403 TFV, ICC-ASP/11/14, 7 August 2012, para. 10. 
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of war; iv) community peace builders; v) former child soldiers;4404 and vi) victims 
of sexual and gender-based violence.4405 The majority of beneficiaries/victims 
receive a combination of integrated physical and psychological rehabilitation 
and/or material support.4406      
As to the kind of support provided by the TFV in pursuit of its general 
assistance mandate outside case-based reparations, it has heavily emphasized 
that the provision of resources does not amount to ‘reparations’ as it belongs to a 
separate, broader mandate which covers the ‘provision of assistance of victims in 
general’.4407 Although support outside a case litigated before the ICC does not 
qualify as reparations under the ICC reparations scheme,4408 it may be argued 
here that such assistance redresses harm of victims of crimes relating to the ICC 
situations since any support by the TFV ‘must seek to redress the harm victims 
have suffered as a result of the crime to which they or their loved ones were 
subjected’.4409 The TFV programs implemented under its general assistance 
mandate are, at least partially, similar to some modalities of reparations. Indeed, 
Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision has acknowledged the importance of 
TFV’s general assistance ongoing programs involving:  
 
[…] child soldiers rehabilitation, sustained by the TFV, which provide support 
to former child soldiers in improving their economic position through access to 
village savings and loans schemes.  Furthermore, partnerships between the TFV 
and various organisations within the DRC have established a local system of 
“mutual solidarity”, which is another form of community savings plan. These 
initiatives, in the Chamber’s views, deserve the support of the ICC, the States 
Parties and any other interested actors.4410 
       
Also, in setting and implementing national reparations programs, 
comparative experience has shown that it is not necessarily victims as 
reparations beneficiaries who have litigated cases before the respective national 
(criminal) courts.4411 On the contrary, this seems to be the exception, like at the 
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4405 TFV, ICC-ASP/11/14, 7 August 2012, para. 10.  
4406 TFV, ICC-ASP/7/13, 3 September 2008, para. 10.  
4407 TFV, ICC-ASP/7/13, 3 September 2008, paras. 15-17; TFV, ICC-ASP/11/14, 7 August 2012, 
para. 10.   
4408 See McCarthy (2009) 269.   
4409 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4410 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 275. 
4411 E.g., as for Peru, see Juan Pablo Pérez León Acevedo, ‘Reparations for and Prosecution of 
Serious Human Rights Violations Cases: Two Pending Points in Peru’s Transitional Justice 
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ICC, due to the necessary selectiveness when prosecuting international crimes. 
Thus, this TFV’s function is related to the notion of an ICC ‘situation country’ 
and not limited to specific cases tried at the ICC. Additionally, the provision of 
general assistance by the TFV recognizes victims’ standing before the ICC as 
victims of particularly heinous international crimes and not merely as 
humanitarian relief assistance beneficiaries.4412 Having said so, the TFV’s general 
assistance mandate should not be expanded to wider forms of socio-economic 
assistance to victims in order to avoid duplication or even conflicts with 
humanitarian organizations working in the same areas and also bearing in mind 
the TFV’s limited resources.  
The existence of the TFV in general and, especially, its general assistance 
mandate corresponds to the fact that although the ICC and the TFV are closely 
connected by the scope of the situations addressed by them, the TFV is not of the 
same nature as the ICC. Trust Funds typically provide redress to an extensive 
number of beneficiaries, especially those who do not access courts.4413 
Accordingly, courts and trust funds constitute different approaches to redress 
harm of victims of international crimes. The large scale and systematic nature of 
the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction reveals a need for redress not only at the 
individual level but equally importantly at the societal level.4414 As a result, the 
actions and the scope of beneficiaries tend to increase in the general assistance 
programs conducted by the TFV. When drafting the ICC RPE, there was actually 
a discussion on whether the resources to be employed by the TFV should be 
limited to reparations only or should be available for a larger array of projects, 
including the assistance of victims of crimes not litigated directly at the ICC.4415 
In this regard, the Norwegian delegation argued for the preservation of 
‘maximum flexibility’ in the design and regulations of the Fund as ‘the Court and 
the Trust Fund may have to deal with very different situations and needs’.4416                                      
Regardless of agreement on the previous reasons explaining why there is 
a need for the TFV to be involved in general assistance mandate programs, one 
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may understandably still be skeptical to the idea of the TFV as a better option 
than NGOs or humanitarian organizations. The latter organizations by 
definition and experience seem to be (much) better equipped to effectively 
address the needs of vast classes of victims. However, some arguments may be 
raised to consider the TFV in its general assistance mandate as a better option 
than NGOs or humanitarian organizations. First, the need to correct the 
imbalance and potential tension between the relatively few victims who benefit 
from the ICC case-based reparations regime and the (much) larger number of 
victims who remain and will remain outside the case-based reparations regime at 
the ICC. Second, the need for increasing coordination and coherence between 
transitional justice mechanisms such as criminal justice (ICC) and, an 
internationally backed-up body with a general assistance mandate to reach out 
those victims who are not reparations claimants/beneficiaries (TFV). Third, 
those victims assisted by the TFV are recognized as active actors in reparation-
like measures that seek to redress their harm. Thus, when conducting its general 
assistance projects, the TFV may (and should) consult victims.4417 Accordingly, 
in spite of falling outside the ICC case-based reparations regime, they may still 
participate in that manner. 
 
3.4. The ECCC 
3.4.1. Preliminary Considerations 
As already examined, both the Trial Chamber,4418 and the Supreme Court 
Chamber,4419 in their respective judgments in Duch, determined that civil party’s 
participation at the ECCC includes not only the victims’ right to participate as 
civil parties in the criminal trial of the accused, but also to ‘pursue a related civil 
action for collective and moral reparations’ against the accused for the harm 
directly attributable to the crimes based upon which (s)he is convicted. Indeed, 
the status dimension of victims (civil parties) as reparations claimants may have 
a more predominant role for civil parties as voiced by the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers in Nuon Chea et al.:  
 
We are mindful, perhaps more than anyone else, of the importance of 
reparations to a judicial process, and the Civil Parties would not participate in 
the trial if it were not for the fact that reparations are their ultimate goal. 
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February 2012, para. 639. 



Reparations necessarily go hand in hand with the sentence in any criminal trial 
which entails Civil Party participation.4420 
 
Moreover, as the Trial Chamber explicitly acknowledged in Duch, 
whereas the Co-Prosecutors’ responsibility is to prove the guilt of the accused, 
the civil parties’ responsibility is to seek reparations and accordingly the Co-
Prosecutors have no role in seeking reparations.4421 To start the long path to 
claim and obtain collective and moral reparations at the ECCC, victims have to 
apply and be constituted civil parties. Requirements to become civil party were 
previously discussed.4422 Thus, here, the emphasis is put on aspects particularly 
relevant to victims (civil parties) as reparations claimants. Under Part C 
(Application to be joined as a civil party) of the Victim Participation Form,4423 
three questions are especially relevant to later receive reparations. Question 2 
requires from the civil party applicant, to state the injury, loss or harm suffered 
by him/her, and to provide a brief description such as physical injury, mental 
pain and anguish, loss of or damage to property. In turn, under question 7, as for 
material or property loss, the civil party applicant is requested to provide any 
further details of physical records helping to identify the extent of loss suffered. 
Finally, question 8 directly deals with the modalities of reparations sought by the 
potential reparations claimants and consists of two sub-questions. First, it is 
given the applicant the option to explicit whether (s)he has any preference 
concerning the form of collective or moral reparation that (s)he would like to 
obtain. Second, if the answer to the first sub-question is in affirmative, the 
applicant is given the chance to provide details.   
The other questions included under the civil party application section of 
the Victim Participation Form and, also relevant, for victims’ status as 
reparations claimants are: i) whether the applicant was examined by a doctor 
after the event(s) took place; ii) whether the applicant received any medical or 
psychological treatment; iii) whether the applicant has any records concerning 
any medical or psychological treatment such as medical report from a doctor, 
hospital or health centre, X-rays, prescription/invoices for medicines; iv) 
whether his/her condition persists today and, if this is the case, to provide 
details; and, v) concerning material or property loss, to give any further details or 
physical records that help identify the extent of loss suffered.4424 Internal rule 23 
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4421 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 9 October 2009, para. 42. 
4422 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.2.1.   
4423 Practice Direction on Victim Participation (Rev.1), Appendix A/Rev.1.   
4424 See respectively questions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
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bis (4) lays down that all civil parties’ application must inter alia ‘attach evidence 
of the injury suffered’.  
 
3.4.2. Seeking Reparations   
3.4.2.1. During Trial   
In Duch, the Trial Chamber directed the civil party groups to file written 
submissions outlining the forms of collective and moral reparations sought 
against the accused in their final brief,4425 in addition to filing a motion on the 
‘form or forms of the award of collective and moral reparations [the civil parties] 
contend shall be awarded against the accused if convicted’.4426 Accordingly, the 
civil parties filed a joint submission highlighting the right of victims of mass 
violence and serious human rights violations as an important reparative justice 
measure ‘Providing meaningful reparative justice in the aftermath of the Khmer 
Rouge atrocities involves identifying remedies that best respond to the rights, 
needs and priorities of targeted beneficiaries, namely the Civil Parties’.4427 
Moreover, taking into account prominent factors such as the impossibility to 
fully redress the harm inflicted on victims, the substantial number of victims as 
civil parties involved, and differences in victims’ experiences, the civil parties 
requested the provision of ‘meaningful reparations in the Cambodian context 
should be of a collective and moral nature’.4428 Under this understanding, despite 
the disagreements among civil party legal teams,4429 the civil parties filed a joint 
claim for reparations, requesting, as a minimum, some specific modalities of 
collective and moral reparations,4430 which are examined in detail later.4431   
Generally speaking, the joint submission pointed out the rights of 
victims of serious human rights violations and, inter alia, requested: i) 
compilation and dissemination of apology statements by Duch made during the 
trial; ii) access to free medical care; iii) funding of educational programs 
informing Cambodians of the Khmer Rouge crimes; iv) erection of memorials; 
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4428 Ibid., para. 44.  
4429 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 196.  
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and v) inclusion of civil parties’ names in the final judgment.4432 Civil parties also 
requested in the event of conviction of the accused, which was finally the case, to 
declare the ECCC competent to ensure the implementation of reparations 
awards by the Cambodian government in the light of international obligations, 
or by the Victims Unit via a voluntary trust fund.4433 The reparations requests 
actually originated from victims and, thus, were not only mere proposals 
submitted by their lawyers.4434    
Some civil parties were able to express their claims for reparations 
directly during hearings before the Trial Chamber, which included the factual 
background, their intention to seek reparations, and physical and emotional 
sufferings related to the crimes alleged against the accused.4435 While civil parties 
mostly left the question on reparations to their lawyers,4436 in other opportunities 
they expressed themselves during the hearings.4437 Also, civil parties’ lawyers had 
the opportunity to question their clients to provide more details and information 
relevant to their reparations claims.4438 Even a civil party, who later was revoked 
in his status, said that he was not seeking reparation.4439 It should be mentioned 
that since the Trial Chamber in Duch was unwilling to entertain witnesses 
proposed by civil parties, it rejected a expert witness on reparations options.4440   
The civil party groups’ final submissions on reparations reiterated the 
requests put forward in their joint submissions, i.e., the collective and moral 
modalities of reparations preliminarily claimed, with groups 1, 2 and 3 providing 
additional particulars or supplementary claims.4441 Civil party group 3 requested 
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4432 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Civil Parties’ Co-Lawyers’ Joint Submission on 
Reparations, E/159/3, 14 September 2009, paras. 16, 21, 24, 26-30, 45. See also Kaing Guek Eav 
alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 652.    
4433 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), E/159/3, 14 September 2009, paras. 2, 41 and 47.  
4434 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 196, footnote, 169.   
4435 See, e.g., Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 17 August 2009, p. 14 et seq., lines 
2-5 et seq.; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 17 August 2009, p. 49, lines 12-17 
et seq.   
4436 See, e.g., Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 18 August 2009, p. 93 et seq., lines 
16-19; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 19 August 2009, p. 8, lines 1-2 et seq.; 
Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 19 August 2009, p. 77, lines 20-25 et seq.   
4437 See, e.g., Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 19 August 2009, p. 80, lines 6-8 et 
seq.  
4438 See, e.g., Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 18 August 2009, pp. 75-84.  
4439 See, e.g., Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 17 August 2009, p. 114, lines 4-7 
et seq.  
4440 McGonigle Leyh (2011) 208.  
4441 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Civil Party Group 1 – Final Submission, E/159/7, 10 
November 2009, paras. 120 and 121.  
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the Chamber to clearly delineate its framework for the enforcement and 
implementation of any reparations awards, and to mandate the Victims Unit to 
conduct wider consultation on how reparations should be approached in the 
Cambodian context.4442 Civil party group 2 requested that the accused, regardless 
of his current income or property, adopts some actions or bears the cost of some 
specific reparations.4443 Civil party group 3 provided: i) further details on the 
modalities of collective and moral reparations requested,4444 later discussed;4445 ii) 
requested the Chamber, in case of the accused’s indigence, to implement the 
modalities and measures of reparations requested, in compliance with 
international obligations, or order the constitution of a voluntary trust fund to 
be managed by Victims Unit;4446 and iii) requested the Chamber to establish 
processes to implement reparations and a mechanism for civil parties to seek 
redress in case of non-compliance with reparation awards.4447  
The Internal Rules were amended in 2010 (not applied in Duch) and, as 
result, the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers are requested to make a single claim for 
collective and moral reparations on behalf of the consolidated civil parties. The 
respective provision (internal rule 23 quinquies (2)), which has been applied in 
Nuon Chea et al, reads as follows:  
 
Reparations shall be requested in a single submission, which may seek a limited 
number of awards. This submission shall provide:  
              a) a description of the awards sought;  
b) reasoned argument as to how they address the harm suffered and specify, 
where applicable, the Civil Party group within the consolidated group to which 
they pertain; and 
c) in relation to each award, the single, specific mode of implementation 
described in Rule 23 quinquies (3)(a)-(b) sought.4448    
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4442 Ibid., paras. 119-124.   
4443 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Co-Lawyers’ for Civil Parties (Group 2) – Final 
Submission, E/159/6, 5 October 2009, paras. 14-21.   
4444 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Co-Lawyers’ for Civil Parties (Group 3) – Final 
Submission, E/159/6, 11 November 2009. See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Co-
Lawyers’ for Civil Parties (Group 3) – Mémoire Additionnel Concernnat la Reparation, E/159/3/1, 
17 September 2009.     
4445 See infra Chapter V 4.4.2.  
4446 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Co-Lawyers’ for Civil Parties (Group 3) – Final 
Submission, E/159/6, 11 November 2009.  
4447 Ibid.  
4448 ECCC Internal Rules, internal rule 23 quinquies 2 (Rev. 6). The current text (Rev. 8) remains 
the same.   
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In turn, as previously examined,4449 the Chambers can under the Internal 
Rules when deciding the modes of implementation of the reparations awards, 
either to order that the convicted bears the costs of the award (internal rule 23 
quinquies 3 (a)) or according to internal rule 23 quinquies 3 (b) to:  
 
[…] recognise that a specific project appropriately gives effect to the award 
sought by the Lead Co-Lawyers and may be implemented. Such project shall 
have been designed or identified in cooperation with the Victims Support 
Section and have secured sufficient external funding.  
 
In application of internal rule 80 bis (4), in the ongoing trial in Nuon 
Chea et al.: 
 
The Trial Chamber may direct the Lead Co-Lawyers, within a deadline 
determined by the Chamber, to provide initial specification of the substance of 
the awards they intend to seek within the final claim for collective and moral 
reparation pursuant to Rule 23 quinquies (3) (b). At a later stage, the Chamber 
will determine the date by which the Lead Co-Lawyers shall file the final claim 
for collective and moral reparation.4450      
 
Additionally, internal rule 80 bis (5) provides the opportunity for civil 
parties, in their final claims, to introduce changes to their initial requests but 
establishing details ‘The Final claim for collective and moral reparation may 
deviate from the initial specification where necessary, but shall in any case 
specify both the substance and mode of implementation of each award’.4451  
The initial specification of awards during an early stage introduced by 
internal rule 80 bis (4) is welcome since it aims at avoiding potentially costly, 
time consuming or misguided reparations projects.4452 Thus, the VSS’s design of 
a project award as identified by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, under internal 
rule 23 quinquies (3) (b), and monitored by the Trial Chamber reduces the 
chances it may be rejected by the Chamber.4453 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber 
may raise concerns early when changes to reparations project developments are 
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4449 See supra Chapter IV 1.4.3.  
4450 ECCC Internal Rules, internal rule 80 bis (4) (Rev. 6). The current text (Rev. 8) remains the 
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4451 ECCC Internal Rules, internal rule 80 bis (5) (Rev. 6). The current text (Rev. 8) remains the 
same.  
4452 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125, 23 September 2011, p.  2. 
4453 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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still possible.4454 Such early specifications are pivotal to guarantee that: i) the 
steps adopted by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers fall within the ECCC Internal 
Rules and lead to ‘meaningful outcomes for victims’; ii) optimal use of resources 
by the VSS and external donors; and iii) Chamber’s oversight and guidance of 
reparations sought. Even though rule 80 bis (5) states that the final claim for 
collective and moral reparations may come from the initial specification, civil 
parties’ lead co-lawyers are obligated to specify both the substance and the 
modality of reparations of each award,4455 which may have led to some initial 
misunderstanding and resistance from the lead co-lawyers at the Initial Hearing 
in Nuon Chea et al.4456 However, as clarified by the Trial Chamber, those initial 
specifications aim at encouraging:   
 
[…] sufficient specificity and advanced planning so as to ensure that meaningful 
reparation can result to the benefit of the consolidated group of Civil Parties 
within the ECCC’s lifespan. It is therefore entirely to the benefit of the 
consolidated group of Civil Parties that as much specificity as possible is 
provided to the Chamber at an early stage regarding reparations measures 
sought on their behalf […] the particulars of the awards sought may evolve over 
time and […] the claims as ultimately presented might differ in terms of certain 
details.4457                     
 
Nevertheless, during the hearings in Nuon Chea et al., civil parties’ lead 
co-lawyers argued that rule 80 bis does not require the civil parties to provide a 
detailed account of the reparations awards under preparation nor their mode of 
implementation as they are only required to provide an initial specification of 
the reparations; however, they hoped that doing so constitutes ‘the beginning of 
a continuing dialogue with the Chamber on issues relating to the development 
and the final outcome of these claims’.4458 Indeed, the Trial Chamber 
acknowledged that: 
 
The purpose of these hearings was to enable the Chamber to provide initial 
oversight and guidance, where necessary, to ensure conformity of the awards 
sought with the ECCC legal framework, to ensure the effective deployment of 
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4455 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4456 Noun Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcript, 29 June 2011, p. 100, line 110.  
4457 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/125, 23 September 2011, pp. 2-3.  
4458 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 9. See also  Nuon Chea et al. (Case 
002), Transcript, 19 October 2011, p. 11, line 24-p. 12, line 19. 
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donor and other resources, and to maximize the possibility of Civil Parties 
obtaining meaningful reparation.4459 
 
Be that as it may, the observations presented by the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers were claimed to be the product of collective work and consultations 
conducted among civil parties’ lawyers and civil parties and, hence, taking into 
account the civil parties’ rights and wishes.4460 Thus, the civil parties’ lawyers, the 
VSS and partner organizations launched a consultation process in depth of the 
(back then) 2129 civil parties living in Cambodia and abroad.4461  
Upon receiving the results of those consultations, civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers as well as civil parties’ lawyers acting in cooperation with the VSS and 
NGOs conducted an exhaustive analysis and a synthesis of all data to determine 
the areas in which the civil parties will express their wishes and, in application of 
the Internal Rules, to express the first indications concerning the nature of 
reparations sought.4462 The lead co-lawyers also highlighted their effort to 
articulate common fields of interest and to come up with consistent and feasible 
reparations projects.4463 Moreover, it was pointed out that civil parties’ wishes 
reflected very often modalities of reparations requested in Duch, which were 
rejected (under the previous regime of reparations implementation) by the Trial 
Chamber and (back then) were still in appeals proceedings.4464  
In addition, 1750 new civil parties (originally rejected) were added to the 
process of consultation in Nuon Chea et al.4465 The need for incorporating each 
and every of the civil parties as potential reparations claimants, shown by civil 
parties’ lawyers is herein considered pivotal to follow a truly inclusive approach 
to reparations claims and not leave out a (substantial) number of civil parties 
that were later incorporated. Otherwise, their status as reparations claimants 
would have been affected.   
Concerning the severance of the facts leading to separation of trial 
proceedings in mini-trials in Nuon Chea et al.,4466 although the Trial Chamber 
had established that this has no impact on the formulation of the civil parties’ 
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4460 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcript, 19 October 2011, p. 8, lines 19-21-p. 9, lines 12-13. 
4461 Ibid., p. 9, lines 15-18.  
4462 Ibid., p. 9, lines 19-25. 
4463 Ibid., p. 9, line 25-p. 10, lines 1-2. 
4464 Ibid., p. 10, lines 4-13.  
4465 Ibid., p. 10, lines 14-21.  
4466 See supra Chapter III 4.4.1.  
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reparations claims made on their behalf by the lead co-lawyers,4467 civil parties 
considered that such severance (without further initial specifications) could 
affect the consolidated group as the change in the scope of trial would mean that 
only 750 civil parties out of 3864 civil parties would be able to have locus standi 
to lodge reparation claims.4468 However, considerations of efficiency and timely 
justice, bearing in mind the high number of civil parties and the complexity of 
this case, similar to those already referred to as for civil parties’ participation,4469 
can be mutatis mutandi invoked herein to justify the decision adopted by the 
Trial Chamber. Therefore, a more substantial and meaningful victims’ status as 
reparations claimants is expected as not all the nearly 4000 civil parties are 
participating at the same time in the trial proceedings seeking reparations. The 
Trial Chamber has not placed limitations ‘on the ability of individual members 
of the consolidated group to benefit from any reparations ultimately endorsed or 
awarded by the Trial Chamber’.4470 Even though the formulation of reparations 
claims should consider internal rule 23 quinquies (1) (a), the Trial Chamber has 
provided guidance to the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers to assist them to formulate 
requests that ‘may result in meaningful measures in reparation and encompass 
the entire consolidated group of civil parties’.4471 Additionally, the Trial Chamber 
reminded: 
 
[…] the Lead Co-Lawyers that severance has no impact whatsoever in relation 
to the new and separate reparations avenue created by Internal Rule 
23quinquies(3)(b), pursuant to which the initiatives proposed as possible 
measures do not result in enforceable claims against an Accused, and may be 
developed in parallel with the trial.4472        
 
Accordingly, civil parties have not been deprived of their status as 
reparations claimants since all of them are able/will be able to claim and, 
depending on the conviction of the co-accused, receive reparations at the end of 
the present and/or subsequent trials/mini-trials within Nuon Chea et al. Thus, 
the Trial Chamber established that while it will only consider harm suffered that 
stems from charges under the first trial (Case 002/01) in Nuon Chea et al., 
specific harm suffered related to the subject-matter of future trials in Nuon Chea 
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4467 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 22 September 2011, para. 8.  
4468 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 19 October 2011, p. 17 line 19-p. 19, line 6. 
4469 See supra Chapter III 4.4.1.  
4470 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 26 April 2013, para. 158. 
4471 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4472 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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et al., will be relevant to those trials.4473 Concerning the reparations foreseen 
under rule 23 quinquies (3) (b), i.e., not borne by the convicted:  
 
[…] the Severance Order does not debar the elaboration of specific projects 
which give appropriate effect to the awards sought by the Lead Co-Lawyers. 
Initiatives sought in relation to this new form of reparation (in particular those 
aiming to secure sufficient external funding) may be conducted in parallel with 
the entire trial in Case 002. However the Chamber urges the Lead Co-Lawyers 
to focus efforts on awards that may be relevant to Case 002/01 and deliverable 
within or soon after the issuance of the verdict in that case.4474  
    
The Trial Chamber also added that, when necessary, it will indicate: 
 
a) which of the reparations awards presently contemplated by the Lead Co-
Lawyers appear to fall within the scope of Case 002/01; 
b) which of the awards identified appear to fall outside the scope of Case 002/01 
(and thus will not be further considered during this trial) but which may instead 
be relevant to future trials [in Nuon Chea et al.]; and 
c) which of the specific projects identified by the Lead Co-Lawyers may fall 
entirely outside the scope of the ECCC legal framework.4475 
 
Upon the severance of Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), in the first case and 
trial within Case 002, i.e., Case 002/01, the Trial Chamber requested the civil 
parties’ lead co-lawyers to identify the civil parties’ prioritized list of reparations 
projects which are currently going under development.4476 Paying attention to 
‘the challenges in bringing reparations to fruition […], the Chamber wishes to 
clarify that implementation of these measures may begin prior to the verdict in 
Case 002/01’.4477 The Chamber also asked the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, in 
consultation with the VSS, information on the status of the financing of their 
prioritized projects.4478 Civil parties’ lead co-lawyers have submitted information 
on the prioritized list of reparations projects and the Trial Chamber has made 
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4473 See Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/145, 29 November 2011. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä 
(2013) 1364. 
4474 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/145, 29 November 2011, p. 2.  
4475 Ibid., p. 3. 
4476 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 3 December 2012, p. 1. 
4477 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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observations and asked for clarification concerning their funding and 
implementation,4479 which is examined in further detail later.4480  
Moreover, as previously mentioned,4481 the VSS has been and will be 
conducting ‘regional forums’ with civil parties in Nuon Chea et al. to, inter alia, 
facilitate discussion between them and their lawyers on the severance order of 
the case into mini-trials and to enable civil parties to be informed of, and to 
exercise their rights, especially those relating to reparations claims.4482 
Furthermore, civil parties will be informed on how their individual cases will be 
involved in the proceedings, depending on the different crimes addressed in each 
mini-trial.4483 Accordingly, this constitutes an important and necessary safeguard 
for civil parties not to miss the opportunity to participate in proceedings directly 
connected with their reparations claims and do it timely.   
Lastly, but equally important, it should be mentioned that internal rule 
100 (Judgment on the Civil Party Claims) establishes that the Trial Chamber 
‘shall make a decision on the Civil Party claims in the judgment. The Chamber 
shall not hand down judgment on the Civil Party action that is in contradiction 
with the judgment on the criminal action in the same case’. Moreover, the same 
provision contemplates the possibility to adjourn its decision upon civil parties’ 
request ‘Where appropriate, the Chamber may adjourn its decision on the Civil 
Party claims to a new hearing’, as the Trial Chamber may consider to give 
priority to the determination of the criminal responsibility.4484   
 
3.4.2.2. During Appeals 
As previously referred to,4485 under internal rule 105 (1) (c), ‘The Civil Parties 
may appeal the decision on reparations’ and under rule 110 (5), civil parties on 
appeal cannot introduce new claims not previously submitted to the Trial 
Chamber. Considering that so far the only reparations order at the ECCC has 
been delivered in Duch, the analysis of civil parties’ participation as reparations 
claimants in appeals proceedings is limited to that case. Civil party group 2 filed 
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4479 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Trial Chamber Memorandum Entitled: Trial Chamber’s 
Subsequent and Final Order on the Updated Specification of Civil Party Priority Projects Pursuant 
to Rule 81bis(4), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2013, paras. 2 and 9.   
4480 See infra Chapter V 4.4.2.2. 
4481 See supra Chapter III 4.4.1.  
4482 See VSS, Press Statement (August 2012).  
4483 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4484 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 685.  
4485 See supra Chapter III 6.4.1.  
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extensive reparations submissions, requesting in its notice of appeal and its 
appeal on reparations to overturn Trial Chamber’s rejection of its nine requests 
and grant them entirely.4486 Civil party group 3 also requested the Supreme Court 
Chamber to grant the appellants’ original reparations claims that were rejected 
by the Trial Chamber.4487 Although civil party group 1 did not file an appeal 
against the Trial Chamber’s findings on reparations as it considered that the 
admission of a civil party application is adequate reparation in and of itself, this 
group requested to also be benefited deriving from and in case of any Supreme 
Court Chamber’s reparations awards requested by other civil parties groups on 
appeals.4488         
Civil party group 2 considered that the State of Cambodia, regardless of 
the changes of Government over a period of time and based on the ICCPR and 
the Convention against Torture, has a legal obligation to satisfy the 
internationally recognized right to reparations.4489 This group also acknowledged 
that although the ECCC does not have the mandate to order reparations that 
would create an obligation on Cambodia, it also claimed that the ECCC is not 
prevented from ordering reparations that require Cambodia’s assistance in the 
form of ‘non-pecuniary and administrative support rather than a financial 
contribution’, as this assistance underlies ‘a general duty of States to take care of 
the needs of their population’.4490 In turn, civil party group 3 sustained that the 
ECCC can go beyond its mandate with regard to awarding reparations in light of 
the ‘provisions of the ECCC law on property acquired unlawfully or by criminal 
conduct’.4491 Civil party group 2 also submitted that Duch’s indigence should not 
prevent the ECCC from issuing reparations orders.4492 Even though reparations 
were to be ‘awarded against, and be borne by convicted persons’ under the 
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(Group 2) on the Reparation Order, Civil Party Group 2, E188/14, 6 September 2010, para. 9; 
Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal against Judgment on Reparations by Co-Lawyers 
for Civil Parties – Group 2, Civil Party Group 2, 2 November 2010, paras. 8 and 130.  
4487 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Notice of Appeal by the Co-Lawyers for Civil Party 
Group 3, E188/4, 6 September 2010, paras. 26-27; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal 
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October 2010, paras. 107-108.  
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4490 Ibid., para. 25. 
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4492 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 30 March 2011, p. 47, lines 14-15. 
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previous reparations implementation regime applied in Duch,4493 they argued 
that they should be issued irrespective of Duch’s financial situation and not 
refused on uncertain financing grounds.4494 As for all unsuccessful reparations 
requests, civil party group 2 submitted that the Trial Chamber erred in law by 
abstracting and grouping the civil parties’ requests without explicitly indicating 
what kind of request was examined under which paragraph, violating the right of 
a reasoned decision.4495  
The Supreme Court Chamber’s findings on Duch’s indigence situation 
were already discussed.4496 With regard to whether the ECCC can issue 
reparations orders, the enforcement of which may require government 
administrative assistance, the Supreme Court Chamber stressed that it lacks 
jurisdiction over matters that are not statutorily conferred to it and, thus, 
reiterated its absence of mandate and jurisdiction over Cambodia or its 
Government to compel it to administer a reparations scheme.4497 It also 
determined that the Government cannot be engaged by the ECCC as civil 
defendant, nor can the ECCC exercise jurisdiction such as encroachment of 
statutory competence of the executive.4498 Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
Chamber concluded that:  
 
[…] any reparation claim is predestined for rejection that necessarily requires 
the intervention of the RGC [Royal Government of Cambodia] to the extent 
that, in effect, such request predominantly seeks a measure failing within 
governmental prerogatives. This is the case, for instance, with respect to 
requests for State apology, organization of health care, institution of national 
commemoration days, and naming of public buildings after the victim. 4499 
 
However, the Supreme Court Chamber also concluded that domestic 
courts are bound to give effect to the ECCC reparations orders against convicted 
persons, similar to any other reparations order delivered by domestic courts.4500 
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4493 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (11)  (Rev. 3). See also ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quinquies (1) 
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4499 Ibid., para. 664. 
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As for whether the Trial Chamber erred by grouping the requests for reparations 
without explicitly indicating which reasons applied to the rejection of each 
reparations request, the Supreme Court Chamber determined that civil parties 
hold a right to a reasoned decision on their reparations claims and that Trial 
Chamber’s course of action infringed the right to a reasoned decision in that it 
did not allow the civil party appellants to unambiguously identify the reasoning 
relevant to certain reparations requests.4501 Thus, the Supreme Court Chamber 
not only recognized the violation of the appellants’ right to a reasoned decision 
but it also, by way of redress, proceeded to give its own reasoning on the 
reparations claims reiterated on appeal.4502 These reparations claims and 
modalities are examined in detail in the next subchapter. What should be 
noticed here is that civil parties, in particular civil party group 2, submitted 
numerous requests that generally speaking represent appropriate forms of 
reparation for the harm inflicted such as provision of medical and psychological 
treatment for direct and indirect victims, naming public buildings after victims 
and installation of informative plaques, holding commemorative ceremonies and 
erection of memorials, e.g., pagodas, pagoda fences and monuments.4503 During 
the appeals hearing before the Supreme Court Chamber, the lawyers of the civil 
parties groups had the opportunity to make oral statements concerning the 
collective and moral modalities of reparations requested by the civil parties and 
denied by the Trial Chamber,4504 as discussed in detail later.4505      
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court Chamber concluded that, due to the 
constraints stemming from the ECCC reparations framework, they could not be 
granted.4506 Also, considering that several reparations requests were rejected due 
to Duch’s indigence and as for those who were adequately specified, the Supreme 
Court Chamber ‘encourages national authorities, the international community, 
and other potential donors to provide financial and other forms of support to 
develop and implement these appropriate forms of reparations’.4507 As seen, the 
Supreme Court Chamber in appeals only exhorted the above-mentioned actors, 
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4501 Ibid., para. 671. 
4502 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4503 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), F13, 2 November 2010, paras. 45-126. See also Kaing 
Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), F9, 5 October 2010, paras. 97-102.   
4504 See Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 30 March 2011, pp. 49, 54, 79-82, 84-
85.   
4505 See infra Chapter V 4.3.1.1 and 4.4.2.1.   
4506 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 717. 
4507 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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falling short of any binding order against them due to the ECCC’s particular and 
restricted reparations implementation regime, especially the previous one.           
        
3.4.3. Civil Parties as Reparations Claimants and the VSS   
Concerning the new alternative to implement a reparations award for civil 
parties, under the amended version of rule 23 quinquies (3) (b) and applicable to 
Nuon Chea et al., a first instance of civil parties’ participation as reparations 
claimants is, via their lead co-lawyers, to identify reparations awards. Thus, as 
emphasized by the Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea et al., it is important the close 
cooperation between the project manager installed in the VSS and the civil 
parties’ lead co-lawyers in order to ‘ensure that requests for such awards are not 
technically, numerically or financially unrealistic’.4508 Moreover, the Trial 
Chamber clarified that it was never intended to burden the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers with project development or with securing funds.4509  
In practice, as submitted by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, both they 
and the civil parties’ lawyers have understood that the burden to coordinate the 
reparations award projects does not lie only on them but also on the civil parties’ 
lawyers and, what is more, the VSS is also tasked with the development of non-
judicial measures that may be implemented immediately (under internal rule 12 
bis) and, in particular, with identifying, designing and later implementing 
reparations projects under rule 23 quinquies (3) (b).4510 In particular, internal 
rule 12 bis (2) clearly establishes that the VSS ‘shall, in co-operation with the 
Lead Co-Lawyers, and, where appropriate, in liaison with governmental and 
non-governmental organisations, endeavour to identify, design and later 
implement projects envisaged by Rule 23quinquies (3)(b)’. 
Accordingly, in Nuon Chea et al., several months of facilitation among 
the lead co-lawyers and civil parties’ lawyers took place and, in turn, the former 
held many meetings with the VSS project manager in order to establish the type 
and nature of the reparations projects.4511 Moreover, the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers reminded that those measures ‘will be implemented through projects 
supported by donors as well as other organizations’,4512 and also in cooperation 
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4508 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125, 23 September 2011, p. 2.  
4509 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4510 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 19 October 2011, p. 25, lines 9-13; Nuon Chea et al. 
(Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 38.  
4511 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 19 October 2011, p. 25, lines 13-17; Nuon Chea et al. 
(Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 38.   
4512 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 19 October 2011, 25, lines 18-20; Nuon Chea et al. 
(Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 39.     
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with the Cambodian Government.4513 As previously seen,4514 the project to set up 
an externally subsidized trust fund to implement collective and moral 
reparations awarded by the ECCC was advanced by the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers as part of the projects submitted. Projects on modalities of collective and 
moral reparations proposed by the civil parties’ co-lead lawyers are discussed in 
detail later.4515 What should be mentioned here is that the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers expressed that the VSS shares their deep commitment to making 
reparations a reality and their on-going collaboration with the VSS will even be 
reinforced in the future.4516  
Nevertheless, civil parties’ lead co-lawyers recognized that the tasks 
assigned to them, to the civil parties’ lawyers and the VSS are ‘not only daunting 
but also unprecedented in the context of an international tribunal’.4517 This 
observation is sound as these tasks are normally conducted by specialized bodies 
or entities, e.g., the TFV, that have an important number of staff members, 
funding, time as well as experience. In this scenario, the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers considered it necessary in order to guarantee the on-time development 
of projects, other than those which are purely symbolic and that ‘are clearly 
unsatisfactory for the Civil Parties’, to propose that the VSS have staff with 
diversified skills.4518  
In Case 002/01, within Nuon Chea et al., civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, in 
consultation with the VSS, have provided information on the status of the 
financing of the prioritized list of reparations projects to ensure that all measures 
under internal rule 23 quinquies (3) (b) might be realized, with the support of 
external collaborators and donor assistance and within a meaningful time 
frame.4519 Thus, as expressed by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers themselves, ‘The 
Lead Co-Lawyers, Civil Party Lawyers, VSS and partner organizations and 
entities will cooperate to finalize the design of the prioritized projects and offer 
our support in fundraising efforts’.4520       
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4513 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 39.      
4514 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.3.2. 
4515 See infra Chapter V 4.4.2.2.  
4516 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 39.  
4517 Ibid., para. 40.  
4518 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4519 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 3 December 2012, p. 1; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 1 August 
2013, para. 2. 
4520 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 12 February 2013, para. 36. 
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Finally, it should be mentioned that the VSS has developed a process of 
consultation, including non-civil parties, to discuss proposals and resources 
necessary for the implementation of non-judicial measures for them.4521  
 
3.5. Comparative Conclusions   
The proceedings whereby victims can seek reparations at the ICC and the ECCC 
are generally speaking similar concerning bringing reparations claims although 
the ICC as a court may be regarded as more proactive. Victims who claim 
reparations at the ICC can be considered parties when it comes to their 
reparations claims during reparations phase proceedings, i.e., after conviction, as 
acknowledged by Trial Chamber I and the Appeals Chamber, although, unlike 
the ECCC or the French system, there is no civil party status at the ICC. During 
trial, appeals, and reparations phase proceedings (including reparations 
hearings, reparations order and appeals against it) the scope of participation and 
procedural rights of civil parties as reparations claimants at the ECCC is in some 
instances broader than that of reparations claimants at the ICC. However, any 
difference is compensated when reparations claimants also hold the status of 
victim participants at the ICC. Additionally, since legal representatives of victims 
(especially the OPCV) may represent both victim participants and victims who 
only claim reparations, legal representatives’ actions and the final outcome of 
reparations are expected to benefit all victims who are seeking reparations at the 
ICC.  
Victims’ status as reparations claimants at the TFV and how its 
reparations implementation plan is integrated within the ICC case-based 
reparations regime constitutes an important difference with regard to the ECCC 
since this lacks a similar trust fund. Nevertheless, at the ECCC, under the 
amended reparations implementation regime, such implementation can 
potentially be conducted with external funds by the VSS in liaison with non-
governmental organizations, e.g., an externally subsidized trust fund (different 
from the TFV) as proposed by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers in Nuon Chea et 
al., and governmental organizations. In turn, civil parties who seek reparations at 
the ECCC have procedural rights similar to those available to civil parties in the 
French system both during trial and appeals proceedings, which are also to an 
important extent similar to the actions that can be followed by victims as 
reparations claimants, especially those who are also victim participants, at the 
ICC. On the other hand, although victims are not technically speaking 
reparations claimants in the Anglo-American criminal proceedings, they can still 
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4521 See SáCouto (2012) 358. 
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benefit from compensation/restitution orders against the accused imposed by 
the respective court and, especially in the United States, there are some ‘indirect’ 
avenues for victims to be more pro-active on this regard. In any case, in the three 
examined national systems, victims can exercise civil actions before civil 
jurisdictions to obtain reparations normally and, in the United States, via class 
actions when it comes to large number of victims, which may be considered as a 
general/indirect reference for the international and hybrid criminal courts. 
Moreover, state special funds have been set up as an alternative. To some extent, 
the TFV resembles this last alternative. 
At the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL, reparations proceedings, 
in particular concerning compensation, have been ‘delegated’ to national 
jurisdictions, i.e., victims may use a condemnatory judgment from these 
tribunals to claim compensation at the domestic level. This can be criticized 
since it is assumed the existence of applicable national law, competent bodies 
and enforcement mechanisms at the domestic level ready to be used by victims 
as reparations claimants, which is not necessarily the case letting alone other 
barriers and limitative factors. These circumstances may explain why, as far as it 
is known, no domestic compensation award has been granted based on a 
judgment of the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL. At the STL, whether its Statute 
provision on singling out victims and based on which they may later file 
compensation claims at the national level can change the above-mentioned 
negative outcome is yet to be seen. In any case, victim participant status for the 
purpose of identification at the STL can be considered quite important. Victims 
not identified by the STL can also use a condemnatory judgment to claim 
compensation in domestic courts or other institutions. At the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL, proceedings on restitution (as a penalty and not existent at the 
STL), which include a separate hearing, are difficult to implement due to, inter 
alia, the need for national authorities’ involvement. In any case, restitution 
proceedings remain theoretical since, as far as it is known, these courts have not 
issued a restitution order. Concerning rehabilitation, some measures have been 
adopted especially at the ICTR but limited to witnesses, i.e., given to victims as 
witnesses. Concerning external mechanisms, where victims can claim 
reparations, related to crimes under these courts’ jurisdictions, it can be 
mentioned, as for the former Yugoslavia, the establishment of hybrid criminal 
courts in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the setting up of the 
Human Rights Chamber and restitution commissions. As for Rwanda, national 
legislation and proceedings as well as specific projects under the ‘International 
Fund for Rwanda’ can be mentioned. With regard to Sierra Leone, a national 
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reparations program has been put into place. Therefore, these external 
mechanisms may be considered as complementary transitional justice 
mechanisms where victims can become reparations claimants.         
At the ICC, victims who seek reparations within the ICC case-based 
reparations regime start this long path process by requesting and indicating, 
inter alia, the injury, loss and harm inflicted, claims for compensation, 
rehabilitation and other modalities of reparations as well as factual background 
and, to the extent possible, the identity of the person(s) believed to be 
responsible for the harm. There is large flexibility as for reparations claimants’ 
documentation, including identifying documents. Victims who apply for victim 
participant status also have the option to additionally claim for reparations by 
filling in the respective application form and, thus, additionally become 
reparations claimants. Victims can bring their claims at the earliest opportunity; 
however, it is better to wait at least after the charges are confirmed since 
reparations are only granted for the harm caused by crimes upon which the 
accused is convicted and, thus, to avoid secondary victimization if some 
charge(s), based upon which victims were looking for reparations, is/are not 
confirmed. Although the ICC can on its own motion exceptionally proceed with 
reparations proceedings, if a victim as a result of notification becomes aware of 
such action, (s)he can always submit a reparations claim and his/her claim be 
treated in the regular way, i.e., be treated as a reparations claimant. Therefore, 
victims who could not initially apply for reparations can still benefit from the 
ICC’s exceptional court-initiated reparations proceedings if beneficiaries can be 
identified by the ICC and/or the TFV and, thus, given the opportunity to claim 
reparations. Notification of reparations claims and proceedings to the accused 
and/or victims have to be conducted timely and, especially concerning 
publication of reparations proceedings, external assistance is foreseen and 
advisable considering the difficult contexts (including communication 
problems) faced by potential reparations claimants.  
At the ECCC, the status of victims as reparations claimants is integrated 
in their status as civil parties as one of the two purposes of civil party 
constitution is to claim collective and moral reparations. Accordingly, 
information related to (later) reparations requests is provided when victims 
apply to become civil parties at which instance victims have to, inter alia, 
provide information on the injury, loss and harm suffered as well as on the 
psychological, physical pain and material loss.     
At the ICC’s cases, victims who hold the victim participant status, 
normally via their legal representatives, have had the opportunity to put forward 
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arguments and also bring evidence related to or concerning their reparations 
claims during trial. Accordingly, the Trial Chambers in Lubanga and Bemba 
(applying regulation 56 of the Regulations of the Court), adopted an approach 
whereby it is possible to hear reparations evidence, ask specific questions to 
witnesses (who may also be victims) in relation to reparations, and admit 
testimony on reparations by victims. It has thus been adopted a balanced 
approach as it is not only considered victims’ interests but also the accused’s 
right to a fair and impartial trial and efficiency. When victims’ legal 
representatives wish to question a witness on reparations-related matters during 
trial, it is necessary to make a written application (including questions, their 
purpose and any relevant document) as well as file it early enough for the 
defence to submit observations. The Chamber will also determine whether and 
to what extent the more flexible questioning rules applicable in reparations 
hearings are also applicable in trial.  
In turn, at the ECCC, in the trial in Duch, the groups of civil parties filed 
a joint written submission emphasizing the right of victims of mass violence and 
serious human rights violations to claim reparations and, in the particular 
context of the ECCC reparations regime, they requested several modalities of 
reparations of a collective and moral nature. In Duch, civil parties’ final 
submissions on reparations reiterated their initial claims and also provided 
additional or supplementary claims. Besides requested collective and moral 
reparations, it was emphasized the need to conduct a wider consultation and the 
Chambers were requested to set up reparations implementation processes. Some 
civil parties were able to express their reparations claims during the trial hearings 
either via their lawyers (in most of the cases) or even by themselves and civil 
parties’ lawyers had the opportunity to question their clients and, thus, enable 
them to provide further information about their reparations claims. In the 
amended ECCC Internal Rules, applicable to Nuon Chea et al. and other on-
going and future cases, civil parties’ lead co-lawyers have to make a single claim 
for collective and moral reparations on behalf of the consolidated civil parties 
group. As for the Chamber’s possibility to order the implementation of a 
reparations award sought by civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, designed or identified 
with the VSS, these have to provide an initial specification of the awards that are 
sought. This should lead to meaningful outcomes for victims as the Trial 
Chamber may early identify whether the awards sought are feasible. In any case, 
civil parties are still allowed to introduce changes to the initial specifications but 
providing details on the substance and form of implementation of the proposed 
award.  
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In Nuon Chea et al., the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers sustained that their 
initial specifications resulted from collective work and consultation with civil 
parties’ lawyers and civil parties, reflecting the civil parties’ wishes on the nature 
and modalities of reparations that are sought. Additionally, civil parties, who 
were originally denied their status, were also consulted, which was a necessary 
inclusion measure. Although Nuon Chea et al. has been divided in (mini) trials 
which may postpone granting reparations for civil parties, it is a more efficient 
option and should lead to a more meaningful and substantial participation of 
civil parties as reparations claimants since not all the almost 4000 civil parties of 
this case are simultaneously doing so. Moreover, all civil parties will have the 
opportunity to have their reparations claims examined. Thus, the harm suffered 
by the civil parties and the respective requests for reparations awards will be 
progressively considered in the respective trials/mini-trials in Nuon Chea et al. 
In Case 002/01, within Nuon Chea et al., upon Trial Chamber’s request, the civil 
parties’ lead co-lawyers have provided a prioritized list of reparations projects 
that are under development. The civil parties’ lead co-lawyers and lawyers, the 
VSS and partner organizations and entities are jointly working to finalize the 
design of the prioritized reparations projects and raise the necessary funds so 
that those projects are endorsed by the Trial Chamber. Furthermore, the ECCC, 
in particular its VSS, has been and will continue informing the civil parties and 
their lawyers of the progress of their individual cases so that they can timely 
participate as for reparations claims. Finally, civil parties may request the Trial 
Chamber to adjourn its decision on reparations claims in a new hearing after the 
judgment.  
Concerning ICC reparations phase proceedings, i.e., after conviction, in 
particular before making a reparations order, under article 75 (3) of the ICC 
Statute, the ICC may invite victims’ representations (both oral and written) and, 
once these are provided, the ICC must take them into account. Article 76 (3) lays 
down the possibility for the Trial Chamber to have an additional hearing on 
reparations, where submissions made under article 75 (3) can be heard. 
Moreover, victim participants or victims who only requested reparations may 
ask the postponement of the reparations hearing although they cannot initiate 
reparations hearings. Victims as reparations claimants can in principle only 
intervene via ‘representations’ in reparations phase proceedings (including 
hearings) when invited by the Chamber. However, they should also be allowed to 
participate as victim participants during reparations phase proceedings, i.e., to 
be granted relevant procedural rights beyond mere submission of 
representations upon the ICC’s invitation, if they hold this status. Reasons for 
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this are: i) since reparations phase proceedings form part of the overall trial 
process and article 68 (3) (legal ground for victim participant status) applies to, 
inter alia, trial, it is also applicable to reparations proceedings; ii) not to deprive 
victims of procedural/participatory rights and consistency with victims’ 
(procedural) rights to both participate and claim reparations; iii) a reference, 
under rule 91 (4) of the RPE, to victims’ participation in the reparations hearing; 
iv) invitations for representations actually seek to allow the ICC to hear victims 
who did not apply for victim participant status; and v) the special interest of 
victims to actively participate in reparations phase proceedings and, thus, obtain 
an important quota of restorative justice. The personal interest to participate as 
victim participants is given by requesting reparations. It must be pointed out 
that Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision referred to expression of victims’ 
views and concerns as well as participation and, thus, implicitly and arguably 
suggested the application of the victim participant status for those who hold it in 
reparations phase proceedings. The above-mentioned considerations are related 
to the idea of considering victims (in general), when claiming reparations, i.e., 
victims as reparations claimants, as parties with relevant procedural rights 
during reparations phase proceedings, as also suggested by Trial Chamber I.   
At hearings limited to reparations, legal representatives of victims are 
given a broader scope of action than in other proceedings as their intervention 
cannot be limited by the Chamber to written submissions and their questioning 
of witnesses, the convicted and experts is in principle not restricted. Victims’ 
legal representatives have the right to be present when the Trial Chamber 
delivers its reparations order and to receive copies thereof. It is expected that the 
number of victims, mainly via their legal representatives or eventually in person, 
intervening during the reparations hearing be larger than those who participated 
during trial proceedings. Finally, victims or their legal representatives can 
request the appointment of experts to the ICC to assess reparations and shall be 
invited by the Chamber to make observation on the experts’ reports, as 
appropriate.   
Accordingly, victims’ status during reparations phase proceedings seems 
to be broader than just a role limited to interventions via ‘representations’ upon 
the ICC’s request. 
In Lubanga, on the road to Trial Chamber I’s reparations decision (not 
originally understood by the Trial Chamber as a reparations order), victims’ legal 
representatives (after conviction and upon Trial Chamber’s invitation) 
submitted their observations concerning the principles on reparations applicable 
by the Trial Chamber; and the procedure to be followed by it including whether 
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reparations should be awarded individually or collectively, the scope of 
reparations beneficiaries, the ways to assess harm, the criteria applicable to the 
reparations awards, whether to grant reparations awards via the TFV and 
whether victims were seeking to call expert evidence. Not only victim 
participants’ lawyers but also importantly the OPCV representing unrepresented 
reparations claimants and even victims who have not yet applied for reparations 
but who may benefit from them, i.e., (unidentified) potential reparations 
claimants and beneficiaries, filed written submissions addressing, inter alia, 
those points. In turn and afterwards, the reparations decision in Lubanga has 
been considered by the Appeals Chamber as a reparations order. This was 
mainly based on the fact that the reparations decision included some procedural 
steps concerning reparations implementation via the TFV, which can only be 
undertaken when a reparations order has been adopted.  
With regard to appeals against reparations orders at the ICC, victims 
(participants or not) who are claiming reparations can via their legal 
representatives appeal a reparations order. The Appeals Chamber in Lubanga 
found, based on article 82 (4) of the ICC Statute, that victims as parties can via 
their (common) legal representatives appeal a reparations order and that the 
categories of victims who hold the right to appeal a reparations order may 
include: i) victims who participated as victim participants in Lubanga’s trial, 
including those who did not claim reparations but made submissions on 
reparations before the Trial Chamber; ii) identified reparations claimants, 
without the need of having participated as victim participants; and iii) 
individuals whose victim participant applications were rejected or whose victim 
participant status was withdrawn by the Trial Chamber. These categories are 
coherent with the lack of need to be victim participants in order to claim 
reparations. As conviction determines the case-based reparations and that has 
been appealed in Lubanga, the suspensive effects of the reparations decision is 
the soundest approach, which is also what happens in the French system. On the 
other hand, based on the wording of the ICC instruments and drafting history of 
the RPE, it may be concluded that the silence about whether victims (including 
victim participants) can appeal the Chamber’s refusal to issue a reparations order 
should in principle be interpreted in negative. Concerning the reparations 
decision in Lubanga, legal representatives of victims filed appeals against some 
grounds of it including the Trial Chamber I’s decision not to consider the 
individual reparations applications received by it as the Chamber instead 
referred them to the TFV. Victims’ legal representatives can submit supporting 
documents and also respond to the accused’s supporting documents on these 
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reparations order appeal proceedings. When a reparations decision is not 
considered a reparations order, to participate in the respective interlocutory 
appeals proceedings, reparations claimants would need to hold the victim 
participant status. However, in practice, even if this is not the case, since several 
categories of victims (e.g., reparations claimants, potential reparations claimants 
and victim participants) can be simultaneously represented and their 
observations can be voiced by common legal representatives, they may benefit 
from their common lawyers’ actions and reparations proceedings outcome.  
In turn, at the ECCC, civil parties groups in Duch exercised their right to 
appeal the Trial Chamber’s judgment concerning its decision on reparations and 
which cannot include new claims not submitted to the Trial Chamber. Thus, 
civil parties (especially civil party group 2) filed extensive written submissions 
requesting the Supreme Court Chamber to overrule the Trial Chamber’s 
rejection of their requests for reparations and civil parties’ lawyers made oral 
submissions. Besides collective and moral reparations, the civil parties claimed 
Cambodia’s duty to be involved in reparations. However, the Supreme Court 
Chamber found that ordering so would go beyond the ECCC’s mandate and, 
thus, it only encouraged (financial) support from external actors for specified 
reparations requests. In any case, lawyers of the civil parties groups had the 
opportunity to make oral statements on, inter alia, collective and moral 
reparations.              
In Lubanga, corresponding to the implementation phase of the 
reparations proceedings, the reparations order implementation plan from the 
TFV, which has already gathered some practical experience, will provide 
important avenues for victims to actively participate as reparations claimants 
and later benefit from reparations. Such avenues include consultation, public 
debates, focus groups with vulnerable victims and collection of proposals for 
collective reparations. Thus, victims’ participation in the design and 
implementation of reparations programs should ensure that reparations are 
meaningful for them. Although victims’ legal representatives have questioned 
that the Trial Chamber did not examine individual reparations applications and 
transmitted them to the TFV, this Chamber’s action may be considered as 
necessary since it has yet to be determined the total universe of potential 
claimants and beneficiaries of reparations in Lubanga. Accordingly, waiting until 
the TFV’s reparations plan is implemented and, thus, to appropriately distribute 
the available resources and to avoid tensions among and with victims was the 
best approach. It may have been better that the same Judges remain seized of the 
case for reparations purposes. In any case, some delegation of the reparations 
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proceedings to the TFV can be justified since a competent Chamber will monitor 
and control the TFV’s activities on this regard and the Chamber will have the last 
word on the implementation of the reparations plan. What is even more 
important is that victims as reparations claimants can fully participate in the 
TFV’s activities either via writing requests or hearings held by a Chamber, 
besides all the process of consultation and accessibility to be guaranteed to them. 
The transcendence of the ICC and, in particular of its TFV, on 
reparations can be justified by the need for granting reparations to victims who 
would be unable to get their harm redressed in domestic systems or would do in 
regional/international systems with more difficulties. The ICC case-based 
reparations regime, implemented with the TFV’s assistance and expertise, 
enhances the status of victims as reparations claimants as adds an important 
quota of restorative justice, via the provision of reparations to the victims, which 
complements the ICC’s mainly retributive/deterrent justice mandate. In 
addition, the TFV via its general assistance mandate has been providing 
measures to redress harm inflicted to a much larger number of victims who will 
not benefit from the ICC case-based reparations as they fall outside of the 
specific charges litigated in the ICC cases but who still were harmed by crimes 
under the ICC’s jurisdiction and from situations under the ICC’s investigations. 
By reaching out victims who would otherwise be left with empty hands, the 
TFV’s general assistance mandate addresses potential tensions created by 
providing reparations to only some victims and leaving out a much larger 
number of them. Moreover, the TFV’s general assistance mandate is conducted 
in a manner that recognizes victims’ standing and involves/benefits them in 
reparation-like measures.  
At the ECCC, the implementation of reparations award sought by civil 
parties’ lead co-lawyers, identified or in cooperation with the VSS, has promoted 
an intense dialogue between the VSS and civil parties’ lead co-lawyers and 
lawyers to determine the modalities and implementation of collective and moral 
reparations in Nuon Chea et al. However the need for a specialized entity, similar 
to the TFV, to do this work has been highlighted by the lead co-lawyers as an 
important challenge.   
 
4. Modalities of Reparations and other Legal Issues    
Under this subchapter, it is first discussed the notions of individual and 
collective reparations as well as the reparations standard/ burden of proof at the 
ICC and the ECCC. Then, the focus is put on the modalities of reparations. 
When examining the situation at the ICC and the ECCC, attention is also given 
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to reparations implementation. According to the UN  Basic Principles and 
Guidelines, the reparations modalities are i) restitution; ii) compensation; iii) 
rehabilitation; iv) satisfaction; and v) guarantees of non-repetition,4522 which 
correspond to human rights bodies’ case law, in particular the jurisprudence of 
the IACtHR. To what extent these modalities, originally crafted as for state 
responsibility, can be applied and implemented at international/hybrid criminal 
courts is also discussed. In addition, the situation at the ICTY, the ICTR, the 
SCSL and the STL is examined. Analysis of the three considered national systems 
is included for complementary/illustrative purposes.     
  
4.1. National Systems 
4.1.1. English Adversarial System  
As previously discussed, although victims are not reparations claimants in 
criminal proceedings, criminal courts have the possibility to establish a financial 
penalty against the accused consisting in a compensation order. As previously 
seen,4523 even though financial penalties and reparations are in principle 
autonomous legal institutions, they are interrelated and for practical effects 
compensation orders may take shapes (almost) identical to compensation as a 
modality of reparations. Under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 
2000 ‘The compensation to be paid under a compensation order made by a 
magistrates’ court in respect of any offence of which the court has convicted the 
offender shall not exceed £5,000’.4524 However, compensation orders have been 
given inconsistently and the amount has frequently been small.4525 In any case, 
the English system of drawing up national guidelines on the levels of 
compensation to be ordered in relation to personal injuries has been qualified as 
deserving consideration by other jurisdictions.4526 Moreover, compensation 
orders are not limited to pecuniary loss, i.e., they can be ordered due to victim’s 
distress or anxiety.4527   
The competent criminal court must be satisfied that the amount of 
compensation is realistic to the injury, loss or damage and evidence on this 
regard has to be produced in court. If there is no compensation order, the 
victims can go to a civil court at which the ‘balance of probabilities’ standard is 
 
4522 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principles 19-23.  
4523 See supra Chapter IV 2.1.1.  
4524 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 131 (1).  
4525 Doak (2008) 233.  
4526 See Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 1073. 
4527 See Bond v Chief Constable of Kent (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 314. Cited by Doak (2008) 233.   
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applicable.4528 The EU Framework Decision on Victims referred to the right to 
compensation and (unless urgently required for criminal proceedings) 
immediate restitution of recoverable property to victims in the course of 
criminal proceedings.4529 The EU Directive on Victims considers the rights to 
reimbursement of expenses, to return of property seized in criminal proceedings 
and to adequate compensation from the offender in criminal proceedings.4530  
As for the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, victims of violent 
crimes can receive compensation for their injuries, ranging from £1000 to 
£500,000 depending on the injuries.4531 As for victims of the London Bombings 
in July 2005, compensation provided has included amounts up to £500,000 for 
death. Compensation categories have included lost earnings, pain and suffering, 
temporary mental anxiety, serious/permanently disabling trauma, medical/care 
expenses and other expenses as well as funeral expenses reimbursement.4532 
Under article 4 of the European Convention on Compensation for Violent 
Crime Victims, compensation awarded via State schemes ‘shall cover, according 
to the case under consideration, at least the following items: loss of earnings, 
medical and hospitalisation expenses and funeral expenses, and, as regards 
dependants, loss of maintenance’. It should be noticed that, by definition, the EU 
Council Directive on Compensation to Crime Victims refers to compensation 
only.        
Concerning civil litigation, the law of torts considers as categories of 
damages for compensation, inter alia, loss of earnings, medical and other 
expenses and non-pecuniary loss.4533 Under the Human Rights Act, a court may 
order to pay damages or compensation in favour of victims of unlawful acts 
committed by public authorities.4534  
In ECtHR cases against the United Kingdom, physical, mental and 
emotional harm (non-pecuniary damage), material damages as well as costs and 
expenses have been considered part of the compensation.4535 In Z v. United 
Kingdom, concerning a violation of the prohibition of torture, the ECtHR 
 
4528 Lewis and Ellis (2006) 9. 
4529 EU Framework Decision on Victims, article 9 (1) and (3).   
4530 See respectively EU Directive on Victims, articles 14, 15 and 16.    
4531 Lewis and Ellis (2006) 8.  
4532 Ibid., 15-16.  
4533 See, for further discussion, Andrew Burrows, ‘Damages’ in Antony Dugdale and Michael Jones 
(eds.), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (19th edn., Thomson 2006) 1799.  
4534 Human Rights Act, Section 8 (1). 
4535 See, e.g., ECtHR, Keenan v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27229/95, Judgment, 3 April 2001; 
ECtHR, McCann v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 18984/91, 27 September 1995; ECtHR, Price v. 
United Kingdom, Appl. No. 33394/96, Judgment, 10 July 2001.       
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awarded victims compensation that was in excess of what they would have 
received in domestic proceedings and, on this regard, the ECtHR noticed that 
‘the rates applied in domestic proceedings, though relevant, are not decisive’.4536 
The state obligation to investigate and punish the perpetrators has also been 
stressed by the ECtHR.4537    
      
4.1.2. American Adversarial System  
As previously said, victims are not properly speaking reparations claimants in 
criminal courts; however, the respective courts can order the accused to provide 
restitution and compensation. The MVRA provides more details on these 
penalties, which are in nature different from reparations. Nevertheless, those 
penalties are examined herein as they, in their outcomes and for practical effects, 
resemble reparations modalities. As for restitution, the Federal MVRA, 
applicable to certain crimes, lays down that the court shall issue a restitution 
order as an additional penalty, in a crime resulting in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim, and shall thus require the defendant to 
‘return the property to the owner of the property or someone designated by the 
owner’.4538 In case restitution is ‘impossible, impracticable, or inadequate’, the 
MVRA foresees the payment of: 
 
[...] an amount equal to—  
(i) the greater of—  
(I) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or  
(II) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less  
(ii) the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property 
that is returned.4539  
 
Moreover, when it comes to a crime resulting in bodily injury to a 
victim, it is foreseen the payment of an amount to cover:   
 
(A) [...] the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including 
nonmedical care and treatment [...];  
(B) [...] the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; and  
 
4536 ECtHR, Z et al. v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 28945/95, Judgment, 10 May 2001, para. 131.  
4537 See, e.g., ECtHR, Finuance v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 29178/95, Judgment, 1 July 2003; 
ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001.   
4538 18 USC § 3 663A (b) (1) (A).  
4539 18 USC § 3 663A (b) (1) (B). 
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(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of such 
offense.4540  
 
Furthermore, in case of the death of a victim, the convicted shall be 
ordered to pay an amount equivalent to the funeral costs and related services.4541 
In interpreting those provisions, it has been considered that the MVRA requests 
awards of all lost incomes resulting from the crime at the time of sentencing, i.e., 
not only those which took place in the past but also those which will occur in the 
future.4542 Federal courts possess the discretion to assign restitution 
proportionally or jointly and severely.4543    
Concerning civil actions and compensation funds, reparations have in 
practice taken mainly the form or modality of compensation. Thus, under the 
several cases litigated via class actions filed by victims under the ATCA and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act, the respective claimant class has been awarded 
very high compensatory amounts (compensatory and punitive damages), which 
in most of the cases consisted in millions of dollars.4544 However, as previously 
mentioned,4545 these quite substantial compensations may be considered as 
merely ‘symbolic’ victories as the claimants have not succeeded to implement 
their compensatory awards. Concerning the September 11 Victim Compensation 
Fund, its purpose was simply to give monetary compensation to victims and 
their survivors for their losses and, therefore, to reduce resultant economic 
hardship and provide an alternative to civil litigation.4546 Concerning the Office 
of Redress Administration (1988) for Japanese-Americans interned during the 
Second World War, in addition to an apology via a letter by President George 
Bush and payments, projects such as curriculum, landmarks and institutions, 
community development, arts and media, research, national fellowships and 
research resources were funded.4547 State compensation systems are intended to 
supplement or step in when restitution cannot be provided by the offenders.4548  
Lastly, but equally important, in the Vietnam-related case Agent Orange 
and in Holocaust Victims’ Assets, the doctrine of cy pres was applied. This 
 
4540 18 USC § 3 663A (b) (2). 
4541 18 USC § 3 663A (b) (3). 
4542 United States v. Bedonie 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004).    
4543 See United States v. Moten, 551 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2008). See also Beloof, Cassell and Twist 
(2010) 618.  
4544 For further details, see Bottigliero (2004) 63-64; REDRESS, (2006) 61-63.  
4545 See supra Chapter IV 3.1.2.  
4546 See Issacharaoff and Morawiec Mansfield (2006) 294-295.   
4547 Yamamoto and Ebesugawa (2006) 274-275.  
4548 Human Rights Watch (2008) 31.  


doctrine allows court’s discretion to establish ‘the most equitable use of limited 
resources in situations where it is inappropriate or impractical to make awards to 
all eligible claimants’ and this use may involve making collective awards in favor 
of a limited category of those who are eligible or those victims who present the 
most pressing need.4549 Thus, when a settlement fund cannot ‘satisfy every class 
member’, it is ‘equitable to limit payments to those with the most severe injuries’ 
to provide ‘as much help as possible to individuals who, in general, are most in 
need of assistance’.4550 Accordingly, in Holocaust Victims’ Assets, in relation to 
the looted assets class of claimants, the court allocated all looted assets funds, 
around US$205 million of the overall US$1.25 billion settlement, for 
humanitarian assistance programs to benefit the most needed victims.4551  
 
4.1.3. French Inquisitorial System  
Losses and injuries may be of a material, moral or both nature.4552 Although the 
CPP does not specify the modalities of reparations to be granted to the civil 
parties, compensation in practice has been the modality of reparations resulting 
from civil actions filed before criminal courts. The wording used in the CPP does 
not suggest that modalities of reparations should only be limited to 
compensation. Thus, CPP provisions, inter alia, refer to: i) the civil action aims 
‘at the reparation of the damage suffered because of a felony, misdemeanor or a 
petty offence; ii) person’s claims to ‘have suffered harm from a felony or 
misdemeanor’; and iii) the mandate of the Cour d’Assises to rule on ‘any claims 
for damages’ brought by the civil party against the accused.4553 Having said so, 
like in most of the other national systems, compensation and reparation have 
been mistakenly considered as synonyms, something particularly contested in 
international human rights law as compensation is only one category of 
reparations,4554 which has later been reflected at international and hybrid 
criminal courts, as discussed in this subchapter. Indeed concerning the so-called 
penalty of ‘sanction-reparation’, under the Criminal Code, it has been translated 
 
4549 McCarthy (2012a) 254.  
4550 Re Agent Orange Product Liablity, 818 F.2d 145, 158 (2nd Cir. 1987). See also Re Holocaust 
Victims’ Assets, 424 F.3d 132, 141 n.10 (2nd Cir. 1987); In Re Holocaust Victims’ Assets, 302 F. 
Supp. 2d 89, 96-97 (EDYN 2004). Cited by Ibid., Loc. cit.   
4551 Thus, those claimants satisfying the respective criteria were presumed to have had property 
looted and, hence, did not have to bring evidence on this regard. See Ibid., 254-255.   
4552 Brienen and Hoegen (2000) 319.  
4553 CPP, articles 2, 85 and 371 respectively.  
4554 See, e.g., Héctor Faúndez Ledesma, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human 
Rights (3rd edn., Inter-American Institute of Human Rights 2008) 756-764.  
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in specific monetary sums,4555, i.e., resulting in an outcome quite 
similar/identical to compensation awards. Nevertheless, the penalties ordered by 
the criminal courts can manifest in financial sanctions against the convicted via 
confiscation,4556 which may end up in restitution of property and, thus, for 
practical effects, being equivalent to the respective modality of reparations. 
However, as previously discussed, reparations and penalties are by nature 
different legal categories although they are interrelated and may take 
similar/identical shapes.                  
Concerning state compensation schemes, i.e., reparations that can be 
obtained via the CIVI, the CPP only refers to compensation. Thus, concerning 
serious bodily attack, it is established that:  
 
Any person who has suffered harm caused by an intentional or non intentional 
action which has the material characteristics of an offence may obtain full 
compensation for the damage deriving from offences against the person when 
the following cumulative conditions exist: […] these actions: - either have 
brought about death, permanent incapacity or total incapacity for work for 
more than one month; - or are set out and punished by articles […] of the 
Criminal Code 
[…]  
Compensation may be refused or its amount reduced if the victim is at fault.4557 
 
With regard to material damage or non-serious bodily harm, it is laid 
down that: 
 
These provisions are also applicable to any persons specified in article 706-3 
who, as victims of offences against the person, as set out in that article, are not 
allowed to claim the full compensation for their damage on this basis, because 
the facts that brought it about have caused a total incapacity to work of less than 
one month's duration.4558 
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4555 Pignoux (2008) 158.   
4556 See, e.g., CPP, article 131-21.    
4557 Ibid., article 706-3 (‘Toute personne ayant subi un préjudice résultant de faits volontaires ou 
non qui présentent le caractère matériel d'une infraction peut obtenir la réparation intégrale des 
dommages qui résultent des atteintes à la personne, lorsque sont réunies les conditions suivantes: 
[…] Ces faits: - soit ont entraîné la mort, une incapacité permanente ou une incapacité totale de 
travail personnel égale ou supérieure à un mois ; 
- soit sont prévus et réprimés par les articles […] du code pénal [...] La réparation peut être refusée 
ou son montant réduit à raison de la faute de la victime’.).  
4558 Ibid., article 706-14 (‘Ces dispositions sont aussi applicables aux personnes mentionnées à 
l'article 706-3 qui, victimes d'une atteinte à la personne prévue par cet article, ne peuvent à ce titre 
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Whereas compensation for grave bodily harm is integral, non-serious 
bodily harm is restricted to an upper monetary limit.4559 For illustrative purposes, 
it is examined briefly what categories of damage have been considered when 
granting compensation by the CIVI. Broadly speaking, two categories of 
damages have been considered. First, damages about which attribution will be 
claimed, including expenses, loss of earnings and psychological problems during 
the temporary incapacity to work, professional damage, and economic damages 
of those entitled.4560 Second, personal damages, whose attribution is not possible 
unless there is evidence brought by the social body.4561 Damages under the 
second category include permanent functional deficit, pretium doloris (i.e., pain 
and suffering and other immaterial damages), aesthetic damage, sexual harm, 
and moral harm of the victims’ relatives.4562 As for victims of terrorism (and 
other crimes), the FGTI considers compensation for physical damage of the 
injured persons as well as moral and economic damages of those who claim these 
damages as for the killed victims.4563 Victims of terrorism also have, inter alia, 
the right to free medical services.4564  
Concerning ECtHR judgments against France, besides granting payment 
of compensation to the victims, it has been stressed the state obligation to 
investigate and punish the perpetrators.4565         
 
4.2. The ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL 
4.2.1. Possibilities of Reparations Modalities Foreseen in the Courts’ 
Instruments   
The instruments of the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL foresee, at least 
indirectly, two modalities or forms of reparations for victims: i) compensation; 
and ii) rehabilitation or support.4566 Restitution of property and proceeds, which 
can be ordered as penalty, may be considered as being in outcome similar to the 
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prétendre à la réparation intégrale de leur préjudice, les faits générateurs de celui-ci ayant entraîné 
une incapacité totale de travail inférieure à un mois’.). 
4559 Association des Paralysées de France- Conseil Technique National (2008) 25 
4560 Ibid., 14.    
4561 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4562 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4563 Ibid., 28.   
4564 Ibid., 29. 
4565 ECtHR, Selmouni v. France, Appl. No. 25803/94, Judgment, 28 July 1999.     
4566 See Brouwer (2005) 395-405; Anne Marie de Brouwer, ’Reparation to Victims of Sexual 
Violence: Possibilities at the International Criminal Court and at the Trust Fund for Victims and 
their Families’ (2007) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 207, 214-218.   
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respective modality of reparations and, thus, considered here. The STL legal 
framework does not consider restitution at all.  
With regard to restitution of property and proceeds, articles 24 and 23 of 
the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes respectively establish that ‘In addition to 
imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any property and 
proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their 
rightful owners’. The wording of article 19 of the SCSL Statute is quite similar, 
existing only two differences. It is established ‘property proceeds and assets 
acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct’ instead of ‘property and proceeds 
acquired by criminal conduct’, which arguably expands the sources from where 
to obtain restitution. However, this apparent broader scope is potentially 
reduced as the SCSL Trial Chamber, under the same article, may order 
restitution to ‘their rightful owner or to the State of Sierra Leone’. As previously 
examined,4567 these proceedings relating to these articles are detailed in the 
respective RPE and, as also seen, victims lack standing to claim restitution. At 
the ICTR, amicus curiae, addressing restitution of property and/or 
compensation,4568 were rejected as previously seen.4569 At the ICTY, the matter of 
restitution was introduced or evidence on property illegally taken from victims 
of a crime within the ICTY’s jurisdiction for which the accused was convicted 
was presented;4570 however, the Tribunal did not issue any restitution order. 
Thus, as far as it is known, no restitution has been ordered by any of the courts 
in question. Restitution orders could have been used in favor of, inter alia, 
victims of sexual violence, who are particularly vulnerable to face problems in 
regaining access to their land, homes and other property taken during armed 
conflicts.4571     
With regard to compensation, although the RPE of the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL and the STL Statute foresee compensation for victims, these same 
instruments have delegated the provision of compensation to domestic courts. 
The decision not to give the ICTY the mandate to provide reparations award was 
criticized by some ICTY Judges in the beginning of the tribunal’s operations, 
especially, because it was considered to be highly inappropriate to prioritize the 
restitution of property over compensation, alongside with the fact that 
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4567 See supra Chapter IV 3.2.1.  
4568 See, e.g., Musema (ICTR-96-13-T), 17 March 1999 (restitution), paras. 10-14. For further 
references see Brouwer (2005) 397.       
4569 See supra Chapter IV 4.2.2 and Chapter V 3.2.1.  
4570 See, e.g., Aleksovski (IT-95-14), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 25 June 1999, para. 186. For further 
references see Malmström (2001) 377; Brouwer (2005) 396-397.     
4571 Brouwer (2005) 397.        
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compensation at national courts would be unlikely,4572 or that compensation 
would depend on the national jurisdiction. However, as discussed,4573 initiatives 
to set up a compensation mechanism at the ICTY and the ICTR failed and, what 
is more, there has been no delegation to and, therefore, no provision of 
compensation by domestic courts based on judgments of those tribunals. Besides 
that, many convicted lack financial means to compensate victims or may have 
disposed of their money and assets. Such disposal could have been avoided but 
the proposal by the former Prosecutor of the ICTY/ICTR Carla Del Ponte to free 
assets that may have been used for, inter alia, providing compensation for the 
victims was not adopted,4574 arguably due to the ICTY/ICTR’s limited mandate 
and (potential) national implementation problems. Survivor victims could have 
used funds thus obtained to, for example, afford their medical treatment when 
infected with HIV/AIDS as consequence of sexual crimes, which has been 
particularly serious in Rwanda.4575 
With regard to rehabilitation, as previously mentioned,4576 the ICTR’s 
program called ‘Support Programme for Witnesses and Potential Witnesses’ 
(2000), which was shortly after partially cancelled (2002), brought support to 
witnesses in form of rehabilitation including legal guidance, psychological 
counseling, physical rehabilitation and reintegration assistance.4577 The Support 
Program was based on the ICTR RPE rule 34.4578 Moreover, the Manual of 
Operational Guidance of the Victims and Witnesses Support Unit (VWSU) 
clarified rule 34 by laying down that counseling and supporting of victims and 
witnesses, especially ‘in cases of rape and sexual assault is a major task, and the 
VWSU must rely on specialized services throughout the judicial proceedings as 
well as in the post-trial phase’.4579 Also, it was stated that the VWSU must 
organize the necessary support services including legal counseling to explain to 
 
4572 Ibid., 399. See also Malmström (2001) 382.   
4573 See supra Chapter IV 2.2.2.  
4574 As for Del Ponte’s proposal, see Security Council Minutes (4150th Meeting) in UN Doc. 
S/PV.4150, 2 June 2000, p. 5. See also Malmström (2001) 378; Brouwer (2005) 400.  
4575 Brouwer (2005) 400.  
4576 See supra Chapter V 2.2.1.  
4577 See ICTR Press Release, ICTR Launches Victims Support Initiative in Rwanda, ICTR/INFO-9-
2-242.EN, 26 September 2000.     
4578 ICTR RPE, rule 34 (‘There shall be set up under the authority of the Registrar a Victims and 
Witnesses Support Unit consisting of qualified staff to: [...] Ensure that they [the victims and 
witnesses] receive relevant support, including physical and psychological rehabilitation, especially 
counselling in cases of rape and sexual assault [...] (B) A gender sensitive approach to victims and 
witnesses protective and support measures should be adopted [...]’.). 
4579 ICTR VWSU, Manual of Operational Guidance 41. Cited by Brouwer (2005) 402. 
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witnesses how to give their testimony at the ICTR and trauma counseling and 
assistance were said to be provided to the relatives and dependants during pre-
trial, trial and post-trial.4580 Furthermore:  
 
[…] medical and psychological services are provided to victims and witnesses 
who suffered extensive trauma as a result of the genocide, and became 
psychologically affected, or who contracted diseases which they were not able to 
overcome before testifying.4581  
 
This also corresponded to the VWSU’s mandate which includes 
provision of, inter alia, medical and psychological assistance, in particular 
counselling in cases of rape and sexual assaults.4582 The problem with the 
Program was that it only provided rehabilitation to victims who were permitted 
to testify as witnesses at the ICTR. Additionally, the Program was not capable of 
responding the pressing demands related to HIV/AIDS treatment due to the 
limited funds.4583 Thus, between 1995 and 2003, victim-witnesses only received at 
their stay at the ICTR some medical and/or dental care, and occasionally a new 
pair of glasses.4584   
Nevertheless, the situation of some victims, especially those survivors of 
sexual violence in Rwanda, later improved as in 2004 a medical unit, under the 
supervision of the ICTR’s Gender Adviser Effange Mbella, was established in 
Rwanda to monitor patients.4585 The ICTR Registrar moved from sub-
contracting a clinic offering medical care to witnesses to the setting up of an 
ICTR Clinic responsible for giving direct medical care to witnesses and 
victims.4586 Accordingly, the ICTR assumed a duty based on ICTR RPE rule 34, 
to provide rape victims who testify at the ICTR, potential witnesses included, 
with general medical services, counseling, social support (including food 
assistance, transport assistance in medical consultations, payment of connected 
medical bills, and follow-up care) and anti-retroviral treatment, throughout the 
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4580 ICTR VWSU, Manual of Operational Guidance 41. Referred to in Brouwer (2005) 402.  
4581 ICTR VWSU, Manual of Operational Guidance 41. Cited by Brouwer (2005) 402.  
4582 See ICTR, Witness Support and Protection at the ICTR. Available at: 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/ICTRStructure/WitnessesVictimsSupportSectionWVSS/tabid/
106/Default.aspx (last visit on 30 November 2012).  
4583 See Brouwer (2005) 402. 
4584 See Ibid., Loc. cit. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1357. 
4585 Brouwer (2007) 216.  
4586 See ICTR, Witness Support and Protection at the ICTR. Available at: 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/ICTRStructure/WitnessesVictimsSupportSectionWVSS/tabid/
106/Default.aspx (last visit on 30 November 2012).
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trial process and also in the pre-trial and post-trial stages.4587 Thus, the clinic has 
taken care of confirmed witnesses and potential witnesses with HIV/AIDS and 
an important number of them have received anti-retroviral drugs as medically 
recommended.4588 Nonetheless, the clinic is dependent on the resources of the 
ICTR’s Voluntary Trust Fund, which serve multiple activities of the ICTR and 
not only to support program for witnesses.4589 Moreover, the financial resource 
problems faced by the Fund and the increase in confirmed cases of HIV infected 
witnesses as HIV testing has been going on,4590 have constituted continuous 
challenges for the Support Program for Witnesses and Potential Witnesses.  
The situation concerning the ICTY Voluntary Trust Fund is not too 
different from the ICTR as only a part of the voluntary contributions are 
employed for victim support.4591 Moreover, unlike the ICTR, the ICTY has not 
adopted any direct responsibility for giving any witness support before or after 
their testimony as the support has been limited only to some basic support 
during the witnesses’ testimonies at the tribunal.4592 The scheme in place at the 
STL seems to be similar to that existent at the ICTY, as the STL Victims and 
Witnesses Unit (VWU) has, inter alia, the function to ‘assist victims and 
witnesses in obtaining medical, psychological and other appropriate support 
necessary for them to testify before the Tribunal’.4593 In turn, the SCSL, at least 
when it comes to the text of its RPE is closer to the ICTR.4594  
Accordingly, compared to the ICTR support for sexual violence victims, 
including anti-retroviral drugs, the support offered to the victims appearing at 
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4587 See ICTR Draft Report on Improved Access to Anti-Retroviral Treatment and Psychological 
Counseling for ICTR Witnesses with HIV/AIDS, prepared by Elsie Effange-Mbella (2006) 2-3. 
Referred to by Brouwer (2007) 216.      
4588 Brouwer (2007) 216; Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1357.  
4589 Brouwer (2007) 216-217. See also Brouwer and Heikkilä (2013) 1357.     
4590 Brouwer (2007) 217.  
4591 See, e.g., ICTY, Fourteenth Annual Report of the ICTR, UN Doc. A/62/172-S/2007/469, 1 
August 2007, para. 116 (‘Voluntary contributions have been utilized for efforts in support of the 
Tribunal’s prosecution and Registry activities, such as the arrest initiative, victims and witnesses 
support, the Outreach Programme, the continued development of the Tribunal’s library, and 
advocacy training activities’.).    
4592 Brouwer (2007) 217. 
4593 STL RPE, rule 50 (B) (iii).  
4594 SCSL RPE, rule 34 (‘[…] [The VWS shall] (A) […] (iii) Ensure that they receive relevant 
support, counselling and other appropriate assistance, including medical assistance, physical and 
psychological rehabilitation, especially in cases of rape, sexual assault and crimes against children. 
(B) The Section personnel shall include experts in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of 
sexual violence and violence against children. Where appropriate the Section shall cooperate with 
non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations’.). 
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the ICTY has been minimal. Nonetheless, the support provided by the ICTR is 
(almost) exclusively confined to sexual violence victims and, in addition, the 
universe of reparations beneficiaries is further reduced as only those who are 
testifying or can potentially testify at the ICTR receive some support.  
As a symbolic reparations measure, under the early and cancelled ICTR 
Assistance Program, the NGO Asoferwa, with money provided by the tribunal, 
built a peace village in Taba, which may be considered as satisfaction under the 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines.4595 The building of this village was clearly 
perceived as connected with the ICTR’s activities and, more specifically, with the 
idea that the ICTR wanted to offer some tangible assistance to women who had 
testified.4596  
Therefore, in general, reparations modalities at those tribunals are from 
extremely limited to non-existent, with the exception of some forms of 
rehabilitative measures at the ICTR, as previously discussed. However, even in 
this case, some rehabilitation is provided based on the victims’ status as 
witnesses rather than as reparations claimants.  
Lastly, but equally important, it should be mentioned that the standard 
of proof concerning the order of restitution of property or proceeds is ‘balance of 
probabilities’ as determined in the respective RPE of the ICTY and the ICTR 
‘Should the Trial Chamber be able to determine the rightful owner on the 
balance of probabilities, it shall order the restitution either of the property or the 
proceeds or make such other order as it may deem appropriate’.4597   
 
4.2.2. Reparations Modalities Outside the Courts 
Modalities of reparations have been provided for victims of crimes that 
materially fall under the jurisdiction of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL. 
Concerning the Human Rights Chamber, Annex 6 to the Dayton Accords 
provides that if the Chamber finds a human rights violation, it must address in 
its decision ‘what steps shall be taken by the respondent Party to remedy the 
breach, including orders to cease and desist, monetary relief (including 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary injuries), and provisional measures’.4598 The 
Chamber ordered remedies including: i) compensation and the return of 
property; ii) orders for the investigation of allegations of ill-treatment and other 
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4595 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 22 (g) (‘Commemorations and tributes to the 
victims’.).  
4596 See Rombouts (2004) 466.  
4597 ICTY RPE, rule 105 (D); ICTR RPE, rule 105 (D).  
4598 Dayton Accords, Annex 6, article XI, para. 1 (b).  
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human rights violations with a view to bringing offenders to justice; iii) the 
prompt conclusion of proceedings which have lasted an unreasonable time; and 
iv) release from detention and reinstatement in employment.4599 In particular, 
concerning enforced disappearances, the Chamber ordered the Republika Srpska 
to conduct full investigation and, where applicable, to find the mortal remains of 
the victims.4600 Concerning the Srebrenica massacre, the Chamber ordered the 
Republika Srpska, inter alia, the release of all information under its control; the 
location of missing persons or their mortal remains; full investigation; lump 
sum, followed by four additional annual payments, as contribution to the 
Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the collective 
benefit of all the applicants and the families of the victims of the Srebrenica 
massacre.4601 The Chamber also ordered the Republika Sprska the reconstruction 
of Banja Luka Mosques.4602 As for Muslim burial sites, it was ordered the removal 
of the remains of the applicants’ beloved ones and payment of a sum for moral 
damages and legal fees.4603 The Chamber refrained itself from ordering an 
apology on the basis that apologies are only meaningful if made voluntarily.4604     
As for repossession of pre-war housing, the Chamber admitted cases not 
falling under the Commission for Real Property Claims of Refugees and 
Displaced Persons.4605 Precisely, this Commission, under the respective 
agreement annexed to the Dayton Accords confirmed pre-war rights of 
claimants entitling them to resume possession of the property or to transfer the 
interest to a third party.4606 Besides determining the lawful owner of the property 
and granting return thereof, if the claimant requested compensation in lieu of 
return, the Commission was expected to grant it;4607 however, the Commission in 
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4599 See Ferstman and Rosenberg (2009) 489-490.   
4600 See Ibid., 491-493 (referring to, among others, Palić v. the Republika Srpska (CH/97/46), 
Decision on Admissibility and Merits, 11 January 2001).     
4601 See Ibid., 493-495 (referring to Ferida Selimović et al. v. the Republika Srpska (CH/01/8365 et 
al.), Decision on Admissibility and Merits, 7 March 2003).       
4602 See Ibid., 495-497 (referring to Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (CH/96/29), 
Decision on Admissibility and Merits, 11 June 1999). 
4603 See Ibid., 497 (referring to Mahmutović v. RS (CH/98/892), Decision on Admissibility and 
Merits, 8 October 1999).   
4604 See Manfred Nowak, ‘Reparation by the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
in Feyter et al. (2005) 245, 285 (referring to Hermas v. Federation (CH/97/45), Decision on 
Admissibility and Merits, 18 February 1998).  
4605 See Ferstman and Rosenberg (2009) 498.  
4606 See Ibid., 505. 
4607 See 1995 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords 
(Annex 7), articles XI, XII (2), (3) and (6).  
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practice never proceeded with this.4608 In turn, the UNMIK Housing and 
Property Claims Commission had only the power to order repossession of 
property but not compensation for damage or destruction of property.4609   
With regard to the hybrid criminal courts established in the former 
Yugoslavia region, which are not examined in this thesis, both the instruments of 
the UNMIK/EULEX War Crimes Panels in Kosovo and the War Crimes 
Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina refer to property claims 
as the reparations modality to be claimed during criminal proceedings.4610  
As for Rwanda, the government did not set up the compensation fund 
promised in 1996.4611 Although national criminal courts have awarded millions 
of dollars in compensation to victims, those judgments have not been enforced 
due to the indigence of the defendants.4612 Moreover, the government granted 
itself immunity from civil liability, sustaining that its responsibilities are met via 
payments to a survivor’s rehabilitation fund and acknowledgment of the 
previous government’s role in the genocide.4613 Although the government has 
drafted several compensation bills since 1997, none of them had been enacted.4614 
Concerning rehabilitation, the government has paid 5 percent of tax revenues 
into a rehabilitation fund, the FARG, each year.4615 The FARG has provided 
scholarships (mainly for high school education) and free medical care to the 
neediest survivors.4616 As for symbolic reparations modalities, the Government of 
Rwanda has built or maintained 78 genocide memorials and around 400 mass 
tombs.4617 Assisted by international donors and NGOs, Rwanda has established 
four high-profile genocide memorials, which have become pilgrimage 
destinations.4618 Concerning the Gacaca courts, the issue of compensation was 
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4608 See Ferstman and Rosenberg (2009) 506. 
4609 UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60, section 2.6.  
4610 See respectively Provisional Criminal Procedure Code for Kosovo, articles 80, 107-118; 
Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, articles 193-204.  
4611 See Lars Waldorf, ‘Goats and Graves: Reparations in Rwanda’s Community Courts’ in 
Ferstman, Goetz and Stephens (2009) 515, 519.  
4612 See Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4613 See Organic Law No. 40/2000. See also Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4614 See Waldorf (2009) 520. 
4615 Law No. 02/98 Establishing a National Assistance Fund for Needy Victims of Genocide and 
Massacres Committed in Rwanda between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994, 22 January 
1998, article 12 (1).  
4616 See Waldorf (2009) 522.  
4617 Ibid., 523. 
4618 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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deferred and, finally, it was promised restitution instead of compensation.4619 
Since 2009 only FARG can bring civil action against those convicted as the most 
responsible for genocide.4620 Finally, in civil universal jurisdiction cases in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, victims have been granted compensation but these 
orders have yet to be implemented.4621 
As for Sierra Leone, as previously referred to,4622 a reparations program 
was set in 2009. Reparations have mainly included three measures. First, interim 
payments (relief money), via grants to amputees, war wounded victims with 50% 
or more incapacity, and sexual violence victims.4623 Second, an emergency 
medical care program for a reduced number of victims who needed medical 
operations was established, and medical examinations and surgery for sexual 
violence victims have been provided.4624 Third, reimbursement of education 
expenses, i.e., school fees, books and uniforms for those children identified as 
victims, including children who are amputees and sexual violence victims.4625 
Funds for the above-referred grants were provided by the United Nations Peace 
Building Fund.4626 Although there is a trust fund for victims, financial limitations 
to provide reparations to all the registered victims have been reported.4627      
 
4.3. The ICC  
4.3.1. Individual/Collective Reparations and Reparations Standard/Burden of 
Proof 
4.3.1.1. Individual/Collective Reparations and their Implementation 
Rule 97 (‘Assessment of reparations’) (1) and (3) of the RPE establishes that: 
 
1. Taking into account the scope and extent of any damage, loss or injury, the 
Court may award reparations on an individualized basis or, where it deems it 
appropriate, on a collective basis or both.  
[…] 
3. In all cases, the Court shall respect the rights of victims and the convicted 
person.   
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4619 SeeIbid., 525-526.  
4620 See REDRESS and African Rights (2011) 5. 
4621 See Ibid., 8.  
4622 See supra Chapter IV 3.2.2.  
4623 See Mohamad Suma and Christian Correa, Report and Proposals for the Implementation of 
Reparations in Sierra Leone (ICTJ December 2009) 7-10; Sesay (2011).  
4624 Suma and Correa (2009) 10-11; Sesay (2011). 
4625 Suma and Correa (2009) 11-13; Sesay (2011).  
4626 See ICTJ/Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law (2009) 1. 
4627 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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In referring to individual and collective reparations at the ICC, Trial 
Chamber I in Lubanga has established that:  
 
Pursuant to Rule 97 (1) of the Rules, the Court may award reparations on an 
individual or collective basis. Furthermore, in accordance with Rule 98 (3) of 
the Rules, the Court may order that a collective award for reparations is made 
through the Trust Fund for Victims.4628  
 
In turn, rule 97 (3) was included to guarantee that the ICC would not 
award reparations against the wishes of the victims.4629 
The legal representatives of the V01 group of victims in Lubanga have 
considered individual reparations as appropriate, and the legal representatives of 
the V02 group of victims have pointed out that the power to provide individual 
reparations (unlike collective ones) is explicit under the ICC provisions.4630 In 
any case, both groups have also argued in favor of collective reparations although 
pointing out some problems of implementation.4631 In turn, the OPCV has 
suggested a combination of individual and collective reparations and the TFV 
has argued against a broadly individualistic approach to reparations.4632 Trial 
Chamber I in its reparations decision generally considered that under 
international human rights law victims and group of victims may apply for and 
be granted reparations.4633 In accordance with rules 97 (1) and 85 of the RPE and 
article 21 (3) of the ICC Statute, the Chamber concluded that reparations may be 
awarded to: i) individual victims; or ii) groups of victims, provided that in either 
case victims have suffered personal harm.4634 In any case, it was sustained that 
the ICC should guarantee that reparations are provided on a non-discriminatory 
and gender-inclusive basis.4635 Bearing in mind the uncertainty of the number of 
victims of the crimes and the limited number of individuals who claimed 
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4628 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2858), 5 April 2012, para. 10. 
4629 Lewis and Friman (2001) 484. 
4630 See respectively Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), 18 April 2012, para. 15; Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-2869), 18 April 2012, paras. 12-13.      
4631 See respectively Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), 18 April 2012, para. 16-17; Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-2869), 18 April 2012, paras. 16, 18, 19 and 34 (a).      
4632 See respectively Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), 18 April 2012, paras. 14 and 17; Lubanga 
(ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, paras. 151 and 152.       
4633 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 217 (referring to the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines, principles 8 and 13; ECHR, articles 25 (1) and 50; ACHR, articles 44 
and 63).   
4634 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4635 Ibid., para. 218. 
	


reparations in Lubanga, the Chamber arrived to the sound conclusion whereby 
the ICC ‘should ensure there is a collective approach that ensures reparations 
reach those victims who are currently unidentified’.4636  
Having said so, the Trial Chamber correctly acknowledged that 
‘Individual and collective reparations are not mutually exclusive, and they may 
be awarded concurrently’,4637 which is consistent with the IACtHR’s 
jurisprudence.4638 In any case, the Trial Chamber also added that the ICC should 
ensure that individual reparations should be provided in a manner that ‘avoids 
creating tensions and divisions within the relevant communities’.4639 In turn, 
when collective reparations awards are granted, ‘these should address the harm 
the victims suffered on an individual and collective basis’.4640 Furthermore, the 
Chamber considered that the ICC ought to provide medical services (psychiatric 
and psychological care included), in addition to assistance on rehabilitation, 
housing, education and training.4641  
Some considerations about individual and collective reparations follow. 
Concerning individual reparations, although article 75 (2) of the ICC Statute 
permits all ‘appropriate’ types and modalities of reparations, the ICC RPE seem 
to suggest that reparations should be granted, as a rule on an individualized 
basis.4642 Rule 97 (1) establishes that ‘the Court may award reparations on an 
individualized basis or, where it deems it appropriate, on a collective basis or 
both’ and rule 98 stipulates that:    
 
1. Individual awards for reparations shall be made directly against a convicted 
person. 
2. The Court may order that an award for reparations against a convicted 
person be deposited with the Trust Fund where at the time of making the order it 
is impossible or impracticable to make individual awards directly to each victim. 
The award for reparations thus deposited in the Trust Fund shall be separated 
from other resources of the Trust Fund and shall be forwarded to each victim as 
soon as possible.             
3. The Court may order that an award for reparations against a convicted person 
be made through the Trust Fund where the number of the victims and the 
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4637 Ibid., para. 220. 
4638 IACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 15 June 2005, Series C No. 124, paras. 194 and 201. 
4639 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 220. 
4640 Ibid., para. 221. 
4641 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4642 Dwertmann (2010) 120. 
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scope, forms and modalities of reparations makes a collective award more 
appropriate [emphasis added]. 
   
Although individual awards in principle seem to be of a monetary 
nature, individual victims can also claim restitution, rehabilitation and ‘other 
forms of remedy’. Indeed, victims in Lubanga have considered as part of 
individual awards not only compensation but also restitution.4643 Nevertheless, 
considering the collective character of the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, 
ordering symbolic acts, e.g., an apology, in favor of only an individual does not 
seem very consistent.4644 Be that as it may, due to the fact that individual 
reparations awards often seek to address a specific harm, the harm must in 
principle be evaluated and the causal link to the crimes of the convicted shall be 
determined in each individual case.4645 The ICC may delegate this task to experts, 
the TFV or an approved organization.4646 If the ICC orders reparations directly 
to victims, these might be more individualized than when individual awards are 
made through the TFV.4647  
According to rule 98 (2) of the RPE, the TFV can be involved in the 
distribution of individual awards when it is impossible or impracticable for the 
ICC to make reparations directly, which under the TFV Regulations may happen 
when: i) the ICC has identified each beneficiary but their names, location or 
other information are unknown;4648 ii) when the ICC has not identified each 
beneficiary or when the potentially high number of beneficiaries makes it 
burdensome to identify them individually;4649 and iii) when it is burdensome for 
the ICC to verify claims and disbursement of awards.4650 The award is then 
deposited with the TFV until it is possible to forward it to the victim or victims 
according to rule 98 (2). The TFV Regulations foresee the application of mass 
claims processing under standardized criteria,4651 which may lead to individual 
but uniform awards.4652 As already examined, Trial Chamber I in Lubanga via its 
 
4643 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2869), 18 April 2012, paras. 16 and 20.  
4644 See also Dwertmann (2010) 120.  
4645 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4646 See ICC RPE, rules 97 (2), 98 (2), (3), and (4).  
4647 Dwertmann (2010) 120.  
4648 TFV Regulations, regulation 59. 
4649 Ibid., regulation 60. 
4650 Ibid., regulations 62-65, 66. 

	
Ibid., regulation 60 et seq. See also ICC RPE, rule 98 (2).
4652 Dwertmann (2010) 121.     
	

reparations decisions instructed the Registry to transmit to the TFV the 
individual applications for reparations,4653 which is currently under appeals.    
Concerning collective reparations, collective awards are given to a 
victimized group rather than to an individual victim.4654 Rule 98 (3) of the RPE 
suggests that collective awards are normally made through the TFV ‘The Court 
may order that an award for reparations against a convicted person be made 
through the Trust Fund where the number of the victims and the scope, forms 
and modalities of reparations makes a collective award more appropriate’. 
Moreover, according to regulation 69 of the TFV Regulations ‘[The TFV is] to 
set out the precise nature of the collective award(s), where not already specified 
by the Court, as well as the methods for its/their implementation. 
Determinations made in this regard should be approved by the Court’. Collective 
awards can be either dedicated to only communal or collective purposes or they 
may also be distributed, upon an internal agreement, to the individual members 
who are a constitutive part of the group of victims following criteria defined 
internally and, possibly, in agreement with the ICC and/or the TFV.4655  
Although the TFV can like in individual awards be limited to implement 
the collective award ordered by the ICC, the wording in rule 98 (3) would 
suggest that the TFV has more influence in determining the nature and 
beneficiaries of collective reparations.4656 Nevertheless, the ICC has the last word 
when determining the nature and beneficiaries of the collective awards.4657 Thus, 
according to regulation 69 of the TFV Regulations, the TFV’s draft reparations 
implementation plan ‘shall set out the precise nature of the collective award(s) 
where not already specified by the Court as well as the methods for its/their 
implementation’ but these determinations ‘should be approved by the Court’. 
Then, such plan can be endorsed via a reparations order by a Trial Chamber and, 
during the implementation of the reparations order by the TFV, the Chamber 
can monitor/supervise the TFV,4658 in application of the TFV Regulations.4659 
This has been the path laid down in Lubanga, i.e., implementation of reparations 
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4654 Dwertmann (2010) 121.  
4655 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4656 Ibid., 270. 
4657 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4658 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2953), 14 December 2012, paras. 55-57.  
4659 See TFV Regulations, regulations 50 (b), 54-55 and 58. See in particular regulation 50 (b) of the 
TFV Regulations (‘For the purposes of these regulations, the Trust Fund shall be considered to be 
seized when: […] the Court makes an order for reparations against a convicted person and orders 
that the award be deposited with or made through the Trust Fund in accordance with rule 98, sub-
rules 2 to 4 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’.). 
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through the TFV, via voluntary contributions,4660 but monitored and controlled 
by a Chamber, i.e., by the ICC.4661  
Collective reparations distribution/implementation may be made to 
organizations. According to rule 98 (4) ‘Following consultations with interested 
States and the Trust Fund, the Court may order that an award for reparations be 
made through the Trust Fund to an intergovernmental, international or national 
organization approved by the Trust Fund’.4662     
It is herein argued that collective reparations are in principle more 
appropriate than individual reparations at the ICC based on three main reasons. 
A first reason consists in the collective nature of the crimes under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, which is especially notorious in cases of genocide but also as for 
certain war crimes and crimes against humanity.4663 As noticed by the TFV in 
Lubanga, collective harm is the result of widespread violations of human 
rights.4664 Crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction and which originate cases litigated 
before it are mainly directed against a specific group and, hence, the 
victimization of the individual victim comes from the victimization of the whole 
group in question.4665 Granting collective reparations in mass-scale atrocities 
contexts seems to be logical inasmuch as those reparations focus ‘on delivering a 
benefit to people who suffered from human rights violations as a group’,4666 
referred to as ‘collective victims’ by Bassiouni.4667 Collective awards can thus 
address identity-based dimensions of individual violations such as systematic 
sexual violence, attacks against an ethnic group and attacks against entire villages 
or towns. In scenarios of mass perpetration of international crimes, the interests 
of justice require more than redress for the particular harm suffered by particular 
individuals. As Greiff suggests, ‘whatever criterion of justice is defended must be 
one that has an eye also on the preconditions of reconstructing the rule of law, 
an aim that has a public, collective dimension’.4668 Since in the crimes under the 
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4660 According to the TFV Regulations, regulations 47, 48 and 50. 
4661 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, paras. 281, 286-287 and 289.  See also supra 
Chapter V 3.3.2.1.  
4662 See also TFV Regulations, regulation 73.  
4663 Dwertmann (2010) 122. 
4664 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, para. 155.
4665 See Cherif Bassiouni, ’The Protection of ’Collective Victims’ in International Law’ in Cherif 
Bassiouni (ed.), International Protection of Victims (Eres 1998) 181, 184. Cited by Dwertmann 
(2010) 122.     
4666 Magarrell (2007) 5.  
4667 Bassiouni (2006) 257. 
4668 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Introduction: Repairing the Past Compensation for Victims of Human Rights 
Violations’ in Greiff (2006a) 1, 14.  
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ICC’s jurisdiction violence is predominantly collective, it is argued here that the 
TFV measures and reparations plans have to place special emphasis on collective 
reparations.4669  
A second reason consists in the difficulties to implement individual 
reparations. Thus, whereas the convicted’s financial situation may not permit to, 
for example, compensate a substantial number of victims, collective awards may 
be pertinent and indeed, under certain circumstances, the only feasible 
alternative as individual reparations awards cannot be implemented or would 
exclude an important number of victims equally harmed from reparations.4670 
Moreover, considering the ICC’s limited financial and human resources, dealing 
with large numbers of individual reparations claims may seriously jeopardize its 
efficiency and/or be inappropriate.  
The third reason invoked here is that when it comes to collective 
reparations, besides symbolic measures, certain community development grants 
and institutional reform may be preferable where a group has suffered harm4671 
and, thus, the amount of payment is nominal as empirical evidence shows that 
victims normally value long-term impact programs as ‘forward-looking 
measures that improve the chances of future generations’.4672        
With regard to the contents of collective awards, these can be made up of 
restitution, rehabilitation or other remedy awarded to a group of victims,4673 as 
identified inter alia by the OPCV in Lubanga.4674 A first possibility is granting a 
certain monetary sum, a lump sum, to a foundation or an organization 
representing the interests of the collective of victims,4675 i.e., via an intermediary 
organization.4676 Although the final reparations beneficiary is the individual 
victim, reparations are collective in nature as the entity representing the victims’ 
interests holds the right to decide how to distribute the awards.4677 Moreover, 
collective reparations are connected to individual harm when individuals’ 
rights/positions are transferred to an entity representing the group of victims.4678 
Thus, at the ICC, the legal representative of victims may claim that a collective 
 
4669 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4670 See Roth-Arriaza (2004) 185; Dwertmann (2010) 121.   
4671 See Magarrell (2007) 5-6.  
4672 Roth-Arriaza (2004) 162.  
4673 Dwertmann (2010) 124. 
4674 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), 18 April 2012, paras. 83 et seq.  
4675 Dwertmann (2010) 124.  
4676 McCarthy (2012a) 276. 
4677 Dwertmann (2010) 124.  
4678 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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reparations award is made through the TFV to an intermediary or organization 
that represents the collective of victims, which in turn can select how to 
distribute individual awards for members of the group but this could still be 
considered as collective compensation,4679 based on the previous reasoning. This 
first possibility for collective reparations can be implemented based on rule 98 
(4) of the ICC RPE and some TFV regulations.4680  
A second possibility for collective reparations is that they can also be 
conducted via a financial award given to community institutions or projects 
designed for the benefit of the ‘group of victims as a whole’.4681 The decision 
about which institutions or projects should be benefited may be taken by the 
TFV or by an intergovernmental, international or national organization 
approved by the TFV, according to rule 98 (4). Although not foreseen explicitly 
in the ICC’s instruments, such approval may arguably be also given by the 
competent Chamber.4682 Since the final ‘beneficiary’ is a collective or communal 
body with, for example, medical, rehabilitative, social, research, purposes and 
activities, which will in turn benefit to the reparations claimants 
overall/collectively, it is considered that the collective element is more 
dominant.4683 This second possibility for collective reparations has been applied 
in the IACtHR’s case law as suggested by the OPCV in Lubanga.4684 Thus, the 
IACtHR in cases of serious human rights violations has ordered the respective 
defendant State, for example, to set up a trust fund for community 
development,4685 to implement a housing program,4686 or to re-open a medical 
dispensary in the village.4687   
A third possibility for collective reparations may consist in symbolic 
awards, which seek to restore the ‘moral well-being of a community and its 
members, such as their dignity, culture or tradition’.4688 Symbolic collective 
reparations such as public apology can redress simultaneously the harm endured 
by both the collective of victims and also each of the individual victims. In any 
 
4679 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4680 TFV Regulations, regulations 71 and 73. See also McCarthy (2012a) 276-285. 
4681 Dwertmann (2010) 125. 
4682 Ibid., 126. 
4683 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4684 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), 18 April 2012, paras. 89-91.  
4685 IACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Judgment of 15 June 2005, operative 
paragraph 5.  
4686 IACtHR, Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment of 1 July 2006, operative 
paragraph 19. 
4687 IACtHR, Case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993, para. 96.  
4688 Dwertmann (2010) 126. 
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case, the efficacy of symbolic reparations depends on both the convicted’s 
authentic willingness to redress the harm inflicted by him/her via the symbolic 
act and on the group of victims to accept it. Symbolic reparations measures, as 
correctly pointed out by the OPCV in Lubanga, are not by themselves sufficient 
in cases of serious human rights violations;4689 however, as identified in the 
IACtHR’s case law, they aim to repair victim’s reputation or dignity and have 
public repercussions.4690    
Lastly, but equally important, it should be indicated that the cy press 
doctrine, previously referred to,4691 may be used at the ICC when this orders 
collective awards or fixed lump sums as may be impossible to make reparations 
awards to all victims.4692 Also, as previously said, the contents of collective 
awards previously summarized are mutatis mutandi similar to those ordered in 
cases of massacres and other serious human rights violations against groups or 
communities of victims under the IACtHR’s jurisprudence.4693     
Accordingly, it is herein agreed with Trial Chamber I’s decision in 
Lubanga to endorse the TFV’s suggestion whereby it should be followed a 
‘community-based approach to collective reparations’.4694 The TFV indicated 
that reparations to be funded by the TFV with its own resources will tend to be 
collective in nature, using a community-based approach or they will be made to 
an organization under regulation 56 of the TFV Regulations,4695 and, based on 
this, the Chamber approved the TFV’s proposal that a community-based 
approach, using the TFV’s voluntary contributions, as the Chamber considered 
that it ‘would be more beneficial and have greater utility than individual awards, 
given the limited funds available and the fact that this approach does not require 
costly and resource-intensive verification procedures’.4696    
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4689 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), 18 April 2012, para. 110.   
4690 IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment of 19 
November 2004, Series C No. 116, para. 93. 
4691 See supra Chapter V 4.1.2.  
4692 McCarthy (2012a) 255; REDRESS (2011) 67. 
4693 For analysis of some of the IACtHR’s case law listed in the previous footnotes concerning the 
three discussed possibilities for collective reparations, see Elizabeth Salmón Gárate, Jurisprudencia 
de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Vol. III: Los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas 
en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Estándares en Torno a su 
Promoción y Protección (IDEHPUCP- Cooperación Alemana al Desarrollo-GTZ 2010b) 82-85.    
4694 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872) paras. 103, 153-180. See also Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2904), 7 August 2012, para. 274.  
4695 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, paras. 16, 153-180 and 244.   
4696 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 274.  
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Having said so, it is necessary not to exclude the provision of individual 
reparations awards altogether based on three reasons. First, as illustrated in 
Lubanga, some victims may show a general preference for individual reparations 
awards over collective awards.4697 This is due to several reasons such as, for 
example, in Lubanga not perception of child soldiers as a cohesive group, being 
perceived in conflict with their own communities, and possible ethnic tensions 
with communities not favored with collective reparations.4698 In any case, victims 
in Lubanga supported collective reparations for child soldiers as a means of 
reintegrating them,4699 and also to avoid a negative perception about them from 
other members of their communities.4700 Second, collective reparations are not 
easy to implement and may be resisted by individual victims as they do not 
respond to the individual dimension of the violations.4701 Moreover, in 
determining collective reparations, the definition of communities may prove to 
be difficult and there may be some (politically manipulated) confusion with 
development policies.4702 Third, international human rights standards are 
expressed in individual terms and individual reparations acknowledge the value 
of each individual and their place as rights-holders.4703     
Accordingly, the approach undertaken in Lubanga by Trial Chamber I of 
considering collective reparations as in principle the most suitable option but 
without excluding the possibility to grant individual reparations since they can 
be awarded concurrently is found here as the most balanced and appropriate for 
the benefit of victims as reparations claimants. Thus, the provision of collective 
reparations should not neglect the importance of individual reparations. 
Therefore, combining collective reparations with and where appropriate and 
necessary individual awards seems to be the best way to give a meaningful 
content to modestly funded programs in contexts of mass criminal violence,4704 
which is the situation of the ICC case-based reparations regime. Indeed, 
sometimes the difference between ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ reparations may be 
very subtle and may mainly be related to the beneficiaries’ role in reparations 
 
4697 In Lubanga, 19 reparations claimants expressed their desire to benefit from individual 
reparations, 5 only requested collective reparations, 59 expressed desires for both and two did not 
express their preference. See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2847), 28 March 2012, para. 10.  
4698 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), 18 April 2012, para. 16.     
4699 Ibid., para. 17. 
4700 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2869), 18 April 2012, paras. 16, 18-19, and 34 (a).  
4701 Magarrell (2007) 6.  
4702 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4703 Ibid., 5. 
4704 Magarrell (2007) 7. 
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plans.4705 Thus, for example, a scholarship fund for child soldiers is collective in 
the sense that benefits a collective group of beneficiaries, but it might also be 
considered having an individual dimension and, as pointed out by the TFV, ‘in 
practice, to the recipient of the scholarship this distinction will most likely not 
matter’.4706 In terminology used by the OPCV, whereas collective reparations in a 
‘narrow sense’ address pre-existing groups tied by cultural or ethnic links, 
collective reparations in a ‘large sense’ refer to situations at which while 
individuals who, for example, have so far claimed reparations and who can 
individually benefit from reparations, the processes are described as collective 
reparations.4707  
It is also important to bear in mind that a program of reparations should 
not be turned into a development program due to the different goals and nature 
of one and the other, i.e., development programs seek to resolve structural 
problems of poverty and inequality.4708  
Be that as it may, as determined in Trial Chamber I’s reparations 
decision: i) victims should receive appropriate, adequate and prompt 
reparations,4709 which is coherent with the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines,4710 and also with the IACtHR’s case law;4711 ii) reparations ought to be 
awarded on a non-discriminatory basis and be formulated and applied in a 
gender-inclusive manner;4712 iii) the awards should be proportionate to the harm, 
injury, loss and damage as established by the ICC;4713 iv) reparations should aim 
to reconciling victims of the case crimes with their families and all the 
communities affected by the charges;4714 v) reparations, when possible, ought to 
reflect local culture and customary practices provided that they are not 
‘discriminatory, exclusive or deny victims equal access to their rights’;4715 and vi) 
reparations need to support self-sustaining programs so that victims, their 
 
4705 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2803), 1 September 2011, para. 25.  
4706 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4707 See Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), 18 April 2012, paras. 31-32, 83-107. 
4708 Greiff (2006b) 470.  
4709 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 242. 
4710 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 15.  
4711 See, e.g., IACtHR, Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras, Interpretation of the Judgment of 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 17 August 1990, Series C No. 10, para. 27.  
4712 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 243. 
4713 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4714 Ibid., para. 244. 
4715 Ibid., para. 245. 
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families and communities can benefit from such measures over an extended time 
period.4716    
 
4.3.1.2. Reparations Standard and Burden of Proof 
With regard to the standard and burden of proof, Trial Chamber I in its 
reparations decision stated that whereas at trial the Prosecution shall determine 
the relevant facts to the criminal standard, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt, a ‘less 
exacting standard should apply’ to the reparations proceedings due to the 
fundamentally different nature thereof.4717 Such finding is consistent with the 
drafting history of the ICC instruments that shows that drafters agreed on that 
the standard of proof required for obtaining reparations is lower than that 
required for a conviction.4718 The Trial Chamber considered that when 
determining the appropriate standard of proof, there are several factors to be 
taken into account such as the difficulty faced by victims to obtain evidence in 
support of their claim because of the destruction or unavailability thereof.4719 
Such limitation is recognized by several authors,4720 and, as remarked by Trial 
Chamber I, rule 91 (4) indeed establishes that victims’ requests for reparations 
shall contain, to the extent possible, any relevant supporting documentation, 
including names and addresses of witnesses.4721 Thus, although reparations 
claimants in principle have to prove their claims, it may be argued that the ICC 
(or certain organs of the ICC) are also responsible to be involved in collecting 
information on substantive claims.4722 Indeed, the reparations application only 
requires victims to identify the person responsible for the crime that caused their 
harm ‘to the extent possible’.4723 Therefore, it is considered both the complicated 
situation faced by victims when claiming reparations and the fact that they are 
not necessarily familiar with legal categories such as command responsibility.4724   
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4716 Ibid., para. 246. 
4717 Ibid., para. 251. 
4718 See Lewis and Friman (2001) 484.  
4719 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 252.  
4720 See, e.g., Jorda and de Hemptinne (2002) 1411; Jacomijn van Haersolte-van Hof, ‘Innovations 
to Speed Mass Claims: New Standards of Proof’ in International Bureau of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (ed.), Redressing Injustices through Mass Claims Processes: Innovative Responses to 
Unique Challenges (Oxford University Press 2006) 13, 14-22; Heike Niebergall, ‘Overcoming 
Evidentiary Weakness in Reparation Claims Programmes’ in Ferstman, Goetz, and Stephens 
(2009) 145, 156-158.   
4721 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 252. 
4722 Dwertmann (2010) 231.  
4723 ICC RPE, rule 94 (1) (c). 
4724 See Dwertmann (2010) 232. 
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Additionally, establishing the process of documenting harm and 
causation may be as such traumatizing for victims considering the types of 
crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, which may force ‘victims to choose between 
revisiting the experience and foregoing reparations, thus producing a further 
form of victimization’.4725 Moreover, although not explicitly provided under rule 
153 of the ICC RPE, the Appeals Chamber might call evidence to determine 
issues arising in the reparations appeals when appropriate under rule 149.4726     
Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision found that when article 74 
stage of the trial, i.e., determination of the accused’s criminal responsibility, is 
finished, ‘the standard of “a balance of probabilities” is sufficient to establish the 
facts that are relevant to an order for reparations when it is directed against the 
convicted person’.4727 The standard of ‘balance of probabilities’ is also portrayed 
as a ‘preponderance of proof’ or ‘the greater weight of the evidence’.4728 The 
standard mentioned by Trial Chamber I is consistent with reparations programs 
dealing with mass claims and which have followed flexible evidentiary standards 
based on a ‘plausibility test’ so as to accommodate the victims’ situation as these 
usually face difficulties to provide the documentation required for.4729 The ICC’s 
flexible approach to the standard and burden of proof on reparations may be 
compared to that adopted by the IACtHR, especially concerning reparations, as 
the latter has sustained that its proceedings are not subject to the same 
formalities existent in domestic courts and particular attention is paid to the 
circumstances of the specific case, respect for legal certainty, and the equality of 
the parties.4730 It should be noticed that the ‘balance of probabilities’ standard to 
grant a reparations order is higher than the prima facie standard used when 
assessing the admissibility of victim participant applications as implied by Pre-
Trial Chamber II in the Uganda Situation.4731  
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4725 Lisa Magarell (2007) 8. See also American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes 
Research Office (2010) 42-43.  
4726 ‘Parts 5 and 6 and rules governing proceedings and the submission of evidence in the Pre-Trial 
and Trial Chambers shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings in the Appeals Chamber’. See 
also Brady (2001b) 588.  
4727 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 253. 
4728 Bryan Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn., Thomson West 2004) 1220. 
4729 See Lewis and Friman (2001) 484.  
4730 See IACtHR, Case of Veláquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 21 
July 1989, para. 127. See also Shelton (2005) 249-251.  
4731 Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-101), 10 August 2007, para. 114 (‘Whilst the determination of 
a causal link between a purported crime and the ensuing harm is one of the most complex 
theoretical issues in criminal law, the Single Judge shares Pre-Trial Chamber I's view that a 
determination of the specific nature of such a link goes beyond the purposes of a determination 
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4.3.2. Modalities of Reparations  
4.3.2.1. Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation 
Even though article 75 (2) of the ICC Statute lists reparations in the modalities 
or forms of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, this enumeration is 
only illustrative as the wording is ‘including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation’. This interpretation has also been reached by Trial Chamber I in 
Lubanga by remarking that ‘this list is not exhaustive’.4732 In referring to other 
modalities of reparations, the Chamber established, as examples, those with a 
symbolic, preventative or transformative value to be appropriate, besides taking 
a gender-sensitive approach when establishing the way in which reparations are 
to be applied.4733 It should be mentioned that the modalities of reparations, i.e., 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and other modalities, identified and 
discussed by Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision went along the lines of 
those which were suggested by the legal representatives of the two groups of 
victims,4734 by the OPCV,4735 as well as by the TFV,4736 in their observations on 
reparations principles. Whereas restitution, compensation and rehabilitation are 
assessed in this sub-section, the other modalities of reparations are analyzed in 
the next subsection. In both cases, the analysis mainly considers the findings in 
the reparations decision.   
With regard to restitution, Trial Chamber I, relying on the IACtHR’s 
jurisprudence,4737 found that restitution should as far as possible restore the 
victims to their circumstances before the commission of crime although this is 
often unachievable in, for example, cases of enlisting, conscription and using of 
child soldiers,4738 due to the fact that the previous situation of victims of 
international crimes cannot be fully restored. Be that as it may, as identified by 
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made under rule 89 of the Rules, whether in the context of a situation or of a case. In particular, 
whereas such an analysis may be required for the purposes of a reparation order, it does not seem 
required when the determination to permit an applicant to present "views and concerns" within the 
meaning of article 68, paragraph 3 of the Statute is at stake’.). See also Ferstman and Goetz (2009) 
332-333.  
4732 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 222. 
4733 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4734 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2864), 18 April 2012, paras. 15-23; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2869), 18 April 2012, paras. 13-20.       
4735 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2863), 18 April 2012  paras 45-121. 
4736 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2872), 25 April 2012, paras. 55-58.  
4737 IACtHR, Case of González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 16 November 2009, Series C No. 205, para. 450. 
4738 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 223.   
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the Trial Chamber, relying on the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines,4739 
restitution is directed at the restoration of the life of an individual, which 
includes: i) the return to his/her family, home and previous employment; ii) 
provision of continuing education; and iii) returning lost or stolen property.4740 It 
was also found that restitution may be apposite for legal bodies, e.g., schools or 
other institutions.4741 When it comes to implementation, since the ICC lacks the 
mandate to order States to provide reparations and, additionally, restitution of 
property, assets and other tangible goods may involve the respective State’s 
sovereignty, such restitution may in principle be implemented only with the 
cooperation of States.4742 About this, article 86 of the ICC Statute foresees the 
States Parties’ general obligation to cooperate with the ICC in the investigation 
and prosecution of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction.    
With regard to compensation, Trial Chamber I, based on the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines,4743 determined that this modality ought to be 
considered when: i) the economic harm is sufficiently quantifiable; ii) an award 
of this sort would be appropriate and proportionate, taking into account the 
seriousness of the crime and also the case circumstances; and iii) the available 
funds guarantee the feasibility of this result.4744 When approaching 
compensation, the Chamber additionally found it necessary the adoption of a 
gender-inclusive approach as well as to avoid reinforcing structural inequalities 
and perpetuating previous discriminatory approaches.4745 As previously 
examined,4746 the Chamber determined that even though ‘harm’ is not defined in 
the ICC Statute and RPE, that concept denotes ‘hurt, injury and damage’.4747 
Although it is not necessary that harm has been direct, it must have been 
 
4739 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 19 (‘Restitution should, whenever possible, 
restore the victim to the original situation before the gross violations of international human rights 
law or serious violations of international humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as 
appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, 
return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and return of property’.).    
4740 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 224.   
4741 Ibid., para. 225. 
4742 Dwertmann (2010) 132-133.  
4743 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 20 (‘Compensation should be provided for any 
economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation 
and the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights 
law and serious violations of international humanitarian law […]’.). 
4744 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 226. 
4745 Ibid., para. 227.  
4746 See supra Chapter IV 2.3.2.2.   
4747 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 228.  



personal to the victim.4748 Considering the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines 
and the IACtHR’s jurisprudence,4749 Trial Chamber I found that compensation is 
of a broad application and, thus, comprehends all forms of damage, loss and 
injury, including material, physical and psychological harm.4750 Even though the 
Chamber found that some forms of damages cannot essentially be quantified in 
financial terms, it concluded, based on the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines 
and the UN Victims’ Declaration,4751 that compensation constitutes a modality of 
economic relief aimed at addressing in a proportionate and appropriate way the 
harm inflicted.4752  
By referring to jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the ECtHR, and also in 
correspondence with the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines,4753 the Trial 
Chamber then proceeded to provide five examples of assessable damages. First, 
physical harm, e.g., causing a victim to lose the capacity to bear children.4754 
Second, moral and non-material damage, which results in physical, mental and 
emotional suffering.4755 Third, material damage, which includes: i) lost earnings 
and the opportunity to work; ii) loss of, or damage to, property; iii) unpaid wages 
or salaries; iv) other forms of interference with a person’s capability to work; and 
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4748 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4749 See respectively UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 8; IACtHR, Case of ‘Las Dos 
Erres’ Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 
24 November 2009, Series C No. 210, para. 226.  
4750 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 229. 
4751 See respectively UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 20; UN Victims’ Declaration, 
principle 1.   
4752 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 230. 
4753 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 20 (‘[...] (a) Physical or mental harm; (b) Lost 
opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits; (c) Material damages and loss 
of earnings, including loss of earning potential; (d) Moral damage; (e) Costs required for legal or 
expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social services’.).  
4754 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 230 (a) (referring to IACtHR, Case of 
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 29 July 1988, paras. 156, 175 and 187; and ECtHR, 
X and Y v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 8978/80, Judgment, 26 March 1985, para. 22).     
4755 Ibid., para. 230 (b) (referring to IACtHR, Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, 
Judgment of 27 August 1998, para. 49; IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. 
Guatemala, Judgment of 19 November 2004, paras. 80-89 and 117; and IACtHR, Case of the 
‘Juvenile Reeducation Institute’ v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment of 2 September 2004, para. 295; and also referring to ECtHR, Selmouni v. France, 
Appl. No. 25803/94, Judgment of 28 July 1999, paras. 92, 98 and 105; and ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, 
Appl. No. 21987/93, Judgment of 18 December 1996, para. 113).      
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v) the loss of savings.4756 Fourth, lost opportunities, which include: i) those 
related to employment, education and social benefits; ii) loss of status; and iii) 
interference with a person’s legal rights.4757 Concerning the concept of ‘damage 
to a life plan’, developed by the IACtHR’s jurisprudence,4758 the Chamber 
considered that it may be relevant for the ICC reparations.4759 In any case, the 
Chamber appropriately pointed out that the ICC shall guarantee that it does not 
perpetuate pre-existing or traditional discriminatory practices, for example, on 
gender grounds, when trying to address those issues.4760 Fifth, costs of legal or 
other relevant experts, medical services as well as psychological and social 
assistance, e.g., relevant help for girls and boys with HIV and AIDS.4761  
Lastly, but equally important, the Trial Chamber, considering the 
particular circumstances in Lubanga, determined that measures for awarding 
compensation should take into consideration the gender and age-specific impact 
that crimes of enlisting, conscripting and use of child soldiers have on direct 
victims, their families and their communities.4762 Moreover, as correctly 
remarked by the Trial Chamber, the ICC ought to determine whether it is 
appropriate to grant ‘compensation for any of the detrimental effect of child 
recruitment for the individuals directly affected, along with their families and 
communities’.4763 It should be mentioned that when the IACtHR’s case law has 
been unable to specifically identify the totality of victims and, therefore, all 
reparations beneficiaries, the IACtHR considered it as a reason to reject 
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paras. 141-152). 
4757 Ibid., para. 230 (d) (referring to ECtHR, Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom (Just 
Satisfaction), Appls. No. 7511/76 and 7743/76, Judgment, 23 March 1983, para. 26; TP and KM v. 
United Kingdom, Appl. No. 28945/95, Judgment, 10 May 2001, para. 15; Thlimmenos v. Greece, 
Appl. No. 34369/97, Judgment, 6 April 2000, para. 70).    
4758 IACtHR, Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of 27 November 1998, para. 147 (‘The so-
called “life plan” deals with the full self-actualisation of the person concerned and takes account of 
her calling in life, her particular circumstances, her potentialities, and her ambitions, thus 
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See also, e.g., Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 3 December 
2001, Series C No. 88, para. 80.     
4759 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 230 (d), footnote 418. 
4760 Ibid., para. 230 (d).  
4761 Ibid., para 230 (e) (referring to IACtHR, Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of 27 
November 1998, para. 129 (d); IACtHR, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment of 30 November 2001, Series C No. 87, para. 42).       
4762 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 231.  
4763 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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compensation for those no individualized at the time of the IACtHR’s judgment 
and, thus, determined instead ‘other forms of reparations’ that would benefit ‘all 
the members of the communities affected by the facts of the case’.4764      
Whether compensation is pertinent/feasible at the ICC is discussed as 
follows. It has been said that compensation payments are not necessarily the 
most appropriate award even if the ICC can access the assets of a convicted 
person inasmuch as other modalities of reparations such as symbolic measures, 
some community development grants and institutional reform may be 
preferable where a group has suffered harm.4765 Additionally, reparations under 
the form of assistance or rehabilitation programs, as an individual or as a 
collective award, may be better than compensation especially when the amount 
of payment is nominal.4766 The TFV has indeed considered that restitution and 
(cash) compensation may be less suitable modalities of reparations as compared 
to others.4767 However, it is herein argued that a reparations program should 
usually and when feasible include measures integrating monetary, material and 
symbolic components rather than relying exclusively on a single form of 
reparation or completely excluding a form of reparation.4768 The UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines refer to ‘adequate, appropriate and prompt 
reparation’,4769 which is held to include in some combination and as appropriate 
restitution, compensation, bodily and mental rehabilitation.4770  
Indeed, in the context of a system for the protection of human rights, it 
has been remarked the transcendental importance held by reparations in general 
and also by compensation, in particular.4771 In cases of serious human rights 
violations such as torture, extrajudicial killing and enforced disappearance, the 
IACtHR considering, inter alia, ‘the grave circumstances of the case, the 
intensity of the suffering caused to the victim and his next of kin’ concluded that 
it is ‘pertinent for compensation to be paid, in fairness, for [inter alia] non-
pecuniary damages’.4772 Concerning the ICC case-based reparations regime, it 
may mutatis mutandi be affirmed the important role that compensation may 
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4764 IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment of 19 November 2004, 
para. 107.   
4765 Magarrell (2007) 5-6. 
4766 Roth-Arriaza (2004) 162.  
4767 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2803), 1 September 2011, paras. 344. 
4768 Magarrell (2007) 4.  
4769 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 15. 
4770 Ibid., Loc. cit. See also Magarrell (2007) 1.    
4771 Faúndez (2008) 756.  
4772 IACtHR, Case of Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 18 
September 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 96. 
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have in specific circumstances. An option is to consider that the ICC reserves its 
power to order compensation when: i) the accused has assets; ii) the link 
between him/her and the individual victim or group of victims is demonstrated; 
and iii) when the case is about a limited and definable group of victims.4773 Be 
that as it may, Trial Chamber I in its reparations decision has suggested that the 
ICC should consider whether the provision of compensation is appropriate.4774   
Principles related to compensation ‘may only refer to the available 
national procedures under which individual victims may have effective access to 
an appropriate civil remedy’.4775 However, when this is not feasible due to, inter 
alia, collapse of the domestic system in question or unavailability of 
compensation mechanisms, the ICC may apply the principle of fairness 
(‘equality of all before the law’) and, hence, permit victims’ access to other 
sources of compensation, including the TFV.4776   
With regard to rehabilitation, Trial Chamber I, relying on, for example, 
the IACtHR and the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, found it to include: i) 
the provision of medical services and healthcare, in particular treatment of HIV 
and AIDS;4777 ii) psychological, psychiatric and social assistance to support 
victims enduring grief and trauma;4778 and iii) any relevant legal and social 
services.4779 Rehabilitation has to be implemented by the ICC in correspondence 
to the non-discrimination principle, which shall include a gender inclusive 
approach encompassing males and females of all ages.4780 As for child 
recruitment victims, rehabilitation should include measures directed at 
facilitating their reintegration to society, bearing in mind the differences in the 
impact of those crimes on boys and girls.4781 These measures ought to include the 
provision of education and vocational training, sustainable work opportunities 
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4774 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para. 231. 
4775 Donat-Cattin (2008b) 1405. 
4776 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4777 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), 7 August 2012, para.233 (referring to IACtHR, Case of the 
Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 15 September 2005, 
para. 312; IACtHR, Case of the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
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4779 Ibid., Loc. cit. (referring to UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 21).  
4780 Ibid., para. 232. 
4781 Ibid., para. 234. 
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that promote a meaningful role in society.4782 Rehabilitation measures should 
include manners of addressing the shame that victims may feel and, indeed, they 
‘should be directed at avoiding further victimization of the boys and girls who 
suffered harm as a consequence of their recruitment’.4783 Rehabilitation (and 
reintegration of child soldiers) steps may also include communities of the 
victims, to the extent that the reparations programs are implemented where their 
communities are located.4784 Programs with transformative objectives, regardless 
of how limited they may be, can actually help prevent future victimization and 
symbolic measures such as commemorations and tributes may also contribute to 
rehabilitation.4785   
Concerning implementation of rehabilitation measures such as medical, 
social and psychological rehabilitation, these require an important amount of 
money to be funded and, thus, it is not quite realistic to assume that an 
individual or individuals may finance them, letting alone the fact that it is in 
principle the State’s obligation to provide social security or health services.4786 
However, the TFV has already gathered experienced with rehabilitation 
programs implemented under its general assistance mandate and which has been 
highlighted by the TFV as an important know-how when implementing similar 
initiatives concerning reparations orders4787 Accordingly, an option is to either 
implement and finance similar programs, under the TFV’s management, for 
case-based reparations claimants and beneficiaries. A second alternative is to 
incorporate reparations beneficiaries to programs already run by the TFV for 
victims of situations in general but always making it explicit that the former 
category of victims are reparations beneficiaries and not general assistance 
beneficiaries. If the convicted is found to have funds, (s)he can be ordered to at 
least partially finance the rehabilitation of an individual or a rehabilitative 
program as part of a collective reparations award.4788    
Lastly, but equally important, as previously said, the ICC cannot issue 
reparations orders against the States Parties to the ICC Statute. In any case, 
concerning enforcement of reparations orders, the ICC can oblige the States 
Parties to conduct certain measures as these have the obligation to cooperate 
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4783 Ibid., para. 235. 
4784 Ibid,, para. 236 (referring to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 39; IACtHR, 
Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment of 30 November 2001, para. 42).      
4785 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4786 Dwertmann (2010) 148-149 
4787 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2803), 1 September 2011, paras. 319-326. 
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with the ICC.4789 Indeed, article 75 (4) provides for that the ICC ‘may […] 
determine whether, in order to give effect to an order [reparations order] which 
it may make under this article, it is necessary to seek measures under article 93 
[Other forms of cooperation], paragraph 1’. Requests for forms of state 
cooperation can be used by the ICC on its own motion, upon application by the 
Prosecutor or victims who requested reparations or will do so.4790 Seizure of 
assets may be used to enforce a reparations order.4791 According to rule 99 (1): 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber, pursuant to article 57, paragraph 3 (e), or the Trial 
Chamber, pursuant to article 75, paragraph 4, may, on its own motion or on the 
application of the Prosecutor or at the request of the victims or their legal 
representatives who have made a request for reparations or who have given a 
written undertaking to do so, determine whether measures should be requested. 
 
As previously referred to,4792 article 75 (5) of the ICC Statute states that 
the enforcement regime for fines and forfeiture order (regulated under article 
109 of the Statute) shall apply to the ICC’s reparations orders and, therefore, 
States Parties are obliged to fully enforce ICC reparations orders ‘A State Party 
shall give effect to a decision under this article as if the provisions of article 109 
were applicable to this article’.4793 Moreover, in enforcing reparations orders, 
national authorities cannot modify them.4794 The provisions examined in the last 
paragraphs are related to the fact that the ICC’s efficacy is based on state 
cooperation towards it.4795  
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4.3.2.2. Other Modalities        
With regard to other modalities of reparations, conviction and sentence are 
examples thereof referred to by Trial Chamber I, based on the IACtHR’s case 
law, as they likely have significance for the victims, their families and 
communities,4796 and, moreover, wide publication of the judgment may raise 
awareness of the crimes in question and, thus, deter those crimes.4797 Under the 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, these measures constitute satisfaction.4798 
The ICC, in accordance with its broad competence and jurisdiction as well as 
assisted by the State Parties and the international community pursuant to Part 9 
(‘International cooperation and judicial assistance’) of the ICC Statute,4799 can 
institute other modalities of reparations as remarked by Trial Chamber I in its 
reparations decision.4800   
The Chamber considered that these modalities of reparations include: i) 
setting or assisting campaigns designed to improve the victims’ position; ii) 
rendering certificates that acknowledge the particular harm experienced by 
individuals; iii) establishing outreach and promotional programs to inform 
victims on the trial outcome; iv) educational campaigns aiming at reduction of 
the stigmatization and marginalization of the victims of the crimes in question 
and, thus, to contribute to the society’s awareness of crimes committed as well as 
the need to promote improved attitudes towards similar events and, for example, 
guarantee that children assume an active role within their respective 
communities;4801 and v) measures to address the shame felt by victims and to 
prevent any future victimization, especially when there has been sexual violence, 
torture and inhumane and degrading treatment, and raising awareness of the 
effective reintegration of child soldiers.4802 These measures may mostly qualify as 
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satisfaction and, to some extent, some of them as guarantees of non-
repetition.4803   
Under the category of other modalities of reparations, the Chamber also 
found that the convicted can contribute by providing a voluntary apology to an 
individual or groups of victims, either on a public or confidential basis.4804 It is 
important to notice that although apology as a satisfaction is also recognized 
under the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines and the IACtHR’s case law, under 
these sources apologies must be public unlike the ICC’s finding where apology 
can be confidential.4805 Even though apology should ideally be given in public in 
the ICC reparations regime, the difference may be explained by the subject who 
has to apologize to the victims, i.e., the State in the case of international human 
rights law vis-à-vis the convicted individual in the context of the ICC. 
Concerning other measures of satisfaction, not explicitly examined in 
Trial Chamber I’s reparations decision in Lubanga, it may be mentioned under 
the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, inter alia: i) search for the whereabouts 
of the disappeared, for the identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies 
of the killed victims, and assistance to recover, identify and bury them in 
accordance to victims’ wishes or cultural practices; and ii) commemorations and 
tributes to victims.4806 As submitted by the OPCV,4807 the IACtHR has 
considered, as ‘symbolic’ forms of reparations, the commemoration of the 
memory of the victims as a measure directed towards not only present but also 
future generations. Thus, the IACtHR has ordered reparations to publicly 
commemorate and/or honor individual victims and groups of victims which 
have consisted in: i) the naming of a street after the victims;4808 ii) the 
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4805 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 22 (d). As for the IACtHR’s case law, see, e.g., 
IACtHR, Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment of 29 November 2006, para. 234; IACtHR, Case of 
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4808 IACtHR, Case of Benavides-Cevallos v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 
19 June 1998, Series C No. 38, para. 48. 
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inauguration of an education center named after the victims;4809 and iii) the 
erection of public monuments frequently with commemorative plaques.4810 The 
search of the whereabouts of disappeared and the bodies of those killed and their 
return has also been ordered by the IACtHR.4811 These measures have 
corresponded to cases of serious human rights violations such as massacres. 
Indeed, the ICC Victims Participation Booklet mentions ‘symbolic measures 
such as public apology or commemoration or memorial’ as examples of 
reparations.4812  
Having said so, it is necessary to notice that some forms of 
symbolic/non-pecuniary reparations identified by the IACtHR, the ECtHR and 
the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines would not necessarily be as such 
applicable in the ICC case-based reparations regime. This is because some 
modalities of reparations include international state obligations such as the 
obligation to investigate the case events, and to identify, prosecute and punish 
those responsible, which is considered as satisfaction under the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines,4813 as well as ordering the State to amend, adopt or 
repeal domestic laws or judgments, which is considered as guarantees of non-
repetition, i.e., those aimed at preventing crimes and associated with reforms, 
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according to the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines.4814 Indeed, only States may 
adopt measures such as introduction of a national memorial day, naming of 
streets or building of memorials.4815 Nevertheless, although such orders could not 
be implemented against an individual due to their nature, they may be taken into 
account when it is possible to be implemented with the respective State’s 
cooperation.4816 Additionally, for example, when the convicted was a former 
State agent, a judgment against that State by domestic civil or regional human 
rights courts, which could also in turn be based on ICC’s previous reparations 
orders.4817  
In general, to implement modalities of reparations, although the ICC 
lacks the power to order States to provide reparations to the victims, the wording 
and context of the ICC instruments neither exclude nor prohibit the possibility 
for the ICC to include recommendations to States Parties to the ICC Statute to 
implement certain reparations modalities.4818 Be that as it may, as presented in 
the previous sub-section, the ICC States Parties have the obligation to cooperate 
with the ICC and, in particular, they are obliged to enforce ICC reparations 
orders. Concerning cooperation from the international community, the ICC 
may also appeal to organizations and other entities representing the 
international community to, for example, make voluntary payments to the TFV 
or support victims in other manners.4819  
Indeed, the TFV has suggested the adaptation of guarantees of non-
repetition, in particular, reform of the security forces and judicial system, as well 
as satisfaction, to the ICC context.4820 As for guarantees of non-repetition, the 
TFV has suggested that the ICC may call upon the international community, the 
interested States, political leaders and affected communities to ‘act responsibly in 
accordance with international standards and law, to promote reconciliation and 
to address any existing conditions that may give rise to renewed conflict’.4821 
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Guarantees of non-repetition adapted to the ICC context, for example, would 
aim at ensuring that no recruitment of child soldiers takes place.4822              
 
4.4. The ECCC 
4.4.1. Collective and Moral Reparations and Reparations Standard/Burden of 
Proof    
4.4.1.1. Collective and Moral Reparations 
The ECCC Internal Rules, both its current version and the previous ones, have 
limited reparations to collective and moral reparations. Thus, internal rule 23 (1) 
(b) establishes that one of the two purposes of the civil party action at the ECCC 
is to ‘Seek collective and moral reparations, as provided in Rule 23 quinquies’. In 
turn, rule 23 quinquies (1) lays down that ‘the Chambers may award only 
collective and moral reparations to Civil Parties’ and adds that ‘These benefits 
shall not take the form of monetary payments to Civil Parties’. Also, internal rule 
23 bis (1) (b) provides for that ‘injury upon which a claim of collective and moral 
reparation […]’. One important reason why at the ECCC reparations are only 
limited to collective and moral reparations, excluding financial reparations, i.e., 
compensation, altogether, is the few resources available,4823 which has been 
particularly notorious at the ECCC reparations system.  
When interviewed outside court, reactions from civil parties about 
receiving collective and moral reparations in Duch have been diverse. Some 
believed that they should receive some individual material reparations, 
particularly in the form of medical or psychological care or a fund to permit 
them to hold a Buddhist ceremony to honor the memory of their loved ones who 
were killed at the S-21 detention centre.4824 Others thought they would be 
entitled to financial rather than non-financial reparations and considered the 
latter as insubstantial.4825 Yet other civil parties while acknowledging the 
symbolic importance of reparations, they have questioned whether 
compensation of any sort could truly contribute to individual and social redress 
after so many years of the commission of the crimes.4826  
The Supreme Court Chamber in its appeal judgment in Duch agreed 
with the civil parties’ lawyers that the term ‘moral reparations’ may be 
unprecedented in international or domestic legal frameworks; however, it 
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concluded, by referring to the IACtHR’s case law,4827 that the concept of moral 
damage is not so.4828 Moreover, the Supreme Court Chamber considered that a 
previous version of internal rule 23 (12) (Rev. 3) provided for some guidance by 
setting some examples of what would qualify as moral and collective reparations, 
namely, the publication of the judgment, financing a non-profit activity or 
service beneficial to victims, and ‘other appropriate and comparable forms of 
reparations’.4829 Accordingly, the Chamber established that ‘“moral” denotes the 
aim of repairing moral damages rather than material ones’.4830 Moreover, the 
Chamber concluded that although the required ‘collective’ character of the 
measures confirms that individual financial awards are not available, ‘neither the 
moral nor collective character requirements preclude tout court measures that 
require financing in order to be implemented’.4831 Furthermore, the Chamber 
recognized the dual collective-individual benefits that may come from moral 
reparations awards ‘As long as the award is available to victims as a collective, 
moral reparations also may entail benefit for the members of the collective’.4832  
By referring to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence,4833 the Supreme Court 
Chamber found that the ‘term’ collective is straightforward and, in the ECCC 
context: 
 
[…] it excludes individual awards, whether or not of a financial nature. It also 
seems to favour those measures that benefit as many victims as possible. The 
present case is concerned with mass crimes, which, by their very nature, directly 
and indirectly affected, albeit to varying degrees, a large number of victims.4834   
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4827 IACtHR, Case of Castillo-Páez v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 27 November 1998, 
Series C No. 43, para. 53.  
4828 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 658. For the meaning of ‘moral and collective reparations’ see also Ruben 
Carranza, ‘Practical, Feasible and Meaningful: How the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Can Fullfil its 
Reparations Mandate’ (International Center for Transitional Justice 2009) 2-3. Available at:  
http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Cambodia-Reparations-2009-English.pdf (last visit on 
30 November 2012).      
4829 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 658. See also ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quinquies (2) (Rev. 5).       
4830 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 658.  
4831 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4832 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4833 IACtHR, Case of the ‘Street Children’ (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment of 26 
May 2001, para. 84. 
4834 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 659. 
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Moreover, as previously examined,4835 the Supreme Court Chamber 
concluded that granting individual reparations to only those who participated as 
civil parties, i.e., those who were reparations claimants, will exclude from the 
scope of reparations beneficiaries those victims who were not able and/or willing 
to become civil parties and, thus, claim reparations, letting alone those victims 
who could not and will most like never be identified.4836 The Supreme Court 
Chamber accordingly was ‘of the view that the most inclusive measures of 
reparation should be privileged’.4837 Therefore, although only civil parties can 
claim reparations at the ECCC, they are not (necessarily) the only reparations 
beneficiaries as those victims who are not civil parties (reparations claimants) 
can still benefit at least indirectly from some collective and moral reparations 
provided by the ECCC, as already seen.4838 In any case, eligibility is conditioned 
to a causal link between the reparations measure in question and the injury 
produced by the crimes upon which the accused was found responsible,4839 as 
previously examined. In addition, the Chamber drew attention to the fact ‘the 
collective harm merits collective redress’, which it connected with ‘the 
reconciliatory function of reparations’.4840 
The Supreme Court Chamber accepted that collective and moral 
reparations ‘may not reinstate the victims of human rights abuses either 
physically or economically’.4841 However, the Chamber also pointed out that 
reparations general purposes at the ECCC are fulfilled to the extent that 
reparations provide an answer to the psychological, moral and symbolic 
elements of the crime or violation perpetrated.4842 Verification of the facts, full 
and public truth disclosure via the victims’ access and participation and via 
identification of victims and individual recognition in the final judgment 
represent a public acknowledgement of their suffering.4843 This is consistent with 
the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines,4844 referred to by the Chamber. Actually, 
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4835 See supra Chapter V 2.4.2.1.  
4836 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 659. 
4837 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4838 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.2.1.  
4839 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 699.  
4840 Ibid., para. 660. 
4841 Ibid., para. 661. 
4842 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4843 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4844 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, principle 22 (referred to in Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch 
(Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012, para. 661).    
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a civil party lawyer expressed in his closing statement in the trial in Duch that the 
ECCC had already given victims with a ‘most valuable reparation’, namely, an 
acknowledgment of their right to be present and participate as well as of their 
solidarity.4845 Moreover, the Chamber concluded that its recognition of a 
proposed reparations award as an appropriate measure presents a potential of 
being ‘per se a form of satisfaction and redress, possibly capable of attracting 
attention, efforts, and resources toward its actual realisation’.4846    
As for the severance of Nuon Chea et al., in mini-trials and its impact on 
collective reparations and forms of reparations, some observations are provided 
here. Generally speaking, grouping and treating victims as a specific collective 
for reparations purposes based upon classifying factors such as crimes suffered, 
location/geographic identity, common ethnic/religious identity is in principle a 
sound option.4847 However, this approach needs to be carefully handled as 
granting certain forms of reparation to one group may raise expectations in the 
other groups or even dissatisfaction when in the most likely scenario different 
forms of reparations are applied to different groups of victims.4848 Another 
consideration in adopting this approach is to adopt appropriate measures to 
avoid the perception that the broader universe of victims of the Khmer Rouge 
regime has been fragmented; otherwise, it ‘may be perceived as diminishing the 
aggregate reparatory effect of the awards even if they are made collectively’.4849  
 
4.4.1.2. Reparations Standard and Burden of Proof  
With regard to the standard of proof for granting reparations, it should be first 
mentioned that the Internal Rules only requires the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
standard when it comes to conviction ‘In order to convict the accused, the 
Chamber must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable 
doubt’.4850 The Supreme Court Chamber in Duch noticed that factual elements of 
the civil party action not included by the criminal charges and, therefore, not 
proven by the Prosecutor beyond reasonable doubt, ‘must be proven by the civil 
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4845 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 23 November 2009, p. 80.   
4846 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 661.  
4847 See Carranza (2009) 4-5.  
4848 See Ibid., 5. 
4849 Caitlin Reiger, Comments on Draft Internal Rules for the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ICTJ November 2006) 7. Available at: 
http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Cambodia-Courts-Rules-2006-English_0.pdf (last visit 
on 30 November 2012).  
4850 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 87 (1). 
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party pursuant to the standard of preponderance of evidence’.4851 After an 
examination of the standards in the ICC, the STL, regional human rights bodies’ 
reparations jurisprudence, and claims programs such as the International 
Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims and the UN Compensation 
Commission,4852 the Supreme Court Chamber in Duch came to the conclusion 
that the standard of proof applicable to reparations is ‘balance of probabilities’ or 
‘more probable than not to be true’,4853 expressions which were found to be 
identical to the ‘more likely than not to be true’ standard introduced in internal 
rule 23 bis (1) (Rev. 5) of the ECCC Internal Rules and which also corresponds to 
the current version thereof.4854 The Supreme Court Chamber, based on the 
evidence accepted by the Trial Chamber during the reparations stage, inferred 
that the Trial Chamber applied the ‘more likely than not to be true’ standard of 
proof to civil party admissibility at the reparations stage.4855 Thus, the Supreme 
Court Chamber concluded that: 
 
[…] the standard of proof applied by the Trial Chamber, namely, “more likely 
than not to be true” or “preponderance of evidence,” was in accordance with the 
law. This standard is common to civil claims across the world. Moreover, there 
is no basis to claim a relaxation of this standard either in practice at the 
international level or in concerns for the proper balancing of interests.4856  
 
As previously discussed,4857 the Supreme Court Chamber also 
determined that the standard of proof used in Duch during the reparations stage 
was higher than the prima facie standard used to preliminarily assess civil party 
applications.4858   
With regard to the burden of proof, the ECCC Internal Rules stipulate 
that civil party applications shall:  
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4851 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 510. See also Ibid., para. 428.  
4852 Ibid., paras. 513-521. 
4853 Ibid., para. 524.  
4854 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4855 Ibid., para. 527.  
4856 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 531. 
4857 See supra Chapter IV 2.4.1.1. 
4858 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, paras. 522-534. 
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[…] contain sufficient information to allow verification of their compliance 
with these IRs [Internal Rules]. In particular, the application must provide 
details of the status as a Victim, specify the alleged crime and attach any 
evidence of the injury suffered, or tending to show the guilt of the alleged 
perpetrator’.4859 
  
In addition, the Internal Rules also provide for that ‘Unless provided 
otherwise in these IRs, all evidence is admissible’.4860 Although the ECCC due to 
its inquisitorial system orientation foresees quite an active role for the Judges in, 
inter alia, evidentiary matters,4861 the Supreme Court Chamber in Duch 
established that ‘the ECCC’s mandate and the legal framework that retains the 
features of the civil action require that evidentiary proceedings on reparations 
remain claimant driven’.4862 However, the Supreme Court Chamber also 
observed that the Trial Chamber, presumably mindful of the problems to 
provide official documents, showed flexibility and ‘broadly accepted any 
documentary evidence capable of supporting the claim directly or indirectly’.4863   
 
4.4.2. Modalities of Reparations and their Implementation  
4.4.2.1. Modalities Examined in Duch 
Three general observations applicable not only to Duch but also to the amended 
reparations implementation regime, i.e., applicable to Nuon Chea et al., should 
be considered as for modalities of reparations and their implementation at the 
ECCC. First, as established by the ECCC in Duch, although the Internal Rules do 
not provide, unlike Cambodian domestic law, modalities such as compensation 
and restitution of property, some collective and moral reparations available at 
the ECCC are not available under Cambodian law.4864 Second, as seen in this and 
the next subsection, modalities of reparations that were requested (Duch) or are 
sought (Nuon Chea et al.) at the ECCC mainly fall under the categories of 
satisfaction and rehabilitation following the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines 
classification, previously referred to. Third, like the previous regime,4865 when the 
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4859 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 bis (4).  
4860 Ibid., rule 87 (1).  
4861 See, e.g., Ibid., rules 87 (4) and 93 (1). For further discussion see supra Chapter II 3.4.2.   
4862 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 685.  
4863 Ibid., para. 527.  
4864 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 643 (referring to article 14 of the 2007 Code of Criminal Procedure).    
4865 ECCC Internal Rules, internal rule 23 (11) (Rev. 3); ECCC Internal Rules, internal rule 23 
quinquies (1) (Rev. 5).   
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reparations awards under the new regime are ordered by the Chamber to be 
borne by the accused,4866 the ECCC lacks the competence to enforce reparation 
awards and, accordingly, they can only be enforced, where necessary, within the 
ordinary Cambodian court system pursuant to and satisfying enforcement 
requirements under Cambodian domestic law (including with regard to 
specificity).4867 The difference is that, as seen,4868 unlike the amended reparations 
implementation regime, reparations awards could only be borne by the accused 
under the previous regime.    
Previous versions of the Internal Rules considered in Duch included an 
illustrative list of modalities of collective and moral reparations to be awarded 
against and be borne by the accused ‘a) An order to publish the judgment in any 
appropriate news or other media at the convicted person’s expense; b) An order 
to fund any non-profit activity or service that is intended for the benefit of 
Victims; or c) Other appropriate and comparable forms of reparation’.4869 The 
painstaking analysis by the Trial and the Supreme Court Chambers of the 
modalities of reparations sought by the civil parties in Duch,4870 are examined 
under this subsection. First, civil parties requested that their names and those of 
the immediate victims be included in the final judgment, including a 
specification concerning their connection with the crimes perpetrated at the S-21 
detention centre.4871 The Trial Chamber determined that although reparations at 
the ECCC are strictly speaking restricted to measures ordered against the 
accused, the Trial Chamber alone was able to honoring this request.4872 It was 
also mentioned that similar official acknowledgments of suffering at other 
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4866 ECCC Internal Rules, internal rule 23 quinquies (3) (a).    
4867 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 661. 
4868 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125, 23 September 2011, p. 1. 
4869 ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 (12) (Rev. 3). See also ECCC Internal Rules, rule 23 quinquies (2) 
(Rev. 5).    
4870 As for requests for reparations filed during trial proceedings, containing claims for modalities 
of reparations, see: Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), E/159/3, 14 September 2009, paras. 16, 
21, 24, 26-30 and 45. See also civil parties’ final submissions on reparations: Kaing Guek Eav alias 
Duch (Case 001), E/159/7, 10 November 2009, paras. 119-124; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 
001), E/159/6, 5 October 2009, paras. 14-21; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), E/159/6, 11 
November 2009; Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), E/159/3/1, 17 September 2009.           
As for appeals on reparations, see: Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), F13, 2 November 2010; 
Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal of the Co-Lawyers for the Group 3 Civil Parties 
against the Judgment of 26 July 2010, F9, 5 October 2010.  
4871 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 667.  
4872 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
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international bodies have been considered as reparations of high symbolic 
significance for victims.4873 
Second, as for the civil parties’ request of the compilation and 
publication of all statements of apology by Duch made during the trial, alongside 
the civil parties’ comments on those statements, the Trial Chamber noted that 
although compilation and publication of apology made by Duch is not strictly 
speaking an order against him, it granted on the ground of ‘the widespread 
recognition of similar measures as reparations’.4874 However, the Trial Chamber 
rejected the inclusion of the civil parties’ comments as these were found to be 
different from the apology statements and their content had not been specified. 
Civil parties appealed this finding. The Supreme Court Chamber examined the 
IACtHR’s jurisprudence in which public acceptance of state responsibility and 
apologies have not included victims’ comments on public apologies,4875 and, 
therefore, concluded that ‘Apology as a form of reparation does not foresee the 
participation of victims via their comments on the apologies. Rather what is 
commonly applied is that the form of apology is court-controlled so as to ensure 
its dignity’.4876 Moreover, the Supreme Court Chamber stressed that a convicted’s 
apology which either contains criticism from some of the victims or incorporates 
content that would diminish the convicted, ‘would readily devalue itself and not 
serve the purpose of just satisfaction’.4877  
As for the claims from legal representatives of civil party groups 2 and 3 
expressing doubts about the sincerity of Duch’s apologies, the Supreme Court 
Chamber established that although it is desirable that all the addressees perceive 
an apology as a sincere expression of remorse, sincerity ‘cannot be enforced and 
supplying the apology with comments does not render it more sincere’.4878 The 
Supreme Court Chamber added that although not all victims accept the sincerity 
of apologies, these are still valuable due to the publication and memorialization 
of the harm and the apology as such.4879 Furthermore, by referring to the 
IACtHR’s case law, the Chamber added that apology ‘transcends the time and 
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4874 Ibid., para. 668, footnote 1153.  
4875 IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment of 19 
November 2004, para. 100; IACtHR, Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment of 1 
July 1 2006, para. 406; IACtHR, Case of Zambrano-Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment of 4 July 2007, Series C No. 166, para. 150.       
4876 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 676.   
4877 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4878 Ibid., para. 677. 
4879 Ibid., para. 677. 
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scene of the courtroom’ and, hence, may contribute to ‘just satisfaction in the 
long run and beyond the immediate scene’.4880  
It is herein sustained that although the reference to the IACtHR’s case 
law made by the Supreme Court Chamber concerning apology is in principle 
correct, its confirmation of the Trial Chamber’s reject of the civil parties’ request 
may still be criticized based on two grounds. First, it should be borne in mind 
that apologies alone have been considered to redress, to some small extent, the 
consequences of serious human rights violations.4881 In cases of gross human 
rights abuses, the IACtHR has considered apologies alongside other modalities 
of reparations such as compensation. This need for going a step further when 
sharpening modalities of reparations, i.e., apology in this particular case, is much 
stronger at the ECCC taking into account the quite limited ECCC reparations 
regime at which compensation is not an option. Accordingly, the almost literal 
reliance by the Supreme Court Chamber on the IACtHR’s case law, in this 
particular case, may be considered as de-contextualized and, hence, civil parties’ 
comments should have been included. This would have been more consistent 
with the final objective of reparations for victims, which is after all to redress the 
harm inflicted as much as possible. Second, the Supreme Court Chamber to 
some extent belittled the claims from civil party groups 2 and 3 about the lack of 
sincerity of Duch’s. In fact, these claims were objectively sound since the defence 
requested the acquittal of Duch. Moreover, as seen before,4882 the Bosnian 
Human Rights Chamber has not ordered apologies when they were not made 
voluntarily. Although lack of sincerity and lack of voluntariness are two different 
concepts, it may be argued that in order to ‘compensate’ the perceived lack of 
sincerity by the victims in Duch, the inclusion of their comments would have 
been appropriate. In any case, the Supreme Court Chamber affirmed the Trial 
Chamber’s decision,4883 to ‘compile and post on the ECCC’s official website all 
statements of apology and acknowledgments of responsibility made by KAING 
Guek Eav during the course of the trial, including the appeal stage’.4884   
 
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of 4 May 2004, Series C No. 106, para. 46; IACtHR, Case of Ticona-Estrada et al. v. Bolivia, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 27 November 2008, Series C No. 191, para. 26).   
4881 Pasqualucci (2003) 253.   
4882 See supra Chapter V 4.2.2. 
4883 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 683.  
4884 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
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Third, with regard to requests concerning publication of the judgment 
and outreach, the Trial Chamber noted that the judgment would be issued 
publicly and be made available at its web site and, hence, accessible to all media 
outlets which desire to refer to it.4885 However, the Trial Chamber rejected 
dissemination in the broadcast media of judgment portions on grounds of lack 
of specificity as the exact nature of the measures sought and their costs are 
uncertain and indeterminable and, hence, not amenable to a reparations award 
against Duch.4886 In any case, the Trial Chamber concluded that the public 
provision of information on the judgment will happen as part of the ECCC 
Public Affairs Section’s outreach activities and, thus, likely to contribute 
meaningfully to reconciliation initiatives in Cambodia and public education.4887  
The Supreme Court Chamber determined that although the Trial 
Chamber did not directly address civil parties’ requests to disseminate audio, 
video and documentary material about trial, it considered that those claims were 
dealt with under the heading ‘Requests concerning publication of the judgment 
and outreach’.4888 The Supreme Court Chamber recognized that a wide 
dissemination of the ECCC’s findings and proceedings is an appropriate form of 
reparations and may contribute to the goals of national healing and 
reconciliation by fostering a public and genuine discussion on the past and, 
hence, minimizing denial, distortion of facts and partial truths.4889 However, the 
ECCC reminded that such measures would have to be implemented at the 
expense of the convicted, which is not feasible because of the convicted’s 
indigence.4890 Be that as it may, the Supreme Court Chamber appropriately 
highlighted that many civil party appellants’ proposals fell within the mandates 
of the Public Affairs Section and the VSS,4891 which include outreach activities 
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4885 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 669.  
4886 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4887 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4888 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 706 (referring to the heading 4.4.3.3 (para. 469) of the Trial Chamber’s 
judgment). It should be mentioned that the Supreme Court Chamber, concerning claims not 
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4889 Ibid., paras. 708-709. 
4890 Ibid., para. 709.  
4891 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
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related to victims,4892 and the dissemination of information on the ECCC.4893 The 
Supreme Court Chamber, without overruling the Trial Chamber’s findings, 
directed the above-mentioned ECCC Sections to pay due attention to civil party 
appellants’ claims when undertaking and implementing outreach activities:  
 
The Supreme Court Chamber welcomes the efforts undertaken to date in 
ensuring the distribution of the Trial Judgement brochures, and audio-visual 
material to most communes and provincial officers, and, on demand, to media 
outlets, and further directs these ECCC Sections to undertake appropriate 
additional outreach activities, including dissemination of and information 
about this Appeal Judgment, attaching due consideration to the present claims 
for reparation of the Civil Party Appellants.4894                            
 
Fourth, as for requests which sought directly or indirectly individual 
monetary awards to civil parties or establishment of a fund, the Trial Chamber 
rejected them as being beyond the scope of the available reparations at the 
ECCC.4895 Therefore, requests including the provision of vocational training, 
micro-enterprise loans and business skills training were rejected.4896     
Fifth, as for requests for measures by the Government of Cambodia, the 
Trial Chamber rejected them as they fall outside the ECCC’s jurisdiction, i.e., 
they were measures that could not be satisfied via orders against the 
convicted.4897 Thus, since both the institution of a national commemoration day 
for victims and the issuance of official apology statements fall solely within 
national governmental prerogatives, the ECCC lacks competence to compel 
Cambodia to do so.4898 Concerning the request on an apology letter from the 
Government of Cambodia, the Supreme Court Chamber concurred with the 
Trial Chamber that this request revealed an intention that the reparation be 
performed by the State,4899 although civil party group 2 argued that the request 
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meant to order the convicted to write a letter.4900 The Supreme Court Chamber 
concluded that a governmental apology cannot be ordered within the ECCC’s 
legal framework regardless of being an internationally practiced modality of 
reparations.4901  The Supreme Court Chamber also added that this kind of order 
cannot be enforceable against the convicted based on the principle of law 
whereby it is not feasible to coerce an individual to perform in specie an 
obligation of facere of personal nature.4902  
Although the request of naming 17 public buildings after the victims and 
associated ceremonies was not especially addressed by the Trial Chamber, the 
Supreme Court Chamber considered it as part of the requests for measures by 
Cambodia,4903 which were dismissed by the Trial Chamber.4904 The Supreme 
Court Chamber denied such request as the ECCC lacks power to issue binding 
orders against any third party or orders that would create obligations on a 
person or entity other than the convicted.4905 In any case, the Supreme Court 
Chamber found that ‘designating a national commemoration day, holding of 
official ceremonies, and erection of informative and memoralising plaques are 
appropriate measures of reparation in the circumstances of the present case’.4906 
Concerning the request for the convicted to write an open letter to the 
Government of Cambodia asking that part of the entrance fees for the Tuol Sleng 
museum and Choeung Ek be used to fund reparations, addressed implicitly by 
the Trial Chamber in the requests for measures by the Government of 
Cambodia,4907 it was rejected by the Supreme Court Chamber. The Supreme 
Court Chamber found that it lacks the power to issue binding orders against 
Cambodia.4908       
Sixth, concerning requests for the construction of pagodas and other 
memorials, although the Trial Chamber sympathized with them, the Chamber 
rejected such requests due to the their lack of sufficient specificity concerning the 
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4900 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), F13, 2 November 2010, para. 57; Kaing Guek Eav alias 
Duch (Case 001), Transcripts, 30 March 2011, p. 50, lines 14-18.  
4901 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 679 (referring to IACtHR, Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, 
Judgment of 1 July 1 2006, paras. 96-97). 
4902 Ibid., para. 680.  
4903 Ibid., para. 710.  
4904 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 671. 
4905 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 712.  
4906 Ibid., para. 713. 
4907 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 671.  
4908 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 3 Febuary 2012, para. 716.  
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exact number of memorials sought, their nature, their envisaged location, or 
their estimated cost.4909 The Trial Chamber found that no information was 
provided, e.g., concerning the identity of the owners of all proposed sites, 
whether these provided their consent to the edification of each proposed 
memorial, whether they consented to the construction of each proposed 
memorial, or whether additional administrative authorizations such as building 
permits would be necessary to give effect to each measure.4910 Since the material 
examined by the Trial Chamber does not allow it to render an enforceable order 
against the convicted or a determinable amount in reparations, the Trial 
Chamber rejected the civil parties’ request.4911 The Supreme Court Chamber 
concurred with the Trial Chamber in sympathizing with those requests, and held 
that they directly fell within the meaning of ‘collective and moral reparations’ 
under the Internal Rules.4912 The Supreme Court Chamber found that the ‘moral 
requirement’ is met by: 
 
[…] the fact that memorials restore the dignity of victims, represent a public 
acknowledgement of the crimes committed and harm suffered by victims, and, 
as lasting and prominent symbols, assist in healing the wounds of victims as a 
collective by diffusing their effects far beyond the individuals who were 
admitted as Civil Parties.4913     
 
By referring to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence,4914 the Supreme Court 
Chamber also found that memorials contribute to national reconciliation since 
they strengthen public knowledge of past crimes, promote a culture of peace 
among the current and future generations as well as contribute to ‘a global 
message of concord to all potential visitors’.4915 Having said so, the Supreme 
Court Chamber found two obstacles for granting this request. On the one hand, 
the convicted’s indigence, which makes impossible the enforcement of orders 
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4909 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 672. 
4910 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4911 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4912 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 683.  
4913 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4914 See, e.g., IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment 
of 19 November 2004, Series C No. 116, para. 104; IACtHR, Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment 
of 29 November 2006, para. 236.  
4915 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 683.  
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against him and thus precludes an ‘effective remedy’.4916 On the other hand, 
jurisdictional limitation impedes the imposition of obligations on Cambodia or 
other third parties, which precludes awards that by their nature would require 
such obligations.4917 Concerning the lack of specificity, the Supreme Court 
Chamber determined that it does not constitute a fatal flaw in a reparations 
request as far as the request in question shows that the reparations award sought 
would be otherwise appropriate and enforceable against the convicted. Even 
though specifics of an award should be provided by the civil parties, they may be 
additionally requested from the parties or obtained by the ECCC via its own 
powers.4918 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court Chamber added that the need for 
adjudicating the criminal case within a reasonable time does not permit the 
ECCC to just adopt the IACtHR’s paradigm in reparations,4919 since the IACtHR 
assumes the ultimate task of designing a just and equitable remedy for the 
harmed party as well as creating the reparations it deems appropriate and is even 
not bound by the requests of victims, which was referred to by civil party group 
2.4920  
The Supreme Court Chamber found that the mandate and the 
framework of the ECCC, by retaining the characteristics of the civil action, 
require that the evidentiary proceedings on reparations are claimant-driven.4921 
Thus, a reparations request has to contain a reasonable level of detail, depending 
on the nature of the request, for the ECCC to issue an enforceable reparations 
award.4922 The Chamber also considered that degree of specificity for reparations 
award requests and the prerogatives of government are issues at which the ECCC 
does not permit it to copy from regional human rights mechanisms such as the 
IACtHR, which uses a significantly lower standard of specificity as it passes some 
burden to or gives some discretion to the State when it comes to execution of the 
order.4923  
Thus, the Supreme Court Chamber concluded that the ECCC can only 
endorse the installation of memorials ‘insofar as to confirm that the form of 
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4916 Ibid., para. 684. 
4917 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4918 Ibid., para. 685 (referring to the internal rule 87 (4)).   
4919 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4920 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), F13, 2 November 2010, paras. 72 and 73.   
4921 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 685.  
4922 Ibid., para. 687. 
4923 Ibid., para. 688.  
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reparation is appropriate’.4924 Nevertheless, the Chamber also added that 
specificity is secondary to the question of interference with third parties’ rights 
and governmental prerogatives and, therefore, it is not needed to provide 
technical specifications to order the erection of a monument (unless it were to be 
on land owned by the convicted).4925 However, this request can only be given as 
an enforceable order provided that the issues of ownership and any 
administrative permits are resolved prior to bringing the request at the ECCC.4926 
In the particular requests in Duch, memorials necessarily interfere with third 
party rights and the executive prerogatives and, thus, such interference and not a 
generic lack of specificity, was found by the Supreme Court Chamber to be the 
basis for rejecting those requests.4927 The Chamber found that, among requests 
for memorials, the S-21 Victims’ Memorial presented by civil party group 3 on 
behalf of the Association of Victims of Democratic Kampuchea, ‘Ksem Ksan’, 
including most victims in Duch stood out because of the specificity provided 
and, therefore, was found to be an appropriate form of reparations under the 
ECCC Internal Rules.4928 Nonetheless, the Chamber, rephrasing civil party group 
3,4929 also added that such official and solemn recognition by the ECCC of the 
adequacy of this reparations request is in itself a modality of reparations 
regardless of its future implementation.4930 Moreover, the Chamber denied the 
request due to the indigence of the convicted although it invited and encouraged 
competent national and international entities to facilitate the performance of all 
measures necessary to bring this request into effect.4931   
Seventh, concerning requests to preserve the S-21 detention centre 
archives, Vann Nath’s paintings and the S-21 and S-24 sites, they were rejected 
by the Trial Chamber due to the lack of particulars concerning the legal 
ownership of the sites, archives or items, or whether their owners or possessors 
consent to proposals that they be accessed or altered or the relocation of 
revenues derived from them to civil parties.4932 
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4924 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4925 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4926 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4927 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4928 Ibid., para. 690. 
4929 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Supplemental Submissions Concerning Reparations, 
F25, 30 March 2010, p. 3, last paragraph.  
4930 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), 3 February 2012, para. 691. 
4931 Ibid., para. 692. 
4932 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 673.  
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Eighth, concerning requests for the provision of access to free medical 
care and educational measures, the Trial Chamber rejected them as by their 
nature are not symbolic but instead designed to benefit a large number of 
individual victims and, thus, those reparations requests are outside the scope of 
available reparations at the ECCC.4933 When appealing this decision civil party 
group 2 argued, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber misunderstood its claim as 
they only claimed treatment for 17 people and not for a larger number of 
individual victims.4934 The Supreme Court Chamber started by emphasizing the 
requirement of a causal link between the reparation measures sought by each 
civil party appellant and the injury caused by the crimes for which the accused 
was convicted.4935 Then, with regard to the modality of reparations, the Chamber 
found the provision of physical and/or psychological treatment of the injury as a 
suitable modality of reparations since the injury inflicted on the victims is the 
damage to their physical and/or psychological health.4936 The Chamber moved 
on to examine whether the reparations measure request qualifies as ‘collective 
and moral’.4937 Relying on IACtHR’s jurisprudence,4938 the Supreme Court 
Chamber concluded that the provision of medical and psychological care is an 
appropriate form of reparations and that it falls under the term ‘collective and 
moral’ reparations under the Internal Rules.4939 This modality of reparations is 
especially suitable when it is not possible for the court in question, for example, 
the IACtHR, to identify the totality of victims, i.e., the totality of all the 
reparations beneficiaries and thus to give it, alongside other modalities of 
reparations, instead of providing individual financial reparations.4940  
The last step of analysis by the Supreme Court Chamber consisted in 
what it called ‘enforceability’ of the reparations measure sought.4941 Unlike the 
IACtHR’s case law where it is required a sophisticated administrative structure 
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4933 Ibid., para. 674.  
4934 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), F13, 2 November 2010, para. 90.  
4935 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 699. 
4936 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4937 Ibid., para. 700.  
4938 IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment of 19 
November 2004, para.107.  
4939 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, paras. 700-701. 
4940 IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment of 19 
November 2004, paras. 62 and 92. 
4941 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, paras. 702-703.  
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to be implemented and executed by the State,4942 the ECCC ‘is not vested with 
powers to render binding orders against the Cambodian State […]’.4943 Nor has 
the ECCC an explicit State’s proposal to be able to assist a potentially large, 
undefined category of beneficiaries,4944 unlike the practice related to the 
IACtHR.4945 These previous considerations must be read ‘In the context of the 
ECCC [where] orders can only be borne by convicted persons’,4946 under the 
previous reparations implementation regime. The Supreme Court Chamber 
concluded that although the provision of medical care constitutes in general an 
appropriate modality of reparations, the reparations request is not maturate 
enough to be singled out for the Chamber’s individual endorsement due to the 
lack of, inter alia, information on the estimated cost of the reparations, the 
number and identities of beneficiaries and duration and modality of the 
treatments needed.4947  
Ninth, concerning paid visits for civil parties to memorial sites, not 
addressed directly by the Trial Chamber, the Supreme Court Chamber noted 
that implementing this request would entail financial investment and significant 
administrative and logistic arrangements.4948 Due to the complete lack of basic 
technical data, which did not allow the assessment of the reasonableness and 
costs of this request, the Chamber did not endorse this claim as an appropriate 
modality of reparations, not even as a non-binding recommendation.4949     
Thus, although the Supreme Court Chamber acknowledged that the civil 
party appellants, in particular group 2, have proposed several, in principle, 
appropriate forms of reparations, they could not be granted due to the ECCC 
reparation framework and the indigence of the convicted:  
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4942 IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment of 19 
November 2004, para. 108; IACtHR, Case of the ‘Juvenile Reeducation Institute’ v. Paraguay, 
Judgment of 2 September 2004, paras. 318-320; IACtHR, Case of Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El 
Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 1 March 2005, Series C No. 120, para. 198.      
4943 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 703.   
4944 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4945  IACtHR, Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment of 19 
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4946 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
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The Supreme Court Chamber recognises the suffering of the victims as well as 
their right to obtain effective forms of reparation under internationally 
established standards. It further notes that the Civil Party Appellants, and CPG2 
in particular, have advanced numerous requests that represent, in general terms, 
appropriate forms of reparation for the harm suffered (for instance, the 
provision of medical and psychological treatment for direct and indirect 
victims, naming public buildings after victims and installation of informative 
plaques, holding commemorative ceremonies, and erection of memorials such 
as pagodas, pagoda fences and monuments). 
Nevertheless, due to the constraints stemming from the ECCC reparation 
framework as outlined above, these specific requests cannot be granted. 
Considering that several requests have been rejected also on the basis of KAING 
Guek Eav’s indigence, and while appreciating that some of them have been 
adequately specified, the Supreme Court Chamber encourages national 
authorities, the international community, and other potential donors to provide 
financial and other forms of support to develop and implement these 
appropriate forms of reparation.4950   
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s 
rejection of claims for reparations and at the same time affirmed the reparations 
measures concerning the compilation and posting on the ECCC’s web-site of the 
convicted’s apologies made during the trial, including the appeal stage.4951 
 
4.4.2.2. Modalities under the Amended Reparations Implementation Regime 
in Nuon Chea et al. 
As seen in the previous sub-section, a decisive factor to reject the collective and 
moral reparations proposed by civil parties in Duch was (almost) 
insurmountable obstacles for their implementation (due to the ECCC 
framework and the convicted’s indigence) although those proposals in most of 
cases were in principle considered by the Trial and Supreme Court Chambers as 
appropriate reparations measures. However, as previously examined,4952 the 
regime of implementation of reparations awards at the ECCC was amended in 
September 2010,4953 and is applicable to Nuon Chea et al. In particular, internal 
rule 23 quinquies (3) (b) lays down that:  
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4951 Ibid., p. 321.  
4952 See supra Chapter V 2.4.3.2.  
4953 This amendment came via Revision 6 of the ECCC Internal Rules adopted on 17 September 
2010.  
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3. In deciding the modes of implementation Chamber may, in respect of each 
award, either: 
a) order that the costs of the award shall be borne by the convicted person; or 
b) recognise that a specific project appropriately gives effect to the award sought 
by the Lead Co-Lawyers and may be implemented. Such project shall have been 
designed or identified in cooperation with the Victims Support Section and have 
secured sufficient external funding [emphasis added]. 
 
In turn, as previously examined, the VSS may in liaison with an external 
entity (having secured funding) implement reparations awards, as established 
under internal rule 12 bis 2 ‘The Victims Support Section shall, in co-operation 
with the Lead Co-Lawyers, and, where appropriate, in liaison with governmental 
and non-governmental organisations, endeavour to identify, design and later 
implement projects envisaged by Rule 23quinquies (3)(b)’.    
The Supreme Court Chamber in Duch, concerning the request for 
provision of medical treatment and psychological services for civil parties, 
remarked that a workable solution (for Nuon Chea et al. and other 
ongoing/future cases) may be the setting up of an externally-subsidized trust 
fund, whose administrative structure would be tasked with the implementation 
of measures asked.4954 Indeed, as appropriately highlighted by the Chamber,4955 
the amendments to the Internal Rules, explicitly establish that the ECCC can 
recognize reparations projects designed and identified by the civil parties’ lead 
co-lawyers in cooperation with the VSS, under internal rule 23 quinquies (3) (b) 
above-quoted. Although the Supreme Court Chamber in Duch welcomed this 
new innovative regime, it noted that it was not applicable in Duch (Case 001).4956 
Thus, it found that the Trial Chamber in Duch correctly dismissed the request to 
establish a trust fund.4957 Accordingly, the Supreme Court Chamber merely 
encouraged the civil parties in Duch, many of whom are also civil parties in 
Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002),4958 and to which case internal rule 23 quinquies (3) 
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4955 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4956 Ibid., Loc. cit. 
4957 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, para. 670.  
4958 As of 3 February 2012, the date when the Supreme Court Chamber issued its judgment, 69 out 
of the 94 civil parties who participated in Duch were admitted as civil parties in Nuon Chea et al. 
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(b) applies, to seek, for example, the provision of access to free medical care via 
the amended system.4959  
The Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea et al., concerning certain categories of 
reparations initially specified by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, made the 
following precisions. First, no request for collective or individual financial 
compensation for civil parties or the establishment of trust fund for this end can 
be entertained by the Trial Chamber in Nuon Chea et al.4960 This approach is 
coherent as although there has been a change in the ECCC regime for 
implementation of reparations awards, compensation is explicitly excluded 
under internal rule 23 quinquies (1) from the reparations modalities available at 
the ECCC. It is also necessary here to remind that the ECCC still lacks power to 
order Cambodia to implement reparations.  
Second, with regard to requests for measures requiring governmental 
approval such as the provision of citizenship to Vietnamese victims and 
instituting a day of remembrance, the Trial Chamber found that these may be 
only endorsed by it if it is clear that those measures have been approved or 
implemented by Cambodia.4961 Third, the Trial Chamber noticed that a number 
of other reparations measures sought lacked sufficient specificity to allow it to 
give a meaningful comment at that stage.4962 Those proposals included: i) the 
setting up of stupas and memorial sites; ii) preservation of killing sites; iii) 
creation of educational programs about the history of Cambodia and for 
children; iv) establishment of a framework of psychological support for victims 
and the creation of centers to provide such services; and v) the establishment of 
museums, archives or libraries in Phnom Penh.4963 The Trial Chamber stated 
that depending on what is specifically envisaged in each measure, some may also 
constitute measures that require specific governmental approval or 
authorization. Although some measures may be appropriately conceived, the 
Trial Chamber reminded the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers of practical issues to be 
addressed so as to guarantee that even a limited cross-section of those measures 
may meaningfully be achieved within the applicable time-frame.4964  
Fourth, with regard to requests for measures falling within the scope of 
the ECCC’s legal framework such as dissemination of the Case 002 Judgment(s) 
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4960 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/125, 23 September 2011, p. 3. 
4961 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4962 Ibid., Loc. cit.  
4963 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), Transcripts, 29 June 2011, pp. 107-109.  
4964 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E/125, 23 September 2011, p. 3.  
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and compilation of a list of civil parties,4965 the Trial Chamber found them to be 
akin to measures previously recognized, in Duch, ‘as appropriate and achievable 
measures within the specific ECCC context’.4966  
The Trial Chamber gave civil parties’ lead co-lawyers the opportunity to 
supplement, update and, where necessary, remedy the initial specifications 
provided during the initial hearing and according to the above-mentioned 
guidelines/observations.4967 Accordingly, the lead co-lawyers addressed the Trial 
Chamber’s observations putting forward, inter alia, the following points.4968 First, 
it was stressed, at that time, that the judgment of the Supreme Court Chamber in 
Duch would provide guidance on devising and refining the reparations claimants 
being prepared by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers and civil parties’ lawyers.4969 
This judgment has previously been examined. Second, it was highlighted the 
coordination and meetings among civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, civil parties’ 
lawyers and the VSS to identify the reparations projects and assess their 
feasibility pursuant internal rule 23 quinquies (3) (b).4970 
Third, as for the establishment of a trust fund, the lead co-lawyers 
clarified that what it is sought is to finance legally sound reparations projects.4971 
Accordingly, the constitution of an independent non-governmental, quasi 
administrative body, outside the ECCC was proposed to implement reparations 
awards ordered by the ECCC and to allocate funds for that effect.4972 Fourth, as 
for measures requiring governmental approval, it was highlighted that while it is 
required official governmental approval, it is not needed governmental action.4973 
Thus, for example, concerning a day of remembrance, it was clarified that the 
civil parties did not seek that the ECCC orders Cambodia to implement it as they 
referred to be working in collaboration with Cambodia before finalizing their 
claim and, only then, they would require the Chamber to endorse the 
outcome.4974 Fifth, as for specificity required for other measures, it was claimed 
the need for a definition of what was understood by ‘requisite specificity’ and 
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4968 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012. See also Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 
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‘sufficient specificity’.4975 As, previously mentioned, the Supreme Court Chamber 
in Duch determined that problems with enforceability rather than lack of a 
generic (technical) specificity to be the basis to reject reparations requests such 
as the installation of memorials.4976 Sixth, with regard to measures within the 
ECCC’s legal framework, it was considered, under the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines,4977 that it should be awarded reparations awards much more 
proportional to the gravity of the violation and harm inflicted than the mere 
publication of court documents.4978                         
Finally, concerning update and further details of the initial specifications 
on reparations, the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers, in collaboration with the VSS, 
analyzed the requests from the 11 legal teams representing civil parties in Nuon 
Chea et al. and identified four main categories where projects may be 
implemented.4979 The first category is remembrance and memorialization, which 
aims at commemorating victims’ lives and deaths and providing literal and 
metaphoric spaces for grieving and reflection, consists of: i) facilitation of a 
memorial day; ii) stupas and monuments; iii) ceremonies; and iv) preservation of 
crimes sites.4980 The second category is rehabilitation, which consists in a range 
of awards aiming to restore the victims’ mental and physical health or at least 
mitigate their harm,4981 i.e., projects to establish psychological and physical 
health services and to support a self-help group.4982 The third category is 
documentation/education, which includes measures to preserve and understand 
the history of the Khmer Rouge and the individual victims’ experiences,4983 i.e., 
school curriculum, documentation center/museum/archives/libraries, victims 
register and publication of the civil parties’ names in the judgment.4984  
The last category encompasses ‘other projects’, which were presented as 
part of international mainstream definitions of reparations.4985 Those projects 
include the setting of a trust fund although the lead co-lawyers correctly pointed 
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out that collective or individual monetary awards cannot be entertained.4986 On 
the contrary, as previously examined,4987 that trust fund project, in process of 
development, would be constituted in order to support genuine and sustainable 
reparations,4988 and in addition to civil parties, it was said it could benefit via 
collective and moral reparations victims in a broader sense.4989 The second 
project proposed was the creation of an entity to monitor the implementation of 
reparations after the verdict.4990 Concerning granting Cambodian citizenship to 
Vietnamese victims, it was clarified that actually it was only intended to facilitate 
applications for citizenship.4991 The last project proposed was to identify 
requirements and preferences for professional training and, to implement it, the 
Cambodian Government would be invited.4992 
The civil parties’ lead co-lawyers acknowledged that their projects are 
ambitious and difficult to implement and that is their responsibility to prepare 
reparations projects to be feasibly implemented;4993 however, they stressed that 
reparations should be meaningful for civil parties and not only limited to the 
‘easy options’ to be implemented.4994 This may be understood as the IACtHR has 
considered declaration of wrongfulness, for example, via the issuance of the 
judgment, as insufficient in cases concerning serious human rights violations.4995  
At the time of writing this thesis, in Case 002/01, within Nuon Chea et 
al., as previously noted,4996 upon Trial Chamber’s request, the civil parties’ lead 
co-lawyers have submitted a prioritized list of reparations projects. In order to 
endorse the reparations projects, the Trial Chamber has set the following 
requirements: 
 
1) Proof of consent and cooperation of any involved third party has to be 
demonstrated; 
2) Funding has to be fully secured, as the Chamber cannot endorse a reparation 
project that has secured partial funding only;  
 
4986 Ibid., paras. 79-80.  
4987 See supra Chapter V 2.4.3.2.  
4988 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E125/2, 12 March 2012, para. 83.  
4989 Ibid., para. 84.  
4990 Ibid., para. 85.  
4991 Ibid., paras. 88 and 90.  
4992 Ibid., paras. 94 and 95.  
4993 Ibid., paras. 100-101.  
4994 Ibid., para. 99.  
4995 IACtHR, Case of Bulacio v. Argentina, Judgment of 18 September 2003, para. 96.    
4996 See supra Chapter V 3.4.2.1. 
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3) Any necessary additional information shall be provided to the Chamber, such 
as detailed descriptions (including sketches and/or pictures) and budget plans 
of proposals.4997  
 
A brief presentation of these projects, which have been grouped up by 
the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers under three categories, and the Trial Chamber’s 
observations on them follow. 
First category (remembrance and memorialization), which consists in 
three projects: i) remembrance day, which fulfills the requirements as Cambodia 
has set May 20 every year for that;4998 ii) public memorials initiative, about which 
no funding has yet been secured;4999 and iii) a memorial in remembrance of 
victims entitled ‘those who are no longer with us’, about which only partial 
funding (from France) has been secured and the Phnom Penh municipality’s 
commitment is still outstanding.5000 
Second category (rehabilitation), which consists in two projects: i) 
testimonial therapy, which aims to provide civil parties in Nuon Chea et al. ‘the 
means to address the psychological suffering caused by the crimes perpetrated 
against them by talking and recording the traumatic experiences with mental 
health workers’ and such testimonials ‘would later be read aloud in public 
ceremonies in accordance with religious or spiritual beliefs and cultural 
practices’,5001 has received partial funding (from Germany) but it has been 
requested to clarify whether that funding is sufficient to cover the 36 months to 
implement the project (planned in conjunction with the Transcultural 
Psychological Organization Cambodia) or if there were no further funding for 
how long the project could continue;5002 and ii) self-help groups, which would 
provide the civil parties in Nuon Chea et al. ‘with collective therapy through 
participation in eight group sessions, permitting them to talk about their 
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4997 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 2013, para. 3. 
4998 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 23 August 2013, para. 5; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 
2013, para. 4  
4999 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 23 August 2013, para. 6; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 
2013, para. 4.  
5000 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 23 August 2013, para. 7; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 
2013, para. 4.  
5001 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 1 August 2013, para. 3.  
5002 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 23 August 2013, para. 8; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 1 August 
2013, para. 3; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 2013, para. 5.   
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suffering’,5003 and about which the same situation/observations concerning the 
previous project are applicable.5004           
Third category (documentation and education), which consists in three 
projects: i) mobile exhibition and education project, which seeks to establish an 
educational exhibition to inform and educate post-war generations of 
Cambodians about the crimes perpetrated during the Khmer Rouge period,5005 
whose funding (from Germany) and the commitment from implementing non-
governmental organizations has been secured;5006 ii) permanent exhibition 
(implemented by non-governmental organizations) that includes documents, 
photographs, relics, multi-media testimonies of civil parties and other survivors, 
historical dioramas, artistic displays and other interactive, educational and 
dialogue components to educate the public about the Khmer rouge regime and 
about which only partial funding has been secured and, thus, it is necessary to 
clarify whether, if were not given further funding, for how long the project 
(originally set for 24 months) could continue;5007 and iii) history book chapters, 
about which the Trial Chamber reminded the civil parties that it:  
 
[…] is unable to endorse any book chapter on facts that are currently under 
judicial consideration and need to be finally adjudicated. Therefore even though 
the idea is generally laudable, the Trial Chamber cannot provide any official 
endorsement regarding this project.5008     
 
Lastly, but equally important, as previously said, the ECCC reparations 
orders cannot be issued against Cambodia. Be that as it may, according to 
internal rule 113 (1), enforcement of reparations granted under rule 23 quinquies 
(3) (a), i.e., those borne by the accused:  
 
[…] shall be done by appropriate [Cambodian] national authorities in 
accordance with Cambodian law on the initiative of any member of the 
collective group, unless the verdict specifies that a particular award shall be 
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5003 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 1 August 2013, para. 3.   
5004 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 23 August 2013, para. 7; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 
2013, para. 5. 
5005 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 1 August 2013, para. 3. 
5006 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 23 August 2013, para. 9; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 
2013, para. 6. 
5007 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 1 August 2013, para. 1 ; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 23 August 
2013, para. 10 ; Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 2013, para. 7.  
5008 Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), 6 September 2013, para. 8. 
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granted in relation only to a specified group. In such case, any member of the 
specified group shall instead initiate enforcement of that award.5009 
 
In turn, enforcement of reparations orders under rule 23 quinquies (3) 
(b), which were examined under this subsection, ‘does not fall within the scope 
of this Rule [rule 113 (1)]’. 
 
4.5. Comparative Conclusions 
A preliminary observation is that when the ICC and the ECCC have discussed 
aspects relevant to collective and/or individual reparations and modalities of 
reparations, they have paid attention to the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines 
and jurisprudence of regional human rights courts, especially that of the 
IACtHR. With regard to claiming and being granted individual and/or collective 
reparations, whereas at the ICC, upon the respective Chamber’s assessment, 
reparations may be granted on individual or collective basis, at the ECCC only 
collective and moral reparations can be granted according to its Internal Rules, 
which have accordingly been applied in Duch and in the ongoing Nuon Chea et 
al.   
Whereas individual reparations at the ICC may normally be 
compensation, they can also take other forms such as restitution and 
rehabilitation. If individual reparations are directly ordered by the ICC, these 
might be more individualized than when made by the TFV. The TFV may be 
involved in distributing individual awards when it is impossible or impracticable 
for the ICC to make reparations directly. According to the ICC RPE, collective 
reparations at the ICC can be made through the TFV, which is in practice 
normally expected, for example, in Lubanga. The TFV’s draft implementation 
plan for collective reparations has to be approved by the ICC. Then, such plan is 
included in a reparations order, implemented by the TFV but 
monitored/supervised by an ICC Chamber, for instance, in Lubanga. The ICC 
may order the distribution of collective awards through an organization 
approved by the TFV. There may be three main possibilities to provide collective 
reparations. First, to give a sum to an entity representing the victims and it may 
then decide how to distribute the sum. The outcome may thus be individualized 
but the process is collective. Second, collective reparations can be given via a 
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5009 See also Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), Appeal Judgment, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 
February 2012, para. 665 (‘[…] there is no doubt that [Cambodian] domestic courts are bound to 
give effect to the ECCC reparation orders against convicted persons, similar to any other 
reparation order issued by domestic courts’.). 
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financial award issued by the ICC in favor of community institutions/projects 
(e.g., with rehabilitative purposes) authorized by either an organization 
(approved by the TFV) or authorized by the TFV or by a Chamber themselves. 
Third, collective awards can also be symbolic such as public apologies. The 
IACtHR’s case law on reparations may be mutatis mutandi illustrative when 
implementing the above-mentioned three main possibilities. Also, the ICC may 
use the cy press doctrine, employed in, for example, the United States, when it 
orders collective awards or fixed lump sums as may be impossible to give 
reparations to all victims. Although the ICC Trial Chamber I in its reparations 
decision in Lubanga has concluded that individual and collective reparations are 
not mutually exclusive, it has endorsed the TFV’s recommendation to focus on 
collective reparations, following a community-based approach, as these would be 
more beneficial than individual reparations.   
Collective reparations are available at the ICC and the ECCC although in 
the latter they cannot include compensation and restitution of property as only 
‘collective and moral’ reparations can be granted, i.e., to redress moral but not 
material damages and via collective awards. In any case, it is concluded here that 
collective reparations are in principle most suitable in the context of 
international and hybrid criminal courts based on four reasons. First, the 
collective nature of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC and the ECCC 
and, hence, violence predominantly collective should in principle be redressed 
collectively as crimes under the ICC and the ECCC are mainly perpetrated 
against a group or collectivity rather than an individual in particular. Second, 
implementing individual reparations is difficult due to, inter alia, the limited 
resources available at those courts. Third, victims may value collective 
reparations in a more constructive way. Fourth, via some modalities of collective 
reparations, e.g., public apologies, memorials or some rehabilitative measures, 
the scope of reparations beneficiaries may at least indirectly include victims who 
did not have the opportunity to claim reparations or who were not even 
identified at the ICC or the ECCC.     
Having said so, individual reparations may also play an important role to 
redress the harm of victims and, therefore, their complete exclusion from the 
ECCC reparations regime may be criticized. The reasons for this criticism, which 
also highlight their applicability in the ICC reparations regime, are basically 
three. First, victims’ requests and expectations, e.g., in Lubanga some victims 
have manifested preference for individual reparations over collective ones, and 
in Duch, some civil parties showed some disappointment and frustration when 
they realized that they would not receive any (financial) individual reparation. 
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Second, there are certain difficulties to implement collective reparations, 
including not paying sufficient attention to the individual dimension of the 
crimes. Third, international human rights standards are expressed in individual 
terms and individual awards may better recognize the status of each victim as a 
reparations right holder. 
Accordingly, in agreement with the ICC and relevant IACtHR’s case law 
on reparations, the best approach in cases of international crimes/serious human 
rights violations is to focus on collective reparations but without excluding 
individual reparations. Therefore, the complete exclusion of individual 
reparations from the ECCC regime is herein considered as detrimental to the 
status of victims as reparations claimants. In any case, some collective 
reparations normally report also individual benefits, i.e., dual collective-
individual benefits from collective (and moral) reparations, e.g., scholarships 
provided to a collective of victims. Be that as it may, reparations, inter alia, 
should be appropriate, adequate and prompt and be awarded without 
discrimination.    
When it comes to standard of proof for granting reparations, the ICC’s 
reparations decision and the ECCC’s Internal Rules/case law agree on the 
‘balance of probabilities’, ‘preponderance of proof/evidence’ or ‘more likely than 
not to be true’ standard, which is less demanding than the ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ standard required for conviction. Such standard also corresponds to 
national practice, civil claims commissions, human rights’ case law and the 
ICTY/ICTR Statutes provisions on restitution. As for the burden of proof, 
although in principle victims are the ones who have to prove their reparations 
claims at the ICC and the ECCC, these courts and their instruments are flexible 
and the Judges using their own powers may call relevant evidence. This approach 
is sound as victims normally face problems to obtain pertinent evidence for their 
reparations claims.       
Collective and individual reparations can take several modalities or 
forms. When it comes to modalities of reparations, the ICC is the international 
criminal judicial forum which in principle provides victims as reparations 
claimants with the broader array of possibilities, in accordance with the UN 
Basic Principles and Guidelines and human rights bodies’ jurisprudence, 
especially that of the IACtHR. In contrast, the ECCC Internal Rules explicitly 
exclude compensation from the modalities of reparations available at the ECCC. 
Moreover, in Duch even though an important number of reparations requests 
asked by the civil parties were considered as appropriate, they were rejected due 
to implementation problems caused in turn by the ECCC’s framework and the 
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convicted’s indigence. This situation is expected to be dealt better under the 
amended regime applicable to Nuon Chea et al., although its severance in mini-
trials has to be handled carefully as for collective reparations modalities to avoid 
tensions among the several groups of reparations claimants. 
Implementation/enforcement problems may be also present in some modalities 
of reparations at the ICC; however, this presents (much) better chances to 
handle these challenges than the ECCC due to the existence of the TFV and its 
international scope involving assistance/cooperation of a large number of States 
Parties to the ICC Statute and the international community.  
At the ICC, restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and other 
modalities (which mainly includes satisfaction) are foreseen in its Statute and 
have been accordingly discussed in Trial Chamber I’s reparations decision and 
related submissions in Lubanga. First, restitution seeks to restore the victims to 
his/her situation before the crime took place; however, due to the nature of 
international crimes this is frequently unachievable. Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL and also examined national systems, which conceive restitution (as 
a penalty) limited to restitution of property/proceeds, restitution as a reparations 
modality is not restricted to it but the ICC would need to rely on state 
cooperation for that kind of specific restitution.  
Second, as for compensation, it has been considered physical damage, 
moral/non material damage, material damage (including loss of earnings and 
property), lost opportunities, and, inter alia, legal and medical services as 
assessable damages. These categories are similar to those found by the regional 
human rights courts, in particular the IACtHR’s case law, and the national 
practice examined. Generally speaking, compensation can be considered 
necessary to redress harm in international crimes/serious human rights 
violations cases. Whether compensation is a feasible reparations modality at the 
ICC may be decided on factors such as accused’s assets and/or available funds, 
quantifiable harm and the existence of a limited or definable group of victims. 
For its implementation, the TFV’s funds might be used. In any case, 
compensation in national systems is the most common modality of reparations 
and/or is often present as financial penalty.  
Third, rehabilitation includes provision of medical, psychological as well 
as relevant legal and social services, reintegration of child soldiers, and may 
include the victims’ communities in the sense that rehabilitation programs are 
implemented in those locations. Implementation difficulties may be sorted out 
via the TFV’s know-how and by implementing programs for case-based 
reparations claimants or, as a second option, by placing them in TFV’s on-going 
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assistance programs but identifying them as reparations beneficiaries. The 
convicted (if not indigent) should also contribute to the funding of rehabilitative 
reparations measures.  
As for other modalities of reparations at the ICC, Trial Chamber I in its 
reparations decision in Lubanga has listed conviction and sentence as such and 
apologies from the convicted, which constitute satisfaction measures, alongside 
others, mainly satisfaction measures, such as (educational) campaigns to 
enhance victims’ situation, certificates on victims’ harm, and outreach and 
promotional programs to reduce stigmatization and marginalization of victims, 
in whose implementation Trial Chamber I has considered its broad jurisdiction 
and the cooperation/assistance from States Parties to the ICC Statute and the 
international community. Although not explicitly considered by Trial Chamber 
I, satisfaction measures such as naming of a street/school after the victims, public 
monuments and commemoration, search for the whereabouts of the 
disappeared, for the identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of the 
killed victims, and assistance to recover, identify and bury the bodies normally 
require state action and cooperation. Moreover, obligations to identify/sanction 
those responsible not prosecuted by the ICC (satisfaction) and amend laws 
(guarantees of non-repetition) are per se state obligations. Additionally, when 
involving ex state agents, these measures may be implemented by a domestic 
(civil) court and/or a regional human rights body, which may in turn rely on the 
ICC’s findings. Concerning guarantees of non-repetition, it might be possible to 
adapt them to the ICC case-based reparations regime as the ICC can always call 
upon the States Parties to the ICC Statute and the international community in 
general to act responsibly and promote reconciliation. Although reparations 
orders cannot be issued against States, with regard to their enforcement, States 
Parties to the ICC Statute are obligated to cooperate with the ICC and give effect 
to the ICC reparations orders.  
When it comes to the ECCC, in Duch and Nuon Chea et al., reparations 
measures, which were requested and are being sought respectively, fall mainly 
into the categories of satisfaction and rehabilitation. Compensation and 
restitution of property are outside the ECCC’s scope. Those modalities and their 
implementation were analyzed here in the light of both the former and the 
current reparations implementation regimes at the ECCC. In any case, when 
awards are ordered to be borne by the convicted, they need to be enforced in 
ordinary Cambodian courts. About the former regime (applied in Duch), 
although most of the requests were considered as appropriate collective and 
moral reparations, only two were accepted due to implementation obstacles and, 
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to some extent, lack of specificity. Convicted’s indigence, the ECCC’s lack of 
power to order Cambodia to implement reparations, and the absence of a 
mechanism similar to the TFV explain that outcome. The reparations requests 
granted by the ECCC were that names of civil parties and their immediate family 
members were included in the trial judgment, and that public statements of 
apology by the convicted during the proceedings were compiled and attached to 
the appeal judgment, which are available at the ECCC’s web site. These 
reparations requests were implemented by the ECCC itself. However, it was not 
accepted to include victims’ comments to the apology compilation, which may 
be questioned considering the ECCC’s quite limited reparations regime and the 
arguable need to ‘compensate’ the civil parties’ perception of lack of sincerity 
from the accused.  
Even though most of the rejected reparations modalities were considered 
appropriate, the Supreme Court Chamber could only encourage external actors 
(including Cambodia and the international community) to provide (financial) 
support to implement them. These reparations requests are summarized as 
follows. First, although broadcast media dissemination of judgment portions was 
considered appropriate, it was rejected as the (unspecified) costs could not be 
afforded by the convicted. In any case, posting the judgments in the ECCC’s web 
site and related outreach and dissemination activities undertaken by ECCC 
sections were considered sufficient. Second, requests for individual monetary 
awards or a fund for, for example, micro-enterprise loans were rejected. Third, 
symbolic measures such as a national day, naming of buildings after the victims, 
official ceremonies, plaques and a government’s letter of apology were 
considered appropriate; however, they were rejected due to the ECCC’s lack of 
power to order Cambodia to implement those measures. Fourth, although 
requests for construction of pagodas and other memorials were considered 
proper reparations and also to contribute to national reconciliation, they got 
rejected because of the convicted’s indigence, lack of ECCC’s power to order 
Cambodia to do so and, to some extent, lack of specificity. Fifth, preservation of 
paintings, sites and archives were rejected due to lack of specifications. Sixth, 
although free medical care and educational measures were found appropriate, 
they were rejected due to the ECCC’s lack of power to order Cambodia to do so. 
Seventh, paid visits for civil parties to memorial sites were rejected as no basic 
information was provided. 
Under the ECCC’s current reparations implementation regime, internal 
rule 23 quinquies (b), applicable to Nuon Chea et al., provides with the possibility 
to implement reparations modalities like most of those rejected in Duch, starting 
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with the early identification of reparations projects by the civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers in coordination with the VSS. The in-advance feasibility assessment of 
these projects (to be potentially later granted) by the Trial Chamber has been 
taking place in Nuon Chea et al. What has not been changed is that reparations 
can only be ‘collective and moral’ and compensation is still excluded, besides the 
ECCC’s lack of power to order Cambodia to implement reparations. However, 
there has been inter alia a project for an externally financed trust fund to finance 
reparations requests as the co-accused are indigents. Thus, the VSS in liaison 
with, for example, a trust fund, may implement reparations. Reparations projects 
have included edification of memorial sites and stupas, a framework of 
psychological support and respective centers, establishment of museums and 
preservation of crime sites. The Trial Chamber has requested further 
information on steps to implement them as at least some of them may require 
Cambodia’s approval. The lead co-lawyers have provided further information, 
including some ongoing dialogue with the Cambodian Government. 
Dissemination of the (future) judgment(s) and compilation of a civil party list 
have not been found contentious. Even though modalities of reparations and 
their implementation are in process of being crafted, the lead co-lawyers have 
stressed the importance of meaningful reparations and added that some 
reparations projects may benefit not only civil parties but also victims (in a 
broader sense). In Case 002/01, within Nuon Chea et al., the prioritized list of 
reparations projects of the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers consists in remembrance 
and memorialization, rehabilitation, and documentation and education. At the 
moment of writing this thesis, these reparations projects are still under 
development and fall under the modalities of satisfaction, rehabilitation and, to 
some extent, guarantees of non-repetition. The Trial Chamber has already 
endorsed some reparations projects. Whether the Trial Chamber will finally 
endorse the outstanding prioritized reparations projects will depend on any 
involved third party’s consent/cooperation, the existence of funding, and any 
necessary additional information. In any case, even though ECCC reparations 
orders cannot be rendered against Cambodia, only concerning reparations 
orders to be borne by the accused, Cambodia is obliged to give effect to them.              
Although victims lack reparations claimant status at the ICTY, the ICTR, 
the SCSL and the STL, possibilities for some modalities of reparations foreseen at 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL instruments are restitution of property and 
proceeds (as a financial penalty), compensation (delegated to national systems) 
and rehabilitation/support (granted only to victims as witnesses or potential 
witnesses). At the STL, references are only to compensation (delegated to 
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national systems) and rehabilitation (for witnesses). In practice, only 
rehabilitation at the ICTR (mainly) via the provisions of medical care, especially 
anti-retroviral drugs against HIV/AIDS, has been implemented but limited 
solely to witnesses or potential witnesses and concerning sexual violence victims. 
However, unlike the ICTY, at the ICTR support for witnesses has not been 
limited to their testimony at the tribunal but has been expanded to pre-trial and 
post-trial. The availability of quite scarce resources from the respective voluntary 
trust funds has been a feature common to the ICTY and the ICTR, which 
explains the limited development of rehabilitation as a modality of reparations. 
In Rwanda, via an ICTR’s early cancelled support program, a peace village was 
built by a NGO, which constitutes a symbolic modality of reparations, arguably 
satisfaction. Be that as it may, in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia region, and 
Sierra Leone, victims of crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICTR, the ICTY, 
and the SCSL have respectively benefited from modalities of reparations 
including compensation (normally not enforced though), restitution, 
rehabilitation and symbolic measures granted by institutions set up in the former 
Yugoslavia region (especially the Human Rights Chamber and concerning 
property claims the hybrid criminal courts in Kosovo and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina constitute an option), national Rwandan institutions/courts and the 
Sierra Leonean reparations program. However, as far as it is known, the 
‘delegation’ to national systems for the victims to obtain compensation, as 
envisioned in the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL instruments, has not been 
implemented and restitution order provisions at these courts remain theoretical. 
Concerning the examined national systems, it is concluded that victims 
have been most commonly awarded compensation and/or restitution of 
property either as a financial penalty or as reparation via civil court litigation or 
by state schemes/funds. Nevertheless, concerning state funds, other modalities of 
reparations such as satisfaction (United States) and rehabilitation (France) have 
also been granted. As for the ECtHR judgments against the United Kingdom and 
France, compensation has normally been granted. The state obligation to 
investigate and sanction perpetrators, i.e., satisfaction, has also been stressed by 
the ECtHR. 
 
5. Chapter Conclusions 
1. At the level of the international and hybrid criminal courts that have been 
examined in this thesis, the status of victims as reparations claimants only exist 
at the ICC and the ECCC, which is similar to the situation existent in the French 
system. At the ICC and the ECCC, reparations orders may only be issued against 
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the convicted person although they may be implemented by the TFV (ICC), or 
potentially with external funding by the VSS in liaison with non-governmental 
organizations, e.g., an externally subsidized trust fund, and governmental 
organizations under the new reparations implementation regime (ECCC). The 
main difference when it comes to the scope of reparations claimants and 
beneficiaries at the ICC and the ECCC is that while in the former victims can 
claim and benefit from reparations without holding the status of victim 
participants, in the latter victims need to be civil parties to claim collective and 
moral reparations. Indeed, this is one of the two purposes of civil party 
constitution and, thus, civil party participation includes the right to seek 
collective and moral reparations at the ECCC. In other words, whereas at the 
ICC victims’ status as reparations claimants is independent from their status as 
victim participants, at the ECCC the constitution of victims as civil parties is a 
sine qua non condition to be reparations claimants, which is a feature also 
present in the French criminal proceedings. Having said so, there are important 
similarities in the victims’ status as reparations claimants at the ICC and the 
ECCC. First, some modalities of collective reparations may benefit not only the 
reparations claimants but, at least indirectly, those individuals who could not 
apply for reparations, could not be identified and/or for whom no one claimed 
reparations benefits at the ICC or who could not become civil parties at the 
ECCC. Second, victims’ harm to be redressed at the ICC and the ECCC depends 
on the accused’s conviction, i.e., a causal link requirement. Third, not only direct 
but also indirect victims can claim and receive reparations and, in addition, the 
victim’s harm to be redressed is of the same kind at the ICC and the ECCC. 
Fourth, at the ICC, victims as reparations claimants can be considered parties 
concerning their reparations claims during the reparations phase proceedings, 
i.e., after conviction, although there is no official civil party status at the ICC 
unlike the ECCC.    
2. According to the ICC’s case law, in particular Trial Chamber I’s 
reparations decision in Lubanga, indirect victims, i.e., those who suffer harm as a 
result of the harm inflicted on direct victims, can also be reparations claimants 
and beneficiaries and this includes family members and successors, those who 
tried to prevent the commission of the crime and those harmed when 
helping/intervening on direct victims’ behalf. The ECCC’s case law has also 
considered indirect victims as reparations claimants and beneficiaries. The 
ECCC has referred to the injury-focused approach in criminal proceedings 
instead of the rights-focused approach employed in human rights courts, which 
has an impact on the ECCC’s margin of discretion and the scope of reparations 


claimants and beneficiaries, including an ECCC’s more restricted approach as 
for presumption of harm concerning direct victims’ immediate relatives. In any 
case, civil parties can claim reparations regardless of whether the direct victim is 
alive. Both the ICC and the ECCC have considered material, physical and 
psychological harm for reparations as well as both courts have taken into 
account cultural contexts to give content to the categories of indirect victims. As 
for causation to receive reparations, i.e., the link between the crime for which the 
accused is convicted and the harm inflicted on victims, ICC Trial Chamber I in 
applying rule 85 (a), which is not limited to direct harm, has used the ‘proximate 
cause’ standard. Although this legal standard (existent in Anglo-American 
systems) is acceptable, it should be applied in a restrictive manner to remove too 
remote or speculative harm from reparations. Only victims, both direct and 
indirect as previously defined, i.e., including family members, who suffered harm 
linked to the crimes for which the accused was convicted should claim 
reparations. Thus, the ICC case-based reparations regime will not be de-
naturalized and an exponential increase in reparations claimants and 
beneficiaries will be avoided. In Lubanga, victims who suffered sexual/gender 
violence caused by the crimes for which the accused was convicted should also 
be redressed in that dimension of their harm. At the ECCC, the Supreme Court 
Chamber, under the ECCC Internal Rules, has applied the direct causal link, i.e., 
an injury suffered as a ‘direct consequence’ of the crime, which is similar to the 
French system. However, this includes not only direct but also indirect victims as 
far as there is a direct causal link, which is similar to the French system.           
3. With regard to resources for implementing reparations, even though 
the ICC and the ECCC can issue reparations orders directly against the 
convicted, in implementing them, i.e., inter alia, bearing the respective costs, the 
ICC can in addition to the accused’s financial resources rely on the TFV, but 
without affecting this body’s general assistance mandate. The existence of the 
TFV is fundamental considering that normally the accused/convicted at 
international and hybrid criminal courts are indigents and due to the active role 
that the TFV can assume to implement reparations orders, for example, in 
Lubanga. A similar institution is non-existent at the ECCC but in Nuon Chea et 
al., in application of the amended reparations implementation regime (internal 
rule 23 quinquies), it has been projected an externally subsidized trust fund (not 
like the TFV though) which may benefit civil parties. At the ICC, reparations 
and financial penalties, i.e., fines and forfeitures imposed on the convicted, have 
different nature as reparations seek to redress the harm inflicted on the victims 
and financial penalties seek to punish the perpetrator. However, at the ICC, 
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reparations and financial penalties are interrelated and may be considered as two 
sides of the same coin. In the Anglo-American systems, compensation and 
restitution imposed as penalties against the accused may have a dual punitive-
restorative effect or even purpose. This is also the case of the ‘sanction-
reparation’ penalty in France, which may benefit victims who did not become 
civil parties.             
4. Victims who claim reparations can be considered parties concerning 
their reparations claims during the reparations phase proceedings at the ICC as 
acknowledged by Trial Chamber I and the Appeals Chamber; however, unlike 
the ECCC or the French system, there is no official civil party status at the ICC. 
In general terms, civil parties’ scope of participation and procedural rights as 
reparations claimants at the ECCC, which is similar to the French system, is in 
some procedural instances broader than that of reparations claimants at the ICC. 
Nevertheless, any difference is compensated when reparations claimants also 
hold the status of victim participants at the ICC. Be that as it may, at the ICC, 
since legal representatives may (simultaneously) represent victim participants 
and those who are only reparations claimants, their actions will benefit all those 
who are seeking reparations. Moreover, at the ICC, victims can claim reparations 
by filling in the respective form. Victims who are applying for victim participant 
status and, additionally, want to claim reparations, have to fill in the respective 
form section. In this latter case, victim participants will also hold the status of 
reparations claimants. Victims who could not initially claim reparations can 
benefit from the ICC’s exceptional court-initiated reparations proceedings and, 
once identified/notified, they can claim reparations. Concerning the ECCC, 
when victims apply for civil party status, which has as one of its two objectives to 
claim collective and moral reparations, relevant information such as injury, loss 
or harm suffered, to be later used for reparations requests is provided.  
5. At the ICC, victim participants can normally via their representatives 
bring arguments and evidence on reparations during trial, including questioning 
of witnesses, but adopting a balanced approach with due regard to the accused’s 
right to a fair trial and efficiency. At the ICC reparations phase proceedings, 
reparations claimants can request the postponement of the reparations hearings 
although they cannot initiate them. In turn, at the ECCC, they can request the 
Trial Chamber to adjourn its reparations order on a new hearing after the 
conviction/acquittal judgment. At the ICC reparations phase proceedings, before 
making a reparations order, victims as reparations claimants may intervene via 
representations when invited by the Trial Chamber and, if made, they must be 
considered by the Chamber. At the ICC, victims should also be allowed to 
	

participate in the reparations phase proceedings as victim participants, i.e., to be 
granted relevant procedural rights beyond mere submission of representations 
upon the ICC’s invitation, if they additionally hold this status. This is justified 
by, inter alia, these reasons: i) reparations phase proceedings are part of the 
overall trial process and victim participation is hence applicable; ii) victims’ 
rights to both participate and claim reparations, i.e., not to deprive victims of 
procedural/participatory rights; iii) a RPE reference to participation during the 
reparations hearing; and iv) victims’ special interest to claim and receive 
reparations, which is an important restorative justice manifestation and should 
be supported by an appropriate set of procedural rights. Indeed, in the 
reparations decision in Lubanga, Trial Chamber I arguably implied the 
application of the victim participant status for those holding it during 
reparations phase proceedings. Victim participants’ personal interest is linked to 
the reparations request. Considering victims as parties (as also acknowledged by 
Trial Chamber I) with all relevant procedural rights when victims claim 
reparations during the reparations phase proceedings underlies those arguments. 
In the ICC reparations hearing, victims’ legal representatives have a broader 
scope of action than in other proceedings as their questioning cannot be limited 
to written submissions. The number of victims who intervene in the ICC 
reparations hearing is expected to be higher than those who participate during 
trial proceedings. Victims can also request the ICC the appointment of experts to 
assess reparations and must be invited by it to make observations on the experts’ 
reports. In Lubanga, upon Trial Chamber I’s invitation, victim participants’ legal 
representatives and the OPCV (representing reparations claimants and those 
who may later claim/benefit from reparations), submitted observations on the 
road to the reparations decision in Lubanga (not originally understood by the 
Trial Chamber as a reparations order) about relevant issues of the ICC case-
based reparations regime such as collective/individual reparations, reparations 
modalities, implementation via the TFV, the harm to be assessed and the 
beneficiaries scope. In turn, the Appeals Chamber has considered the reparations 
decision to be a reparations order.  
6. At the ECCC, during the trial in Duch, civil parties filed a joint written 
submission, detailing, inter alia, their requests for collective and moral 
reparations. This was followed by final submissions on reparations, which were 
in turn complemented by civil parties’ participation in hearings normally via 
their lawyers. Under the amended regime, applicable to Nuon Chea et al., civil 
parties’ lead co-lawyers have to make a single reparations claim for the 
consolidated civil parties group. As for reparations projects, the initial 
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specification thereof and further clarifications, as foreseen in the amended 
Internal Rules, have been already applied by the lead co-lawyers in cooperation 
with the VSS and following consultation with civil parties’ lawyers in Nuon Chea 
et al. It is expected that via this process meaningful and feasible reparations can 
be awarded to the civil parties in this case, which includes an important number 
of civil parties who participated in Duch and who got almost all their reparations 
requests rejected (under the previous reparations implementation regime). The 
severance of Nuon Chea et al. in mini-trials is in general positive in order to 
increase a meaningful participation concerning reparations requests and as far as 
the civil parties are informed of the progress of their individual cases. Harm 
suffered by civil parties and their reparations requests will be progressively 
considered in the respective trials/mini-trials in Nuon Chea et al. At the moment 
of writing this thesis, in Case 002/01, within Nuon Chea et al., following the Trial 
Chamber’s request, the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers provided a prioritized list of 
reparations projects that are under development. The civil parties’ lead co-
lawyers and lawyers, the VSS and partner organizations and entities are working 
together to make the prioritized list of projects implementable and raise the 
necessary funds so that those projects are endorsed by the Trial Chamber.    
7. Concerning appeals against a reparations order, both at the ICC and 
the ECCC, victims (via their legal representatives) who are claiming reparations 
(ICC) and civil parties (ECCC) can appeal the respective reparations orders 
according to their respective instruments. This stems from the consideration of 
victims as parties in reparations phase proceedings at the ICC and as civil parties 
at the ECCC. In Lubanga, victims were granted the right to appeal the 
reparations decision, i.e., a reparations order, and exercised it via their legal 
representatives, which includes submission of supporting documents. The ICC 
Appeals Chamber has identified as victims holders of the right to appeal, as 
parties, a reparations order: i) victims who participated as victim participants in 
trial, including those who did not request reparations but made submissions on 
them during trial; ii) identified reparations claimants, without the need of having 
participated as victim participants; iii) and those individuals who were rejected 
in their victim participant applications or those who lost their victim participant 
status. These categories are coherent with the lack of need to be victim 
participants to claim reparations. The silence on the ICC instruments about 
whether victims’ representatives have the right to appeal the Chamber’s refusal 
to issue a reparations order may be interpreted in negative. At the ICC, when a 
reparations decision is not a reparations order, although victims cannot appeal 
it, victim participants can as such still participate in the respective interlocutory 
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appeals proceedings. In any case, at the ICC, victims who hold different status 
can benefit from common legal representation, their lawyers’ actions and 
reparations outcomes. At the ECCC, civil parties cannot introduce additional 
reparations requests via appeals. At the ECCC, in Duch, the civil parties groups 
exercised their right to appeal against the Trial Chamber’s judgment, which had 
refused most of their reparations requests. Additionally, civil parties, via their 
lawyers, made oral statements. However, the appeals outcome was mostly 
negative for civil parties due to the ECCC framework, especially under the 
previous regime applied in Duch.                    
8. Whereas at the ICC collective and individual reparations can be 
claimed and granted, the ECCC regime is restricted to collective and moral 
reparations, i.e., these cannot include individual reparations, compensation or 
restitution of property, which is criticized herein. Individual reparations do not 
necessarily have to be compensation at the ICC. Collective reparations at the 
ICC, which may be and are normally expected to be made through the TFV, for 
example, in Lubanga, can: i) be provided via distribution of a sum via an entity 
representing the victims; ii) be provided via a financial award to community 
institutions/projects authorized by an organization (approved by the TFV) or by 
the TFV itself; and iii) be of a symbolic nature. Collective reparations both at the 
ICC and the ECCC are in principle more suitable based on these reasons: i) the 
collective nature of the crimes under these courts’ jurisdiction; ii) 
implementation difficulties with individual reparations; iii) collective reparations 
may be valued by victims more constructively; and iv) some collective 
reparations can benefit victims who could not claim reparations. Nevertheless, 
individual reparations can also play an important role due to: i) victims’ 
expectations/preferences; ii) collective reparations may miss paying due 
attention to the individual dimension of the crime; and iii) individual awards 
may better individualize the victim’s status as a reparations right holder. 
Therefore, in the context of international crimes and international/hybrid 
criminal courts, the best approach is to focus on collective reparations but 
without excluding individual awards since they are not mutually exclusive. 
Hence, the ECCC’s legal framework by not considering individual reparations at 
all should be criticized. In any case, some collective reparations may also have an 
individual effect. Finally, the reparations standard of proof, i.e., ‘balance of 
probabilities’/‘more likely than not to be true’, and the flexibility for victims 
when it comes to the burden of proof, i.e., evidentiary flexibility to prove their 
reparations claims, although reparations are still primarily claimant-driven 
constitute features common to the ICC and the ECCC.  
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9. Whereas at the ICC collective and individual reparations may assume 
a diverse variety of modalities, i.e., restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, at the ECCC collective and moral 
reparations do not include compensation and restitution of property. In any 
case, both the ICC (in its reparations decision) and the ECCC’s case law have 
relied on the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines and human rights bodies’ 
jurisprudence, especially that of the IACtHR, to, inter alia, give content to these 
modalities and, more generally, to the notion of collective reparations. At the 
ICC, inter alia: i) restitution is not limited to restitution of property; ii) 
compensation includes physical, moral/non-material, material damages, lost 
opportunities, and costs; iii) rehabilitation, includes medical and psychological 
programs; iv) satisfaction includes conviction/sentence as such, apologies, 
memorials and campaigns; and v) guarantees of non-repetition have to be 
adapted to criminal proceedings. In some of these measures, state action is 
necessary for implementation and, thus, the ICC needs to rely on cooperation 
from the States Parties to the ICC Statute and the international community at 
large. Although ICC or ECCC reparations orders cannot be issued against States, 
as for their enforcement, ICC State Parties are obliged to give effect to 
reparations orders unlike the ECCC where only Cambodia is obliged and solely 
as for reparations orders to be borne by the accused. At the ECCC, in Duch only 
two reparations requests were granted, namely, inclusion of civil parties’ names 
and their immediate family members in the trial judgment, and compilation of 
public apology statements and public access to them, available at the ECCC’s 
web-site. These two reparations requests were implemented by the ECCC itself. 
Even though the rest of reparations requests, including broadcast media 
dissemination of judgment portions, memorials, official ceremonies and free 
medical care and educational measures were considered as appropriate collective 
and moral reparations, they were not granted due to the ECCC’s legal 
framework, Duch’s indigence, ECCC’s lack of power to order Cambodia to 
implement them, and/or lack of specificity. Under the amended regime 
applicable in Nuon Chea et al., similar reparations measure projects have been 
presented by the civil parties’ lead co-lawyers and for their implementation:  
liaison between the VSS and non-governmental organizations, in particular an 
externally subsidized trust fund has been proposed, besides some on-going 
dialogue with the Cambodian Government. In Case 002/01, within Nuon Chea et 
al., the prioritized reparations projects correspond to 
remembrance/memorialization, rehabilitation and documentation/education 
and whether the Trial Chamber finally endorses all of them will mainly depend 
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on any involved third party’s consent/cooperation and funding. In any case, 
modalities of reparations at the ECCC normally are satisfaction, rehabilitation, 
and, to some extent, guarantees of non-repetition. Some of the modalities of 
reparations at the ICC and the ECCC, especially compensation (ICC) and the 
respective compensable damages, are similar to those existent at the examined 
national systems.                               
10. At the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the STL, victims lack the 
reparations claimant status. References to some proceedings and modalities of 
reparations under those courts’ instruments are quite limited and do not change 
this conclusion based on the following reasons. First, compensation is ‘delegated’ 
to national systems, i.e., victims may use a condemnatory judgment from these 
tribunals to claim compensation at the domestic level, although there were 
unsuccessful attempts to set an internal compensation system at the ICTY and 
the ICTR. Moreover, as far as it is known, it has been not granted a national 
compensation award based on a judgment of the ICTY, the ICTR or the SCSL. 
At the STL, whether its Statute provision on identification of victims, who using 
this identification may later file compensation claims before national courts, will 
change the previous negative outcome remains to be seen. Victims not identified 
by the STL can also use a condemnatory judgment to claim compensation in 
domestic courts or other institutions. Victim participant status at the STL is not 
a pre-requisite to claim compensation at the national level. Second, some 
rehabilitative measures, such as anti-retroviral treatment at the ICTR, are 
restricted to victims who are witnesses or potential witnesses, i.e., given to 
victims not as reparations claimants. Third, although restitution of property and 
proceeds is foreseen at these courts’ instruments (there is no restitution at the 
STL though), it may be ordered as a penalty but not based on reparations claims 
and, as far as it is known, it has not actually been ordered. Like at these courts, at 
the Anglo-American systems victims lack the status of reparations claimants in 
criminal proceedings. However, victims in the Anglo-American systems can 
benefit from compensation/restitution orders imposed on the accused as 
penalties, which unlike the ICTY and the other courts is commonly ordered. In 
any case, at some mechanisms outside these courts but related to crimes under 
their jurisdictions, e.g., Human Rights Chamber and the hybrid criminal courts 
in the former Yugoslavia region or national actions in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, 
victims have been reparations claimants and beneficiaries. This may be 
considered as an example of complementarity between international and hybrid 
criminal courts, and other transitional justice mechanisms in the area of 
reparations.       
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11. The importance of international and hybrid criminal courts for 
victims’ status as reparations claimants in contexts of international crimes has to 
be highlighted. Thus, both the ICC and the ECCC constitute avenues where 
victims can be reparations claimants in contexts where, otherwise, victims would 
be left with empty hands due to the inexistence of or difficulties with national 
reparations programs and/or regional/international mechanisms. Moreover, an 
institution like the TFV, monitored and supervised by the ICC, may prove to be 
necessary to implement reparations at the level of international and hybrid 
criminal courts. Indeed, the process of inclusive consultation with victims and 
their communities to be undertaken when the TFV applies its reparations order 
implementation plan in Lubanga, following a community-based approach to 
collective reparations, will constitute an important avenue of participation for 
them, besides reparations claimants’ written requests or their participation in 
Chamber-held hearings. Therefore, the Trial Chamber I’s referral of individual 
reparations applications to the TFV in Lubanga is understandable as it is first 
necessary to know the total universe of reparations claimants and beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, the TFV’s general assistance mandate includes the large number of 
victims, in the ICC’s investigations, left outside by the ICC’s case-based 
reparations regime and, thus, reduces potential tensions. At the ECCC, under 
the new reparations implementation regime, the VSS working in liaison with 
non-governmental organizations, for example, an externally subsidized trust 
fund, and governmental organizations seems to be a feasible and necessary way 
to guarantee the sustainable implementation of reparations requests projects as 
proposed in Nuon Chea et al. and also concerning other ongoing and future 
cases. Moreover, the process of consultation with civil parties’ lawyers in Nuon 
Chea et al. exemplifies again that it is not only important what to receive as 
reparations but also how to receive reparations, i.e., via a victims’ participatory 
process. Lastly, but equally important, when designing and implementing 
reparations regimes at the international and hybrid criminal courts, it should be 
borne in mind the more limited scope of these courts in comparison with 
national systems, at which victims can also claim reparations (mainly 
compensation) before civil courts or state funds.   
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Chapter VI. Thesis Conclusions 
 
 
1. In contexts of massive commission of international crimes, international and 
hybrid criminal courts may constitute an important transitional justice 
mechanism, where victims can exercise one or more dimensions of their status. 
Although these courts in principle are driven by a retributive/deterrent or 
utilitarian justice approach and by adversarial system features in a greater or a 
lesser extent, the progressive and increasing introduction of restorative-oriented 
justice approach elements and inquisitorial system features have created better 
conditions to enhance the victims’ status. Thus, whereas at the ICC, the ECCC 
and the STL victims’ status dimensions are more numerous and/or broader in 
scope, at the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, victims’ status is fundamentally 
reduced to that of being witnesses. Victims’ status as victim participants and/or 
civil parties and as reparations claimants clearly corresponds to the influence of 
the inquisitorial criminal system, e.g., France, and is guided by a restorative 
justice approach. Moreover, enhancement of the victims’ status as witnesses has 
in some instances been guided by restorative justice approach considerations 
and/or inquisitorial criminal system influence. In any case, as seen in examined 
national practice (England and United States), some developments on victims’ 
status have also come from the adversarial criminal system. Be that as it may, the 
idea that victims can play an important role in international and hybrid criminal 
courts in principle constitutes an increasing trend in these institutions.      
2. Victims’ status at the international and hybrid criminal courts that 
have been examined in this thesis may mainly consist of up to three dimensions, 
i.e., victims as witnesses, victims as victim participants/civil parties and victims 
as reparations claimants. Whereas the first dimension, i.e., victims as witnesses, 
exists in all the examined international and hybrid criminal courts, the other two 
dimensions of the victims’ status are only present in some courts. Accordingly, 
what may be called the participatory dimension of the victims’ status, i.e., victims 
as victim participants/civil parties, can only be exercised at the ICC and the STL 
concerning victim participants and at the ECCC with regard to civil parties. In 
turn, victims’ status as reparations claimants only exists at the ICC and the 
ECCC (in the latter via civil party action). Although due to inter alia 
methodological reasons each of these dimensions has been primarily examined 
on its own merits, this thesis also paid close attention to the interaction between 
two or the three dimensions of the victims’ status. Thus, the three dimensions of 
the victims’ status as presented in this thesis can be cumulative depending on the 
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respective court’s legal framework and/or practice as analyzed too. The 
underlying idea about this last point is that in principle victims as individuals 
constitute a unity and, thus, if it is provided under the respective court’s legal 
framework/practice, the exercise of the three dimensions of victims’ status as 
presented in this thesis should reflect such unity. Arguably, the three dimensions 
of victims’ status can be held simultaneously and throughout the different stages 
of the proceedings only at the ICC. In other words, at the ICC, the same victim 
can hold and exercise his/her status as witness, victim participant, and 
reparations claimant on simultaneous basis. At the ECCC, although civil parties 
can provide unsworn testimony, they cannot be simultaneously witnesses. In any 
case, at the ECCC, the three dimensions of the victims’ status are available, i.e., 
witnesses, civil parties and reparations claimants. Indeed, the same victim as a 
civil party can claim reparations, i.e., simultaneously hold a dual status under the 
scheme presented in this thesis, and since inter alia his/her unsworn testimony is 
considered evidence and it has not been given less weight than witness testimony 
at the ECCC, in this regard (s)he may in practice be considered as mutatis 
mutandi relatively similar to a ‘witness’. At the STL, victims can hold the dual 
status victim participant-victim witness but since they cannot claim reparations 
at it, they cannot additionally be reparations claimants. At the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL, victim status is limited to the first dimension of victims’ status 
considered in this thesis, i.e., victims as witnesses, although with some limited 
avenues of ‘participation’, namely, amicus curiae and victim impact statements. 
It should be additionally noted that at the examined international and hybrid 
criminal courts, when compared with the Prosecutor and the defence, victims’ 
status is limited even when the latter hold the civil party status. However, the 
exception to this is arguably victims’ status as reparations claimants due to the 
fact that, in this dimension of their status, victims can generally speaking be 
considered as fully fledged parties concerning reparations (phase) proceedings as 
for their reparations claims.    
3. Victims’ status as witnesses is present at all the examined international 
and hybrid criminal courts. Victims as witnesses are called to testify about facts 
known to them, normally by the Prosecutor or, where applicable, by victim 
participants/civil parties. Victims as witnesses do not express their own views 
and concerns (unlike victim participants) and their sworn testimonies are 
evidence (unlike victim participants’ statements). Accordingly, the general legal 
regime for witnesses is also applicable to victims as witnesses. In any case, the 
principle of oral, live and in person testimony has been attenuated by measures 
which can be regarded as victim-friendly such as admission of testimony by 
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deposition and video-link, witness evidence in written form and hearsay 
evidence. Victims can hold the dual official status of victim participant-victim 
witness only at the ICC and the STL. At the ECCC, victims have to choose 
between being civil parties and witnesses, i.e., they cannot be simultaneously civil 
parties and witnesses. In any case, at the ECCC, considering that civil parties can 
still provide (unsworn) testimony, the fact that their testimonies are subject to 
adversarial argument and have not been given less weight than witness 
testimony, that the Judges/parties have referred to civil parties as witnesses, and 
that the Judges have treated civil party testimony as witness testimony, civil 
parties at the ECCC may in practice be considered as holding a sort of dual 
status. Revocation of dual status victim participant-victim witness at the ICC is 
not in principle justified when it is only based on unreliable testimony as the 
latter corresponds to victims’ status as witnesses. To avoid serious issues 
concerning witness credibility similar to those present in the ICC’s first 
completed trials, the ICC and its OTP have been adopting measures.   
4. In order to, inter alia, avoid secondary victimization and for security 
reasons when the victims testify as witnesses (and also applicable to victim 
participants/civil parties), international and hybrid criminal courts have crafted 
protective measures, which have included measures specially tailored to protect 
vulnerable groups of victims and witnesses such as sexual violence and child 
victims. These measures, given motu proprio by Judges or Chambers or upon 
request of parties, victims or witnesses, are granted based on criteria such as 
witness’s legitimate and objective fear that requires a protective measure 
(necessity), that the effect on the public proceedings is justified, and 
proportionality. Protective measures have included a wide array of actions such 
as sealed proceedings, expunging person’s identification from records, 
pseudonyms, not disclosing a person’s identity to third parties, image/voice 
distortion, in camera or closed proceedings, controlled cross-examination, 
witness being accompanied by someone else, and recorded audio/video 
testimony. These measures are in principle exceptional (especially during trial) 
and should be granted with due regard to the accused’s rights and, during trial, 
measures concealing victims’ identities are applicable as for the media/public 
rather than as for the accused. Protective measures constitute an exception to the 
principle of public hearings. There are also special evidentiary principles 
applicable to sexual crimes, i.e., non-corroboration as particularly emphasized 
on sexual crimes, irrelevance of consent in oppressive circumstances, and 
irrelevance of victim’s prior/subsequent sexual conduct. Protection of sexual 
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violence and other vulnerable victims has also taken place mutatis mutandi 
under and been influenced by international human rights law.  
5. Anonymity of victim witnesses has been applied exceptionally during 
pre-trial. As for trial, for those international and hybrid criminal courts whose 
instruments are ambiguous/keep silence on the issue (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ICC), 
the best option is not to grant anonymity based on a systematic reading of their 
instruments, due regard to the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial, 
witness protection programmes and the existence of other less restrictive 
protective measures. As for the STL and the ECCC, even though their 
instruments explicitly (STL) and implicitly (ECCC) allow anonymous witness’s 
testimony exceptionally during trial, such testimony should be avoided due to 
similar previous considerations. In any case, at the ICC, the STL and the ECCC, 
victims as participants or civil parties exceptionally can participate (ICC, ECCC) 
or should be allowed (STL) to participate anonymously during trial, which 
corresponds to the difference in nature between victims’ status as witnesses and 
as victim participants/civil parties. Hence, an absolute, complete and irrebuttable 
prohibition of anonymous victim participants during trial (STL’s emerging 
approach) is criticized herein and a more balanced approach (ICC’s) by allowing 
anonymous victims with limited participation modalities to protect the accused’s 
rights is better. Be that as it may, the application of victim-friendly measures and 
protective/special measures available to witnesses should make the reliance on 
anonymous witnesses during trial unnecessary. Therefore, the predominant 
trend consisting in not allowing anonymous witnesses during trial in the practice 
of the studied international and hybrid criminal courts is reasonable.    
6. Victims’ status as victim participants/civil parties only exists at the 
ICC, the STL (victim participants) and at the ECCC (civil parties). Victim 
participants intervene to present their own views and concerns and civil parties 
participate in criminal proceedings by supporting the prosecution and to seek 
reparations. Victims once admitted as civil parties, unlike victim participants, are 
not subject to prior authorization to participate. This is related to the difference 
in status between victim participants and civil parties. However, the modalities 
of participation/procedural rights in both cases are generally speaking similar 
and, thus, the difference in status between civil parties and victim participants is 
reduced in practice. To be granted the victim participant or civil party status, a 
prima facie evaluation, which is necessary due to the volume of applications, is 
conducted requiring applicant’s identification, crimes under the court’s 
jurisdiction, physical/material/mental personal harm, and causal link between 
the crime and harm. To be allowed to participate, victim participants 
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additionally have to demonstrate that their personal interests are affected and 
also victim participation’s consistency with the accused’s rights. Not only direct 
victims but also indirect victims, i.e., those harmed by the direct victim’s harm 
and who go beyond family members, can qualify as victim participants/civil 
parties. Measures to speed up the victims’ application process have been adopted 
as they are necessary considering the high volume of applicants but those 
measures should remain within the respective court’s legal framework. As seen 
in the practice of the ICC and the ECCC, victims’ status as participants/civil 
parties can later be revoked as it is granted on prima facie basis, which may lead 
to victims’ frustration and disappointment. At the ICC, in some very specific 
instances (during investigation/pre-trial), victims can via 
observations/submissions participate without holding the official/formal victim 
participant status granted upon application.  
7. Whereas victim participants at the ICC can intervene during judicial 
proceedings within the investigation, victims can only participate as victim 
participants at the STL after the indictment confirmation. At the ECCC, victims 
cannot participate as civil parties during preliminary investigations where 
victims can only be complainants. At the ECCC, victims can participate as civil 
parties during judicial investigations. Victim participants’ modalities of 
participation/procedural rights during the pre-trial stage of a case at the ICC and 
the STL are mutatis mutandi similar and include ICC case-record access (ex 
parte materials excluded), STL case-file access (confidential/under seal and ex 
parte materials excluded), access to ‘disclosure’ materials under conditions 
(STL), attendance at hearings (except ex parte (ICC) or excluded by the Pre-Trial 
Judge (STL)), and participation in hearings and filing of written motions not 
excluded by the instruments (ICC) or the Pre-Trial Judge (STL). As for the ICC, 
directly related to/during charges confirmation, victim participants can file 
submissions on parties’ evidence admissibility/probative value and examine such 
evidence, and can examine parties’ witnesses. In the ICC’s practice, victim 
participants cannot file evidence additional to that filed by the parties. During 
pre-trial proceedings, civil parties have similar procedural rights than victim 
participants but they are broader due to civil parties’ status as parties. Thus, civil 
parties, unlike victim participants, can request the conduct of investigations 
linked to the Co-Prosecutors’ ones. Additionally, civil parties can inter alia 
access the dossier, confront and question the accused, request and propose 
witnesses, attend and participate via oral and written submissions in the 
proceedings (unless participation is not allowed, e.g., provisional detention 
hearing), and support the prosecution.  
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8. During trial, whereas the ICC’s practice has broadened the victim’s 
participatory regime, the ECCC’s instruments/practice have sometimes limited 
the civil party’s participation. This leads to an outcome where the status of 
victim participants (at the ICC) and civil parties present similar features, e.g., 
whereas civil parties can support the prosecution explicitly under the ECCC 
rules, the ICC’s case law allowing victim participants to tender/challenge 
evidence on the accused’s guilt or innocence may be considered as an indirect 
support to the Prosecutor. In any case, victim participants and civil parties are 
not additional, auxiliary or parallel prosecutors. The STL RPE generally speaking 
follow the ICC’s practice/legal framework, explicitly including some modalities 
of participation/procedural rights not explicitly included in the ICC RPE but 
developed in the ICC’s case law; however, the STL RPE are relatively 
conservative in some aspects. Be that as it may, civil parties’ rights are still 
broader than those of their victim participants counter-parts. At the ICC and the 
STL, victim participants, inter alia, have notification right, can access 
documents, materials, and filings (ex parte excluded), can attend/participate in 
public and closed hearings (as for ex parte hearings, it has been allowed by some 
ICC Trial Chambers), can participate orally (opening and closing statements 
included) and in writing, can introduce/challenge evidence (calling witnesses 
included), can question witnesses/the accused, can testify under oath, can benefit 
from disclosure (ICC’s practice) and may have certain disclosure obligations. At 
the ECCC, civil parties, inter alia, have legal representation right, have audience 
right, can provide unsworn testimony and statements of suffering, can support 
the prosecution but without being transformed in an additional Prosecutor, can 
propose witnesses to be called by the Chamber, can respond preliminary 
objections, can file written submissions, can examine the case file, can make 
closing statements, and can tender written evidence.    
9. With regard to sentencing, there is the curious situation in which 
whereas victim participants at the ICC and the STL can intervene via, for 
example, oral and written submissions, the ECCC’s practice has precluded civil 
parties from doing so although they can provide statements of suffering during 
trial. Thus, victim participants’ status is arguably stronger than that of the civil 
parties. In any case, victim participants cannot comment on specific 
imprisonment terms but can make submissions on, inter alia, the impact of the 
crimes on them. As for appeals, whereas both victim participants and civil 
parties cannot appeal the Trial Chamber’s verdict/sentence (civil parties can 
appeal against the trial judgment when the Co-Prosecutors have done so), they 
can participate in the related appeals proceedings and also appeal a reparations 
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order. However, whereas civil parties can also appeal certain interlocutory 
decisions (including decisions on protective measures and civil party 
application) and participate in the respective proceedings, victim participants 
cannot appeal interlocutory decisions (ICC) or their right to appeal is limited to 
specific interlocutory decisions fundamentally affecting victim participants’ 
personal interests and not as an automatic right (STL). In any case, victim 
participants can participate once the respective appeals have been triggered by a 
party. Victim participants’ right to participate in appeals proceedings is not 
automatic.     
10. In examining the participatory dimension of the victims’ status 
(victim participants/civil parties), certain considerations of efficient proceedings 
(also involving more victims within a more conservative participatory regime), 
respect for the accused’s rights, guaranteeing his/her right to a fair and impartial 
trial/proceedings, as well as the fact that not necessarily more procedural rights 
are more beneficial for the victims would support criticism against the victims’ 
broad participatory regime in the ICC’s practice. The ECCC’s amended 
instruments/practice and the STL’s instruments/emerging practice have taken 
note of these factors. However, in balance, the ICC’s practice on an enhanced 
victim participatory regime and also mutatis mutandi applicable at the ECCC 
and the STL can be justified considering elements such as victims’ right to and 
contribution to the truth in the fight against impunity (the main mandate of 
these courts) and the need to incorporate elements of restorative-oriented justice 
in what are predominantly retributive justice bodies. In any case, it should be 
avoided extremes, i.e., instruments/practices that preclude victims from 
participation in an entire procedural stage altogether or those which by 
enhancing victims’ status severely/really affect other interests such as accused’s 
rights or efficiency of proceedings. Division of trials in mini-trials may be sound, 
for example, at the ECCC, to make civil parties’ participation more meaningful, 
and undertaken after having heard them. Victim participants/civil parties’ 
procedural rights have as a rule and in practice been exercised via common legal 
representatives at the ICC, the ECCC and the STL. Although this is necessary to 
handle the large volume of victims (especially at the ICC and the ECCC), 
victims’ interests must be considered when the respective court selects/appoints 
their common legal representatives and, in general, victims’ opinions should 
always be sought by their lawyers and considered when represented. Otherwise, 
the participatory dimension of the victims’ status may become purely symbolic, 
which may be even worsened when there are extra appointed legal 
representation filters/intermediaries. In practice, the difference between 
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anonymous/non-anonymous victim participants is diluted as they are 
represented by the same common lawyers. Finally, as for the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL, since there is no victim participant/civil party status, victims can 
only ‘participate’ during certain procedural instances, mainly, via amicus curiae 
and victim impact statements.    
11. Victims’ status as reparations claimants only exist at the ICC and the 
ECCC, among all the examined international and hybrid criminal courts. While 
at the ICC victims can be reparations claimants without being victim 
participants, at the ECCC victims have to be civil parties to claim and obtain 
reparations. Indeed, seeking collective and moral reparations is one of the two 
purposes of the civil party’s participation at the ECCC. Similarities at the ICC 
and the ECCC include, inter alia, that: reparations orders are issued against the 
convicted; some collective reparations may potentially benefit those victims who 
could not claim them; harm to be redressed is of the same kind; granting 
reparations depends on the accused’s conviction; and direct and indirect victims 
(including family members and successors) can claim and receive reparations for 
the harm caused to them by accused’s crimes upon which (s)he is found guilty 
although at the ICC (unlike the ECCC) the causal link is not limited to direct 
harm and, thus, a ‘proximate cause’ causality standard may be used but 
restrictively applied to avoid an excessive influx of reparations claimants 
affecting the ICC’s efficiency and the de-naturalization of the case-based 
reparations regime. Concerning resources for implementing reparations, the 
ICC can rely on the TFV in addition to the convicted’s resources, which is of 
pivotal importance as normally the accused/convicted at these courts are 
indigent. The TFV is also fundamental to prepare reparations plans and to 
implement reparations orders, in particular collective reparations awards. 
Although the ECCC lacks a body like the TFV, under its amended reparations 
implementation regime, potentially such implementation with external funding 
may be conducted by the VSS in liaison with non-governmental organizations, 
e.g., an externally subsidized trust fund, and governmental organizations.              
12. During reparations phase proceedings, i.e., after conviction, victims 
as reparations claimants at the ICC can be considered parties (as acknowledged 
by Trial Chamber I and the Appeals Chamber) although there is no formal civil 
party status unlike at the ECCC. Victim participants at the ICC can become 
reparations claimants by claiming reparations. ECCC civil parties’ procedural 
rights concerning reparations claims may be in general considered broader than 
those available to victims as reparations claimants at the ICC; however, such 
difference is compensated when the reparations claimants also hold the victim 
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participant status at the ICC. At trial, victim participants can intervene 
concerning evidence/arguments as for reparations. During the reparations phase 
proceedings (including reparations hearings) reparations claimants at the ICC 
can not only intervene via representations upon the Chamber’s invitation but 
they should also be allowed to participate as victim participants, i.e., be equipped 
with relevant procedural rights, (if they additionally hold this status) due to, inter 
alia, victims’ particular interests in this phase and the underlying rights to 
participate and claim reparations (restorative justice) during this phase which is 
part of the overall trial. This is based on regarding victims as parties with all 
relevant procedural rights when they claim reparations during the reparations 
phase proceedings at the ICC. Regardless of having participated as victim 
participants, victims as parties can appeal reparations orders (via their legal 
representatives) as took place in Lubanga, and exercise other specific procedural 
rights at the ICC like civil parties do at ECCC. When a reparations decision is 
not a reparations order, reparations claimants can be victim participants in the 
respective interlocutory appeals if they hold that status at the ICC. In any case, as 
victims with different status have common legal representatives at the ICC, these 
lawyers’ actions in practice benefit victims claiming or who can claim 
reparations. At the ECCC, in Duch, civil parties filed a joint written submission 
on reparations complemented by final submissions and participation in 
hearings. They also appealed, alongside their civil party status revocation, the 
denial of their reparations requests; however, the appeals outcome was negative 
due to the ECCC’s previous reparations implementation regime. In Nuon Chea 
et al., under the ECCC’s amended reparations implementation regime, civil 
parties’ co-lead lawyers (in cooperation with the VSS) submitted initial 
reparations projects, following consultations with the civil parties’ lawyers, so 
that these may be determined as feasible by and later granted by the competent 
Chamber. This dialogue/consultation with civil parties at the ECCC exemplifies 
that it is not only important what to receive but also how.          
13. Both individual and collective reparations can be granted at the ICC 
unlike the ECCC where only collective and moral reparations can be provided, 
which is criticized herein. Collective reparations should be preferred at 
international and hybrid criminal courts due to, inter alia, the collective nature 
of the crimes, a broader scope of potential beneficiaries, and courts’ limited 
resources. However, individual reparations should not be excluded and indeed 
they are not mutually exclusive with collective reparations. As for the standard of 
proof to grant reparations, the ‘balance of probabilities/more likely than not to 
be true’ standard is applicable at the ICC and the ECCC. Whereas reparations at 
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the ICC can take the modalities of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction, and (adapted) guarantees of non-repetition, compensation and 
restitution of property are excluded from the ECCC, which is criticized herein. 
In any case, reparations implementation requires, especially in some reparations 
modalities, state cooperation. The ICC stands in principle better chances to 
implement reparations than the ECCC due to the existence of the TFV, which 
under the ICC’s monitoring/supervision is directly involved in implementing 
reparations orders, and at which reparations claimants can participate actively 
via, inter alia, consultation when the TFV applies its reparations order 
implementation plan, written requests and Chamber-held hearings. This is 
complemented with the ICC’s scope, i.e., a numerous collective of States Parties 
(not only one State, i.e., Cambodia as for the ECCC) obliged to cooperate with 
the ICC and enforce reparations orders although ICC or ECCC reparations 
orders cannot be issued against States. At the ECCC, implementation problems 
in Duch got almost all the reparations requests rejected although they were 
found to fall under collective and moral reparations. Nevertheless, this situation 
is expected to improve in Nuon Chea et al., in application of the amended regime 
leading to projects implemented by the VSS in liaison with non-governmental 
organizations, e.g., an externally subsidized trust fund, and governmental 
organizations. In Case 002/01, within Nuon Chea et al., the prioritized 
reparations projects are constituted by remembrance/memorialization, 
rehabilitation and documentation/education, and whether the Trial Chamber 
will finally endorse all of them will mainly depend on any involved third party’s 
consent/cooperation and funding. Finally, at the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and 
the STL, victims are not reparations claimants, compensation is ‘delegated’ to 
national systems, limited rehabilitative measures are given to victims as 
witnesses and restitution of property may be imposed but as a penalty. Even 
though the victim participant status at the STL is not required to claim 
compensation at the national level, it may be useful for identification purposes. 
Some external mechanisms have allowed victims to be reparations claimants in 
the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.          
14. As demonstrated in this thesis, victims’ status as witnesses, victim 
participants/civil parties and reparations claimants capture to a very large extent 
the complex paths that victims of the most serious international crimes have to 
face when searching for justice and redress in international and hybrid criminal 
courts. Inter alia, protective/special measures when victims are intervening as 
witnesses (also applicable to victim participants/civil parties), modalities of 
participation/procedural rights regarding victims as victim participants/civil 
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parties and reparations modalities concerning victims as reparations claimants 
are specific manifestations at international and hybrid criminal courts of victims’ 
rights to protection, participation and reparations. However, although such 
general rights are recognized in diverse sources of international law as well as in 
examined national practice, their implementation at international and hybrid 
criminal courts is particularly challenging. Two important factors that are in the 
background to the victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal courts are 
the large number of victims and limited resources of these courts. In particular, 
concerning the dimensions of victims’ status as victim participants/civil parties 
and as reparations claimants, these factors can be limitative and, thus, for 
example, common legal representatives have by necessity and to a very large 
extent become victims’ mouths at international and hybrid criminal courts.              
15. In addition to bearing those factors in mind, it is clear that in order 
to increase the chances of a successful and fulfilling development of the victims’ 
status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and reparations claimants, 
other existent interests which are equally legitimate at the international and 
hybrid criminal courts must be taken into account. In other words, victims’ 
status is a legal concept which does not work in isolation but in direct interaction 
with other interests, concerns and needs at international and hybrid criminal 
courts. Therefore, the accused’s rights, in particular the right to fair and 
impartial trial/proceedings guarantees, can be more or less affected or at least put 
in jeopardy by an enhancement of the dimensions of victims’ status. Thus, for 
example, closed sessions and especially anonymity of witnesses concerning 
victims as witnesses or certain modalities of participation which put victim 
participants/civil parties closer to a situation of a sort of additional or auxiliary 
prosecutor reveal the almost intrinsic tense relationship between victims and the 
accused. Efficiency of proceedings may also be affected when being too generous 
with victims’ status and especially considering their high numbers. Moreover, 
victims’ expectations may be crushed when implementation problems, in 
particular concerning reparations, prevent promises from becoming a reality. 
Furthermore, although international and hybrid criminal courts are by 
definition where international criminal law is applied, international criminal law 
as directly or indirectly interpreted and/or applied by other transitional justice 
mechanisms such as TRCs, reparations programs, domestic criminal and civil 
courts normally grant/may grant a more central role, stronger status to victims.  
16. Having said so, it is concluded that international and hybrid criminal 
courts in balance constitute feasible and important judicial platforms for victims’ 
status as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and reparations claimants to 
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be fulfilled and enhanced. Since the most serious international crimes committed 
against a large number of victims fall under the jurisdiction of these courts, the 
incorporation of the victims’ status not only as witnesses but also in their other 
two dimensions results logical and even necessary. Under no circumstances does 
this affirmation deny that to make such victims’ status incorporation workable 
and meaningful for victims at these courts, reasonable and painstaking 
assessment of how to pull together victims’ interests, rights and expectations 
with the other interests, needs at stake at and also limitations of these courts 
should be conducted and checked on constant basis. International and hybrid 
criminal courts have arguably and continuously examined the options to make 
the three dimensions of the victims’ status, as considered in this thesis, workable 
leading to sometimes positive and other times negative outcomes. By doing so, 
each court has observed not only its own mistakes/limitations but also practices 
from its peer courts. 
17. The general trend regarding victims’ status at international and 
hybrid criminal courts is that victims no longer are limited to a status of being 
mere witnesses (ICTY, ICTR and SCSL) but, with the establishment of the ICC 
as followed by the ECCC and the STL, at least one of the other two dimensions 
of the victims’ status has been considered as exercisable before them. This is 
arguably a trend that should guide the constitution of future international and 
hybrid criminal courts and always adopting the necessary guarantees, safeguards 
and mechanisms to make victims’ status workable. In this manner, it is possible 
to satisfy and meet victims’ expectations and rights. Such trend thus corresponds 
to the thirst for justice that victims in many instances cannot quench at the 
national level, either in national criminal courts or other transitional justice 
mechanisms. Careful consideration of the three dimensions of victims’ status as 
presented in this thesis and also of how these dimensions interact is fundamental 
to design proceedings and mechanisms, and adopt coherent practices (both 
normative and jurisprudential) at international and hybrid criminal courts so 
that victims’ status is enhanced in such a manner that not only victims 
themselves are benefited but also without disturbing other legitimate interests 
and within these courts’ limited legal and material frameworks. This at the end 
of the day will have a positive repercussion on victims themselves.        
18. Should the three dimensions of victims’ status be present, it gives the 
respective international and hybrid criminal court more options in order to in 
some instances ‘compensate’ some limitations set by it to one victims’ status 
dimension with some additions to other victims’ status dimension, e.g., 
prohibiting anonymous witness’s testimony during trial but allowing 
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anonymous victim participants’ statements or limiting some procedural rights 
during trial but expanding them during the reparations phase proceedings. 
Therefore, creative solutions may help to relocate some options for victims from 
one status to another when necessary for the sake of victims themselves and also 
considering other competing/parallel interests and courts’ limitations. After all, 
these three dimensions constitute part and parcel of the victim understood as an 
integral unity, as a human being and a subject of international law. Victims’ 
status dimensions as witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and reparations 
claimants used creatively and correctly can provide an important quota of 
restorative justice to victims at international and hybrid criminal courts.       
19. Provided that mechanisms, guarantees and balanced approaches, 
carefully considering other legitimate interests and implementation/resources 
limitations, are adopted to make victims’ status workable at international and 
hybrid criminal courts, an additional and powerful reason to equip the victims’ 
status with the three dimensions examined in this study, now only present at the 
ICC and the ECCC, at each future international and hybrid criminal court is that 
those dimensions correspond to the victims’ rights to protection, participation 
and reparations under international human rights law. Thus, it is easier to 
sustain a more coherent and close dialogue between international criminal 
(procedural) law and international human rights law, which alongside 
international humanitarian law, regard victims as rights holders. This does not 
deny that while in international human rights law victims assume a central role, 
in international criminal (procedural) law victims’ role still remains (relatively) 
secondary due to inter alia: i) the main goal pursued by international human 
rights law vis-à-vis international criminal law, i.e., state responsibility 
determination and reparations for victims vis-à-vis individual criminal 
responsibility determination and repression/deterrence concerning international 
crimes; ii) regional human rights courts/monitoring human rights bodies and 
international and hybrid criminal courts have different mandates/competences; 
iii) while victims are parties at human rights courts and bodies, at international 
and hybrid criminal courts that is the case only concerning civil parties and, in 
general, victims as reparations claimants concerning reparations (phase) 
proceedings as for their reparations claims; and iv) philosophical differences, i.e., 
while the retributive/utilitarian or deterrent justice paradigm in international 
and hybrid criminal courts is still predominant, the restorative justice paradigm 
is arguably prevalent at regional human rights courts. Additionally, it must be 
taken into account that even though, for example, certain participatory rights in 
criminal proceedings have been recognized for victims under human rights 
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courts/bodies’ case law to be applicable in national criminal proceedings, those 
institutions by definition are not criminal courts.      
20. The presence of the three dimensions of the victims’ status at 
international and hybrid criminal courts as examined in this thesis, in particular 
victims’ status as victim participants/civil parties and as reparations claimants, 
brings to these judicial bodies important avenues to enhance the victims’ status 
seen as a whole. Moreover, the existence of those three dimensions, and not only 
victims’ status as witnesses, reflects inquisitorial system elements under which 
victims’ status is stronger and which are in general more propitious frameworks 
for victims’ status, e.g., France, as compared to victims’ status in adversarial 
systems, e.g., England and the United States. Furthermore, provided that (as 
examined) mechanisms and balanced approaches are adopted and that other 
legitimate interests and implementation/resources limitations are carefully taken 
into account, the importance of the presence of the three dimensions of the 
victims’ status at international and hybrid criminal courts also consists in that 
those judicial bodies constitute parallel and/or additional transitional justice 
mechanisms for victims and which have unique (international) justice features 
not present in human rights courts/bodies and other mechanisms. This does not 
deny that international and hybrid criminal courts fall short of being a panacea 
for problems of victims of the most serious international crimes and, indeed, 
these courts should ideally work on a coordinated basis with other transitional 
justice mechanisms.    
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Sammandrag på svenska av avhandlingen 
   
Bestraffning av internationella brott vid internationella och hybrida 
straffrättsliga domstolar har traditionellt och huvudsakligen grundat sig på 
principen om retributiv (vedergällande) rättvisa och ackusatorisk process 
snarare än återuppbyggande rättvisa och en inkvisitorisk modell. Därav har 
brottsoffrens ställning vid dessa straffrättsliga domstolar begränsat sig till den 
som innehas av vittnen vid Tribunalen som behandlar brott som begåtts i det 
forna Jugoslavien (ICTY), Internationella krigsförbrytartribunalen för Rwanda 
(ICTR) och Specialdomstolen för Sierra Leone (SCSL). Internationella 
brottmålsdomstolen (ICC), å sin sida, har medfört en viktig förändring gällande 
brottsoffrens ställning i internationella straffrättsliga fora, vilket innebär att de 
från att ha betraktats  endast i egenskap av vittnen nu även har en rätt att delta 
och lämna sina synpunkter (i egenskap av brottsofferdeltagare) samt kräva 
gottgörelse. Denna trend har fortsatt inom området för internationell straffrätt, 
vilket manifesterats vid hybridtribunaler som tillsatts efter ICC såsom 
Kambodjadomstolen (ECCC) vid vilken brottsoffer kan agera civilrättsliga parter 
och Specialdomstolen för Libanon (STL) där brottsoffer kan inneha en 
deltagande roll.          
Den föreliggande studien behandlar två huvudsakliga frågeställningar, av 
vilka den första lyder: Vilken ställning tillskrivs brottsoffren vid internationella 
domstolar och hybridtribunaler? I detta hänseende argumenterar författaren, 
sammanfattningsvis, för att brottsoffrens ställning vid internationella 
straffrättsliga domstolar och hybridtribunaler huvudsakligen tar sig uttryck på 
tre sätt, d.v.s. som brottsoffer i egenskap av vittnen, som brottsoffer i egenskap av 
deltagande brottsoffer/civilrättsliga parter samt som brottsoffer som kräver 
gottgörelse. I egenskap av vittnen ger brottsoffer vittnesmål gällande 
omständigheter/fakta de bevittnat. Brottsoffer kan agera som vittnen vid 
samtliga internationella och hybrida straffrättsliga domstolar. Faktum är att 
denna ställning är den enda som tillskrivs brottsoffren vid ICTY, ICTR och 
SCSL. Brottsoffer i egenskap av deltagare/ civilrättsliga parter deltar i förfarandet 
för att göra sig hörda beträffande egna intressen och åsikter 
(brottsofferdeltagare) eller för att stöda åklagarsidan samt kräva gottgörelse 
(civilrättsliga parter). Brottsoffrens ställning såsom 
brottsofferdeltagare/civilrättsliga parter gör sig enbart gällande vid ICC och STL 
(brottsofferdeltagare) liksom vid ECCC (civilrättsliga parter). Vid ICTY, ICTR 
och SCSL gör sig möjligheten till ”deltagande” gällande endast i några 
begränsade fall. Brottsoffer som kräver gottgörelse kan kräva och erhålla 
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gottgörelse för skada som förorsakats av brott. Det är enbart ICC och ECCC som 
tillskriver brottsoffer denna ställning. Noteras bör att, beroende på domstol, kan 
dessa tre sätt på vilka brottsoffrens ställning tar sig uttryck vara kumulativa.   
Den andra frågeställningen för denna studie lyder: På vilket sätt fungerar 
brottsoffrens ställning som vittnen, brottsofferdeltagande/civilrättsliga parter och 
gottgörelsekrävande vid internationella och hybrida straffrättsliga domstolar? I 
detta hänseende hävdar författaren, sammanfattningsvis, följande 
huvudpunkter. Vad beträffar brottsoffer i egenskap av vittnen är dessa 
underställda en strikt regimen i enlighet med vilken de inte kan uttrycka som 
sådana egna åsikter och intressen eftersom de tillkallats som beviskälla. Av 
säkerhetsskäl och för att förhindra ytterligare viktimisering erbjuds dessa 
brottsoffer dock särskilda skydds- och specialåtgärder (särskilt då det är frågan 
om sårbara vittnen), vilka i undantagsfall kan inkludera anonymitet (vanligtvis 
före huvudförhandlingen i domstol). Beträffande brottsoffer i egenskap av 
brottsofferdeltagare/civilrättsliga parter  måste dessa för att erhålla formell 
ställning som brottsofferdeltagare (ICC, STL) eller som civilrättsliga parter 
(ECCC) först ansöka om och beviljas sådan. Såtillvida det senare är fallet, och i 
enlighet med respektive domstols instrument och rättspraxis, kan brottsoffer 
delta i egenskap av brottsofferdeltagare (ICC, STL) eller som parter (ECCC) 
utgående från ett antal olika former av deltagande/processuella rättigheter för att 
föra fram sina egna intressen. Deltagande i form av 
brottsofferdeltagande/civilrättsliga parter är möjlig i enlighet med respektive 
domstols instrument under förundersökningsskedet, huvudförhandlingen, 
straffmätningsskedet och/eller överklagan.   
Vid Internationella brottmålsdomstolen kan vittnen delta i specificka 
procedurer under utredningar före behandlingen av fallet, även om de inte har 
’officiell’ status som brottsofferdeltagare (sådan status beviljas på basis av 
ansökan). Offer som kräver gottgörelse bör vidta processuella åtgärder för att få 
gottgörelse för den skada de har utsatts för och som har en koppling till brott 
som lagförs vid ICC och Kambodjadomstolen, inklusive specifika 
gottgörelseprocesser vid dessa domstolar. Offer kan kräva och erhålla 
individuell/kollektiv gottgörelse (ICC) eller kollektiv och moralisk gottgörelse 
(ECCC). Gällande implementeringen av dessa kan mekanismer såsom 
brottsofferfonden som har inrättats i anslutning till ICC användas.   
Under den andra forskningsfrågan argumenterar författaren för att 
granskningen av de sätt på vilka offrens ställning vid internationella och hybrida  
straffrättsliga domstolar fungerar inte endast bör rikta uppmärksamheten mot 
offrets intressen utan också mot andra parallella och/eller tävlande intressen 


såsom den åtalades rättigheter, effektiva processer, sökande efter sanningen i en 
rättslig process, och/eller utmaningar gällande implementeringen. Allt detta 
existerar inom ramen för en verklighet med stort antal offer och domstolar med 
begränsade resurser.   
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Punishment of international crimes at international and hybrid criminal 
courts has been traditionally and primarily guided by retributive justice 
and adversarial proceedings rather than by restorative justice and an 
inquisitorial model. Thus, victims’ status has been fundamentally lim-
ited to be witnesses at the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). However, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has meant a pivotal change in how 
victims are considered at international and hybrid criminal courts, i.e., 
from a paternalistic view regarding them only as witnesses to a judicial 
scenario at which they can also voice their views and concerns (victim 
participants) as well as claim reparations. This trend has continued at 
the international criminal justice level as evidenced in hybrid criminal 
courts created after the ICC such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) at which victims can be civil parties and 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) at which victims can be victim 
participants, in addition to the existence of victims’ status as witnesses 
in both courts. 
The present study seeks to address two main research questions. 
The first one is: What is the victims’ status at international and hybrid 
criminal courts? and the second one is: How does victims’ status as 
witnesses, victim participants/civil parties and reparations claimants 
work at international and hybrid criminal courts? Besides the legal 
framework and case law/practice of the courts considered, other ar-
eas of law such as comparative criminal procedural law and interna-
tional human rights law have been examined in this study. Moreover, 
victims’ status considered in a triple dimension as witnesses, victim 
participants/civil parties and reparations claimants has been ana-
lyzed paying attention to not only the victims’ status as such but also 
other interests existing at the courts. Therefore, this study seeks to 
present a comprehensive and integrated critical view of the victims’ 
status across six international and hybrid criminal courts.   
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